Pressures for political change - inspired by conditions of economic recession - are growing in the Southern Cone. While all four countries had been ruled by military governments, Argentina is reestablishing democracy following presidential elections on October 30. Despite an economy heavily burdened by foreign debt and the post Falklands political tensions, the Argentine elections were held on schedule and Raul Alfonsin of the Radical Party won with 52% of the vote. This development will have a major impact on the political process in neighboring countries. Chile and Uruguay are at various stages of transition to a more democratic government. In Paraguay, however, there is now no perceptible involvement toward democracy. Human rights concerns have ceased to be a major issue in our bilateral relations with Argentina as it moved toward the restoration of democracy but remain a source of irritation with the other three countries.

In Chile, the ten-year-old regime of President Augusto Pinochet faces growing opposition and demands that he define and speed up the transition to democracy. In an effort to diffuse growing political unrest, the new Minister of the Interior, Sergio Jarpa began a dialogue with an opposition coalition, the Democratic Alliance, to try to reach agreement on a transition timetable. This dialogue, however, has broken down, and it is unclear whether any accord can be peacefully reached. The fundamental issue of Pinochet's continuation in power until 1989 is the most difficult to resolve.

Uruguay's transition back to civilian rule, which calls for presidential elections in November 1984 and inauguration of a new government in March 1985, has not been smooth. Although internal party elections were held in November 1982 as scheduled, a political-military dialogue to discuss constitutional ground rules broke down in July and has not started again. The military, however, have repeatedly reiterated their commitment to the transition timetable, recently lifted the proscriptions of 26 politicians and authorized a massive opposition political rally. These actions suggest that the Armed Forces are willing to reach an accommodation with the opposition that will allow the transition to proceed.

Paraguay, in contrast, remains frozen politically. Elected on February 6 through "democratic elections" for another 5-year term, President Stroessner, who appears in good health, continues to rule Paraguay with an iron hand and complete disregard for human rights. With the opposition largely fragmented and disorganized, and the judicial and legislative branches carefully controlled by the executive and the officially sponsored Colorado party, Stroessner is likely to stay in power indefinitely.
Popular enthusiasm for Raul Alfonsin's inauguration reflects not only relief at the end of military repression but also hope that his victory will end Argentina's post-1930 pattern of alternating civilian and military regimes. Voters rejected not only the armed forces and their dismal 1976-83 record, but also the Peronists who have dominated post-WWII politics with their peculiar blend of populism, statism, intolerance, and violence. They voted for an Alfonsin who traded primarily on his impeccable credentials as a democrat, a constitutionalist, and a human rights advocate. For his election to become a watershed event, Alfonsin must turn over the mantle to an elected successor in six years. He probably has a better chance of doing that than any president since Juan Domingo Peron's first win in 1946.

Alfonsin's domestic situation is remarkably strong for a man who had been given less than an even chance to win a plurality on October 30. He has the popular mandate inherent in his 52 percent electoral majority. In addition, his Radical Party has a majority in the lower house of congress and a chance to negotiate a controlling coalition in the upper chamber. His most serious weakness may lie in the nature of the coalition that he molded during the campaign. The difference between the Radical Party's traditional 25 percent and Alfonsin's 52 percent probably resulted primarily from non-Radicals casting protest votes against Peronism and the military. Much of this support will probably prove ephemeral if Alfonsin is less than an economic miracle worker.

Alfonsin's initial political advantage will be magnified by the relative weakness of two potentially important sources of institutional opposition—the armed forces and organized labor. There is no immediate threat of a military coup. The armed forces are disorganized, discredited, and only too anxious to leave power. Alfonsin is committed to several initiatives intended to ensure military subordination to civilian authorities. It is unlikely, however, that he will give in to the temptation to exploit his anti-military mandate and move swiftly and dramatically to cripple the armed forces. However, the importance he attaches to curbing the military's political activity may be reflected in his assignment to the Defense Ministry of one of his most loyal and able followers, Raul Borras.

In organized labor, Alfonsin faces a potential opponent that is controlled by the opposition Peronists, accustomed to being pampered by civilian governments, and fearful of his pledges to democratize the unions. At the moment, national labor leaders preside over disunity and hold their posts by little more than inertia and self-acclamation. Nonetheless, labor cooperation will be essential to the success of any economic strategy that Alfonsin chooses. Thus, he can either seek rapid passage of new labor legislation and gamble that nationwide union elections will improve his position, or he can use the threat of such actions as leverage to pry support from the existing union bureaucracy.
ARGENTINA

ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Argentina has the potential for a strong economic base in its rich agriculture and well-educated population. However, it is currently saddled with a heavy external debt burden and suffers the effects of decades of economic mismanagement under a succession of military and populist governments. The economy is coming out of a severe recession, in part buoyed by optimism resulting from the imminent return to civilian rule. Inflation, estimated at about 400% for all of 1983, is still a problem.

