TO: The Secretary
The Deputy Secretary
FROM: ARA - Viron P. Vaky
HA - Patricia M. Derian

Current Human Rights Situation in Argentina

(U) The following is a summary of the human rights situation in Argentina. A more detailed review of current conditions is set forth in the attachment.

Disappearances: Seventeen since February 1; three have turned up arrested by the GOA, one was released, and 13 remain unresolved. The last reported disappearance occurred May 13. In 1978, 55 persons disappeared per month; in 1977, 180; in 1976, 300.

Accounting for the Disappeared: The GOA is preparing new legislation to shorten to six months the time period for declaring presumptive death. Army Commander and Junta Member Viola has spoken publicly for the first time of the disappeared as "those who will be absent forever" and told the Embassy he thinks, with rare exceptions, most of the disappeared are dead. The GOA has so far refused to provide individual accounting.

PEN Prisoners: The GOA announced on June 29 it now holds 1,723 persons under PEN (executive detention). It is not clear how many former PEN detainees have been freed and how many have continued in prison after civil or military trials, but the Embassy and the ICRC estimate the total number of political prisoners at just under 3,000 in all of these categories. GOA officials plan to reduce the PEN category to 800-1,000 by late 1979; the latter will continue to be held for an unstated period. In early 1978, the GOA acknowledged that it held about 3,500 PEN prisoners.
Clandestine Prisoners: The question of whether clandestine prisoners exist in significant numbers remains unresolved. If there are, they could number up to a few hundred as an outside limit; our Embassy considers it unlikely that the number would be that high; we have no firm evidence. Fragmentary data, however, suggest the existence of at least some unacknowledged prisoners and of some small scattered clandestine detention centers about to be closed.

Right of Option: Moving at a slow pace, with only 18 GOA approvals so far for PEN prisoners seeking to come to the U.S. The GOA has approved approximately 170 applications since September 1977 for all countries.

Prison Conditions: The GOA issued nationwide uniform prison regulations in late April and consolidated PEN detainees in six facilities. In February, there were reports of two beatings (one fatal) and a disappearance in prisons and, in May, of a number of beatings and robberies among a group of prisoners in transit. The GOA believes prison conditions have improved over last year, when it criticized the GOA for poor prison conditions.

The Judiciary: The NYC Bar Association mission noted that the Executive continues to be uncooperative in responding to habeas corpus petitions. The Judiciary has made some attempts to force greater cooperation, but its effective power remains limited.

Argentine Attitudes Toward the Human Rights Issue: Videla and Viola appear to be trying to carry out commitments to us to end disappearances and reduce PEN detentions. Hardliners such as General Suarez Mason and General Menendez have recently stepped up calls for a new GOA offensive to root out "intellectual subversion." A political test of strength between these two points of view is shaping up for year's end.

(U) The NYC Bar Association mission noted that progress is possible but would come much faster if the Argentine legal profession would take a more active interest in return to rule of law.
(U) The Church and some elements of the press have become more outspokenly critical in dealing with human rights.

Attachment:

Detailed Review of Current Conditions.

8/1/79   X21966

Clearances: INR/RAR:JBuchanan
Current Human Rights Situation in Argentina

(U) Following is a description of key human rights developments since the Task Force completed its assessment in early February:

Disappearances

We have received reports of seventeen disappearances for the period since February 1. We immediately communicated these reports to high GOA authorities and asked for information on their whereabouts. The GOA has provided us with information that three of the persons were arrested and charged in the courts. One person was briefly detained and then released. The GOA has been unable to provide information on the thirteen other cases. In three cases, however, the disappeared persons have contacted relatives by letter or telephone call to advise that they were well and would eventually reappear. The last disappearance took place May 13. A list of unresolved disappearances, including those three, is attached.

The victims of these abductions/disappearances have no confirmed connection with terrorist groups. Some, such as members of the Socialist Workers' Party, and the Argentine Communist Party-associated Relatives of Disappeared and Detained Persons are related to the nonviolent political left.

This record since February compares to previous years when disappearances averaged about 55 per month in 1978, 180 per month in 1977, and 300 per month in 1976. In mid-May 1979 the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights published a list of 5,465 disappearances since 1975; in the month following publication, the Assembly received reports of an additional 105 previously unreported cases. An earlier Assembly report contained 80 1978 disappearances unknown to the Embassy and one from 1979.

Accounting for the Disappeared

The GOA has not yet taken any public step to account for the disappeared. The Government has addressed the broad issue internally and is seeking solutions to specific aspects of the problem, such as
shortening the period for legal presumption of death. There are also indications that it is seeking to establish what documentary evidence exists throughout the security apparatus.

Foreign Minister Pastor briefed EC-9 ambassadors in Buenos Aires recently on the terms of new legislation and said that relatives will be able to petition the Government for assistance and information three months after the occurrence of a disappearance. The Government will have three months to establish the whereabouts of the missing person and, if no information is developed, relatives will be able to claim survivors' benefits and regularize their legal status. Although he did not supply details, Pastor said relatives will be able to claim indemnization.

General Viola reiterated to Ambassador Castro on June 25 that the GOA does not have information on the fate of the disappeared and in view of the extended periods of disappearance he doubted any of these people were alive. He said a few of the disappeared may reappear, but these would be rare exceptions. In a public speech delivered on Army Day (May 29) Viola referred obliquely to the fate of the disappeared, calling them "those who will be absent forever." Argentine human rights groups have interpreted this tacit statement as an admission that many of the disappeared were killed by Argentine police and military forces.

The Embassy concluded in a recent trends report (May 31) that "we are reasonably certain that the apparatus for disappearing people still exists although, even considering a small upsurge of disappearances in the past several weeks, it appears less used than in the past."

**PEN Prisoners**

The GOA has continued to release detainees from PEN. The Embassy estimated in mid-June that the political prisoner population in this category is now at about 2,200. The GOA announced June 29 that there are now 1,723 PEN prisoners. At the end of 1978, this figure stood at about 2,900 and at the beginning of 1978 at about 3,500. It is not clear
how many of those removed from PEN are at liberty and how many remain in custody under some form of charges in judicial processes, or after having been convicted by either military or civilian tribunals. The Embassy estimate the total current prison population of persons confined because of the GOA's counter-subversion campaign at just under 3,000, including those held under PEN and persons who have been tried and convicted in civil or military courts. We have been told by a source on President Videla's staff that the GOA will continue to review the status of PEN detainees and plans to have the number down to 800 to 1,000 by the end of this year; these prisoners would continue to be held indefinitely under PEN since the "Campora amnesty" of 1973 makes it impossible to prosecute them. Other high-level Argentine officials have said that a certain number of persons will continue under PEN since the GOA considers them committed subversives although it lacks evidence that will stand up in court.

Foreign Minister Pastor said the GOA has augmented its legal staff reviewing PEN detention from four to 30.

**Clandestine Prisoners**

The Embassy has received fragmentary but credible data which suggest the GOA may continue to hold a number of prisoners that it has not publicly acknowledged. In a recent case a woman, who had disappeared in late 1978, was released by the authorities. It appears that most of the persons being held clandestinely are either the "disappeared" in process through the security apparatus or former terrorists who are cooperating with the authorities. As the number of new disappearances has dropped, there is little reason to think that there are still substantial numbers "in process." The Embassy believes that if clandestine prisoners exist, their number could not be more than a few hundred as an outside limit, and it considers it unlikely that the figure be that high. There are fragmentary data supporting, in the Embassy's view, that some small, scattered clandestine detention centers still exist, each holding no more than perhaps 25 persons. It is believed that such centers would be closed before the arrival of the IACHR in November.
Right of Option

Argentine Government action on the right of option program continues at a slow pace. The GOA has given permission for 18 detainees to travel to the U.S. under the right of option program; 13 entered the U.S. under our parole program. The Embassy has issued 95 certificates of eligibility. General Viola assured Ambassador Castro again that approval of right of option cases would proceed more quickly. GOA officials announced that about 170 persons have been released under right of option for travel to all countries.

Prison Conditions

The GOA has published uniform regulations for the treatment of detainees in a move designed to end variations in treatment at different facilities. The ICRC urged this step and has called the rules a significant improvement for the treatment of detainees. We have reports, however, that the regulations have not yet been fully implemented in all facilities. The GOA has consolidated PEN detainees in six facilities.

According to reports reaching from other prisoners, in February one person disappeared from prison, another was tortured, and a third died as a result of beatings by guards. In early May, the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights reported that some of the 200 prisoners moved from Resistencia prison to the La Plata prison were beaten and robbed during the transfer.

The Judiciary

As the NYC Bar mission noted in its report, the executive power continues to decline to provide information in response to habeas corpus petitions filed by the relatives of disappeared persons. Regarding PEN detainees, the Executive response is that "links with subversives" constitute sufficient grounds for continued detention, invoking its alleged power to hold individuals without charge under the Constitutional state of siege authority. The NYC Bar mission report was sharply critical of the lack of professional objection to the denial of due process and deterioration in the executive power of the judiciary in recent years.
(U) The courts have recently tried a number of persons on pre-1976 subversive charges and sentenced them to prison terms. Three police officers were recently prosecuted for abuse of prisoners.

Argentine Attitudes Toward the Human Rights Issue

(U) President Videla and Army Commander Viola are maintaining their leadership position within the GOA on human rights policy and appear to have begun carrying out commitments made to us repeatedly in the past to bring disappearances to an end and reduce PEN detention. Hardliners in the Argentine military still favor repressive policies directed at a broad range of political dissidents. Army Chief of Staff General Suarez Mason, for example, recently proposed to the Cabinet a broad offensive against political subversives which clearly would include groups unrelated to the terrorist movements of the past. General Menendez, Third Corps Commander, has called for continued strong efforts to battle "ideological subversion."

(U) The prestigious daily La Prensa has joined The Buenos Aires Herald in championing human rights. However, no paper has agreed to publish the Permanent Assembly's latest list of disappearances. The Catholic Church addressed an appeal to President Videla on May 4 on behalf of disappeared persons, PEN detainees, jailed labor leaders, and lower income groups adversely affected by present GOA economic policy.

(U) The New York Bar Association's report on human rights conditions in Argentina noted that ingredients are present for future progress in human rights observance, but that the support of the Argentine legal profession is essential for a quick return to civilized legal practices. The New York Bar Association exhorted its Argentine colleagues to take a more active role in this area.
UNRESOLVED DISAPPEARANCES SINCE
February 1, 1979

Roberto and Maria Rosa Barreiros

Reported picked up by the police on March 12. Mr. Barreiros's mother subsequently received a telephone call from her daughter-in-law advising that the couple was well and would reappear. There has been no word from them since.

Julio Cesar Abruzzese

Reported picked up by police on April 11. Mr. Abruzzese was reputed to be involved in criminal activities and his disappearance does not appear to have political significance.

Thelma Dorothy Jara de Cabezas

Mrs. Jara de Cabezas was reported picked up by the police on April 27. She was a key official of the Argentine Communist Party-associated Relatives of the Disappeared and Detained (FDD). Letters have subsequently been received from her (one by Ambassador Castro) describing in detail her work for the FDD and denouncing the Montoneros for having used her for subversive political ends. Family members are convinced that the letters are genuine. There has been no further word from her.

Mario Marrero (April 20), Jorge Sabador Gullo (April 26), and Elbio Jose Rodriguez (April 23). All are in their 20's.

These three persons were reported disappeared in separate incidents in Buenos Aires. We have received no information concerning their whereabouts.

Jorge V. Sznaider, Jorge Perez Brancato, Hugo Malosovsky, Noemi Graciela Beltone, Carlos Alberto Perez, and Mirta Silber de Perez. All are in their 20's.

These six persons were reported picked up by the police on May 13 in a Buenos Aires apartment while they were holding a political discussion. No word has been received since on their whereabouts.
MEMORANDUM (Entire Text)

TO: ARA - Ambassador Bowdler
FROM: ARA/ECA - Claus W. Ruser
SUBJECT: Follow-Up on Smith Visit

Supplementing our two principal reporting cables, I would like to give some personal impressions about Ambassador Smith's trip to Buenos Aires.

1. The Argentines were genuinely pleased by the Smith visit. It confirmed a more conciliatory U.S. approach. It also served their own interests since they are often queried by friendly governments why their relations with the U.S. are so poor. The visit (as the preceding ones by Goodpaster and Hodges) demonstrate to their own people that their relations (and their international acceptance) are improving.

2. Predictably, the human rights community and the political opposition in Argentina have reacted coolly to these visits. Human rights groups do not wish the U.S. to improve relations with the GOA. We should expect to see this reaction reflected by human rights groups here in the U.S. within a short period of time.

3. Smith and I told Argentine opposition leaders that human rights remain a central concern. They said, in essence, that the improvement in U.S.-Argentine relations weakens their political position and that we should take care to avoid the appearance of a shift in policy.

4. Videla, Viola, and Pastor all stalled on Tlatelolco; there was no glimmer that Argentina might ratify to put itself on the same basis as Brazil. There is awareness of a regional proliferation problem as Argentina pushes ahead with its nuclear program, and Smith played heavily on the emergence of a nuclear arms race on the Indian sub-continent. The tendency in Argentine thinking at this point is to downplay the problem on grounds that South America is basically a peaceful continent that lacks deep-rooted and abiding antagonisms among its peoples. (Smith's account of the developing nuclear competition between India and Pakistan was greeted with silence by the senior military officers meeting with him.)
5. The Argentine leadership, on the other hand, is very conscious of the significance of Argentine-Brazilian cooperation. Their thinking on dealing with the proliferation problem within the Hemisphere seems to run in terms of mutual inspection with Brazil (there was an oblique reference to this in Castro Madeiro's talks with Smith) and, over the long term, some arrangement similar to EURATOM. But they are conscious of their technological lead, do not believe any other Latin American country will be able to catch up any time soon, and probably see these arrangements emerge step-by-step as other countries acquire nuclear facilities (in many cases through cooperation with Argentina).

6. The discussion on grains had worrisome aspects. Martinez de Hoz stressed that Argentina was in effect priced out of its traditional markets, thus laying a basis for a possible decision to exceed the informal export limits. For this reason we should continue to stress the importance of these limits. While export availabilities are sharply reduced, the present limits are quite generous by historic standards; any further increase in Argentine exports beyond these limits, even though modest, would be received badly here in Washington.

7. Pastor stressed very heavily their desire that Humphrey-Kennedy be lifted. They know of the new waiver provision now in the Congress and the Embassy here is following the amendment closely. Smith gave them no encouragement that the prohibition could be lifted this year.

8. The economic team is extremely confident and made a strong presentation. They feel that their work to establish a pluralistic, efficient market economy and to decentralize the public sector (with many services shifted to the provinces and local communities), is laying the basis for a democratic state. They consider the structuralist arguments once propounded by Prebisch and the Economic Commission for Latin America totally discredited and believe that their own neo-conservative market-oriented policies are the wave of the future throughout Latin America.

9. Our interlocutors displayed some sensitivity and testiness about Smith's probes on human rights (basket 3), suggesting that "Argentina needs no lessons about democracy from the U.S.". They were quite categoric
that disappearances were over and that the opening of the political dialogue was a first important step on the long road back to civilian institution.

10. With regard to Vaquero, Smith had received authority from the Secretary to propose a visit. In deference to ARA's position, however, he agreed to qualify his statement, stressing the need for continued favorable developments in human rights and U.S.-Argentine relations.

11. We noted with some surprise the strength and urgency of Pastor's presentation on the Beagle channel. (During the Goodpastor visit, his reference to the problem was low-key, almost perfunctory.) During the talks it appeared that Pastor's presentation was simply a restatement of an earlier Argentine position --during the 1978 crisis the Argentines argued that the U.S. should press the Chileans to be more flexible. In view of the most recent intelligence that the Argentine General Staff is once again beginning preparations for a military solution, Pastor's change in tone, in retrospect, conveys a more ominous note.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Pastor  
National Security Council  
The White House  

FROM: John W. Spiegel  
Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State  

SUBJECT: Assessment of Current Human Rights Situation in Argentina  

Attached is a report on the current human rights situation in Argentina, done at Secretary Vance's request by the Assistant Secretaries for Latin America, Human Rights, Policy Planning, and Intelligence and Research. The report concludes that kidnapping, by official security units, continued during 1978 at a rate of roughly 55 "disappearances" per month. Approximately 90% of those abducted are estimated to have been tortured during interrogation, and many have been summarily executed.

On the basis of the attached report, Secretary Vance and Mr. Christopher believe that we cannot continue abstaining in the multilateral development banks on non-basic human needs loans to Argentina. The United States moved from a position of voting no on non-basic human needs loans to abstention because of signs that the Argentine government intended to address seriously the very grave human rights situation. We have urged the GOA to do so in repeated diplomatic approaches at the highest levels, including Secretary Vance and the Vice President. We had hoped that the GOA's decision last fall to invite the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to visit Argentina this May would provide a further inducement for improvements in advance of the visit, and for that reason we went forward with Export-Import Bank financing and some IMET courses. Notwithstanding our efforts and expectations, there has been no improvement in what remains the worst human rights situation in the hemisphere.
As you know, the legal restrictions, from a human rights standpoint, on U.S. positions on loans by the multilateral development banks are much stronger and more explicit than in other areas of economic relations such as Ex-Im lending, OPIC guarantees, or export licenses, where we have followed a somewhat more liberal course with respect to Argentina. The U.S. is required by law to seek to channel assistance in the multilateral development banks away from countries whose governments engage in "a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights," and to oppose loans to those countries unless the loans serve basic human needs. We consistently vote against loans to a number of countries where the situation is not as grave as in Argentina. Given these considerations, and taking into account the need to address this difficult bilateral issue in a positive way whenever possible, Secretary Vance and Mr. Christopher have concluded that the U.S. must move soon to a "vote no" position unless there are substantial improvements in the Argentine human rights situation.

Amb. Vaky is discussing with the Argentine Ambassador this need for improvement in the near future and the likely consequences of a continuation of the current situation.

Please let me know if you have any reactions to the attached report.

Attachment:

As stated.
ARGENTINA: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

Parameters and problems. The following assessment covers the Argentine government's 1978 performance and the current situation with respect to category-one human rights. Inevitably, efforts have been hampered somewhat by the US Government's limited capacity for monitoring human rights events in Argentina and verifying reports of either positive or negative developments.

Imprecision is most clearly a problem with statistical material. Frankly stated, we do not know exactly how many people have been tortured or killed, how many are now being held prisoner, how many prisons are being used, etc. We are forced, in many cases, to reply upon estimates whose credibility stems from their relatively wide acceptance among groups interested in and informed upon Argentina human rights developments.

We do not believe, however, that timely, precise and verifiable information would fundamentally alter the assessment offered below. The record of Argentine human rights events is sufficiently complete to produce a convincing cumulative picture of the government's performance. And while precise statistics might alter somewhat the quantitative dimensions of that picture, its qualitative aspects would remain unchanged.

Current situation. With respect to category-one rights, conditions can be summarized as follows:

Political prisoners: Approximately 2,900 persons purportedly guilty of security violations are being detained at the disposition of the national executive branch under state-of-siege powers provided for in the Argentine constitution (PEN prisoners).

* The current state of siege was instituted on November 6, 1974 by the Isabel Peron government. Under the state-of-siege, the national executive is empowered to detain prisoners indefinitely, but it can neither judge nor punish detainees. The Argentine courts ruled in 1977 and 1978 that the executive branch must cite specific causes for detention
There are two other groups of prisoners, neither of which is publicly acknowledged by the government. One group is being held at the disposal of military authorities (DAN prisoners) and probably includes about 500 persons. According to Embassy Buenos Aires sources, most of these prisoners are either former terrorists now cooperating with security units or new detainees undergoing interrogation and not, therefore, listed as PEN detainees. The final group involves prisoners who have been selected for a rehabilitation program run by the security services. We have no reliable figures, but the program appears to be relatively small, encompassing at most a few hundred persons.

No sustained official effort is being made to substantially reduce the number of political prisoners by (1) releasing those against whom there exists no evidence of terrorist or criminal involvement nor pending charges; (2) trying those charged with specific offenses; or (3) permitting political prisoners to exercise their constitutional rights to choose exile over imprisonment (right-of-option). The right-of-option program initiated in late 1977 has resulted in few approvals of prisoner petitions for exile.

There is little evidence to substantiate persistent rumors that thousands of political prisoners are being held in clandestine camps located throughout the country.

Torture and prisoner mistreatment: Physical and psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment for alleged subversives, or persons believed to have information about subversion who refuse to cooperate with security

in response to habeas corpus petitions covering PEN prisoners. However, the Executive does not always respond to court order. While we have little information that would permit categorizing detainees according to types of offenses, the PEN list probably includes few if any terrorists suspected of having committed violent acts against persons or property. Such individuals, when captured by security units, are routinely killed after interrogation. The alleged security violations of most of those listed as PEN detainees probably include such things as (a) non-violent actions undertaken in support of subversive (broadly defined to include action or teachings contrary to the military's conception of social order) groups, e.g., poster and pamphlet distribution and a variety
officials. Torture generally occurs during interrogation, prior to official listing of a detainee as a PEN prisoner, or his or her summary execution. Most of the PEN prisoners and many undeclared prisoners reported in August that as many as 90 percent of PEN detainees were tortured during interrogation. **

Prisoner treatment beyond the interrogation stage and after PEN listing appears to vary considerably depending upon such factors as the prisoner's alleged offense, the proclivities of the regional military commander, and the character of individual jailors. Reports of severe mistreatment (beatings, denial of adequate food, medical care, exercise, etc.) are most often associated with specific military jurisdictions and prisons, or with the transfer or release of prisoners. In at least five reasonably documented instances in early 1978, for example, prisoners released from a La Plata jail were immediately either murdered or kidnapped, presumably by security elements. Official actions appear to have prevented recurrences of this particular type of abuse, but in late 1978 ** reported to the Embassy his belief that prison conditions and prisoner treatment had deteriorated during the year.

** Disappearances: Reports of disappearances continue to accumulate. In the vast majority of cases, responsibility almost certainly lies with one of the many security units. In the absence of evidence of clandestine camps housing thousands of allegedly disappeared persons, most must be presumed dead.

of other support activities; (b) economic actions perceived by the authorities as directly having supported subversion (the Graiver case) or otherwise endangered national interests; (c) affiliation with groups vaguely defined as "leftist"; or (c) actions that contributed to an intellectual-cultural environment conducive to the growth of "subversion" (herein lies the danger to journalists, writers, teachers, performing artists, etc.). Thus, the term "security violation" has no specific meaning. Its operative definition is largely left to the discretion of regional and local authorities with arrest powers.

** Reports received from released prisoners tend to substantiate observations on the frequency of torture.
(U) Non-governmental human rights organizations tend to use the figure of 15,000 for disappearances over the past 3-4 years. Argentine groups share that estimate and have presented the government with documentation on almost 5,000 cases. In truth, however, no one knows precisely how many people have disappeared or, in many cases, why specific individuals were victimized.

Few who have disappeared since about mid-1977, and on whom we have any information, could be considered terrorists or security threats. With most terrorists either eliminated or living in exile, the security forces have made a significant shift in their targeting practices to draw into the security net a range of non-terrorists associated with the vague and expansively defined political left. The decision as to which specific individuals will be picked up is left to regional and local authorities and, therefore, depends upon the latter's perception of what kinds of activities constitute security threats. The victim's culpability may only have involved past membership in a group that was entirely legal at the time. Insofar as there is a discernible pattern, there has been a tendency toward the disappearance of persons with a common association past or present; e.g., graduates of the same high school or university faculty, members of a political party or youth group, etc. However, there are many cases that make no apparent sense and for which the explanation may lie more in internal politics than in any specific act of the victim.

Public criticism of government policies has, with few known exceptions, generally not been considered by authorities as grounds for detaining the critics and abusing or killing them. Many politicians, labor leaders, businessmen, and other professionals have criticized the government's economic, political and human rights policies without suffering retribution at the hands of the security forces.

There has been no significant official effort to collect and publish information on persons who allegedly have disappeared. When queried about disappearances by non-governmental organizations or foreign governments, the Argentines' standard response is "no information". The Argentine courts
regularly accept habeas corpus petitions concerning alleged disappeared persons, but they have refused to accept jurisdiction in such cases.

The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (relatives of disappeared persons) one of the most persistent and cohesive groups seeking information on disappeared persons, has recently been prohibited from conducting what had been a weekly Thursday vigil in front of Government House in downtown Buenos Aires. The demonstrations apparently had become too large and potentially disruptive in the judgment of government officials who do not intend to satisfy their demands for information. The Mothers are now holding their gatherings at smaller and less conspicuous sites.

Given the diffusion of authority that has characterized the counterterrorist effort, it is highly unlikely that any government agency either has collected or will be able to collect definitive files on alleged disappearance cases. The various security units have an obvious interest in withholding or destroying information on cases for which their operatives have been responsible.

"Reappearances" emerged as a new and possibly under-reported facet of the human rights scene in 1978. There are no reliable figures, but the number of cases is probably quite small in relation to the reported number of disappearances. As of mid-September, the Embassy had received reports of 15 cases and by mid-November Argentine human rights groups placed the figure at over 100, with a UNHCR representative suggesting it might be as high as 300. During 1978, the government published 4 lists with the names of hundreds of persons who had allegedly reappeared. In most cases, however, the individuals appear to have been the subjects of regular "missing persons" cases. Their names did not appear on the lists of disappeared persons maintained by the Embassy and Argentine human rights organizations.

Fair public trial. All who have been detained by official security agencies and subsequently disappeared have obviously been denied a fair public hearing of the charges against them.
Insofar as alleged security violators are charged and tried in civilian or military courts, there are two notable problems: the often extended period between detention and judicial processing and the reported predominance of convictions based on confessional evidence extracted through torture. Professional legal groups such as the ICJ intend to investigate the question of confessional evidence.

Invasion of the home. The detention practices of operational counterterrorist units regularly involve illegal invasion of the home. In addition, there are numerous reports of arresting officers ransacking private residences and stealing the personal property of the detainee.

Trends. 1978 produced no substantial quantitative improvement or deterioration in category-one terms. The year featured a variety of positive and negative factors, but the net result was to leave the situation little changed. Violations of category-one rights at the hands of official security personnel were frequent throughout the year, and there was no evidence of a concerted, effective government effort to halt the abuses.

It is difficult to refine the trends analysis to reflect possible patterns of the incidence of certain kinds of abuses because the available statistical material is not always reliable. The question of disappearances provides a good example. In June 1978, Embassy Buenos Aires and Argentine human rights groups believed that disappearances during the first third of 1978 had declined in frequency (about 15 per month) in comparison to 1977. By later in

The status of PEN prisoners with respect to judicial processing is quite complicated because a prisoner held under a PEN decree can simultaneously be processed on charges in civilian or military courts and, if convicted, serve and complete the imposed sentence. Perhaps half or more of the current PEN detainees are either being tried or have been sentenced by judicial authorities. This is significant because, among other reasons, PEN detainees who are under the concurrent jurisdiction of judicial authorities are not eligible to petition for exile under the right-of-option program.
the year, however, additional information forced upward adjustments in the figures. Interior Ministry records showed a rate of 40 per month for January to October (as compared to 150 per month in 1977 and 250 per month in 1978) and a Foreign Ministry source placed the ten-month 1978 figure at about 80 per month. By November, the Embassy had reports of disappearances averaging about 34 per month for the January-April period. The Embassy has since concluded that a figure of 55 per month would be a reasonable estimate for 1978.

On the basis of such evidence, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that disappearances occurred with relative frequency throughout the year with month-to-month variations reflecting tactical considerations rather than policy decisions. In essence, the situation changed little during 1978.

Counterterrorism uncontrolled. The conclusion that conditions did not improve in 1978 is based, in part, on evidence that the security forces continued to operate without effective central control. Numerous reports during the year from a variety of intelligence sources stated that:

--- President Videla and his moderate supporters were attempting to establish rigid command and control over security operations;

--- new orders had been issued with respect to conducting police and military operations within the bounds of the law; or

--- police and military operatives had been dismissed or disciplined for abuses.

Some of the reported efforts were probably undertaken. Some improvements may well have occurred, particularly in areas under the jurisdiction of officers disposed toward reform. Nonetheless, at the close of 1978 it was apparent that counterterrorist actions were generally being conducted in accord with orders issued by regional and local military authorities who viewed themselves as unconstrained by the law or the directives of national authorities. In late October, an admiral with counterterrorist responsibilities in the Buenos Aires area stated to an Embassy officer that there was almost no central control over operational counterterrorist units.
The political context. The "dirty war" argument so frequently employed by Argentines to rationalize human rights abuses is no longer relevant. According to estimates drafted by the Argentine Federal Security Service in late 1978, there were only about 400 active terrorists in Argentina; no single group was estimated to have more than 245 resident activists, and no group was judged a serious and immediate security threat. High government officials, including President Videla, have repeatedly stated both publicly and privately that the "war" is over, i.e., that there is no continuing high-level internal security threat.

