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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

Withdrawer

JET 4/13/2005

File Folder MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1985 (5/10)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 13

YARHI-MILO

1303

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7997	CABLE	111357Z NOV 85 R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	6	11/11/1985	B1
7998	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7985 R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3	1	11/13/1985	B1
7999	MEMO	KEYWORTH TO MCFARLANE RE ADMINISTRATION POLICY FOR S&T COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIETS R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	2	11/14/1985	B1
8000	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7986 R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	1	ND	B1
8001	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE PROPOSED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE FOR GENEVA R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3	1	11/6/1985	B1
8002	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO KEYWORTH RE PROPOSED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE FOR GENEVA R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	1	ND	B1
8003	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE KEYWORTH'S PROPOSAL FOR A PRESIDENTIAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR GENEVA R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	2	11/1/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MATLOCK, JACK: FILES

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File Folder MATLOCK CHRON NOVEMBER 1985 (5/10)

FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 13

YARHI-MILO

1303

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7984	MEMO	KEYWORTH TO POINDEXTER RE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER MEETING WITH GORBACHEV: CONSIDERATION OF A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OPTION R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	3	10/18/1985	B1
8004	MEMO	KURSCH TO MARK P RE ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND THE NOVEMBER MEETING R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	1	ND	B1
7985	MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE PROPOSED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVES FOR GENEVA R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3	1	11/13/1985	B1
7986	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO KEYWORTH RE PROPOSED SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVES FOR GENEVA R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	1	ND	B1
8005	MEMO	PLATT TO MCFARLANE RE KEYWORTH'S PROPOSAL FOR A PRESIDENTIAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR GENEVA R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	2	11/1/1985	B1
7987	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS DOC #7984 R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3	3	10/18/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FOIA

F06-114/3

Box Number 13

YARHI-MILO

1303

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7988	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S EXCHANGE INITIATIVES <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	11/14/1985	B1
7989	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO PRESIDENT RE SOVIET RESPONSE TO YOUR EXCHANGE INITIATIVES <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
8006	MEMO	SHULTZ TO PRESIDENT REAGAN RE SOVIET RESPONSE TO YOUR EXCHANGES INITIATIVE <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	2	11/13/1985	B1
8007	MEMO	SOVIET RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT'S EXCHANGE INITIATIVES <i>R 10/30/2007 NLRRF06-114/3</i>	6	ND	B1
7990	MEMO	MATLOCK TO MCFARLANE RE GENEVA MEETING: PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	11/14/1985	B1
7991	TALKING POINTS	FIRST PRIVATE SESSION NOVEMBER 19, 1985, A.M., MAISON FLEUR D'EAU <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1
7992	TALKING POINTS	SECOND PLENARY NOVEMBER 19, 1985, P.M., MAISON FLEUR D'EAU <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1

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YARHI-MILO

1303

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
7993	TALKING POINTS	SECOND PRIVATE SESSION, NOVEMBER 20, 1985, A.M., SOVIET MISSION <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
7994	TALKING POINTS	THIRD PLENARY NOVEMBER 20, 1985, A.M., SOVIET MISSION <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1
7995	TALKING POINTS	THIRD PLENARY NOVEMBER 20, 1985, A.M., SOVIET MISSION SUPPLEMENTARY TALKING POINTS <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	2	ND	B1
7996	TALKING POINTS	FOURTH PLENARY NOVEMBER 20, 1985, P.M., SOVIET MISSION <i>R 3/8/2011 F2006-114/3</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~Matlock~~

9146

File

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SECRET

Jack
I had already
sent it forward.
Many thanks
Jed

ACTION

November 13, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Art Hartman's Comments on Geneva

In case it has not already come to your attention, I want to be sure you see Art Hartman's cable on Gorbachev and his likely approach to the Geneva meeting. It is an excellent assessment of the man and his style. I think it is well worth sharing with the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I forwarding Art Hartman's assessment of Gorbachev.

Approve *M*

Disapprove _____

attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Cable from Art Hartman

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *WS* NARA, Date *7/2/02*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Art Hartman's Comments on Geneva

Issue

To review the attached cable from Art Hartman.

Facts

Art Hartman has sent in a personal assessment of Gorbachev and his likely approach to your Geneva meeting.

Discussion

Art has had extensive direct contact with Gorbachev. His assessment of the man and his style is excellent and well worth reviewing.

RecommendationOKNo

That you review the cable from Art Hartman at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A Cable from Art Hartman

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CIS NARA, Date 7/2/02



Department of State

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ACTION NODS-00

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7014

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 16035

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOUO-116/3 #7997

BY CIV NARA DATE 10/30/07

SPECIAL ENCRYPTION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: GORBACHEV AND THE GENEVA MEETING

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

--
2. SINCE YOU AND I HAVE SEEN MORE OF GORBACHEV THAN ANYONE ELSE ON OUR SIDE, I WANTED TO GIVE YOU MY THOUGHTS ON HIS PERSONALITY, HIS LIKELY BEHAVIOR WITH THE PRESIDENT IN GENEVA, AND THE TACTICS THE PRESIDENT MIGHT FOLLOW IN DEALING WITH THIS MAN.

--
GORBACHEV'S PERSONALITY

3. TO USE A FAMILIAR IDIOM, THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY COULD BE PLAYED CONVINCINGLY BY GEORGE C. SCOTT BUT NOT BY JIMMY STEWART. HE IS INTENSE, SELF-ASSURED AND ASSERTIVE. IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE WHY:

-- HIS RISE IN THIS TOUGH, DEMANDING BUREAUCRACY HAS BEEN METEORIC, AND HE DIDN'T MAKE IT TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT AT THE TENDER (FOR THIS PLACE)

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~
Department of State

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AGE OF 47 BY BEING A MARSHMALLOW.

-- IN ADDITION TO HIS INNATE QUALITIES, HE KNOWS HE PERSONIFIES THE SOVIET UNION, AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S IMAGE SUFFERED BADLY UNDER HIS DECREPIT PREDECESSORS.

-- WITH ONLY NINE MONTHS AS GENERAL SECRETARY, HE STILL FEELS UNDER PRESSURE TO PROVE HE IS UP TO THE AWESOME RESPONSIBILITIES HE HAS INHERITED.

-- IN PARTICULAR, HE WANTS HIS BEHAVIOR TO REFLECT HIS CONCEPT OF WHAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE: DYNAMIC, PROUD, CLEAR-EYED ABOUT TODAY'S PROBLEMS AND COMPETENT TO OVERCOME TOMORROW'S CHALLENGES.

--
4. I THINK WE HAVE SEEN ENOUGH OF HIM TO CONCLUDE THAT HE HAS A RIGID CAST OF MIND AND CAN APPROACH ARROGANCE IN REJECTING IDEAS THAT CLASH WITH HIS PRECONCEPTIONS. HE HAS DONE THIS REPEATEDLY ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. HE DID IT IN OUR MOST RECENT MEETING WHEN YOU LINKED AFGHANISTAN TO THE DEMISE OF SALT II. IN SHORT, THIS IS A MAN WHO REFUSES TO BE CONFUSED OR EVEN CONFRONTED WITH UNPLEASANT FACTS. INSTEAD, HE IS MORE THE DEFENSIVE LAWYER WAITING (BUT NOT NECESSARILY LISTENING) FOR THE CHANCE TO GET HIS PUNCH IN.

--
GORBACHEV'S LIKELY DEMEANOR AT GENEVA

5. HIS MEETING WITH YOU LAST TUESDAY, PLUS HIS EARLIER SESSIONS WITH THE O'NEILL AND BYRD GROUPS,

SHOW THAT GORBACHEV HAS ABSORBED A VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

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INCOMING

PAGE 04 OF 07 MOSCOW 16035 00 OF 03 111423Z C01/05 006768 NOD154
THAT IMPEDES AND SOMETIMES TOTALLY FRUSTRATES SERIOUS
DISCUSSION. IN HIS MIND, WE REPRESENT THE "REAL"
EVIL EMPIRE, HINDERING AS BEST WE CAN THE USSR'S
EFFORTS TO LEAD MANKIND TO ITS "BRIGHT FUTURE."