Argentina's international debt is about $40 billion, 2/3 of its annual GDP. Its principal and interest payments both to banks and to official agencies (including Eximbank) are in arrears. Commercial banks just disbursed $500 million of a $1.5 billion medium-term loan; this disbursement eased but did not eliminate the arrearages. Argentina has been out of compliance with its IMF program since August for technical reasons and is not expected to meet its year-end targets. The new administration would like to secure the disbursements remaining under the existing program, which expires in March, but is under heavy domestic pressure to obtain less stringent terms beyond that.

The economic philosophy of Alfonsin's Radical Party is more interventionist than that of either U.S. party, but less so than that of the Peronists or the outgoing military government. Under previous governments, state-owned enterprises were permitted to operate inefficiently and piled up large losses. Debts incurred by or on behalf of state enterprises account for much of Argentina's debt problem. The new government intends to improve the efficiency of state enterprises and reduce somewhat the government's role in the marketplace, but will retain a mixed economy with heavy state involvement.

President-elect Alfonsin's choice for Minister of Economic Affairs, Bernardo GRINSPUN (pr. Green-spoon), is highly regarded in the financial community. He faces a difficult task in reconciling the need for continuing austerity to manage the debt problem with demands from many sectors in Argentina to pursue expansionist policies after two years of recession.

The fundamental strength of the Argentine economy is agriculture. The country is the world's third largest wheat exporter after the U.S. and Canada and a major supplier of wheat to the Soviet Union. Growing exports, led by a record grain crop, have combined with severe restriction of imports to enable Argentina to generate a substantial trade surplus. A large surplus must be maintained if Argentina is to service its debt, but increased imports of capital goods will be needed for capital investment in support of economic recovery.
Alfonsin's administration will bring some changes in foreign policy, if only because Argentina will be treated differently by others. Given a democratically elected government, for example, Argentina automatically will be restored to the ranks of acceptable international company, after having long suffered exclusion as a human rights pariah. However, fundamental foreign policy changes will probably be few because Alfonsin's perception of Argentina's national interests is remarkably close to that of the outgoing military.

New policy lines and biases will naturally reflect Alfonsin's personal perceptions and preferences. Reportedly his choice of a 38-year-old neophyte as Foreign Minister stemmed from a desire to maintain personal control over foreign policy. Alfonsin's view of international affairs is close to that of Western European socialists and social democrats. U.S. "imperialism," in his view, is a major threat to Argentine and Latin American political and economic interests.

Given this mind set, we can expect:

-- closer relations with West European socialist and social democratic parties and governments;
-- a strong pro-democratic, pro-human rights bias in international forums;
-- a clear preference for civilian controlled governments in Latin America; and
-- a strong rhetorical reaction to any perceived US intervention in the hemisphere, particularly in Central America.

On major substantive matters, however, we can expect a perhaps surprising degree of continuity with respect to:

-- the search for better relations with the US; the Argentines will be looking for immediate certification, and help with debt refinancing and the Falklands;
-- active participation as a moderate in the non-aligned movement;
-- maintenance of existing policies in territorial disputes over the Beagle Channel (Chile) and the Falkland Islands (UK); and
-- pursuit of trade advantages with the Soviet bloc while remaining free of political contamination.

Alfonsin suffers from few illusions about the Soviets. He is, for example, as critical of their role in Central America as he is of the US role.
The President's decision to certify to Congress that Argentina has made significant progress in human rights will be effective upon the day of the inauguration of Alfonsin. Public announcement of this decision will be made on December 8. The report required by the law explaining the rationale for the decision will be forwarded to Congress the week of December 12.

In reaction to the serious human rights violations in Argentina in the late 1970's Congress prohibited arms transfers and security assistance to Argentina until the President certified that Argentina had made significant human rights progress and the provision of such assistance is in the national interest. The law required that in making this determination, consideration be given to the GOA's efforts to provide information on "disappeared" persons and to release political (PEN) prisoners.

The timing of the decision and the public announcement was based on a desire to:

-- put the issue behind us prior to the inauguration;
-- emphasize our commitment to democracy;
-- have the most positive effect on our relations with the new government;
-- minimize opposition from the Hill and human rights groups;
-- make a gesture to the outgoing government which promised and delivered a return to democracy, and
-- provide time for the necessary consultations with the governments of Chile and the UK.

We have assured the UK that arms sales requests from Argentina will be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the potential effect on regional stability and that we will consult with them on any major transfers. We have avoided, however, giving the British the impression that they have a veto.