The explanation for the continuing human rights abuses lies in armed forces, and especially army, politics rather than in internal security problems. The army is the predominant service, and its political heterogeneity is reflected in the conduct of government affairs. President Videla leads a group of military and civilian moderates who would prefer to see human rights abuses halted. Videla's priority concern, however, is to maintain the maximum degree of army and military unity, because the development of irreparable internal splits would spell his own quick demise and the end of the military's National Reorganization Process. Videla is not power hungry, but he is committed to the military government's reform program and believes his own role important. Thus, Videla's preferences give way to his long-term political goals when his preferences threaten military cohesion.

In the case of human rights abuses, neither Videla nor any other significant military figure, has questioned the pre-March 1976 decision to physically eliminate hard core terrorists. Videla's differences with the so-called hardliners center on violations of the rights of non-terrorists. The hardliners are philosophically authoritarian and inclined to label a wide range of political activity and sentiment as subversive. They do not entirely share the moderate perception that the "war" against subversion is over. Powerful corps commanders like Major General Carlos Guillermo Suarez Mason (formerly Commander, Corps I, Buenos Aires) and Major General Luciano Benjamin Menendez (Corps III, Cordoba) continued throughout 1978 to condone counterterrorist tactics that ensured human rights abuses.

Other factors that diminished Videla's chances of achieving human rights reforms in 1978 included his August retirement as an active-duty officer and Army Commander and
a gradual increase in military and civilian disenchantment with the general economic and political performance of his government. Those conditions, plus the degree to which the Beagle Channel controversy with Chile dominated official attention during the last quarter of the year, created highly improbable circumstances for bold human rights initiatives on Videla's part.

The results of the recent army promotion/reassignment cycle appear to offer mixed prospects for human rights reforms. Moderates politically in sympathy with Videla and Army Commander Viola now may be in a position to exert more effective control over the service. Particularly notable changes involved the following officers:

--- Suarez Mason has been shifted from his Corps I commander slot to Army Chief of Staff. His new post is a prestigious one from which he might be able to advance to the Commander in Chief's slot. Nonetheless, since he no longer has a troop command nor, more importantly, direct control over counterterrorist units, his promotion is probably a net short-term human rights gain.

--- Major General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri has replaced Suarez Mason as Corps I commander. Galtieri most recently commanded Corps II (Rosario) where he established a reputation for reasonableness and restraint in human rights matters. It has been in his geographic jurisdiction, for example, that the most progress has been registered with respect to the judicial processing of PEN prisoners. If he displays the same tendencies as Corps I Commander, he will be a needed improvement over Suarez Mason.

--- Major General Santiago Omar Riveros, another officer notorious for his permissive attitude toward human rights abuses, has been shifted from his sensitive Buenos Aires command (Military Institutes) to the Inter-American Defense Board.

--- Major General Jose Montes will replace Riveros. A Videla-Viola loyalist, Montes could combine with Galtieri to give the moderates the potential for curving the abuses heretofore characteristic of
counterterrorist operations in the Buenos Aires area.

-- Brig. General Juan Bautists Sassiani's appointment as Chief of the National Police is an ominous move in human rights terms. A counterterrorist expert, Sassiani is reputedly rough and cruel.

-- Major General Luciano B. Menendez, a fanatic on subversion who has condoned human rights violations by those under his command, remains the Corps III commander (Cordoba). Militarily, Menendez's retention may be attributable to the need for his services in the event of hostilities with Chile over the Beagle Channel. In human rights terms, however, it means that the situation in Cordoba is not liable to improve in the near future.

In all likelihood, the army command shifts will not result in immediate and drastic human rights improvements, but the political context appears to be more favorable than it has been since the March 1976 coup. Much will depend upon whether the Videla-Viola tandem chooses to exercise the necessary leadership, and perhaps ultimately upon whether the Argentine public becomes sufficiently exercised over continuing abuses to demand change.

IAHRC visit. From the Argentine government's perspective, the next critical human rights deadline is May 29 when the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) will begin a week-long on site investigation.

It is questionable, however, whether the prospect of the IAHRC visit will lead to fundamental changes in the tactics employed by the security forces and, thereby, open the way to long-term human rights advances. In this critical area, the army command changes probably offer more hope for reform than the IAHRC visit.
Attached at Tab A is the report on Argentina, which I mentioned in a recent evening report item. After reading it, both Vance and Christopher were convinced that we should adopt a tougher approach to Argentina. From October - December 1977, we voted "no" on loans to Argentina in the IFI's. We changed our position to abstention in February 1978 and have kept it since then, hoping that would induce some improvement in the human rights situation. Such improvement has not occurred, and Vance and Christopher now believe that we should vote "no" on loans in the IFI's.

Assessment

The report was prepared by INR—not HA—and it is a sobering document. The human rights situation in Argentina is the worst in the hemisphere, and despite repeated promises in 1978 by the Argentine government, it has not improved. Let me summarize the report:

-- There are 2900 acknowledged political prisoners; probably another 500 who are believed to be terrorists are held by the military; and a smaller group is being "rehabilitated." There is no effort underway to substantially reduce this number.

-- "Physical and psychological torture apparently remain standard treatment." The Red Cross estimated that 90% of the political prisoners are tortured, and some are executed.

-- Disappearances -- probably by security units -- continued at a rate of about 55 per month during 1978. (Argentina's Interior Ministry claimed 40 per month; while
the Foreign Ministry admitted to 80 per month; Embassy estimates, 55.) Increasingly, the people who disappear have vague associations with the "political left" rather than with terrorists. Both international NGO's and Argentine human rights groups estimate that there have been about 15,000 disappearances in the past 3-4 years. (S)

-- Illegal invasion of the home -- including theft by security units -- remains as commonplace as fair public trials are infrequent. (S)

The justification for official terrorism is tenuous, even using the Argentine government's statistics. Argentina's Federal Security Service estimated that there were only about 400 active terrorists in Argentina in 1978, and even Videla has admitted that the war is over. INR concludes that the explanation for continued official terrorism is army politics. (S)

Policy

While I think the assessment is quite accurate, I draw different conclusions than State as to what policy we should adopt. I understand that Vance and Christopher approach the issue as a legal one: Argentina is unquestionably engaged in a systematic pattern of human rights violations, and the law requires that we vote "no" on non-basic human needs loans. (Laws on X-M and OPIC provide more flexibility.) The law only requires that we "oppose" such loans, and "opposition" has been interpreted to include abstention as well as negative votes so I believe we have some flexibility. (S)

In deciding what approach to take, I believe we should address two questions:

(1) What is the most effective approach to Argentina to encourage them to improve the human rights situation? (S)

(2) What approach will permit us to sustain in the U.S. our overall human rights policy? When we take punitive steps toward Argentina, we not only enrage the right-wing ideologues, we also arouse the business sector and the media in the U.S. This doesn't mean that we shouldn't necessarily take such steps if we feel that it's required, but it does suggest that we should move carefully and explain our position to a wide-range audience before taking any steps, least we jeopardize our overall human rights policy. (S)

An Effective Policy

What is the most effective approach? Argentina is a big, proud and subtle country. We have an impact on Argentine government
decisions, but it's never as direct or as much as we want. This is the case of our human rights policy. 

The Argentine government wants a warmer relationship with us for three reasons: (1) our historical, reasonably close relationship; (2) the U.S. under Carter has the prestige and the morality which could contribute to the idea that the Argentine military government is legitimate; and (3) such legitimacy would undermine the civilians and the democrats in Argentina and therefore strengthen and contribute to the institutionalization of the military government. The Argentine government has pursued a two-track approach to try to get closer to the U.S.; (1) through lobbying and propaganda in the U.S., they have tried to undermine the credibility of our human rights policy, and (2) they have taken "baby steps" in the human rights area at home. I think our cool and correct posture has been as effective as any policy could be. I think negative steps as State envisages would not be any more effective with Argentina, and it would cause us serious problems in the U.S. 

In short, I would recommend that we maintain a cool and correct posture to Argentina, though we should continue to use every opportunity both directly and through third countries to encourage them to clean up their act. They will continue to try to lure high-level visitors, and we should resist that until progress is evident. (S)

But even if you believe as Vance and Christopher do, that we should take the negative steps outlined above, I would encourage delay. 

One could argue that we have been waiting for 18 months; what will several more months do? Four new factors argue for waiting a bit longer: (1) The Argentine government has been paralyzed by the Beagle Channel conflict for the past eight months; now that it's quiet, they have the opportunity to move. (2) Several of Argentina's most hard-line Generals have been transferred, and Videla and Viola are more secure than at any time before. (3) Argentina's Ambassador has just told Vaky that he thinks there is a good possibility of some progress on the human rights front over the next few months. And (4) the Inter-American Human Rights Commission is going there in May. We should wait and gear any new policy shifts to their report. That may mean a delay of six months or more.

RECOMMENDATION:

Vance has apparently decided to change our policy. I therefore recommend you call him and ask him to re-consider. If he remains convinced, you may want to ask him to delay a decision pending the IAHRC report.

Approve ______  Disapprove ______
cc: Jessica Mathews Views:

Bob is right that our primary concern should be what will work with Argentina. Our policy of the past year (abstention) certainly hasn't worked, and I have little expectation that prolonging it will change anything, despite the fact that the Beagle Channel dispute is over. On the other hand, a tougher posture probably won't work either. I suspect that in the near term nothing will work until and unless Videla gets much more secure or there is a strong change in Argentine public opinion.

However, there is one important consideration missing here, namely the relationship of Argentina to the rest of our human rights policy. As Bob points out, the situation in Argentina is the worst in the hemisphere and has even deteriorated in the past year (at least in relation to the terrorist threat if not in absolute numbers). While it is impossible to compare events in say Argentina and Indonesia, we do have to struggle to make the policy consistent insofar as we can, and by these standards there is a general consensus that we should be taking a firmer stand toward the GOA.

If neither posture is likely to be much more successful vis-a-vis the GOA, we should pick the one that is more consistent with the human rights policy -- returning to the tougher "no" vote position.

[Handwritten note:

"2/B - Maybe we should be friendly, then Videla has no hand, and see if he then can clean up his act. We need to take short-term heat but do might be until it."

Signed: [Signature] ]
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Human Rights in Argentina

Your memorandum to the Secretary of June 27 informed the Department of the President's wishes to acknowledge human rights actions taken by the Argentine government on June 14. These actions were the basis for acknowledgements by both the Secretary at Grenada and by our Director to the World Bank:

-- In his conversation with Foreign Minister Montes at Grenada on June 16, the Secretary informed his counterpart that we would be abstaining on two Argentine loans in the World Bank but made reference to recent progress.

-- The same day in the World Bank, our Director stated that there have been a number of recent indicators which suggest that the situation may be changing for the better in Argentina. The Director continued that it was the United States strong hope that further improvement in the human rights situation will make it possible for us to support future loans to Argentina. Privately, our Director made it clear to his Argentine colleague that the indicators we were talking about were the June 14 actions.

With respect to the improvements noted in your memorandum, our Embassy in Buenos Aires commented upon them in its B.A. 04638 of June 22.

-- The Embassy stated that the release of 342 persons from executive custody over two weeks represents a considerably larger number of people than usual.
However, the Embassy noted that we do not know how many people actually regained liberty and how many were turned over to the courts.

-- The processing of almost 1,000 cases of subversion by the federal and military courts is difficult to assess. The Argentine government has not released the names of those tried, the nature of the charges, or information on the sentences.

-- President Videla's reported instructions to his officials to analyze the reinstatement of the suspended right of option recalls earlier reviews of this subject. The last review resulted in an extension until September. The Embassy feels it is unclear whether more favorable action may be expected after September.

Based on continuing information on abuses emanating from all elements of our Mission in Argentina, the Department believes that the June 14 steps should be viewed cautiously. They may possibly be nothing more than a statistical smoke screen designed to mask a continued repressive policy.

The attached cable, in accordance with the President's wishes, expresses United States interest in recent Argentine steps and elicits further information. We would appreciate your clearance.

Attachment:

-Cable to Amembassy, Buenos Aires
--BA 04638 of June 22
December 16, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing Papers for Your Meeting with Congressman Reuss

Attached per your request are papers for your briefing of Congressman Reuss in relation to the trip to Latin America that he and a number of other Congressmen plan. Apart from treatment of specific subjects that were requested (non-proliferation, human rights and trade), the Department has provided information and talking points on other issues important in our bilateral relations and which will come up in the Congressmen's conversations. Some of the information is classified; we leave to your discretion what you want to share.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Briefing Papers
ARGENTINA

Overview

President Jorge Rafael Videla came to power in a March 1976 coup d'etat. Economic instability and right-wing and left-wing violence were rampant. The new government took the form of a Junta composed of the chiefs of the three armed services with Videla (Army) as President. It had two primary goals: elimination of terrorism and restoration of the economy.

The struggle against terrorism from the left is now largely won, but the excesses of counterterrorism remain a serious problem. Some of the security forces continue out of control. We believe that President Videla is a moderate who apparently has sought to constrain right-wing terrorism, but hard-line pressures have limited his success. Some progress in human rights has been made, however. Prisoners have been released, and the Argentines have allowed the resumption of International Red Cross visits to jails and military bases where prisoners are kept.

The once powerful trade unions are under tight wraps, and many of their leaders have "disappeared". The government is considering a plan for incorporating civilians into the political process, but no action has yet been taken.

In the security field, the Argentines and Chileans are locked in a boundary dispute over islands and waters south of Tierra del Fuego. Negotiations are proceeding, but there have been indications the Argentines are willing to push the Chileans to the brink of war if an agreement is not reached. Argentina is also negotiating with the UK for return of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.

In the economic field, the Videla government began to reverse the populist programs of the Peronist years by reestablishing a free market economy. The results have been generally very successful, but inflation remains a continuing problem; labor has been squeezed and illegal strikes have ensued.

U.S.-Argentina difficulties relate to the excesses of counterterrorism and our concerns regarding nuclear proliferation. Secretary Vance visited Argentina on November 21, and the joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit declared the intention of the GOA to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
ARGENTINA
Human Rights

-- Terrorism began under the Peron regimes and came close to civil war conditions; the present state of siege was established in 1974.

-- U.S. reactions since the 1976 coup to human rights violations have severely strained our relations with Argentina.

-- The Argentines believe we overemphasize official violations and underestimate the terrorist actions which trigger them; they claim not to understand why we curtail military assistance and vote against Argentine loans in the IFIs.

-- Hundreds of members of the Armed Forces and innocent civilians have been killed by leftist terrorists. The military, aided by fanatical rightist civilians, have reacted brutally.

-- Many terrorist activists and suspects have been summarily executed. Torture to produce confessions and obtain information is commonplace.

-- The government has abducted many civilians, some of whom had no ties to violent leftist groups. No exact numbers are possible, but disappearances are estimated to exceed 2,000 since the Junta came to power. On December 8 some 20 people, meeting to request information on missing relatives, were abducted apparently by security forces.
-- There are over 4,000 political prisoners now jailed in Argentina. Many have been imprisoned for over a year without charges.

-- In October the Argentines reinstated a constitutional provision which would allow political prisoners to opt for exile instead of imprisonment. However, few prisoners have been released.

-- During the Panama Canal Treaties Signing Ceremony, President Videla told President Carter that he would try to resolve the cases of some of these prisoners before Christmas. Further encouragement was given during Secretary Vance's November 21 visit to Argentina, when he was told that there may be a Christmas amnesty which would free some prisoners.

-- The U.S. government has made repeated presentations to the Argentines about our human rights concerns. President Carter fully discussed the question with President Videla. Secretary Vance spoke with the Argentines of a list of some 7,500 names of disappeared and detained persons; Assistant Secretaries Derian and Todman have raised the subject in separate visits. The Argentines also received an Amnesty International visit.

-- Human rights concerns have caused the U.S. to cut off military training, withhold FMS credits, delay FMS cash sales and vote against Argentine loan requests in the IFIs.
As of October 1, 1978, legislation will prohibit military sales to Argentina unless the human rights situation has greatly improved.

There have been frequent reports of anti-Semitism in Argentina, and indeed there have been bombings of synagogues (no casualties resulted) and threats against Jewish leaders. However, the GOA does meet frequently with Jewish leaders and is considering making it a crime to incite violence against religious groups.
ARGENTINA

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

-- Argentina has the most advanced nuclear program in Latin America. It was the first and so far only state to have an operating nuclear power plant (1974) and now plans to export reactors, beginning with Peru.

-- It has ambitious and credible non-military goals which include a major power production program and self-sufficiency in producing fuels and reactors.

-- Argentina has based its power program on heavy water reactors, which are fueled with natural uranium and thus avoid dependence upon foreign enrichment services.

-- The Argentines are dependent on the U.S. and Canada for heavy water.

-- Much of Argentina's nuclear program does not operate under international safeguards.

-- We are trying to persuade the Argentines to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco and work out full scope safeguards with the IAEA. We also seek to persuade the Argentines to defer reprocessing of its spent reactor fuel.

-- The Argentines are participating in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation.
-- During Secretary Vance's visit to Argentina, a joint communique was issued in which the two countries expressed an interest in increasing the present cooperation and enlarging the scope of their existing agreement for cooperation to include relevant technology and ways of meeting Argentina's heavy water needs as well as provision of fuel to be used in the research reactors Argentina would export to Peru.

-- In the joint communique the Argentines declared their intention to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
ARGENTINA

Trade

-- Argentina's international economic position is improving steadily.

-- Exports should reach $4.5 billion in 1977, compared to imports of about $4 billion, including more than $700 million from the U.S.

-- While the Argentine trade balance will be some $400 million in our favor this year, Argentina's favorable balance with the communist countries will also be about $400 million. This could lead to pressure for greater Argentine purchases from the Soviets.

-- The Argentines presently have some $3 billion in foreign currency reserves.

-- Recent improvements in Argentina's economic situation have led to considerable interest but, as yet, little new investment by foreign companies.

-- U.S. investment now stands at $1.4 billion and loans by U.S. banks to Argentina exceed $3 billion.

-- During Secretary Vance's visit, we agreed to the establishment of an Argentine-U.S. Mixed Economic Commission to consider trade and investment questions.
-- The Argentines may wish to use the Commission to request the U.S. to reconsider its restrictions on Argentine beef exports. Because of endemic hoof and mouth disease, Argentine beef exports to the U.S. are restricted to canned and cooked-frozen products.

-- The Treasury Department is now considering countervailing duty cases against Argentine leather and clothing exporters.

-- The Argentines have taken generally forthcoming and responsible positions on trade issues in international fora.

-- They have serious reservations about a common fund for commodities, most of which they do not export.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Legislative Inter-agency Group
FROM: Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.
SUBJECT: Country, Commodity and Human Rights Restrictions/Foreign Assistance Legislative Strategy

Summary

The Bilateral and Security Assistance Authorizations restrict assistance to some countries and commodities. With the exception of lifting the embargo on arms sales to Turkey, the Administration proposes to leave the restrictions in place and seek only to avoid new ones.

Similar prohibitions in the FY-78 Appropriations Act will expire September 30, and the House will undoubtedly seek to re-enact them in this year's bill. While we will probably be unable to resist prohibitions on direct assistance which repeat those in this year's Appropriations Act, we must decide how to fight prohibitions on indirect assistance which inevitably will be offered.

Our options regarding attempts to cut funding levels are discussed in a separate paper.

Background

There are three categories of prohibitions:

- Country-specific prohibitions (see Tab A summary of present prohibitions)
- Commodity-specific prohibitions (Tab B)
- General human rights prohibitions (Tab C)

All prohibitions now in the law limit direct assistance only. Last year the House adopted amendments which would have prohibited "indirect" assistance to certain countries and for certain commodities. Young's prohibition on indirect
assistance to Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia and Uganda was adopted 295-115. Mozambique and Angola were added by voice vote. Cuba was included by 274-112. An indirect prohibition for loans for citrus fruit, sugar and palm oil was adopted 209-179. The conference deadlocked, and the President thereupon sent Chairman Long a letter stating that he would "instruct the U.S. executive directors in the banks to oppose and vote against, throughout FY '78, any loans to the 7 countries mentioned in the (Young) Amendments and for the production of three commodities in cases where resulting exports could injure producers in the United States."

(President's letter, Tab D)

The President's letter did not cover UN-type international organizations which supply technical assistance rather than loans. Chairman Long has indicated that the President's commitment should have applied to all international organizations using U.S. funds for development purposes. State intends to present a separate policy memo to the LIG on this issue.

International Development and Food Assistance Bill of 1979. The Administration is not seeking to remove any of the prohibitions now contained in the AID authorizing statute except for 620x, the embargo on Turkey, repeal of which will be an element of this year's security assistance bill.

Security Supporting Assistance Authorization. The Administration does not seek to supply military assistance to any countries for which assistance is now prohibited. We will, however, seek an amendment to eliminate Section 620x of the Foreign Assistance Authorization which places an arms embargo on Turkey. The Administration is also requesting $50 million in Security Supporting Assistance for Turkey which must be authorized in this bill.

In general, we believe the authorizing committees are predisposed against further country or commodity restrictions, and that those who desire to impose such restrictions will wait for the appropriations bill when the Long-Young team is likely to be more hospitable.

Foreign Assistance Appropriations. The Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee has traditionally eschewed country and commodity prohibitions, direct and indirect. Inouye last year felt this position had been seriously compromised by the President's letter to Long, and he is not
likely to get out in front this year unless he is sure we are solidly behind him. With proper consultation, however, his committee should generally support the Administration's position in fiscal '79.

In the House, by contrast, we can expect Congressmen Long and Young to lead a fight for maximum restrictions, starting with the Subcommittee markup on May 9. If attempts to add restrictive language in the Subcommittee and/or full Committee are defeated, Long and Young will press their case on the House floor.

Specifically, Long, Young and others may:

- Seek to extend all country and commodity restrictions from last year, and add some new ones. Long has floated two lists of countries in which he seems to have special interest, and Wilson has threatened to cut aid to 13 countries criticized in a recent ADA study on human rights (Tab E). Steel and textiles are likely candidates for commodity restrictions.

- Legislate prohibitions on "indirect" assistance for at least those countries covered by the President's letter of last year;

- Prohibit assistance to countries which aid other countries on the prohibited list -- e.g., India, which is assisting Viet-Nam.

- Ensure that assistance via UN agencies is also included;

- Demand amendments to the charters of the IBRD, the IMF and IDA to require those institutions to establish human rights standards for loans;

- Require human rights reports on all countries receiving indirect assistance.

Some of these objectives would require parliamentary contortions because of rules which prevent legislating on appropriations bills.

The fundamental question is how to fight Long and Young. The options seem to be these:
Option I. Stick to our guns. If we have the votes to avoid prohibitions in the Subcommittee, we will nevertheless probably be unable to prevent floor amendments at least as onerous as those the House adopted last year. Assuming the Senate stands by us, we could expect a compromise in conference which might pass the House successfully. A stalemate like last year's seems more likely, however, and this time could result in a continuing resolution.

The advantages of holding firm include the following:

. Consistency with the Budget and with the Administration's announced policy of increasing U.S. AID contributions;

. The gamble might pay off in higher AID levels, fewer restrictions.

The disadvantages include:

. A high visibility political fight which would demand a great deal of the President's and Vice President's time, and dramatize an inherently unpopular position in an election year;

. Risk having our position overrun, particularly in the House, leaving us espousing a hopeless position when the battle had moved elsewhere.

. Declaring war not only on Long and Young, but on Obey who thinks we should compromise at the outset (see below). The Subcommittee markup would be a shambles, from which we might partially recover in the full Committee.

Option IIA. Fire and Fallback. Assuming we could muster the votes to protect the Administration program in the Subcommittee markup, we could make a new assessment of the floor outlook in early June and decide then whether to compromise or not. This option would be viable only if there were leadership on the Subcommittee willing to support it. Inouye would have to understand that our capitulations in the House were tactical only, and that we wanted as much as we could get in the Senate.

Option II. Compromise at the outset. We could take our cuts and prohibitions now, hoping to create a firebreak
to limit future damage. Dave Obey has proposed a package which would include a billion dollar cut in the appropriations request, plus language taken from the President's letter last year which would instruct representatives to "vote against and oppose" loans to countries on the prohibited list. Presumably this package is susceptible to compromise. Obey offers himself as leader of the compromise forces.

The advantages of this strategy are these:

. Obey and his immediate supporters would provide a rallying point and some leadership for potential foreign assistance supporters amidst the chaos of the House.

. The House leadership would probably welcome Obey's de facto chairmanship of the Administration cause after being held hostage last year to Long's follies.

Disadvantages:

. We could hardly ask the Senate to fight for something better than our agreed to position in the House, and might leave chips on the table.

. Even if the Senate did produce a better product and the conference was favorable, it would be difficult to ask our allies in the House to go above the original position.

Option IIA. Option IIA is a compromise now but not with Obey. Having decided at the outset what cuts and restrictions we could accept, the President might then ask the House leadership -- Jim Wright in particular -- to carry the ball as chief legislative strategist and also as Administration spokesman on issues arising during floor debate. Wright could then ask Obey and others on the Subcommittee to work with him during markup. This formula might appeal to Obey, since it would make his position vis-a-vis Long somewhat less uncomfortable.

Action Requirements:

(1) The LIG must decide whether we are prepared to compromise now on any portion of the original program and, if so, where and how far.

(2) Designate someone to meet with Obey and/or the leadership to convey the Administration position and/or
explore compromise packages. Consult similarly with Inouye.

3) Choose an option and stick to it.

4) Develop strategy in support of that option in time to make the most of the House Subcommittee's markup on May 9.
April 11, 1978

TO: H - Doug Bennet

FROM: H - Don Gelber

SUBJECT: Country-Specific Amendments and Security Assistance

Country-specific amendments have been attached to both the Authorizing and Appropriation's Acts. Edited texts of the extant country-specific enactments are attached. Those derived from authorizing statutes are permanent features of law and have to be specifically repealed to cease having any effect. Country-specific prohibitions attached to appropriation's bills, however, generally are valid only for the fiscal year covered by the appropriation's bill. Thus, to have continuing effect, they must be reenacted on an annual basis.
Country-Specific Prohibition on U.S. Assistance

Herewith are the statutory country-specific prohibitions on U.S. assistance.

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 1978

Title I - Foreign Assistance Act Activities--International Military Education and Training: None of the funds appropriated under this paragraph shall be used to provide international military education and training to the Government of Argentina.

Section 107. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance or reparations to Uganda, Cambodia, Laos or the Socialist Republic of Viet-Nam.

Section 114. None of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant to this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to Mozambique or Angola.

Section 503 A. None of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant to this Act shall be used to provide military assistance, international military education and training or foreign military credit sales to the Governments of Ethiopia and Uruguay.

Section 503 B. None of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant to this Act shall be used to provide foreign military credit sales to the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
Section 503 C. Of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant to this Act no more than $18,100,000 shall be used for foreign military assistance, not more than $1,850,000 shall be used for foreign military credit sales, and not more than $7,000,000 shall be used for international military education and training to the Government of the Philippines.

Section 506. None of the funds appropriated in this Act shall be used for any form of aid or trade, either by military payment or the sale or transfer of any goods of any nature, directly to Cuba.


Section 406. (a)

(1) No military or security supporting assistance and no military education and training may be furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for Chile; and no credits (including participation in credits) may be extended and no loan may be guaranteed under the Arms Export Control Act with respect to Chile. No deliveries of any assistance, credits, or guarantees may be made to Chile on or after the date of enactment of this section.

(2) No sales (including cash sales) may be made and no export license may be issued under the Arms Export Control Act with respect to Chile on or after the date of enactment of this section.

International Security Assistance Act of 1977 (PL 95-92)

Section 25. No assistance of any kind may be furnished for the fiscal year 1978 for the purpose, or which would have the effect, or promoting or augmenting, directly or indirectly, any military or paramilitary operations in Zaire unless and until the President determines that such assistance should be furnished in the national security interest of the United States and submits to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report containing-

(1) a detailed description of the assistance proposed to be furnished, including the amounts of such assistance, the categories and specific kinds of assistance proposed, and the purposes for which such assistance will be used; and
(2) a certification that the President has determined that the furnishing of such assistance is important to the national security interests of the United States and a detailed statement, in unclassified form, of the reasons supporting such determination.

Section 28. (a)(1) It is the sense of the Congress that the President should take all effective measures to assure that the Republic of Korea is cooperating fully with the investigation (including any resulting prosecutions) being conducted by the Department of Justice with respect to allegations of improper activity in the United States by agents of the Republic of Korea.

(2) Accordingly, the President is requested to report to the Congress, within ninety days after the date of enactment of this Act and once during each ninety-day period thereafter while such investigation (including any resulting prosecutions) is underway, with respect to the extent to which the Republic of Korea is cooperating with such investigation.