--
6. HE IS NOT AN IDEOLOGUE, CONCERNED ABOUT
DOCTRINAL SUBTLETIES (ALTHOUGH HIS WIFE, WHO HAS
A DOCTORATE IN "PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES," MAY BE).
GORBACHEV NONETHELESS IS A TRUE BELIEVER IN HIS
SYSTEM AND HIS PARTY'S CAUSE. HE IS ZEALOUS,
AS WELL AS TOUGH AND ABLE, AND THIS IS ANOTHER KEY
TO HIS SUCCESS.

--
7. DOBRYNIN MAY BE RIGHT IN TELLING YOU THAT
GORBACHEV WILL NOT BE AS VITUPERATIVE WITH THE
PRESIDENT AS HE WAS WITH US ON NOVEMBER 5. BUT
THE GENERAL SECRETARY IS UNLIKELY TO CONCEDE
ANY SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DETERIORATION
OF OUR RELATIONS OVER THE PAST DECADE. ACCORDING
TO HIS DISTORTED VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES, "SHAPED
BY THE LIKES OF DOBRYNIN AND ARBATOV:

-- A SMALL CIRCLE OF ANTI-SOVIET HAWKS AROUND THE
PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED TO FORCE THE USSR TO ITS
KNEES.

-- THEY DELUDE THEMSELVES INTO BELIEVING THE
SOVIET ECONOMY IS ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE AND
THUS MOSCOW WILL IN THE END SWALLOW UNEQUAL ARMS
CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

-- THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S WARPED VIEW OF THE
SOVIET UNION IMPEDES IF NOT TOTALLY FRUSTRATES SERIOUS
DISCUSSION (THE MIRROR IMAGE OF OUR ASSESSMENT OF
HIS VIEW OF US).

~~SECRET~~

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

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8. GORBACHEV HAS RESORTED TO A NUMBER OF TACTICAL DEVICES TO ENSURE THAT HIS VIEW OF REALITY IS NOT CHALLENGED. THESE INCLUDE:

-- A COMBATIVE INSISTENCE THAT THE USSR MUST, IN WORD AND DEED, BE ACCORDED EQUAL STATUS WITH THE UNITED STATES. AS GENERAL SECRETARY, GORBACHEV SEEMS DISINCLINED TO DEFER TO AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS, IN CONTRAST TO THE ATTITUDE OF HIS AMIABLE FOREIGN MINISTER.

-- IN PARTICULAR, GORBACHEV IS INTOLERANT OF EFFORTS TO LAY OUT GENERAL PROPOSITIONS ABOUT THE U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND THEN APPLY THEM TO THE CURRENT SITUATION. ON SUCH OCCASIONS, HE WILL INTERRUPT (AT TIMES IN MID-TRANSLATION) TO CHALLENGE WHAT HE CONSIDERS TO BE A FALSE PREMISE.

-- HE IS ALSO ADEPT AT BRINGING AN ISOLATED FACT FROM LEFT FIELD TO THROW HIS INTERLOCUTOR ON THE DEFENSIVE (E.G., THAT YOU AND CAP WERE BUSINESS COLLEAGUES, THAT WE CHOSE A NEW YORK CRIMINAL LAWYER TO ANALYZE THE ABM TREATY, THE PRESIDENT'S MISQUOTATION OF LENIN).

--
IMPLICATIONS FOR GENEVA

9. THIS VIEW OF GORBACHEV HAS SEVERAL IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR APPROACH TO GENEVA. FIRST, WE NEED TO BE COLDLY REALISTIC BOTH WITH OURSELVES AND WITH

THE PUBLIC ABOUT WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED AT AN INITIAL REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING. THE SOBER TONE OF YOUR MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. I AM HAPPY THAT THE VARIOUS VOICES IN WASHINGTON CONTINUE IN A SIMILARLY REALISTIC

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~
Department of State

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DIRECTION.

--
10. SECOND, WE ARE NOW ON THE RIGHT TRACK TO TAKE EVERYONE'S EYE OFF A POSSIBLE IMPRECISE COMMUNIQUE OR VAGUELY-WORDED PSEUDO-AGREEMENT. THIS MEETING HAS TO CONCENTRATE ON HOW WE GET A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP STARTED. NOT MUCH MEAT FOR A JOINT STATEMENT THERE.

--
11. THIRD, ON A TACTICAL LEVEL THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR CONTENTIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV. IT WILL BE A TALL ORDER TO CHALLENGE HIS INTELLECTUAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PRECONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES AND U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS. WHILE THE GENERAL SECRETARY WILL ATTEMPT TO GIVE AS GOOD AS HE GETS, SEVERAL TECHNIQUES SHOULD BE HELPFUL TO BLUNT HIS ASSERTIVENESS:

-- A FRANK, STRAIGHTFORWARD APPROACH IS ADVISABLE. HE IS A MAN WHO COMES DIRECTLY TO THE POINT. HE WILL BE LESS COMBATIVE IF HE SENSES THAT THE PRESIDENT IS SIMILARLY DIRECT.

-- GORBACHEV WILL NOT ADMIT BASIC MISTAKES ON THE SOVIET UNION'S PART. HE SHOULD BE QUIETLY REMINDED THAT THIS PRETENSE OF INFALLIBILITY IS NOT CREDIBLE, THAT ALL LEADERS ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MISCALCULATIONS AND WE FRANKLY REGARD THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AS PARTICULARLY SO BECAUSE IT OPERATES ON THE BASIS OF AN UNREALISTIC CONCEPTION OF SOCIETY AND GLOBAL AFFAIRS.

-- WE SHOULD THROW HIS RIGIDITY INTO CONTRAST BY BEING CANDID ABOUT OUR OWN MISTAKES (E.G., THE FAULTY LENIN QUOTATION, THE MISSTATEMENT ABOUT THE

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~
Department of State

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INCOMING

PAGE 07 OF 07 MOSCOW 16035 00 OF 03 111423Z C01/05 006768 NOD154
RUSSIAN WORD FOR FREEDOM).

-- HE CAN BE MERCURIAL IN HIS MOOD CHANGES. PERIODIC
INJECTIONS OF HUMOR WILL BE USEFUL IN DEFUSING HIS
AGGRESSIVENESS.

-- IF HE TALKS TOO LONG OR TOO ASSERTIVELY, THE
PRESIDENT SHOULD CALMLY HOLD UP HIS HAND AND WITH A
SMILE SAY: "DON'T OUR PEOPLE EXPECT MORE OF US.
WON'T WE GET FURTHER IF WE HAVE A SIMPLE CONVERSATION
AND NOT A DEBATE." IN SUM, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD
NOT HESITATE TO USE HIS SENIOR (IN AGE AND POSITION)
PLACE TO CALM HIS INTERLOCUTOR AND GET HIM BACK
ON THE TRACK.

--
12. THE LAST IS THE MOST IMPORTANT BECAUSE
THE IMPRESSION WE WANT TO LEAVE WITH MR. GORBACHEV
IS THAT WE ARE LED BY A STRONG, CALM, SURE-FOOTED,
UNCOMPLICATED AND HUMANE MAN WHO WITH PATIENCE SEEKS
WAYS TOWARD MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS. THIS IS
THE PRESIDENT. NO ACTING REQUIRED.
HARTMAN

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

FILE

November 13, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Proposed Science and Technology Initiative for Geneva

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum forwarding NSC views on George Keyworth's proposal for a major U.S.-Soviet science and technology initiative in Geneva. NSC asked the Department of State for its reaction to the proposal, and State's response is at Tab II. State argues that:

- o there is not enough time between now and the November meeting to clarify details of the proposal and develop the necessary interagency consensus for such a broad effort,
- o it is not desirable to reorganize the existing structures for U.S.-Soviet scientific cooperation, and
- o Soviet treatment of Andrey Sakharov and Elena Bonner does not allow us to undertake a major new scientific initiative at this time.

While the idea of a joint U.S.-Soviet initiative in Geneva is attractive in principle, I think State's arguments are sound.

or Gerald May, *X* Sven Kraemer, and *TC* Ty Cobb concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I conveying NSC views to Mr. Keyworth.

Approve _____

Disapprove *J* _____

Attachments

State really hoodwinked us on this one.