There are intelligence reports which indicate the GOA may have received nuclear reprocessing technology from an Italian firm. In addition Argentina announced on November 18 that it had constructed a gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment facility. We have not reached a firm conclusion whether Argentina has acquired reprocessing or enrichment technology, materials or equipment from another country. If it were found to have done so, under the Glenn or Symington amendments economic and certain security assistance would be prohibited. This would prevent an IMET program (budgeted at $50,000 for FY-84), as well as credits for military sales. We have no plans for any other military or economic assistance covered by the Glenn or Symington amendments. Foreign Military Sales on a cash basis and approval of munitions control export licenses are not precluded by either amendment.
Following reaffirmation of our commitment to the Contadora process, the Nine foreign ministers, meeting on the margins of the OAS, focused on maintaining momentum as negotiations continue to translate the Document of Objectives into a verifiable, operational agreement. The Contadora Four draft peace treaty was reviewed by the Technical Commission December 1-2. The Ministers will consider the Commission's work December 20.

In El Salvador, right-wing death squads have stepped up their activities against prominent individuals. Pressure on this issue has prompted Salvadoran DefMin Vides to condemn right-wing terrorism by name. The National Police Director also has spoken out against violence. To be effective, however, these statements must be followed by unequivocal action against those involved.

On Nov. 25, important changes were made in the military command structure, moving several officers involved with death squads and putting more aggressive officers in key positions. But Salvadoran guerrillas are again active, particularly in the east where they have effectively engaged company and battalion-sized units. The National Campaign Plan has made progress in San Vicente, however. Food is being provided to 29,000; 2,600 displaced have been relocated; new jobs have been created; schools have been built and roads repaired. Nevertheless, recent guerrilla successes have had an adverse psychological impact.

Human rights are also a mounting concern in Guatemala, where both political abductions and civilian deaths have increased since the August 8 military coup. Although some violence can be attributed to personal disputes and to attempts by right-wing parties to counter their political opponents, much of the resurgence in kidnapping, arbitrary arrest, and assassination is attributable to government security forces.

In Nicaragua the Sandinistas are sending signals of flexibility -- although these seem mostly tactical. The Bishops Council has met with the GRN to discuss recent attacks on churches by Sandinista mobs. The GRN has also made conciliatory gestures toward La Prensa. In both cases, compromise on the core issues seems remote. Press reports discuss a reduction in the Cuban presence and the departure of Salvadoran guerrillas from Nicaragua. But except for the departure of 1500 teachers on regular end-of-year leave, we have no confirmation that Cuban advisers have left, or that the guerrillas have shut down their command and control center in Managua.

Argentina has made dramatic progress in recent months. Although the "dirty" war in the late 1970's against terrorism was largely successful, it caused major violations of human rights. Freedom of the press was severely restricted. Political party and trade union activities were suspended. Thousands of people simply disappeared and are presumed dead. Torture was widely practiced.

Following Argentina's defeat in the Falklands conflict, a new military government was installed. It announced that it would oversee the return to democratically elected government. The new government lifted the ban on political activity, gradually removed restrictions on the press, relaxed constraints on trade union activity, released or remanded for trial all political prisoners, and sharply reduced the number of human rights violations committed by the security forces. Finally, on October 30, 1983, the Argentine people, in elections universally applauded as free and fair, elected Raul Alfonsin as president of Argentina.

The one remaining major human rights issue involves accounting for the disappeared. The Argentina military governments have never rendered a satisfactory accounting. The Bignone government's "final report" on this question in April of 1983 was widely condemned as a whitewash. The government's decision to issue an amnesty law on September 23, 1983, granting immunity to all those responsible for crimes committed during the "dirty war", has also been widely criticized.

A related issue concerns the fate of an estimated 100 children of disappeared parents who were either with their parents when they were arrested or were born during their mother's detention. The children are believed to have been placed by the military with other families. A resolution of this problem will have to consider the interests of the original and adopting families as well as the interests of the children themselves.

The United States has deplored the violations of human rights that occurred during the 1970's in Argentina. The United States has also continuously encouraged the Argentine government to provide as full an accounting as possible on the disappeared. When the current government released its April report, the United States expressed its disappointment that an occasion had been lost to begin the resolution of this question.

The United States has maintained that these issues are ones that must be resolved by the Argentines themselves. The democratically elected civilian government, which will deal with these difficult issues, also constitutes the best guarantee that human rights will be respected in the future in Argentina.
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRET
June 16, 1981

TO: Nancy Bearg Dyke
FROM: John Owens

SUBJECT: The Graiver Connection
(Timmerman Affair)

In answer to the Vice President's question, evidence linking David Graiver to left wing terrorist organizations in Argentina is circumstantial. The allegations have never been proven.