(b) It is the further sense of the Congress that the President should take all effective measures to assure that the Republic of Korea is cooperating fully with the investigations being conducted by committees of Congress.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as Amended

Section 513. Military assistance authorizations for Thailand and Laos, and South Vietnam. (a) After June 30, 1972, no military assistance shall be furnished by the United States to Thailand directly or through any other foreign country unless that assistance is authorized under this Act or the Foreign Military Sales Act.

(b) After June 30, 1974, no military assistance shall be furnished by the United States to Laos directly or through any other foreign country unless that assistance is authorized under this Act or the Foreign Military Sales Act.

(c) After June 30, 1976, no military assistance shall be furnished by the United States to South Vietnam directly or through any other foreign country unless that assistance is authorized under this Act of the Foreign Military Sales Act.

Section 533. Southern African Special Requirements Funds. - (a)(1) Of the funds authorized to be appropriated by section 532 for the fiscal year 1978, $80,000,000 shall be available only for the countries of southern Africa to
address the problems caused by the economic dislocation resulting from the conflict in that region, and for education and job training assistance for Africans from Namibia and Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia). Such funds may be used to provide assistance to African refugees and persons displaced by war and internal strife in southern Africa, to improve transportation links interrupted or jeopardized by regional political conflicts, and to provide trade credits for the purchase of United States products to those countries in the region adversely affected by blocked outlets for their exports and by the overall strains of the world economy.

(2) Of the funds made available under this section, not more than the following amounts may be made available for the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>$15,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>$15,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>$5,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional programs for education, training and refugee assistance</td>
<td>$45,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) To the extent practicable consistent with the purpose specified in paragraph (1), assistance under this section should be used to meet the objectives set forth in sections 102 (c) and (d) and in other sections of chapter 1 of part I of this Act.

(4) Before obligating any funds under this section, the President shall notify the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate with respect to the specific projects and programs for which such funds will be used.

(b) Of the funds made available under subsection (a) of this section for regional programs, not to exceed $1,000,000 may be used by the President for the preparation of a comprehensive analysis of the development needs of southern Africa to enable the Congress to determine what contribution United States foreign assistance can make.

(c) (1) None of the funds made available under this section may be used for military, guerrilla, or paramilitary activities in any country.

(2) No assistance may be furnished under this section to Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, or Zambia, except that the President may waive this prohibition with respect to any such country if he determines (and so reports to the Congress) that furnishing such assistance to that country would further the foreign policy interests of the United States.
(d) It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should support an internationally recognized constitutional settlement of the Rhodesian conflict leading promptly to majority rule based upon democratic principles and upholding basic human rights. The Congress declares its intent to support United States participation in a Zimbabwe Development Fund. The Congress intends to authorize the necessary appropriation when progress toward such an internationally recognized settlement would permit establishment of the Fund.

Section 620, Prohibitions Against Furnishing Assistance (a)(1) No assistance shall be furnished under this Act to the present Government of Cuba. As an additional means... the President is authorized to... embargo... Cuba.

(f) No assistance shall be furnished under this Act as amended, (except section 214 (b)) to any communist country. ...the phrase communist country shall include specifically, but not limited to the following countries: Peoples Republic of Albania, Peoples Republic of Bulgaria, Peoples Republic of China, Czechoslovakia Socialist Republic, German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Estonia, Hungarian Peoples Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, North Korean Peoples Republic, North Vietnam, Outer Mongolia-Mongolian Peoples Republic, Polish People Republic, Romania Peoples Republic, Tibet, Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia, Cuba and Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (including its captives constituent republics).

(x)(1) All military assistance, all sales of defense articles and services (whether for cash or by credit, guaranty, or any other means), and all licenses with respect to the transportation of arms, ammunitions and implements of war (including technical data relating thereto) to the Government of Turkey, shall be suspended on the date of enactment of this subsection, unless or until the President determines and certifies to the Congress that the Government of Turkey is in compliance with the Foreign Military Sales Act and any agreement entered into under such Acts and that substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus; provided, that for the fiscal year 1978 the President may suspend the provisions of this subsection and of section 3 (c) of the Arms Export Control Act with respect to cash sales and extensions of credit and guarantees under such Act for the procurement of such defense articles and defense services as the President determines are necessary to enable Turkey to fulfill her defense responsibilities as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, except that during the fiscal year 1978 the total value of defense articles and defense services sold to Turkey
under such Act either for cash or financed by credits and guaranties shall not exceed $175,000,000.

Section 620 B. Prohibition Against Assistance and Sales to Argentina. (1) After September 30, 1978 no assistance may be furnished under chapters 2, 4, or 5 of part II of this Act to Argentina.

(2) No credits (including participation in credits) may be extended and no loan may be guaranteed under the Arms Export Control Act with respect to Argentina.

(3) No sale of defense articles or services may be made under the Arms Export Control Act to Argentina; and

(4) No export license may be issued under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act to or for the Government of Argentina.

Section 655. Limitations Upon Assistance to or for Cambodia. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other law may be obligated in any amount in excess of $377,000,000...for or on behalf of Cambodia during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975.

(c) No funds may be obligated for any of the purposes described in subsection (a) of this section in, to, for, or on behalf of Cambodia in any fiscal year beginning after June 30, 1972, unless such funds have been specifically authorized by law...

(e) After the date of enactment of this section, whenever any request is made to the Congress for the appropriation of funds for use in, for, or on behalf of Cambodia for any fiscal year, the President shall furnish a written report to the Congress explaining the purpose for which such funds are to be used in such fiscal year.

(g) Enactment of this section shall not be construed as a commitment by the United States to Cambodia for its defense.
TO: H - Mr. Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.
FROM: H - Paul K. Stahnke
SUBJECT: Commodity-Specific Prohibitions on US Assistance

April 11, 1978

The following are the citations of law providing for prohibitions on the support by US representatives to International Financial Institutions on loans for palm oil, sugar or citrus crops.

Authorization for US Participation in Certain International Financial Institutions, 1977

Section 901(a) "...The United States representatives to the institutions named in this section shall oppose any loan or other financial assistance for establishing or expanding production for export of palm oil, sugar, or citrus crops if such loan or assistance will cause injury to United States producers of the same, similar, or competing agricultural commodity." (Note: the institutions named in this section are The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), The International Development Association (IDA), The International Finance Corporation (IFC), The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), The African Development Fund (AFDF), The Asian Development Fund (ADF), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).)

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1978

No commodity-specific prohibitions; however, in a letter to Clarence Long referring to the appropriations legislation, the President stated, inter alia: "...I shall instruct the US executive directors in the banks to oppose and vote against, throughout FY 1978, any loans to the seven countries mentioned in the House amendments. Our representatives will also oppose and vote against loans for the production of the three commodities where such production is for export and could injure producers in the United States."
Comment: The President's assurance to Clarence Long on commodities parallels the language in the authorization act. The double tests (a) production for export and (b) injury to US producers has proven acceptable to the Administration in practice. The fact that we have voted against only one loan -- palm oil in Malaysia -- for production of any of these three commodities may cause Dawson Mathis and his supporters to consider stronger language. Perhaps an even greater danger is the possibility of adding to the list of commodities. For example, Clarence Long held a hearing on March 3 regarding the role which US assistance to foreign steel production may have played in damaging the US industry.
To Chairman Clarence Long

Secretary Blumenthal has informed me of your constructive efforts to achieve a successful resolution of the problems posed by the amendments to the foreign aid appropriations bill restricting the use of U.S. contributions to the international development banks.

I deeply appreciate your helpful suggestions and the role you have played thus far in steering this vitally important legislation through the House.

As I stated in our meeting last Friday, I fully agree with you and your colleagues in the House that U.S. assistance through the banks must take full account of the human rights policies of recipient countries. Accordingly, I will shortly sign into law the recently passed authorizing legislation for U.S. participation in the international development banks which require that the U.S. representatives to the banks oppose loans to gross violators (except where those loans are directed specifically to programs which serve the basic human needs of citizens of such countries).

Additionally, as we discussed earlier, I shall instruct the U.S. Executive Directors in the banks to oppose and vote against, throughout FY 1978, any loans to the seven countries mentioned in the House amendments. Our representatives will also oppose and vote against loans for the production of the three commodities where such production is for export and could injure producers in the United States. You may be certain that I shall closely watch and review the lending practices of the banks during this fiscal year.
I am happy to report to the Treasury, in consultation with the leadership and appropriate committees of the Congress, to undertake a thorough study of how the whole range of U.S. objectives, including the type envisaged in these amendments, can best be pursued in the banks. I would expect that the results of this appraisal could help guide our efforts for FY 1979 and beyond, in partnership between the Administration and the Congress.

I would hope that these steps would enable the House to avoid adopting any of the restrictive amendments, previously passed, in the final foreign assistance appropriations bill for FY 1978.

I appreciate your support and counsel on these critically important issues confronting our foreign policy.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honorable Clarence D. Long
Chairman
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
Committee on Appropriations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

cc:  Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
     Majority Leader James C. Wright, Jr.
     Chairman George H. Mahon
     Congressmen C. W. Bill Young
13 COUNTRIES LISTED IN MARCH 1978
AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION STUDY

Bangladesh
Bolivia
Dominican Republic
Haiti
Indonesia
Iran
Morocco
Nicaragua
Paraguay
Philippines
South Korea
Thailand
Tunisia
Meetings

There are 4 different possible meetings which would be useful:

(1) Cabinet meeting alone
(2) Cabinet meeting with Senior Staff
(3) Cabinet meeting with President (no staff)
(4) Cabinet, President, Staff

Each meeting has a separate, useful purpose. If time permits only 2 major meetings, then clearly meetings (2) and (4) are the most essential.

Purpose

The meetings need to revolve around the central theme of how the Administration---President, Cabinet, and Staff---can improve its performance and correct problems now hurting the Administration's effectiveness. Those problems might be appreciated as follows:

1. Difficulty in setting and communicating to the public and Congress Presidential priorities.
2. Inconsistency and abrupt change in policy positions (or at least the continued perception of this occurrence).
3. Difficulty in mobilizing public support for major Administration initiatives.
4. Continued inability to deflate public expectations of Administration achievements.
5. Insensitivity to Political needs of Congress and major Administration constituencies (or at least a perception of such insensitivity).
6. Unfocused and diffused projection of President's public image.
7. Perception of Administration incompetence, repeated mistakes, poor leadership.
8. Decisionmaking process -- involvement of Cabinet, lateness of final decisions being presented to President, accuracy of viewpoints presented to President.
9. Contrary presentations in Congress and public by Administration spokesmen (seeking additional funds beyond approved budget being an obvious example).
10. Perception of Administration inability to reward its political friends and punish its political opponents.
11. Lack of overall sense of purpose within the Administration—
lack of feeling of unity, oneness between Cabinet Departments
and White House -- lack of an esprit associated with the
undertaking of a major project (like a campaign); low morale.

12. Perceptions by Congress of an Administration which fails
to consult prior to final decisions and fails to care about
Congressional political needs.

13. Perception by Cabinet, Congress and Public of a White
House staff which is poorly organized, inexperienced and
unschooled in the ways of Washington.

In addition to the above overall Administration problems, there
are a number of issues concerning the relationship between the
Cabinet and the White House Staff which might be discussed:

Issues to be Raised by the Cabinet with the Senior Staff

1. Inconsistent (often the result of overlapping jurisdictions
and inattentive coordination) guidance from Senior Staff and
their staffs to Cabinet officials and their staffs.

2. Major policy decisions affecting the Departments without
adequate involvement of those Departments.

3. Inability to have greater control of the paper flow
process -- uncertainty as to staff recommendations placed on
top of Cabinet memoranda and recommendations, and delays in
submitting Cabinet memoranda to the President.

4. Involvement of the staff and the President in much greater
detail of Cabinet operations then is necessary.

5. Inability to control leaks to the press regarding Cabinet
recommendations and Cabinet personalities.

6. Need for greater access to the President and clearer direction
from him.

7. Need for additional members of the staff with Washington
experience.

Issues to be Raised by the Senior Staff with the Cabinet

1. Greater need for interagency cooperation -- less promotion
of a Department's special interests concerns and greater promotion
of Presidential concerns.

2. Adherence to the OMB/DPS clearance process for testimony
and legislation.
3. Need for greater attention to the President's political needs rather than a Department's political needs; improved use of the grant-making process.

4. Greater concern with Presidential recommendations concerning Cabinet Department appointments.

5. Improved means of controlling leaks of Presidential decisions and Presidential options memoranda -- need to eliminate fights over Administration policy in the newspapers.
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: Warren Christopher, Acting
SUBJECT: The President's Interest in Argentine Human Rights Improvements

Our Embassy in Buenos Aires has now responded to the instructions sent to it concerning the President's interest in human rights improvements in Argentina. The exchange of messages on this subject is attached. The Embassy concludes that recent steps have some substance, but recommends caution with respect to associating the President with any specific favorable developments. Nevertheless, our Charge in Buenos Aires did call the attention of the Minister of Economy, the key civilian in the Argentine government, to the President's statement at Yazoo City. According to the White House transcript of July 21, the President said, "We have seen recently in Argentina 342 political prisoners, who had been there for a long time, released."

I.

We can point to the following hopeful human rights developments:

-- Prisoner releases. While the announcement of the release of 342 political prisoners is a positive sign, it should be noted that we can only confirm categorically that there have been four releases, and that we do not yet know what proportion of those released have actually been freed without charges and what proportion have been charged formally and must face trial. In the six weeks since, the Argentine government has reported 199 detentions and 77 releases.
A very successful state visit to Venezuela in May.

While the government has been condemned for its hardline policies, the human rights situation in the Buenos Aires region remains very unsatisfactory in Argentina, particularly in the Tucuman province on the other hand, the human rights situation is.

II

That the court will declare the ban unconstitutional.

An Argentine government appeal against the Torah's acceptance of engagements in politics by the government's human rights record. The government has promoted political parties, the Red Light green party, to criticize the government's policies.

However, the President's party, the New Party, may seek voluntary exile. The New Party, which the government has promised, will restore a limited form of the Right of Option, if federal laws permit.
At least five labor leaders have been warned recently to leave Argentina. Earlier this month a prominent Jewish leader fled to the United States after being threatened.

Nearly all serious violations of human rights in Argentina are now taking place in the Buenos Aires military region. The commander of the region, General Suarez Mason, is a notorious hard-liner, and is viewed as one of Videla's principal rivals for power; Suarez is seconded by a retired general who acts as governor. These men are being held responsible by many for the latest round of violence.

Given the delicate political situation in Argentina, as well as the possibly hopeful but very uncertain human rights situation, I believe that we should await developments before further public comment. We will remain alert for favorable developments, as the President has directed, and for appropriate opportunities to express his gratification.

Attachments:

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Human Rights in Argentina

Your memorandum to the Secretary of June 27 informed the Department of the President's wishes to acknowledge human rights actions taken by the Argentine government on June 14. These actions were the basis for acknowledgements by both the Secretary at Grenada and by our Director to the World Bank:

-- In his conversation with Foreign Minister Montes at Grenada on June 16, the Secretary informed his counterpart that we would be abstaining on two Argentine loans in the World Bank but made reference to recent progress.

-- The same day in the World Bank, our Director stated that there have been a number of recent indicators which suggest that the situation may be changing for the better in Argentina. The Director continued that it was the United States strong hope that further improvement in the human rights situation will make it possible for us to support future loans to Argentina. Privately, our Director made it clear to his Argentine colleague that the indicators we were talking about were the June 14 actions.

With respect to the improvements noted in your memorandum, our Embassy in Buenos Aires commented upon them in its B.A. 04638 of June 22.

-- The Embassy stated that the release of 342 persons from executive custody over two weeks represents a considerably larger number of people than usual.
However, the Embassy noted that we do not know how many people actually regained liberty and how many were turned over to the courts.

-- The processing of almost 1,000 cases of subversion by the federal and military courts is difficult to assess. The Argentine government has not released the names of those tried, the nature of the charges, or information on the sentences.

-- President Videla's reported instructions to his officials to analyze the reinstatement of the suspended right of option recalls earlier reviews of this subject. The last review resulted in an extension until September. The Embassy feels it is unclear whether more favorable action may be expected after September.

Based on continuing information on abuses emanating from all elements of our Mission in Argentina, the Department believes that the June 14 steps should be viewed cautiously. They may possibly be nothing more than a statistical smoke screen designed to mask a continued repressive policy.

The attached cable, in accordance with the President's wishes, expresses United States interest in recent Argentine steps and elicits further information. We would appreciate your clearance.

Attachment:

-Cable to Amembassy, Buenos Aires
--BA 04638 of June 22
FOR THE CHARGE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SHUM, AR

SUBJECT: GOA NOTES HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS

REF: B.A. 04668

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOTED RECENT ARGENTINE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS IMAGE, INCLUDING THE RELEASE OF PERSONS FROM CUSTODY, THE PROCESSING OF CASES IN THE COURTS, AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE RIGHT OF OPTION MAY BE REINSTATED.

2. WHILE THESE ACTIONS WERE ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE SECRETARY AT GRENADA AND BY OUR DIRECTOR AT THE WORLD BANK, WE BELIEVE THAT A FURTHER EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO MAKE THE ARGENTINES AWARE OF OUR INTEREST IN THESE AND CONTINUING STEPS TOWARD THE RESTORATION OF THE RULE OF LAW.

3. YOU ARE REQUESTED, THEREFORE, TO APPROACH THE GOA AT AN APPROPRIATELY SENIOR LEVEL AND NOTE THE CONSIDERABLE INTEREST WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS IN RECENTLY ANNOUNCED GOA STEPS AND INQUIRE WHETHER FURTHER INFORMATION COULD BE PROVIDED CONCERNING THESE STEPS. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW HOW MANY INDIVIDUALS NAMED IN
THE LIST OF 342 PERSONS RELEASED FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY HAVE BEEN ACTUALLY FREED. FOR PERSPECTIVE, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW HOW MANY INDIVIDUALS WERE ARRESTED DURING THE SAME PERIOD. ARE THE NAMES OF THOSE PROCESSED BY FEDERAL AND MILITARY COURTS (I.E., THE 1000 CASES) AVAILABLE? WHAT ARE THE CHARGES AND SENTENCES? HOW SOON CAN WE EXPECT A DECISION ON THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF OPTION?

4. WE LEAVE IT TO YOUR DISCRETION HOW FAR TO GO IN ELICITING INFORMATION. HOWEVER, WE DO WANT THE GOA TO KNOW UNITED STATES IS VERY INTERESTED IN THE MEASURES THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED AND WOULD APPRECIATE A MUCH CLEARER INDICATION OF THEIR SIGNIFICANCE TO THE OVERALL HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION. 44
SUBJECT: GOA NOTES HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS

SUMMARY: AS ANTICIPATED IN DEMARCHES BY MARTINEZ DE HOZ IN BUENOS AIRES (REFTEL B) AND AMBASSADOR AJA ESPIL IN WASHINGTON (REFTEL A), ARGENTINE OFFICIALS ANNOUNCED A NUMBER OF ACTIONS JUNE 14 THAT BEAR ON THE COUNTRY'S HUMAN RIGHTS IMAGE OVERSEAS. THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS INCLUDE THE RELEASE OF 342 PERSONS FROM EXECUTIVE CUSTODY, PROCESSING OF ALMOST 1,000 SUBVERSIVE CASES IN FEDERAL AND MILITARY COURTS, POSSIBLE REINSTATEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF OPTION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY, AND BANNING OF TWO ISSUES OF A FAR RIGHT, RACIST MAGAZINE. WHILE THE ANNOUNCEMENTS IN THEMSELVES SHOW LITTLE BY WAY OF CERTIFIABLE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO COMPILE EXAMPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES ITS RISING SENSITIVITY TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POSITION AND OUR ADVERSE VOTES IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

END SUMMARY

1. AS NOTED IN REFTEL B, GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA'S (GOA'S) PRESENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS DEMONSTRATES BASICALLY FRIENDLY GESTURES AND INCREASED CONCERN ON THE PART OF GOA OFFICIALS TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP IN RESPONSE TO U.S. REPRESENTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION. THE LIST OF ACTIONS TAKEN, HOWEVER, SHOWS LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE. AS ANTICIPATED, THE GOA ACTIONS AND COMMUNIQUES WERE RELEASED JUNE 14 AND PUBLISHED IN JUNE 15 PRESS.

2. AS A 15-DAY COMPENDIUM THE LISTING OF 342 PERSONS CITED AS NO LONGER BEING HELD AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE EXECUTIVE IS CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN THE TYPICAL WEEKLY LISTS PUT OUT BY THE INTERIOR MINISTRY. FURTHER, THERE IS NO WAY IMMEDIATELY TO VERIFY THAT PERSONS LISTED HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN RELEASED. (MARTINEZ DE HOZ DID, HOWEVER, TELL CHARGE THAT THE PERSONS LISTED WERE DEFINITELY BEING PHYSICALLY RELEASED FROM DETENTION AND NOT JUST PASSED TO OTHER AUTHORITIES.)
3. As for specific cases, three of the names were familiar—David Divinsky and his wife Ana Maria Miler, book publishers listed as released from executive custody for subversive crimes; and Juan Carlos Rousselet, listed as released from custody for economic crimes. As of June 16, neither Miler nor Divinsky has yet been released according to family friends. We are trying to verify these cases as possible indicators as to usual fate of listed persons. Since the lists began being published weekly in January, we have verified and reported several actual releases, although many embassy sources, including visitors and representatives of church and human rights groups, claim that the majority of persons listed remain in detention. (This could result partially from defiance of interior ministry orders, and partly from bureaucratic incompetence of federal and military prison authorities.)

PERMANENT ASSEMBLY DIRECTOR JOSE WESTERKAMP (WHO HOSTED PATRICIA DERIAN’S MEETING WITH ASSEMBLY IN MARCH) TOLD EMBOFF ON JUNE 14 ABOUT THE PARTICULAR CASE OF A BOY JAILED WITH WESTERKAMP’S SON IN SIERRA CHICA PRISON WHOSE NAME HAS APPEARED TWICE ON THE RELEASE LISTS AND ONCE ON THE LIST OF PERSONS NEWLY DETAINED BY THE EXECUTIVE. THE BOY HIMSELF WAS NEVER INFORMED OF THE PUBLICATION OF ANY OF THE LISTS AND HIS STATUS AS A DETAINEE UNDER STATE OF SIEGE PROVISIONS HAS IN FACT REMAINED UNCHANGED FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR.
4. The Interior Ministry statement that 667 subversive cases have been remanded to the Federal Courts (with 327 sentences passed) and 305 cases sent to Special Military Courts Martial. (with 158 sentences handed down) appeared in press without names or commentary. As very few of these talks and subsequent sentencing have been reported in the press or independently confirmed by Emobps, we cannot comment on the significance of the announcement.

5. President Videla’s reported instructions to authorities to analyze the reinstatement of the suspended constitutional option for persons being held under state of siege provisions to leave the country recalls his earlier appointment of a commission chaired by interior minister Harguindeguy to review the suspension last April. As a result of the commission’s deliberations at that time, legislation was passed to extend the suspension for another 150 days beginning May 1, 1977. It is not yet known whether the President’s statements mean the option will be considered more favorably in the near future or will actually be reinstated before the present 150 days suspension is up in September.

6. GoA suspension of the distribution, sale, and circulation of the May-June Cabildo issue No. 8 was of interest. The magazine was accused of “propagating ideological-racial conflict in opposition to the nation’s objectives.” The decree further prohibited the printing and circulation of the July issue and “any other that attempts to replace it.” The ban does not, however, affect the magazine’s administrative or publishing capacity beyond the two issues, and this short term suspension does little to undo the strident anti-Semitic rhetoric of the April Cabildo, issue No. 7. It was this which prompted protests by Jewish groups in Argentina and occasioned local and international press commentary (see FMT 3370 and 3631).

7. Comment: This flurry of statements to the public on human rights was undertaken with the specific purpose of influencing the U.S. vote on two large bank loans of particular importance to this country. The government—intervened la opinion on June 16 flatly stated that the government’s recent actions were
"SIGNIFICANT MEASURES TO COUNTERACT ACCUSATIONS FROM ABROAD AND IMPROVE THE COUNTRY'S IMAGE OVERSEAS. (NO OTHER PAPER HAS COMMENTED EDITORIALLY ON THE GOVERNMENT'S ANNOUNCEMENTS TO DATE.) OF INTEREST, IS WHETHER THIS INITIATIVE WAS NOTHING MORE THAN WARMED OVER STATISTICS AND SMOKESCREEN GESTURES OR WHETHER SOME NEW ELEMENT HAS BEEN ADDED TO ARGENTINE EFFORTS IN THIS FIELD.

OUR CONCLUSION AFTER STUDYING THIS LATEST "EVIDENCE"—MUCH LIKE OUR INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORTED IN REF B—is that the initiative is hollow from the substantive side, but interesting and encouraging in what it demonstrates about rising Argentine bureaucratic sensitivity concerning the seriousness of the U.S. human rights position.

CHAPLIN

CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 11552: N/A

TAGS: SHRM, PFOM, AR, UY

SUBJ: VISIT OF ARGENTINE PRESIDENT TO URUGUAY

1. SUMMARY. President Videla of Argentina made a 48-hour visit to Uruguay June 28-30. The visit was capped with the issuance of a communiqué which, among other things, expressed support for the UN and OAS, rejected intervention in the internal affairs of states, and condemned violence, terrorism, and subversion as assaults on the rights of man. In other opportunities President Videla spoke of his strong belief in the democratic system of government, but reiterated his government’s position that democracy requires a firm foundation and that the OAS has no timetable for its installation. Three private meetings were held with President Mendez, but details of the content of their discussions were not made public.

END SUMMARY.

2. The forty-eight-hour visit of President Videla June 28-30 culminated with the issuance of a joint communiqué of approximately 1,000 words concerning such matters as respect for international law, support of the UN and OAS, intervention in internal affairs, subversion, the Falkland Islands, La Reta, sub-regional development, water rights and exploitation and nuclear energy, and support for the establishment of bi-national enterprises. Unifying translation of certain paragraphs of the declaration follow:

A. BOTH GOVERNMENTS: “RENEW THEIR UNCONDITIONAL RESPECT AND ADHESION TO THE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES WHICH GUIDE RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH GUARantee JURidICAL EQUALITY, SOVEREIGN SELF-Determination OF PEOPLE IN THEIR INTERESTS IN INTERNAL OR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES AND THE NON-RECognition OF TERRITORIAL CONQUESTS ACQUIRED THROUGH THE USE OF FORCE, THE REVOCATION OF THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AND THE FAITHFUL COMPLIANCE OF AGREEMENTS.”

BOTH GOVERNMENTS RATIONALIZE THEIR COMPLETE ADHESION TO THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES WHICH ARE THE FOUNDATION OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND EXPRESS THEIR CONVICTION THAT THIS IS THE APPROPRIATE FORUM TO CONSOLIDATE THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OF ALL MEMBER STATES THROUGH THE SOLUTION OF WORLD PROBLEMS, AND FUNDAMENTALLY THROUGH COLLECTIVE ACTIONS WHICH FURTHER THE PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES MORE THAN THE INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS OF EACH STATE.

C. “THEY REITERATE THEIR AGREEMENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GUIDE THEIR ACTIONS IN THE OAS IN ORDER TO SACRIFICE PEACE, ASSURE JUSTICE AND PROMOTE COOPERATION; UNDERSTANDING THAT THESE PRINCIPLES STRENGTHEN THE DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY.”

END TRANSLATION.

UNCLASSIFIED
ALL DUE RESPECT, BUT WITH COMPLETE RESPONSIBILITY, REAFFIRMED ITS PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND NON-INTERVENTION. BECAUSE IT IS A FREE COUNTRY, IT DOES NOT, AND WILL NOT, ACCEPT OUTSIDE INFLUENCES ATTEMPTING TO MEDDLING IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS."

6. THE TWO-DAY VISIT, MARKED BY VERY TIGHT SECURITY TOGETHER WITH A HEAVY CEREMONIAL SCHEDULE, GAVE VIDELA HARDLY ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR DIRECT PUBLIC EXPOSURE. NEVERTHELESS, TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE VARIOUS EVENTS PROVIDEDAN IMAGE OF VIDELA AS AN HONORABLE MAN, A GOOD SIMPLE MAN, BUT ONE OF UNUSUAL INTELLIGENCE.

7. VIDELA MET PRIVATELY THREE TIMES WITH PRESIDENT MENDEZ, BUT DETAILS OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS WERE NOT REVEALED.

HAAR
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Edmund S. Muskie

1. Namibia: South Africa yesterday accepted the U.N. Secretary General's proposal for an all-parties "pre-implementation meeting" on the UN Plan for Namibian independence. The meeting would be held January 7-14. South Africa has agreed that if "trust and confidence" can be established among the parties, implementation of the U.N. Plan can start by March 1, 1981, with a view to independence by the end of the year.