Tab I Memorandum to George Keyworth
Tab II State memorandum on proposed science initiative
Tab III Keyworth to Poindexter memorandum suggesting science initiative for Geneva

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3# 798

BY *RW* NARA DATE 3/8/11

DECLASSIFIED

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OSTP #85003 10

Copy 4 of 11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 14, 1985

NLRR F06-114/3 #7999
BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JAY KEYWORTH *Jay Keyworth*

SUBJECT:

ADMINISTRATION POLICY FOR S&T COOPERATION WITH
THE SOVIETS

Recent events in preparation for the President's meeting with Secretary Gorbachev clearly manifest the absence of coordinated scientific and technical oversight of the government's scientific relations with the USSR. The Administration's decision over the past year to renew selected bilateral S&T agreements and to reinvigorate existing programs has occurred without benefit of an integrated science policy to underpin the spectrum of government-sponsored S&T programs with the USSR. Rather, our scientific interactions with the Soviets are becoming a fragmented assortment of isolated S&T agreements, driven by the in-house agendas and separate missions of our technical agencies. In consequence, we are not addressing our long-term security interests, but are failing to protect our emerging, strategic technologies while constraining scientific and intelligence gains through expanding interactions with the Soviets.

The extant coordination mechanisms for US-Soviet S&T cooperation have been resurrected from the 1970's experience--a detente exercise. These multiple USG coordinating groups, including State's ICCUSA, even the SIG on Technology Transfer, and COMEX, perpetuate the piecemeal approach and lack of scientific oversight in our interactions with the USSR. Each such group manages a "slice of turf", from ICCUSA's responsibilities in the foreign policy arena to the SIG and COMEX' role in technology transfer cases. However, none of these groups tackles the critical issue of determining government-wide scientific priorities in selecting the technical research fields that constitute the core and substance of our growing network of scientific cooperation with the USSR.

In two pivotal cases, the proposed initiatives for the Geneva meeting illustrate this flawed process and underscore the negative implications for national interests. In each case, the proposals hinge on flashy, isolated S&T initiatives that the President could offer to Gorbachev to counter and soften his position on other Summit issues. In both cases, the proposals' perceived worth as political instruments overruled scientific substance, technology transfer concerns, and domestic financial ramifications.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECL: OADR
~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Predictably, the Soviets rejected the first of these initiatives, which called for cooperation in the peaceful uses of space. The Soviets saw this as a propaganda opportunity and linked the proposal to SDI and the U.S. militarization of space. The second proposal, for the U.S. and Soviets to cooperate in a multilateral \$3.5 billion fusion research program and build a prototype fusion reactor, is in response to a Soviet overture. This proposal runs counter to the Administration's domestic R&D and energy policy, which has set zero growth budgets for domestic fusion programs and ruled out demonstration projects. But more important, it would advance Soviet strategic interests by further polarizing the American scientific communities' support and participation in SDI research programs. The very scientists who have been encouraged to be responsive to the Administration's goals of using S&T better for national security and industrial competitiveness would be undermined.

The changing environment in US-Soviet relations has encouraged technical agencies to begin preparations to expand programs and explore new S&T initiatives with their Soviet counterparts. In order to protect our security interests and achieve national goals through S&T cooperation with the Soviets, we must formulate a government-wide science policy to direct the substance of all programs and provide adequate scientific and technical oversight consistent with Administration R&D policies. Towards that end, as Chairman of the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET), I am re-establishing the Subcommittee on International Science and Technology. Under that senior-level rubric, a working group on US-Soviet S&T cooperation will be formed to determine national S&T priorities and provide the technical evaluation and oversight now absent in our management of US-Soviet scientific cooperation.

bcc: Don Regan
Bill Casey
Cap Weinberger
John Herrington

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GEORGE A. KEYWORTH

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Proposed Science and Technology Initiative for
Geneva

The NSC has reviewed your suggestion for a science and technology initiative at the President's November meeting with Gorbachev. We find it an attractive idea in principle, but there are serious practical considerations which make such a joint effort impossible to implement for Geneva - particularly in view of how little time remains before the meeting takes place.

Specifically, we would need more time to:

- o clarify details of your proposal and develop the necessary interagency consensus for such a broad effort,
- o consider the implications of reorganizing the existing structures for U.S.-Soviet scientific cooperation.

In addition, continued Soviet mistreatment of Andrey Sakharov and his wife make it extremely difficult to undertake a major new scientific initiative at this time.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR FOI-114/3 #8010

BY AN NARA DATE 10/30/07

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

November 6, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Proposed Science and Technology Initiative for Geneva

Attached at Tab I is a suggested memorandum from Admiral Poindexter to George Keyworth forwarding the State Department's views on Keyworth's proposal for a major U.S.-Soviet science and technology initiative in Geneva. State argues that:

- o there is not enough time between now and the November meeting to clarify details of the proposal and develop the necessary interagency consensus for such a broad effort,
- o it is not desirable to reorganize the existing structures for U.S.-Soviet scientific cooperation, and
- o Soviet treatment of Andrey Sakharov and Elena Bonner does not allow us to undertake a major new scientific initiative at this time.

While the idea of a joint U.S.-Soviet initiative in Geneva is attractive in principle, I think State's arguments are sound.

aj Gerald May, *SA* Sven Kraemer, and *TC* Ty Cobb concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memorandum to Admiral Poindexter conveying State's views to Mr. Keyworth.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum from John Poindexter to George Keyworth
Tab A State memorandum on proposed science initiative
Tab II Keyworth to Poindexter memorandum suggesting science initiative for Geneva meeting

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Declassify on: OADR

NLRR FD6-114/3 #8001
BY *RW* NARA DATE 3/8/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GEORGE A. KEYWORTH

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Proposed Science and Technology Initiative for
Geneva

The NSC and the Department of State have reviewed your suggestion for a science and technology initiative at the President's November meeting with Gorbachev. We find it an attractive idea in principle, but there are serious practical considerations which make such a joint effort impossible to implement for Geneva - particularly in view of how little time remains before the meeting takes place.

Attached is the full text of the State Department's review of the proposal.

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NLR 106-114/2 #8002
BY 011 NARA DATE 10/30/07

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S/S 8532487

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15NLRR Feb 7/14/3 #8003

United States Department of State

BY

CU

NARA DATE

10/30/07

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 1, 1985

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Dr. Keyworth's Proposal for a Presidential Science
and Technology Initiative for Geneva

The Department of State does not favor the proposal that the President and General Secretary Gorbachev announce at Geneva that their two Science Advisors will determine new scientific priorities and fields of research for future bilateral cooperation.

This proposal, which recommends an extensive reevaluation of the US-Soviet scientific relationship, is overly broad. As such, it risks drawing criticism from those who would see this as an entree for the Soviets to expand their access to our scientific establishment as well as others who would be suspicious that it is an attempt to pull back from mutually beneficial scientific exchanges currently underway. In our view it would be a mistake to make a procedural science and technology proposal to the Soviets without having carefully vetted the substantive areas in which it might be in our interest to expand cooperation.

Additionally, even if the proposal were further clarified, there is not enough time left before the Geneva meeting to fully staff out and develop an interagency consensus on a broad proposal to chart a new scientific relationship with the Soviet Union. As such, we do not see the proposal as an attractive Presidential initiative.

Seven of the eleven science and technological agreements initiated between 1972 and 1974 are currently in force. A complete reevaluation of the US-USSR scientific relationship may bring into question the future of these executive agreements, some of which have years to run. The bilateral agreements have provided an effective structure for carefully delimited scientific cooperation with the Soviets. Should the Administration conclude that it is in the national interest to expand science cooperation with the Soviets, the four agreements allowed to lapse -- energy, space, transportation, and science and technology -- along with any new proposals can be fully examined.

Dr. Keyworth's proposal seems to imply a basic reorganization of US-USSR science and technology coordination within the USG. The Department of State does not believe such

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-2-

a reorganization is desirable. Bilateral cooperation with the Soviets over the past twenty-five years has given rise to a network of effective interagency structures to evaluate and coordinate these exchanges. The Interagency Coordinating Committee for US-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA) is a 22 agency body chaired by State providing overall coordination of all exchanges activity. The Executive Secretaries Subcommittee of ICCUSA has a base of experience and expertise to manage any expansion of scientific cooperation which the Administration may direct. The Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) gives interagency intelligence evaluations on technology transfer concerns of specific exchange projects and new proposals.