If the Government of Argentina possessed solid proof, they would have produced it during Timmerman's trial.
Dear Margaret:

As you know Argentina has been making steady progress in improving its human rights situation in recent months. The elections there on October 30 were fair, open and honest. When President-elect Alfonsin takes office on December 10, Argentina's return to democracy will have been completed. In view of this, and taking all the factors into consideration, I have authorized Secretary Shultz to publicly announce on December 7 our decision to certify Argentina upon installation of the new government. I want this issue to be dealt with before our delegation arrives for the inauguration.

We will be informing Congressional leaders, President Bignone and President Pinochet of this decision on December 6. I wanted to inform you first because I realize this will not be a popular decision in Great Britain. The following are factors which underlay this decision.

First, following events during the past year, I have determined in accordance with US law that the Government of Argentina has made significant progress in complying with internationally recognized principles of human rights. Second, certification is not equivalent to arms sales. We will
evaluate each request very carefully on a case-by-case basis, taking into account any threat that may be posed to peace in the region. In addition, we would consult closely with your government on any major sales. Third, significant sales are not expected. Argentina has replaced most of its losses from a variety of sources. President-elect Alfonsin is firmly committed to significantly reducing the military budget. The economic situation in Argentina is very difficult and would not support major arms acquisitions. Finally, arms are readily available from other sources, including the Soviets.

I therefore believe that not only is it in the interests of the United States to normalize our relationship with Argentina, but it is also in the interests of Great Britain. Certification would help strengthen U.S. influence with Argentina, thus enabling us to work more effectively to assure regional stability. Improving the climate for dialogue and negotiation is the best means of avoiding a recurrence of conflict in the South Atlantic.
There can be no doubt that your nation and mine are the closest of allies. Your statement in the Guildhall address, setting out your view of the relationship between our two countries, was appreciated for both its eloquence and its timeliness. The depth and enduring nature of this relationship not only strengthens our respective countries but gives hope to all those in this world who share our values.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan
Reynaldo Benito BIGNONE  
(Phonetic: been Y'Onay)  

President  
(since July 1982)  

Addressed as:  
Mr. President  

Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Reynaldo Bignone will relinquish his office on 10 December when Argentina returns to a civilian form of government and Raúl Alfonsín is inaugurated. As President, Bignone has guided Argentina through the process of returning the country to democracy by gaining the support of political parties, organized labor, and the Roman Catholic Church.

Inherently cautious and contemplative, Bignone is a moderate who prefers dialogue and negotiation in resolving conflicts. He is mild, sincere, and conciliatory. When he first took office, they considered him to be reluctant to exercise authority and unprepared to take a stand on controversial issues. Since then he has attempted to establish himself with the public as a confident leader and decisionmaker by making public appearances and holding publicized talks with political, labor, and military leaders. We nevertheless believe that the real power has rested with the ruling military hierarchy.

When President Leopoldo Galtieri resigned after Argentina’s defeat by Great Britain in the battle for control of the Falkland Islands, Bignone was chosen for his position by Lt. Gen. Cristino Nicolaides, the Commander of the Army and a member of the three-man ruling military junta. An important factor in his selection for the presidency was his ties to former Presidents Jorge Videla (1976-81) and Roberto Viola (March-November 1981), who continue to have friends in the military. In addition, having retired from the Army in January 1982, Bignone was not involved in the Falklands dispute and was therefore free of the taint of failure suffered by active duty generals.

Bignone graduated from the Argentine Military Academy in 1947. He has held numerous military posts, including those of chief of the Cadet Corps and director of the National Military Academy. In 1976 he was Provisional Minister of Social Welfare. Bignone was secretary general of the Army from 1977 until 1980. In that capacity he served as a key political adviser to various Army commanders. During 1979-80 he was a member of the Argentine delegation that went to the Vatican to negotiate the Beagle Channel sovereignty dispute with Chile. In 1981 he served as commander of the Military Institutes.

The Argentine press has described Bignone as a model husband and father. He is relaxed and pleasant in social situations, despite being initially shy. He has traveled throughout South America and to Italy, Spain, and the United States. Bignone, 55, Married, he has three children and two grandchildren.
On 30 October Radical Civic Union (UCR) leader Raúl Alfonsin, who had widely been considered to be running slightly behind Peronist Italo Luder, was elected President of Argentina. His victory was the first defeat for the Peronists in a presidential election. A bold political operator and a charismatic and fiery orator, Alfonsin led an aggressive campaign that involved extensive travel, numerous speeches, television advertisements, and a nationally televised rally. He is generally believed to have won his following by actively supporting human rights groups and attacking the military government on a broad range of issues. He will probably assume office in December.

Alfonsin stated that his foreign policy goals are to reestablish Argentina's prominence in Latin America, to maintain its role as a moderate force in the Nonaligned Movement, and to avoid involvement in East-West disputes. Two days before the election he publicly condemned the US military intervention in Grenada, rejecting any interference by the superpowers in Latin American affairs.