Although we consider South African acceptance of the implementation date a significant achievement, representatives of the Front Line States in New York are skeptical about the South African linkage of implementation to the prior establishment of "trust and confidence." These Front Line States envoys won't block the meeting, but they apparently want to go ahead with the U.N. General Assembly debate on Namibia, scheduled to begin early next week. We have instructed our Embassies in the Front Line States to join their colleagues from the Western Contact Group in demarches urging delay of the debate. Although it is the Security Council and not the General Assembly which will supervise the U.N. plan, we fear that the inevitable hard-line African statements and resolutions in the General Assembly could prompt South Africa to withdraw its agreement to the pre-implementation meeting and the implementation date, on the grounds of U.N. partiality to SWAPO.

2. Argentina: I met with Argentine Foreign Minister Pastor this morning. On the issue of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) Report on Argentina, Pastor said the Argentines will circulate a draft resolution this afternoon.

RDS 2/3 11/22/00 (MUSKIE, Edmund S.)
and urged that we continue efforts to reach agreement. I emphasized the importance we attach to maintaining the authority and effectiveness of the IAHRC. Regarding Bolivia, Pastor said Argentine recognition of the Garcia Meza regime should not be confused with support for certain policies of the regime. President Videla has twice urged ex-Bolivian President Banzer to use his influence to bring about a halt to human rights abuses and narcotics trafficking, and to encourage eventual return to democracy. On the non-proliferation issue, Pastor reaffirmed that his government is actively seeking a safeguards formula that will permit it to sign the Treaty of Tlateloisco.

3. Meeting With Foreign Minister Uribe: During my meeting with the Colombian Foreign Minister, Uribe raised the pending Quita Sueno Treaty as his first order of business. He said his government hoped the Treaty would be ratified under this Administration and not left for the new Administration. In the area of narcotics, Uribe said that, with or without U.S. assistance funds, Colombia was committed to fight vigorously against narcotics trafficking. He cited new agreements Colombia had signed with Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras for cooperation against narcotics.
THIS MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION IS EXEMPTED FROM THE GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE PURSUANT TO 5 FAM 924 (D) AS DISCLOSURE OF THIS MATERIAL WOULD PLACE THE SOURCE IN IMMEDIATE JEOPARDY.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

July 10, 1978

PARTICIPANTS:  Mr. Alfredo Bravo, Co-President, Permanent Assembly for Human Rights and President
Mrs. Alfredo Bravo
Miss Susana Dieguez

(Briefly) Mr. John R. Higgins, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, American Embassy, Buenos Aires
Mr. Anthony G. Freeman, Acting Political Counselor, American Embassy, Buenos Aires
Mr. F. Allen Harris, Political Officer, American Embassy, Buenos Aires

PLACE: American Embassy

SUBJECT: Detention and Interrogation of Alfredo Bravo

Background

Mr. Alfredo Bravo is the co-president and one of the founders of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights. He is believed to be a Radical Party sympathizer (somewhere left of center, e.g. social-democrat or socialist of the West European variety), who for a number of years has headed the Argentine Teachers' Union. To the Embassy's knowledge he has had no connection with any terrorist or subversive organization. His abduction in early September, 1977 brought enormous pressures on the Argentine government domestically and internationally for resolution of his disappearance. This memorandum is a summary record of a four hour conversation regarding Mr. Bravo's detention and interrogation.

Preliminaries

Mr. Bravo called Mr. Harris on July 10 stating that he wished to stop by the Embassy to thank Mr. Harris for his help in obtaining his release. At 5:00 p.m. Mr. Bravo accompanied by his wife and the common law wife of one of his La Plata Prison cell mates arrived at the Embassy. Mr. Bravo thanked Mr. Harris and the Embassy for their efforts in obtaining his release. The discussion started out on prison conditions at La Plata Prison. Mr. Bravo stated that the prison's rules are not published and thus are subject to the interpretation of each individual guard. He noted that any small infraction results in the prisoner being confined to the "chanchon" (pig pens).
Mr. Freeman and later Charge Higgins entered the office and on both occasions Mr. Bravo thanked them profusely for the Embassy's aid in obtaining his release from prison.

Detention and Transit

Mr. Bravo suggested that the best way of discussing his case would be to relate in detail what had actually happened to him. He said that on September 8, 1977 he began teaching at about 8 p.m. Shortly after his class began, three men entered his classroom, showed police identification, said he was wanted for questioning, and escorted him outside to a "run-down" Renault IV automobile. He said his hands were handcuffed behind his back but that his treatment was correct as long as the vehicle was in the Federal Capital. However, after they crossed the bridge into the province of Buenos Aires, the Renault pulled off into a side street. He was taken out of the car, punched and then blindfolded by the three men. The men then discussed among themselves that they had to kill him. One questioned if they had enough gasoline to burn him. Another suggested that kerosene would be better as it disguised the body smell better. They again punched him around and finally one man stated that they couldn't kill him because he had to confess first. They then handcuffed his hands in front of his body. They placed eye glasses (he presumed with dark lens) over his, blindfold and put a hat on his head and again resumed driving.

After a period of time, the car stopped. Bravo heard the sound of buses nearby. He peered under an edge of his blindfold and noted a modern bar and saw a street sign with 2nd Street on it in the lettering of street signs used in La Plata (the capital of Buenos Aires Province). He saw two uniformed policemen pass by with rifles. He thought about calling to them for help, but decided that they were probably colleagues of his abductors.

A new voice gave orders to his abductors on where to take him. They then drove to another place. There were a number of other cars there, Bravo recalled bumping into several cars before he went up some stairs. When he arrived in the building, the voices in the room went silent.
At this time, he was stripped naked; his rings and his brief case were taken. A hood was placed over his head. (Bravo noted that hoods were changed throughout his interrogation. He believes that the hoods were of different colors denoting the point at which the person was in the interrogation process. He added that he remained naked and blindfolded throughout 10 days of interrogation and torture. He also had no sense of time during this period.)

First Session

Shortly after being stripped, Bravo was spread eagled on a table. His hood was removed. Before any questions were asked, Bravo said a four pronged electric picana was run over his chest from his neck to his waist in what he called a "rastrillo" (rake). Bravo described this as being excruciatingly painful. At the start of this session and all following torture sessions, Bravo said he was addressed with mocking courtesy as "Estimado Alfredo" or "Estimado Bravo" as if to signal what was to come next. The questioning during this session focussed on his relations as a top labor leader with key government figures. He recalled the following specific questions: What connection did he have with Colonel Reston?; What was his relation with government intervenors of the CGT?; What was his relationship with General Viola?; What was his relationship with Colonel Longo (the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Labor)? Bravo said that he first mentioned the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights himself. He said that it was his first serious error as the Assembly became the constant theme of his later interrogations.

The first round of torture ended. At this point, Bravo stated he was "so full of electricity" that his jaws and tongue were paralyzed. He stated he was allowed to rest between rounds until he regained some use of his jaw and tongue. At this point, a helpful voice which he believes to be that of his caretaker during the torture process told him do not swallow saliva or drink anything during or after the picana session. A second round of "rastrillo" applications began. At this point, Bravo stated he was unable to communicate. He had no use of his jaw muscles and tongue. Again the same questions were repeated regarding his union affiliations. He was incapable of replying.
At the conclusion of the second round of picana applications, someone poured water in his mouth. This caused him to choke and to gag as his mouth and gums felt like they were suddenly, grossly swollen. He said he would have drowned if someone had not come and turned his head to his side and sponged the water from his mouth and from between his lips and teeth. He mentioned that during this round he was given an injection in the buttocks. Bravo believes that the injection was some sort of a cardiovascular stimulant to enable him physically to endure continued electric shock treatment.

Another round began with further applications of the "rastrillo". Bravo was not able to recall how many times the "rastrillo" was applied to his body. He remembered that most of the applications were to his chest and some to his ribs on his side. Close to the end of the third round, the "rastrillo" was placed on the back of his neck. He stated that this was the worst as it had direct shock effect on his brain. Mr. Bravo noted that during the second and third rounds he was threatened. He recalled two specific threats -- first, that "we are going to do the same to you as we did to the writer Eduardo". (Bravo believes this is a reference to disappeared journalist Eduardo Sajon.) Secondly, that we are going to treat you the same as we treated (Air Force Junta Member) Agosti's niece. During his torture Bravo said he heard repeated cries from other nearby rooms.

At the conclusion of the last round, he was put in the back of a van with a man and a woman who he believes were dead. He saw through his blindfold a part of a woman's face which was beaten bloody. He was taken to a second place of detention which he described as a "deposito". He alone was taken out of the van.

Second Session

When he entered the "deposito" a new hood was placed over his head. After some time he was taken into a room and subjected to a torture called "el cubo" (the bucket). His feet were forced into a bucket of ice water. He said when he tried to lift his feet from the water, someone pressed his knees down forcing his feet back into the bucket. His feet were kept in the ice water for five or six minutes.
After this time had past, one of his torturers, as if to be nice, said to the others to let Bravo take his feet out. But his feet were then jammed into another pail containing boiling hot water. The pain was intense. After several minutes, his feet were again placed back into the bucket of ice water and the questioning began. Bravo stated that he was subjected to four cold-hot cycles, during which the interrogation centered on the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights. The specific questions that Mr. Bravo recalled focussed on who provides funds to the Permanent Assembly. Bravo noted that his interrogators knew the Assembly had received money from the World Council of Churches. Questions were asked about the foreign connections the Assembly maintains and how the Assembly got its information out of the country. Other questions dealt with the Assembly's contacts with the United States Embassy, the Swedish Embassy, the French Embassy and the Consulate General of Italy. (Bravo mentioned that the Italian Ambassador has been unsympathetic to the human rights problem in Argentina but the Consulate General has been very responsive.)

Bravo was then carried, as he could not walk, and placed on the wooden floor of a small cell. Up a staircase, a friendly voice consoled him (his custodian?) it was only a few steps more. He said he slept for an unknown period of time.

Third Session

Some time later, Bravo was taken from his cell and brought into a room where there were other prisoners. Bravo said he was told to grab the other prisoners' hands and they formed a circle. Suddenly electricity was passed through the entire group. While he was held in this communal torture room, a woman was raped in the midst of the other (presumably blindfolded) prisoners. A prisoner shouted that the woman being raped was his "companion" (friend), and went beserk and attacked the guards. He was severely beaten. Another man was also beaten severely and was threatened with being killed. Bravo said then one of the guards said "shove your gun up his anus" and suddenly a muffled shot was heard. Bravo said that he believes that the man was killed in the room. During his detention in the room, the entire group was beaten severely (with "pinas", i.e. punches). In response to a question, Bravo said that during his detention in the room his hands
were free. He noted that generally his hands and feet were not bound except when he was tortured on one or two occasions.

After a stay of an undetermined time in the communal torture room, he was placed in another cell on a cement slab. He recalled that this was the moment of his great crisis. He broke down, sobbed, and then slept. In response to a question, Bravo stated that he had neither food nor water until the end of his interrogations.

Fourth Session

At some time later, he was taken and placed in a van with seven or eight other naked prisoners. They were forced to lie down on top of one another on the floor of the van. During the ride, Bravo said the prisoners whispered to each other. He learned that a number of the prisoners were workers from the Peugeot factory near La Plata. One worker said he worked in the mold department; another said his name was Aurelio. The van stopped along the way and some of the prisoners were taken out. He was finally taken out of the van at a third detention facility. There he was subjected to "the submarine". With mock courtesy, being called "Estimado Alfredo" and "Estimado Bravo," Bravo said he was held under water six or seven times until he was writhing for air. He came up gagging for breath. Bravo said that the first two times after he was submersed, he did not have a chance to catch his breath after being pulled out of the water as he was gasping for air in very small breaths. On the third time after he came up, he tried to get as much air into his lungs before his head was forced back under the water. After the repeated submerging, he said he was questioned again about the Permanent Assembly. Specifically, he was questioned regarding the goals of the Permanent Assembly, about the contacts it maintains with other national and international organizations. Bravo recalled that the focus was on Permanent Assembly's connections with the Communists, the Montoneros, the Third world priests and the ERP. Bravo said that after a lengthy questioning period about the general goals and contacts of the Permanent Assembly itself, he was questioned in detail regarding many members of the Assembly's leadership. He was queried regarding Jamie Schmirgeld's and Comte-MacDonald's connections with the Communist Party; Emilio Mignone's connections with...
the Montoneros; and Methodist Bishop Migues Benino (phonetic) connections with the Third World priests. He was asked about the relations between the Assembly and a number of painters, sculptors and writers. Bravo remembered that Julio Cortazar, an Argentine writer exiled in France was a particular subject of questioning. He was also asked about journalist Rodolfo Walsh. He said three persons took turns questioning him during this period. They asked him to identify 20 or 25 names. Some of whom he knew only by their position as they had signed Permanent Assembly appeals, others he did not know at all. The questioning focussed on the covert political and terrorist affiliations of all these individuals. Bravo said this subject became a major element in all his future interrogations. Bravo stated that throughout his interrogation he provided only the minimal amount of information which was publicly available. For example, he said he acknowledged that Mignone was a former Under Secretary at the Ministry of Education, that Comte-MacDonald was a Christian Democrat, and that Schmirgeld was affiliated with the Communist Party. But, Bravo said he had continually denied connections between these Permanent Assembly members and the Montoneros, the Third World priests and the ERP under intensive and repeated questioning as he knew he was telling the truth and if he said what they wanted his fate would be sealed.

Session Five

While in the same facility, Bravo stated that he was taken to a room and he was told to shut his eyes and not to open them until he was so ordered. His blindfold was then removed and the vertical adhesive strips removed from his eyes. Then he was told to open his eyes and not to shut them. He said what he saw was a "Dantesque" scene from hell. One person chained to the wall in a crucified position, another woman whose hands had been horribly burned was sobbing while lying on a table; another woman was sitting on a small stool with her hands tied through her legs to a ring on the floor. He was then told "look well, you are a candidate for this, if you do not tell us the true political affiliation of these Assembly people." He was then told that he should rest well and that tomorrow they would talk. He was led back to his cell. When he was struggling up the stairs to his cell (because of his burnt feet), the friendly voice told him "falta poco, arriba".
Session Six

Bravo stated that he was subsequently taken from his cell and rubber wraps were placed around his wrists and ankles and ropes were tied to his limbs. He was then hung by his arms from the ceiling so that his feet were suspended from the floor in the middle of a room. A piece of wood was strapped between his ankles so he could not move his feet. He was then beaten with (he thinks) a rubber baton and questioned again regarding the covert political affiliation of the Permanent Assembly members and the Assembly's press contacts. Bravo was specifically asked how many meetings he had held with foreign new agencies. During this session Bravo said he had a severe breakdown and begged his torturers to kill him as he did not know anything. During the interrogation, he was asked about a number of people whom he did not know. Some were identified as nuns, others were Jews from the sound of their names. One was a Methodist Minister, Raul Aragon. Bravo mentioned that he was extensively questioned regarding Jorge Pascale, a former priest who currently is the Executive Director of the Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights (MEDII) and local representative of the Peace and Justice Movement. Bravo noted that many questions centered on Pascale who was referred to as a turncoat priest as he had left the Church in order to marry.

Bravo commented that his tactic in answering all these questions was to deny all possible information to his questioners and to provide only that information which was publicly known. He felt that if he answered one question affirmatively he would be forced to answer the next question and under torture he could be made to say anything that his captors wanted him to agree to. He feared that if he answered any questions positively it would lead down a path in which he would be killed.

Bravo noted in passing that he believed he had been held by the Provincial Police of Buenos Aires. He said that Provincial Police detention centers are known as "caves" and each has a number such as "cueva numero dos", etc. He said Federal Police detention facilities are called "clubs".

Session Seven

At an unspecified time later, Bravo was taken from his cell and brought to another room. He sensed
that there were a number of persons around him in a circle. His hands were handcuffed behind him. He was again greeted as "Estimado Bravo" and seated in a chair. He was then beaten severely and repeatedly asked regarding the political affiliation of all the Permanent Assembly and other names which had been raised in previous interrogation sessions. After a break he was again questioned; but this time regarding his relations with Assistant Secretary of State Derian. He was specifically asked about the meetings the Permanent Assembly had with her; the relationship between the Permanent Assembly and the State Department. Bravo denied (falsely) any contact with her. He said that if he had acknowledged ever having met Derian, this would have led to a series of questions and replies which his torturers would force him to agree to. He noted to us that he had met with Mrs. Derian during her first visit to Argentina in the Buenos Aires apartment of Dr. Westercamp with other members of the Permanent Assembly. He remembered that Mrs. Derian was accompanied by a Spanish-speaking, dark-haired person from the Department of State (Rondon).

Bravo at this point recalled that one thing was of comfort to him during all his interrogations was the fact that he had received a special certificate from the government which entailed a full field, Navy and Army clearance. He knew therefore that there was no derogatory information regarding him in the hands of the security services. He emphasized that his torturers, who he presumed to be the Provincial Police of Buenos Aires, did not have details regarding the Derian-Permanent Assembly meeting, other than the fact that it had taken place. He felt that had he been in the hands of the Federal Police or of one of the Military Services, they would have had much better information regarding the Permanent Assembly, himself, and its membership and he would not have been able to deny as much as he did.

A Break

That night a large number of persons were brought into the interrogation center. He heard many voices in the large room outside of the cell door. He managed to peer through the crack under the door and saw three or four dressed young people. He learned later that a pipe bomb had been set off on the railway in La Plata and the Provincial Police had conducted a large scale roundup. He was not interrogated for what he believes several days because of the detention center having to process this large number of young suspects. Bravo said that he believes that he was at this time being held in the Regional Provincial Police Station No. 1 of La Plata. During this break, he was told
to clean his own cell which he described as revolting work as prisoners in the detention facilities were not allowed to use the bathrooms and defecated and urinated on their cell floors. In response to a question, he noted that during the first pickana treatment he had completely lost control of his bodily functions but had not lost control during the submarine. He was allowed to bathe. During his shower, he had the first drink of water that he had during his captivity.

Session Eight

Some time later Bravo said he was placed in a truck with a number of other naked people and driven outside of La Plata. The truck stopped in a muddy area which probably was a garbage dump, and the passengers were pushed out of the truck. The debris badly hurt his bare feet as he walked on it. He heard the sound of others being beaten. Then many shots were fired, including machine guns. At the conclusion of the firing, he and a few others were led back to the truck. He believes that the others were executed. He noted that during the beatings no one cried out. When he returned to the prison, he was told by his "friendly voice" you are saved ("estas salvada").

Session Nine

Later Bravo said he was brought to a room where he was questioned by a person, who he guesses was a military officer. The interrogation was conducted in an entirely different manner as a conversation between two civilized people." Bravo said it was a long session, covering much the same ground that had been covered in the torture sessions. He did not know how many other people were in the room or if there was a tape recorder present. He felt that a door was open as he felt the cold air coming in and could also sense daylight.

Session Ten

On what Bravo believes to be September 20, he was given a razor and allowed to shave himself, although his blindfold was not removed. He commented that he had done a poor job shaving off a heavy growth of beard. He was taken out of the detention place clothed and in daylight.
During the short drive from this place to the next site, the vehicle carrying him waited for a number of minutes for a train to pass. He also noted that the road at one point dropped steeply.

At the next building, he saw through the edges of his blindfold uniformed policemen. Here, he was then asked a number of questions for a formal statement. Bravo said he believes that he was questioned by Colonel Etcheolcas, former head bodyguard for ex-Provincial Governor (Peronist labor thug) Calabro. He was startled during this interrogation session because during the questioning regarding his relationship with Walsh, Etcheolcas used the phrase "Estimado Bravo" and he recognized the voice as being the same in his first interrogation under the four-prong picana.

Session Eleven

Bravo was brought to Buenos Aires Provincial Police Chief Colonel Camps who told him, "You are complicated". Camps threatened Bravo that if he talked of what happened to him he would be found to have committed suicide. Bravo was then put in a cell with a hangman's noose hung from a pipe and left there.

Bravo noted that Col. Camps had pictures of General Rosas and San Martin in his office and a small Nazi flag under the glass of his desk.

Bravo's Son Questioned

Mrs. Bravo interjected that her oldest son had gone to La Plata on September 22 about the possibility of the family visiting Mr. Bravo. The Bravo son was interrogated by Col. Etcheolcas regarding his father's activities and his books. In response to Bravo son's question as to why his father had been picked up, the Colonel responded that his father was a fine gentlemen who had fronted unwittingly for other people. He had been picked up because he was "the visible head of the Permanent Assembly." The Colonel said the police had interrogated his father, but had not tortured him. The PEN decree on Alfred Bravo was issued on September 20, 1977.

Conclusion

Bravo noted that he had heard tales in La Plata Prison which made his treatment look moderate. He stated that his strength to endure the questioning came from the fact that he knew
he was not involved with terrorism or subversion. He stated that negating everything possible was his only salvation. He added it was not a question of physical will but of psychic will. He noted that he had three serious breakdowns during the 11 days of his interrogation. He said he was no superman and had cried out with pain like any other man. He said that he had provided this information to the Embassy to "show you what you are fighting for." He asked that the Embassy treat this information carefully, "as my life is in your hands."

Treatment in La Plata Jail

Bravo stated that the jail conditions in La Plata were severe. A number of the trustees in charge of the prisoners were former AAA members (Right wing terrorists). He stated that he had received only one severe beating while in La Plata Prison before his only outside meeting with John M. Thompson, Secretary General of the World Conference of Organizations of the Teaching Profession.

Right of Option

In response to an inquiry from Mr. Freeman regarding his personal safety, Bravo stated that he was not afraid and noted that everyone ran certain risk. He mentioned that on July 5, he and his wife had met with Under Secretary of Interior, Ruis Palacios. At that time, Palacios said that Bravo could have the right of option to leave the country if he would apply for it. Bravo said he told Palacios that he had been offered that opportunity earlier while in prison and found it even less attractive now. Bravo said that he was able to work (but not allowed back to his government teaching job). He could not participate in either his union or human rights activities under the terms of his parole status.

Postscript

At a later meeting with Poloff Harris, Bravo said that he wished the report of his experiences to be sent to Secretary Vance and Mrs. Derian, but that he hoped that the information in the report -- sanitized to disguise the source -- would be widely circulated to international organizations, human rights groups, and to interested governments. Bravo said that the United States has information experts and he hoped his information would provide them the raw material for making strong and factual reports about the situation in Argentina. Bravo said that he had no fears for his personal safety as the government had done everything to him that it could except kill him. But, he emphasized, he was concerned about his wife and family who are the ones at risk.
COMMENT: Three theories have circulated as to the reasons for Mr. Bravo's arrest: a) that he was in the process of fomenting a teachers' strike (which had the support and sympathy of many teachers who are wives of members of the Argentine security forces); b) that it was the outgrowth of a meeting with members of an AFL-CIO delegation two days prior to his arrest. (AFL-CIO representatives for some time feared that this was the case); c) that he was a "rabble rouser" for the cause of human rights and had contacts with foreign newsmen (particularly European) interested in playing up the Argentine human rights situation in Europe. (It was widely known, for example, that Bravo told a Norwegian TV team a year and a half ago that there were 30,000 missing or dead in Argentina as a result of the anti-subversion campaign.)

We do not doubt the story he has told us about the ordeals which he underwent during his interrogation. Many of the details in the Bravo report parallel interrogation practices and patterns previously reported to the Embassy by other subjects. The picana, the submarine, beatings, threatened and actual executions, the continual repetition of questions day after day are usual interrogation techniques. We have no reason to doubt Bravo's judgment that he was held by Buenos Aires Provincial Police.

It takes only one meeting with Bravo to recognize that he is a man with exceptional conviction in what he is doing. He describes himself as a fighter in the cause of democracy. He has a vivid hatred for military dictatorships. We understand that the Argentine Government answered an inquiry concerning Bravo's disappearance with the statement "that Bravo was a Marxist teacher." However, this Embassy has no information that Bravo had any connections with terrorist organizations or that he is or was a member of the Communist Party. On the contrary, we have received hints that in the past Bravo has cooperated with military authorities in his capacity as a union leader. We should note that this is very common in Argentina given the political realities here. Bravo may have level Army and Navy "clearances" were factors which gave him courage.

We are awed by Bravo's report that he stood up to the brutal interrogations and denied substantial amounts of information
to his interrogators which he know to be true. We do not know what to make of this and at present can only say that Bravo indeed must be an extraordinary man.

Department should be aware that general information regarding Bravo's interrogation is circulating within human rights circles in Buenos Aires. According to Bravo the full details of his mistreatment are not known, only that he was subjected to extensive torture during his interrogation.

END COMMENT.

Distribution:
P - Under Secretary Newsom
HA - Ms. Derian
ARA - Mr. McNeil
ARA/ ECA - Mr. Bumpus
AMB/DCM
POL (LIMDIS File)

Clearances:
AMB: RCastro (draft)
DCM: MChaplin (draft)
A/POLCOUNS: AGFreeman (draft)

POL: FAHarris: jk 8/3/78
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 7, 1977

INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNEW BRZEZINSKI
FROM: NORTH-SOUTH
SUBJECT: Evening Report
Evening Report - Wednesday, September 7, 1977

Brazil. The Second Army Commander has recommended that authorities reopen the Herzog case, a Brazilian journalist who died mysteriously under Second Army detention in 1975. President Geisel reportedly was extremely interested in the case and other past similar cases could be reopened as well.

Argentina. The Argentine intelligence community believes that Montonero and ERP terrorists are operating covertly in Europe and the U.S. and may have missions to assassinate Argentine officials. The Defense Attache in Buenos Aires comments that evidence seems to substantiate this claim and that they are still a viable force.

The Argentine Government acknowledged the late August detention of prominent Argentina citizen Deutsch and family for subversive actions, a move which Embassy Buenos Aires relates to President Videla's visit here.

Chile. Uniformed and plain clothes police detained and interrogated U.S. citizen and AIFLD Country Program Director Joseph Campos for two hours in Concepcion, searching his AID vehicle. Embassy Santiago believes the incident was intended to harass trade union leaders meeting in the town and intends to protest.

El Salvador. The wife of an American citizen Elena Lima Chiurato, was abducted at a San Salvador shopping center September 6, in what preliminary reports suggest is a ransom kidnapping.
Uruguay. Our Charge passed the names of 19 Uruguays on whom we have received recent human rights inquiries to the Government, using for the first time an official-informal channel recently established. Embassy Montevideo notes that we will have to await the results, but the establishment of this long-sought channel itself is a step in the right direction.
The Southern Cone governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay have a somewhat cynical view of US policies toward Latin America. Their perspective is shaped by the conviction that Washington's preoccupation since the mid-1960s with other parts of the world has left the US out of touch with Latin American realities. They view US policy toward their region as inconsistent, incoherent, and unreasonably punitive. There is a strong feeling that in the broader arena the US has been outmaneuvered by the Soviets and is losing its ability to lead the West.
Many of the differences between the US and the Southern Cone nations have historical origins. At the present time, however, each country in the area has specific grievances against the US, with the most common problem being human rights. The military leaders of the region believe that security against leftist terrorism and international Communism takes precedence over personal well-being and individual freedom. Most of these leaders are convinced that intervention by the military prevented a leftist takeover. They tend to identify economic development and a slow, incremental approach toward democratic processes as the requisite therapy for accumulated national weaknesses. For the countries that have experienced a struggle against terrorism, the fight for national survival has been very real. All of the Southern Cone countries are obsessed with the threat of subversion, and herein lies the basic conflict with US human rights policies.

The Southern Cone governments bitterly resent their poor image in the world press and in international forums, where their military leaders are commonly described as "totalitarian" and "fascist." Government spokesmen often complain that exiled Communists and terrorists are allowed to criticize openly without rebuttal. One Brazilian official lamented two years ago to US Embassy officers that the Israelis were praised for staging a raid into Uganda against terrorists, while counterterrorist activities in Brazil were denounced by the US press.

Leaders in the Southern Cone believe that investigations by unofficial and official organizations such as Amnesty International and the UN Commission on Human Rights are overzealous and misguided, and that US policymakers accept these findings uncritically. They deplore the United States' selective attention to Latin America while it ignores human rights violations in Communist countries.

This does not mean that US human rights policy has had a completely negative impact on the area. On the
contrary, police and military officials in these countries are now sensitized to human rights considerations. Every chief of state in the area claims to have made clear to his subordinates that torture and arbitrary arrest will no longer be tolerated. All of these countries have shown general improvement during the past year in their treatment of prisoners.

From their perspective, however, these improvements go unacknowledged by Washington, and moreover, the torrent of criticism, adversary treatment, and antagonistic US legislation has continued. Their conclusion is that the US is playing a game with them—using human rights as a way to dictate the timetable and ultimate shape of the political mode the US wants them to adopt. If, indeed, return to "democratic government" is the real issue, their answer is that competitive politics is not possible in the near future. This stand will not be negotiable until the various military regimes are convinced that they have established economic progress and ensured the permanence of political changes they have brought about. Continued US pressure to speed up the process will probably only increase the bitterness and recrimination.