A recent meeting of the Senior Interagency Group on the Transfer of Strategic Technology (SIG/TT), of which OSTP is a member, agreed that its chairman, Under Secretary of State William Schneider, should employ his circular 175 authority to insure that all new science and technology initiatives with the Soviets be given careful interagency evaluation for technology transfer risks. The SIG/TT further agreed that such a review process was the proper way to ensure that any science and technology arrangement with the Soviet Union be consistent with the Administration's long-standing policies on technology transfer.

You asked for the Department's assessment of the possible negative impact a new science initiative would have in the absence of any improvement in the Soviet treatment of Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner. The mistreatment of these two individuals, as well as the Soviet Union's failure to adhere to international human rights commitments, continues to have a deleterious effect on US-Soviet scientific relations at all levels.

The recently-announced exit permission for Elena Bonner may be a positive step, however we are concerned that the condition of Sakharov is deteriorating. Additionally, our concerns and efforts should not cease while abuse against others continues. The Department recently received reports of consternation among dissident Soviet scientists over their perception that the US may be moving into a "business as usual" science and technology relationship while Soviet human rights abuses continue. The Department of State believes an announcement of a broad scientific initiative would only contribute to further weakening of resolve in the Soviet scientific community.


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

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~~DECL:OADR~~

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NLRR F06-114/3 #7984

BY AN NARA DATE 10/30/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8364

October 18, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: G. A. KEYWORTH *gk*

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER MEETING WITH
SECRETARY GENERAL GORBACHEV: CONSIDERATION
OF A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OPTION

Issue

How to respond to possible Soviet overtures in science and technology and whether to propose a comprehensive S&T Initiative at Geneva to portray the President as an open, peace-loving world leader and create a public diplomacy success.

Objective

To protect long-term security interests and promote national goals in foreign policy, science and technology, and public relations.

Scenario for S&T Option

- 1) The President raises the theme of science and technology cooperation with Gorbachev and highlights peaceful scientific research as an international endeavor critical to the future of mankind.
- 2) Commending both nation's accomplishments in science and technology, the President portrays this area as one in which the U.S. and USSR could derive reciprocal benefits from enhanced interaction.
- 3) The President proposes to Gorbachev that the two nations chart a new scientific relationship. Demonstrating his commitment to this concept, the President proposes that the two leaders task their respective Science Advisors to determine the scientific priorities and fields of research for future bilateral cooperation.

Advantages

Political

- ° This option would further given objectives for the November meeting. The President would score significant political mileage from initiating cooperation in an area uniformly perceived as beneficial to mankind.

- 18
- ° This option does not hinge upon a flashy isolated initiative in space, health, or environment which Gorbachev can accept, reject, negotiate, or link to other bilateral issues.
 - ° In keeping the Initiative general, the President cannot be viewed as having a "hidden agenda", as was the case with the Soviets' interpretation of the space cooperation proposal which they rejected and linked to SDI.
 - ° The President's only commitment at Geneva will be future discussions. By entrusting the "S&T store" to his Science Advisor, the President closes the door on negotiations at Geneva and ensures that critical technical discussions will take place in the proper venue, away from the political spotlight.
 - ° The Soviets cannot reject this Initiative without publicly denouncing future cooperation with the U.S. in science and technology and risking negative world opinion.

Scientific

- ° A national science policy will underpin all US-USSR S&T cooperation to maximize scientific gain and protect strategic technologies and security interests. The technical content of US-Soviet S&T cooperation will be re-defined and the scope of interactions controlled. The "balance of benefits" from US-Soviet S&T cooperation will be redressed in favor of the U.S.
- ° This Initiative would harness the Soviets, curtail their ability to carve out separate, isolated S&T programs with U.S. technical agencies and limit the technical benefits they can reap by manipulating a fragmented U.S. system.

Military

- ° US-Soviet scientific contacts, dependent upon reciprocity and the joint selection of research fields, will result in better access to the Soviet elite. New intelligence opportunities to assess Soviet S&T strengths and weaknesses will enhance analyses of Soviet economic/military capability and acquisition of strategic technologies.
- ° Soviet on-site access to university-based cutting-edge basic research, in which the U.S. leads, but the Soviets target, will be limited.

Public Relations

- ° The President will be portrayed as a world leader, sharing his nation's expertise in science and technology to benefit all nations--including his adversary--the USSR.

- ° U.S. political prestige and credibility will be enhanced among our allies and adversaries who will view the President's proposal as open and forthright and without a hidden purpose.
- ° The President's call for US-Soviet research ventures to promote the health and well-being of mankind will deflect the Soviet propaganda campaign aimed at linking all U.S. scientific research efforts to SDI and the "militarization of space".
- ° The President's sincerity and personal commitment to improving US-Soviet relations will be publicly demonstrated when he entrusts this important task to his Science Advisor.
- ° Possible Headlines Include:
 - Reagan calls for a new beginning in US-Soviet scientific relations.
 - Americans and Soviets agree to cooperate in the peaceful uses of science and technology to benefit mankind.
 - President Reagan invites Soviets to participate in U.S. science and technology research programs.

Disadvantages

- ° This option could be viewed as giving US-Soviet science and technology cooperation high political visibility and inappropriate linkage with the overall state of US-Soviet relations.
- ° This option could be misinterpreted as signalling a return to the era of detente and an expansion in US-Soviet S&T relations, whereas the objective is to deliver maximum political pay-off and chart a new course for US-Soviet interactions to achieve national goals.

Interagency Support

This option should enlist support from a number of constituencies. The scientific and military applications protect the technology transfer/security concerns of Defense, CIA, and Treasury's Enforcement Operations. Our scientific agencies will endorse a Presidential Initiative that creates a national science policy to underpin their present and future dealings with the Soviet Union. The President's public relations advisors, State, and USIA will recognize the political benefits the Initiative confers and should welcome this opportunity for a public diplomacy success at Geneva.

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NLRR FOI-7143 #8004 20

To: Mark P.

From: Don Kursch *DK*

BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

Subject: Economic/Commercial Relations and the November Meeting

I have heard that you may be having an idea session tomorrow re. the November meeting. Frank Vargo and I discussed this question informally yesterday with respect to econ/commercial issues.

We both feel that probably the most useful thing that the President could do on this issue would be to repeat our interest in expanding non-strategic trade, endorse the approach trying to identify those areas where we are able to trade comfortably---as opposed to bickering over the areas where we are unwilling to trade---and, most importantly, emphasize that we will allow our companies to fulfill those contracts we have endorsed, despite the inevitable ups and downs in our relationship.

I think a verbal commitment on contract sanctity along the lines suggested above would be the most important, and most appropriate, step the President could take in the area of trade relations. He has already done this in agricultural trade, and the Soviets once again view us as rather reliable trading partners in this area. If we expect to be able to sell food processing equipment, shoe factories, etc. the Soviets will expect to be assured that we will not cut off our deliveries half way to completion to show our displeasure over some future Soviet policy action. I should emphasize that making a commitment to contract sanctity need not mean that we will always be willing to sell the Soviets shoe factories and the like but merely that we will not interrupt deliveries, spare parts and service where an existing contract is in force.

While we have strongly suggested in our discussions with the Soviets that we will respect existing contracts--mostly by pointing to the provisions of the new Export Administration Act which make it more difficult to impose export controls for foreign policy reasons--, an assurance from the President to Gorbachev personally would carry a great deal more weight. Bureaucratically, it would make much harder, at least for a Reagan Administration, to backslide at some future date in response to the inevitable congressional calls for economic sanctions.

As you may recall, it has been my view all along that we are best off proceeding slowly and cautiously with the Soviets in the trade area to help insure that we will be able to deliver on the promises of our companies. If we regress to the previous Administration's policy of breaking existing contracts with the Soviets we are likely to destroy the possibility of doing any meaningful business outside of agriculture, where Congress has imposed tight limits on the authority of the executive.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 13, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Proposed Science and Technology Initiative for Geneva

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum forwarding NSC views on George Keyworth's proposal for a major U.S.-Soviet science and technology initiative in Geneva. NSC asked the Department of State for its reaction to the proposal, and State's response is at Tab II. State argues that:

- o there is not enough time between now and the November meeting to clarify details of the proposal and develop the necessary interagency consensus for such a broad effort,
- o it is not desirable to reorganize the existing structures for U.S.-Soviet scientific cooperation, and
- o Soviet treatment of Andrey Sakharov and Elena Bonner does not allow us to undertake a major new scientific initiative at this time.

