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SYSTEM II
90373

April 26, 1988

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 305

OBJECTIVES AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT (X)

I have accepted General Secretary Gorbachev's invitation for a Moscow Summit meeting beginning May 29 and ending June 2. My visit to the Soviet Union will be preceded by a stop in Helsinki and followed by a stop in London. My specific objectives for the Soviet and Western European portions of this trip are listed below. The overall objectives of the trip may be summarized as follows:

-- to demonstrate the success of this Administration's approach to the Soviet Union based on the principles of strength, realism, and Western unity;

-- to consolidate the gains made by this Administration on the four-part agenda with the Soviet Union and to press for further progress, particularly on attainment as soon as possible of a START agreement which fully meets our security concerns, significant improvement in the Soviet Union's human rights performance, and resolution of regional conflicts beyond Afghanistan;

-- to reaffirm to both the Soviets and West Europeans that the United States remains fully committed to overcoming the postwar East-West division of Europe, and that broad progress toward this goal is the best guarantee of long-term stability and improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. (X)

My visit to the Soviet Union should not be seen as a dialogue only with the Soviet government, but also as a way of communicating with the Soviet people. I want to emphasize throughout my trip that the democratic values that make our country great are those toward which much of the world--including, we hope, the Soviet Union--is moving. At the same time, I wish to make clear that, while we welcome promises of reform within the USSR, the policies of the United States and the West toward Moscow must be based on Soviet deeds rather than words. Only a realistic approach can pass the test of time and contribute to the stable development of the East-West relationship. (X)

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Specific Objectives in the Soviet Union

My specific objectives in the Soviet portion of my trip include:

-- to stress the importance of progress in Soviet human rights performance across the board -- an increased rate of emigration, family reunification, release of prisoners of conscience, and especially, changes in laws and practices that will produce greater respect for individual liberties -- as a means of furthering overall improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations;

-- to make maximum practical progress toward an agreement for a fifty percent reduction in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces, while making clear to the Soviet side that we have no deadline and that the pressures of time cannot be used to obtain an agreement which does not fully meet our security concerns;

-- to follow through on the progress made on the regional agenda in the signing of the Geneva instruments. This includes emphasizing to the Soviets the importance of completing a prompt withdrawal from Afghanistan, reaffirming our objective of a genuinely independent, non-aligned Afghanistan in which the Afghan people are free to determine their own future, and actively engaging the Soviets to be helpful in resolving other regional issues on our agenda;

-- to consolidate progress and move forward on bilateral issues, including exchanges and, where warranted, economic relations;

-- to press for progress on all other matters of interest on our four-part agenda and to assure the Soviets that we are prepared to continue working actively on this agenda through the end of this Administration. ~~AN~~

Specific Objectives in Western Europe

My objectives in Western Europe include emphasizing to our friends and Allies:

-- that the U.S. gives, and will continue to give, the highest priority to shared Western interests and security concerns in our bilateral dialogue with the Soviets;

-- that Western unity and strength are the twin pillars which have proven their success in negotiation with the Soviets;

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3

-- that we must guard against exaggerated expectations on the future pace and achievement of U.S.-Soviet relations or the reform process underway in the Soviet Union, but be willing to move forward as quickly as the situation allows;

-- that we will do our part to ensure continuity and stability in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. ~~SECRET~~

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