Public Views of US Policies

It is much more difficult to get an accurate reading of public reaction to US human rights policy. Most citizens seem to support the military governments; the rest are either unconcerned with politics or belong to a declared opposition. The Chilean Government probably enjoys the greatest backing in the Southern Cone; the plebiscite vote held there earlier this year, even though rigged to a certain extent, is a good indication of this support.

Judging from newspaper commentary and personal conversations, US human rights policy has had little impact on the general populace. Some political groups that have long opposed the various governments and other groups representing civil and human rights causes have used the policy to air their own specific grievances.
Liberal clergy have also cited the policy as being similar to their own programs.

Argentina

The human rights issue is the major point of contention between Argentina and the US. Senior Argentine officials view human rights abuses as an unfortunate but inevitable consequence of their efforts to eradicate leftist terrorism. Under these circumstances, they resent attempts by foreign critics to portray the Argentine Government as an oppressive dictatorship. Current US policy is perceived by the Argentines as a sign that the US considers good bilateral relations to be expendable. They believe that this policy is selective and biased against Argentina, that they are marked for "punishment" regardless of their internal problems. Seeing themselves as victims of a conspiracy, they often say that if the US understood the terrorist problem, it would also understand the government's tough measures.

Now that the terrorist threat seems to be abating, the government is attempting to wind down its massive security operations and exert tighter controls over police and military units. It has ordered the release of many prisoners to the custody of their relatives during daylight hours. The Interior Minister has warned police chiefs to stop bullying the public and restore normal procedures, and the government has strengthened requirements for proper police identification. In an effort to appease its critics, the government has published several lists of those arrested or under detention and is making a concerted effort to locate missing persons. The Inter-American Human Rights Committee has been invited to visit the country, possibly between March and May 1979.

The basic problem, as far as the Argentines are concerned, is that their efforts to deal with the human rights issue have not been noted by Washington. The Argentine Government is discouraged by the reduction of
foreign military sales, the reduction in the size of the US military mission, the nonappropriation of training funds, and the lack of authorization for Argentina to pay for military training in the US. Buenos Aires has been concerned about the recently implemented Humphrey-Kennedy amendment that prohibits foreign military purchases, export licenses, and training. The State Department's recent decision to authorize a small military training contract for noncombatants alleviated some of the tension, but Senator Kennedy's letter to President Carter protesting the decision is sure to rankle Buenos Aires.

Another problem is the Argentine plan for an "experimental" plutonium reprocessing plant. The decision runs counter to President Carter's desire to curb the spread of proliferation-prone facilities. Argentina steadfastly refuses to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, contending that it discriminates against countries without nuclear weapons. Admiral Raul Castro Madero, the head of Argentina's Nuclear Commission, says that all countries will have to use reprocessing in the future and the US will have to relent in its current policy. Meanwhile, Argentina wants to have the technology so it can independently decide whether or not to reprocess.

The Argentines are also concerned about Cuban-Soviet expansion in Africa and cite US inactivity as "Western weakness." They have recently discussed taking a more active role in the nonaligned movement to counter Cuban activities. The hardline attitude is taken by Army General Agosti, who commented earlier this year that Argentina's "armed forces wiped out a Marxist bridgehead without anybody's help or advice" and that something should be done about Africa.

There recently was an emotional outpouring in Buenos Aires against the US over the Export-Import Bank decision not to finance equipment exports for the Yacreta Dam project. The Export-Import Bank's change of mind on this issue has lessened the hue and cry, but many military men...
think that the financing turnaround is somehow linked to the visit by the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. Linking the Export-Import Bank financing with other problems with the US, many Argentine leaders seem determined to begin redirecting their country's foreign policy. Foreign Minister Montes, for example, played up Argentina's potential as a nuclear supplier during his recent trip to Eastern Europe. Military officers, meanwhile, have hinted that they are thinking of abrogating the Rio defense pact and expelling the US military group.

Brazil

Brazil's foreign policy reflects its very real great power aspirations. It wants to develop new markets and to expand existing ones for Brazilian exports, and it is working to achieve and demonstrate independence of the US in foreign affairs. These are not new attitudes, but resentment of US human rights and nuclear proliferation policies has heightened Brazilian sensitivities and evoked dramatic reactions such as Brasilia's severance last year of military ties with Washington.

Brazil is particularly concerned over the US position on human rights, which it attacks as an unwarranted intrusion into Brazil's domestic affairs. This truculence masks a very real fear that the US, deliberately or not, will encourage civilian dissent and increase domestic demands for basic changes. While President Geisel and President-elect Figueiredo seem to favor gradual liberalization, they do not want the pace to be pushed by social forces. Nevertheless, the government has now formally ended press censorship and committed itself to restoring habeas corpus in many political and national security cases and shelving the decree law that gives the regime sweeping dictatorial powers.

Brazilian officials are also acutely concerned that the country's economic well-being is still fragile and
vulnerable to outside forces. Thus, the Brazilians tend to view certain US trade positions—such as countervailing duties—as harmful to their development drive, fueled as it is by ever-expanding exports. This is especially true this year because poor agricultural performance has forced the government to concentrate on alleviating the balance of payments problem by promoting more exports of manufactured goods to developed nations. One observer has noted that the intense focus on rapid modernization tends to lead Brazilian policymakers to perceive almost all foreign policy conflicts as potentially threatening to basic Brazilian interests.

The Brazilians view US nuclear nonproliferation concerns in a similar context, often saying that US opposition to the Brazil-West German nuclear accord is merely a veiled attempt to constrain Brazilian growth. They point out the critical importance to them of non-fossil fuel as a source of energy because of the high cost of imported oil. Argentina's decision to develop reprocessing technology will almost certainly prompt Brazil to follow suit.

Added to these specific problems with the US is the growing opinion in Brazil that the US has lost or is losing its resolve and even some of its capacity as a world power. The sizable conservative sector in Brazil sees the US limited in its capacity for action abroad by an excess of permissiveness, an aura of decadence, and the aftermath of its experience in Vietnam. The situation in Africa is perceived as the best current example of this development.

The US is viewed from an environment in which there is a tradition of a very strong executive, with power wielded by an elite that distrusts and fears the masses. At present the government is controlled and supported by a conservative military that is strongly anti-Communist and convinced that Brazil is a prime target of the international Communist movement.
The general populace is somewhat more sensitized to the issue of human rights than people in the rest of the Southern Cone because of the low incidence of terrorist activity in the country and the growing civil rights movement among the black population. The Brazilian church has also been a factor through its long championing of the human rights cause and its protests against government policies. Nevertheless, like other Latin American countries, Brazilians in general adhere to authoritarian, paternalistic cultural patterns and are much more tolerant of limitations on the individual than North Americans. In a recent conversation the chief of the Brazilian National Intelligence Service rhetorically questioned which posed the greater threat to Brazil--the US or the Soviet Union? The intelligence chief went on to wonder why the US did not understand Brazil's problems and why Washington would not assist a gradual move toward democratic government rather than engage in constant and unproductive criticism.

Chile

Chilean leaders have long been convinced that US policy on human rights has been aimed specifically at them. The Pinochet government is bewildered by this because it believes that it has made substantial progress in eliminating human rights violations, but it has yet to hear any favorable comment from Washington. President Pinochet is disappointed by the lack of US recognition of the improving situation in Chile. He believes that he is being criticized with the same intensity as before he tried to make improvements. The Chileans will be interested in the US vote on the UN Human Rights Committee's attempt to provide funds to "victims" of Chilean human rights violations.

Among the human rights advances the Chileans cite are: a relaxation of press controls and an end to the state of siege; a reduction in the curfew; an amnesty for political prisoners and official consent for most exiles to return; a sweeping reorganization and reform of the
intelligence service, which had been responsible for much
of the abuse of human rights; civilian appointments to
the cabinet, including the key Interior Ministry, which
is responsible for the intelligence service; accelerated
completion of a new constitution and advancement in the
timetable for an elected government; preparation of a new
labor code with plans to reinstitute collective bargaining
next year; and the visit of the UN Human Rights Committee
delegation.

The Chilean military sees itself as a traditional
ally of the US and believes that Washington "encouraged"
the coup against Allende. Once Allende was overthrown,
however, the military believes that the US was forced by
domestic political concerns to become strongly critical
of the new government and to deny any part in the coup.

The Chileans are now convinced that US-Chilean
relations will never be the same. They believe that
there is a small coterie in Washington that is actively
working to undermine the Pinochet regime. They find it
incomprehensible that the US does not realize that the
stringent government controls in Chile were a necessary
course of action after the overthrow of the Marxist
Allende regime. They also think that the US is being
overzealous in its prosecution of the Letelier case; the
Chilean media have contrasted this enthusiasm with what
it describes as a lack of interest in finding out the
"truth" in the Kennedy assassination. Anti-US nation-
alism is easily aroused. For example, a Washington Post
editorial in June calling for Pinochet to resign and be
replaced by a Christian Democratic government was de-
nounced in a series of man-in-the-street interviews and
was described by nearly everyone as an unwarranted in-
trusion in Chilean affairs.

The opposition political parties, meanwhile, view US
human rights policy as made to order for their own cam-
paign against the government. The Christian Democrats,
in particular, hope that the fallout from the Letelier
case will bring down Pinochet.
While the Chileans believe they are being unfairly treated by Washington, there is still a strong pro-US feeling in the country. Military officers and civilian officials alike admire the US and would like their country eventually to evolve along US lines. Despite a current perception distrust of the US, the Chileans' great concern is that the poor relations between the two countries will deteriorate even further. The Chileans appear determined to refrain from any hostile act or statement against the US and continue to hope for better treatment. For example, Foreign Minister Cubillos recently devoted most of a meeting with Secretary Vance to setting forth the Chilean position in the Beagle Channel negotiations with Argentina. Despite the poor relations with the US, Cubillos clearly hoped that Washington would use its influence to soften Argentina's position in the dispute.

Cubillos went on to explain the evolutionary process of the return to democratic government in Chile. He acknowledged the Chilean belief that civilian government is impossible now, but pointed out that political institutionalization is under way. Cubillos' remarks and the general atmosphere in Santiago suggest that even though there are strong feelings in Chile favoring an accommodation with the US, there is little chance of a quick return to civilian rule. Not only has the government been successful in solving the country's chronic economic problems, there are strong memories of the political and economic chaos of the Allende years--in sum there is little desire to return the country to the politicians.

Paraguay

President Stroessner has been in power since 1954, and there appears to be little chance for any change in the policies that, in his view and in the view of many Paraguayans, have brought the country internal peace, stability, and economic progress. The Stroessner regime has a poor human rights record, but there is some evidence that improvements are being made and indications
that combined Western diplomatic pressure is beginning to have an effect, however slight.

One recent example is the case of arrested human rights activist, Domingo Laino, in which the combined efforts of the US, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and France resulted in Laino's release from prison. Indeed, largely as a result of US pressure, Paraguay has released almost all of its political prisoners from jail. Human rights, however, will probably continue to be a problem because of the subservience of the judiciary to presidential authority and the lack of control over police interrogation methods.

The US Ambassador in Asuncion noted as early as last May that the Paraguayans were improving their human rights performance. He called the move by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to cut expansion credits and the military training program for Paraguay from the fiscal year 1979 Foreign Assistance Bill too harsh in the face of improved conditions. He argued that Washington's continued ignorance of improvements played into the hands of hardliners who urge suppression of all dissidence.

The Paraguayan Government's public response to the US human rights policy has been negative. President Stroessner often cites his staunch anti-Communism as well as concern over terrorism and subversion as reasons for strict controls. Many members of the Paraguayan political elite are plainly worried by what they see as the US failure to meet the Soviet-Cuban challenge in Africa. They see the US as a weakened ally that can no longer be counted upon to fight against Communist aggression. They regard US criticism of their country as naive and an invasion of their domestic affairs.

Because of the extent of media censorship in the country, it is difficult to determine what the populace thinks of the Stroessner regime. The President appears to be personally popular, however, and his travels about the country are enthusiastically received by the citizens.
A return to civilian rule any time soon is highly unlikely.

**Uruguay**

Uruguay has taken some steps during the past year to improve human rights conditions, although the overall situation remains poor. The government retains extensive statutory powers of control that it is reluctant to give up. On the average, fewer political arrests have been made in 1978 than last year, and there have been far fewer instances of mistreatment of political prisoners. Although the judicial system is hamstrung by executive controls and is far from independent, military courts are reducing the backlog of political and subversive cases and are ordering the release of increasing numbers of detainees. The local press is beginning to advocate more freely—if cautiously—an expeditious return to civilian government.

Among the positive measures taken by the government are: permission for an American Bar Association visit in April; plans to publish a list of prisoners released since 1 January 1978; an intention to invite the International Red Cross to visit Uruguay and to open talks with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission on ground rules for a visit; and curtailment of prisoner detentions under emergency powers. Most indications are that the regime would like to improve its image abroad and will move steadily to change its human rights practices.

Once South America's most liberal democracy, Uruguay may now be the region's most highly controlled society. To explain this, Uruguayan leaders point out that Washington has no appreciation for the intensity of the struggle against the Tupamaro guerrillas. The Uruguayan military sees this battle as a defense of its national moral values, patriotism, and honor. For this reason, it remains adamantly opposed to US human rights policies and has attempted to discredit the US through a well-managed media campaign.
Many rightist military officers oppose the US and want to follow the Brazilian political mode. On the other hand, General Gregorio Alvarez, the commander in chief of the Army who wants to be President some day, supports a new evaluation of the human rights situation and is moving cautiously to compel military officers to accept his reform measures. The strength of the rightist officers, however, should not be underestimated, however. Their recent pique at remarks of the US Army attache and subsequent campaigns to have him recalled are instructive.

Moreover, even if General Alvarez is successful in his campaign, the Uruguayan military has no intention of ending its control of the government until 1986. Meanwhile, Uruguay's poor human rights performance, together with US legislative and policy restrictions on economic and military assistance, are impediments to better relations. Uruguayans hope that a new, more positive attitude toward human rights will result in better relations with the US, but they insist that Washington should have no illusions about the prospects for an early return to civilian government.
Our Embassy in Buenos Aires has sent us a 14-page, single-spaced Memorandum of Conversation with Alfredo Bravo, co-President and one of the founders of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights. Bravo spent four hours with our Embassy officials detailing the horrors of his imprisonment and torture by the Buenos Aires police. Bravo's story is a compelling one, and I found myself reading through the entire 14-page Memcon, though I had intended only to skim it.

Because I believe his story is important as we begin to lay the groundwork for a new strategy to Argentina, I have prepared below a short summary of that Memcon.

Bravo's account is that of a classic "disappearance"—plain-clothesmen entered the classroom where he was teaching, took him for "questioning" blindfolded and in an unmarked car. Then begins the horror.

Bravo was held for ten days in various detention centers. During that time he was hooded constantly, naked, and denied food and water. The list of tortures he experienced and witnessed reads like a primer of cruel and unusual punishment. He himself was:

-- beaten, both by hand and rubber clubs;
-- subjected to electrical shocks via a four-pronged electric picana until his mouth and jaws were paralyzed;
-- subjected to a bucket treatment where his feet were held in a bucket of ice water until thoroughly chilled and then shoved into a bucket of boiling water;
-- subjected to "the submarine"—repeatedly being held under water until almost drowned.
Beyond the physical torture were a variety of psychological horrors that Bravo was forced to watch or listen to:

--- As he was moved from detention center to detention center, Bravo was thrown in vans with dead bodies and other naked prisoners showing physical evidence of violent torture.

--- Group tortures occurred in which Bravo was placed in a circle of prisoners holding hands and electricity was applied; a woman prisoner was raped with the group standing by and her boy friend shot when he objected; the group was beaten.

Throughout the ten days of torture, the interrogation was a litany of questions about the activities and political affiliations of people known and unknown to Bravo. In the last session, Bravo and a number of other prisoners were taken to a field which appeared to be a garbage dump. Bravo, still hooded, heard the sounds of beatings and many shots being fired. Then he and a few other prisoners were returned to the truck and to detention.

Following that episode, further interrogation was conducted on an entirely different plane— as civilized people conducting a conversation. Then, Bravo was made a "regular prisoner", and warned not to talk of what had happened to him or he would be found to have committed suicide. During his months in La Plata prison, Bravo heard other stories paralleling his own and worse.

In his talk with Embassy officials, Bravo emphasized that he was no superman and had cried out with pain like any other man. He said he provided this information "to show you what you are fighting for". He asked that the Embassy treat the information carefully, "as my life is in your hands".

cc: Jessica Tuchman Malcora

[Signature]

ZB, This is a very good summary of the main points. Do you want to use it in the WR? Rick
THIS MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION IS EXEMPTED FROM THE GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE PURSUANT TO 5 FAM 924 (D) AS DISCLOSURE OF THIS MATERIAL WOULD PLACE THE SOURCE IN IMMEDIATE JEOPARDY.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

July 10, 1978

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Alfredo Bravo, Co-President, Permanent Assembly for Human Rights and President Mrs. Alfredo Bravo Miss Susana Dieguez

(Briefly) Mr. John R. Higgins, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, American Embassy, Buenos Aires Mr. Anthony G. Freeman, Acting Political Counselor, American Embassy, Buenos Aires Mr. F. Allen Harris, Political Officer, American Embassy, Buenos Aires

PLACE: American Embassy

SUBJECT: Detention and Interrogation of Alfredo Bravo

Background

Mr. Alfredo Bravo is the co-president and one of the founders of the Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights. He is believed to be a Radical Party sympathizer (somewhere left of center, e.g. social-democrat or socialist of the West' European variety), who for a number of years has headed the Argentine Teachers' Union. To the Embassy's knowledge he has had no connection with any terrorist or subversive organization. His abduction in early September, 1977 brought enormous pressures on the Argentine government domestically and internationally for resolution of his disappearance. This memorandum is a summary record of a four hour conversation regarding Mr. Bravo's detention and interrogation.

Preliminaries

Mr. Bravo called Mr. Harris on July 10 stating that he wished to stop by the Embassy to thank Mr. Harris for his help in obtaining his release. At 5:00 p.m. Mr. Bravo accompanied by his wife and the common law wife of one of his La Plata Prison cell mates arrived at the Embassy. Mr. Bravo thanked Mr. Harris and the Embassy for their efforts in obtaining his release. The discussion started out on prison conditions at La Plata Prison. Mr. Bravo stated that the prison's rules are not published and thus are subject to the interpretation of each individual guard. He noted that any small infraction results in the prisoner being confined to the "chanchos" (pig pens).
Mr. Freeman and later Charge Higgins entered the office and on both occasions Mr. Bravo thanked them profusely for the Embassy's aid in obtaining his release from prison.

Detention and Transit

Mr. Bravo suggested that the best way of discussing his case would be to relate in detail what had actually happened to him. He said that on September 8, 1977 he began teaching at about 8 p.m. Shortly after his class began, three men entered his classroom, showed police identification, said he was wanted for questioning, and escorted him outside to a "run-down" Renault IV automobile. He said his hands were handcuffed behind his back but that, his treatment was correct as long as the vehicle was in the Federal Capital. However, after they crossed the bridge into the province of Buenos Aires, the Renault pulled off into a side street. He was taken out of the car, punched and then blindfolded by the three men. The men then discussed among themselves that they had to kill him. One questioned if they had enough gasoline to burn him. Another suggested that kerosene would be better as it disguised the body smell better. They again punched him around and finally one man stated that they couldn't kill him because he had to confess first. They then handcuffed his hands in front of his body. They placed eye glasses (he presumed with dark lens) over his blindfold and put a hat on his head and again resumed driving.

After a period of time, the car stopped. Bravo heard the sound of buses nearby. He peered under an edge of his blindfold and noted a modern bar and saw a street sign with 2nd Street on it in the lettering of street signs used in La Plata (the capital of Buenos Aires Province). He saw two uniformed policemen pass by with rifles. He thought about calling to them for help, but decided that they were probably colleagues of his abductors.

A new voice gave orders to his abductors on where to take him. They then drove to another place. There were a number of other cars there, Bravo recalled bumping into several cars before he went up some stairs. When he arrived in the building, the voices in the room went silent.
At this time, he was stripped naked; his rings and his brief case were taken. A hood was placed over his head. (Bravo noted that hoods were changed throughout his interrogation. He believes that the hoods were of different colors denoting the point at which the person was in the interrogation process. He added that he remained naked and blindfolded throughout 10 days of interrogation and torture. He also had no sense of time during this period.)

First Session

Shortly after being stripped, Bravo was spread eagled on a table. His hood was removed. Before any questions were asked, Bravo said a four pronged electric picana was run over his chest from his neck to his waist in what he called a "rastrillo" (rake). Bravo described this as being excruciatingly painful. At the start of this session and all following torture sessions, Bravo said he was addressed with mocking courtesy as "Estimado Alfredo" or "Estimado Bravo" as if to signal what was to come next. The questioning during this session focused on his relations as a top labor leader with key government figures. He recalled the following specific questions: What connection did he have with Colonel Reston?; What was his relation with government intervenors of the CGT?; What was his relationship with General Viola?; What was his relationship with Colonel Longo (the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Labor)? Bravo said that he first mentioned the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights himself. He said that it was his first serious error as the Assembly became the constant theme of his later interrogations.

The first round of torture ended. At this point, Bravo stated he was "so full of electricity" that his jaws and tongue were paralyzed. He stated he was allowed to rest between rounds until he regained some use of his jaw and tongue. At this point, a helpful voice which he believes to be that of his caretaker during the torture process told him do not swallow saliva or drink anything during or after the picana session. A second round of "rastrillo" applications began. At this point, Bravo stated he was unable to communicate. He had no use of his jaw muscles and tongue. Again the same questions were repeated regarding his union affiliations. He was incapable of replying.
At the conclusion of the second round of picana applications, someone poured water in his mouth. This caused him to choke and to gag as his mouth and gums felt like they were suddenly, grossly swollen. He said he would have drowned if someone had not come and turned his head to his side and sponged the water from his mouth and from between his lips and teeth. He mentioned that during this round he was given an injection in the buttocks. Bravo believes that the injection was some sort of a cardiovascular stimulant to enable him physically to endure continued electric shock treatment.

Another round began with further applications of the "rastrillo". Bravo was not able to recall how many times the "rastrillo" was applied to his body. He remembered that most of the applications were to his chest and some to his ribs on his side. Close to the end of the third round, the "rastrillo" was placed on the back of his neck. He stated that this was the worst as it had direct shock effect on his brain. Mr. Bravo noted that during the second and third rounds he was threatened. He recalled two specific threats -- first, that "we are going to do the same to you as we did to the writer Eduardo". (Bravo believes this is a reference to disappeared journalist Eduardo Sajon.) Secondly, that we are going to treat you the same as we treated (Air Force Junta Member) Agosti's niece. During his torture Bravo said he heard repeated cries from other nearby rooms.

At the conclusion of the last round, he was put in the back of a van with a man and a woman who he believes were dead. He saw through his blindfold a part of a woman's face which was beaten bloody. He was taken to a second place of detention which he described as a "deposito". He alone was taken out of the van.

Second Session

When he entered the "deposito" a new hood was placed over his head. After some time he was taken into a room and subjected to a torture called "el cubo" (the bucket). His feet were forced into a bucket of ice water. He said when he tried to lift his feet from the water, someone pressed his knees down forcing his feet back into the bucket. His feet were kept in the ice water for five or six minutes.
After this time had past, one of his torturers, as if to be nice, said to the others to let Bravo take his feet out. But his feet were then jammed into another pail containing boiling hot water. The pain was intense. After several minutes, his feet were again placed back into the bucket of ice water and the questioning began. Bravo stated that he was subjected to four cold-hot cycles, during which the interrogation centered on the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights. The specific questions that Mr. Bravo recalled focussed on who provides funds to the Permanent Assembly. Bravo noted that his interrogators knew the Assembly had received money from the World Council of Churches. Questions were asked about the foreign connections the Assembly maintains and how the Assembly got its information out of the country. Other questions dealt with the Assembly's contacts with the United States Embassy, the Swedish Embassy, the French Embassy and the Consulate General of Italy. (Bravo mentioned that the Italian Ambassador has been unsympathetic to the human rights problem in Argentina but the Consulate General has been very responsive.)

Bravo was then carried, as he could not walk, and placed on the wooden floor of a small cell. Up a staircase, a friendly voice consoled him (his custodian?) it was only a few steps more. He said he slept for an unknown period of time.

Third Session

Some time later, Bravo was taken from his cell and brought into a room where there were other prisoners. Bravo said he was told to grab the other prisoners' hands and they formed a circle. Suddenly electricity was passed through the entire group. While he was held in this communal torture room, a woman was raped in the midst of the other (presumably blindfolded) prisoners. A prisoner shouted that the woman being raped was his "companera" (friend), and went beserk and attacked the guards. He was severely beaten. Another man was also beaten severely and was threatened with being killed. Bravo said then one of the guards said "shove your gun up his anus" and suddenly a muffled shot was heard. Bravo said that he believes that the man was killed in the room. During his detention in the room, the entire group was beaten severely (with "pinas", i.e. punches). In response to a question, Bravo said that during his detention in the room his hands
were free. He noted that generally his hands and feet were not bound except when he was tortured on one or two occasions.

After a stay of an undetermined time in the communal torture room, he was placed in another cell on a cement slab. He recalled that this was the moment of his great crisis. He broke down, sobbed, and then slept. In response to a question, Bravo stated that he had neither food nor water until the end of his interrogations.

Fourth Session

At some time later, he was taken and placed in a van with seven or eight other naked prisoners. They were forced to lie down on top of one another on the floor of the van. During the ride, Bravo said the prisoners whispered to each other. He learned that a number of the prisoners were workers from the Peugeot factory near La Plata. One worker said he worked in the mold department; another said his name was Aurelio. The van stopped along the way and some of the prisoners were taken out. He was finally taken out of the van at a third detention facility. There he was subjected to "the submarine". With mock courtesy, being called "Estimado Alfredo" and "Estimado Bravo," Bravo said he was held under water six or seven times until he was writhing for air. He came up gagging for breath. Bravo said that the first two times after he was submerged, he did not have a chance to catch his breath after being pulled out of the water as he was gasping for air in very small breaths. On the third time after he came up, he tried to get as much air into his lungs before his head was forced back under the water. After the repeated submerging, he said he was questioned again about the Permanent Assembly. Specifically, he was questioned regarding the goals of the Permanent Assembly, about the contacts it maintains with other national and international organizations. Bravo recalled that the focus was on Permanent Assembly's connections with the Communists, the Montoneros, the Third World priests and the ERP. Bravo said that after a lengthy questioning period about the general goals and contacts of the Permanent Assembly itself, he was questioned in detail regarding many members of the Assembly's leadership. He was queried regarding Jamie Schmirgeld's and Comte-MacDonald's connections with the Communist Party; Emilio Mignone's connections with
the Montoneros; and Methodist Bishop Migués Benino (phonetic) connections with the Third World priests. He was asked about the relations between the Assembly and a number of painters, sculptors and writers. Bravo remembered that Julio Cortázar, an Argentine writer exiled in France was a particular subject of questioning. He was also asked about journalist Rodolfo Walsh. He said three persons took turns questioning him during this period. They asked him to identify 20 or 25 names. Some of whom he knew only by their position as they had signed Permanent Assembly appeals, others he did not know at all. The questioning focussed on the covert political and terrorist affiliations of all these individuals. Bravo said this subject became a major element in all his future interrogations. Bravo stated that throughout his interrogation he provided only the minimal amount of information which was publicly available. For example, he said he acknowledged that Mignone was a former Under Secretary at the Ministry of Education, that Comte-MacDonald was a Christian Democrat, and that Schmirgald was affiliated with the Communist Party. But, Bravo said he had continually denied connections between these Permanent Assembly members and the Montoneros, the Third World priests and the ERP under intensive and repeated questioning as he knew he was telling the truth and if he said what they wanted his fate would be sealed.

Session Five

While in the same facility, Bravo stated that he was taken to a room and he was told to shut his eyes and not to open them until he was so ordered. His blindfold was then removed and the vertical adhesive strips removed from his eyes. Then he was told to open his eyes and not to shut them. He said what he saw was a "Dantesque" scene from hell. One person chained to the wall in a crucified position, another woman whose hands had been horribly burned while lying on a table; another woman was sitting on a small stool with her hands tied through her legs to a ring on the floor. He was then told "look well, you are a candidate for this, if you do not tell us the true political affiliation of these Assembly people." He was then told that he should rest well and that tomorrow they would talk. He was led back to his cell. When he was struggling up the stairs to his cell (because of his burnt feet), the friendly voice told him "falta poco, arriba".
Session Six

Bravo stated that he was subsequently taken from his cell and rubber wraps were placed around his wrists and ankles and ropes were tied to his limbs. He was then hung by his arms from the ceiling so that his feet were suspended from the floor in the middle of a room. A piece of wood was strapped between his ankles so he could not move his feet. He was then beaten with (he thinks) a rubber baton and questioned again regarding the covert political affiliation of the Permanent Assembly members and the Assembly's press contacts. Bravo was specifically asked how many meetings he had held with foreign new agencies. During this session Bravo said he had a severe breakdown and begged his torturers to kill him as he did not know anything. During the interrogation, he was asked about a number of people whom he did not know. Some were identified as nuns, others were Jews from the sound of their names. One was a Methodist Minister, Raul Aragon. Bravo mentioned that he was extensively questioned regarding Jorge Pascale, a former priest who currently is the Executive Director of the Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights (MEDH) and local representative of the Peace and Justice Movement. Bravo noted that many questions centered on Pascale who was referred to as a turncoat priest as he had left the Church in order to marry.