While the idea of a joint U.S.-Soviet initiative in Geneva is attractive in principle, I think State's arguments are sound.

ax Gerald May, *x* Sven Kraemer, and *xc* Ty Cobb concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I conveying NSC views to Mr. Keyworth.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to George Keyworth
Tab II State memorandum on proposed science initiative
Tab III Keyworth to Poindexter memorandum suggesting science initiative for Geneva

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Declassify on: OADR

NLRR F06-114/3 #7985

RV RW NADA DATE 3/8/11

8864

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GEORGE A. KEYWORD

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Proposed Science and Technology Initiative for
Geneva

The NSC has reviewed your suggestion for a science and technology initiative at the President's November meeting with Gorbachev. We find it an attractive idea in principle, but there are serious practical considerations which make such a joint effort impossible to implement for Geneva - particularly in view of how little time remains before the meeting takes place.

Specifically, we would need more time to:

- o clarify details of your proposal and develop the necessary interagency consensus for such a broad effort,
- o consider the implications of reorganizing the existing structures for U.S.-Soviet scientific cooperation.

In addition, continued Soviet mistreatment of Andrey Sakharov and his wife make it extremely difficult to undertake a major new scientific initiative at this time.

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NLRR FOI 714/3 #7986

BY CJ NARA DATE 10/20/07



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S/S 8532487

United States Department of State

NLRRF06-714/3 #805

BY AN NARA DATE 10/30/07

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 1, 1985

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Dr. Keyworth's Proposal for a Presidential Science
and Technology Initiative for Geneva

The Department of State does not favor the proposal that the President and General Secretary Gorbachev announce at Geneva that their two Science Advisors will determine new scientific priorities and fields of research for future bilateral cooperation.

This proposal, which recommends an extensive reevaluation of the US-Soviet scientific relationship, is overly broad. As such, it risks drawing criticism from those who would see this as an entree for the Soviets to expand their access to our scientific establishment as well as others who would be suspicious that it is an attempt to pull back from mutually beneficial scientific exchanges currently underway. In our view it would be a mistake to make a procedural science and technology proposal to the Soviets without having carefully vetted the substantive areas in which it might be in our interest to expand cooperation.

Additionally, even if the proposal were further clarified, there is not enough time left before the Geneva meeting to fully staff out and develop an interagency consensus on a broad proposal to chart a new scientific relationship with the Soviet Union. As such, we do not see the proposal as an attractive Presidential initiative.

Seven of the eleven science and technological agreements initiated between 1972 and 1974 are currently in force. A complete reevaluation of the US-USSR scientific relationship may bring into question the future of these executive agreements, some of which have years to run. The bilateral agreements have provided an effective structure for carefully delimited scientific cooperation with the Soviets. Should the Administration conclude that it is in the national interest to expand science cooperation with the Soviets, the four agreements allowed to lapse -- energy, space, transportation, and science and technology -- along with any new proposals can be fully examined.

Dr. Keyworth's proposal seems to imply a basic reorganization of US-USSR science and technology coordination within the USG. The Department of State does not believe such

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a reorganization is desirable. Bilateral cooperation with the Soviets over the past twenty-five years has given rise to a network of effective interagency structures to evaluate and coordinate these exchanges. The Interagency Coordinating Committee for US-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA) is a 22 agency body chaired by State providing overall coordination of all exchanges activity. The Executive Secretaries Subcommittee of ICCUSA has a base of experience and expertise to manage any expansion of scientific cooperation which the Administration may direct. The Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) gives interagency intelligence evaluations on technology transfer concerns of specific exchange projects and new proposals.

A recent meeting of the Senior Interagency Group on the Transfer of Strategic Technology (SIG/TT), of which OSTP is a member, agreed that its chairman, Under Secretary of State William Schneider, should employ his circular 175 authority to insure that all new science and technology initiatives with the Soviets be given careful interagency evaluation for technology transfer risks. The SIG/TT further agreed that such a review process was the proper way to ensure that any science and technology arrangement with the Soviet Union be consistent with the Administration's long-standing policies on technology transfer.

You asked for the Department's assessment of the possible negative impact a new science initiative would have in the absence of any improvement in the Soviet treatment of Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner. The mistreatment of these two individuals, as well as the Soviet Union's failure to adhere to international human rights commitments, continues to have a deleterious effect on US-Soviet scientific relations at all levels.

The recently-announced exit permission for Elena Bonner may be a positive step, however we are concerned that the condition of Sakharov is deteriorating. Additionally, our concerns and efforts should not cease while abuse against others continues. The Department recently received reports of consternation among dissident Soviet scientists over their perception that the US may be moving into a "business as usual" science and technology relationship while Soviet human rights abuses continue. The Department of State believes an announcement of a broad scientific initiative would only contribute to further weakening of resolve in the Soviet scientific community.

Nicholas Platt

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

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DECL:OADR

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NLRR Feb 11/4/3 #7987

THE WHITE HOUSE

8364

BY CN NARA DATE 10/30/67

WASHINGTON

October 18, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: G. A. KEYWORTH *gk*

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER MEETING WITH
SECRETARY GENERAL GORBACHEV: CONSIDERATION
OF A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OPTION

Issue

How to respond to possible Soviet overtures in science and technology and whether to propose a comprehensive S&T Initiative at Geneva to portray the President as an open, peace-loving world leader and create a public diplomacy success.

Objective

To protect long-term security interests and promote national goals in foreign policy, science and technology, and public relations.

Scenario for S&T Option

- 1) The President raises the theme of science and technology cooperation with Gorbachev and highlights peaceful scientific research as an international endeavor critical to the future of mankind.
- 2) Commending both nation's accomplishments in science and technology, the President portrays this area as one in which the U.S. and USSR could derive reciprocal benefits from enhanced interaction.
- 3) The President proposes to Gorbachev that the two nations chart a new scientific relationship. Demonstrating his commitment to this concept, the President proposes that the two leaders task their respective Science Advisors to determine the scientific priorities and fields of research for future bilateral cooperation.

Advantages

Political

- This option would further given objectives for the November meeting. The President would score significant political mileage from initiating cooperation in an area uniformly perceived as beneficial to mankind.

- 74
- ° This option does not hinge upon a flashy isolated initiative in space, health, or environment which Gorbachev can accept, reject, negotiate, or link to other bilateral issues.
 - ° In keeping the Initiative general, the President cannot be viewed as having a "hidden agenda", as was the case with the Soviets' interpretation of the space cooperation proposal which they rejected and linked to SDI.
 - ° The President's only commitment at Geneva will be future discussions. By entrusting the "S&T store" to his Science Advisor, the President closes the door on negotiations at Geneva and ensures that critical technical discussions will take place in the proper venue, away from the political spotlight.
 - ° The Soviets cannot reject this Initiative without publicly denouncing future cooperation with the U.S. in science and technology and risking negative world opinion.

Scientific

- ° A national science policy will underpin all US-USSR S&T cooperation to maximize scientific gain and protect strategic technologies and security interests. The technical content of US-Soviet S&T cooperation will be re-defined and the scope of interactions controlled. The "balance of benefits" from US-Soviet S&T cooperation will be redressed in favor of the U.S.
- ° This Initiative would harness the Soviets, curtail their ability to carve out separate, isolated S&T programs with U.S. technical agencies and limit the technical benefits they can reap by manipulating a fragmented U.S. system.

Military

- ° US-Soviet scientific contacts, dependent upon reciprocity and the joint selection of research fields, will result in better access to the Soviet elite. New intelligence opportunities to assess Soviet S&T strengths and weaknesses will enhance analyses of Soviet economic/military capability and acquisition of strategic technologies.
- ° Soviet on-site access to university-based cutting-edge basic research, in which the U.S. leads, but the Soviets target, will be limited.

Public Relations

- ° The President will be portrayed as a world leader, sharing his nation's expertise in science and technology to benefit all nations--including his adversary-the USSR.

- ° U.S. political prestige and credibility will be enhanced among our allies and adversaries who will view the President's proposal as open and forthright and without a hidden purpose.
- ° The President's call for US-Soviet research ventures to promote the health and well-being of mankind will deflect the Soviet propaganda campaign aimed at linking all U.S. scientific research efforts to SDI and the "militarization of space".
- ° The President's sincerity and personal commitment to improving US-Soviet relations will be publicly demonstrated when he entrusts this important task to his Science Advisor.
- ° Possible Headlines Include:
 - Reagan calls for a new beginning in US-Soviet scientific relations.
 - Americans and Soviets agree to cooperate in the peaceful uses of science and technology to benefit mankind.
 - President Reagan invites Soviets to participate in U.S. science and technology research programs.