**Domestic Issues**

Among Alfonsin's greatest challenges will be renegotiating Argentina's enormous national debt and curbing its spiraling inflation rate. The Argentine press reports that he will discard the economic management system of the previous, military government and will take direct control of economic matters himself. Alfonsin is optimistic that an expansion of agricultural exports will pave the way to economic recovery. He will immediately deal with the issue of the desaparecidos, the approximately 7,000 people who disappeared in the late 1970s during a military anti-insurgency campaign. Alfonsin has expressed opposition to an amnesty law recently passed by the military absolving itself of responsibility for crimes committed under military rule, and he has publicly vowed to bring to justice the officials responsible for such crimes. In addition, he has proposed limiting the role of the military by abolishing the service commander posts, cutting military spending to 2 percent of the gross national product, and ending mandatory military service.

Alfonsin is also expected to attempt to democratize the trade unions by allowing them to elect their own leaders. They say that step would be intended to remove the entrenched Peronist labor bureaucracy, which he says does not represent the rank and file. In July 1983 if Alfonsin were elected, the unions would give him no quarter. Because his policies have alienated both that powerful sector and the military, we believe he will have great difficulty implementing his domestic program.
Career and Personal Data

Alfonsín has a doctorate in law and social sciences from the University of Buenos Aires. He has held positions in the UCR since the 1950s. He has served two terms in the Buenos Aires provincial Chamber of Deputies, and during the early 1960s he served in the national Chamber of Deputies. He was the UCR candidate for governor of Buenos Aires Province in 1967, before the then ruling military canceled the election.

Alfonsín acquired his image in Argentina as a populist and an activist, reform-minded democrat in the late 1960s, when he published antigovernment editorials in the UCR monthly and was arrested for participating in an illegal street demonstration. Once a protegé of now deceased UCR leader Ricardo Balbín, Alfonsín became dissatisfied with Balbín’s conservative, accommodative position on military rule in the early 1970s. They say he became convinced that the UCR needed to take on a more populist character and to move to the left to challenge the Peronists and to take advantage of widespread public discontent with the military government. For over a decade he fought tenaciously for the party leadership. In the year preceding the presidential election, he organized massive political rallies; backed human rights marches; and, as an attorney, defended numerous political detainees. He assured his dominance in the party when his faction won absolute control of the UCR National Committee in internal party elections in July 1983.

During the past year Alfonsín has met with European Socialist leaders in Europe, including French President François Mitterrand and Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González Márquez. He has also visited the United States and the Soviet Union and has traveled throughout Latin America. Alfonsín, 56, is married to the former María Lorenza Barreneche. He has six children and at least 12 grandchildren.

31 October 1983
Raúl BORRAS  
(Phonetic: BORahs)  

Minister of Defense-Designate

Addressed as:  
Mr. Borras

A journalist, businessman, and partner in President-elect Raúl Alfonsín’s legal practice, Raúl Borras will become Minister of Defense when the new administration takes office on 10 December. Borras, who has been a member of the Radical Civic Union (UCR) since his youth, forged the intraparty and interparty electoral alliances that led to Alfonsín’s victory. They add that, unlike some of his UCR colleagues who expected a close loss at best, Borras accurately read the mood of the country and predicted a Radical sweep in the electoral college. The Western press reports that, as soon as he assumes his Cabinet post, Borras will begin the process of putting the armed forces under civilian control, removing military personnel responsible for human rights abuses, and reducing military spending.

Borras was president of the Pergamino municipal council from 1963 until 1964. For the next two years he served as under secretary of agriculture and livestock in the administration of Arturo Illia. During 1973 Borras represented Buenos Aires Province in the national legislature.

Borras is 50 years old. He and his wife, the former Emma Botti, have a son and two daughters.
Antonio Américo TROCCOLI  
(Phonetic: TROHKcohlee)  
Minister of Interior-Designate  

Addressed as:  
Mr. Tróccoli

Antonio Tróccoli is a lawyer, economist, and college professor who has been active in politics for over two decades. Long a rival within the Radical Civic Union (UCR) of current President-elect Raúl Alfonsín, Tróccoli has been associated with that faction of the party that adhered to the conservative and nationalistic views of former UCR leader Ricardo Balbín. In light of his Cabinet appointment, however, we believe Tróccoli may have reached an accommodation with Alfonsín and decided to back the President-elect's reformist policies. Tróccoli will assume his post on 10 December. In the Cabinet he will use his excellent contacts with opposition Peronist leaders to help the new government work effectively with the governors of opposition-dominated provinces.