Bravo commented that his tactic in answering all these questions was to deny all possible information to his questioners and to provide only that information which was publicly known. He felt that if he answered one question affirmatively he would be forced to answer the next question and under torture he could be made to say anything that his captors wanted him to agree to. He feared that if he answered any questions positively it would lead down a path in which he would be killed.

Bravo noted in passing that he believed he had been held by the Provincial Police of Buenos Aires. He said that Provincial Police detention centers are known as "caves" and each has a number such as "cueva numero dos", etc. He said Federal Police detention facilities are called "clubs".

Session Seven

At an unspecified time later, Bravo was taken from his cell and brought to another room. He sensed
that there were a number of persons around him in a circle. His hands were handcuffed behind him. He was again greeted as "Estimado Bravo" and seated in a chair. He was then beaten severely and repeatedly asked regarding the political affiliation of all the Permanent Assembly and other names which had been raised in previous interrogation sessions. After a break he was again questioned; but this time regarding his relations with Assistant Secretary of State Derian. He was specifically asked about the meetings the Permanent Assembly had with her; the relationship between the Permanent Assembly and the State Department. Bravo denied (falsely) any contact with her. He said that if he had acknowledged ever having met Derian, this would have led to a series of questions and replies which his torturers would force him to agree to. He noted to us that he had met with Mrs. Derian during her first visit to Argentina in the Buenos Aires apartment of Dr. Westercamp with other members of the Permanent Assembly. He remembered that Mrs. Derian was accompanied by a Spanish-speaking, dark-haired person form the Department of State (Rondon).

Bravo at this point recalled that one thing was of comfort to him during all his interrogations was the fact that he had received a special certificate from the government which entailed a full field, Navy and Army clearance. He knew therefore that there was no derogatory information regarding him in the hands of the security services. He emphasized that his torturers, who he presumed to be the Provincial Police of Buenos Aires, did not have details regarding the Derian-Permanent Assembly meeting, other than the fact that it had taken place. He felt that had he been in the hands of the Federal Police or of one of the Military Services, they would have had much better information regarding the Permanent Assembly, himself, and its membership and he would not have been able to deny as much as he did.

A Break

That night a large number of persons were brought into the interrogation center. He heard many voices in the large room outside of the cell door. He managed to peer through the crack under the door and saw three or four dressed young people. He learned later that a pipe bomb had been set off on the railway in La Plata and the Provincial Police had conducted a large scale roundup. He was not interrogated for what he believes several days because of the detention center having to process this large number of young suspects. Bravo said that he believes that he was at this time being held in the Regional Provincial Police Station No. 1 of La Plata. During this break, he was told
to clean his own cell which he described as revolting work, as prisoners in the detention facilities were not allowed to use the bathrooms and defecated and urinated on their cell floors. In response to a question, he noted that during the first picana treatment he had completely lost control of his bodily functions but had not lost control during the submarine. He was allowed to bathe. During his shower, he had the first drink of water that he had during his captivity.

Session Eight

Some time later Bravo said he was placed in a truck with a number of other naked people and driven outside of La Plata. The truck stopped in a muddy area which probably was a garbage dump, and the passengers were pushed out of the truck. The debris badly hurt his bare feet as he walked on it. He heard the sound of others being beaten. Then many shots were fired, including machine guns. At the conclusion of the firing, he and a few others were led back to the truck. He believes that the others were executed. He noted that during the beatings no one cried out. When he returned to the prison, he was told by his "friendly voice" you are saved ("estas salvada").

Session Nine

Later Bravo said he was brought to a room where he was questioned by a person, who he guesses was a military officer. The interrogation was conducted in an entirely different manner as a conversation between two civilized people. Bravo said it was a long session, covering much the same ground that had been covered in the torture sessions. He did not know how many other people were in the room or if there was a tape recorder present. He felt that a door was open as he felt the cold-air coming in and could also sense daylight.

Session Ten

On what Bravo believes to be September 20, he was given a razor and allowed to shave himself, although his blindfold was not removed. He commented that he had done a poor job shaving off a heavy growth of beard. He was taken out of the detention place clothed and in daylight.
During the short drive from this place to the next site, the vehicle carrying him waited for a number of minutes for a train to pass. He also noted that the road at one point dropped steeply.

At the next building, he saw through the edges of his blindfold uniformed policemen. Here, he was then asked a number of questions for a formal statement. Bravo said he believes that he was questioned by Colonel Etchecolas, former head bodyguard for ex-Provincial Governor (Peronist labor thug) Calabro. He was startled during this interrogation session because during the questioning regarding his relationship with Walsh, Etchecolas used the phrase "Estimado Bravo" and he recognized the voice as being the same in his first interrogation under the four-prong picana.

Session Eleven

Bravo was brought to Buenos Aires Provincial Police Chief Colonel Camps who told him, "You are complicated". Camps threatened Bravo that if he talked of what happened to him he would be found to have committed suicide. Bravo was then put in a cell with a hangman's noose hung from a pipe and left there.

Bravo noted that Col. Camps had pictures of General Rosas and San Martin in his office and a small Nazi flag under the glass of his desk.

Bravo's Son Questioned

Mrs. Bravo interjected that her oldest son had gone to La Plata on September 22 about the possibility of the family visiting Mr. Bravo. The Bravo son was interrogated by Col. Etchecolas regarding his father's activities and his books. In response to Bravo son's question as to why his father had been picked up, the Colonel responded that his father was a fine gentlemen who had fronted unwittingly for other people. He had been picked up because he was "the visible head of the Permanent Assembly." The Colonel said the police had interrogated his father, but had not tortured him. The PEN decree on Alfred Bravo was issued on September 20, 1977.

Conclusion

Bravo noted that he had heard tales in La Plata Prison which made his treatment look moderate. He stated that his strength to endure the questioning came from the fact that he knew
he was not involved with terrorism or subversion. He stated that negating everything possible was his only salvation. He added it was not a question of physical will but of psychic will. He noted that he had three serious breakdowns during the 11 days of his interrogation. He said he was no superman and had cried out with pain like any other man. He said that he had provided this information to the Embassy to "show you what you are fighting for." He asked that the Embassy treat this information carefully, "as my life is in your hands."

Treatment in La Plata Jail

Bravo stated that the jail conditions in La Plata were severe. A number of the trustees in charge of the prisoners were former AAA members (Right wing terrorists). He stated that he had received only one severe beating while in La Plata Prison before his only outside meeting with John M. Thompson, Secretary General of the World Conference of Organizations of the Teaching Profession.

Right of Option

In response to an inquiry from Mr. Freeman regarding his personal safety, Bravo stated that he was not afraid and noted that everyone ran certain risk. He mentioned that on July 5, he and his wife had met with Under Secretary of Interior, Ruis Palacios. At that time, Palacios said that Bravo could have the right of option to leave the country if he would apply for it. Bravo said he told Palacios that he had been offered that opportunity earlier while in prison and found it even less attractive now. Bravo said that he was able to work (but not allowed back to his government teaching job). He could not participate in either his union or human rights activities under the terms of his parole status.

Postscript

At a later meeting with Poloff Harris, Bravo said that he wished the report of his experiences to be sent to Secretary Vance and Mrs. Derian, but that he hoped that the information in the report -- sanitized to disguise the source -- would be widely circulated to international organizations, human rights groups and to interested governments. Bravo said that the United States has information experts and he hoped his information would provide them the raw material for making strong and factual reports about the situation in Argentina. Bravo said that he had no fears for his personal safety as the government had done everything to him that it could except kill him. But, he emphasized, he was concerned about his wife and family who are the ones at risk.
COMMENT: Three theories have circulated as to the reasons for Mr. Bravo's arrest: a) that he was in the process of fomenting a teachers' strike (which had the support and sympathy of many teachers who are wives of members of the Argentine security forces); b) that it was the outgrowth of a meeting with members of an AFL-CIO delegation two days prior to his arrest. (AFL-CIO representatives for some time feared that this was the case); c) that he was a "rabble rouser" for the cause of human rights and had contacts with foreign newsmen (particularly European) interested in playing up the Argentine human rights situation in Europe. (It was widely known, for example, that Bravo told a Norwegian TV team a year and a half ago that there were 30,000 missing or dead in Argentina as a result of the anti-subversion campaign.)

We do not doubt the story he has told us about the ordeals which he underwent during his interrogation. Many of the details in the Bravo report parallel interrogation practices and patterns previously reported to the Embassy by other subjects. The picana, the submarine, beatings, threatened and actual executions, the continual repetition of questions day after day are usual interrogation techniques. We have no reason to doubt Bravo's judgment that he was held by Buenos Aires Provincial Police.

It takes only one meeting with Bravo to recognize that he is a man with exceptional conviction in what he is doing. He describes himself as a fighter in the cause of democracy. He has a vivid hatred for military dictatorships. We understand that the Argentine Government answered an inquiry concerning Bravo's disappearance with the statement "that Bravo was a Marxist teacher." However, this Embassy has no information that Bravo had any connections with terrorist organizations or that he is or was a member of the Communist Party. On the contrary, we have received hints that in the past Bravo has cooperated with military authorities in his capacity as a union leader. We should note that this is very common in Argentina given the political realities here. Bravo may have level Army and Navy "clearances" were factors which gave him courage.

We are awed by Bravo's report that he stood up to the brutal interrogations and denied substantial amounts of information
to his interrogators which he knows to be true. We do not know what to make of this and at present can only say that Bravo indeed must be an extraordinary man.

Department should be aware that general information regarding Bravo's interrogation is circulating within human rights circles in Buenos Aires. According to Bravo, the full details of his mistreatment are not known, only that he was subjected to extensive torture during his interrogation.

END COMMENT.

Distribution:
P - Under Secretary Newsom
HA - Ms. Derian
ARA - Mr. McNeil
ARA/ECA - Mr. Bumpus
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CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS
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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: PRC on Argentina

May 12, 1980

Attached for your information is the issues paper for the PRC Meeting On Argentina which will be held on May 14, 1980 at 10:30 a.m. in the White House Situation Room.

Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

Review on May 12, 1981
I. THE SETTING

The United States has three major interests in Argentina: East-West relations, nuclear nonproliferation, and human rights. It also has significant interests in a peaceful solution of the Beagle Channel dispute, Argentine support in Hemispheric matters, and in trade and investment relations.

The Goodpaster, Hodges and Smith visits have introduced new balance into our relations with Argentina. They have substantially improved the tone of the relationship while making a promising start at reducing the differences. The current status of our interests is as follows:

**East-West Relations.** As part of its probings to expand political and economic influence in South America, the Soviet Union is consciously courting both Argentina and Brazil. Argentina has responded to a limited degree because of:

  -- a strong interest in Soviet trade opportunities;
  -- a strong desire for Soviet support in international fora on human rights matters;
  -- an interest in keeping open the possibility of nuclear supplies; and
  -- some desire for greater balance in its foreign relations between East and West.

However, the Argentine military regimes in prospect for at least the next four to seven years have no desire to emulate the Soviets or to align themselves with the Soviet Union, although there is a natural inclination for economic and political reasons toward warmer bilateral relations. Our improved dialogue with Argentina since January has produced:

  -- repeated affirmation of Argentina's basic commitment to the West;
-- a degree of cooperation on grains exports despite our late start on consultations; and

-- greater evidence of Argentine desire to consult and cooperate on Hemispheric matters, such as accepting Cuban refugees and consulting on Central America.

The dialogue also contributed to Argentina's decision to join the Olympics boycott.

Nuclear Nonproliferation. It is clear that Argentina will insist on the continued development of its nuclear technology capabilities, of which it is very proud, and the maintenance for the foreseeable future of a nuclear explosive option. It has demonstrated that it will not respond to pressure on these matters. Our best hope is that a calmer assessment of its own long-term self-interests will lead it more toward safeguards and away from keeping an explosive option open. Closer Brazilian-Argentine relations, symbolized by President Figueiredo's visit to Buenos Aires scheduled for May 13-15, may be helpful in this regard. Argentina is still considering whether to proceed now with the ratification of Tlatelolco. Although the Argentine interpretation that the Treaty permits the development of peaceful nuclear explosives is unhelpful, its ratification could be an important step. The Smith visit was useful, and we hope to reach agreement with Argentina on arrangements to maintain limited nuclear cooperation.

Human Rights. The status of human rights remains a matter of deep concern. While there is broad agreement on the facts of the situation, views differ on the scope and significance of the improvements that have occurred, especially over the past year. Disappearances, a central human rights concern, have declined, as have the number of political prisoners. We are aware of at least 2 disappearances thus far in 1980. (There reportedly were 44 disappearances last year; 55 a month the year before.) Our Embassy recently reported, however, that suspected active terrorists would continue to be dealt with summarily. There is no present prospect that the Argentine Government plans to respond positively to pleas for information about the fate of the thousands of people who have disappeared in recent years. GOA officials recently told Ambassador Smith that about half of the 1300 remaining political prisoners would be tried or released by the end of the year. GOA officials say that, although there is insufficient evidence to try the others, the security forces regard
them as dangerous and do not plan to release them. The latter group includes some persons who benefitted from the 1974 amnesty of President Campora (who, elected with Peronist support, opened the door for Peron's return) and therefore cannot be tried. The state of siege and lack of due process continue. The military government has committed itself to eventual return to civilian, democratic rule, but no one expects this to occur before the mid or late 1980s, and few in Argentina are pressing for a more rapid timetable. A basic issue that remains unresolved is the future form of Argentina's political party system, especially the future role and orientation of Peronism. A dialogue with political leaders is now beginning, although political party activity remains prohibited.

In the economic area, the government continues to reconstruct the economy on the basis of free market principles, to remove the burden of controls accumulated under Peronism, curtail the role of the public sector while strengthening the functions of provincial and local governments, progressively bring inflation under control, and encourage foreign investment as part of a drive for greater productivity and a higher rate of investment. In the short term, these policies have resulted in belt-tightening for lower and lower-middle income groups. However, full employment has been maintained as part of a deliberate government policy to cushion the impact of these measures. In the longer term, these policies could produce sustained dynamic Argentine economic performance and a decentralized economic system more compatible with a pluralistic political order than the statist centralism of the Peron period.

Argentine officials and human rights activists have praised our human rights report this year as balanced and objective. There were difficulties between the Argentine and U.S. Delegations to the UN Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva last February-March. These reflected honest differences over substantive issues such as the new disappearance procedure and the draft torture convention. The Argentines will be very sensitive to what occurs in OAS and UN considerations of their human rights performance later this year and early next year; they want to see an end to the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment against military sales, and positive U.S. votes in the international financial institutions.
The discussion paper previously distributed described our continued political and economic consultations and military and nuclear relations over the next few months. Is there more that could and should be done in this period?

II. ISSUES FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS

1. Significance of Argentine-Soviet Ties and the Appropriate U.S. Response:

The discussion paper draws a distinction between expanding trade ties and political cooperation. The expansion of bilateral trade is a normal phenomenon and will continue, irrespective of U.S. action. The Argentine interest in political cooperation with the Soviets, on the other hand, is related to the Argentine desire to assure Soviet bloc support on human rights issues and reduce the danger of censure in UN fora. A possible interest in Soviet nuclear supplies is related to U.S. safeguards conditions (this issue appears to be approaching solution).

The basic approach proposed in the discussion paper is a political one: to manage U.S.-Argentine relations in a way that strengthens Argentina's sense of identification with the West, to pursue U.S. interests in a balanced fashion and in a manner that takes into account Argentine deep-seated nationalism, and to achieve these goals without compromising our human rights objectives by diminishing or appearing to have diminished our interest in human rights conditions.

Is the approach advocated in the paper an adequate one, in terms of the significance of expanding Argentine-Soviet relations? In terms of the balance of the various U.S. interests?

2. How can the U.S. obtain meaningful Argentine cooperation in restraining exports to the U.S.S.R. for the 1980/81 crop year?

The Acting Secretary of State asked the Argentine Economic Minister on May 6 for GOA cooperation in a program of tighter restrictions on grain shipments to the U.S.S.R. in the coming crop year. Strategy and tactics for cooperation among all the major grain exporting countries are currently under consideration in the SCC, including the explicit ceilings we would seek from each exporter.
a. An Argentine-U.S.S.R. grain agreement is in the offing (contrary to the discussion paper, it has apparently not yet been signed). Reportedly it will state Argentine intentions to supply certain minimum levels of grain. Can the U.S. take advantage of such an agreement to secure an understanding that Argentina will regard the minimum specified in the agreement as a maximum as well? Or would such levels be too high to constitute "meaningful restraint"?

b. How can the U.S. persuade Argentina to announce publicly any ceiling agreed upon? To do so would reinforce the commitment and would help reduce the current premium on prices on Argentine grain which have resulted in the loss of traditional Argentine markets. If the minimum levels contained in the Soviet agreement are consistent with a meaningful Argentine ceiling, the conclusion of the agreement could provide the pretext for a public announcement helpful to the cooperation effort.

3. What is the appropriate human rights stance for the U.S. in this period in the light of Argentine performance and our other interests?

   a. In bilateral demarches and contacts with Argentina?

   One approach would strongly press for improvements in all areas, including strong pressure for a serious accounting to families, either directly or indirectly, of the fate of disappeared persons; the other would proceed more selectively, with emphasis on further reform of current security and judicial practices rather than an accounting for the disappeared and other past violations. One approach would include occasional strong public criticism of the GOA's practices; the other, while maintaining our public posture of criticism and concern, would do so in a lower key, and place greater emphasis on quiet but persistent dialogue to press for specific reforms, taking advantage of an improving atmosphere and closer bilateral relations.

   b. In the OAS and the UN?

   The GOA is greatly concerned over the potential work of the new group of experts on disappearances established by the UNHRC with strong U.S., West European,
and Canadian support. It feels that the group's principal effort will be directed at Argentina, for an accounting of the fate of disappeared persons. The GOA undoubtedly fears that specific data, if available, on disappearances (i.e., torture and summary executions) would lead to demands that those responsible be identified and punished. Although the methods of the working group remain to be worked out, the GOA fears that the group's work will be the basis of moves next year to seek the appointment of a special rapporteur on Argentina and the GOA's public condemnation in UN fora. This fear is a principal reason the GOA seeks to strengthen political cooperation with the Soviets in UN fora.

The OAS has recently released a report on the human rights situation in Argentina based on the visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights last September. The report is highly critical of Argentina and has been attacked by the GOA as biased and an interference in Argentina's internal affairs. The IAHRC report will be taken up at the OAS General Assembly this fall.

The Argentine position on how to deal with the IAHRC report is still under study in Buenos Aires. One view circulating within the regime -- reportedly angered by the report's alleged failure to properly acknowledge the history of pre-1976 terrorism and the improvements accomplished since 1978 -- is that Argentina should withdraw from the OAS, thus perhaps triggering an exodus by other countries, including Brazil. In private conversations, Argentine diplomats have warned of this possibility, stressing the depth of feeling on the issue in Buenos Aires. We have no evidence as of this time, however, that this view is about to be adopted as the Government's policy.

How should we deal with these matters in OAS and UN fora?

c. With our NATO Allies?

One approach would be to initiate a series of high-level consultations with our NATO Allies for the purpose of sharing information about human rights developments and about the Soviet-Argentine relationship, and of discussing the most effective way of dealing with these matters, including possible joint or parallel demarches, public statements, and coordinated action in international institutions (including the multilateral
With regard to sanctions (vote in the IFI's, military training, and military sales)?

Our abstentions in the IFI's have not prevented ordinary capital loans to Argentina. The prohibition of military sales has shifted Argentine purchases of new equipment to European sources; it is, however, beginning to create problems for the Argentines with respect to spare parts for U.S.-supplied equipment.

On the other hand, our measures have considerable political significance as a tangible expression of disapproval of Argentine human rights violations. Any possible modification of our posture in this area would have to take into account the implications for our stance toward other countries with major human rights violations, as well as the message this would send to human rights groups in Argentina and to other countries who have joined us in criticizing human rights violations in Argentina.

4. How far should we carry military-to-military contact and cooperation under present circumstances?

Cooperation involves three possible levels:

-- visits, joint exercises, consultations on security matters;

-- the sale of military training;

-- a military supply relationship (new equipment and spares).

The sale of training under FMS and military supplies (FMS and Munitions List items) are prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy amendment. In addition, under current policy, the U.S. Executive limits sales of non-Munitions List items to the Argentine military and the police through the Commerce export control licensing system.

The PRC discussion paper argues for limited contacts (visits, joint exercises) but opposes a change in our military supply policy at this time.

A second view is that we should avoid the political
symbolism of support which these contacts imply, or minimize them until there is a definitive breakthrough on human rights. A third view, on the other hand, argues that, because of our strategic interests and the improvement in human rights, we should streamline, liberalize, or lift altogether, the restrictions on the military supply relationship. This would involve a) an elimination of restrictions on Commerce export licences; and/or b) the modification or elimination of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment.

The denial of training (the sale of training under FMS is now prohibited by the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment) involves a separate issue: Argentine officers traditionally sent to the U.S. are officers with promising careers. (Videla, Viola, and Galtieri all received training or served in the U.S.) Shortly the Argentine Armed Forces will have no officers of the rank of major or below who have received U.S. training. One view questions whether the U.S. should continue to deny itself this avenue of influencing the outlook of the next generation of Argentine military leaders. Another view argues that the present generation of military leaders is responsible for the government's repression of the past four years and questions the premise that U.S. training has had a significant positive influence on their outlook. It also argues that a military training relationship is a clearly visible, high-profile means of demonstrating U.S. political support for a government.

5. Are our present policies with regard to nuclear relations with Argentina adequate?

The issues are:

-- At what level can we and should we pursue nuclear cooperation?

-- Is there anything more we can and should do to encourage Argentine ratification of Tlatelolco and acceptance of full-scope safeguards?

-- How would possible actions in these areas impact on our general relationship and would they be worth the cost?

The discussion paper argues:
-- Nuclear Cooperation. We should try to resolve the pending safeguards issue on the basis of what is required by U.S. law. Official Argentine interest in further cooperation, beyond the research fuel, appears to be modest at this time. Once the safeguards issue is resolved, we would probe to see what interest there might be in Argentine nuclear circles in U.S. cooperation (see also below).

-- Tlatelolco. We should continue a dialogue with Argentina's most senior leaders on global and regional proliferation concerns. Nothing more specific to encourage Argentine ratification appears feasible or desirable at this time. (We should, of course, on appropriate occasions, continue over the next few months to remind the GOA of President Videla's commitment to ratify.)

In addition, looking beyond the issue of safeguards assurances, the Administration must also address the issue of licensing of U.S. components for Argentine nuclear projects. This issue carries with it the possibility of a continuing role of U.S. industry in Argentina's nuclear program even though the position of prime contractor has been lost to German, Canadian, and Swiss companies. For example:

-- the U.S. firm, Combustion Engineering, working with the Argentine firm, Pescarmona, wishes to bid as a subcontractor for the pressure vessel for Atucha II. Siemens/KWU argues against Combustion Engineering's qualifications on grounds that the U.S. firm, in view of the uncertainties of whether a U.S. export license can be obtained, is not a reliable supplier.

-- Sulzer Brothers, the Swiss prime contractor for the heavy water plant, has approached Canadian firms about components, some of which may be U.S. controlled.

The issue is whether the U.S. should encourage or discourage such industrial collaboration. The current U.S. stance has been to discourage Combustion Engineering, partly because of our concern to keep good faith with the Canadians who -- unsuccessfully -- insisted on full-scope safeguards as a condition of the sale of a nuclear power reactor and heavy water plant.
Significant U.S. exports, the future of U.S.-Argentine industrial cooperation in this important sector, and U.S. nonproliferation policy are at stake in this issue.

III. THE BROAD CHOICES

Option A. Continue strong concentration on human rights.

We would maintain a cool and correct posture until the human rights situation shows substantial further progress, making clear that we are prepared to improve relations when and to the degree that fundamental human rights problems are solved. Military relations would be kept to a minimum; political relations should be cool and correct.

Rationale: The human rights situation remains exceedingly grave and outweighs the practical significance and relevance of other interests in our relations with Argentina. The essential elements of Argentine human rights violations -- the apparatus of repression, the lack of due process, the prohibition of meaningful political and labor union activity, and the failure to provide information about disappeared persons -- all remain in place. Expanding Argentine-Soviet cooperation thus far has been pragmatic and self-limiting. It is not now a significant threat to U.S. strategic interests, but we should continue to watch Argentine-Soviet relations closely.

Option B. Continue the current level of effort for more balance in the treatment of our interests in Argentina.

We would continue the present efforts to strengthen working relations with the GGO, principally through stepped-up political consultations, but also through some increase in cooperation and increased military contact. We would continue to stress the importance of human rights, but need to establish priorities in terms of benefits to Argentine society and attainability. We should seek further specific improvements through dialogue in the improved atmosphere, but maintain our present policy on votes in the IFI's and the restrictions on military supplies. We should, however, seek to reopen the sale of training (which would require modification of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment). Our general approach, especially in the UNHRC, should seek to avoid pushing Argentina into cooperation with the Soviets.
Rationale: Our approach to limit Soviet influence should be basically a political one. There has been progress in human rights -- notably, few new security cases and a new assertiveness by the judiciary and in public expression and a general decline in violence and repression. Our approach should acknowledge this progress. Certain issues in the relationship which have not been linked in the past should be kept delinked. There is no strategic need to relax military supply restrictions at this time. Training, however, is important to try to influence the next generation of Argentina's military leaders. We do not want to create too much of an imbalance in our relations with Argentina and with Chile, however, while the Beagle Channel issue is still outstanding.

Option C. Move a step further toward normal relations.

We would seek further to strengthen working relations with the GOA by lifting the restrictions on Commerce licences and by initiating a move to lift the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment restrictions on the military supply relationship. We would stress to the GOA that human rights remain important to us and would continue our abstention on IFI loans. But we would more explicitly and unconditionally reaffirm General Goodpaster's general assurances that we were not interested in seeking the GOA's public censure at the 1980 UNHRC meeting, and would not support future moves for censure in UN or OAS fora in view of current and prospective progress.

Rationale: The deteriorating international security situation makes Argentine cooperation important. We must take seriously Soviet probes to establish influence in Argentina and Brazil and to foster mutually profitable economic relations. Argentine fears of public censure in the UN, essentially for past human rights violations, are a principal reason for increasing Argentine-Soviet political cooperation. Many political observers agree that a solution to the problem of past disappearances is not feasible at this time and will come, if at all, as part of a broader political settlement, including a general amnesty. The Smith mission, in its report, noted that no major Argentine political leader is pressing for an accounting at this time. The measures contemplated under this approach are the strongest card we can play to counter Soviet probing for influence, to reestablish close working relations, to obtain Argentine cooperation on grains and other East-West issues, and to elicit further Argentine cooperation in Hemispheric matters.
ANNEX

EVOLUTION OF ARGENTINE-SOVIET RELATIONS

Over the past two years, Argentine-Soviet relations have intensified markedly. The scope of bilateral contacts and cooperation has broadened to include new areas and present current and potential challenges to U.S. interests in Argentina. A brief survey of the various facets of the relationship today discloses the following:

-- Political: In August 1979, the Argentine Foreign Ministry implemented a long-range plan for improving relations with communist countries, especially the Soviet Union. The strategy called for, inter alia, annual bilateral political discussions prior to UNGA sessions. In more immediate terms, there is ample evidence of Argentine-Soviet cooperation. The two sides have clearly exchanged support in international forums in ways that have appeared unusual for the Soviets and a military government that claims to have just won a war against elements of an international communist conspiracy. The Soviets (along with the East Europeans and the Cubans) have remained silent about human rights violations in Argentina and supported Argentina on minor items like the Falkland/Malvinas Islands dispute with Great Britain. For their part, the Argentines lent quiet support to the Cuban bid for a Security Council seat last Fall (despite the claims of some Argentine officials to the contrary) and worked with the Soviets at the March 1980 sessions of the UNHRC in Geneva. More recently, Argentina has refused to support publicly U.S. efforts to restrain grain shipments to the U.S.S.R., even though it condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While the Argentines are obviously able to leap ideological issues like human rights, the Videla government is consciously attempting to avert too high a political profile in dealing with the Soviets and is becoming somewhat defensive about the relationship in the face of the publicity it has been given both at home and abroad. The image of an Argentine rushing into Russian arms is not only unseemly and somewhat difficult to rationalize in terms of the military's often professed

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anti-communism, but a high profile also contributes to developing increased momentum in the relationship when the Argentines want a more controlled, gradual pace. Thus, the most recent reports indicate that Videla will not make a previously planned visit to Moscow. He will, however, reportedly travel to the PRC and perhaps the Middle East in an attempt to maintain balance in Argentine foreign policy and demonstrate to the Soviets that they cannot take Argentina for granted. Consonant with this approach was Argentina's recently announced support for the Olympic boycott.

