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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

November 26, 1983

National Security
Decision Directive 115

Visit of Prime Minister Shamir

The forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Shamir affords us a unique opportunity to make progress on our Middle East agenda and to develop a more mature strategic relationship with the Government of Israel. In order to put these discussions in a proper strategic context, we need to stress that from the USG perspective, the array of threats to our vital interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and Southwest Asia posed by the Soviet Union, Syria, Libya and the fundamentalist Islamic regime in Iran dictate that we enhance and deepen our security cooperation with Israel and the moderate Arab states. With this strategic purpose in mind, the following should comprise the main themes for our discussions with Israeli leaders.

Political-Military Cooperation with Israel. As directed in previous National Security Decision Directives, the US is prepared to immediately undertake enhanced and expanded political-military consultations with the GOI. Our objective is to undertake combined military planning to protect common interests and defend shared objectives focusing first on the Soviet-Syrian threats to our interests. Our consultations should work toward the preparation of combined operational plans, access and support for U.S. forces and equipment which could be deployed to Israel and meaningful military exercises which would enhance our readiness to cooperate in combined military operations.

U.S. Security Relations with the Moderate Arab States. Recognizing that there are long-standing Israeli sensitivities regarding U.S. military cooperation with -- and assistance to -- certain Arab states (e.g., Jordan and Saudi Arabia) and a long history of active Israeli opposition to these activities, we will reiterate our determination to pursue these relationships because we deem them critical to the protection of our vital interests. The Israeli leadership must be told of our insistence that while we do not expect open support for these efforts, we cannot accept active Israeli intervention to impede them. Moreover, we need to explain that our relationships with Arab states on the one hand and Israel on the other should involve in ways that they become mutually reinforcing over time.

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U.S. Commitment to the Peace Progress. The U.S. remains committed to the process begun at Camp David as amplified and elaborated in my initiative of September 1, 1982. We should note the indications we have received that the Government of Jordan may be seriously considering new initiatives to advance a peaceful resolution of the Palestinian problem and stress our deep commitment to furthering such an initiative. We should press the Israeli leadership to relax restrictions which have impaired the quality of life for Palestinians on the West Bank and repeat, in strong terms, our continued opposition to Israeli settlement activity.

Progress in Lebanon. We should reiterate the objectives outlined in NSDD-111 and stress again the need for flexibility on future Israeli withdrawals if adequate security arrangements can be concluded with the Government of Lebanon. We should note our approval for the decisive actions recently undertaken by Israel to deter and preempt terrorist attacks in Lebanon and our continued support for the May 17th agreement.

In signing this - I still believe we must retain some plausibility and persuade Israel that our only hope for peace depends on our not driving a wedge between ourselves and the moderate Arab states.

Ronald Reagan

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