As Interior Minister, Tróccoli will be responsible for police matters. In several press interviews in November 1983, he promised to reform the police system, closely monitor police actions on human and civil rights matters, and allow political exiles to return with full restoration of their rights. In another newspaper interview he called upon the new government to return leadership of the unions to rank-and-file members—a stance that will, we believe, draw criticism from Peronist labor leaders.

Tróccoli is a graduate of the Law Faculty of the National University of La Plata. He represented Buenos Aires Province in the Federal Chamber of Deputies during 1963-66 and 1973-77. During his second term he headed the UCR congressional bloc. Between his terms in Congress and since 1977, Tróccoli has practiced or taught law. Offered a Foreign Leader Grant to visit the United States in 1968, he told US Embassy officials that he could not accept because of the pressure of work.

Tróccoli, 58, is married to the former Dolores Celia Bustos and has seven sons.

CR M 83-16393  
2 December 1983
Carlos ALCONADA ARAMBURU
(Phonetic: ahkoNAHdah ahrahmbooROO)

Minister of Education and
Justice-Designate

Addressed as:
Mr. Alconada Aramburú

A lawyer and former Minister of Education, Carlos Alconada Aramburú will take office on 10 December. He has announced that he plans to modify the present judicial system, including restricting the state-of-siege law and reforming the current preventive arrest system—measures that will probably have widespread public support. On the other hand, he may arouse dissatisfaction in the Roman Catholic Church and among many middle- and upper-class Argentinians if he carries out the suggested plans of President-elect Raúl Alfonsín to reduce subsidies to private schools. Aramburú is a longtime member of the Radical Civic Union.

In the 1940s Alconada Aramburú attended the National University of La Plata and received a degree in social and juridical sciences. His first public position was as secretary to the La Plata appellate court for civilian and commercial issues, a post he held until 1952. In 1956 he was appointed an attorney for Buenos Aires Province. During the next two years he served as Minister of Interior in the administration of Arturo Frondizi. Alconada Aramburú was the Minister of Education from 1963 until 1966 under President Arturo Illia. After Illia was ousted by a military coup, Alconada Aramburú became director of both the Federal Capital Bar Association’s Private Law Institute and the Commercial Law Institute.

Alconada Aramburú is 63 years old. He and his wife, the former Balloina Magliano, have nine children.

ARGENTINA

CR M 83-16385
2 December 1983
V Good visit - fully accomplish objectives
Met Corp members - deal relat.

V Policy - demonstrably change
Some voices but not worried

V Seeing subtle change in US/IT relat.
Received many warm congrats & visit reinforced warmth

V P + Z have talked & related to - specific Arg.
Knew there were improvements in your country
Your views on me, & rate ?

V Hum pts. - maintain hum pts. - implicit
in democracy
Founded like NT to
Hum pts + hum dignity
Improve life of citizens
Zealous defender of hum pts &
rt of nations
Arg needs understanding
have lived through harsh &
dirty war
No comparison & conflict in Arg & El S. urban tier in Arg. city of 10m.
El S. faced of same crisis.
war in countryside not cities
Arg war taken + the / if in countryside
"any more leads to excesses"

People her Army - Marxist
Majid

Climate of peace & calm now in Arg.
Min. of Freedom & Justice provide
If a few limitations see I

Want understanding & fair application
of human rights policy

If you find less yelling I know it.
We can't dictate to our friends

We don't want any more than what
you have just said.
Nuc: strictly peaceful
divided agreement in last few days of
exploration - nuc. coop
Each " info
Bog = "only one will lose bomb" vs. U.S.
Arg has 10 yr edge on the other 110 countries
maintain the 10 yr edge
NPT treaty: will continue to treaty but
need time:
- domestic considerations
- have to neg. w/ external agencies the opping
safeguards
Need time
Want to provide
retroactive
safeg/assurance

Why domestic?
It affects our society

credit
Wheat

Advice to go
will continue in 1981

Who is try to overthrow Quirino

Extreme left
VP: Inside?

V outside support - common
ingredient in terrorism
Not at all surprised that:
cut
Nic
for
Maybe VN + China

Assure you we coop with US in
any new policy to halt
Sov. expansionism

VP: Would be surprised if China helping

V US might pay more attention to internal
security
Restraining Iran in other CA countries
seek agreement on views & attitudes
of other CA + LA countries

V Arg position in NAM
Not same pos. as other NA nations
utopian purpose for remaining
in it before
We have special situation
Efforts were to have movement avoid
com. flavor
US must talk at length arg. role in develop. democracy around the world
VP set
arg. has role we may differ some -- like at UN -- but we need to talk
Too many propagandists for high US around
like to help enhance arg. role as moderator in UN + elsewhere
V Love to discuss at length
VP We won't embarrass you
V Would like to see Am pres -- partic. yours -- in LA
Deeply interested in a visit from you
deeply interested in a visit from you
see how to help in settling for expansionism
VP Would like to -- ting etc.
SECTION 01 OF 02 BUENOS AIRES 08418

EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PREL, AR
SUBJECT: INITIAL THINKING OF INCOMING DEFENSE MINISTER

1. (C) ON NOVEMBER 25 DCM LUNCHED PRIVATELY WITH INCOMING DEFENSE MINISTER BORRAS. BORRAS EXPLAINED THAT DEFENSE WAS THE LAST JOB HE HAD EXPECTED IN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION. HE HAD BEEN IN CHARGE OF ARRANGING POLITICAL ALLIANCES IN THE PROVINCES AND EXPECTED TO BE INTERIOR OR SOCIAL ACTION MINISTER TO CONTINUE TO MANAGE THESE DELICATE POLITICAL RELATIONS. ONCE ALFONSI WIN BY A LARGE MARGIN, THE ENTIRE PERSPECTIVE CHANGED. ALFONSI DECIDED THE HIGHEST PRIORITY IS TO ASSURE LONG-TERM MAINTENANCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM AND ASKED HIM TO TAKE CHARGE OF THE SENSITIVE DEFENSE PORTFOLIO. HE HAD TO SPEND CONSIDERABLE TIME PASSING HIS OOSE ENDS TO THE INCOMING INTERIOR MINISTER AND HAD REALLY ONLY BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED ON DEFENSE ISSUES FOR ABOUT A WEEK. HE COMMENTED THAT A NUMBER OF ISSUES, ESPECIALLY RETIREMENTS, SEEM TO BE SOLVING THEMSELVES.
Simply because the decisionmaking process is slow and he is not interested in negotiation with the outgoing group.

2. DCM stressed that the US, including the US military, fully supports democracy and its institutionalization and maintenance in Argentina. He said that, because most of US activities in the defense field are military-to-military, there is sometimes a mistaken impression that we endorse military coups in Latin America. DCM urged that the US and Argentina now develop a civilian-to-civilian relationship in the defense area as the framework for the re-establishment of the usual military-to-military relationship and that both sides take steps to assure that there never in the future be "any confusion on the full US support for Argentine democracy. Borrás greatly welcomed these remarks, said he had already heard of military-to-military links which were not democratically oriented. He added that Argentines can only admire US civilian control of the military. DCM commented that such civilian control grows more from institutions, tradition and political philosophy than from any mechanical procedures or controls but that we would welcome the opportunity to tell and show Argentine civilians how civilians: exercise authority in the US defense establishment. In fact, one or two USIS international visitor grants have been reserved for this purpose. Borrás indicated he would be back to DCM on this opportunity once his civilian staffing is more fully in mind.

3. Borrás made the following additional points:
   -- He is approaching changes in the military slowly and carefully; in the first year even budget reductions will be moderate; he does not agree with those that
BELIEVE THE MILITARY IS NOW WEAK AND SHOULD BE CRIPPLED; IN FACT, HE SAID ARGENTINA NEEDS A MILITARY, BUT ONE MORE PROFESSIONAL AND IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT;

-- THE ARGENTINE LAW PROVIDES THAT IN PEACE TIME THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE IS THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES; THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE THREE FORCES - THE SENIOR ACTIVE DUTY OFFICER - WOULD REPORT DIRECTLY TO HIM;

-- HE PLANS TO ESTABLISH A CIVILIAN STAFF AT THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IN SUCH AREAS AS BUDGET, PERSONNEL, TRAINING, AND LOGISTICS; THESE FUNCTIONS WOULD REPORT TO THE MINISTRY STAFF FROM EACH SERVICE AND WOULD NOT BE HANDLED THROUGH THE CHIEF OF STAFF; CIVILIAN CONTROL WOULD BE CONCENTRATED IN THESE SUPPORT FUNCTIONS;

-- HE HOPES TO BUILD UP THE JOINT STAFF; THE BEST OFFICERS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED THERE; OVER TIME HE WILL INSIST ON JOINT PLANNING, JOINT OPERATIONS, AND MELDING OF SERVICE COOPERATION INSTEAD OF COMPETITION;

-- THE OVERALL ASSUMPTIONS FOR DEFENSE PLANNING WOULD BE PREPARED BY THE CIVILIANS INCLUDING THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; ALL PRIORITIES WOULD THEN HAVE TO BE RELATED TO THIS OVERALL PLAN;

-- THE VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE SERVICES WOULD BE PHASED DOWN, REDIRECTED AND BROUGHT UNDER CIVILIAN CONTROL ONLY VERY SLOWLY; MEMBERS OF THESE GROUPS WOULD BE A MUCH GREATER MENACE UNEMPLOYED IN THE STREET THAN WHERE THEY ARE; SIDE WILL PROBABLY BE THE OVERALL COORDINAT...
OUTLINE