-- Commercial economic: A substantial two-way trade that heavily favors Argentina has been the central element in the expanding relationship. Access to Soviet and bloc markets is an important economic advantage that the Argentines will make concessions to maintain and expand. The Soviets are inclined to exploit the commercial opening for potential political-military advantages, using their trade deficit as a lever to pry concessions from Buenos Aires. The present Soviet Ambassador in Buenos Aires was reportedly sent with specific instructions to expand trade in every possible way.

Since the mid-1970's, the trade balance has run between 10 and 20 to 1 in Argentina's favor. In 1978, the figures read $385,480,000 in Argentine exports (6% of the country's total exports) against $11,137,000 in Argentine imports of Soviet goods. The Soviets ranked seventh among Argentine customers in 1978, but they will likely rise to near the top slot this year on the basis of increased grain sales. Meat, grains, wool, hides, and wines provide the bulk of Argentine exports, while Soviet sales consist primarily of heavy equipment for the oil, mining, and power generating industries.

The primary source of the huge disparity in sales is the Soviet lack of exports marketable in Argentina. Thus, the Argentines face Soviet pressure to close the trade gap through other avenues such as arms purchases or concessions in non-trade areas like fishing.

Hydroelectric development has been the major Soviet entree point into the Argentine economy. The U.S.S.R. is supplying the 16 turbines for the Salto Grande (Argentine-Uruguayan) project, is preparing a feasibility study in connection with the Parana
Medio complex, and has entered a consortium with Western European interests to bid on contracts for the Yacyreta (Argentine-Paraguayan) dam. The most recent spurt in bilateral trade is related to Argentina's response to U.S. efforts to restrict grain sales to the Soviets. We have received repeated official assurances that Argentine sales remain within limits agreed upon during General Goodpaster's January visit, and the sketchy picture that emerges from our statistics on confirmed sales tends to confirm Argentine claims. However, some commodities analysts reportedly believe that Argentine sales will exceed agreed levels by 400,000 to 1,000,000 metric tons, thus reaching the 6.6-7.3 MMT level. Even shipments at the levels established in the Goodpaster talks would mean sales and profits considerably above average year levels. Argentine meat sales to the Soviets have also spurted in 1980. The 24,000 tons sold in the first quarter of the year is roughly equivalent to average annual sales since the mid-1970's (except 1978 when sales were nil). Total sales for 1980 delivery will probably reach 60,000 tons and could go as high as 80,000.

In early April, Argentine and Soviet negotiators discussed future grain sales in the context of the Argentine-Soviet Mixed Commission meetings in Buenos Aires. Having successfully resisted Soviet demands for agreement on specific levels of future coarse grains shipments, and no grain agreement was completed. However, the discussions led Argentine grain officials to anticipate conclusion of a long-term bilateral grains agreement by the end of this year. The accord will cover the "intentions" of the parties and avoid establishing specific sales levels. The sole exception may be citation of the figure of 3 MMT for corn.

the

Mixed Commission meetings also produced three "Protocol of Intent" covering:

-- the bases for increased bilateral trade;

-- scientific and technical cooperation, including a Scientific and Technical Mixed Commission that will meet in Moscow in late 1980; and

-- continuing discussions on a civil aviation
agreement between the respective state airlines.

-- Fishing. For several years the Soviets and East Europeans have been seeking agreements covering fishing rights in Argentine waters. An accord was apparently reached with the U.S.S.R. in 1974 but never ratified. From 1976 to 1979, the Soviets and their bloc partners pursued fishing initiatives, only to have the Argentines consistently evade the issue. In the meantime, bloc trawlers harvested Argentine waters illegally, causing at least one incident in which Soviet boats were nearly fired upon by the Argentine navy.

By August 1979, a change of policy in Buenos Aires. Bilateral fishing agreements with the Soviets and East Europeans became part of the overall plan to improve relations with Communist nations. With respect to fishing, the reasoning was directly related to Argentina's past success in gaining access to communist markets. A more responsive posture on fishing would lead to even greater market access, especially for unexploited Argentine marine resources. An agreement also made sense, argued some, because the Soviets were stealing the fish anyway. The Soviets in mid-1979 were offering wide economic, technical, and commercial cooperation with the Argentine fishing industry in return for (1) fishing rights within Argentina's claimed 200-mile waters; (2) joint scientific investigation of marine resources; and (3) the establishment of joint Soviet-Argentine fishing enterprises with the participation of Soviet capital.

Having decided to proceed with bilateral fishing agreements, the Argentines are moving cautiously. They are carefully considering the legal and political implications with respect to the Falkland Islands, Beagle Channel, and Antarctic areas, and the security implications of a potentially significant increase in the Soviet presence in the area. On March 29, a preliminary step was completed with the signing in Buenos Aires of a "protocol of understanding: covering a joint study of resources in the South Atlantic. Topics included in the discussions that preceded the protocol reportedly included Soviet technical support for the Argentine fishing industry, possible Soviet financing for the Argentine boats.
and equipment, and Soviet interest in purchasing part of the Argentine catch.

Minister of Economy Martinez de Hoz has been the most influential lobbyist for a fishing agreement with the Soviets. Members of the governing Junta of the Army and Air Force and the Navy's representative overruled objections raised by the Navy's representative.

-- Military Sales: Since 1976, and particularly since 1978, Soviet offers of military equipment to the Argentines. Fighter aircraft have been the most frequently cited item in a variety of arms for all branches of the armed services. From the Soviet perspective, sales would help reduce their trade deficit with Argentina, but Argentine officials have tended uniformly to see the offers as a blatant attempt to exploit Argentine difficulties with the U.S. Given the extremely favorable terms that accompany the Soviet offers, the ideological factor and the easy availability of arms from other suppliers have been the main inhibiting considerations for the Argentines. In the 1976-77 period -- during the height of the counter-terrorist war against Marxist subversives and prior to passage of the Humphrey-Kennedy Amendment -- a generally scornful response by Argentine officers to Soviet arms offers. In more recent years, significant sectors of the armed forces appear inclined to a more open-minded posture. While not eager to "buy Soviet", neither are they quick to reject a potential source of arms supply. Part of that attitude is sheer posturing for U.S. consumption, designed to show the U.S. that its arms embargo could drive the Argentines into Soviet arms. The Argentine Air Force has consciously and assiduously cultivated this line with U.S. officials, even sending alleged buying missions to the U.S.S.R. to add credibility to the implicit threat.

We know of no purchases completed or imminent, but the Argentines know that they can get almost any weapon they might need, whenever they might need it.

In addition to military equipment, the Soviets have offered training in the U.S.S.R. for an unspecified number of Argentine officers of colonel rank and above.
along with an officer exchange program that would place like numbers of Argentine and Soviet army officers in each others armies. The Argentines rejected both offers.

Finally, the military relationship has involved an August-September 1979 exchange of high-level army delegations that focused on training programs in the host country and a 1979-80 exchange of port visits between ships of the two navies.

-- Nuclear: Cooperation in the peaceful development of nuclear energy has been one of the new areas in which bilateral relations have blossomed in the past year. Since the advent of Argentina's current military government in 1976, the Soviets have expressed a generic interest in cooperating with the Argentines on energy development, including nuclear energy. Until recently, however, little has transpired in the nuclear area beyond the sale of Soviet zircalloy machining equipment for Argentina's nuclear fuel fabrication plant.

In mid-1979, the Soviets first broached the idea of a nuclear cooperation agreement with Argentine officials. Six tons of heavy water were reportedly offered by the Soviets as an enticement. Since that time, (1) the Argentines obtained in the FRG 4.3 tons of unsafeguarded heavy water of Soviet origin; (2) the Soviets have offered to sell Argentina 50 tons of heavy water under unspecified safeguard conditions; and (3) a Soviet grain mission to Buenos Aires in January 1980 offered to barter zirconium sponge and zircalloy for grain.

In late March, cooperation went one step further with the visit to Moscow of a high-level delegation of Argentine nuclear experts. While no general cooperation agreement was completed, topics reportedly discussed were the supply of heavy water, heavy water technology and enriched uranium, all matters of priority concern to the Argentines and the source of disagreements with the U.S. The Soviets agreed to supply Argentina's enriched uranium
needs if ongoing problems with U.S. supply could be settled.

-- Beagle Channel: A corollary to the bilateral political realationship has been Soviet support for Argentina in its dispute with neighboring Chile over sovereignty in the Beagle Channel area at the southern tip of the continent. While currently the subject of Vatican mediation and unlikely to erupt into the kind of war scare that arose in late 1978, the potential for conflict remains. Soviet support has the effect of emboldening the Argentines and providing a source of arms should Argentine aggressiveness toward Chile prompt other potential suppliers to embargo sales. In the midst of the December 1978 tensions, the Soviet DCM in Buenos Aires stated that the Soviets supported the Argentines and had offered to sell Argentina surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles to close a gap in the country's arms inventory.

Drafted: INR/RAR: JBuchanan: mas
5-9-80 X22251
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:

Information

Response to Your Message to Viola: In response to your congratulatory message, General Viola expressed his "profound appreciation" and said he fully reciprocated your belief in the importance of strengthening U.S.-Argentine relations. Viola said his government would seek to make U.S.-Argentine relations as productive as possible. He returned to this theme several times, stating that he believed the current issues between our two countries were the product of present circumstances and will "one way or another" be resolved. Viola added that his government had four objectives in the foreign policy arena: to increase the "presence" of Argentina in the southern cone; rebuild Argentina's ties in the Andean Pact; repair and expand relations with Western Europe; and restore and strengthen relations with the U.S.

Kaunda Concerned by Possibility of a Reagan Presidency: During private discussions with Ambassador Wisner on Friday, President Kaunda expressed deep concern over the possibility of a Reagan presidency. He said he was not confident about Reagan's views on South Africa or the Middle East -- two issues which were immensely important to him personally. In addition, Kaunda said his recent visit to Eastern Europe had brought home the critical state of detente and reinforced his belief that you would be better in dealing with the Soviets than Reagan. While admitting that American policies do not vary greatly between presidencies, Kaunda said he nevertheless wanted to warn us of his deep concern should Reagan be elected, and he asked that his prayers for you be communicated.

South Korean President's Anger over U.S. Pressure: President Chun Doo Hwan feels that he is in an extremely difficult position regarding the death sentence of Kim Dae Jung. While Western nations have strongly urged that he commute Kim's sentence...
to life imprisonment, President Chun is under heavy pressure by the South Korean officer corps to let the sentence stand. He stated that "U.S. pressure is making me angry" and that if the U.S. applies more pressure, he would "have no choice but to allow the execution of Kim." (S)
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Energy
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Agenda and Discussion Paper for PRC Meeting (U)

Attached are the agenda and the discussion paper for the PRC Meeting on Argentina which is scheduled for April 30 at 3:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. (C)

Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary

Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT
Review on April 28, 1981
PRC MEETING ON ARGENTINA

AGENDA

-- Recent Soviet initiatives in the Western Hemisphere: Soviet Near and Long-term Objectives

-- Significance of and Prospects for Argentine-Soviet Cooperation

-- Basic U.S. Approaches To Contain Soviet Influence While Pursuing Other U.S. Objectives

-- Discussion of Specific Courses of Action
THE ARGENTINE-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

THE ISSUE

In recent months the Soviets have stepped up their efforts to woo Argentina and Brazil, the two major powers on the South American continent.

In the case of Brazil, a Soviet parliamentary delegation brought a personal invitation from Brezhnev for President Figueiredo to visit Moscow; our Ambassador in Brasilia conveyed concern but Figueiredo accepted in principle, with the visit to take place some time in 1981. In the case of Argentina, the Soviets have offered nuclear materials and have probed Argentine interest in military cooperation. Both countries have been visited by high-level economic delegations.

U.S. interests in Argentina, the subject of this paper, are considerable. Argentina is a major center of Spanish-speaking America, with considerable influence throughout the region. Primary U.S. interests are Argentina’s orientation in the East-West relationship, nonproliferation, human rights (both integrity of the person and Argentina’s future political evolution), and the maintenance of peace and stability in the Hemisphere (i.e. peaceful resolution of the Beagle Channel dispute). Other U.S. interests are substantial bilateral trade and investment ties; a constructive Argentine role on major international issues; and a positive contribution to the affairs of the Hemisphere.

This paper examines:

-- the scope, motivation and prospects of Argentine-Soviet cooperation; and

-- possible U.S. actions to contain Soviet efforts to gain increased political and economic influence, taking into account U.S. interests in human rights and nuclear non-proliferation.

THE FACTS

Contact and cooperation between Argentina and the Soviet Union is expanding in six areas:

-- Political Cooperation, principally focused
on the UN. The Soviets and the GOA have agreed to increase consultations prior to UNGA sessions and to support each other, especially on human rights. Moscow has ceased its propaganda attacks on the GOA. Argentina, on the other hand, has voted with the majority in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Videla will visit Peking in late May, partly in an effort to maintain balance in Argentine foreign policy. Argentine officials have been defensive about their support of Soviet-Cuban causes, stressing the pragmatic character of such cooperation.

-- Beagle Channel. The Soviets are publicly supporting Argentina against Chile. (While papal mediation is continuing, no solution to the dispute is in sight at this time.) During the period of high military tensions in December 1978, the Soviets reportedly offered to sell surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles to Argentina. Recently there have been disturbing reports of renewed Argentine contingency planning for military action, although probably as a tactic to pressure the Chileans into concessions.

-- Growing Economic Ties. Argentina and the Soviet Union are becoming major trading partners. Argentine exports to the U.S.S.R. grew from $219 million in 1976 to $385 million in 1978 and could reach $900 million this year (compared with an estimated export total world-wide of $8 billion). The Soviet Union will become Argentina's largest market for agricultural exports in 1980.

Argentina is running a large surplus with the Soviet Union. Thus, there is considerable pressure on the Soviets to increase exports to Argentina and for the GOA to help the Soviets identify market opportunities. Both governments are interested in further expanding bilateral trade. On April 15 they signed an economic agreement; reportedly, Argentina agreed to maintain its exports of wheat at current levels. There are conflicting reports on whether Argentina agreed to set a specific figure for coarse grains (corn and sorghum). Argentine officials, however, have assured us that despite heavy Soviet pressure they rejected a commitment to a specific figure.

-- Cooperation in Fisheries. The Soviets have offered wide-ranging cooperation in return for fishing rights within Argentina's claimed 200 mile zone; joint scientific investigations; and the establishment of
joint Soviet-Argentine fishing enterprises. The GOA apparently has decided to proceed with bilateral arrangements (a protocol covering a joint study of resources in the South Atlantic was signed last month) but is now considering cautiously the legal, political, and security implications of a significant increase in the Soviet presence in the South Atlantic.

-- Military Offers. Since late 1979, there have been exchanges of high-level army delegations, which discussed training methods in each country, and exchanges of port visits between the two navies. Despite numerous Soviet overtures, however, the Argentines have not purchased any Soviet arms. Western Europe plus Israel have emerged as Argentina's principal arms supplier. (Some $3.5 billion of military hardware have been purchased by Argentina from European suppliers and the Israeli Government since 1977.) The Argentines also have not accepted Soviet proposals for training and exchanges. Resistance to a supply/training relationship appears to remain strong within the Argentine Armed Forces, although perhaps not as firm as one or two years ago; alleged buying missions have been scheduled to the Soviet Union, possibly as an intended warning to the U.S.

SIGNIFICANCE AND PROSPECTS

In seeking to expand cooperation with Argentina
(and Brazil), the Soviets are pursuing both specific operational and long-term strategic interests.

Over the next decade, the Soviets may also hope to gain some access to Argentine naval and air facilities, especially for reprovisioning of naval units, which would make it easier for them to pursue naval and air operations over the South Atlantic. The Soviets at present have access on the west coast of Africa but no support points in the Western Hemisphere, except in Cuba. The small Soviet flotilla continually deployed in the South Atlantic currently limits its operations largely to West African waters. (In the past the Soviets have also conducted reconnaissance flights from Murmansk and Havana, which terminated in Conakry and Luanda. The Soviets have now lost access to Conakry; there have been no reconnaissance missions on the Havana-Luanda run this year.)

From the Argentine standpoint, the Soviet overtures have considerable attraction. They offer concrete benefits -- economic (because of a profitable trade relationship with the Soviets), political (because of isolation in the West over human rights), and technological (because of differences with the U.S. on safeguards assurances). Argentine leaders also believe that expanded ties with the Soviet Bloc will help them gain greater freedom of action and enhance Argentina's international position. Both the economic ministry and the foreign office are strong advocates of expanded cooperation with the Soviet Bloc. Despite the present regime's conservatism and strongly anti-Marxist bent, this policy appeals to Argentine nationalism in the present climate of strains with the West.

Prospects are for expanding economic ties over
the next decade, irrespective of U.S. action. This may inhibit Argentine support of U.S. positions in opposition to the Soviet Union. The extent of Argentine-Soviet political cooperation, on the other hand, will depend importantly on the state of U.S.-Argentine relations and the issues between us. The outlook for Argentine-Soviet military cooperation is uncertain; however, there may be growing pressure from the Soviets to use some portion of the trade surplus for military purchases.

In sum, looking ahead into the decade, Argentine-Soviet relations are likely to expand, a development we must watch closely and take into account. The growth and scope of Soviet influence will partly depend on U.S. policy. Argentina's basic cultural and political identification with the West -- Europe, Latin America, and the U.S. -- remains an important asset, and a fundamental realignment of Argentine foreign policy, away from its present alliance relationships, is unlikely at this time. But even without formally forsaking the OAS/RIO Treaty, Argentina could drift toward a neutral position on East-West issues or provide the Soviets considerable specific support in return for Soviet benefits. Such a development could represent a significant political and psychological setback to the United States.

U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS

In recent visits to Buenos Aires, U.S. emissaries -- the Goodpaster, Hodges, and Smith missions -- have stressed our desire to strengthen relations and have placed greater emphasis than in the past on seeking cooperation and understanding on East-West and nuclear issues. They have also, however, continued to emphasize that human rights remain important to us and that we will have to "agree to disagree" with respect to the question of NPT-type full-scope safeguards on Argentina's nuclear program.

Over the past four years U.S.-Argentine relations had been strained, principally because of our concerns and actions over human rights; and because of U.S. diplomatic efforts to persuade other suppliers of nuclear technology to seek full-scope safeguards as a condition for the sale of new equipment.

Our efforts to persuade the FRG and the Swiss have failed, and their sales of nuclear equipment
are going ahead. Despite previous promises, the GOA has not ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco. However, it appears Argentine leaders are becoming more aware of the problem of nuclear proliferation. As regards human rights, there has been some progress — notably in regard to curbing the practice of disappearances and reducing the number of Executive detainees — but serious problems remain which impede the resumption of a full and normal bilateral relationship.

As a result of the recent consultations, the tone of U.S.-Argentine relations has considerably improved. We have made clear that our continuing human rights and nuclear concerns do not preclude dialogue and cooperation in other areas. Argentine leaders have stressed that they consider Argentina part of the West, that their aim is to construct a stable democratic system, and that they desire better relations and closer cooperation. Argentina has begun to provide limited cooperation on issues important to the U.S. In particular, the GOA:

— recalled its ambassador from Tehran for consultations (while continuing economic ties);

— agreed to set certain informal limits on its grains exports to the Soviet Union, although at a level close to twice that of Argentina's previous high (we expected Argentina to have a bumper crop and the levels seemed not unreasonable); and

— is likely to decide against participation in the Moscow Summer Olympics.

We also believe there is a reasonable prospect that the GOA will eventually agree to continue some informal limits on grain exports in the year beginning October 1. This may require intense negotiations, and the GOA most likely would be unwilling to reduce coarse grains exports from this year's levels. Without some limitation, however, Argentine grains exports to the Soviet Union might substantially increase.

POSSIBLE U.S. APPROACHES

Looking ahead through the decade, we should take steps to impede the growth of Soviet influence; expanding Argentine-Soviet cooperation should be a matter of serious concern.
Our basic approach should be three-fold. We should:

-- help foster an Argentine sense of identification with the West and promote an Argentine perception that, despite important differences, they have something of value to gain from improving their relations with us, and that we seek to narrow differences through a continuing high-level dialogue;

-- convey to GOA leaders our sensitivity and concern to the growing Argentine-Soviet connection and our expectation that they will stand with us on East-West issues (we do not wish, however, to give encouragement to the Argentines that their Soviet connections give them leverage on U.S. policy); and

-- continue to pursue other U.S. policy interests vigorously, but in a manner that takes into account Argentine deep-seated nationalism.

Following are the specific actions now contemplated or under way, to promote closer working relations with the GOA, together with certain possible additional steps:

1. Political Consultations

We plan to continue the expanded high-level political dialogue begun by the Goodpaster mission. The next opportunity will be the visit by Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Cavandoli to Washington May 1-2. Secretary Vance will be meeting Foreign Minister Pastor at the OASGA and the UNGA later in the year. The Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs plans to visit Buenos Aires later in the year provided that human rights progress continues and the timing is propitious from other points of view.

As circumstances permit, Argentina (and Brazil) should be included in consultations and briefings on major world developments which we undertake with OECD countries. We also propose to set up periodic bilateral policy planning talks with the GOA, similar to those with Brazil.

During these meetings we plan to discuss the international security situation, Argentina's role in East-West relationships, its contribution to Hemispheric affairs (i.e. Central America), and U.S.-Argentine bilateral relations. We also plan to raise the issue of Soviet-Argentine cooperation. (The visit by Minister
Martinez de Hoz will offer another opportunity for doing so -- see below.)

There is also the question of whether we should consult with our allies on the expanding Argentine-Soviet relationship, as well as related policy issues, such as human rights.

2. Economic Consultations

Minister of Economy Martinez de Hoz will be visiting Washington on May 6. This visit will offer an opportunity to begin discussions on Argentine cooperation in the grains embargo after October 1.

Deputy Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges, during his visit to Buenos Aires, agreed to a meeting of the U.S.-Argentine Mixed Economic Commission. We believe this meeting should be held in October as discussed during the Hodges visit.

A further question is whether the bilateral agreement of cooperation in agriculture, negotiated by a USDA team in Buenos Aires last year, should now be concluded and implemented, or whether this step should be held back pending further progress in human rights.

3. Military Relations

Visits. General Vaquero, Chief-of-Staff of the Argentine Army, is to be invited by General Vessey to make a military visit in mid-September. The invitation is to be issued in June, assuming developments with respect to human rights and U.S.-Argentine relations are favorable. No senior U.S. visits are contemplated for the rest of this year; however, General Tanguy has recently visited Buenos Aires as part of his responsibilities.

Joint Exercises. Argentina has been invited to participate in UNITAS XII in September. We also need to decide whether to go forward with plans to invite the Argentine navy to participate in Ocean Venture, a joint exercise of NATO and South American naval units in the South Atlantic now planned by CINCLANT for 1981.

Security Talks. The Argentines have expressed an interest in consultations, perhaps together with Brazil, focused on Soviet activities in the South
Atlantic. We doubt that Brazil would wish to participate. Some middle-level talks could be held in conjunction with preparations for Ocean Venture in 1981.

4. Nonproliferation

Nuclear cooperation. We will try to maintain some cooperation with Argentina, in the hope of gaining some influence on Argentine nuclear policy over the longer term, while engaging Argentine leaders in a continuing dialogue on the problems of global proliferation. If Argentine officials are interested, we will seek to work out a solution on the safeguards assurances, in conformance with U.S. law, to permit delivery of the uranium required by Argentina for its research program. If the assurances issue can be resolved on this basis, Embassy Buenos Aires will explore possible Argentine interest in new cooperation not requiring amendment of the existing agreement of cooperation. We recognize, however, that Argentine interest in further cooperation, beyond the research fuel, appears to be modest.

Dialogue on Proliferation. We will search for ways to continue a dialogue with Argentina's most senior leaders on global and hemispheric proliferation concerns. As a first step, Ambassador Smith plans to write a letter to Admiral Castro Madero following up his recent consultations in Buenos Aires.

PROSPECTS BEYOND 1980

We believe initiatives towards Argentina during the remainder of this year should be limited to the areas outlined above. We do not favor the resumption of military training or FMS at this time. We also do not believe that current policy in the International Financial Institutions should be modified. Our reasons are:

-- We need to maintain some balance in our relations with Argentina and Chile, particularly in view of the Beagle Channel problem.

-- We would like to see further progress on human rights.

-- The struggle over the Presidential succession within the senior ranks of the Argentine Armed Forces will make it increasingly difficult, as the year progresses,
to discuss specific human rights concerns effectively with Argentine leaders.

The military supply relationship and our position in the IFIs can be reviewed next year in light of human rights conditions prevailing at that time.

Attachment:
Annex - Evolution of Argentine-Soviet Relations.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT
From: Cyrus Vance
Subject: Meeting with Argentine President Videla

You are scheduled to meet with Argentine President Videla September 4 in Rome to discuss U.S.-Argentine relations and ways to reverse a precipitous deterioration in our relations. The basic point you should make is that we seriously wish to improve relations as conditions permit and that a comprehensive and thorough review of our total relationship may be desirable. Assistant Secretary Vaky has been designated to undertake this task and is prepared to make arrangements with President Videla for this purpose.

SETTING

Faced with a once severe terrorist threat, the military government in Argentina has seriously abused basic human rights (Attachment 1). The United States has as a result restricted military sales (an embargo on the sale of Munitions List items will go into effect October 1, Attachment 2), held back approval of Argentine transactions in the Export-Import Bank, and voted against Argentine loan proposals in the International Financial Institutions (Attachment 3). We have sought to induce improvement by indicating that Argentine steps in this direction would result in relaxing these restrictions.

Initially, the Argentine Government reacted to our pressure with some restraint and sought to convince us of the necessity of its actions. More recently, however, it has moved rapidly to diversify its international ties, reassess its relationship with us, and prepare to adopt an adversarial course.

In a major attempt to encourage progress in human rights and improve relations, Under Secretary Newsom visited Argentina last May and suggested that some
relaxation of our restrictive actions would be possible if the Argentine government would take one or more of the following steps (Attachment 4):

- Agreement with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) on a visit to Argentina.
- Try, release, or allow exile for the prisoners held without charge.
- Establish a mechanism to inform families of the fate of the disappeared.

While Mr. Newsom was given a courteous and sympathetic reception, the Argentine authorities have not taken any significant steps forward since his visit. Reaction in Argentina to our pressure, on the other hand, has been severe. Contrary to our own view, many Argentines consider that the situation has measurably improved in the last two years. The recent denial of an Ex-Im letter of interest to Allis-Chalmers for the sale of hydroelectric equipment, in particular, was seen as a deliberate escalation in our sanctions.

As the most powerful Spanish-speaking country of South America, Argentina could become a significant negative force in areas important to us such as nuclear proliferation (Attachment 5), regional security arrangements, conventional arms restraint, and Third World issues.

Videla's Approach

We do not know exactly what Videla will say. He may simply give the standard Argentine exposition -- that human rights violations are an unfortunate, if unavoidable and necessary, by-product of the effort to suppress a vicious terrorist campaign, which threatens Argentina with anarchy. On the other hand, there is also the possibility that he might bring some new concrete points, explain steps they are now prepared to take (particularly in regard to the Human Rights Commission), and suggestions on the future evolution of U.S.-Argentine relations.

Your Approach

Your approach should be sympathetic. You would wish to avoid commitments in response to specific suggestions, if any, but would note that you will carry Videla's
message back to President Carter.

We recommend you say specifically:

-- On our side, we seriously wish to improve relations;

-- As a token of this, we have taken -- and are taking -- some modest steps, such as release of export licenses for ambulance aircraft as well as Army helicopters, airport radar equipment, voice security communications equipment and other items on our Munitions Export Control List.

-- While we understand the tragic history of Argentina's domestic political conflict, we remain concerned over the human rights situation, specifically the treatment of the human person.

-- We wish to maintain normal relations in as many areas as possible, as is evidenced, for example, by the forthcoming bilateral economic consultations (Attachment 6), and are prepared to expand these relations as conditions permit.

-- We believe a thorough and comprehensive review of the whole gamut of our relations would be desirable. The President and the Secretary of State have asked Assistant Secretary Vaky to undertake this.