Disadvantages

- ° This option could be viewed as giving US-Soviet science and technology cooperation high political visibility and inappropriate linkage with the overall state of US-Soviet relations.
- ° This option could be misinterpreted as signalling a return to the era of detente and an expansion in US-Soviet S&T relations, whereas the objective is to deliver maximum political pay-off and chart a new course for US-Soviet interactions to achieve national goals.

Interagency Support

This option should enlist support from a number of constituencies. The scientific and military applications protect the technology transfer/security concerns of Defense, CIA, and Treasury's Enforcement Operations. Our scientific agencies will endorse a Presidential Initiative that creates a national science policy to underpin their present and future dealings with the Soviet Union. The President's public relations advisors, State, and USIA will recognize the political benefits the Initiative confers and should welcome this opportunity for a public diplomacy success at Geneva.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

November 14, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Soviet Response to the President's Exchange
Initiatives

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President forwarding a memo from Secretary Shultz which outlines the Soviet response to the President's exchange initiatives. Overall, the Secretary characterizes the response as positive, and says that we should be able to announce agreement on some of the President's initiatives in Geneva.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I forwarding Secretary Shultz's memorandum.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Memorandum to the President from Secretary Shultz

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NLRRF06-114/3#7988
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Soviet Response to Your Exchange Initiatives

Issue

To review the memorandum from George Shultz on the Soviet response to your exchange initiatives.

Facts

The Soviets gave our Embassy in Moscow a written response to your proposals on exchanges.

Discussion

Overall, George and I think the Soviet response is positive. We should be able to announce agreement on some of the initiatives in Geneva.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you review the memorandum from George Shultz at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from George Shultz

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

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ES SENSITIVE 8533556

BY CU NARA DATE 10/30/87 THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

November 13, 1985

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

SUBJECT: Soviet Response to Your Exchanges Initiatives

The Soviets provided us in Moscow today a paper (Tab 1) that responds in detail to the exchange proposals we handed over on October 18 (Tab 2). The Soviets elaborated on some proposals, accepted others outright, added several of their own, and ignored others. Overall, it was a positive response. While we will have to balance the benefits and costs carefully in each case, we believe there are now grounds to agree in several of these areas and announce them in Geneva next week.

The Soviets were quite interested in the proposal to cooperate in the development of microcomputer educational software for secondary school instruction. Their response elaborated this into cooperation on introducing and building courses on computer courses and "rebuilding school education in the conditions of the computerization of society." The seven points they added for clarification leave no doubt they hope for a complete look at placing computers in the classroom.

The Soviet paper accepts our idea for a distinguished Soviet and American educator or other public figure to study ways to promote the study of each other's language. It agrees to a Rhodes-scholar type arrangement in which ten of the best students from each country would be sent to universities in the other for work. It agrees to the exchange of ten professors a year from each side for courses on the other country. The Soviets added several new and quite specific ideas on language training, e.g., three months of training in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. for 300 Soviet teachers of English and 300 American teachers of Russian.

The Soviets turned aside the two proposals for massive exchanges of undergraduates and high school students (5,000 of each both ways.) The first was replaced by increased exchanges of up to 300 "specialists and graduate students" in the natural and technical sciences and the humanities for 6 to 10 month periods. This obviously changes the nature of the proposal and raises the usual questions of technology transfer and security. The second was watered down to visits by "one or two small groups of elementary school children" for up to two weeks in Pioneer and YMCA camps.

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The increase in sporting events and television coverage of them was accepted. While the Soviets turned aside our suggestions on baseball, football, and a "great race", they did list a large number of sports in which both sides participate. The Soviets also seemed interested in training methodology (including athletic medicine and "doping" control) and equipment manufacture.

The Soviet paper ignores our proposals on terrorism and consultations to combat alcoholism and drug abuse and trafficking. It side-steps our ideas for increased information exchanges with the suggestion that we continue the practice of television "space bridges", a private venture that has produced several US-Soviet programs in the past two-to-three years.

Finally, the Soviets agreed to your suggestion that we reestablish cooperation in the field of cancer research.

Obviously, there remains a great deal to be done before any of these projects can formally get underway. Nevertheless, the Soviet response is more positive than might have been expected, and doubtless reflects their awareness of your personal interest in expanding exchanges. We will be touching the necessary bases around town and with the Soviets to shape up the more promising initiatives now in play for announcement in Geneva.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

SOVIET RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT'S
EXCHANGE INITIATIVES

The Soviet side proposes, in view of American considerations, the following concrete variants of the development of contacts and exchanges, which could become the subject of agreement between the corresponding departments of the two countries.

In the Field of Education:

The exchange of experience concerning the application and introduction of programs of computer instruction into schools in the USSR and the USA, and concerning the training and retraining of school teachers. The exchange of experience concerning the application of principles of building courses of information science for senior classes of general curriculum schools.

The working out of the problem of a basic rebuilding of the system of school education in the conditions of the computerization of society and the use of intensive methods of instruction.

In these two projects the following themes would be included:

1. The application of computer methods for developing creative activity of high school students with the use of the methods of cognitive psychology.
2. The creation and trying out of educational and educational/recreational computer programs for elementary and high schools.
3. Experimental study of various methods of using computers in the educational process.
4. The working out of proposals about the application of computers for the perfection of methods of instruction in school, outside of school institutions, and in the family.
5. The study of existing methods of instruction in school. The comparison of the experience of the U.S., the USSR and other countries. The evaluation of the efficiency of these methods.

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BY CW NARA DATE 10/30/07

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6. The working out of demands for the equipment and programmatic means of computer education.

7. The organization of joint experiments with the utilization of various computer systems and local networks.

The selection of two well-known pedagogues or other societal figures -- one from the American and the other from the Soviet side -- for conducting research on the ways to promote the study of each other's language in their countries.

The increase up to three hundred people a year in the exchange of specialists and graduate students for a scientific study period "Stazhirovka," (for up to 10 months) and the conduct of scientific research (for up to 6 months) in natural and technical sciences and the humanities in coordination with the needs of the sending side.

A yearly exchange of 10 professors for conducting special courses in history, culture, economics, in corresponding faculties of Soviet and American institutes of higher learning. The holding of bilateral, scientific seminars, symposiums and conferences on these subjects.

The institution of a Soviet-American program of stipends, keeping in mind that the sides will send 10 of the best students each in natural sciences, technical sciences, and the humanities, for the period of a school year for continuing pre-dissertation ("prediplomnaya") work and the preparation of dissertations, in two universities for each side.

The organization of permanently operating three month courses in the USSR for raising the qualifications of American teachers of the Russian language, and in the U.S. for raising the qualifications of Soviet teachers of the English language -- with a yearly contingent of up to 200 people.

The exchange of 10 experienced teachers of the Russian and English languages for a period of one school year for educational-methodological and pedagogic work in institutions of higher learning of the two countries.

The creation of a joint authors collective for the writing of a textbook for studying the English and Russian languages for student philologists.

The exchange of groups of teachers in Soviet schools and American colleges for a language study period.

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- 2 -

6. The working out of demands for the equipment and programmatic means of computer education.

7. The organization of joint experiments with the utilization of various computer systems and local networks.

The selection of two well-known pedagogues or other societal figures -- one from the American and the other from the Soviet side -- for conducting research on the ways to promote the study of each other's language in their countries.

The increase up to three hundred people a year in the exchange of specialists and graduate students for a scientific study period "Stazhirovka," (for up to 10 months) and the conduct of scientific research (for up to 6 months) in natural and technical sciences and the humanities in coordination with the needs of the sending side.

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The exchange of groups of teachers in Soviet schools and American colleges for a language study period.

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Exchanges Involving People:

The exchange of one or two small groups of elementary school children under the leadership of pedagogues/educators for a period up to two weeks. In the USSR, this would take the form of the organization of excursions to cities with lodgings at Pioneer camps "Artek" and "Orlenok."

In the U.S. this would take the form of lodgings in recreational areas. For instance, in the camps of the Young Men's and Women's Christian Association (YMCA, YWCA) or other societal organizations in the case that the American side guarantees the safety of the Soviet children.