1. DCMS JOINED THEIR DECISIONS ON PEOPLE IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD HAVE NOT EVEN BEGUN TO BE TAKEN; HE WELCOMED DCM'S OFFER FOR EVENTUAL CONTACT WITH APPROPRIATE US EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

4. DCM ASKED IF HE HAD FOCUSED ON QUESTION OF CERTIFICATION. HE SAID IT DID NOT SEEM TO BE AN IMPORTANT ISSUE, WHEN WOULD IT HAPPEN, HE ASKED. DCM SAID SOMEWHERE IN DECEMBER WAS LIKELY. HE WAS PLEASANTLY SURPRISED BUT DID NOT INDICATE WHY HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE LATER. HE ASKED WHAT ISSUES WOULD THEN ARISE. DCM SAID WE ARE NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF PUSHING ARMS ON ANYONE AND WOULD WANT TO CONSULT WITH HIM ON ANY SIGNIFICANT REQUEST AS PART OF OUR OWN INTENSIVE CASE-BY-CASE REVIEW PROCESS. HE WELCOMED WHAT HE CALLED THIS COMMITMENT. DCM SAID QUESTION OF A-4'S FROM ISRAEL MIGHT BE AN EARLY MATTER. HE SAID WHETHER OR NOT THEY HAVE
ALREADY BEEN PAID FOR WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF JUDGMENT FOR HIM. DCM SAID HE WAS NOT CLEAR ON WHAT CONTRACT TERMS MAY EXIST.

5. BORRAS ASKED IF ARGENTINE PERSONNEL WERE IMPORTANT TO US OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA. HE PROFESSED NOT TO BE BRIEFED ON THIS ISSUE. DCM SAID HE BELIEVED ALL ARGENTINE PERSONNEL HAD NOW DEPARTED HONDURAS/NICARAGUA AND, THIS WAS AN HISTORICAL QUESTION WHICH BEST NOT BE OPENED PUBLICLY. BORRAS SEEMED TO AGREE. DCM ASKED WHAT HIS FEELINGS ON BOLIVIA ARE. HE SAID ARGENTINA SHOULD STAY OUT AND ASKED IF ARGENTINES ARE DOING ANYTHING. DCM SAID HE WAS NOT SURE BUT HOPED NOTHING WOULD HAPPEN THERE DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WHICH ARE SO DELICATE IN BOTH ARGENTINA AND APPARENTLY ALSO IN BOLIVIA. BORRAS SAID HE KNEW ARGENTINA HAD BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED SOME TIME AGO AND PUSHED FOR MORE RECENT INFORMATION. DCM SAID HE HAD SEEN SCATTERED AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION SUGGESTING THERE MIGHT STILL BE SOMETHING MORE THAN OBSERVER INTEREST.

6. THE INITIAL IMPRESSION FROM THESE THREE HOURS OF INTENSIVE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION AND TWO PRE-ELECTION GROUP ENCOUNTERS IS THAT BORRAS IS A SOPHISTICATED POLITICAL OPERATIVE WHO WILL BE MORE THAN A MATCH FOR INDIVIDUAL ARGENTINE MILITARY; HOWEVER, HE IS ONLY ONE MAN AND MUCH WILL DEPEND ON HIS ABILITY TO BUILD A GOOD CIVILIAN TEAM. AS HE SAID, NO ONE IN ARGENTINA SEEMS TO KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE MILITARY EXCEPT MILITARY, ACTIVE AND RETIRED. HE REGRETTED THE ABSENCE OF THINK TANKS SUCH AS RAND AND BROOKINGS FROM WHICH HE HAD THE IMPRESSION A SHADOW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT EMERGES. DCM SAID SUCH THINK TANKS PROVIDE ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF THE CIVILIAN POLITICAL APPOINTEES WITH MOST COMING FROM BUSINESS AND OTHER CIRCLES AND
MANY DOING MUCH LEARNING ON THE JOB.

7. BORRAS HAS BEEN CLOSE TO ALFONSO FOR MANY YEARS AND IS CREDITED WITH BEING HIS LEADING POLITICAL STRATEGIST -- HE COMMENTED THAT HIS PREDICTION OF A NARROW ELECTION PLURALITY WAS ONE OF HIS BIGGEST ERRORS EVER. HE SEEMS TO BE WORLDLYWISE AT LEAST ON THE REAL WORLD OF ARGENTINA. IF HE CAN ACCOMPLISH WHAT HE HAS IN MIND, ARGENTINE DEMOCRACY JUST MIGHT HAVE A LONG RUN WITHOUT A MILITARY COUP. ORTIZ