-- The place and format for such consultations would be for President Videla to decide. Assistant Secretary Vaky is willing to come to Buenos Aires, as previously proposed.
ATTACHMENTS

1. HUMAN RIGHTS
2. KENNEDY-HUMPHREY AMENDMENT
3. HUMAN RIGHTS & U.S. RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES
4. UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM VISIT
5. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION - ARGENTINA
6. CONSULTATIONS
7. ARGENTINA - GENERAL BACKGROUND
8. BIOGRAPHIC DATA

President-Lt. Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla
Foreign Minister - Vice Adm. Oscar A. Montes
HUMAN RIGHTS

The 1978 human rights record of the military junta led by President Jorge R. Videla is demonstrably better, than it was in mid-1976 or even mid-1977. Serious violations still occur, however, raising questions about the significance, scope and effectiveness of measures that Argentine officials insist be recognized as "fundamental improvements."

There is no evidence available to us that would indicate that strict observance of legal procedures in the treatment of political-security cases is in sight.

On the positive side:

-- An apparent, although unverifiable, decline in the rate of disappearances has occurred since mid-1977. Both Embassy Buenos Aires and Argentine human rights activists believe that the rate has declined. If true, this is the most important development listed here.

-- Over 300 prisoners were released in a Christmas amnesty. Subsequently, the government undertook serial publication (nine lists to date) of the names of the some 3,600 executive (state-of-seige) prisoners acknowledged as detained.

-- The "right of option" program has been implemented, enabling executive detainees to petition for exile in lieu of continued imprisonment. Less than 50 prisoners have so far departed under this procedure, however.

-- Responsive action has been taken on cases in which the U.S. has expressed special interest, e.g., Jacobo Timerman, Guillermo Vogler, and the Deutschs.

-- Attempts reportedly have been made by some security authorities to regularize detention procedures, return counterterrorist troops to normal military activities, and demilitarize the police.
On the negative side of the ledger:

-- Disappearances continue, with one of the several security entities probably responsible in nearly every instance. Victims have included not only suspected terrorists but also labor leaders and workers, human rights advocates, scientists and doctors, members of radical political parties, and others whose specific vulnerability remains unknown.

-- Despite President Videla's professed desires, renegade security elements continue to operate with apparent impunity because they act with the toleration if not under orders of some military officials. At least in cases involving suspected terrorists, clandestine arrest, torture, and summary execution are standard practices.

-- There are five reasonably documented cases (which occurred in February and March) in which political prisoners were released and almost immediately assassinated, presumably by security officials. There have been reports of other cases like these.

-- A particularly shocking incident, which occurred last December, was the abduction by unidentified security personnel of 13 members of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, a group that pressures the government for information on disappearance cases. According to reports, the bodies of seven of the group, including two French nuns, later washed ashore.

-- Official harassment of selected religious groups continues. The Jehovah's Witnesses have borne much of the brunt.

Problem of the "disappeared." Estimates vary widely, but at least several thousand people have disappeared since the March 1976 military coup. Security personnel have been responsible in most cases, and it is during illegal detentions and subsequent interrogations that the most egregious violations tend to occur. In mid-1977 there was some fear that the gradual reduction in the number of terrorist combatants would be followed by a sweeping and systematic effort to eliminate so-called "intellectual authors"
of terrorism" and others who, for whatever reason, ran afoul of military hardliners. To our knowledge, no such sweeping attack was initiated, although, as indicated above, individuals not terrorists and representing a variety of sectors and interests have been abducted. Many are reported or presumed to be dead.
Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment

On October 1, 1978 the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act will enter into effect and prohibit the sale of items on the Munitions Control List to Argentina.

The amendment was passed by Congress in August 1977 because of the serious human rights problems in Argentina, but was drafted to allow approval of license requests before October 1, 1978 if the situation in Argentina merited.

Based on this amendment, and more general legislation, the Department has held back most license requests for Argentina -- over 200 are now pending. This has created a most adverse reaction among the Argentine military and triggered their turn to European arms suppliers.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. RESTRICTIVE ACTIONS

The United States has taken the following restrictive actions in response to human rights violations in Argentina.

The International Financial Institutions

-- IBRD - We have abstained on three loans valued at $265 million since June 1977.

-- IDB - We have voted no on three loans worth $123 million since October 1977.

-- IFC - We have abstained on $33 million of loans since March 1978.

The Export-Import Bank

By law, the Export-Import Bank must take human rights into consideration when considering new transactions. Because of this legislation, there are 11 loan requests for Argentina valued at $683 million held back by the Bank. One of these cases, a request by Allis-Chalmers for $270 million for electrical generating equipment for a hydroelectric project, caused considerable negative reaction in Argentina. The Bank announced that it could not give Allis-Chalmers a letter of interest, which would have strengthened the company's hand in the international bidding for the contract because of the human rights situation in Argentina. The Argentines called in our Ambassador and presented a Note of Protest over what they considered this intervention in their domestic affairs.

The Boeing Corporation, which has requested Export-Import Bank financing for the sale of $196 million in airplanes to Argentina, has had to turn to private banks in the face of the Export-Import position. The company may lose $100 million of the potential $196 million order.

Military Sales

-- There are over 200 Munitions Control List cases valued at $145 million pending. Mainly spare parts, some cases have been held back eight months or more.

-- 101 requests worth some $25 million for Foreign Military Sales letters of authorization are pending action by the U.S. They will not be acted upon unless there is positive movement in the human rights area in Argentina.
Under Secretary Newsom Visit

Under Secretary Newsom's late May visit to Argentina was made with the hope of eliciting some positive movement in the human rights area. Newsom made clear to the Argentines that our basic concern was for the rights of the person and promised that the U.S. would respond if the Argentines moved in any one of the three following areas:

-- Reach mutual agreement with the Interamerican Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) of the OAS for a visit by the Commission to Argentina

-- Try, release, or allow exile for the 3500 prisoners held without charge.

-- Establish a mechanism to inform the families of the disappeared of the fate of these people.

Specifically, Mr. Newsom promised that the U.S. would 1) recommend approval of the Allis-Chalmers and Boeing requests for Export-Import Bank financing and, 2) approve sale of military training if the Argentines would agree to a mutually acceptable IAHRC visit (President Videla had expressed to Mr. Newsom his government's intention to invite the IAHRC).

The Argentines were elusive on the actions they would take, but the conversations were generally positive in tone.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation -- Argentina

Argentina has the most advanced and comprehensive nuclear energy program in Latin America. It seeks to become self-sufficient in nuclear energy, and to become the first exporter of nuclear technology in the hemisphere. It has based its power program on reactors fueled by natural (unenriched) uranium in order to avoid dependence upon suppliers of enriched fuel. Natural uranium reactors require heavy water to operate, and while Argentina can produce small quantities of this material, it cannot produce heavy water in the amounts required to support its ambition of complete independence. Acquiring heavy water production technology is therefore of critical importance to Argentina, and adequate technology is available only from the U.S. and Canada. However, technology of a lower order might be available elsewhere.

Beyond self-sufficiency in its nuclear energy program option, the ultimate intentions of the Argentine leadership in the nuclear field are not clear. Argentina's decision to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco represents a limited but welcome step to accept greater restrictions on its freedom of action. At the same time, Argentina is continuing with its plan to construct a sizeable reprocessing plant, and maintains that it is not prepared to forego this program unless parallel action is taken by Brazil. This plant would give Argentina an ample source of safeguard-free plutonium to support a weapons program as early as 1981. There is no evidence of a decision by the government to carry out such a program, but the capability is there.

Our most important lever in Argentina is the possibility of eventual transfer of heavy water production technology. We have made clear that the supply of heavy water production technology to Argentina is conditioned upon the acceptance of full-scope safeguards and the cancellation or deferral of the Argentina reprocessing project. The Argentines have repeatedly attempted to distort the U.S. position to obtain this technology without foregoing reprocessing. They maintain that since they have now ratified Tlatelolco and have indicated their readiness to accept full scope safeguards, the U.S. is obligated to supply this technology. But, we understand that in fact they have not deposited their instrument
of ratification in Mexico City. We are uncertain whether this is in retaliation for U.S. human rights initiatives or simply bureaucratic laggardness.

Both Governments have thus far managed to keep our nuclear dialogue apart from the human rights issue, but this is becoming increasingly difficult. In an effort to keep nuclear cooperation from becoming linked to the deterioration in other aspects of our relationship with Argentina, we are sending a delegation to Buenos Aires in October to discuss some next steps in expanding our cooperation in this area.
CONSULTATIONS

We have attempted to convey to the Argentines our interest in maintaining continued contact and cooperation in areas other than those directly related to human rights.

Joint US-Argentine Economic consultations are scheduled for September 18-22 in Washington. The talks will touch most areas of economic concern, including discussion of the MTN, countervailing duties, investment and tourism.

We are also scheduling an October visit to Argentina by a nuclear group which will discuss possible ways of expanding cooperation in this field. We hope that sandwiching the two meetings -- nuclear and economic -- around the October 1 military sales cutoff dates will make it clear to the Argentines that we are desirous of improved relations and that the Kennedy-Humphrey amendment is not a unilateral declaration of hostility by the U.S.
ARGENTINA

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Argentina is Latin America's most European state. Its highly literate population of 26 million is Latin America's best trained. The first Latin American state to build a nuclear reactor (1958), it is the first "Third World" state to export a reactor to another country - to Peru in 1978. In agriculture, its potential remains vast. It is already the fourth largest wheat exporter in the world as well as the fourth largest cattle producer.

At the time of the military takeover in March 1976, the civilian government of Maria Isabel Peron had disintegrated. Fanatical groups of leftist and rightist terrorists fought pitched battles, the country was nearly bankrupt and inflation exceeded an annual rate of 600%. Order has been imposed but at a heavy price in terms of human rights.

The three man Junta which came into power in 1976 has managed to maintain stability for 2 1/2 years, and prospects are for a continuation of relative internal peace for the foreseeable future.

President Videla, recently elected in his retired-or civilian-status constituting the "fourth man" in the junta, projects a cautious image, suggesting a preference for acting by consensus within the army rather than risk dissension within the senior ranks. Civilian politicians and Church leaders perceive Videla as a moderate whose objective is to restore democratic rule.

The ambitious Navy Commander, Admiral Massera, wants to circumscribe the Presidency's as yet unclearly defined powers. Massera himself will retire soon and has his lines out to civilian politicians and labor leaders in a clear bid for the Presidency at some future date. Massera, who distinguished himself as a tough counter-terrorist, is now championing human rights.

The political parties, whose activities were suspended when the Junta came to power, discreted themselves by their ineffectiveness before the 1976 coup and have
shown little effective resistance to the military government. They have few attractive candidates or issues to offer the voters. The Peronistas, a coalition of populist and minor labor elements won over 50% of the vote in the last election in 1973, but are divided over who should inherit Juan Peron's mantle. The middle class Radicales are making some effort to revive their party and stimulate public support, but seem to be making little effective headway.

In the next few years, there appears little possibility of a return to civilian rule, provided the Junta is able to bring about improvements in the economic lot of major sectors of the population. Although the Junta has been successful in rationalizing the economy and restoring business confidence from the chaotic pre-revolution conditions, serious problems remain.

The government has built up foreign exchange holdings of over $5 billion, increased exports to over $5 billion annually and is attempting to balance the budget and has held unemployment to 4%. However, the government has not been able to control inflation, which is still running at over 100% per year. Expectation of runaway inflation is the main obstacle to private enterprise-oriented Economy Minister Martinez de Hoz's plans for economic recovery. Given credit for the economic progress made by the Junta, the Minister could lose his military backing if the situation does not improve soon. Most serious is the decrease in the salaried employee's living standards. Real wages have declined by as much as 30% in some sectors in the last two years and popular discontent is increasing.

The United States has $1.4 billion in investments in Argentina and $3 billion in loans from U.S. commercial banks. U.S. companies and banks have continued to show interest in Argentina, but are awaiting assurances that the country is politically and economically stable before making new long term investments.

The U.S. has traditionally enjoyed trade surpluses with Argentina. 1977 exports to Argentina were $383 million. The Argentine trade deficit with the U.S. for the First Quarter of 1978 was $42 million.
Organized terrorist movements have been largely brought under control. The once powerful Montonero revolutionaries and the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) have been decimated. Assassinations and bombings attributable to the left, however, do still occur occasionally. The American business community, which numbered approximately 1,200 in 1973, plunged to 50 business representatives in 1975 but has now increased to somewhere over 100.

The human rights situation remains bleak. While the government did acknowledge in February that it is holding some 3,400 prisoners without charges, there has been a reluctance to free or charge those detainees. Meanwhile, disappearances and torture continue. We have made it clear to the Argentines that we do want better relations, but that there will have to be improvement in the human rights area before this is possible.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT:

Information

Congressional Delegation Meeting with Teng Hsiao-ping: Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping gave an unusually positive appraisal of the chances for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue during discussions with Congressman Wolff's delegation on Sunday. While Teng stated that China would never make a commitment not to use force to recover Taiwan, he indicated that American sensitivities were understood and that Peking would do its best to "create conditions to solve the question by peaceful means." He characterized as "very positive" recent reports that the U.S. would not sell planes to Taiwan, arguing that such sales would block the chances for a peaceful settlement, and twice referred to pre-1949 cooperation with the Kuomintang as a possible mode for a future settlement. Teng also remarked that the Chinese would welcome quicker and more active efforts by the U.S. on normalization, and that he hoped you would take more resolute action than President Nixon did.

Letter from John West: Ambassador West wrote you a letter on June 23, giving an upbeat evaluation of the Saudis' reaction to the Annapolis speech and U.S. opposition to Communist activities in Africa. Crown Prince Fahd is convinced that reconvening the Geneva Conference is the best approach to the Arab-Israeli issue. Fahd seems confident that he can get the PLO to accept Resolution 242 and that he can get King Hussein to go along with any reasonable approach involving a reconvened Geneva. West favors international pressure on Begin through Geneva or reference of the matter to the UN rather than submission of an "American plan." He says that Fahd is "more anxious than I've ever seen him to help, especially if it involves Geneva."
France Finesse the Argentine Human Rights Issue: France has offered to sponsor a favorable report on political conditions in Argentina in an effort to clear the way for improved relations and expanded French economic opportunities. The French may be reacting to the increased potential for arms sales to Argentina once the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment eliminates the U.S. as a possible supplier on September 30. State has no information about an official Argentine response, but if the strategem were successfully executed, Argentina's sagging international image would receive a much-needed boost.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Videla of Argentina
Friday, September 9, 1977, 9:00 a.m.

The paper for the meeting you and the President will have with President Jorge Rafael Videla of Argentina is at Tab A.
PARTICIPANTS

ARGENTINA

President Jorge Rafael Videla
(HORhay RAPAIel VeeDEHleh)
Vice Admiral Oscar Montes,
Foreign Minister
(OHScar MOHNtes)

US

The President
The Secretary
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Assistant Secretary Todman
Charge' Maxwell Chaplin
Mr. Robert Pastor

Checklist

-- Courtesy Point - We want to thank President Videla for his warm reception of Assistant Secretary Todman on his recent trip to Argentina.

-- Human Rights - We want to impress on the Argentines our concern over their continuing gross violations of basic human rights. We understand that they inherited a chaotic mess, but terrorism is now largely controlled. Human rights violations continue however. We think now is the time to move ahead. We are heartened to hear of releases of prisoners and the reinstatement of the "right of option".

-- Non-Proliferation and the Treaty of Tlatelolco - We want to impress on the Argentines the danger of nuclear arms proliferation; full safeguards are a necessity. We also want them to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco to indicate Argentine dedication to peaceful uses of atomic energy.

-- Malvinas/Falkland Islands - We want to stay out of this Argentine--UK dispute. We are pleased that conversations are going on between the two governments to resolve the questions.

-- Helicopter Sale - (If raised by President Videla) - We limited the equipment which will be supplied on the eight commercial Model 212 Bell helicopters because of present problems in the human rights field.

-- Trade - Point out that current US health and custom regulations will not allow Argentine fresh meat to enter the US.
ARGENTINA

I. Setting

President Jorge Rafael Videla came to power in a March 1976 coup d'etat. Economic instability and right-wing and left-wing violence were rampant. The new government took the form of a Junta composed of the chiefs of the three armed services with Videla (Army) as President. It had two primary goals: elimination of terrorism and restoration of the economy.

The struggle against terrorism from the left is now largely won, but the excesses of counterterrorism remain a serious problem. Some of the security forces are running out of control. We believe that President Videla is a moderate who probably would constrain such right-wing terrorism if he could, but pressure from hard-line military officers restricts his freedom to act. Some progress in human rights has been made, however. Prisoners have been released and the Argentines have announced they will soon reinstate the "right of option".

The once powerful trade unions are under tight wraps and many of their leaders have "disappeared". The government is considering a plan for incorporating civilians into political process, but no action has yet been taken.

In the security field we are concerned that the Argentines $350 million favorable trade balance with the Soviet Union, may lead them to seek Russian weapons. Our restrictions on arms sales for human rights reasons pushes them toward the Russians.

In the economic field, the Videla government began to reverse the populist programs of the Peronist years by reestablishing a free market economy. The results have been generally very successful; but inflation remains a continuing problem and labor has been squeezed. The U.S. had a $250 million favorable trade balance with Argentina in 1976.

U.S.-Argentina difficulties relate to the excesses of counterterrorism and our general concerns regarding nuclear proliferation. (The latter issue is now coming to the fore.)
II. Issues

I. Human Rights

The human rights situation in Argentina is the principal obstacle to closer relations. There have been some improvement, including the release of some prisoners and an announcement that the "right of option" will soon be reinstated. However, the Argentine government continues to refuse to acknowledge the names of thousands of political prisoners. Disappearances, summary executions, torture, and instances of anti-Semitism also occur.

As the result of human rights violations, we proposed a reduced FMS credits program for FY '78. Argentina rejected the proposal but kept the door open to FMS sales and training. We have not signed the FY '77 FMS agreement for human rights reasons. We are now refusing all military items for internal security use. All other requests for military items are reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

The Argentines will not participate in this year's joint US-Latin American fleet exercise (UNITAS). Their stated reason for nonparticipation is "difficulty in obtaining small parts" for their ships. We believe it is a protest of our arms sales policy.

The Kennedy-Humphrey amendment to this year's security assistance bill will virtually eliminate military ties to Argentina on October 1, 1978.

We have abstained, voted against and pressed the Argentines to withdraw loan proposals in the international financial institutions. There is no AID program in Argentina because of its high per capita income.

Talking Points

-- The United States recognizes that Argentina has been victim of a brutal terrorist campaign.

-- The Argentine government has decisively mastered the security situation, but it does not appear to be moving with sufficient speed and determination to abolish lawlessness by security forces and others.

-- We are concerned that people are being repressed simply because they dissent. Lawful opposition should not be confused with subversion.
We strongly urge an end to the state of siege and the public listing of all prisoners showing their place of detention and the charges against them. Due process should be restored and all future excesses punished.

Reports of continued torture and disappearances are distressing.

We want to express our concern over the case of Jewish publisher Jacobo Timmerman of the respected daily La Opinion. He is being held without charges. Should an outbreak of anti-Semitism occur it would be most harmful to US-Argentine relations.

We do recognize the partial steps taken by the Argentine government to assure basic human rights. The May release of prisoners and the recently announced intention to restore the "right of option" are positive indications of such Argentine movement. (The "right of option" allows Argentine citizens to leave country if held under State of Siege provisions.)

We think it essential for the government to recognize its unquestioned strength. It should begin to gamble on the side of returning the country to the rule of law.

Human rights concerns will not permit us to sign the FY 1977 FMS credits.

We regret the Argentine nonparticipation in the UNITAS exercise but appreciate their offer of logistic support. We look forward to their rejoining UNITAS in the future.

2. Non-Proliferation and the Treaty of Tlatelolco

Argentina has the most advanced nuclear capability of any Latin American state and the greatest potential for an autonomous fuel cycle. The Argentine government has stated that it seeks nuclear technology in order to satisfy its energy needs and for strictly peaceful purposes. We are concerned, however, because of Argentina's apparent progress toward acquiring an independent, unsafeguarded reprocessing capacity. We are considering the transfer of sensitive heavy water technology to the Argentines if they will forego reprocessing and accept full scope safeguards. The Argentines recently signed a limited safeguards agreement with Canada covering previously purchased nuclear fuel. They are now discussing with the Canadians the possibility of accepting full scope safeguards in return for further Canadian technical assistance in the nuclear area.
Talking Points

-- The United States is concerned over the possible spread of nuclear explosive capabilities. We feel the world community must take steps to reduce this growing danger.

-- At the same time, the United States recognizes the need for states to expand and diversify their energy resources on a secure basis.

-- We applaud the recent Argentine-Canadian limited safeguard agreement.

-- Ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco would demonstrate Argentine commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

-- The US is considering Argentine requests for technical assistance and nuclear cooperation. Specific requests relating to nuclear fuel are also under study.

3. The Malvinas/Falkland Islands

Argentina has disputed British possession of the Malvinas (Falkland Islands) since 1833. The 2,000 inhabitants of the islands want nothing to do with Argentina. The issue is further complicated by possibly large oil reserves in the Falkland Island shelf. In July, the UK and Argentina began another round in a series of conversations about sovereignty of the islands. The US has not taken sides in this dispute. (In talking with Videla you should use the Argentine name, Malvinas.)

Talking Points

-- We are pleased that Argentina and the UK are carrying on conversations directed toward resolving this question.

4. Sale of Helicopters (If raised by GOA)

We have agreed to sell the Argentine military eight Bell 212 commercial model helicopters, two of which will be used to transport President Videla. However, we did not agree to the original configuration requested by the Argentines. Machine gun mounts were eliminated on all of the eight, and armor plating was permitted only on those two aircraft to be used for President Videla's security.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

July 14, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

FROM: NORTH-SOUTH

SUBJECT: Evening Report

Daily Activities (Thornton)

Yesterday, Paul Gibson (American businessman pushing the Sullivan Principles for South Africa) discussed the state of play with Carol Hansen and me. He is optimistic that there will be major changes in apartheid within a year; I have heard that before, but his enthusiasm is commendable and his activities are doing at least some good. In the afternoon, Erb and I attended an unfortunately soporific briefing by Gilligan and others on North-South public affairs matters.

Today was taken up with the SCC meeting and follow-up; also a visit by Ambassador Bradford (to Chad) who modestly but forcefully pointed out the gaps in our policy towards countries such as Chad -- failure to support friends militarily (they cite the Atlantic City speech) and through effective aid measures. For the rest, a flurry of memos which I need not detail since you are the recipient.

As a result of protracted (3/minute) negotiations Quandt and I reached a deal whereby Mauritania and three draft choices changed hands. I, of course, had to give him the draft choices. He resisted my efforts to make him take Chad as well. (U)

Significant Intelligence

Zairian Internal Amnesty Measure Becomes Law

Despite the fact that Mobutu approved internal amnesty in principle, he has added important qualifications to the document. Embassy Kinshasa reports that Mobutu rejected the Council's request that the internal amnesty measure apply to all political prisoners broadly defined, including those condemned by military courts. Mobutu indicated in early July that no former military personnel will benefit from the amnesty. Thus, the former FAZ officers and men found guilty during the 1975 and 1978 coup plot trials will remain in prison. To date no prisoners have been released.
Significant Intelligence (Thornton) (cont'd)

General Akuffo Requests Information on Cuban Actions in Ghana. Akuffo has asked the Embassy Accra's assistance in gaining answers to two questions: (1) Are there any Cuban agents operating in Ghana at the present time? (2) What secret arrangements, if any, were made during the visit to Cuba by a Ghanaian delegation in October 1977 and by a Cuban delegation in April 1978 to Accra? The Embassy has no information bearing on the two questions, but feels that the new regime may be approaching us and the British as a means of reinforcing the pro-Western stance which it has assumed since achieving power.

Zaire and Angola to Renew Talks in Brazzaville. The Zairian Press Agency reports that the dialogue between Zaire and Angola may resume on Monday, July 17, and that it will be "directed toward normalization of friendly and brotherly relations." Embassy Kinshasa reports that Mobutu remains willing to start reducing tensions along the border through a system of neutral verification on both sides, that the Congo is acceptable to the GOZ as a mediator, and that Mobutu is willing to meet with Neto in Khartoum. Angola seems to find Mobutu's concept of a "neutral zone" a good one, according to Don Junior, but that the GOZ would also have to dismantle UNITA, FNIA, and FLEC within Zaire. Mobutu seems to still have little confidence in Luanda's intentions, according to our Embassy, nor does he expect much from the Brazzaville meeting. However, he "at least understands the importance we attache to reopening a dialogue and our view that a gradual approach, with initial focus on border security, seems to offer the best chance for success." (5)

Newsom's Travels. Newsom's conversations in Delhi were a replay of Desai's talks with the President here in Washington. All to the good, however, and the Indians clearly appreciated the gesture. His reception by Desai and Vajpayee is noteworthy for the protocol-conscious Indians. In Kabyl he had lengthy and rather inconclusive talks with Taraki and others. The atmospherics were generally good, but he left the city without answers to the basic questions. Hardly surprising. He recommends that we proceed with some major aid projects and see what happens. (5)
Daily Activities (Pastor)  July 14, 1978

Bolivia. Yesterday, after discussions with State, they posted a statement expressing concern about the allegations of fraud in the Bolivian elections, and at the same time, instructed Boeker to tell the Bolivians that stealing the elections will have a significantly adverse impact on our relations. By coincidence, Vaky and I had been invited to dinner at the Bolivian Embassy last night, and it gave us a further opportunity to directly communicate our concern. The Ambassador got the message, and I'm sure will relay it to his boss. Today, I spoke to one of the international observers, who had been in Bolivia, and he recounted the crude tactics used by the Banzer government to steal an election, which he was probably going to win. 

Venezuela. I met with Luis Lauredo, who was Mayor Ferre's special assistant. He had just returned from Venezuela where he spoke with Caldera, the titular head of the COPEI party, which may win the Presidential elections. COPEI feels that the Carter Administration has been neglecting them, and while this is untrue -- we have tried to be neutral -- we may need to find ways to show we care, like meeting with some of their people. I will talk to Vaky about that.

Nicaragua. Our Ambassador does not want to deliver the letter to Somoza, and instead he delivered the message orally and without mentioning its confidentiality. State and I are working on a memo on this. In the meantime, the political situation in the country is deteriorating.

Puerto Rico. Henry and I have just received the draft statement and will work on it this weekend. Governor Romero will be in town next week, perhaps providing an opportunity to float this idea past him.

Talked about our Latin American human rights policy before a group of Notre Dame alumnae. With Thornton, I spoke to Don Bandler of Face-to-Face/Carnegie to suggest some ideas for their meetings. After our conversation yesterday, cleared off a bundle of NAM cables, including a last one defending our basic human needs strategy with Guy Erb. Worked on bracero memo with Annie Gutierrez of Domestic Council; cleared off memo on North-South scholarship program with Bill Smith of Vice President's staff; wrote talking points for Frank Moore to use on Senator Magnuson on the Pan American Highway. Christopher had already sent letters on the subject.
Daily Activities (Pastor) (cont'd)

Brady Tyson called, and I suggested that he communicate quietly to his friend Brizola that this may not be the best of years for a triumphant return to Brazil. Brady surprisingly agreed; his fear was that the opposition could fragment. Also, he informed me that General Golbery had sent word to Brizola that it would be all right to go back if he waits another year. Interesting. Also, Brady asked my opinion about helping him in setting up appointments in the USG with a "new political party" in Argentina, the Montoneros. I strongly discouraged him from touching them.
Bolivia: The election situation grows more dismal with each report today. The Embassy reports that the harassed electoral court is despairing and a FBIS report indicates that the Cabinet ordered Bolivian diplomats to denounce "interference by international observers." State reports that the OAS observers are preparing a confidential report apparently indicating that fraud may account for 20% of the voting. The Embassy reports that the best outcome would be for all four parties to appeal to the electoral court to throw out all suspect ballots. This would result in no clear winner and necessitate coalition negotiations. "This course is now only an outside chance." (c)

Ecuador: Embassy Quito reports that Sunday's presidential election is unlikely to produce a majority winner, thus necessitating a run-off. Reservations exist about the role of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal which has not distinguished itself thus far for integrity or independence. A belated call for OAS observers was rejected by the GOE.

China and the Caribbean: [Redacted]

Chile: [Redacted] The Embassy reports that rumors of Pinochet's pending departure abound in Santiago and that most expectations are for an entirely new junta.

Nicaragua: Embassy reporting indicates continued violence resulting from student demonstrations in a number of towns, including several deaths and number of wounded. The Broad Opposition Front (FAO) has decided to call a general strike on July 19. A communique to be issued in conjunction with the strike will call on youth and students to avoid violence as a form of opposition.
Dominican Republic: Santo Domingo reports on Dominican government measures to enforce the controversial electoral commission decision. A Congressional resolution reserving right to examine documents of the commission appears calculated to hold Guzman's victory hostage for PRD acceptance of loss of the Senate majority. Armed forces and police issued a joint communique expressing unrestricted support for the commission's decision.

Paraguay: The five resident European Ambassadors met and agreed to recommend to their capitals that the chairman of the Council of Ministers issue a declaration on the arrest of Laino.