In the Field of Information:

The continuation of the practice of regular Television Bridges in Space between the USSR and the USA, in which Soviet and American scientists, journalists, and artistic groups participate.

In the Field of Sport:

The exchange of teams and the showing to Soviet television viewers of the international tournaments and bilateral basketball, hockey, and soccer matches in the U.S.

The increase in the number of television broadcasts of sports events.

The exchange of specialists in the field of athletic medicine and doping control, and trainers for swimming, synchronized swimming, and track and field.

The holding in 1986, as planned, of bilateral games in 16 areas of sport.

The holding of regular competitions in boxing, bicycling, free style and classical wrestling, chess (Soviet-American match), and also of joint training for swimming, tennis, and downhill skiing.

A yearly dispatch to the U.S. of two delegations in gymnastics, acrobatics, and figure skating for public performances.

In the Field of Medicine:

The reestablishment of cooperation in the field of cancer research.

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EXCHANGES INITIATIVES

EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES

An offer to cooperate in the development of microcomputer educational software for secondary school instruction.

Nomination of two distinguished educators or other public figures, one American, one Soviet, to undertake a major study of ways that we can increase mutual understanding by promoting the study of each other's language in our respective countries.

A massive exchange of undergraduate students. As a start, at least 5,000 each way for a year of study in each other's country.

Establishment of chairs of American studies at 10 Soviet universities with a reciprocal establishment of Soviet affairs chairs at 10 U.S. universities -- all twenty to be filled annually by eminently qualified Soviet and American scholars.

Creation of a Soviet-American scholarship program, similar to the Rhodes Scholars, that annually would send 10 of the best and brightest students from each country to study at a distinguished university of the other.

PEOPLE TO PEOPLE EXCHANGES

An ambitious "youth exchange" program for a year or a summer involving at least 5,000 secondary school-age youths who would live with families in the other country and either attend school or engage in cooperative summer camp projects with their local counterparts.

A massive expansion of "sister city" relationships with at least one people to people visit each year each way by city officials or delegations with an accompanying effort to increase general tourism between participating cities. The program could begin with 50 pairings the first year.

INCREASED CONSULTATIONS

Inauguration of regular bilateral consultations in cooperative efforts to halt terrorism. These could be on the model of the regional consultations already underway.

Joint regular consultations about efforts to combat alcoholism and drug abuse and trafficking.

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WIDER INFORMATION EXCHANGES

Establishment of national out-of-embassy cultural centers and libraries in each other's countries with uncontrolled access.

Inauguration of regular media exchanges with Soviet columnists writing once a month in American journals and American writers given similar regular space in Soviet publications.

Regular TV discussion shows at least once a month between American and Soviet journalists and/or officials.

Annual TV addresses by the leaders of our two countries to the people of the other.

More exchanges of radio and television programs coupled with an end to all jamming of foreign broadcasts.

Facilitation of Soviet satellite transmissions to America via "Gorizont" and "Worldnet" and other U.S. broadcasts to the Soviet Union.

Increased publication and distribution for each nation's books and publications in the other, including establishment of a book store in the Soviet Union as an outlet for American publications similar to book stores here which sell Soviet publications.

SPORTS COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES

A reciprocal televised exchange of each country's best sports competitions, such as football, soccer, basketball, and hockey.

An exchange of American football and baseball teams for a series of exhibition games and workshops in the Soviet Union with reciprocal tours by Soviet hockey and soccer teams.

A proposal for joint sponsorship of an annual televised Washington to Moscow -- or Moscow to Washington -- sporting "Great Race." It could be open to entrants from any country and could be for cars, bicyclists, light planes or other vehicles. The Paris-Dakar auto race is one model.

A dramatic increase in binational sporting competitions across the entire sporting agenda, all to be jointly televised.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen 11/15 38
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November 14, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *rcm*
SUBJECT: What to Expect from Gorbachev in Geneva

George Shultz has forwarded the memorandum at Tab A which analyzes Gorbachev's typical approach to a number of the questions which may arise during your meetings with him and suggests appropriate responses.

I believe that this is an excellent treatment of this subject and recommend that you read it. We will work the talking points into the material for your meetings.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you read the Memorandum from Secretary Shultz at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary George P. Shultz

*I kept the memo
to take with me
RCM*

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CLS NARA, Date 7/2/02

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

November 13, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

JACK MATLOCK *JM*

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT:

What to Expect from Gorbachev in Geneva

Secretary Shultz has sent a Memorandum to the President which analyzes Gorbachev's typical approach to many of the general questions which may come up at the Geneva Meeting, and provides suggested talking points for countering them.

I think this is an excellent analysis and consider the suggested responses pertinent and effective.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the Memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve *W*

Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Shultz Memorandum to the President

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 27, 1997
By *C/S* NARA, Date *7/2/02*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

November 14, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *Jm*

SUBJECT: Geneva Meeting: President's Talking Points

As we discussed, I have recast the President's talking points so that the basic points for each meeting occupy less than a page. In respect to regional issues, additional points should be made during the discussion regarding specific issues, and these are contained on the two pages following the "overview" page for the Third Plenary Session. Bob Linhard and Bill Wright supplied the points on arms control issues (Second Plenary Session).

We will be developing similar points for the two dinners and some contingency points for the meetings in case they are needed, but I would appreciate your reaction to the approach taken here. If you approve, these points could provide a framework for the NSC discussion tomorrow and be included in the Day Books.

Jm { Fortier, Sestanovich, Linhard and Cobb concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the talking points at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I -- Talking Points for President's Meetings with Gorbachev

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3 #7990
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

41

~~SECRET~~

FIRST PRIVATE SESSION

November 19, 1985, A.M., Maison Fleur d'Eau

Objective:

To get acquainted and set tone of meetings to follow.

Procedure:

There will be a photo opportunity at the very beginning. The meeting is then scheduled for 15 minutes, but obviously can go on as long as you wish.

Main Points:

- Glad to meet. Looking forward to discussions.
- Heavy responsibility on both. Whole world wants results.
- I come to meeting in constructive spirit. Want to start solving problems.
- Know he is frank and welcome this. Both of us must face up to issues and speak our minds.
- Judging from conversations with Secs. Shultz and Baldrige, feel he has some serious misconceptions of U.S. Welcome opportunity to address these.
- I don't like your system of government just as you don't like ours. But that must not prevent us from forging more constructive relations.
- This will be my aim.
- Hope to have more private meetings. Feel free to send advisers out or take a walk whenever you want to deal with something privately.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-114/3#7991

~~SECRET~~

BY RW NARA DATE 3/2/01

42

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FIRST PLENARY

November 19, 1985, A.M., Maison Fleur d'Eau

Objective:

To give Gorbachev your view of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and describe the direction in which you would like to see it move.

Procedure:

Since you are host, invite Gorbachev to make his initial presentation. Then follow with yours, adding to it comments or reaction to Gorbachev's initial statement.

Main Points:

- U.S. is strong and firm, but of peaceful intent.
- U.S. has reacted to Soviet aggressiveness by building up its forces for defense.
- Strong consensus in U.S. for policy and resources required will not change.
- U.S. has no designs against Soviet Union or its legitimate interests, but will defend itself and Allies vigorously.
- Choice we face: (1) to continue pattern of past -- which inevitably means an arms race and danger of confrontation, or (2) to direct our competition into non-military and non-threatening channels.
- We can prevent war between us either way, but U.S. prefers second course.
- Our proposals are directed at laying groundwork for second course.
- Need concrete steps, not just words.
- Question of use of force is basic. If U.S. views USSR as trying to expand influence by force, it will react.
- Arms reduction important. Should concentrate on most threatening and destabilizing systems. Difficult, perhaps impossible, to achieve without restraint in use of force.
- Building confidence is also a key. For this, must solve problems with compliance, establish better communication and improve working relationship.
- Cannot work all this out at one set of meetings, but if you wish, can make an important start.

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SECOND PLENARY

November 19, 1985, P.M., Maison Fleur d'Eau

Objective:

To impress upon Gorbachev the desirability of moving toward a radical reduction of nuclear weapons in a manner which enhances stability, and is fair and verifiable. If there is a possibility of agreeing on negotiating guidelines favorable to U.S. interests we should set the groundwork.

Procedure:

If Gorbachev spoke first in the morning session, you should lead off with your views.

Main Points:

- United States put forward a comprehensive new proposal; builds on positive elements in Soviet counterproposal; bridging the two positions.
- Perhaps we can provide some guidelines for our negotiators to proceed under.
- In strategic arms we apply the general concept of 50% reductions but to specific, comparable categories which enhance stability.
- Our INF proposal would call for equal global levels of longer range intermediate-range missile warheads, as an interim step toward their complete elimination.
- Both of us should conduct our strategic ballistic missile defense research programs as permitted by, and in compliance with, the ABM Treaty. We believe "open laboratories" concept could enhance mutual confidence in this area.
- Verification and compliance are central elements to achieving progress in arms control.
- We believe a verifiable, worldwide CW ban is the way to solve this CW problem.
- Our policy remains to not undercut existing arms agreements to the extent the Soviets exercise comparable restraint and actively pursue meaningful arms reduction agreements.
- If Soviets can agree to the confidence and security building measures proposed in Dublin speech we could give our CDE delegations parallel instructions to commence drafting.
- We are ready to explore idea of risk reduction centers, military-to-military exchanges and are pleased with the INCSEA mechanism of practical problem-solving.

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRP 60-14134-1992

BY RNS NARA DATE 3/8/11

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SECOND PRIVATE SESSION

November 20, 1985, A.M., Soviet Mission

Objective:

To impress upon Gorbachev the importance of solving human rights concerns if U.S.-Soviet relations are to improve.

Main Points:

- Humanitarian issues are of key importance if U.S.-Soviet relations are to improve.
- Understand sensitivity. Not trying to interfere.
- But issue cannot be ducked.
- When commitments in Helsinki Final Act ignored, calls into question good faith in carrying out all agreements.
- Beyond this, fact is that approval of treaties and funding of cooperative projects depends on Congress.
- Unless situation improves, ratification and funding of measures we both want will be difficult.
- Political fact of life in U.S.
- Issue particularly relevant to trade.
- Would like to create better conditions for trade and relations as a whole.
- Cannot do that unless we see positive action on Soviet side.
- Do it your own way. No need to change your laws. I won't try to take credit.
- Bottom line is: without progress in this area, my hands will be tied on many issues.

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NLRR F06-114/3 # 7993
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

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THIRD PLENARY

November 20, 1985, A.M., Soviet Mission

Objective:

To make clear that the choice Gorbachev faces in regard to regional disputes is (1) to continue present policies, which will meet U.S. resistance by whatever means we deem appropriate; or (2) to find a way to eliminate the military involvement of both our countries in these disputes.

Main Points:

-- Lets cut through debates about individual areas and get to the nub of the problem.

-- Nothing has disturbed U.S.-Soviet relations more over the years than Soviet military involvement -- direct or indirect -- in conflicts beyond your borders.

-- This, along with Soviet military build-up going well beyond defensive needs, has required U.S. to rebuild its defenses and to take action where it would prefer not to.

-- If these Soviet actions continue, U.S. will counter them by whatever means seem appropriate. U.S. has resources and will.

-- Make no mistake -- in the final analysis, Soviet efforts to expand its influence by using military force will fail.

-- Such efforts also cause major strains on U.S.-Soviet relations and risk confrontations.

-- U.S. does not want to perpetuate cycle of action and reaction.

-- Thus my proposals at UNGA. Not one-sided, since aim is to provide means for both of us to disengage militarily and leave resolution of problems to people in area.

-- Support your friends all you want, so long as it is non-military. We'll support ours too, but without fueling conflicts with arms if the competition is peaceful.

-- Ask yourself: what can Soviet Union gain from pouring arms and troops into other countries? Or backing the Cubans and Vietnamese in their adventures? In your interest to seek peaceful solutions.

-- U.S. will cooperate if Soviet policies change. No desire to "triumph" or damage Soviet prestige. But Soviet policies must change if we are to have a more cooperative relationship.

-- Choice is yours.

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NLRR F06-114/3 #7994

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

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THIRD PLENARY

November 20, 1985, A.M., Soviet Mission

Supplementary Talking Points

NOTE: In addition to the general points, the following comments should be made on specific areas during the discussion:

Afghanistan

- Big obstacle to better relations; UN resolution shows world support for Afghan national liberation struggle.
- Soviet troop withdrawal, return of refugees essential.
- Respect Soviet desire for secure border; if Soviet troops withdraw, we'll cooperate in giving guarantees.

Pakistan

- Disturbed by growing bombing attacks across Pak border.
- U.S. is helping Pakistan protect itself; we'll do more if needed; actions against Pakistan are extremely dangerous.

East Asia

- Vietnamese and North Korean policies threaten stability of region.
- You should use your influence in Hanoi to urge political settlement in Cambodia; attacks on Thailand must stop.
- Re Korea, need to encourage North-South dialogue and bring both into UN as members.

Central America and Caribbean

- Most dangerous crisis in past relations arose over this region; should not happen again.
- Concerned about arms buildup in Nicaragua. Reserve right to take all necessary action.
- Reconciliation in Nicaragua and end to Cuban adventurism would help peace in region and remove obstacle in U.S.-Soviet relations.
- What can Soviet Union gain compared to risk it is taking? Think about it.

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NLRR F06-114/3#7995

BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

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Southern Africa

- U.S. committed to independence for Namibia, reconciliation in Angola, and democracy in South Africa.
- Essential to end violence; but Soviet involvement obviously growing. Deeper Soviet role forces others to respond.
- Soviets would also gain by helping us to cut flow of outside arms and encouraging negotiation.

Middle East

- U.S. committed to work with all parties in region for lasting peace.
- Direct negotiations only realistic path.
- International conference risks stalemate leading region back to war.
- Hope you will reassess, support movement toward peace rather than block it.
- Otherwise, Soviet role cannot be positive factor for peace.

Berlin

- Important to maintain calm around the city.
- Clear need to enforce greater discipline on Soviet troops in dealing with our Liaison Mission.
- Also important to settle differences over air safety, reestablish quadripartite control.

Europe

- Artificial division of Europe is unjustifiable, and a source of instability.
- Problem not borders or existence of alliances, but attempt to cut Eastern Europe off from normal contacts with neighbors.
- Must begin taking steps to increase freedom of movement and contacts as agreed in Helsinki Final Act.
- Pressure on Poland to suppress its people's legitimate desires places great burden on U.S.-Soviet relations.

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FOURTH PLENARY

November 20, 1985, P.M., Soviet Mission

Objectives:

(1) To stress the importance of bringing our societies in closer contact and better communication if we are to have a more peaceful relationship; and (2) To wrap up any concrete agreements reached which serve U.S. interests and which can be announced.

Main Points:

- We both agree on the necessity of avoiding war.
 - One of the most effective ways to achieve this over the long term is to bring our societies in more regular and fruitful contact.
 - Both can benefit greatly.
 - Glad you accepted some of my proposals. We liked most of yours, including the international fusion project.
 - Still, we have a very long way to go. Lets both keep pushing our people to do more in this area.
- [Points on agreements reached to be supplied when situation is clearer.]

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DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F06-114/3 #7996
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/11

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

9182

November 14, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

THROUGH: ROBERT W. PEARSON

FROM: STELLA S. BRACKMAN

SUBJECT: Request to Travel to Geneva for the Geneva Meeting
on
November 19-21, 1985

I will be traveling to Geneva for the Meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on November 19-21, 1985 as a member of the support staff.

Transportation will be on government aircraft. Per Diem expenses will be paid by the Department of State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve my travel.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

cc: Administrative Office

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

DATE: November 14, 1985

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: Stella S. Brackman
2. PURPOSE(S), EVENT(S), DATE(S): Support Staff to the Geneva Meeting between Pres. Reagan and GenSec Gorbachev, November 19-21, 1985

3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): Washington/Geneva/Washington

DEPARTURE DATE <u>10/16/85</u>	RETURN DATE <u>10/21/85</u>
TIME <u>9:05AM</u>	TIME <u>8:35PM</u>
4. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOV AIR XX COMMERCIAL AIR _____ POV _____ RAIL _____ OTHER _____
5. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM _____ OTHER _____ TOTAL TRIP COST _____
6. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC _____ OTHER DEPARTMENT OF STATE
7. IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO _____
9. IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid by Traveler, Describe Source and Arrangements): _____

10. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ 0
11. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____

12. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: _____
13. APPROVALS: