A STAFF REPORT

concerning

ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
IN THE UNITED STATES

submitted to

The Subcommittee on International Operations
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

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January 18, 1979
PREFACE

The following report is written in the present tense. Because of the inherent ebb and flow of the activities discussed, certain aspects of the report may now seem outdated, especially in light of recent events such as the turmoil in Iran and recognition of the People's Republic of China. Regardless of these events, however, its integrity and relevance remain intact; many of the highly questionable activities described herein continue, and there now exists no effective institutional structure for controlling them. For that reason, the reduction or even the cessation of foreign agent activities by such forces as, for example, the Iranian secret police, should not be viewed as a harbinger of the end of these activities; rather, it may simply have created a vacuum into which other foreign services will be drawn.
(1) Chile. Although no intelligence officer of the Government of Chile apparently is currently stationed in the United States, such officers have visited the United States using false
identification, and their activities were not known. The Chilean intelligence service is a member of a consortium of South American intelligence services, "Operation Condor," which has, in the past, plotted assassinations in foreign countries and maintained files on anti-regime activists. This service maintains close liaison with the German Nazi colony of La Dignidad in Southern Chile, which makes its substantial resources available to it. (P. 7)
ACTIVITIES OF CERTAIN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES
II. Findings

A. Activities of foreign intelligence agencies in the United States

(1) Chile. Although no intelligence officer of the Government of Chile apparently is currently stationed in the United States, such officers have visited the United States using false identification, and their activities were not known. The Chilean intelligence service is a member of a consortium of South American intelligence services, "Operation Condor," which has, in the past, plotted assassinations in foreign countries and maintained files on anti-regime activists. This service maintains close liaison with the German Nazi colony of La Dignidad in Southern Chile, which makes its substantial resources available to it.

The Directorate of National Intelligence, DINA, was established in early 1974 following the overthrow of the Allende regime. It was established as an arm of the presidency, under the direct control of President Pinochet. Colonel Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, a close friend of President Pinochet, was named as Director. DINA's initial mission was to identify and eliminate subversives in Chile, a problem which was regarded as a legacy of the Allende regime. DINA consisted largely of former police and army officers, numbering, by 1977, some 38,000 personnel and supported by a budget of $27 million. It was organized in a manner similar to that of other intelligence services.

Shortly after DINA was established, Director Contreras came to the United States to seek American assistance.
By 1976, with "subversion" under control, DINA turned its attention abroad. In an effort to monitor the activities of Chilean dissidents outside Chile, DINA began to station agents in Europe and certain South American countries. Apparently, no DINA agents were stationed in the United States, although as described below plans were at one time made to do so.

In August, 1977, President Pinochet dissolved DINA and replaced it with the Central Nacional de Informaciones, or "CNI."* The publicly-announced reason was that DINA had completed its mission. In fact, however, the action was likely the result of pressure from within the United States, where sensitivity to Chilean repression was heightened by the assassination of Orlando Letelier, and also of pressure from within Chile. Church and army leaders there disliked the heavy-handedness of Contreras and were concerned about Chile's international image.

The new Director is the former chief of army intelligence and former ambassador to Uruguay, Odlanier Mena-Salinas. Upon taking over in 1977, Mena apparently carried out a major shake-up of the intelligence organization* A wholesale dismissal of personnel and a total reorganization

*To avoid confusion, "DINA" is used hereafter in reference to CNT as well.
seems to have taken place. CNI's arrest and detention powers were abolished and placed in the hands of the uniformed police. CNI now has no internal police functions, but does retain an intelligence-gathering mission. Moreover, unlike DINA, CNI is not directly under the President but is responsible to the Minister of the Interior. "Quite an improvement in the human rights record" has occurred in Chile since the shake-up, the number of illegal detentions and political prisoners and the amount of torture have decreased.

Much of the information in the hands of United States intelligence and law enforcement agencies regarding DINA activities in the United States relates to the assassination of Orlando Letelier. Much, though not all, of that information the Executive Branch declined to provide the Subcommittee, and no effort was made to acquire it in the belief that its acquisition might, however inadvertently, interfere with the Justice Department's investigation and prosecution of that case. * Notwithstanding this embargo, it was learned that Chilean officials

*The indictment handed down by the Grand Jury on February 7, 1977, charged the then-Director of DINA, Manuel Contreras Sepulvada, DINA's then-Director of Operations, Pedro Espinoza, and a DINA agent, Michael Townley, with conspiring to murder Orlando Letelier. Contreras, the Grand Jury charged, ordered Letelier's assassination, and Espinoza conveyed the order to Townley.
have entered the United States, purchased "bugging" equipment, and have brought it out of the United States using bogus passports. The 1976 entry involved the assassination of Letelier; in 1977, persons accompanying President Pinochet to the signing ceremony of the Panama Canal Treaty used false passports. In the case of one of those visits, the false passports were obtained in Paraguay by DINA officers who might have been acting under the umbrella of an organization known as "Operation Condor."
Established in 1976, Operation Condor is an international consortium of the intelligence services of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay.* Condor conducts joint operations against common targets in member countries for the purpose of countering what it regards as terrorism and subversion. Chile has been the center for Operation Condor, and, under Condor, Chilean intelligence has maintained officers in Chilean embassies in all member countries. Argentine and Chilean intelligence officers have agreed through Condor that if any Chilean is known to be involved in an Argentine terrorist group, Argentine authorities may kill him upon capture. DINA also maintains an officer in the Chilean embassy in Madrid who has responsibility for operations in Western Europe. In addition, DINA has tried to place representatives in France, England and West Germany to monitor the activities of Chilean leftists in those countries. DINA personnel in Condor use civilian, rather than military, cover.

A highly secret dimension of Operation Condor -- the so-called "phase three" operation -- involves the formation of special teams from member countries assigned to travel anywhere in the world to non-member countries to carry out "sanctions" including assassination -- against Condor enemies. According to the plan, once a given Condor enemy is determined by a firs

*Membership has varied from year to year.
Condor team to be present in a certain country, a second team from Condor is dispatched to locate and surveil the target. A third team, composed of individuals from one member country or from several, is then issued false documentation from member countries of Condor and dispatched to carry out the actual sanction against the target.

Such a "phase three" operation was planned in 1974 following the assassinations of the Bolivian Ambassador in Paris, a Chilean official in the Middle East, and a Uruguayan attache in Paris. Condor thereupon planned an operation aimed at assassinating three well-known European leftists, one of whom was the notorious terrorist Carlos. The plot was foiled, however, when, during the first team's search for the three targets, it was discovered that the governments of the countries in which the assassinations were likely to occur -- France and Portugal -- which in turn warned possible targets (aware of the identity only of Carlos) and called in representatives of Condor countries to warn them to call off the action. They did -- after denying that it had ever been planned.

The above-described plot is relevant insofar as it provides evidence of Condor's capabilities as well as its possible intentions in planning to open a station in Miami shortly afterwards. Unable to determine Condor's specific purpose in doing so, but did discover the plan and inform
the Department of State. The Department considered issuing a formal demarche to the governments involved but Secretary Kissinger objected. Instead, it was decided that [redacted] would inform Condor, [redacted] that the United States disapproved. The Miami Condor station was never opened.

Condor may have become less active in recent months, but has not, over that period, acquired any information concerning its activities. Whatever its current posture, Condor clearly has the potential of planning and executing drastic covert operations. Indeed, it was barely two years ago that the FBI concluded that "it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the recent assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. may have been carried out as a third phase of 'Operation Condor.'"

Another element with an uncertain relationship to DINA is the "Colony". Located in Parral, Linarest Province, "La Dignidad was established by former Nazi Luftwaffe officers at the close of World War Two. The Colony is registered as a "farm property" known in the Colony as "The Commander."
Residents must leave Chile through Argentina. The Colony's leadership maintains good relations with Chilean military officials, particularly officers of the Chilean Air Force, who have close ties to the Colony's former Luftwaffe pilots.

The Colony maintains complete autonomy over its territory. Investigations into its activities have always come to an abrupt halt. The Colony's primary source of livelihood is a large dairy farm, although it also produces other agricultural products and engages in some mining. It maintains good relations with the local peasant population, in part because an excellent medical facility maintained by the Colony is open once a week for free medical treatment and medicine to farm families in the area.

DINA has maintained a detention center inside the Colony, and there are allegations that torture has taken place there. Allegations also have been made that German personnel, who are described as ex-Gestapo or ex-SS officers, have given instruction in torture techniques and have actually taken part in the application of those techniques.

The Colony has received large amounts of money over the years, probably from German Nazis. DINA, which maintains two facilit
nearby, makes use of the Colony's national and international contacts. Knowledgeable State Department officials believe that they "might very well indeed be part of the so-called network of German exiles in Latin America."

Precisely what actions have been carried out by DINA and Operation Condor, and what role the "Colony" has played, are unclear. "Our knowledge of DINA operations is almost nil," the CIA stated. What is clear is that DINA and Condor possess both the motive and capability to harm United States residents. The former director of DINA, Manuel Contreras, has said DINA has representatives in all Chilean embassies abroad except behind the Iron Curtain. These agents, he said, served under civilian cover, and their mission included "hittin Chilean enemies in those countries. "We will go to Australia if necessary to get our enemies," he said.
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SUBJECT: THREATS TO THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

1. ***ENTIRE TEXT***

2. MARIO GORENSTEIN (PLEASE PROTECT), PRESIDENT OF DAIA (THE UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION OF THE ARGENTINE JEWISH COMMUNITY), TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER JUNE 26 THAT HE AND OTHER JEWISH LEADERS HAVE BEEN TOLD BY GOA "AUTHORITIES" THAT TIMERMAN'S ATTACKS ON ARGENTINA COULD PRODUCE ANTI-SEMITIC VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA. GORENSTEIN SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER CAMILION TOLD HIM THAT WITH TIMERMAN SO EFFECTIVELY ATTACKING ARGENTINA'S REPUTATION, ANTI-SEMITIC ELEMENTS IN ARGENTINA ARE INCREASINGLY LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE ARGUMENT -- PRESUMABLY FROM GOA MODERATES -- THAT ANTI-SEMITIC ACTS WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE ARGENTINA'S IMAGE ABROAD. GORENSTEIN SAID THAT HE WAS PRETTY SURE THAT CAMILION'S ADVICE WAS INTENDED AS FRIENDLY, GIVEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS. HOWEVER, HE ADDED, OTHER JEWISH LEADERS HAVE RECEIVED A SIMILAR MESSAGE FROM GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THAT WAS DELIVERED IN A MANNER THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A KIND OF BLACKMAIL. (GORENSTEIN, WITHOUT NAMING THE GOA SOURCES, DESCRIBED THIS SITUATION TO VISITING

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

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3. COMMENT. WHETHER BLACKMAIL OR FRIENDLY ADVICE, GORENSTEIN SAYS HE IS CONCERNED. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ASSESS THE DEGREE OF DANGER. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME IN THE GOA MAY WANT TO ENLIST THE JEWISH LEADERSHIP IN AN EFFORT TO GET TIMERMANN TO HALT HIS ATTACKS. BUT ANTI-SEMITIC GROUPS AND ATTITUDES ARE A FACT OF LIFE HERE. VIOLA AND HIS FELLOW MODERATES HAVE DOMINATED THE HARDLINE, ANTI-SEMITIC ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY, BUT THEY MUST CO-EXIST WITH THEM. THE RECENT SPATE OF THREATS TO HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS, THE ATTACK ON COMMUNIST MANFRED SHOENFELD AND THE BRIEF ARREST THIS WEEK OF ABOUT 60 LEFT-OF-CENTER POLITICIANS ATTENDING A POLITICAL MEETING ARE WIDELY AND PROBABLY CORRECTLY RETARDED AS THE WORK OF GROUPS OPERATING UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HIGHLY PLACED HARDLINERS. AN EDITORIAL IN "LA NACION" AND AN ADVISOR OF VIOLA BOTH USED THE SAME WORDS TO DESCRIBE THE MEN TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTS: "GROUPS WHICH OPERATE WITH IMPUNITY."

4. FOR SOME TIME WE HAVE BEEN STRUCK THAT JEWISH TARGETS HAVE NOT BEEN ATTACKED OR THREATENED, DESPITE WHAT FAR RIGHT ELEMENTS HERE REGARD AS TIMERMANN'S "PROVOCATIONS." WE BELIEVE THE GOA MODERATES HAVE PROBABLY MADE AN EFFORT TO RESTRAIN THE POTENTIAL ATTACKERS, USING THE ARGUMENT THAT CAMILION MENTIONED TO GORENSTEIN. THAT RESTRAINT MAY NOW BE WEARING OFF AS TIMERMANN CONTINUES TO SALLY FORTH.

5. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THE BEST COURSE FOR NOW IS TO REINFORCE THE MODERATES' WILL TO RESTRRAIN THEIR HARDLINE ASSOCIATES. WE SUGGEST THAT A DEMARCHE ON THIS SUBJECT BE MADE BOTH HERE AND IN WASHINGTON -- WITH CARE TAKEN NOT TO EXPOSE GORENSTEIN OR THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AS THE SOURCE OF OUR INFORMATION OR CONCERNS. SEE ALSO SEPTEL ON FOREIGN MINISTER CAMILION'S DISCUSSION WITH CHARLES RUSER.

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1. The Argentine army maintains a counterterrorism capability in the greater Buenos Aires area. This capability consists of two ranger-type companies trained to react to terrorist incidents, as of mid-February 1985.

2. Early in the administration of President Raúl Alfonsín, Minister of Interior Antonio (Toreco) created a special 300-man unit in the Argentine federal police (PFA), a subordinate organization to the Ministry of Interior which has the mission of reacting to terrorist problems anywhere in Argentina. This unit carried out three training exercises in 1984. The PFA unit has no liaison with the army ranger-type companies; the only form of liaison that exists between the PFA and the army on counterterrorism matters takes place at the Ministry of Interior—Ministry of Defense level. In the barracks and concern itself only with conventional warfare and not with subversion or terrorism. It also believe that a fear, or a "paranoia" as they call it, that the Army could revert to the kinds of activities which it carried out during the counterinsurgency campaign of the 1970's if given other than pure national defense responsibilities led to the creation of the Argentine federal police counterterrorism unit.

Argentine
A farm which is located in Buenos Aires Province an estimated thirty to forty kilometers in an as yet unknown direction from Buenos Aires City, in several groups in enclosed trucks. Army intelligence personnel are trying to locate the farm, and they are using helicopters in this effort.)

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SUBJ: TRAINING GIVEN TO MEMBERS OF THE LEFTIST "MONTONERO" MOVEMENT IN REGARD TO THE TAKING OVER OF BUILDINGS

TEXT:

1. Sixty members of the leftist "Montonero" movement received a full day of training on procedures to take over -- that is, to seize -- factories, banks, and public buildings. Additionally, the "Montoneros" received training in the use of arms and explosives in carrying out these kinds of takeovers. They also had instruction on the way to deal with factory workers and bank and government employees encountered in these activities. Finally, the "Montoneros" were given guidance on the use of hostages and on negotiating with the government.

2. [Redacted] The "Montoneros" who received the training described above had arrived at the training site,
ARGENTINA: TRIAL OF FORMER PRESIDENTS BEGINS

//THE TRIAL OF NINE FORMER MILITARY JUNTA MEMBERS THAT BEGINS TODAY BEFORE A CIVILIAN COURT WILL RAISE POLITICAL TENSIONS AND AGGRAVATE THE GOVERNMENT'S UNEASY RELATIONS WITH THE ARMED FORCES.//

//THE JUNTA LEADERS--INCLUDING THREE EX-PRESIDENTS WHO RULED FROM 1976 TO 1983--ARE CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED DURING THE "DIRTY WAR" AGAINST TERRORISM. RETIRED AND ACTIVE-DUTY OFFICERS FEAR THE TRIAL WILL TURN INTO AN INDISCRIMINATE ATTACK ON THE ARMED FORCES AND SET THE STAGE FOR PROSECUTING SUBORDINATE OFFICERS WHO, IN THE MILITARY'S VIEW, WERE ONLY OBEYING ORDERS. PROMINENT CIVILIAN POLITICIANS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MILITARY ARE FANNING THESE FEARS BY ACCUSING THE GOVERNMENT OF TRYING TO ISOLATE AND PENALIZE THE ARMED FORCES AS A WHOLE.//

//THE FEAR ALSO HOPES TO USE THE TRIAL FOR ITS OWN PURPOSES. SEVERAL EXTREMIST GROUPS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS PLAN TO DEMONSTRATE AT THE COURTHOUSE TO ANGER THE ARMED FORCES AND INFLAME THE PUBLIC BY FORCING THE GOVERNMENT TO DISPERSE THE PROTESTERS VIOLENTLY.//

CONTENT: //THE TRIAL WILL PRODUCE A STREAM OF BAD PUBLICITY

1. ARGENTINA: TRIAL OF FORMER PRESIDENTS BEGINS

DEPT OF STATE FOR SESTATE AID; USUN NEW YORK FOR POLAD; DIA FOR LA; CINCINCEUR FOR POLAD; USUCINCSO GHTS PANAMA FOR POLAD; AIR UNIVERSITY FOR STAF REP AND CIA REP; NAVY VAR COLLEGE FOR STATE DEPT REP; TREASURY DEPT ATTN HRS BECK 9045; COMUSARMY FT HEAD FOR SPECIAL RESEARCH DET; COMDT COASTGUARD FOR POLAD; HQ SNA FOR TACOPS/1901; HGS DSA FOR CIS; BERGSTRÖM AFB TEC FOR 67 TAC/IN; NPIC FOR PB CABLES; CINCUSAFE FOR INMC XPH; HQ MAC SCOTT AFB IL FOR INZ; CDR ITAC FOR GIPD; 24 COMP WING ROYAL AFB IN 1R; RAF BARKSDALE AFB LA/INZ; 26AD LIRE AFB ARIZ/INZ; 92BW FAIRCHILD AFB WA/IN; 12 TAC BERGSTRÖM AFB FOR INL; 15S ATTN POINT, 9TH AFB GRAN AD/INJ; CENTCOM MADILL AFB FL//J/7; NS REDCOM/J/3.


FROM: DOJ/OCAS.

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1. ARGENTINA: TRIAL OF FORMER PRESIDENTS BEGINS

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ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE MILITARY THAT WILL STAIN PRESIDENT ALFONSIÓN'S ALREADY POOR RELATIONS WITH THE SERVICES. IF THE PROCEEDINGS DEGENERATE INTO AN ANTI-MILITARY DIATRIBE, SOME OFFICERS MAY CONSIDER MOVING AGAINST ALFONSIÓN WITH EITHER A COUP OR MORE LIKELY—BACKSTAGE POLITICAL MANEUVERING. //

//TO MITIGATE THESE DANGERS, ALFONSIÓN PROBABLY WILL URGE THE COURT TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF THE TRIAL AND TO DAMPEN INFLAMMATORY Rhetoric. The government has already pledged not to prosecute the officers who actually fought the "Dirty War," and it is contemplating an amnesty that would cover both leftists and rightists. Such a move will come only after the junta members have been convicted, however, thereby preserving at least some of Alfonso's standing with the left and the human rights movement. //

2. GUATEMALA: CHALLENGES AHEAD

//OPPOSITION BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO ECONOMIC REFORMS HAS SEVERELY DAMAGED CHIEF OF STATE MEJÍA'S REPUTATION, AND HIS DESTRUCTORS ARE TRYING TO EXPLOIT HIS WEAKENED POSITION. //

//MEJÍA HAS REPEALED THE UNPOPULAR TAX MEASURES BUT THUS FAR REFUSES TO COMPLY WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR'S DEMANDS TO REMOVE ECONOMY MINISTER HERNÁNDEZ AND OTHER OFFICIALS. THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY HAS THREATENED TO CALL A GENERAL STRIKE UNLESS BOTH DEMANDS ARE MET, BUT US EMBASSY REPORTING INDICATES THAT ITS LEADERSHIP MAY BE DIVIDED OVER THIS ISSUE. HERNÁNDEZ, MEANWHILE, HAS INDICATED HE MAY ACCEPT A JOB WITH AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. //

//SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS REPORTEDLY ALSO WANT MEJÍA TO REMOVE HERNÁNDEZ AND OTHER KEY ADVISERS, INCLUDING FOREIGN MINISTER ANDRADE. //////////////// THAT JUNIOR OFFICERS REGARD BOTH AS LEFTISTS. THE OFFICER CORPS, HOWEVER, CONTENDS THAT IT REMAINS LOYAL TO MEJÍA. //

//LEADERS OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES RECENTLY MET WITH MEJÍA TO DISCUSS ADVANCING THE DATE FOR NATIONAL ELECTIONS, NOW SCHEDULED FOR 23 OCTOBER. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS ARE DEMANDING THAT THE VOTE BE MOVED UP TO JULY AND THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT BE INSTALLED IN SEPTEMBER. //

COMMENT: //MEJÍA'S REPEAL OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS APPEARS TO HAVE TEMPORARILY PEACEFUL MOST BUSINESS LEADERS. THE PRIVATE SECTOR'S APPARENT INABILITY TO AGREE ON THE STRIKE ISSUE SUGGESTS THAT ITS LEADERS MAY BE LESS INTRANSIGENT IN FUTURE TALKS WITH THE FT
Several senior army officers brought pressure to bear on Brigadier General (BG) Hector Rios Erenu, Chief of the Edge, in the latter part of March and the first part of April 1985 to establish some type of an organization to defend the prestige of the army and that of Army officers who would face civilian court trials because of excesses allegedly committed during the countersubversive campaign of the 1970s. The officers putting the greatest pressure on Rios Erenu included BG Ignacio Anibal (Verduzca), Commander of III Corps; BG Jorge Pedro (Ollagamba), Deputy commander of V Corps; and BG Ernesto Arturo (Inlais), Sub inspector for training and assigned to the army of Argentina.

2. Agreed to form a “crisis cabinet,” as the edge colonel called it, in the army general staff. this group has the role of attempting to deal with what the senior army officers see as the worsening situation of their service. the “crisis cabinet” consisted of Rios Erenu; BG Mario (Sanchez), Deputy Chief of the edge; Colonel (Col.) Roberto (Boccalardino), Secretary General of the Army who has given the role of the group’s Secretary; BG Enrique Braillo (Olea), chief of the intelligence G-2) section of the edge; BG Leopoldo Hector (Flores), chief of the operations G-3) section of the edge; Col. Luis (Cordoba), Member of the edge Secretariat General; Col. Arturo Ricardo (Palmeri), chief of social communication for the edge; and Col’s Pascual (Buqueri) and Roberto Ricardo (Campos), the chief and deputy chief, respectively, of the army commission for institutional affairs.

3. In a 2 April meeting, members of this army “crisis cabinet” decided that they would work up and carry out a general strategy of trying to influence President Raul (Alfonso) and the national congress to make decisions favorable to the army. They also decided to set up a tactical operations command (comando de operaciones tacticas - cot) to handle tasks outside the scope of their general strategy. They established the following subgroups in the cot:

- A. Operational Elements - headed by Guerrieri. These elements have the mission of carrying out what the “crisis cabinet” calls “special activities” to bring pressure to bear on the administration.

- B. Political Elements - headed by Cordoba.

- C. Psychological Action Element - headed by Palmeri. This element has the mission of using the media and other resources to place the army in the best light possible.

4. On 8 April, the army “crisis cabinet” met again, and Rios Erenu announced he had learned that civilian administration of-
The next few months, the serious problems faced by the administration and by the country would cause the revision of many things. The chief of the ENGE had elaborated on, or had given examples of, the "many things" which he mentioned.

7. Also in the meeting, Rios Ereu was asked by Flores that the COT be reestablished secretly. After some discussion, the chief of the ENGE agreed to reestablish the COT without the knowledge of the Alfonsin administration. As a result of the discussion at the 12 April meeting, Rios Ereu apparently opted to join with those army officers who want to take a stronger position against the administration.

8. The participants in the meeting circulated among themselves a list of seven actions which the operational elements of the COT would carry out. These actions include attacks on targets such as the headquarters of leftist political parties and human rights organizations. Rios Ereu said he disassociated himself from any knowledge of these planned attacks.

9. As of mid-April, a good bit of maneuvering apparently is going on between Rios Ereu and most of the other important army general officers (all brigadier generals), including Verdera, Naldo (IASSO) head of the logistics command, Jose Dante (Carabbi), Commander of V Corps, and Flores. Supposedly, the army's major commanders believe that the low pay of army personnel and planned cuts in the service's already low budget, combined with the tension which they expect the trial of the former junta members to produce, will lead to Rios Ereu's downfall and to his replacement as chief of the ENGE before the end of 1985. Rios Ereu has shown himself very skillful, however, in avoiding meetings with major commanders which could weaken his position. As a way of protecting his position, Rios Ereu has recommended to Secretary of Defense Jose Horacio (Jaunarena), the second-ranking MOD official, that the administration should contribute to the stability of the FFAA's leadership. He has made the point to Jaunarena that frequent changes of the army's leaders would only bring closer to power those officers who are most critical of the Alfonsin administration.

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REPORT CLASS SECRET

DIST: 10 MAY 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA


2. SUAREZ VENT ON TO SAY HE BELIEVES THAT THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION MUST PROCEED CAREFULLY IN ESTABLISHING CONTACTS WITH THE PFA, IN ORDER THAT THE BATTALION CAN BE CERTAIN THAT THE OFFICIALS WITH WHOM IT CHOOSES TO COOPERATE ARE DISCREET AND TRUSTWORTHY. BASED ON SUAREZ' LATTER REMARK, THE BATTALION OBTAINED A LIST BY NAME AND POSITION OF HIGH-LEVEL PFA OFFICIALS IN ORDER TO REVIEW IT AND TO CONDUCT CHECKS THAT WOULD ENABLE IT TO IDENTIFY THE PFA OFFICERS WHO WOULD BE THE MOST APPROPRIATE CONTACTS.
1. On 23 October 1985 Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín commented that Argentine Foreign Minister Dante (Caputo) was the driving force behind the President's decision to arrest military officers and civilians for involvement in recent bombing incidents.

That for two weeks before the arrests took place, Caputo continually urged the President to take strong steps against the suspected perpetrators of the bombing incidents. Caputo, however, stressed to the President that it was essential that he take strong actions, in the form of arrests, in order to show that the government would not stand for this type of activity.
TEXT: LATE IN THE WEEK OF 20 OCTOBER 1985 A

EFFORTS BY THE ADMINISTRATION TO DETAIN SIX ACTIVE DUTY AND RETIRED ARMY OFFICERS, THE ARMY SHOULD FOLLOW THE ARGETINE CONSTITUTION AND SHOULD PUT TO REST ANY THINKING WITHIN THE SERVICE CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF CARRYING OUT A COUP D'ETAT. THE ARMY HAS BEEN UNFAVORABLY HUMILIATED IN RECENT MONTHS AND THAT IF THE INSTITUTION IS "BACKED FURTHER INTO A CORNER," IT MAY PERCEIVE THAT IT HAS NO OTHER OPTION BUT TO STRIKE BACK. THE ARMY OFFICERS SAID INDEPENDENTLY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD
REPORT CLASS

DIST: 30 OCTOBER 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA
SUBJECT: CLAIM THAT ARMY INTELLIGENCE HAS INFORMATION LINKING THE CIVILIAN STATE INTELLIGENCE SECRETARIAT TO RECENT BOMBINGS AND BOMB THREATS
DOI: LATE OCTOBER 1985

TEXT: 1. ACCORDING TO LATE OCTOBER 1985, THE SECTION CALLS A SERIOUS INVESTIGATION OF RECENT BOMBING INCIDENTS IN ORDER TO FIND OUT WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM. THE G-2 SECTION CLAIMS IT HAS INFORMATION LINKING BOMB THREATS AGAINST SCHOOLS TO AT LEAST TWO TELEPHONE LINES OF THE CIVILIAN STATE INTELLIGENCE SECRETARIAT (SIDE). G-2 OFFICERS SAY THAT THEY TOOK THIS INFORMATION TO MINISTER OF DEFENSE SOQUE (CARRANZA), BUT HE REACTED IN AN EXTREMELY ANGRY AND EMOTIONAL
1. EN.DD - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DEPARTMENT IS RECEIVING OUR REPORTS THAT ELEMENTS OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY MAY BE CONTEMPLATING ARMED ACTION AGAINST THE ALFONSIÑ GOVERNMENT. THE SURREAL ASPECT OF INCOMPREHENSIBLE ARMED ACTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE FOLLOWING LIGHT. ARGENTINA IS ONLY FOUR DAYS AWAY FROM GENERAL ELECTIONS FOR CONGRESS AND LOCAL OFFICES. THE OVERWHELMING CONSENSUS IS THAT ALFONSIÑ'S PARTY WILL BE STRONGER AFTER THE ELECTIONS WHICH WILL BE SEEN AS A PLEBISCITE ON ALFONSIÑ. WITH ALFONSIÑ AND HIS PARTY STRENGTHENED THE HARD LINE MILITARY SEE THEIR FUTURE IN BLEAKER TERMS. CURRENTLY THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO LIVE WITH DEEP SALARY AND OPERATING FUND CUTS. THE TRIALS OF NINE FORMER MILITARY JUNTA LEADERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CRIMES ARE ENDING. MOST, IF NOT ALL, WILL BE GIVEN PRISON TERMS. HUNDREDS OF OTHER MILITARY OFFICERS ARE FEARFUL THAT THEY ALSO WILL BE PUT ON TRIAL AND SUBJECT TO PUNISHMENT. THE BUMBLING AND REPEATED ARRESTS, COURT RELEASES AND RE-ARRESTS OF ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS AND THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF SEIGE APPARENTLY AIMED AT THE MILITARY HAS BROUGHT REACTIONS BY MANY MILITARY OFFICERS TO A FEVER PITCH. DEVELOPMENTS DESCRIBED ABOVE ARE INTERPRETED BY MANY MILITARY, AIDED AND ABETTED BY RETIRED OFFICERS AND SOME CIVILIANS, AS DEFILING THE ARMY'S HONOR. TO LARGE NUMBERS OF OFFICERS "HONOR" OFTEN TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER COMMON SENSE. THEREFORE THERE EXISTS AN INCREDIBLE POSSIBILITY THAT A SMALL GROUP MAY DECIDE TO TAKE UP ARMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF ARGENTINES WOULD REACT VERY STRONGLY AGAINST SUCH AN ATTEMPT. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT CAN COUNT ON ANY SIGNIFICANT ARMED UNITS TO DEFEND HIS ADMINISTRATION EVEN AGAINST A SMALL BAND OF ZEALOTS BECAUSE OF THE
GENERALIZED STATE OF REJECTION OF AND ANGER AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES AND POLICE WHO ALSO ARE ON SHORT RATIONS. THUS ANY SERIOUS MILITARY ACTION, EVEN IF IT WERE A DESPERATE LAST-DITCH ACTION BY A SMALL BAND OF CRAZED FANATICS COULD RESULT IN INCALCULABLE DAMAGE TO ARGENTINA JUST AT THE TIME WHEN THINGS HERE SEEMED TO BE WORKING OUT.

3. TRADITIONALLY COUPS IN ARGENTINA HAVE MAJORITY POPULAR SUPPORT WITH A POPULAR MANDATE OF SORTS FOR SPECIFIC CHANGES. WE NOW FACE THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF COUP -- TO PROTECT THE MILITARY AS AN INSTITUTION AND PARTICULARLY THE LIFESTYLES OF ITS OFFICERS. THERE IS NO ECONOMIC, SOCIAL OR POLITICAL PROGRAM FAVORED BY THE MILITARY THAT MIGHT TAKE OVER ALTHOUGH THEY MAY FIND CIVILIAN ALLIES AMONG EXTREME CONSERVATIVES AND SOME LABOR LEADERS WHO HAVE LONG SEEN THE MILITARY, NOT THE BALLOT BOX, AS THEIR ROAD TO POWER. THE CURRENT ECONOMIC PROGRAM WITH ITS SHARPLY INCREASED TAXES AND FORCED SAVINGS IS SEEN AS A DIRE THREAT BY SOME OF THESE BUSINESS INTERESTS.

4. DURING THE PAST 48 HOURS I MET FOR FRANK SESSIONS WITH THE FOUR KEY CIVILIANS, THE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN MINISTER, DEFENSE MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENCY. IN EACH CASE I ASSURED THEM OF OUR SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY AND URGED A LEVEL-HEADED APPROACH. THEY COMPLAINED THAT THEY HAVE NO INTELLIGENCE ON THE DOMESTIC SITUATION AND ASKED FOR OUR HELP. I TOLD THEM WE WOULD PROVIDE ANY INDICATION WE PICKED UP OF WHAT SEEMED TO US TO BE SERIOUS THREATS TO DEMOCRACY. LAST NIGHT JUST BEFORE HIS MEETING WITH THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND WE PROVIDED THE PRESIDENT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE UNCORROBORATED REPORTS INDICATING SOMETHING MIGHT BE AFOOT.

5. SOME, APPARENTLY INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT OF URUGUAY, BELIEVE THAT THE RADICALS STARTED THIS WHOLE SCENARIO THEMSELVES AS AN ELECTION PLOY. CAPUTO AND ALFONSIÑ REPORTEDLY TOLD THE URUGUAYANS THAT THE INFORMATION ON WHICH THEY ACTED CAME FROM US, AND EVEN INVOLVED URUGUAYAN MILITARY COOPERATION. HOWEVER THIS SITUATION MAY HAVE STARTED, THE GOVERNMENT CLEARLY HAS DUG ITS HOLE DEEPER AND IT WILL REQUIRE GOOD MANAGEMENT AND SOME CONCESSIONS TO THE MILITARY TO AVOID A SITUATION NOW -- OR ONE BUILDING -- WHICH WILL BRING NEW VIOLENCE. BT
6. We shall continue to report these inexplicable
and lamentable developments as they occur. With the
Department's guidance we shall continue to take the
most effective steps open to us -- our influence
over the military is limited -- to help assure
Argentina's tender democracy survives this latest
in a long series of tests. Ortiz
ROUTINE
DEPARTMENT #226 3011344
R 3183164 OCT 85

DIST: ARGENTINA/CUBA
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA/CUBA

SUBJ: REQUEST BY MARIO EDUARDO FIRMENICH, LEADER OF THE
LEFTIST ARGENTINE "MONTONERO" MOVEMENT, THAT CUBAN
PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO RUIZ HELP WITH RESOLVING
INTERNAL MOVEMENT PROBLEMS

DATE: MID-OCTOBER 1985

TEXT: 1.

AROUND SENIOR MOVEMENT LEADERS HAD REACHED A CRITICAL POINT. HE
POINTED OUT THAT AS A RESULT, DEPARTED "MONTONERO" LEADER
MARIO EDUARDO (FIRMENICH) SOUGHT CUBAN ASSISTANCE IN RESOLVING
THE MOVEMENT'S DIVISIONS. HE NOTED THAT FIRMENICH HAD SENT A
LETTER TO CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL (CASTRO) RUIZ IN WHICH HE ASKED

THE CUBAN LEADER TO USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH KEY "MONTONERO" FIGURES
ROBERTO CIRILO (PERDIA) AND FERDANDO HARVAJA TO
CONVINCE THEM TO SUBMIT TO FIRMENICH'S DIRECTION OF THE
MOVEMENT. THE "MONTONERO" ADDED THAT FIRMENICH HAD COMPLAINED
IN HIS LETTER TO CASTRO THAT THE DEDICATION OF PERDIA AND VACA
HARVAJA TO THE PRINCIPLES OF REVOLUTION IS IMPERILING THE
POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE "MONTONEROS."
That the officers in question could be removed by means of "retirement" from active duty, rather than by means of a potentially traumatic dismissal.

2. President Alfonsin stressed to the four senior officers that he is personally committed to seeking an end to the trials of FFAA officers on charges related to human rights abuses during the war against subversion. He noted, though, that the senior officers must be reminded that in addition to serving as president, he is a politician and therefore cannot address the question of trials until after the 3 November off-year elections.

The executive office regarding the activities of anti-government groups in the services. Alfonsin then made the point that given the current situation, he felt it appropriate to order the chiefs of staffs of each service to take the necessary steps to remove officers involved in anti-government activities in the most expedient manner possible. He added however that he wanted this done calmly and quietly, and that he saw no need for undue haste or for the creation of "trauma." He suggested
SUBJ: BELIEF IN THE ARGENTINE AIR FORCE THAT "SECTORS" OF THE ARMY ARE INVOLVED IN PLANS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

TO: HPIC
DEPT OF STATE
DIA
TREasury DEPT
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF
INLCUDE DTS REMARKS

DISTR: 31 October 1985
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

TEXT:

1. THE AIR FORCE IS CONVINCED THAT "SECTORS" IN THE ARGENTINE ARMY ARE INVOLVED IN PLANNING ACTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. HE CLAIMED HE COULD PERSONALLY CONFIRM THAT THIS ACTIVITY IS GOING ON BECAUSE HE HAD RECEIVED AN INVITATION--WHICH HE DECLINED--FROM AN ACTIVE DUTY ARMY COLONEL, WHOSE ID HE DID NOT IDENTIFY, TO ATTEND MEETINGS HELD TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE ACTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

2. ACCORDING TO THE OFFICER, THE FAAA GENERAL STAFF HAS INFORMATION INDICATING THAT HIGH-LEVEL ARMY OFFICERS ARE INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DISCUSSIONS. HE POINTED OUT THAT IN THIS REGARD, THE NAMES OF THE FOLLOWING ARMY BRIGADIER GENERALS HAVE APPEARED IN THE INFORMATION RECEIVED BY THE AIR FORCE: MARIO JAIME (GAUCHET), DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF; LEOPOLDO NECTOR (FLORES), CHIEF OF OPERATIONS (6-3) OF THE ENDE; JUSTO (ROJASI) ALCORTA,
A PLAN FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNING RADICAL CIVIC UNION FOR THE 3 NOVEMBER ELECTIONS

SUMMARY: A DOCUMENT PRESENTS A PLAN FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE GOVERNING RADICAL CIVIC UNION FOR THE 3 NOVEMBER ELECTIONS.
SHOULD AN OPPORTUNITY ARISE, PRESIDENT ALFONSIÑ SHOULD CHARGE AT SOME POINT BETWEEN 19 AND 22 OCTOBER THAT THERE EXISTS THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ÉTAT. THE IDEAL SITUATION FOR THIS ACTION COULD BE SOME UNUSUAL ACTIVITY WITHIN THE ARMY OR THE NAVY. IF SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE, AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD CONSIST IN RAISING THE PERCEPTION THAT AN ANTI-DEMOCRATIC GROUP EXISTS, BY SETTING OFF A NUMBER OF BOMBS IN ONE NIGHT AT OFFICES OF THE UCR, OF LEFTIST POLITICAL PARTIES, OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, AND OF OTHER LIBERAL ORGANIZATIONS.

B. OBLIGATORY MILITARY SERVICE. THE PLAN SAYS THE UCR SHOULD ADVOCATE FEWER CONSCRIPTS AND SHORTER TERMS OF SERVICE.

C. THE ATOMICIZATION OF THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORATE. IN SUPPORT OF THIS THEME, THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DOCUMENT INCLUDE GIVING THE APPEARANCE THAT INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF PERONISM ARE EXACERBATING.

D. THE DEFENSE LAW. THE DOCUMENT RECOMMENDS THAT THE UCR POINT OUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED DEFENSE LAW WOULD DO AWAY WITH THE "DOCTRINE OF NATIONAL SECURITY," UNDER WHICH THE PRECEDING MILITARY GOVERNMENT OPERATED. IT ADDS THAT THE CAMPAIGN COULD PICTURIZE PERONIST OPPOSITION TO THE ADMINISTRATION-SPONSORED LAW AS SUPPORT FOR THE "DOCTRINE OF NATIONAL SECURITY."

E. THE LABOR MILITARY PACT. THE DOCUMENT RECOMMENDS THAT THE PARTY CONTINUE WITH THIS THEME WHICH PRESIDENT ALFONSIÑ USED IN THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE 1983 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

Page 1 of 3

Approved for Public Release
8 December 2016

The document lists four steps for an election campaign: preparatory, "accusations," exploitation, and the elections themselves. It says that the purpose of the preparatory phase consists of:

A. Preparing the electoral climate by generating a sense of confusion, especially by bringing about confusion in perjury and in the various electoral fronts; and,

B. To generate a climate of insecurity and to identify persons connected with bringing about this situation as supporters of the overthrow of the government, while creating an image of the president as the guarantor of constitutional continuity. The document recommends that the establishment in the preparatory phase of action groups of the coordinadora (GAC) and of propaganda groups of the coordinadora (GPC) which would operate under the exclusive control of the "secretary general" in coordination with the state intelligence secretariat (SIP), and the public information secretariat (DSP), and government ministers or secretaries. It points out that the GAC and the GPC would be autonomous and would be at the exclusive service of the electoral campaign strategy. It adds that these two groups should operate in such a manner and with sufficient protection that they cannot be detained or identified, and it also says that the actions carried out by these groups should be followed immediately by a public information campaign which would draw public repudiation of those to whom the actions would be attributed.

4. In regard to the "accusations" stage, the document says that the purpose of this stage consists in identifying the enemies of democracy. It notes that these enemies could be "fascist Peronist," business, the rightist union of the democratic center (UCR) and, extreme left. It adds that these enemies would be identified with those favoring a coup d'etat.

5. According to the document, a UCR campaign could create in the exploitation stage the impression that Alfonsin needs majorities in the legislatures in order to stop a wave of destabilization brought about by rightist plotters. In this stage the GAC could carry out attacks on national- and provincial-level legislators, on the facilities of public services and of the police, and on radio and television stations and newspapers and magazines. For their part the GAC could make threats against public figures, newspaper directors of schools, UCR candidates, human rights organizations, and judges.

6. The document points out that the purpose of the election stage is to assure that the UCR receives between 48 and 52 percent of the vote or, if the elections are not favorable to the party, to minimize its losses. It says that for those provinces and municipalities in which the UCR may not do well, preparations should be made to levels charges of fraud and of irregularities.

8. THAT THE DOCUMENT DISCUSSED ABOVE IS CIRCULATING AMONG OFFICERS OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF (EMGE). EMGE OFFICERS ARE DIVIDED IN THEIR OPINIONS OF THE DOCUMENT, WITH SOME BELIEVING IT IS AUTHENTIC AND OTHERS BELIEVING THAT IT IS A FORGERY.)
TEXT: 1. In late October 1985, President Raúl Alfonsín (Alfonsín) had not intended or wanted the 25 October declaration of a state of siege and had been infuriated with officials who took the initiative to make the move necessary. Alfonsín was by nature highly impulsive and had felt that his administration should be seen to be taking some action in the light of the recent wave of bombings. The 21 October detention of six military men and six civilians as right-wing conspirators had been the chosen response and the state of siege had subsequently been required to cover up errors and legal transgressions in the government's case. Alfonsín was particularly concerned about the spate of bomb threats made to schools because his grandchildren attended one of the establishments affected.

2. As far as the dozen arrestees were concerned, the authorities were exerting maximum pressure to bring into line the judges who were dealing with related habeas corpus submissions. The accusations against those detained rested upon the product from telephone tapping, when the harsh expressions of opinions was open to exaggerated interpretation. This was evident with regard to Col. Pascual (Guerrieri), who had been involved, at the behest of army chief of staff Col. Hector (Rosso) Erenu, in the arrangements for the defense of the former Juana members, currently on trial for human rights violations during counterterrorist operations. Guerrieri could consequently have made some outspoken remarks, but he did not appear to be directly linked to any right-wing coup plots.

Although he had last year organized the raid on the Rosario Courthouse, in which incriminating "dirty war" documents had been stolen, he had done so with the knowledge and approval of the then defense minister, Raúl (Borrañes). Chaos continued to reign in the Argentine intelligence community, an independent security service set up by the radicals who recently received a bomb threat in a telephone call traced back to the headquarters of the 1st Battalion army intelligence. The authorities also suspected that unfavorable intelligence reports had been assembled about the sexual and commercial dealings of prominent radical electoral candidates such as Leopoldo (Horeau) and Marcelo (Guberti), and that these were being leaked to the press.

3. Apart from the telephone intercepts, the authorities had no hard evidence against the detainees. The government had, however, drawn up a further list of some 48 supposed subversives who had a reputation for right-wing nationalism. These included about 30 serving or retired armed forces officers, one or two journalists, and quite mistakenly, certain figures whose political inclinations should not be called into question.

4. In view of the problems resulting from the first detentions, it was unlikely that the government would act on the basis of this catalogue, but a campaign of character assassination was to be expected, in order to reinforce the idea that the administration had earlier been justified in taking drastic steps. In that respect, the former nationalist/fascist leader, Guillermo Patricio (Kelly), would...
PLAY A PART, SINCE HE HAD PUBLISHED A LIST OF ABOUT 40 ALLEGED CONSPIRATORS. SOME OF THESE, SUCH AS THE LAWYERS JAIME (SMART), RETIRED COL. OSVALDO (RIVE/RID) AND CARLOS (ACUNA), WERE ALSO MARKED DOWN BY THE GOVERNMENT.

5. THE ISSUE OF THE DETECTIONS AND THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF SIEGE HAD BEEN HANDLED PRIMARILY BY CARLOS (ALCONADA) ARAMBURU, MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND JUSTICE;
PAY THE PRICE FOR HIS BUNGLING AND WOULD BE REPLACED BY NATIONAL DEPUTY JORGE ( IVANOSI) IN THE NEAR FUTURE. MEANWHILE, GEN. RIOS ERENU HAD BEEN PLACED IN A PAINFULLY DIFFICULT POSITION FOLLOWING THE ARREST OF ARMY PERSONNEL AMONG THE SUPPOSED CONSPIRATORS, AND HAD PRESENTED HIS RESIGNATION ON 25 OCTOBER. THE GOVERNMENT HAD URGED HIM TO DELAY HIS DEPARTURE UNTIL AFTER THE 3 NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, SINCE THEY COULD NOT AFFORD A CHANGEOVER AT SUCH A CRITICAL TIME AND, ANYWAY, HAD NO OBVIOUS CANDIDATE TO SUCCEED HIM.
Argentina: Grappling With Intelligence Reform

When President Alfonsin took office in December 1983 he inherited a chaotic intelligence apparatus whose mission and mind-set was out of step with Argentina's new democratic system. The President soon made clear in public statements that he had little confidence in these services and would make intelligence reform a priority. Alfonsin began several reforms, but military resistance to change and a lack of capable intelligence officials loyal to the government have hampered these initiatives. Moreover, a string of scandals has raised charges of corruption and incompetence and reinforced the public's conviction that Alfonsin does not fully control the intelligence services. The President is now trying to reorganize the intelligence community and has proposed legislation that would severely restrict the military's autonomy. We believe, however, that military intrasigence and civilian weakness will frustrate efforts at change and that the military intelligence services in all likelihood will continue to serve their own interests—rather than those of the elected government—for the remainder of Alfonsin's term.

A Tarnished Image

Argentina's many intelligence services (see inset) enjoyed favored status under the 1976-83 military government. According to academic and press accounts, the services operated virtually independently of the military junta, seldom coordinated their activities or shared information, and frequently tried to discredit and sabotage one another. Testimony from ongoing military trials indicates that all the services committed human rights abuses during the "dirty war" against terrorism, and heavy press coverage of the court proceedings has reinforced the public's negative opinion of the intelligence community.

Civilian Services. Alfonsin announced publicly early in his administration that cleanup of the intelligence services would be high on his agenda. The President used charges that the civilian intelligence service, SIDE, had conducted illegal surveillance of Argentine legislators to justify a purge of all senior staff officers with military rank or who had been appointed during military rule. He replaced many key officials with loyalists from his own Radical Civic Union who would represent administration interests and implement reforms. These moves, in our view, enhanced Alfonsin's control over SIDE, but did so at the cost of the service's professionalism. Many career officers resented the appointment of inexperienced individuals to senior positions and resigned from the service.

We believe that these losses gutted SIDE's operational capability and left Alfonsin with no dependable, nonmilitary, source of intelligence. Alfonsin tried to fill this breach by organizing his own parallel intelligence organizations. He established extraofficial groups within the Ministries of Defense and the Interior that operated for roughly two years before being exposed in a scandal referred to by some Argentine political commentators as Alfonsin's "Watergate."

The case hit the Buenos Aires' headlines early this year when relatives of real estate magnate and kidnap victim Osvaldo Sivak alleged that elements within SIDE and the Federal Police had inadequately investigated his case and extorted ransom money from the family. Heavy press coverage forced Alfonsin to order an investigation that subsequently revealed the involvement of members of his parallel groups, according to the US Embassy. This evidence unleashed a deluge of criticism from the opposition; Congress demanded that Interior Minister Troccoli and then Defense Minister Lopez explain these events.
irregularities. The Embassy reports that Troccoli weathered the storm largely because of extensive support from Radical Party leaders, but that Lopez resigned to protest what he called the administration’s mishandling of the affair.

Other scandals have also damaged the civilian service’s reputation. A SIDE officer accused of involvement in the 1983 kidnapping of an Argentine magazine editor, for example, easily eluded law enforcement officials and escaped to Spain, according to US Embassy and press reports. Chagrined SIDE officials subsequently urged Alfonsin to negotiate his extradition with Madrid. The Embassy reports, however, that SIDE was unable to provide the evidence necessary to convict him when he returned to Buenos Aires, causing the courts to release him.

Finally, another case that is now unfolding in the Argentine press reveals that at least one of Alfonsin’s political appointees was a traitor. The SIDE officer, named to a post in Geneva in 1983, recently vanished; the government has accused him of selling SIDE codes to the British, according to the US Embassy. This scandal cast doubt on Alfonsin’s judgment and led to a round of public name calling among Radical Party officials. Former Defense Minister Lopez publicly denounced the head of SIDE for covering up the case, the SIDE chief blamed Lopez for appointing the accused, and both pointed the finger at Alfonsin.
Military Intelligence. Although overshadowed in the press by SIDE’s blunders, the military services have been implicated in several scandals, according to Embassy and defense attache reporting. In September 1985, a wave of terrorist bombings afflicted Argentina. The government—advised by SIDE that extremist elements within the military were trying to foment trouble prior to the November elections—arrested six active duty and retired officers for masterminding the violence. Although evidence against the alleged perpetrators was inconclusive and they were eventually released, they tended to substantiate SIDE’s contention that elements within military intelligence had engineered at least some of the bombings to give the impression that Alfonsin was not in complete control of the country.

There is other evidence of military intelligence’s uncertain loyalty to Alfonsin. In May of this year, police discovered a bomb along Alfonsin’s route to visit an Army headquarters in Cordoba. Press reports indicate that Army intelligence carried out a cursory investigation, after which military officials publicly implied that the incident was only a mildly dangerous...
prank. The Cordoba corps commander resigned rather than comply with the administration’s demands that he identify the perpetrators. The military then alleged that the bomb was the brainchild of Radical Party leaders who wanted to use the incident to justify a purge of the Cordoba corps—a longtime locus of antidemocratic activities. Several courts continue to investigate the case, but the US Embassy reports that, as with last year’s bombings, convictions are unlikely.

Democratizing the Intelligence Services
The Embassy reports that Alfonsin is extremely sensitive to public and Congressional criticism of the intelligence services. He has publicly acknowledged the need to coordinate and control intelligence activities to avoid future “operational disorders,” and

He is also promoting a National Defense bill—currently being debated in the Senate—aimed, in part, at defining the responsibilities of each service and establishing checks on their activities. The most controversial provision of the bill, in our view, gives civilian authorities sole responsibility for domestic intelligence activities and restricts the military services to foreign and strategic matters. In our view, Alfonsin hopes that this division of intelligence functions will limit the influence of any one service.

The proposed law addresses the issue of accountability by centralizing authority over the entire intelligence community in a single government agency, the National Intelligence Center (CNI). The head of the CNI—appointed by, and directly responsible to, the President—would coordinate all intelligence tasking, collection, and processing. The government has not yet determined the exact structure of the CNI.

The Military Response
We believe that the armed forces are the biggest obstacle to lasting reform of the intelligence community. The civilian intelligence agencies, in our view, are at present too weak and ineffective to take over the duties currently performed by the military services. Moreover, many midlevel SIDE and Federal Police officials would even welcome subordination to the military, hoping that it would restore some of their professionalism.

Military intelligence chiefs represent the administration’s attempts to alter their role and organization and oppose Alfonsin’s efforts to subordinate them to elected authorities. Most military officers have little respect for Alfonsin’s...
ARGENTINA: PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ORGANIZATION
AND COLLECTION RESPONSIBILITIES

civilian appointees, citing their lack of experience in
intelligence matters and the litany of errors they have
committed as evidence of their incompetence. More
fundamentally, the military—and especially its
intelligence branches—in our view, has pledged only
conditional loyalty to democratic rule. It remains
primarily concerned with protecting its institutional
interests and countering leftist influence, not with
protecting the still fragile Argentine constitutional
system. 

Seventeen of the chiefs indicated that they will
continue to collect domestic intelligence even if legally
prohibited from so doing.

Finally, longstanding rivalries between the services
are fueling opposition to reform. Alfonsin's proposed
changes call for the intelligence agencies to share
information and coordinate data processing. The
services, however, have historically been pitted
against one another by military governments and the
resulting mistrust permeates them as they scramble to
protect well-established and hard-won power bases.
Any supposed favoritism Alfonsin displays toward one of the services
quickly prompts the others to demand equal
treatment. For example, when the press reported that
the Air Force Chief of Staff had presented an intelligence reform plan to the President, the Army and Navy chiefs quickly countered with their own proposals.

Outlook

In our view, problems over intelligence reform are likely to plague Alfonsin for the remainder of his term. The Senate probably will decide to water down the provisions for civilian control in the National Defense bill, leaving the military with substantial responsibility for domestic collection. We believe that, under these conditions, the military—with its antidemocratic ethos and adversarial view of the Alfonsin government—will continue to place a low priority on monitoring the activities of antigovernment rightwing extremists, and may on occasion, even abet these activities.

Senate passage of the intelligence reforms as they now stand would not substantially improve the situation either, in our view. Under such circumstances, the military probably would continue its domestic operations illegally, while the President would be forced to rely on SIDE and the Federal Police—services of proven ineffectiveness—for internal intelligence. The President's only option would be to risk more scandals by once again organizing extraofficial groups to keep tabs on civilian extremists and the military's political activities.
ARGENTINA: Confrontation With the Military

President Alfonsin is coming under increasing pressure from the military to reverse a civilian court decision to arrest an active-duty officer on charges of human rights abuses committed during the period of military rule. The judge involved has apparently thwarted Alfonsin's attempts to calm the situation by denying the President's request that the charges be dropped or at least that the case be delayed on grounds of insufficient evidence. The officer charged has refused to surrender to authorities, and his supporters have allegedly vowed to use force to protect him. Several active-duty general officers are threatening to resign if the arrest order is carried out.

Comment: This confrontation has been brewing since the transfer of such cases to civilian courts in June. The armed forces believe that the administration's handling of this matter will set a precedent for all cases pending against active-duty officers. They are, therefore, challenging Alfonsin to show his support. The military's stand could lead the President to circumvent the civilian courts by issuing an amnesty for all but the worst offenders, although doing so would be politically unpopular.
ARGENTINA: Move To Resolve Human Rights Issue

President Alfonsin is urging civilian courts, in effect, to acquit the vast majority of Argentine military officers accused of human rights abuses during the years of military rule on the grounds that they were following orders. If the courts fail to adopt this approach voluntarily, Alfonsin may introduce legislation to require it. Alfonsin's decision follows an episode in which proceedings initiated by a provincial court against an active-duty officer aggravated civilian-military tensions.

Comment: This approach would be tantamount to an amnesty. The increasing independence of the judiciary, however, makes voluntary compliance by the courts unlikely. The President would face stiff congressional opposition to legislation that would enforce compliance. Nevertheless, discontent in the military will mount as more such cases enter civilian courts, leaving Alfonsin with few alternatives to the politically risky step of seeking congressional action on the issue. (S NF)
Argentina: Prospects for Leftist Terrorism

The recent extradition from Brazil to Buenos Aires of Montonero terrorist leader Mario Firmenich has again focused public attention on the danger of a resurgence of leftist terrorism in Argentina. Terrorism by the left has been a persistent source of political instability in Argentina and has played a central role in undermining the authority of both military and civilian regimes. President Alfonsin's response to the first inklings of terrorist reorganization shows, in our view, that he understands the gravity of the threat.

We foresee little chance of a serious terrorist movement emerging over the next six months. Nevertheless, the political scene is volatile and the Alfonsin government may not be able to contain the social, economic, and political pressures that could ignite leftwing violence at a later date.

Return of the Montoneros

The Montoneros, who first emerged in the late 1960s, have long sought to convert Peronism into a movement of the revolutionary left. After Juan Peron's death in 1974, the Montoneros clashed openly with the Peronist party's conservative leadership and were expelled from the movement by his widow and successor, Isabel. The Montoneros continued to struggle for what they termed "authentic Peronism," becoming one of South America's largest, wealthiest, and most deadly terrorist groups. Nevertheless, they were crushed after the military coup of 1976. The few Montoneros who were not killed or captured by the armed forces were forced into exile, where they launched a largely ineffectual propaganda campaign against the military.
successfully prosecute the military for its excesses during the antiterrorist campaigns of the late 1970s, took a tough stance regarding the Montoneros. Two top Montonero leaders, Ricardo Obregon and Oscar Bidegain, were arrested soon after returning to Buenos Aires in December 1983, and Firmenich has remained in custody since his extradition from Brazil in October 1984. Moreover, public statements by government officials indicate that Alfonsin—despite cutbacks in military spending—intends to preserve the military’s ability to monitor terrorist capabilities.

**Internal Divisions**

These arrests, in our view, dealt a severe blow to the Montonero movement and have hindered its efforts at reorganization. With their most experienced leaders in prison or in hiding, the Montoneros’ once solid chain of command has broken down. Two basic currents have emerged: a relatively moderate majority faction loyal to Firmenich, and more violence-prone groups whose leadership is unclear.

The Firmenich faction has publicly abjured violence, asserting that the Montoneros will now concentrate on electoral politics. Before his arrest, Ricardo Obregon announced the Montoneros’ dissolution as an armed force and their reconstitution as the Authentic Peronist Party. Instead of forming an independent party, the Montoneros have attempted to infiltrate the regular Peronist movement’s radical left wing, the Peronist Intransigence and Mobilization (IMP) faction. The IMP is headed by Peronist Senator Vicente Saadi, a well-known Montonero sympathizer whose newspaper, La Voz, was formerly subsidized by Montonero ransom money. We believe that the Montoneros’ current goal is to gain full control of the IMP and use it to turn the entire Peronist movement toward the revolutionary left. The Montoneros are supplementing this strategy by infiltrating Peronist-controlled trade unions and rural cooperatives.

We believe that the Firmenich faction’s rejection of violence is a tactical maneuver and that it would return to armed struggle under more favorable circumstances. The Montoneros have pledged in the past to work for peaceful change, but they quickly reverted to violence when conditions shifted. Furthermore, members of the group are rearming and continue to train in terrorist tactics and guerrilla warfare. Recent public statements by Roberto Perdia and Fernando Vaca—the top Montonero leaders not in prison—have hinted at a resumption of violence if Alfonsin continues to “persecute” the movement.

The immediate danger, however, stems from those Montoneros who question the leadership’s cautious stance. Although not formally structured into an anti-Firmenich group and divided among themselves, these Montoneros doubt that they can ever dominate Peronism and are eager to resume violence.

**Reorganization of the ERP**

Argentina’s other significant leftist terrorist group is the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP). In contrast to the vague populism espoused by the Montoneros, the ERP is rooted in Trotskyite Marxism-Leninism and has drawn inspiration more from Castro and Mao than Peron. Emerging concurrently with the Montoneros, the ERP was smaller and was concentrated in Argentina’s interior provinces, where it conducted sporadic rural guerrilla warfare until the late 1970s. Like the Montoneros, the group was ravaged by the military’s post-1976 crackdown. The ERP lost 85 percent of its cadre and close to 95 percent of its weapons, safehouses, and vehicles during that period.
Enrique Gorriaran Merlo

An Argentine of Basque origin, Enrique Gorriaran, about 42, is the ranking leader of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). A founder of the ERP in 1970, Gorriaran was arrested one year later and imprisoned in southern Argentina. In 1972 he escaped to Cuba, returning to Argentina the following year to participate in the ERP's rural guerrilla campaign. US diplomats report that, by the late 1970s, Gorriaran led the ERP's military wing, which attacked businessmen and labor leaders and assassinated police and military personnel. He fled the country following the 1976 military coup and resurfaced in Nicaragua, fighting alongside the Sandinistas. He currently lives in Managua.

Mario Eduardo Firmenich

Mario Firmenich, 36, is on trial in Buenos Aires for kidnapping and homicide. A founder of the Montoneros, Firmenich gained notoriety in the early 1970s for his involvement in two bold terrorist acts: the kidnap/murder of former Argentine President Pedro Aramburu and the kidnapping of two Argentine businessmen, which resulted in a record $60 million ransom. After the 1976 military crackdown, he moved abroad and tried to mobilize support for the Montoneros in Latin America and Western Europe. He remains friendly with Sandinista leaders and in 1981 was involved in smuggling Cuban arms to El Salvador.
Press reports indicate that remnants of the ERP—probably no more than 100 persons—returned to Argentina in the wake of Alfonsin's election. As with the Montoneros, the group split into moderate and radical sectors. Unlike the Montoneros, however, the ERP appears to be fairly cohesive and well organized, with orders issued by exiled leaders in Managua, Nicaragua.

These leaders—chief of whom is Enrique Gorriaran—evidently believe that the moment is not ripe for the resumption of armed struggle in Argentina. Exiled ERP chiefs have justified their failure to return home by alleging that Alfonsin wants to arrest them to complement the Montoneros already imprisoned. Gorriaran pledged at a press conference in Managua earlier this year that, for the time being, ERP members in Argentina will use violence only in self-defense.

ERP is seeking to expand its political base by infiltrating the small but influential far left Intransigent Party (PI). The ERP has chosen the PI because the two groups are ideologically compatible and, because the ERP wants to avoid competing with Montonero penetration of the Peronists. The ERP has also been active in a handful of leftist labor unions and some of Argentina's human rights organizations. Its overall success in these efforts is unclear, but penetration of the Intransigents has been extensive and that many ERP members hold important PI leadership posts.

We share the judgment that the ERP's long-term goal is to return to armed struggle. In the meantime, however, the group's more moderate sector has effectively reigned in unruly elements who want to initiate violence immediately. Exiled leaders recently denied permission for an ERP cell to recover an arms cache in Argentina dating from the late 1970s. While reassuring as to the movement's short-term intentions, this may indicate that the ERP has at least a rudimentary capability to undertake terrorism if and when it abandons its current policy of relying solely on political infiltration.

ERP-Montonero Contacts

One of the more disquieting developments is a trend toward ERP-Montonero cooperation; the two movements recently have set aside longstanding ideological disputes and have begun to work together. An ERP-Montonero meeting was held in Cordoba Province in April 1984, according to press reports, and the two groups have agreed to cooperate in order to infiltrate labor unions. The political organizations with which the Montoneros and the ERP are linked have also been moving closer together: the IMP and the PI are trying to coordinate efforts to politicize and manipulate several human rights groups.

Foreign Support

Although ERP-Montonero collaboration may ease logistic barriers—such as lack of sufficient weapons and funds—to a resumption of terrorism, in our view, the radical left would require considerable foreign support to mount a serious threat to Argentine democracy. At present, prospects for such aid are dim:

- The PLO, which previously trained and funded the Montoneros, refused appeals for renewed aid in mid-1983.
- Mexican officials are terminating safehaven arrangements and government jobs they formerly provided for exiled Montoneros.
- The Cubans, according to a source with good access, want to ingratiate themselves with Alfonsin and will therefore use their considerable influence over the
Montoneros to discourage terrorist acts. The ERP may be similarly constrained by the Cubans.

- Remaining ERP and Montonero contacts with the Sandinistas, Chilean MIR, and the remnants of the Uruguayan Tupamaros are highly unlikely to compensate for the lack of substantial Cuban and East Bloc backing.

**Outlook**

We believe that the ERP and the Montoneros will concentrate on political activity over the medium term. Both groups recognize that, in the wake of the terrorist bloodletting and military repression of the 1970s, there is scant popular support in Argentina for political violence. And the Alfonsin government's arrest and prosecution of Montonero leaders has sent a clear message to the left that a return to terrorism will bring swift retribution.

The Montoneros will not, in our view, succeed in wresting control of the Peronist movement from the center right. Senator Saadi and the IMP faction have recently suffered a series of setbacks and appear to be losing status within the party. At best, the Montoneros can hope to retain a voice on the Peronist left via the IMP or, if the movement splits, dominate a small independent radical Peronist faction. The ERP has slightly better prospects for expanding its political influence through the Intransigent Party. The PI did well in recent student elections, and polls show that it could become a vehicle for the expression of leftist discontent with Alfonsin. The party, however, lacks a national structure and following, and its radical ideology has historically precluded it from attracting more than 5 to 10 percent of the electorate.

Although leaders of both the ERP and the Montoneros are likely to be preoccupied with political machinations over the coming months, violence by dissident elements of both organizations cannot be discounted. This is especially true in the case of the Montoneros, where discipline appears to be weakest. We believe that the Montoneros' radical fringe does have some capability to conduct kidnappings and assassinations. Such actions could be triggered by further arrests of terrorist leaders, a harsh verdict in the trial of Firmenich, or provocations by rightwing terrorists. But we also believe that, under present circumstances, isolated acts of leftist violence can be effectively contained by the security forces.

Over the long run, however, there is a danger that the radical left could resume full-scale terrorism. Argentina's new democracy remains fragile and has not yet been fully tested. Severe and prolonged economic pressures, or a power vacuum stemming from the assassination or incapacitation of Alfonsin, could jeopardize political stability. Such a scenario would probably include militant labor unrest, widespread social disorder, and a growing disaffection with democratic institutions on both the right and the left. Under these conditions the ERP and the Montoneros might be tempted to take up arms once again. The press reports that rightwing terrorists are also reorganizing and were responsible for several recent bombings of leftist and government targets; further attacks could spur a response from the radical left. The consequences of such developments are uncertain, but the stage would then be set for escalating left-right violence, growing political polarization, and a possible reentry by the military into the political system.
The recent extradition from Brazil to Buenos Aires of Montonero terrorist leader Mario Firmenich has again focused public attention on the danger of a resurgence of leftist terrorism in Argentina. Terrorism by the left has been a persistent source of political instability in Argentina and has played a central role in undermining the authority of both military and civilian regimes. President Alfonsin's tough response to the first inklings of terrorist reorganization shows, in our view, that he understands the gravity of the potential threat. For this reason—and because most of the radical leftists doubt that the current political climate is suitable—we foresee little chance of serious terrorism emerging over the next six months.

**Return of the Montoneros**

The Montoneros, who first emerged in the late 1960s, have long sought to convert Peronism into a movement of the revolutionary left. After Juan Peron's death in 1974, the Montoneros clashed openly with the Peronist Party's conservative leadership and were expelled from the movement by his widow and successor, Isabel. The Montoneros continued to struggle for what they termed "authentic Peronism," becoming one of South America's largest, wealthiest, and deadliest terrorist groups. Nevertheless, they were crushed after the military coup of 1976. The few Montoneros who were not killed or captured by the armed forces were forced into exile, where they launched a largely ineffectual propaganda campaign against the military. That there were approximately 300 Montoneros in the country and some 500 abroad, although we believe these figures were somewhat inflated.

Numerous Montoneros returned to Argentina in the months following the election in October 1983 of the new civilian government. If they expected any lenience from the authorities, however, it did not materialize. Alfonsin, who personally abhors terrorism and needs to hold the left accountable for its crimes if he is to successfully prosecute the military for its excesses during the antiterrorist campaigns of the late 1970s, took a tough stance regarding the Montoneros. Two top Montonero leaders, Ricardo Obregon and Oscar Bidegain, were arrested soon after they returned to Buenos Aires in December 1983, and Firmenich has remained in custody since his extradition from Brazil in October 1984. Moreover, public statements by government officials indicate that Alfonsin—despite cutbacks in military spending—intends to preserve the military's ability to monitor terrorist capabilities.

**Internal Divisions**

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The Firmenich faction has publicly abjured violence, asserting that the Montoneros will now concentrate on electoral politics. Before his arrest, Ricardo Obregon announced the dissolution of the Montoneros as an armed force and their reconstitution as the Authentic Peronist Party. However, that instead of forming an independent party, the Montoneros have attempted to infiltrate the regular Peronist movement's radical left wing, the Peronist Intransigence and Mobilization (IMP) faction. The IMP is headed by Peronist Senator Vicente Saadi, a well-known Montonero sympathizer whose newspaper, *La Voz*, was formerly subsidized by Montonero ransom money.
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We believe that the Firmenich faction's rejection of violence is only a tactical maneuver and that it would return to armed struggle under more favorable circumstances. The Montoneros have pledged in the past to work for peaceful change, but they quickly reverted to violence when conditions shifted. Furthermore, members of the group are rearming and continuing to train in terrorist tactics and guerrilla warfare. Recent public statements by Roberto Perdigon and Fernando Vaca—the top Montonero leaders not in prison—have hinted at a resumption of violence if Alfonsin continues to "persecute" the movement.

The immediate danger, however, stems from those Montoneros who question the leadership's cautious stance. Although not divided among themselves about other issues, such as leadership, they all doubt that the Montoneros can ever dominate Peronism and are eager to resume violence.

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Press reports indicate that remnants of the ERP—probably no more than 100 persons—returned to Argentina in the wake of the election of Alfonsin. As with the Montoneros, the group split into moderate and radical factions. Unlike the Montoneros, however, the ERP appears to be fairly well organized and cohesive, and it follows the orders issued by exiled leaders in Nicaragua. The ERP, chief of whom is Enrique Gorriaran—have declined to return home because they believe that Alfonsin would have them arrested just like the Montonero leaders.

The ERP is reportedly seeking to expand its political base by infiltrating the small but influential far-left Intransigent Party (PI). The ERP has chosen the PI because the two groups are ideologically compatible and, because the ERP wants to avoid competing with the Montonero penetration of the Peronists. The ERP has also been active in a handful of leftist labor unions and some of Argentina's human rights organizations. Its overall success in these efforts is unclear.

We share the judgment that the ERP's long-term goal is to return to armed struggle. In the meantime, however, the group's more moderate sector has effectively reined in unruly elements who want to initiate violence immediately. Recently, for example, exiled leaders reportedly denied permission for an ERP cell to recover arms from a cache established in the late 1970s. While reassuring as to the movement's short-term intentions, this may indicate that the ERP retains at least a rudimentary capability to undertake
Enrique Gorriaran Merlo

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Foreign Support

Although ERP-Montonero collaboration may ease logistical barriers—such as the lack of sufficient weapons and funds—to a resumption of terrorism, in our view, the radical left would still require considerable foreign support before it presented a serious threat to Argentine democracy. At present, prospects for such aid are dim:

- The PLO, which previously trained and funded the Montoneros, refused appeals for renewed aid in mid-1983.
- Mexican officials are terminating safehaven arrangements and government jobs they formerly provided exiled Montoneros.
- The Cubans want to ingratiate themselves with Alfonsin and will therefore use their considerable influence over the Montoneros to discourage terrorist acts. The Cubans may be trying to restrain the ERP in similar fashion.
- Remaining ERP and Montonero contacts with the Sandinistas and with various South American terrorist groups are not likely to compensate for the lack of substantial Cuban and East Bloc backing.

Outlook

We believe that the ERP and the Montoneros will concentrate on political activity for at least the next few months. Both groups recognize that, in the wake
of the terrorist bloodletting and military repression of the 1970s, there is scant popular support in Argentina for political violence. And the Alfonsin government's arrest and prosecution of Montonero leaders has sent a clear message to the left that a return to terrorism will bring swift retribution.

The Montoneros will not, in our view, succeed in wresting control of the Peronist movement from the center-right. Senator Saadi and the IMP faction have recently suffered a series of setbacks and appear to be losing status within the party. At best, the Montoneros can hope to retain a voice in the Peronist movement left via the IMP or, if the movement splits, dominate a small independent radical Peronist faction. The ERP has slightly better prospects for expanding its political influence through the Intransient Party. The PI did well in recent student elections, and polls show that it could become a vehicle for the expression of leftist discontent with Alfonsin. The party lacks a national structure and following, however, and its radical ideology has historically prevented it from attracting more than 5 to 10 percent of the electorate.

Although leaders of both the ERP and the Montoneros are likely to be preoccupied with political machinations over the coming months, the possibility of violence by dissident elements of either organization cannot be discounted. Such evidence is more likely in the case of the Montoneros, where discipline appears to be weaker. We believe that the Montoneros' radical fringe does have the capability to conduct kidnappings and assassinations. Such actions could be triggered by further arrests of terrorist leaders, a harsh verdict in the trial of Firmenich, or provocation by rightwing terrorists. But we also believe that, under present circumstances, such leftist violence can be contained by the security forces.
TIOII THIS VOULO PERIII T WHICH IIOU L D VIM FAVORABLE PUBLI C OPINION FOR CREATING CONFI DENCE RAUL BORRAS VERE THIIIKING ABOUT CARRYING OUT SAID IN SUMMARY: ARGENTINE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JOSE HORACIO JAUNARENA

SUBJ: COMMENTS BY OIST:

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

1/2 HITS HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DEPT OF COMMERCE

USTR


ARGENTINE-U.S. RELATIONS, AND THAT THE GDA WOULD ACT TO IMPROVE CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE GDA AND THE U.S. AND WOULD HAVE TO MAKE CHANGES IN ITS POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA. HE INDICATED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS HAVING PROBLEMS WITH THE ARGENTINE LEFT AND WITH A HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP. FINALLY, HE OPINED THAT, EVEN THOUGH PRESIDENT Raul Alfonsin Is Dedicated To Imposing An Austerity Program On Argentina and to Revamping The Argentine Financial Sector, The GDA Would Not Be Able To Keep All Its Commitments To The International Monetary Fund.


2. TURNING TO INSTITUTIONAL ARMED FORCES MATTERS, JAUNARENA SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NO PLANS TO REMOVE ANY OF THE SERVICE CHIEFS OF THE GENERAL STAFF OR TO MAKE ADDITIONAL CHANGES IN THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF (JGSI) OF THE FFAA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. HE ADDED, THOUGH, THAT BORRAS AND PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSON) MAY MAKE SOME SENIOR OFFICER CHANGES IN MARCH, BUT HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THIS REMARK. HE NOTED, TOO, THAT BORRAS AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD PROBABLY REPLACE TWO OF, OR ALL, THE SERVICE OF SOME ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS WHO ARE WORRIED THAT PROSECUTION OF FFAA OFFICERS COULD LEAD TO A COUP D'ETAT, AND, ULTIMATELY, PERMIT THE ADMINISTRATION TO WIN APPROVAL OF A LAW OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. JAUNARENA WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE CIVILIAN LEADERS OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT (GDA) DO NOT PLAN ANY MORE CHANGES IN SENIOR ARMED FORCES ASSIGNMENTS UNTIL MARCH, BUT WILL PROBABLY MAKE CHANGES IN THE CHIEFS OF THE SERVICES' GENERAL STAFFS BY THE END OF 1985. HE ALSO TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON THE REORGANIZATION OF, AND THE BUDGETS OF, THE ARMED FORCES, SAYING THAT ONLY THE AIR FORCE WOULD EXPAND UNDER THE REORGANIZATION AND THAT THE BUDGETS WOULD NOT CHANGE FOR THREE YEARS. JAUNARENA WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE IS A CRISIS IN

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3. Jaunarena claimed that the administration would have its plan for the reorganization of the armed forces finally ready by June 1985 and would then implement it immediately. He forecast that, of the three services, the Argentine air force (FAA) would least oppose the reorganization of the FFAA. He pointed out that only the air force would expand under the reorganization, and would do so at the expense of the army and navy. Jaunarena added that the reorganization plan would favor the development of airborne and rapid intervention forces. He also said that the reorganization of the FFAA would not be completed until 1987 or 1988 because of budget restrictions: He said the administration does not intend to increase the budget for the FFAA for the next three years.

4. Switching to international relations, Jaunarena commented that, in regard to Argentine–United States relations, there continues to exist what he called "an old crisis of confidence" between the Argentine (GOA) and U.S. (USG) governments. He claimed that this crisis was then, in his words, "very acute" and that the GOA had done little to reduce tension between the U.S. and Argentina. Jaunarena did not define the crisis of which he spoke, but he went on to say that, during 1985, the GOA should, and would, act to establish a solid bond of confidence with the U.S.
5. JUANARENA NEXT COMMENTED ON THE RELATIONS OF THE ALFONSO ADMINISTRATION WITH THE ARGENTINE LEFT. HE NOTED FIRST THAT, BECAUSE OF LEFTIST PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION, IT HAD MADE SOME CONCESSIONS TO THE LEFT, AND HE INDICATED THAT THESE CONCESSIONS INCLUDED ALLOWING A GROUP OF YOUNG ARGENTINES TO GO TO NICARAGUA AS MEMBERS OF A GROUP CALLED "COFFEE BRIGADE." HE DID NOT PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE LEFTIST PRESSURES HE REFERRED TO, AND HE DID NOT DISCUSS FURTHER THE GOA'S CONCESSIONS. JUANARENA NEXT SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S RELATIONS WITH THE "MOTHERS OF THE PLAZA DE MAYO" HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP ARE BAD AND ARE GETTING WORSE, AND HE ADDED THAT HE EXPECTS TO SEE AN OPEN BREAK BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE GROUP; BUT AGAIN, HE DID NOT EXPAND ON HIS REMARKS.

6. IN REGARD TO ECONOMIC MATTERS, JUANARENA SAID HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GOA WOULD BE ABLE TO LIVE UP TO ALL PORTIONS OF ITS AGREEMENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF). HE DID NOT PROVIDE THE BASIS OF THIS BELIEF, BUT HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT ALFONSO IS DEDICATED, HOWEVER, TO IMPOSING A STRONGER AUSTERITY PROGRAM ON ARGENTINA AND TO REVERSING THE ARGEENTINE FINANCIAL SECTOR. HE ADDED THAT, IN REGARD TO MEETING THESE TWO COMMITMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT, THERE WOULD BE NO DECEIT, NO WAVERING, AND NO BACKING DOWN.

C. PRESSURE ON BORRAS FROM LEFTISTS IN THE GOVERNING RADICAL CIVIC UNION (UCR) WHO VIEW HIS MEETING WITH THE ARMY GENERALS AND COLONELS AND THE RELEASE OF THE NAVY OFFICER AS AN INDICATION OF WEAKNESS ON THE PART OF BORRAS IN DEALING WITH THE ARMED FORCES AND WHO PUT PRESSURE ON HIM TO DO SOMETHING TO SHOW HIS LEADERSHIP OF THE FAA.

D. THE DESIRE OF THE PART OF PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSO) TO DEMONSTRATE TO CIVILIANS BEFORE HE VISITS THE UNITED STATES THAT HE IS IN CONTROL OF THE FAA.

The Joint General Staff to become Chief of Staff to the President.

The second event began with the decision of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces -- the senior court martial -- to release an Argentine Navy Lieutenant accused of committing crimes during the counterinsurgency campaign. The problem created by this decision worsened when Fernandez Torres, saying that the Supreme Council was not under his command, refused Borras' request to intervene with the Council and have it reverse its decision.

2. In the wake of these incidents, Borras met with President Raúl Alfonsín, who decided to remove Fernandez Torres and to replace him with Pianta. While meeting with the Army's other generals, however, and hearing them make clear their feeling that it would be unacceptable for him to accede to the Government's decision to reassign him as Chief of the ENM, Pianta told the generals that he agreed with their position; he then advised Borras that he would not accept the new assignment. Pianta's decision led the Government to reach down into the Army's General Officer Corps and choose Brigadier General Hector Luis (Boris) Eremu, at the time the commander of III Corps, as the Chief of the Service's General Staff. With this move, the Government gave the senior Army position to the general most closely identified with the governing Radical Civic Union (UCR) and had the opportunity to remove from active duty Army General Officers who had previously spoken out against the Government.

TEXT: 1. Two specific events produced the situation which led to the 4 March 1985 resignations of Army Lieutenant General (LG) Julio Alfredo (Fernández) Torres, then serving as Chief of the Joint General Staff (EMG) of the Argentine Armed Forces (FMA), and of Major General (MG) Ricardo Gustavo (Pianta), assigned at the time as Chief of the Army General Staff (EMGE). The 25
ARGENTINA: ANOTHER SHAKE-UP OF SENIOR MILITARY COMMANDERS

On 4 March, Lt. General Julio Fernandez Torres, head of the Argentine Armed Forces Joint Staff, retired for reasons which are not entirely clear. President Alfonsin asked Army Chief-of-Staff Pianta to replace Fernandez Torres, but Pianta refused, choosing retirement. Alfonsin appointed Air Force General Teodoro Waldner as new Joint Chief, despite advice from Defense Minister Borras that the army—the most powerful service and already hostile to the joint staff—would not accept subordination to an air force officer. This may be a tacit admission that the joint staff idea is going nowhere. Alfonsin appointed Brigadier General Hector Luis Rios Erenu, Commander of III Corps in Cordoba, as new Army COS. This forced the retirement of six officers senior to Rios Erenu.

Whether or not Alfonsin planned it this way—and many officers are convinced he did—he has in less than 18 months retired all but two Army generals who were promoted before he took office. Many observers will see this as too convenient to have been a coincidence. Some also note that this second housecleaning in the army in less than a year will also inhibit the rise of coherent opposition or a service strongman.

Fernandez Torre's retirement may have resulted from:

—his unhappiness at the ineffectiveness of his position—the services continue to view themselves as city states rather than participants in a joint staff operation;

—his inability to forestall large cuts in the military budget;

—military unhappiness over government human rights policy and handling of the infamous Astiz case.
General Pianta's refusal to accept the post was reportedly the result of pressure from a group of general officers who told him that they would resign en masse and precipitate a crisis if he accepted. Their reasons can only be surmised at this stage, but probably center around unhappiness with Pianta's previous performance, opposition to the entire joint staff concept, and a desire to show discontent with government policies. Rios Erenu reportedly refused to join this group.

A large question mark hangs over Rios Erenu. Press reports characterize him as pragmatic and politically astute, and respected in the military. Rios Erenu is close to Defense Minister Borras and the ruling UCR, and is trusted by government officials. He was, after all, promoted to general by the Alfonsin government. Reports last year, however, linked him to rightist terrorist groups in the military. After rightists exploded several bombs in Cordoba, he reportedly sent an intermediary to Borras to cut a deal that tied cessation of terrorist actions to a halt in human rights prosecutions. He intervened to remove an accused officer from the jurisdiction of a civilian court. III Corps was said to be a hotbed of rightwing discontent and activity. The study on terrorism in Argentina repeats the assertion that Rios Erenu has links to the extremists.

The evidence is not conclusive. It is difficult to imagine that Alfonsin would not know of such activities, and equally difficult to believe that he would elevate Rios Erenu if the reports were true. If Alfonsin's intent is to prevent the emergence of a military strong man and the new Army COS is closely associated with extremists, the move might have backfired.
TEXT: 1. Argentinian Army field grade officers and officers assigned to the joint general staff (EOG) of the Argentine armed forces (FFAA) believe that the problems between the administration of President Raúl Alfonsín and the armed forces -- especially the army -- which came to a head with the reassignments and retirements of a number of FFAA officials in the first part of March 1985 began early in the administration's term when, these officials held, civilian government officials decided to back the Argentine air force (FFAA) against the other two services as part of their approach for exerting civilian control over the FFAA. These officials say that the civilian officials established a close relationship with FFAA Brigadier General Borrás and the defense minister established a close relationship with FFAA Brigadier General Borrás (BRIGADIER) as a means of exercising leverage in the air force.

2. After Minister of Defense Rafael (Borrás) returned to work following convalescence, he began in mid-February 1985 to maneuver, as especially army field grade officers call his next moves. He met with the army's general officers and its colonels selected for promotion on 25 February in what army officers claim was a routine meeting without problems. Although no controversial topics arose during this meeting, leaders of the government radical civic union (PRO) and the newspapers said falsely, army officers assert -- that, in that meeting, the army expressed dissatisfaction over a number of issues and events.

3. On 1 March, Borrás called together then army lieutenant general Julio Alfredo (Fernández) Torres, at the time serving as chief of the EMC, and the then chiefs of the general staffs of the three services to discuss the decision by the supreme council of the armed forces -- the senior court martial -- to free an Argentinian navy (MAR) lieutenant accused of crimes during the counterinsurgency campaign of the 1970s. Borrás expressed his anger with the decision and said that the case of the army officer was, as he phrased it, a government problem and not an FFAA problem. In this meeting, Fernandez Torres made the point that the supreme council is a ministry of defense (MOD) organization and is not under the influence of the armed forces.

4. Next on 1 March, Borrás met with members of the supreme council and angrily demanded an explanation of the decision to release the navy officer. In reply, retired major general Horacio Antúral (Rivera) spoke for the council and told him that he was asking that council members act as politicians while they are actually old men who are acting as professional armed officers; Rivera added that the council must make legal decisions, not political ones. Borrás ended this meeting in anger.

5. Still on 1 March, Borrás met with Alfonsín. After that, he met with Fernandez Torres and, in the name of the president, offered him the position of military advisor to the president, an offer which the officer turned down. Fernandez Torres said...
THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY ADVISOR POSITION WOULD NOT LEAD TO GOOD ADMINISTRATION-ARMED FORCES COOPERATION AND HE ADDED THAT, IF ALFONSIN WANTED HIS RESIGNATION, HE WOULD OFFER IT AND LEAVE QUIETLY. BORRAS ASKED FERNANDEZ TORRES TO RECONSIDER THE OFFER OF THE ADVISORY POSITION AND TO INFORM HIM OF THE FINAL DECISION ON THE NEXT DAY. AT 0100 HOURS ON 2 MARCH, FERNANDEZ BT
Had come and he still refused the offer. Field Comment: In offering the advisory position to Fernandez Torres, President Alfonso and Borrás were relieving him -- and, in effect, firing him. Fernandez Torres would have been split away from the FFAA and would have become another of the President's many advisors, the ranks of whom have been thinned by fired or otherwise former government officials.)

6. Several more events reflecting, and bearing on, administration-armed forces relations took place on 4 March. The following are the most important of those events:

D. All Army generals whose date of rank fell between Pianta and Rios Erenu resigned.

E. On the order of Borrás that the Air Force and the Navy must retire part of their senior officer corps, Waldner retired two officers holding the equivalent rank of Brigadier General, and Vice Admiral Ramón Antonio (Arósaj), Chief of the Navy General Staff, retired four flag officers.

7. As of the latter part of the first week of March, Borrás did not seem to want Waldner to become Chief of the Joint General Staff. He recognized that moving Waldner to this position would lead to Crespo's becoming the chief of the Air Force general staff. He acknowledged that, although Crespo is, in his opinion, friendly toward the UCR and had been helpful to the Ministry of Defense, the Air Force officer is viewed as a bit unstable and the administration did not want to give him the power that would come with assignment as Chief of his Service's general staff. Borrás opined that Crespo was more useful as deputy chief of the Air Force general staff.

B. In the evening, Fernandez Torres spoke to reporters. Newspaper reporting covered accurately these remarks as well as developments involving administration-FFAA topics over the weekend of 2-3 March.)

B. All the Army generals met to discuss the administration's intention of reassigning Pianta from Chief of the ENOC to Chief of the ENOC and of reassigning Rios Erenu from Commander of III Corps to Chief of the ENOC. The other generals advised Pianta not to accept the Joint General Staff position because, by doing so, he would indicate the compliance of the Army with what the generals claimed was a plan of the radical Civic Union to humiliate Fernandez Torres and the Army's senior officers.

C. Pianta spoke with Borrás and rejected the offer of the assignment of Chief of the Joint General Staff.
A secret eleven-point plan to form a national front for taking action against the government of President Raul Alfonsin. But he did not identify any of these individuals. He said that the national front has two goals: the first and more immediate of which, he explained, consists in bringing pressure on the administration to end its efforts to prosecute armed forces (FFAA) personnel for alleged illegal activities during the counterinsurgency campaign. Camps pointed out that the second and longer term goal would involve the removal of the Alfonsin government. He added that activities based on this plan should begin about 2 April 1985.

3. Camps listed the points below as action "agreements" included in the eleven points of Menendez and his plan:

A. Undertaking a joint effort to raise money.

B. Setting up a parallel, but clandestine, joint general staff which would include active duty and retired officers.

C. Unifying and coordinating "action groups" of active duty personnel, who remain loyal to Alfonsin, which would begin conducting operations designed to bring pressure on the Alfonsin government. These operations would include the bombing of selected targets. He mentioned specifically human rights groups as among the selected targets, and he said others would include "anti-military" targets.
D. Launching coordinated propaganda and psychological actions against the government.

E. Coordinating the collection of information on the Alfonsin administration.

F. Agreeing on a common strategy for the near term.

5. Also early in the week of 17 March, Alfonsin, who is involved with the National Front, claimed that the National Front has support in various areas of Argentine society. Alfonsin is in constant contact with certain Argentine political leaders, whom the retired general did not name, with international rightist groups; with union leaders; with a political grouping headed by Herminio Iglesias) and Jorge (Argentoi); with active duty and retired armed forces and
A. INITIATING A COORDINATED POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARXISM IN ARGENTINA.

B. USING "SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTION GROUPS," AS THE OFFICER CALLED THEM, TO PROVOKE OR ENGINEER INCIDENTS DESIGNED TO EMBARRASS THE ALFONSO GOVERNMENT AND TO DEMONSTRATE ITS WEAKNESS. THE OFFICER'S DESCRIPTION OF THE MAKE-UP OF THE "SPECIAL ACTION GROUPS," THEY SEEM IDENTICAL WITH THE ACTION GROUPS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 2C, ABOVE.

C. UNDERTAKING A COORDINATED EFFORT TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF THE MAJOR FFAA COMMANDERS OR, IF THIS EFFORT FAILS, USING THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTION GROUPS TO COMPROMISE THE COMMANDERS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT THEY WOULD FIND THEMSELVES WITH NO CHOICE OTHER THAN.

D. MAKING A COORDINATED EFFORT TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF A NUMBER OF UNION AND POLITICAL LEADERS. AGAIN, IF THIS EFFORT SHOULD FAIL, IT WOULD TURN TO THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACTION GROUPS FOR THE SAME PURPOSE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.

E. TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE TO VARIOUS SECTORS OF ARGENTINE SOCIETY, TO THE ADMINISTRATION, AND TO JUNIOR ARMED FORCES OFFICERS IN COMMAND POSITIONS THAT THE FFAA ARE UNIFIED.

F. SETTING UP A PARALLEL, BUT CLANDESTINE, JOINT STAFF ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATED PROBLEM-SOLVING AND FOR DEVELOPING STRATEGY.

G. SETTING UP A PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM TO PROTECT THE LEADERS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT.

H. COORDINATING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACTS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT COULD ASSIST THE FRONT. THE FIRST TWO PRIORITIES IN REGARD TO THIS POINT INVOLVE THE SEEKING OF CONTACTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN WHAT HE CALLED "ANTI-MARXIST" COUNTRIES.
LOCATIONS -- CORDOBA OR GREATER BUENOS AIRES, FOR EXAMPLE -- AS HAS OCCURRED IN PAST CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE FFAA AND A GIVEN ADMINISTRATION.

2. NO ARMY GENERAL OFFICER HAS YET SURFACED WITH THE QUALITIES NEEDED TO PULL TOGETHER, CONTROL, AND LEAD MILITARY OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT. NO ARMY GENERAL OFFICER OR ANY OFFICER OF EQUIVA-LENT GRADE IN THE OTHER TWO SERVICES HAS SHOWN SUPPORT FOR, OR A WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE, A COUP D'ETAT. THE ARMY'S COLONELS WHO ARE DUE FOR PROMOTION IN 1985 AND 1986 ARE THE BEST OFFICERS IN THE ARMY, HOWEVER, AND SEVERAL OF THEM HAVE TRUE LEADERSHIP QUALITIES. AMONG RETIRED ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS, RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL (NG) LUCIANO BENJAMIN (DAMOND) RETAINS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE AMONG MIDDLE- AND LOWER-RANKING ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS, BUT RETIRED BRIGADIER GENERAL (BG) RAMON (ICAMPS) DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR WITH ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL.


4. B. A SITUATION WHICH ARISES FROM PROBLEMS OUTSIDE THE CONTROL OF, AND FROM INSTABILITY IN, THE FFAA ALWAYS LEADS IN ARGENTINA TO TALKING AND PLANNING AMONG VARIOUS GROUPS OF OFFICERS, BUT THE LACK OF KEY INGREDIENTS (MONEY, ORGANIZATION, AND LEADERSHIP) FREQUENTLY KEEP THESE GROUPS FROM MOVING TO AN ACTION STAGE. CURRENTLY, THOUGH, SOME GROUPS MAY HAVE BEGUN TO UNDERTAKE ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR PLANS.

C. BECAUSE OF THE WIDELY-Spread BASES OF PRESSURE IN THE FFAA, THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ARGENTINE COUP D'ETAT OF 1955 NIGH SERVE AS A TYPE OF SCENARIO FOR ANY FUTURE FFAA ACTIONS AGAINST THIS GOVERNMENT; THAT IS, A SERIES OF REBELLIOUS OR MUTINIES, RATHER THAN ONE IMMEDIATE DIRECT EFFORT TO REMOVE THE PRESIDENT.

D. THE ARMY'S GENERAL OFFICERS AND ITS COLONELS HOLDING KEY TROOP-LEADING ASSIGNMENTS MUST TAKE CARE THAT THE PRESSURE FROM THE MIDDLE- AND LOWER-RANKING OFFICERS DOES NOT GET OUT OF HAND AND THAT THEY DO NOT LOSE CONTROL OF THESE OFFICERS.

E. ULTRA-RIGHT PARAMILITARY GROUPS WHICH WORKED IN THE PAST WITH RETIRED GENERALS MENENDEZ AND CAMPS MAY WELL BE PUTTING PRESSURE ON SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS TO TAKE FIRM ACTION AGAINST PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONSO).
Nine former junta members, including three ex-presidents, went on trial this week for waging the "dirty war" against leftists and subversive guerrilla organizations.

The defendants face charges of human-rights violations during the 1976 to 1979 campaign against terrorism and miscellaneous charges resulting from Argentina's role in the 1982 Falklands (Malvinas) conflict. President and Armed Forces Commander Raul Alfonsin brought the charges in December 1983 just 3 days after he assumed office. The purpose of the trials reportedly is to close out a tragic period of history and not to try the armed forces as an institution. Although the court proceedings have been orderly, huge numbers of demonstrators were on hand to call for justice and for punishment of the guilty and to seek redress for the alleged 9,000 "disappeared ones." The trials are apparently contributing to the heightened political tension in the capital. Moreover, the President has indicated the trials would not go substantially beyond the nine accused former general officer junta members, but the armed forces are worried the courts will want to involve the rank-and-file in the proceedings. The concern is that the inquiries will be expanded to include individuals who carried out military orders that provoked the human-rights violations and alleged excesses.

**COMMENT:** Observers speculate that the court will deal differently with military personnel who gave the orders and those who carried them out. This possible precedent could assist in limiting the scope and perhaps the scale of the trials, relieving one of the current tensions between the military and the executive. Other speculation is circulating that the trial could take up to 6 months and become highly politicized as human-rights activists from national and international organizations take the stand to use it as a forum for their cause. President Alfonsin reportedly met with the newly installed military leadership to allay their fears and assure them that everything is being done to project an even-handed focus on the proceedings. Reports have also surfaced of possible amnesty after sentences have been passed. The trial should resolve an extremely sensitive and delicate emotional issue. What impact the outcome will have on politico-military relations is not clear, however, especially while the Alfonsin administration struggles to confront mounting problems that seem to threaten the tenure of the government itself. (DECL OADR)
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1. SUMMARY: ARGENTINA IS RELATIVELY FREE OF
POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE. THERE ARE NOW SIGNS
THAT THIS SITUATION MAY BE ABOUT TO END. THE COMING
PERIOD OF ECONOMIC AUSTERITY, RECESSION GENERATED
BY THE TRIAL OF THE FORMER JUNTA MEMBERS, AND A
GROWING FEELING THAT ARGENTINA IS ADRIFT EXACERBATE
THESE WORRIES. END SUMMARY.

2. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED
VIOLENCE SINCE ALFONSO'S INAUGURATION IN DECEMBER
1983.

POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE IS STILL AT A RELATIVELY
LOW LEVEL IN ARGENTINA, BUT THERE ARE INCREASING PANS
OF AN UPWARD TREND IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY. IN THIS REGARD,
THE "BUENOS AIRES HERALD" RECENTLY REPORTED THAT THE
PUBLIC SEEMED "DISPOSED TO HEAR ECHOES OF THE PAST"
AS ARGENTINA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS SUGGEST HARD TIMES
AHEAD. POLITICAL TENSIONS ARE BEING GENERATED BY THE
TRIAL OF THE NINE FORMER JUNTA MEMBERS AND THE COMING
PUBLIC TRIAL OF MONTONERO LEADER MARO FIRMEZ.

PRESIDENT RAUL ALFONSO AND VICE PRESIDENT VICTOR
HARTINEZ BOTH RECENTLY PREDICTED THAT EXTREMIST
GROUPS "WILL TRY TO CREATE TENSIONS" TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF THE UPCOMING PERIOD OF ECONOMIC

3. SEVERAL BOMBINGS AND PROPERTY ATTACKS, APPARENTLY
MOTIVATED BY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, HAVE OCCURRED
THIS YEAR. ONE PERONIST, ONE INTRANSIGENT PARTY, AND
THREE RADICAL COMMUNIST DISTRICT OFFICES WERE BOMBED IN
THE CAPITAL, AS WAS THE HOME OF A PERONIST LOCAL
COUNCILLOR. THE DEVELOPMENTALIST PARTY HEADQUARTERS
WAS ALSO BOMBED. BOMBS ALSO EXPLODED IN A SUBURBAN
BUENOS AIRES METALWORKERS UNION OFFICE AND A PROVIN-
CIAL COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICE IN THE NORTHERN TOWN
OF RESISTENCIA. GUNMEN FIRING FROM A CAR STOLE THE
SUPREME COURT BUILDING IN THE PROVINCIAL CITY OF
TUCUMAN ON APRIL 16. ON APRIL 29, AN EXPLOSION
DAMAGED THE FACILITIES OF A BUENOS AIRES RADIO
STATION. THROUGH NO SERIOUS INJURIES OCCURRED
DURING THESE EARLY MORNING INCIDENTS, THE ATTACKS
SPARKED WIDESPREAD COMMENTARY. CHRISTIAN
DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST
ANDOLO ELITE CLAIMED THAT THE EXPLOSION AT THE
INTRANSIGENT PARTY'S OFFICE WAS THE WORK OF
"SECTORS CLOSE TO ARMY INTELLIGENCE." THE
PERMANENT ASSEMBLY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (ADH) STATED
ITS CONCERN THAT THESE ATTACKS WERE PART OF THE
"PERFECTLY-ORGANIZED PLAN OF THE AGENTS OF DEATH
AND TERRORISM" DESIGNED TO "CREATE CONDITIONS OF
ANARCHY" AND TO UNDERMINE DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS.

4. PERSONAL ASSAULTS ARE INCREASING

ASSAULTS ON PROMINENT OR POLITICALLY-ACTIVE PERSONS
ALSO ARE INCREASING. MANY OF THESE ATTACKS SEEM
TO BE THE WORK OF COMMON CRIMINALS, BUT SOME MAY
HAVE A POLITICAL MOTIVATION. UNHAPPY ASSAILANTS
ASSAULT A SOCIALIST AND TWO COMMUNIST PARTY
ACTIVISTS. A RASH OF ATTACKS ON PERONIST PARTY
MEMBERS ALSO OCCURRED RECENTLY. THESE INCIDENTS
SEEM TIED TO INTERIOR PARTY BICKERING. THE
KIDNAPPING OF PROMINENT CATTLE-BARON RICARDO
LAUSSUS AND INDUSTRIALIST LUIS REITTI PESCARONI
WERE ALSO BIG NEWS. LAUSSUS WAS FREE UNARMED; ON

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7. GUERILLA TRAINING CAMPS

There are rumors, but no hard evidence, of guerilla training camps in the interior provinces of Cordoba and Tucuman. Unproven rumors also circulated that the Peruvian Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) revolutionary group is active in Tucuman. In addition, some people charge that the Revolutionary Army of the People/Worker's Revolutionary Party (ERP/PERT) is infiltrating the Intransigent Party, especially its youth wing. Montoneros are periodically linked with Peronist youth groups and, according to press stories, participated in the April 22 March of Human Rights organizations that supported the trial of the ex-Junta members. Defense Minister Raul Borras recently denied all these reports publicly, though he admitted that Argentina's intelligence services "have information about persons that could have been loosely tied to subversion (in the past) that are today acting through politics." Borras warned that the government would not allow a terrorist rebirth, would meet the problem first with the police, and would only "in the last instance" call on the armed forces to help. The military, he stressed, would act within all legal boundaries should it be called upon to battle terrorists.

5. WEAPONS ARE READILY AVAILABLE

Argentines are even more concerned over these events because weapons are widely available among violent sectors of society. Several arms shops were robbed earlier this year. Some of these crimes, including the robbery of an armory, were solved. Police say common criminals were the culprits. Concern over arms smuggling across Argentina's porous borders is also high. An unidentified GGA official, however, told the press that the flow of arms may be out of Argentina, not into it. Recent arms robberies, he said, were done with the goal of shipping the weapons to Bolivia, to support his allegation, he noted that Bolivians were involved in the solved armory robbery and that this year the Border Police detained ten Bolivians, in separate incidents along the frontier, smuggling arms and drugs.

Comment: Much of the arms smuggling across Argentine borders does involve common criminals. While the smuggling of weapons to terrorists cannot be completely discounted, two reports suggest that extreme leftists may have sufficient arms caches on hand for their current strength. Eight-wing nationalists also do not appear lacking in weapons, perhaps drawing them from army sympathizers. End comment.

6. DISCOUNTED, TWO REPORTS SUGGEST THAT EXTREME LEFTISTS MAY HAVE SUFFICIENT ARMS CACHES ON HAND FOR THEIR CURRENT STRENGTH. EIGHT-WING NATIONALISTS ALSO DO NOT APPEAR LACKING IN WEAPONS, PERHAPS DRAWING THEM FROM ARMY SYMPATHIZERS. END COMMENT.

8. DISCOUNTED, TWO REPORTS SUGGEST THAT EXTREME LEFTISTS MAY HAVE SUFFICIENT ARMS CACHES ON HAND FOR THEIR CURRENT STRENGTH. EIGHT-WING NATIONALISTS ALSO DO NOT APPEAR LACKING IN WEAPONS, PERHAPS DRAWING THEM FROM ARMY SYMPATHIZERS. END COMMENT.

5. WEAPONS ARE READILY AVAILABLE

ARGENTINES ARE EVEN MORE CONCERNED OVER THESE EVENTS BECAUSE WEAPONS ARE WIDELY AVAILABLE AMONG VIOLENT SECTORS OF SOCIETY. SEVERAL ARMS SHOPS WERE ROBBED EARLIER THIS YEAR. SOME OF THESE CRIMES, INCLUDING THE ROBBERY OF AN ARMORY, WERE SOLVED. POLICE SAY COMMON CRIMINALS WERE THE CULPRITS. CONCERN OVER ARMS SMUGGLING ACROSS ARGENTINA'S POROUS BORDERS IS ALSO HIGH. AN UNNAMED GGA OFFICIAL, HOWEVER, TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE FLOW OF ARMS MAY BE OUT OF ARGENTINA, NOT INTO IT. RECENT ARMS ROBBERIES, HE SAID, WERE DONE WITH THE GOAL OF SHIPPING THE WEAPONS TO BOLIVIA. TO SUPPORT HIS ALLEGATION, HE NOTED THAT BOLIVIANS WERE INVOLVED IN THE SOLVED ARMORY ROBBERY AND THAT THIS YEAR THE BORDER POLICE DETAINED TEN BOLIVIANS, IN SEPARATE INCIDENTS ALONG THE FRONTIER, SMUGGLING ARMS AND DRUGS.
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11. COMMENT: POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA 
   DECLARED SINCE REFUEL C. TEN MONTNS AGO BUT IS STILL 
   AT A RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL. MORE NOTICEABLE, 
   THOUGH, IS THE CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC'S PREVIOUSLY 
   OPTIMISTIC ATTITUDE THAT THE EXCESSIF THE PAST 
   WERE DEFINITIVELY OVER. EXTREMISTS, HOWEVER, STILL 
   LACK SOCIETAL SUPPORT AND ARE MOVING CAUTIOUSLY, 
   FOCUSING ON INFLTRATING TARGET GROUPS AND REFINING 
   THEIR OWN INFRASTRUCTURE. THE INCIDENTS THAT DO 
   OCCUR ARE DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN THE 
   SURVIVABILITY AND CAPABILITIES OF THE ALFONSO 
   ADMINISTRATION. DESPITE OCCASIONAL FLARE-UPS, THE 
   CURRENT LOW LEVEL OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY WILL LIKELY 
   CONTINUE OVER THE NEAR TERM. RECONCILING THE 
   PUBLIC'S REVOLUTION WITH THE BLOODY YEARS OF THE 
   1970S, TERRORISTS HAVE GENERALLY DESIGNED THEIR 
   CURRENT ACTIONS TO AVOID LOSS OF LIFE. SHOULD 
   ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WORSEN, AND POLITICAL AND 
   SOCIAL STRIFE INCREASE, EXTREMIST GROUPS MAY RAISE 
   THEIR PROFILE AND REVISE TACTICS, WHICH HAVE THUS 
   FAR HELD LOSS OF LIFE IN CHECK. GARRU 
   01

9. CAN THE GOV HANDLE TERROR???

IF THERE IS AN UPSURGE OF TERRORISM AND THE ALFONSO 
ADMINISTRATION CALLS UPON THE MILITARY OR INTELLIGENCE 
SERVICES FOR HELP, THEY MAY DISCOVER UNRELIABLE ALLIES. 
THESE ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUE TO FEEL UNACCOUNTED 
UPBOATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND TROUBLED BY THE LOW 
PRESTIGE AND PAY OF THEIR WORK. RECOGNITION OF LOW 
MILITARY SALARIES LED THE DEFENSE MINISTRY TO 
CONSIDER GRANTING ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL A 15 
PERCENT REAL SALARY INCREASE. THE POLICE ALSO 
RECEIVE HEFER SALARIES THAT MAY MAKE THEM LESS 
WILLING TO RISK THEIR LIVES FOR THE GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS SITUATION." PROBLEMS WITH 
POLICE SALARIES ARE LEADING TO SCATTERED PROTESTS,
INCLUDING A RECENT ONE-DAY SIT-IN BY LOH TUCUMAN 
PROVINCIAL POLICEMEN AT THEIR HEADQUARTERS BUILDING. 
AS TIGHT BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS GO BEYOND PAY, 
MILITARY OFFICERS ARE ALSO INCREASINGLY WORRIED 
ABOUT THE OPERATIONAL OUTCOMES THEIR SERVICES ARE 
SUFFERING.

10. HOW ARE THE MILITARY REACTING?

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3. ALTHOUGH ARGENTINA APPEARS CALM ON THE SURFACE AND LIFE AND COMMERCE SEEM TO CONTINUE NORMALLY, A SENSE OF INSECURITY AND A DEGREE OF TENSION DEVELOPED DURING THE PAST SIX WEEKS. THIS SITUATION OCCURRED IN PART BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING EVENTS:

SUMMARY. AN INSTITUTIONAL COUP D'ETAT BY THE ARMED FORCES (FFAA) AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT (UCR) DOES NOT SEEN LIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, ALTHOUGH AN UNSTABLE SITUATION EXISTS IN THE FFAA, ESPECIALLY IN THE ARMY, SINCE MID-OCTOBER 1985. ACTS OF VIOLENCE—ESPECIALLY BOMBINGS—AND INTIMIDATION CREATED A SENSE OF INSECURITY AND A DEGREE OF TENSION IN ARGENTINA OVER THE PAST SIX WEEKS. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT PUT AN END TO THIS VIOLENCE, AND IT RESORTED TO ATTEMPTING TO DETAIN PEOPLE—WITHOUT OFFERING EVIDENCE—
THE DETONATION OF BOMBS--ESPECIALLY IN GREATER BUENOS AIRES; A
LARGE NUMBER OF ANONYMOUS BOMB THREATS MADE TO SCHOOLS AND
HOSPITALS; AND KIDNAPPINGS AND A HIGH INCIDENCE OF
CRIME. ADDITIONALLY, SPOKESMEN FOR THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT (GOA)
RAISED THE SPECTRE OF RIGHT-VING CAUSING OPERATING AGAINST DEMOCRACY.
AS A RESULT OF THE BOMBINGS, A SENSE OF CONFUSION DEVELOPED BECAUSE
THE PERPETRATORS--POSSIBLY FROM AT LEAST TWO GROUPS AT OPPOSITE
ENDS OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM--WERE NOT IDENTIFIED, A CONDITION
PERHAPS CREATED IN PART BY THE TENDENCY OF ARGENTINE ACTIVISTS
INVOLVED IN VIOLENCE TO MAKE AN ACTION APPEAR THE WORK OF ANOTHER
GROUP WITH COMPLETELY DIFFERENT POLITICS.

4. THE ADMINISTRATION AND ITS SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES FOUND THEMSELVES UNABLE--UNWILLING, SOME OF THE GOA'S
OPPONENTS SAY--TO STOP THE BOMBINGS AND TO MAKE ARRESTS. THE
ADMINISTRATION ISSUED AN ILL-ADVISED, LEGALLY-FRAMED EXECUTIVE
DEGREE ORDERING THE DETENTION FOR SIXTY DAYS OF TWELVE ARGENTINE
CITIZENS--CIVILIANS AND RETIRED AND ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OFFICERS--
ON THE ALLEGATION THAT THEY WERE INVOLVED IN AN EFFORT TO DE-
STABILIZE THE GOVERNMENT. THE ADMINISTRATION OFFERED NO
EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE ITS ALLEGATION, AND THE COURTS FOUND THE
DEGREE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THE GOA THEN DECREED A STATE OF SEIGE,
WHICH PROVIDED A LEGAL BASIS FOR DECREETING DETENTIONS--WHICH IT
DID AGAIN, SPARKING A ROUND OF COURT REVIEWS AND APPEALS WHICH
SOON WILL REACH THE SUPREME COURT FOR RESOLUTION.

5. WHILE THE BOMBINGS WERE TAKING PLACE AND THE ADMINISTRATION
APPEARED TO BE BUNGLING ITS EFFORTS TO TAKE ACTION TO STOP BOMB
ATTACKS AND INTIMIDATION, THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE GOVERNING
BY
Suggested that the UCR use such actions as bombings, taking advantage of anti-Semitic actions or proposals which could be interpreted as anti-Semitic which have occurred recently in Argentina, and manipulation of the media for the Party's political objectives.

6. Through its actions and failures since mid-September, the administration deepened the problems existing between the armed forces and itself and exacerbated tensions in the FFA, especially in the Army. By innuendo, it indicated that FFA personnel might be responsible for the bombings. With its efforts to hide the detentions of Active Duty Army officers, the administration raised the concern in the Army that additional detentions of Active Duty Officers might follow and indirectly, it heightened concern that younger officers might be brought to trial on charges arising from the countersubversive campaign of the 1970's. Through its actions which added to discontent already existing in the FFA over such issues as pay and the trial of former members of preceding military government, the administration created a situation which Army officers, in particular, perceived as an attack on the Armed Forces as an Institution. In turn, this situation resulted in anti-government talk in the FFA and reports and rumors of plotting. By conducting the election campaign as they did, the administration and the UCR angered the Armed Forces and fostered feelings of insecurity concerning the attitude of the government toward the FFA as a political institution.

7. In addition to worsening relations between itself and the Armed Forces, the administration has hued itself in other ways in recent weeks. Consequently, President Alfonso may take steps such as the following after the 3 November elections:

To restore confidence in the administration and to reduce tensions between itself and the FFA and in the three services:

A. Reform the intelligence organizations, especially side and the Army intelligence service which have been accused of power politics, or "dirty tricks," and incompetence.

B. Replace incompetent DIA officials and improve procedures related to the conduct of government.

C. Identify or control the sources of the violence of the past six weeks.

D. Reorganize the UCR.

E. Replace the chief of the Army General Staff (EMGE) who lost the support and confidence of subordinates because of his perceived failure to prevent or confront what many officers considered an administration attack on the Army.

F. Release those individuals now detained without proof that they were connected with activities intended to destabilize the administration.

G. Name, or hold to, a decision that younger Armed Forces officers will not face trial on charges arising from the countersubversive campaign.

H. Protect himself, the administration, and the UCR from possible charges of unfair campaign practices.

8. President Alfonso will remain in power because of his...
POPULARITY, THE LACK OF A HIGHLY DEVELOPED MOVEMENT IN THE
MILITARY, AND THE PRESIDENT’S INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. HOWEVER,
HE WILL NOT FIND GOVERNING ARGENTINA EASY IN THE SHORT TERM,

EVEN IF HE RESTORES CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION, HE WILL
HAVE TO DEAL WITH SUCH ISSUES AS WAGES, PRICES, AND ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE ADJUSTMENTS, AND FACE OPPOSITION FROM THE LABOR MOVEMENT
AND THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY. HE WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE DEALING WITH
ARGENTINA’S FOREIGN DEBT AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. HE MUST
FACE A UCR PARTY CONGRESS IN MID-NOVEMBER, AND THE UCR IS NOT A
MONOLITHIC ORGANIZATION. ADDITIONALLY, THE PRESIDENT WILL BE IN
A SITUATION IN WHICH SOME ARGENTINES SEE VICE PRESIDENT VICTOR
(MARTINEZ) AS A MORE CONSERVATIVE AND MALLEABLE SUCCESSOR.
FINALLY, HE WILL BE DEALING WITH PEOPLE IN THE ARMED FORCES, THE
GOVERNMENT, AND THE UCR WHO HAVE TAKEN STRONG POSITIONS IN RECENT
WEEKS FROM WHICH THEY MAY FEEL THEY CANNOT RETURN -- IT IS POSSIBLE
THAT EVENTS AND INDIVIDUAL POSITIONS TAKEN DURING THE PAST MONTH
WILL BE THE SEEDS OF UNREST AND EVEN COUP PLOTTING IN 1986 OR
BEYOND.

9. TENSIONS WILL EXIST IN REGARD TO THE FFAA. ALTHOUGH THE
LEVEL OF TENSION MAY SUBSIDE FROM THE PEAK OF LATE OCTOBER,
TENSIONS WILL REMAIN HIGHER THAN THEY WERE JUST A FEW WEEKS AGO AND
GROUPS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES ARE NOW ENTRENCHED AS OPPONENTS
OF THE GOVERNMENT. AS A RESULT OF INDICATIONS AT LEAST BY INNUEDO
THAT ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BOMBINGS WHICH
BEGAN IN MID-SEPTEMBER AND WERE INVOLVED IN EFFORTS TO DESTABILIZE
AT
ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION EXISTING BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT; ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE ARMED FORCES; PROBLEMS FACING THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY

SUMMARY: ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OFFICERS BELIEVE IN EARLY MARCH 1984 THAT GOVERNMENT-ARMED FORCES RELATIONS HAVE REACHED A LOW POINT AND THAT SOME TYPE OF CONFRONTATION IS LIKELY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE OFFICERS ARE MOST CONCERNED AT THIS TIME ABOUT THREE ISSUES. WHEN ARMY OFFICERS TALK ABOUT A CONFRONTATION WITH THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, THEY ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT A COUP D'ETAT. BUT THEY DO ADMIT THAT A LOCALIZED UPRISING COULD TAKE PLACE IN RESPONSE TO A GIVEN SITUATION OR ISSUE. THEY BELIEVE THAT CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE NOT TAKEN STOCK OF THE FACT THAT THE OFFICERS WHOM THEY HAVE PUT INTO KEY POSITIONS COME FROM THE SAME BACKGROUND AS DO THE OFFICERS WHOM THEY RETIRED. ARMY OFFICERS ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF MUST SOON TELL THE CIVILIAN LEADERS THAT THERE EXISTS A POINT BEYOND WHICH THE ARMY WILL NO LONGER ACCEPT CIVILIAN TAMPERING WITH THE ARMED FORCES AS AN INSTITUTION. OFFICERS ARE CRITICAL OF ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN POLICY.

A. A civilian minister of defense, Raul (Borrás), and his control over many decisions traditionally taken by the service commanders.

B. Continuing accusations concerning excesses by FFAA personnel during the counterinsurgency campaign of the 1970's and the prospects that accused personnel face trials both by courts martial and, more irriatingly, by civilian courts.

C. Many army lieutenant colonels and colonels have no work to do, or are not doing any work.

2. When army officers talk about a confrontation with the government, they are not talking about a coup d'état. But, they do not rule out the possibility that some type of a situation or issue could get out of hand and provoke an uprising in a given unit or organization.

3. Army officers note that officials of the civilian government have made a mistake if they assume that, by retiring a number of general and flag officers, they could control the FFAA through leaders of their own choice. The officers say the civilian officials seem to have forgotten that the officers whom they retired and the officers whom they moved into key positions have had the same background and ideological and political exposures; consequently, there has not been any real change in the thinking of armed forces officers.

4. Army officers believe that brigadier general (BG) Jorge (Arguindegui), the chief of the army general staff, must soon tell civilian authorities -- including president Raul (Alfonsin) -- that there exists a not-yet-defined point at which the army will no longer accept civilian tampering with the army and with the armed forces as institutions. The officers acknowledge that this would represent a difficult decision for Arguindegui, but they believe that, with the rate at which they see armed forces-government relations deteriorating, he will have to take a stand in front of the civilian authorities before too long.

5. In regard to Argentina's foreign policy, armed forces officers believe that the government is foolish in trying to align itself with European socialism. They also believe that a third-world position on international issues is absurd for Argentina.

6. Army officers generally credit president Alfonsin with having an understanding on the limits to which the government can go in attacking the FFAA, but believe the president is being influenced by the more radical of his advisors who are pressing for a hard line against the FFAA. Army officers have begun to move from the position that the armed forces had to return to the barracks to the position that the army is in opposition to the civilian government.

7. A very short-lived honeymoon between the FFAA and the civilian government is coming to an end. Problems between the government and the FFAA seem increasingly serious and could lead to a confrontation sooner than once anticipated.
President Alfonsin recently accepted the resignation of the Army's top officer, Chief of Staff Arquíndegui, and replaced three of the country's five corps commanders. The move followed press reports of a "destabilization campaign" within senior officer ranks and official unhappiness over Arquíndegui's handling of the matter. Armed forces discontent over several issues appear to have convinced Alfonsin to assert civilian authority. Although there is no evidence of any coup plotting, problems remain.

* * *

Tensions between the civilian government and the armed forces came to a head on July 4 with the dismissals of Arquíndegui and III Corps commander General Mansilla. Alfonsin's action came after several days of public speculation about a "destabilization" plot within the senior ranks of the armed forces. Several other senior officers were subsequently replaced.

Those who may have harbored fears about military plotting were reflecting memories of past military excursions into politics rather than hard appraisals of current armed forces' capabilities and intentions. There are matters causing considerable disquiet within military ranks--low pay, budget cuts, delayed promotions, persistent public attacks on the military for past sins, and continued vulnerability of individual soldiers to punishment for "dirty war" abuses. There is also skepticism over the government's ability to solve the country's economic problems. Nonetheless, there is no evidence of active coup plotting by the military that would present any imminent threat to the Alfonsin administration.

The armed forces continue in the state of disarray that has characterized them since Alfonsin's inauguration last December. This appears to be particularly so in the case of the army, which would have to be the locus of any serious conspiring. The army's general-officer ranks are currently manned at only about 30 percent of normal level because of post-inaugural resignations and the slowness of the Alfonsin government in completing the promotion-retirement-reassignment cycle that should have been completed at the end of 1983.

Alfonsin's quick reaction to rumors of military dissatisfaction is typical. Avoiding decisive action in other areas, he has swiftly cashiered military officers when they have publicly criticized civilian authorities. He remains deeply distrustful of military intentions and is willing to assert his constitutional mandate as commander-in-chief whenever he believes it potentially threatened. He will not tolerate the armed forces arrogating to themselves the public role of another political party or interest group.
ARGENTINA:

Terrorism Spreading

Terrorist incidents in Argentina, while still few in number, are increasing as extremists on both the right and the left seem to be preparing to stage more attacks.

Offices of the ruling party and a progovernment military club were bombed recently, and last month police foiled a plot to kill President Alfonsin. Argentine officials link these acts to far rightist civilians and members of the armed forces.

Ultrarightists also were responsible for several bombings in Cordoba Province earlier this year, says the terrorists and local military authorities have since agreed with Defense Minister Borras to halt the violence as long as the government stalls trials of military personnel for human rights abuses and exempts specific officers from prosecution.

The far-left Montoneros have established paramilitary training camps, one faction claims it is about ready to renew terrorist activity.

Comment: Terrorism does not currently jeopardize the stability of Alfonsin's government. If the Defense Minister's reported bargain with the far right and military officers in Cordoba Province is confirmed, it would set a dangerous precedent. It could tempt elements of the armed forces and their civilian allies to use the threat or reality of terrorism again to force concessions from the government.

Although Montonero leaders oppose renewed terrorism for now, dissident members may stage violence soon in response to the coming trial of Firmenich. Such actions could provoke a rightist response, leading to a cycle of violence that would sap the government's authority. (C NF)
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

TEXT:

1. IN REGARD TO THE CASE OF ARGENTINE NAVY (MARINA) LIEUTENANT (LT.) ALFREDO ASTIZ, WHO WAS DETAINED IN A CIVIL COURT IN BUENOS AIRES IN AUGUST 1984, NAVY OFFICERS SAY THAT ASTIZ'S CASE IS A TEST OF THE ABILITY OF THE TWO TO WORK TOGETHER. BORRAS SUPPORTED THE EFFORTS OF VICE ADMIRAL (AVONDAH RAYNO) (ARGOS), THE CHIEF OF THE NAVY GENERAL STAFF (GNA), TO OBTAIN THE TRANSFER OF THE ASTIZ CASE FROM THE CIVILIAN COURT SYSTEM TO THE NAVY. ARA'S PRESENCE IN THE COURT MIGHT BE REFLECTED IN THE COURT'S DECISIONS.

2. NAVY OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT, IF ASTIZ IS FOUND GUILTY IN A CIVIL COURT OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM AND IS SENT TO JAIL, THE CONSEQUENCES COULD BE SERIOUS. OFFICERS SAY THAT THE ARA'S FLAG OFFICERS HAVE DISCUSSED RESIGNING EN MASSE IN PROTEST IF THE CURRENT CASE INVOLVING ASTIZ IS NOT TRANSFERRED TO A COURT MARTIAL. THEY ALSO SAY THE ADmirals AND OTHER SENIOR NAVY OFFICERS CONSIDER THE ASTIZ AFFAIR AS A TEST OF ADMINISTRATION-FBA Relations and as a test of the ability of the two to work together.

3. NAVY OFFICERS HOPE THAT THE VILIAN ADMINISTRATION WILL PRESSURE MIGUEL DEL CASTILLO, THE FEDERAL JUDGE IN CHARGE OF THE ASTIZ CASE, TO TRANSFER THE CASE TO THE COURT MARTIAL. THE OFFICERS ARE POORLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE TRANSFER, BUT THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE THE SUPPORT OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE RAUL (BORRAS) FOR THE TRANSFER.

4. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ARE WARNED AS A RESULT OF THE ASTIZ AFFAIR, ESPECIALLY BORRAS, WHO SEES THE CASE AS A TEST OF ADMINISTRATION-FBA Relations and as a test of the ability of the two to work together. BORRAS SUPPORTED THE EFFORTS OF VICE ADMIRAL (AVONDAH RAYNO) (ARGOS), THE CHIEF OF THE NAVY GENERAL STAFF (GNA), TO OBTAIN THE TRANSFER OF THE ASTIZ CASE FROM THE CIVILIAN COURT SYSTEM TO THE NAVY.

5. ON 18 DECEMBER, PRESIDENT ALFONSIN MET WITH BORRAS AND ARGOS. HE EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN WITH THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME OF THE ASTIZ AFFAIR, BUT HE MADE NO COMMITMENTS CONCERNING ANY STEPS WHICH HE MIGHT TAKE.
TEXT:

1. In several meetings in late March 1987, a group of officers representing the three Argentine armed services discussed the issue of the impending trials of Armed Forces (FFAA) personnel who allegedly committed human rights violations during the countersubversive campaign of the 1970's. In their discussions, the officers highlighted the different attitudes toward the trials issue which exist in the navy and the army on the one hand and in the air force on the other hand.

2. In the first of the meetings, navy and army officers argued that the A-57 should publish a statement in nationally-circulated newspapers in support of those accused of human rights violations. They noted that the statement should criticize the administration of President Raul ((Alfonsin)) for allowing the prosecution of the very people who are responsible for creating a climate in which democracy could flourish. For their part, air force officers took exception to the argument of the navy and army officers and said they would take the matter up with Major General ("Brigadier Mayor") Ernesto Horacio ((Crespo)), the chief of the air force general staff (EMGFA).

3. Crespo later met with the air force officers from the A-57 and thanked them for their show of loyalty in bringing the issue of the statement to his attention. He said that such public statements...
NOTHING TO HELP THOSE FACING TRIALS AND, THEREFORE, COMPLICATE MATTERS FOR THE CHIEFS OF THE GENERAL STAFFS OF THE THREE SERVICES WHO ARE TRYING TO SEEK POSITIVE SOLUTIONS FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WITH REGARD TO THE TRIALS IN THIS MEETING, CRESPO INDICATED TO THE AIR FORCE OFFICERS THAT HE IS NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE ALFONSN ADMINISTRATION, WHICH HE DESCRIBED IN COLORFUL TERMS AS A "MESS." HE POINTED OUT THAT HIS PRIMARY INTEREST CENTERS ON PRESERVING THE AIR FORCE AS AN INSTITUTION. CONCLUDING HIS REMARKS, CRESPO ASKED THE AIR FORCE OFFICERS TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO SMOOTH THE TONE OF ANY PRONOUNCEMENT RELEASED BY THE A-57, IF THE ARMY AND NAVY MEMBERS INSISTED ON THE ASSOCIATION'S TAKING A PUBLIC STATEMENT. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH CRESPO, THE AIR FORCE MEMBERS OF THE A-57 MET AGAIN WITH THE NAVY AND ARMY MEMBERS AND WERE ABLE TO CONVINCE THEM TO DEFER THE PUBLICATION OF ANY LETTER UNTIL THE ASSOCIATION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMPLETE A STUDY ON ACTIONS WHICH COULD BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN THE "FAA.

4. AT THE SECOND MEETING OF THE A-57 MEMBERS, TWO ARMY COLONELS—RICARDO ((MATALONI)) AND JORGE ((KIEGER))—NOTED THAT THE SPEECH WHICH PRESIDENT ALFONSN HAD GIVEN IN THE CORDOBA PROVINCE CITY OF LAS PERDICES ON 23 MARCH HAD BEEN POORLY RECEIVED BY THE ARMY. MATALONI WENT ON TO SAY THAT CONTRARY TO SOME ALLEGATIONS, IT IS FAR FROM CERTAIN THAT AN ATMOSPHERE OF INDISCIPLINE EXISTS AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE. HE NOTED THAT THE WAR COLLEGE’S SENIOR OFFICERS HAD ALLOWED ACTS OF SOLIDARITY BY OFFICERS STATIONED AT THE COLLEGE WITH MILITARY ACADEMY CLASSMATES ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

5. IN THE SAME MEETING, NAVY CAPTAIN JULIO ((SALAS)) POINTED OUT THAT THE SITUATION OF REAR ADMIRAL RAMON ANTONIO ((AROSA)), THE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL GENERAL STAFF (EMGA), REMAINS "DELICATE" BECAUSE OF THE WIDESPREAD RESENTMENT AMONG NAVAL OFFICERS WHO PERCEIVE THAT HE HAS FAILED TO INTERCEDE WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN CASE OF NAVY OFFICERS ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. SALAS ADDED THAT COMMENTS BY VICE ADMIRAL MAXIMO ((RIVERO)) KELLY, THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE EMGA, IN WHICH RIVERO KELLY ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTAIN ACTIONS DURING THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN DID NOT REPRESENT THE SENTIMENTS OF NAVY OFFICERS AND HAD CAUSED SURPRISE AND DISMAY AMONG THEM.
SUBJ: OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY AS A RESULT OF
THE TRIALS ISSUE; COMMENTS ON GROUPS OF DISAFFECTED
OFFICERS; REPORTED ASSURANCES OF THE PRESIDENT
CONCERNING POST-TRIAL TREATMENT OF CONVICTED ARMED
FORCES PERSONNEL

SUMMARY:

Relations between the army and the administration remained "delicate" as a result of the impending
trials of armed forces (FFAA) personnel who allegedly committed human

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GROUP IN THE ARMY WAS THEN PLOTTING A COUP D'ETAT. NOTED THAT TO DATE, SENIOR ARMY COMMANDERS HAD MANAGED TO PERSUADE THEIR SUBORDINATES TO COMPLY WITH SUMMONSES FROM CIVILIAN COURTS DIRECTING THEIR APPEARANCE IN CASES INVOLVING THE ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

2. THE APPEARANCE OF "SUPPORT GROUPS" FOR OFFICERS ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS REPRESENTED THE GREATEST PROBLEM WHICH THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND THEN FACED. THESE SUPPORT GROUPS CONSIST OF OFFICERS WHO GRADUATED FROM THE MILITARY ACADEMY IN THE CLASSES ("PROMOCIONES") TO WHICH ACCUSED OFFICERS BELONG. HE NOTED THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SUPPORT GROUPS HAD CREATED A SITUATION IN WHICH ARMY OFFICERS--WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE AUTHORITY OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND IN ALL OTHER AREAS--"ANSWER" TO THE SUPPORT GROUPS ON MATTERS RELATED TO THE PROSECUTION OF THEIR PEERS IN CIVILIAN COURTS. HE ADDED THAT THE SUPPORT GROUPS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH CONSIST OF MAJORS OR LIEUTENANT COLONELS, WERE TRYING TO EXPAND THEIR RANGE OF CONTACT BY SEEKING SUPPORT FROM ARGENTINE NAVY (ARA) AND AIR FORCE (FAA) OFFICERS WHO GRADUATED FROM THEIR ACADEMIES IN THE SAME YEARS WHICH THE GROUPS REPRESENT. HE MADE THE POINT THAT THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND HAD BECOME CONCERNED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OR MORE OFFICERS CALLED BY THE CIVILIAN COURTS WOULD REFUSE TO APPEAR BECAUSE--AS A RESULT OF THE FORMATION OF THE SUPPORT GROUPS--OFFICERS WOULD FEEL CERTAIN THAT SUCH AN ACT OF DEFIANCE WOULD HAVE THE SUPPORT OF THEIR PEERS. HE ADDED THAT THIS SITUATION WOULD PLACE THE HIGH COMMAND IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO ARREST THE DEFIANT OFFICERS ON BEHALF OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES.

4. OTHER GROUPS OF DEFIANT OR DISAFFECITED OFFICERS EXIST IN THE ARMY, BUT HE DISMISSED THESE GROUPS AS HAVING LITTLE OR NO IMPORTANCE. ONE SUCH GROUP, WHICH HE STRESSED IS QUITE SMALL, CONSISTS PRIMARILY OF RETIRED COLONELS AND GENERAL OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN CALLING ACTIVELY FOR A COUP D'ETAT. HE CHARACTERIZED THESE RETIRED OFFICERS AS INDULGING MORE IN "COFFEE HOUSE CHATTER" THAN IN SERIOUS PLANNING. THIS GROUP HAS NO SUPPORT AMONG SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS. ANOTHER GROUP, MADE UP OF ACTIVE DUTY COLONELS AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS, HAS BEEN CALLING FOR MORE ACTION BY ARMY CORPS COMMANDERS WHOM THE GROUP WOULD LIKE TO SEE INTIMIDATE THE ADMINISTRATION WITH THE THREAT OF DISRUPTING PUBLIC ORDER IN HOPES OF FORCING THE GOVERNMENT TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT OF THE TRIALS ISSUE WITH THE FAA. THIS SECOND GROUP BASES ITS PLANS ON A MODEL WHICH ITS MEMBERS SAY THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE URUGUAYAN ARMY USED IN PRESSURING THE GOVERNMENT INTO DECLARING AN AMNESTY FOR URUGUAYAN OFFICERS ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. HE CLAIMED THAT ARGENTINE ARMY OFFICERS RECOGNIZE THAT THE SITUATION WHICH ALLOWED AN AMNESTY IN URUGUAY DOES NOT EXIST IN ARGENTINA AND THAT, CONSEQUENTLY, THE GROUP HAS LITTLE APPEAL IN THE ARMY.

5. TENSIONS WOULD RISE CONSIDERABLY WHEN THE CIVILIAN COURTS BEGIN HEARING CASES OF ALLEGED HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES COMMITTED BY OFFICERS ONCE ASSIGNED TO THE FORMER I CORPS. THESE CASES WOULD BRING ABOUT NEW EFFORTS IN CERTAIN QUARTERS IN THE ARMY TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT TO HALT THE TRIALS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE AND THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL ARE THE CENTER OF A SECRET INTELLIGENCE
6. **ENDED HIS REMARKS BY SAYING THAT MAJOR GENERAL SECTOR LUIS ((RIOS)) ERENU HAD RECEIVED PRIVATE ASSURANCES FROM PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSI)) THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD PARDON, OR COMMUTE THE SENTENCES OF, FFAA PERSONNEL WHO, ACCORDING TO A DETERMINATION BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, HAD ACTED IN COMPLIANCE WITH ORDERS—THE PRINCIPLE OF DUE OBEDIENCE—and who had not been **CONVICTED OF MURDER OR TORTURE.
SUBJECT: ALFONSIN PLANS TO HANDLE INSURRECTION ACTION

1. AT REQUEST PRESIDENT, SOURROUILLE GAVE ME A SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT PLANS TO HANDLE THE INSURRECTION SITUATION IN ONE UNIT IN CORDOBA WHERE ONE MAJOR WHO WAS SUPPOSED TO APPEAR IN COURT ON HUMAN RIGHTS CHARGES APRIL 15 HAS BEEN GIVEN PROTECTION BY THIS REGIMENT.

2. AS MORNING PRESS MAKES CLEAR, MAJOR BARREIRO WAS DISCHARGED DISHONORABLY FROM THE ARMY LAST NIGHT. ALFONSIN HAS CANCELLED HIS NEEDED EASTER VACATION AND IS COORDINATING OPERATIONS WITH HIS KEY ADVISORS.

3. HIS POLICY IS TO BE FIRM BUT TO HANDLE THE SITUATION CAREFULLY. THE GOA DOES NOT YET HAVE FORCES POSITIONED FOR A THREATENED OR ACTUAL CONFRONTATION.

4. A STATE OF SIEGE WILL BE DECLARED PROBABLY TODAY AND THE CONGRESS CALLED TO RATIFY IT. EFFORTS ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY TO OBTAIN SUPPORT FROM OPPOSITION POLITICIANS, BUSINESSMEN AND OTHER GROUPS TO MAKE CLEAR THE ENTIRE COUNTRY IS BEHIND THE PRESIDENT.

5. THE PRESIDENT WILL TRY TO DRAW THE LINE ON THIS FIRST CASE TO AVOID AN UNRAVELLING OF HIS AUTHORITY.

6. I PASSED THE MESSAGE TO ALFONSIN THAT WE ARE, AS IN THE PAST, PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL TO THE EXTENT WE CAN, INCLUDING A POTENTIAL STATEMENT HERE OR IN WASHINGTON BUT ONLY INCORPORATING ANY SUCH STATEMENT IN ALFONSIN’S OVERALL STRATEGY.

7. COMMENT: CORDOBA HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN THE HOTBED OF MILITARY UNREST, BUT EVENTS THERE HAVE HISTORICALLY BEEN LOCALIZED IF THEY DO NOT RECEIVE MAJOR SUPPORT ELSEWHERE. WE BELIEVE ALFONSIN WILL MOUNT VIGOROUS NEGOTIATION EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE SITUATION OF THIS OFFICER WHILE RALLYING THE COUNTRY BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE RULE OF LAW INCLUDING THE APPEARANCE IN COURT OF THOSE ACTIVE MILITARY OFFICERS CALLED. THE COUNTRY WILL GIVE THIS SUPPORT.

9. UNTIL WE GET A SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR A STATEMENT FROM ALFONSIN, I URGE THE DEPARTMENT NOT COMMENT. A U.S. STATEMENT MIGHT DELAY SUPPORT FROM SOME DOMESTIC GROUPS, AND ANY EVENTUAL STATEMENT SHOULD FIT PRECISELY WITHIN THE OVERALL STRATEGY WHICH ALFONSIN, JAUNARENA, NOSIGLIA, AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN PREPARING FOR OVER A MONTH FOR JUST THE CURRENT SCENARIO. BARREIRO’S ACTION WAS NOT A SURPRISE.

10. NOTE: THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE CONTADORA AND...
SUPPORT GROUP COUNTRIES ARE SIT TED IN AMOUNT - TON AND THE GOA CAN ARRANGE THEIR SUPPORT IF SUCH FITS THEIR STRATEGY. GILDRED
SUBJECT: INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE ARGENTINE ARMY’S MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CENTER CONCERNING THE REBELLION OF THE 14TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (AIRBORNE) AND RELATED TOPICS

*** INCOMPLETE CABLE ***

PART 1 OF 2

REPORT CLASS SECRET

DATE: 16 APRIL 1987

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJECT: INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE ARGENTINE ARMY’S MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CENTER CONCERNING THE REBELLION OF THE 14TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (AIRBORNE) AND RELATED TOPICS

C01: 16 APRIL 1987

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INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE CENTER CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN CORDOBA IN WHICH A NOW-FORMER ACTIVE DUTY MAJOR SOUGHT AND OBTAINED SUPPORT AND PROTECTION FROM AN ARMY UNIT. HE PROVIDED AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AS NOTED THE ARMY’S EFFORTS TO RESOLVE IT. HE ALSO PROVIDED INFORMATION ON THE ADMINISTRATION’S PLANS FOR DEALING WITH THE SITUATION CAUSED BY THE REBELLIOUS OFFICER AND UNIT. HE DESCRIBED AN INCIDENT WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE ON 15 APRIL AT THE ARMY’S "CAMPO DE MAYO" BASE, AND HE NOTED THAT THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF SEES 21 APRIL AS A KEY DAY IN MILITARY-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.
INFORMED MAJOR GENERAL HECTOR (R) RENU, THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF (EMGE), THAT RIOS HAS HIS SUPPORT BUT THAT FICHERA DOES NOT HAVE ENOUGH MEN TO SEIZE THE 14TH INFANTRY’S COMPOUND BY FORCE. FICHERA ALSO TOLD RIOS THAT TWO OTHER PRINCIPAL REGIMENTS IN THE CORDOBA AREA – THE SECOND INFANTRY (AIRBORNE) AND THE 5TH ARTILLERY, AS WELL AS AIRBORNE ENGINEER AND COMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES, HAD SAID TO HIM THAT THOUGH THEY DO NOT SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 14TH REGIMENT, THEY WOULD NOT INTERVENE BY FORCE IN AN ATTEMPT TO ARREST BARREIRO.

POLO IS AN ARDENT NATIONALIST AND A FOLLOWER OF RIGHTWING, NATIONALIST ARMY COLONEL MOHAMED ALI (SENEFELMEN).

2. ON 16 APRIL THAT BARREIRO AND HIS SUPPORTERS APPARENTLY HAVE THE OBJECTIVE OF CAUSING PROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT WHILE NOT ADVOCATING A COUP D’ETAT. HE NOTED THAT THESE OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT BARREIRO AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN ACCUSED INJUSTLY AND THAT THEY PROBABLY WANT TO CALL ATTENTION TO THEIR SITUATION. HE ADDED THAT THE OFFICERS SUPPORTING AND SHELTERING BARREIRO HAVE NO SPECIFIC PLANS OTHER THAN PROTECTING HIM AND OTHERS WHO WISH TO TAKE REFUGE IN ARMY UNITS. HE ALSO SAID BARREIRO CLAIMS TO HAVE SUPPORT IN 30 ARMY UNITS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, BUT HE ADDED THAT THIS IS ONLY A BOAST. HE WENT ON TO SAY THE CENTER BELIEVES THAT BARREIRO AND HIS SUPPORTERS DO NOT HAVE ANY SUPPORT FROM ACTIVE DUTY GENERAL OFFICERS OR COLONELS, BUT RATHER THAT HIS SUPPORT COMES FROM LIEUTENANT COLONELS, MAJORS, AND CAPTAINS.

3. HE NOTED THAT AS OF THE AFTERNOON OF 16 APRIL, THE ADMINISTRATION WAS PLANNING TO GIVE THE ARMY MORE TIME IN WHICH TO SETTLE THE AFFAIR PEACEFULLY. HE ALSO SAID THE ARMY HAD PLANNED TO SEND MAJOR GENERAL MARIO JAIME (SANCHEZ), THE VICE CHIEF OF THE EMGE TO CORDOBA WITH THE MISSION OF TRYING TO CONVINCE POLO TO SURRENDER THE MAJOR. HE ADDED THAT THE CENTER HAD NO INFORMATION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE GOVERNMENT PLANS TO HAVE THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE (PFA) OR THE PARAMILITARY NATIONAL GENDARMERIE (GN) ATTEMPT TO SEIZE BARREIRO BY FORCE.

4. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT (GOA) IS PLANNING A LARGE PUBLICITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION CAMPAIGN WHICH WILL INVOLVE ARGENTINES FROM ALL WALKS OF LIFE AND FOREIGN POLITICAL DIGNITARIES IN CALLING PUBLICLY FOR SUPPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION. ON 16 APRIL, THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY CONVENED GROUPS OF ARGENTINES REPRESENTING DIFFERENT POLITICAL SECTORS AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE (THE "CASA ROSADA") TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION. LEOPOLDO (MOREAU) IS ONE LEADING FIGURE OF THE GOVERNING RADICAL CIVIC UNION (UCR) WHO FAVORS THE GOVERNMENT’S TAKING IMMEDIATE AND STRONG ACTION AGAINST BARREIRO AND HIS SUPPORTERS IN THE 14TH INFANTRY. A POLITICIAN ATTENDING A MEETING AT THE "CASA ROSADA" RECOMMENDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT ASK ARMY PERSONNEL TO LEAVE THEIR BARRACKS AND DEMONSTRATE IN THE STREETS IN FAVOR OF
SUBJ: COMMENTS BY ARMY AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THEIR SERVICES AS A RESULT OF THE TRIALS ISSUE

TEXT:

HE THAT THE COMMANDERS OF THREE ARMY REGIMENTS, WHICH HE DID NOT IDENTIFY, HAD TOLD MAJOR GENERAL HECTOR LUIS ((RIOS)) ERENU, THE CHIEF OF THE EMGE, IN EARLY APRIL THAT THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THEIR REGIMENTS WERE PREPARED TO HARBOR, AND TO DEFEND WITH THEIR WEAPONS IF NECESSARY, ANY MEMBERS OF THEIR UNITS WHO DID NOT WANT TO APPEAR BEFORE CIVILIAN COURTS TO ANSWER CHARGES ARISING FROM THE COUNTERSUBLIERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. ADDED THAT ACCORDING TO AN OFFICER WHO HAD SPOKEN WITH RIOS ERENU, THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF HAD ADVISED MINISTER OF DEFENSE JOSE HORACIO ((JAUNARENA)) OF THIS INFORMATION AND THAT JAUNARENA IN TURN HAD SPOKEN WITH PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSI)). HE NOTED THAT REPORTEDLY, ALFONSI HAD TOLD THE DEFENSE MINISTER THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER FURTHER FOLLOWING THE APRIL VISIT OF POPE ((JOHN PAUL II)) TO ARGENTINA.

2. ANOTHER OFFICER, WHOM HE DID NOT IDENTIFY EXCEPT TO POINT OUT THAT HE WAS A REPRESENTATIVE OF MILITARY ACADEMY GRADUATING CLASSES ("PROMOCIONES") OF 19 TO 107, HAD SPOKEN TO RIOS ERENU IN WEEK OF 22 MARCH ABOUT THE CASE OF ARMY CAPTAIN ENRIQUE ((MONES)) RUIZ, WHO IS EXPECTED TO FACE DETENTION AND TRIAL IN THE COMING MONTHS. HE NOTED THAT THE OFFICER HAD TOLD RIOS ERENU THAT MEMBERS OF THE CLASSES HAD NO IDEA ABOUT THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY SHOULD DEAL WITH THE CASE OF MONES, IF INDEED THAT SHOULD DO ANYTHING AT ALL. HE ADDED THAT THE OFFICER HAD ALSO SAID THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE GRADUATING CLASSES FELT LEADERLESS,
 noting that they had looked to Army Colonel Mohamed Ali (Seinfeldin), who was recently reassigned to Panama, for guidance. The representative officer finally indicated to Rios Erenu that the classes would not plan any action on
their own in defense of Mones.
3. Also in early April, officers at the main
Argentine Navy (ARA) base at Puerto Belgran6 and ARA officers
assigned to the Buenos Aires area had not received well a letter
which Vice Admiral Maximo (Rivero) Kelly had sent to a Buenos Aires
newspaper. With the letter—which represented Rivero Kelly's only statement on the trials issue, the
Admiral was making his own defense and was not defending his ARA
colleagues. He asserted that whom he did not identify, there exist no firm plans or even intentions in the
navy for taking action against, or in defiance of, civilian court
actions.
4. Finally, the situation of Navy
Lieutenant Alfredo (Astiz), who faces trial for human rights
violations allegedly committed at the Naval Mechanics School (ESMA).
He noted that although supposedly under detention at the Puerto
Belgran6 base, Astiz has been seen on the streets of Buenos Aires on
several occasions. He claimed that Vice Admiral Ramon Antonio
(Arosa), the Chief of the Navy General Staff, and the Commander of
the Puerto Belgran6 base had discussed the matter of Astiz' detention
and had reached the conclusion that they cannot and should not do
anything about the Lieutenant's leaving the base.
REPORT CLASS  S  E  C  R  E  T

DIST:  16 APRIL 1987
COUNTRY:  ARGENTINA
SUBJECT:  REBELLION OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY'S 14TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (AIRBORNE); INITIAL DECISION OF PRESIDENT ALFONSI TO FORCE THE ARREST OF OFFICERS INVOLVED

OI:  15 APRIL 1987

TEXT:  1. LIEUTENANT COLONEL ENRIQUE DEL ((FINO)), THE OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF AN ARGENTINE ARMY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION CENTER (CRIM) OFFICE INVOLVED IN COORDINATION AND LIAISON MATTERS, COMMENTED ON 15 APRIL 1987 THAT EARLIER IN THE DAY, OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY'S 14TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (AIRBORNE) HAD DECLARED LOCAL CONTROL OF THE REGIMENT IN ORDER TO PROTECT MAJOR ERNESTO G. ((BARREIRO)), AN ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OFFICER WHO HAD FLED TO THE REGIMENT RATHER THAN REPORT TO A CIVILIAN COURT IN CORDOBA WITH REGARD TO CHARGES OF COMMITTING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. DEL FINO IDENTIFIED THE THREE KEY OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT AT THE 14TH INFANTRY REGIMENT AS BERREIRO AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS ((SCHIERANO)) ((FNU)) AND ((GONZALEZ)) NAYA ((FNU)). HE ADDED THAT A TOTAL OF SEVENTEEN OFFICERS ARE INVOLVED, INCLUDING OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO OTHER UNITS OF III CORPS, TO WHICH THE 14TH INFANTRY IS SUBORDINATE. HE ALSO SAID THAT THESE SEVENTEEN OFFICERS CAN CALL ON THE SUPPORT OF OTHER OFFICERS WHO FOUGHT IN THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN AND WHO ARE ASSIGNED THROUGHOUT THE ARMY. HE ASSERTED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL ANTONINO ((FICHERA)), THE III CORPS COMMANDER, AND HIS MOST SENIOR OFFICERS WERE ALLOWING THE INCIDENT IN THE 14TH INFANTRY TO DEVELOP AND WERE NOT TAKING ANY STEPS TO BLOCK IT, BUT HE DID NOT EXPLAIN OR EXPAND
4TH INFANTRY. THE UNIT IS A PARATROOP REGIMENT AND IT CONSISTS OF PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS WHO ARE WILLING TO FIGHT AND TO TAKE CASUALTIES SHOULD THE ADMINISTRATION ORDER AN ATTEMPT TO RETAKE CONTROL OF THE UNIT.

"A MAJOR HUGO JOSE ((SCHIERANO)) WAS ON ACTIVE DUTY AT THAT TIME, AS WERE LIEUTENANT COLONEL GUILLERMO ENRIQUE ((GONZALEZ)) NAYA AND MAJOR ARTURO FELIX ((GONZALEZ)) NAYA. THE TWO OFFICERS WHO WERE MAJORS IN 1982 MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH THE TWO LIEUTENANT COLONELS OF WHOM DEL PINO SPOKE.

2. DEL PINO WENT ON TO SAY THAT AT 1900 HOURS (LOCAL) ON 15 APRIL, PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)) HAD ORDERED THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE (MOD), THE NATIONAL GENDARMERIE (GN), AND THE ARGENTINE FEDERAL POLICE (PFA) TO RETAKE THE 14TH INFANTRY AND TO ARREST BARREIRO. HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS STILL RECEIVING CONFLICTING ADVICE WITH REGARD TO THE MANNER IN WHICH HE SHOULD HANDLE THE SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT ENRIQUE "COTI" (NOSIGLIA)) OF THE NATIONAL COORDINATING BOARD (JCN OR "COORDINADORA"), OTHER MODERATE MEMBERS OF THE FACTION, AND HE WERE COUNSELING THE PRESIDENT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE OFFICERS WHO HAD TAKEN OVER THE 14TH INFANTRY, WHILE MORE LEFTIST ADVISORS, INCLUDING A MEMBER OF THE ((STORANI)) FAMILY, WERE TELLING HIM THAT HE SHOULD ACT QUICKLY TO RETAKE THE REGIMENT. DEL PINO ADDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS ATTEMPTING TO PLACE A NEWS BLACKOUT ON THE TAKEOVER OF THE 14TH INFANTRY AND IS CENSORING ALL ITEMS PERTAINING TO THE INCIDENT.

3.

4.
SUBJ: COMMENTS BY AN OFFICER ASSIGNED TO NAVY HEADQUARTERS CONCERNING ATTITUDES IN THE COUNCIL OF ADMIRALS AND CONCERNING DISCONTENT IN THE NAVY

TEXT:

1. In the latter part of March 1987, the Council of Admirals, which represents the Service's flag officers, has taken a firm commitment for capping the large amount of dissent among line officers in the ranks of lieutenant commander and commander with regard to the impending civilian court trials of ARA personnel accused of human rights abuses in the countersubversive campaign of the 1970's. Without explaining the commitment of which a perceived lack of support by the ARA's senior officers for anti-administration activities has prevented junior officers from declaring their unwillingness to answer summonses from civilian courts. That for its part, the Council of Admirals hopes to sacrifice the active duty and retired ARA personnel already accused of human rights abuses as the only group of naval personnel responsible for such abuses. The Council had taken this position in hope that the ARA could emerge from the current situation unchanged as an institution—and with the Council's members still in charge.

2. In the Navy toward the impending trials of ARA personnel has taken the form of a psychological campaign designed to magnify the undercurrent of discontent in the service in an effort to place pressure on the executive and judicial branches by creating the impression that constitutional order is threatened. Among active duty officers, this resistance is directed by leading figures of several Naval Academy graduating classes, officers and
The efforts of these groups is complemented by a group of retired ARA personnel who call for more hard-line measures and who, as he termed it, are prone to think in terms of a coup d'état. However, that active duty officers remain more circumspect about calls for action since in the absence of support from above, they stand to lose their careers.

3. The ARA’s top command is most concerned about reactions of naval personnel at the time at which the civilian courts hand down sentences in the case of the active duty and retired officers now facing trial, which the high command expects to occur before the end of 1987. The council of admirals believes that the removal of Vice Admiral Ramon (Arosa) as the chief of the navy general staff (EMGA) would represent one way of lessening tension in the service. Many ARA officers see Arosa as buckling under to the administration by failing to defend the actions of his subordinates who now face trial by saying that they had done nothing more than follow the orders of senior officers. Officers assigned to the ARA’s principal operating base at Puerto Belgrano had registered the strongest resistance thus far toward Arosa.

4.
REPORT CLASS  S E C R E T

DIST:  15 APRIL 1987
COUNTRY:  ARGENTINA
SUBJ:  VIEWS OF PRESIDENT ALFONSIN ON THE ISSUE OF PARDONS FOR ARMED FORCES OFFICERS; THE PRESIDENT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE ARMED FORCES

TEXT:  1. IN THE WEEK OF 15 MARCH 1987, ARGENTINE PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)) TOLD THE CHIEFS OF THE GENERAL STAFFS OF THE THREE ARMED SERVICES AND PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS THAT WITH A VIEW TOWARD EVENTUALLY GRANTING PARDONS, HE WAS THEN INTENDING TO REVIEW THE TRIALS AND CONVICTIONS OF ANY ARMED FORCES (FFAA) OFFICERS ACCUSED OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S. PRESIDENT ALFONSIN NOTED THAT A KEY DETERMINATION WITH REGARD TO A DECISION TO GRANT A PARDON WOULD CONSIST IN A CHIEF OF A SERVICE GENERAL STAFF STIPULATING THAT AN INDIVIDUAL IN QUESTION WAS FOLLOWING THE ORDERS OF A SUPERIOR OFFICER. THE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT ONCE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH DETERMINES THAT SUCH A STIPULATION IS CORRECT, A PARDON WOULD BE GRANTED TO THE INDIVIDUAL CONCERNED--WITHOUT SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF "DUE OBEEDIENCE." ALFONSIN MADE THAT POINT THAT PARDONS WOULD NOT BE GRANTED TO INDIVIDUALS FOUND GUILTY OF PREMEDITATED MURDER, MURDER FOR GAIN, OR TORTURE.

2. ALSO IN THE WEEK OF 15 MARCH, PRESIDENT ALFONSIN TOLD ADVISERS THAT HE FEELS THE CRISIS WHICH EXISTS IN THE ARMED FORCES AS THE RESULT OF THE TRIALS ISSUE WOULD COME TO A HAPPY ENDING IN 1988, AS HE PHRASED IT. THE PRESIDENT WENT ON TO SAY HE BELIEVES THAT SENIOR ARMY AND NAVY OFFICERS HAD EXAGERATED TO HIM THE DISCONTENT IN THEIR SERVICES IN HOPES OF PRESSURING THE ADMINISTRATION INTO DECLARING AN AMNESTY--SOMETHING WHICH ALFONSIN STRESSED HIS ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT DO.

3. [TEXT OMITTED]

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SUBJECT: GOA SEEKS BROAD-BASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN RESPONSE TO MAJOR'S DEFIANCE

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

"BEGIN SUMMARY"

2. SUMMARY: A KEY ELEMENT IN GOA'S IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO MAJOR BARREIRO'S DEFIANCE OF CORDOBA FEDERAL COURT IS EFFORT TO BRING FORTH AN OUTPOURING OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND RULE OF LAW WITH A VIEW TO DEMONSTRATING TO DISSIDENT ARMY ELEMENTS THAT THEY HAVE NO POPULAR SUPPORT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT DECLARATION OF A STATE OF SIEGE IS A POSSIBLE PARALLEL STEP TO HIGHTEN PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION. THE GOA HAS THUS FAR NOT MOVED TO HAVE BARREIRO CAPTURED FORCIBLY, ALTHOUGH THE JUDICIAL ORDER OF CAPTURE HAS BEEN PASSED BY MOD TO THE ARMY. BARREIRO AND HIS MID-LEVEL ARMY SUPPORTERS REMAIN TOTALLY CONVINCED THEY ARE RIGHT. THEY SAY THEIR INTENTION IS NOT TO PROVOKE A COUP, BUT RATHER TO SEEK VINDICATION. THE DANGER IS THAT RESISTANCE COULD SPREAD TO OTHER REGIMENTS, OR THAT LARGER UNITS, SUCH AS ARMY III CORPS, COULD TAKE UP BARREIRO'S CAUSE. SITUATION IS NOT LIKELY TO BE RESOLVED RAPIDLY. NOR ARE THERE MANY REALISTIC APPROACHES. AS WE HAVE SPECULATED ALL ALONG, SHARPLY HEIGHTENED PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT STABILITY OF SYSTEM COULD CREATE BASIS FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION, POSSIBLY IN FORM OF AMNESTY LEGISLATION. END SUMMARY.

"END SUMMARY"

3. THE GOA IS MOVING TO STIMULATE MASSIVE OUTPOURING OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC ORDER IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO BUILD PRESSURE ON BARREIRO AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO GIVE UP THEIR DEFIANCE.

-- NUMEROUS RADICAL AND PERONIST LEADERS WENT TO THE CASA ROSADA THIS MORNING TO EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY TO PRESIDENT ALFONSI.

-- GOA CALLED A MAJOR DEMONSTRATION WITH THE THEME "DEMOCRACY OR DICTATORSHIP" TO TAKE PLACE AT 1700 LOCAL TIME IN PLAZA DEL CONGRESO IN BUENOS AIRES.
ATTENDANCE AT DEMONSTRATION, CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS, IS REPORTEDLY MASSIVE. SOME DESCRIBE TURNOUT AS GREATER THAN FOR POPE. LOCAL RADIO IS ASKING ALL RESIDENTS TO GO TO NEAREST SQUARE OR PLAZA TO EXPRESS THEIR SOLIDARITY.

-- SIMILAR DEMONSTRATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE IN OTHER MAJOR CITIES.

-- PRESIDENT ALFONSN WILL ADDRESS THE NATION ON THE SITUATION AT 2100 TONIGHT.

-- DEPUTY MARCELO STUBRIN, WHO HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN PALACE DECISION SINCE PRE-DAWN HINTED TO US THAT FONMIN CAPUTO WOULD SHORTLY INITIATE AN EFFORT TO OBTAIN INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. RADIO HAS ALREADY ANNOUNCED THAT ALFONSN RECEIVED MESSAGES OF SUPPORT FROM PRESIDENTS OF BRAZIL AND PERU, PROBABLY STIMULATED THROUGH FONMINS HERE FOR CONTADORA MEETING.

4. WE CONTINUE TO HEAR REPORTS THAT A DECLARATION OF A STATE OF SIEGE IS IMMINENT, AND THAT IT WILL INCLUDE A CURFEW. STATE OF SIEGE WOULD NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ANY OSTENSIBLE EFFECT ON SITUATION IN CORDOBA, BUT WOULD SERVE TO ALERT COUNTRY CLEARLY TO DANGER IMPLICIT IN SITUATION AND STIMULATE PRESSURE FOR RESOLUTION.

5. THE GOA HAS THUS FAR NOT MOVED TO HAVE BARREIRO CAPTURED FORCIBLY, ALTHOUGH THE JUDICIAL ORDER FOR CAPTURE HAS BEEN PASSED BY MOD TO ARMY. AT THIS POINT, IT APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT ARMY III CORPS WILL AGREE TO USE FORCE AGAINST ITS 14TH REGIMENT. CALLING IN GENDARMERIA IS POSSIBLE FUTURE OPTION, BUT LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE WEIGHTY. BY POSTPONING USE OF FORCE, GOA IS ATTEMPTING TO HOLD DOOR OPEN TO SOME SORT OF NEGOTIATED OR POLITICAL SOLUTION.

CINCSO AND CINCLANT ALSO FOR INTAFF
3.0. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, AR
SUBJECT: GOA SEEKS BROAD-BASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR BARREIRO AND HIS MID-LEVEL ARMY SUPPORTERS REMAIN TOTALY CONVINCED THAT THEY ARE ON THE SIDE OF JUSTICE AND RIGHT. THEY CONSIDER HUMAN RIGHTS TRIALS PROCESS UNFAIR, DISCRIMINATORY AND RANDOM IN NATURE. THEY SEE THEMSELVES AS HEROES WHO WON A WAR AGAINST A SUBVERSIVE MENACE. THERE APPEARS TO BE AN ELEMENT OF ANATICISM IN THEIR POSITION WHICH MAY MAKE ANY SOLUTION NOT INVOLVING VINDICATION EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO ACCEPT.

A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS COMPLICATION IS THAT SIMILAR SITUATION MAY ARISE IN OTHER REGIMENTS. IF THE GOA CANNOT OR WILL NOT END THE CORDOBA INCIDENT, OTHER ARMY UNITS, SENSING GOVERNMENT WEAKNESS, OULD ADD THEIR SUPPORT TO THE DEFIANCE. IT IS WELKNOW THAT BARREIRO HAS CONSIDERABLE LATERAL SUPPORT WITHIN THE ARMY. SOME OTHER REGIMENTS HAD SUPPORTED BARREIRO'S STANCE. IN ADDITION, A III CORPS CAPTAIN SAYS THE III CORPS "DOES NOT SUPPORT THE AUTHORITY
AND "MANY GARRISONS" HAVE THE SAME ATTITUDE AS THE 14TH. WHAT IS NOT CERTAIN YET IS THE EXTENT OF UPWARD SUPPORT. ADDITIONAL DEFICIENCY COULD OCCUR AS A RESULT OF SPECIFIC CASES, (TWO CAPTAINS ARE SCHEDULED TO TESTIFY NEXT WEEK AND AT LEAST ONE IS REPORTEDLY PREPARED TO RESPOND LIKE BARREIRO) OR AS A GENERALIZED EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT, NOT TRIGGERED BY ANY SPECIFIC INCIDENT.

8. THIS SITUATION COULD BREAK IN MANY DIFFERENT WAYS. FOR EXAMPLE, BARREIRO AND SUPPORTERS COULD CAPITULATE TO PUBLIC AND GOA PRESSURE. THERE COULD BE A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. DEPUTY ARMY COS GENERAL SANCHEZ HAS GONE TO CORDOBA, PRESUMABLY IN THAT CONNECTION. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS BLOODSHED. THE GOA COULD ORDER OTHER ARMY UNITS, THE GENDARMERIA OR EVEN PROVINCIAL POLICE TO ATTEMPT TO MAKE THE ARREST. IT IS, OF COURSE, ALSO POSSIBLE THAT VASTLY HEIGHTENED PERCEPTION OF DANGER TO POLITICAL SYSTEM, WHICH WILL BE EMPHASIZED BY A STATE OF SIEGE, WILL ESTABLISH THE BASIS FOR A MOVE TO SOLVE THE OVERALL MILITARY HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION THROUGH AMNESTY LEGISLATION. HOWEVER, WHIPPING UP PUBLIC SENTIMENTS TO BUTTRESS RULE OF LAW MAY HAVE OPPOSITE EFFECT OF DIMINISHING CHANCES FOR A QUICK-FIX AMNESTY LAW SOLUTION.

GILDRED
SUBJ: INTENTION OF AN ACTIVE DUTY ARMY OFFICER TO FORCE THE ADMINISTRATION'S HAND ON THE TRIALS ISSUE; POSSIBILITY THAT SEVERAL ARMY OFFICERS WILL NOT ANSWER COURT SUMMONSES AND THAT ARMY PERSONNEL WILL HARBOR AND DEFEND THEM

2. On 9 April 1987, an active duty army officer who himself faces trial on charges of human rights violations in the countersubversive campaign of the 1970's told a colleague that Major Ernesto ((Barreiro)), an active duty army officer, plans to force the government's hand on the trials issue by creating a situation in which the administration would have to act against him or would have to negotiate with the army on the issue. The officer noted that Barreiro has the ultimate goal of forcing an end to the trials of army personnel. He noted that Barreiro plans to force the government's hand by staying firm in his intention not to appear in a civilian court in Mendoza as scheduled on 15 April, even though the major has deliberately given misleading public indications that he would answer his summons. He pointed out that Barreiro says he will report to an army unit in Cordoba as scheduled on 13 April for pre-trial briefings, but will seek refuge in a unit prior to the time set for his court appearance the officer...
ADDED THAT BARREIRO BELIEVES THAT BY GOING TO A UNI FOR REFUGE, HE CAN FORCE THE GOVERNMENT’S HAND AND RECEIVE PROTECTION FROM ARREST. HE WENT ON TO SAY THE MAJOR HAS POINTED OUT THAT “PEOPLE” WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN ABOUT REFUGE, INDIVIDUALS WHOM HE HAS NOT IDENTIFIED, HAD DISCUSSED WHAT THEY WOULD DO IF A CIVILIAN GROUP CAME TO DEMONSTRATE AND HAD SAID THEY WOULD USE DEADLY FORCE AGAINST EVEN CIVILIANS IF NECESSARY. HE NOTED BARREIRO HAD REMARKED THAT IF THE ADMINISTRATION DECIDED TO USE THE PARAMILITARY NATIONAL GENDARMERIE TO ARREST HIM, THE ENSUING PROBLEM WOULD BE THE ARMY’S. HE ADDED THAT DESPITE HIS INTENTIONS AND REMARKS, BARREIRO CLAIMS HE IS NOT TRYING IN ANY WAY TO INSTIGATE A COUP D’ETAT. (DRAWING IN ARGENTINE WIRE SERVICE DISPATCHES, THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE BUENOS AIRES "HERALD" REPORTED ON 10 APRIL THAT BARREIRO HAS PUBLICLY VOICED HIS OPPOSITION TO BEING TRIED IN A FEDERAL COURT.)

3. BARREIRO WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE SITUATION IN THE ARMY AS “A STATE OF FLUX.” HE NOTED THAT SEVERAL GROUPS OF MID-LEVEL ACTIVE DUTY OFFICERS—PARTICULARLY MAJORS AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS—AND OF RETIRED OFFICERS ARE PREPARED TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND TO TAKE NON-VIOLENT ACTIONS IN OPPOSITION TO THE IMPENDING TRIALS, BUT LACK AN INITIAL IMPELMENTING FOR DOING SO. HE ADDED THAT MEMBERS OF MANY OF THESE GROUPS BELIEVE THAT BARREIRO’S PLAN TO TAKE REFUGE IN AN ARMY UNIT RATHER THAN APPEAR IN A CIVILIAN COURT COULD PROVIDE THEM WITH THE IMPETUS OR PROXIMATE CAUSE WHICH THEY NEED.

4.

5. 8 APRIL THAT THERE EXISTS A VERY GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT IN MID- TO LATE APRIL, SEVERAL ARMY OFFICERS WHOM HE DID NOT IDENTIFY WOULD NOT ANSWER SUMMONSES TO TESTIFY BEFORE CIVILIAN JUDGES. HE ADDED THAT SOME ARMY UNITS, WHICH AGAIN HE DID NOT IDENTIFY, ARE PREPARED TO HARBOR AND TO DEFEND THESE OFFICERS. HE ADDED THAT THE INTENTIONS OF THE OFFICERS AND THE UNITS SHOULD BE SEEN AS AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSI)) TO BARGAIN ON THE TRIALS ISSUE AND SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS AN ATTEMPT TO CARRY OUT A COUP D’ETAT.
WASHINGTON DISSEMM:
TO WHSITRM: EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR,
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM.
TO STATE EXCLUSIVE FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INR.
TO DIA EXCLUSIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, DIA.
REPORT CLASS SECRET

DIST: 13 APRIL 1987

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: COMMENTS CONCERNING A HARDENING OF ATTITUDES IN THE ARMY AND NAVY WITH REGARD TO THE TRIALS ISSUE

DOL: EARLY APRIL 1987


-- IN THE ARMY, THE STRONGEST RESISTANCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION ON THE TRIALS ISSUE CURRENTLY CENTERS AROUND THE FIGURES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL (BG) ANTONIO (FICHERA), THE COMMANDER OF III CORPS IN CORDOBA, AND BG ARTURO (ALAI1S), THE COMMANDER OF II CORPS IN ROSARIO. THE TWO GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE TAKEN A POSITION OPPOSED TO THAT OF MAJOR GENERAL HECTOR LUIS (RIOS) ERENU, THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF (EMGE), IN THAT THEY HAVE CALLED FOR MAKING GREATER EFFORTS IN THE DEFENSE OF ARMY PERSONNEL CALLED BEFORE CIVILIAN COURTS.

-- GROUPS OF OFFICERS FROM THE MILITARY ACADEMY GRADUATING CLASSES ("PROMOCIONES") WHO CURRENTLY HOLD THE RANKS OF MAJOR AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL ARE CALLING FOR OFFICERS WHO ARE SERVING IN SIX DIFFERENT REGIMENTS IN THE INTERIOR OF ARGENTINA AND WHO FACE...
Sequester themselves in the installations to which they are assigned. The commanders of the six regiments support the call of the groups of officers.

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With regard to the situation in the Navy, Rear Admiral (RADM) Jose Maria (Arriola), the Chief of Operations (J-3) for the Joint General Staff (EMC), and RADM Emilio J.G. (Osses), the Commanders of the Fleet, have been lobbying the Council of Admirals to pressure Vice Admiral (VADM) Ramon Antonio (Arosa), the Chief of the Naval General Staff (EMGA), to undertake steps which would preclude the prosecution of ARA personnel facing civilian court trials on charges of alleged human rights violations. Arriola and Osses base their lobbying on the concept of due obedience of orders issued by higher authority.

2. Returning to the situation in the Army, an organization called the Argentine Army in Resistance ("Ejército Argentino en la Resistencia") was then subjecting the Army to an intense psychological campaign which calls for it to disobey Rios Erenu. He offered his opinion that this and similar psychological campaigns probably would wane during the 6 to 12 April visit of Pope (John Paul II) to Argentina but would gather momentum in the second half of April. He ended his remarks by saying that the opening of cases against officers once assigned to the former I Corps could provide the catalyst for greater resistance on the part of FFAA personnel.

3.

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Approved for Public Release
8 December 2016
GOVERNMENT FEARS OF A REACTION FROM THE MILITARY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS TRIALS

1. SPEAKING IN EARLY APRIL 1987 TO A

EXRESSED CONCERN THAT ELEMENTS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES MIGHT PRODUCE A SPECTACULAR ACT OF DEFIANCE ("UN CIMBRONAZO") AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THIS COULD TAKE THE FORM OF A MAJOR BOMB, OR AN ATTACK ON A SENIOR FIGURE IN THE EXECUTIVE OR JUDICIARY.

2. THERE WERE TWO KEY DATES IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE FIRST WAS 6 APRIL WHEN CASE NUMBER 450, INVOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE FIRST ARMY REGION CAME BEFORE THE COURT. IT WAS EXPECTED THAT SOME 80 SERVING OFFICERS WOULD BE INDICTED. THE SECOND WAS 15 APRIL WHEN LT COLONEL (FNU) ((BARREIRO)) WAS SCHEDULED TO APPEAR IN THE CORDOBA FEDERAL COURT IN CONNECTION WITH CRIMES COMMITTED IN THE LA PERLA DETENTION CENTRE. BARREIRO HAD ALREADY INTIMATED THAT HE WOULD NOT ATTEND THE HEARING. BARREIRO IS ARMY MAJOR ERNESTO G. ((BARREIRO)).

IN THE 13 APRIL 1987 EDITION OF "AMBITO FINANCIERO," COLUMNIST CARLOS (TORTORA)) REPORTED THAT THE CRITICAL SUMMONSES OF ARMY CAPTAINS JUANITO ADOLFO ((ALSINA)) AND ENRIQUE ((MONES)) RUIZ, AND OF ARMY MAJOR ERNEST BARREIRO HAVE BEEN POSTPONED AGAIN UNTIL THE END OF APRIL OR THE BEGINNING OF MAY. TORTORA ALSO NOTED THAT BARREIRO HAS MAINTAINED TO SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES THAT IN NO WAY WOULD HE PRESENT HIMSELF BEFORE THE CIVILIAN COURTS. THE ARTICLE DID NOT GIVE REASON FOR THE POSTPONEMENTS.

3. WITHIN THE NEXT 20 TO 30 DAYS IT WAS EXPECTED THAT THE
NAVY WOULD MAKE A FORMAL PRESENTATION TO THE GOVERNMENT DEMANDING THAT AN AMNESTY BE GRANTED TO ALL THOSE INVOLVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS TRIALS. IF THIS WAS NOT FORTHCOMING, ALL THE SERVING ADMIRALS WOULD RESIGN. NAVY CHIEF OF STAFF

REAR-ADMIRAL RAMON (AROSA) HAD LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HE WOULD NOT TOLERATE THE DETENTION OF ANOTHER SERVING NAVAL OFFICER.

4. WITHIN THE LAST MONTH THE GOVERNMENT HAD DETECTED EVIDENCE OF A CHAIN OF COMMAND WITHIN THE ARMY PARALLEL TO THAT OF THE GENERALS. EACH GRADUATION YEAR ("PROMOCION"), FOR INSTANCE, HAD DESIGNATED A REPRESENTATIVE TO LIAISE WITH PROVINCIAL GARRISONS. THIS WAS A NEBULOUS ARRANGEMENT WHICH MADE IT ALL THE HARDER TO DEAL WITH, AS THERE WAS NO ONE INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP TO WHOM THE GOVERNMENT COULD TALK. THE OFFICER CORP COULD AT PRESENT BE DIVIDED INTO THREE GROUPS:

A. THE COLONELS AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS. THESE WERE PRIMARILY CONCERNED THAT, IF THE SITUATION DETERIORATED SUFFICIENTLY TO MAKE ALL SERVING GENERALS RESIGN, THEY WOULD BE LEFT TO CARRY THE LOAD.

B. THE MAJORS AND CAPTAINS WHO WERE EXPRESSING SOLIDARITY WITH THEIR COMRADES AND ATTEMPTING TO HAVE CASES RESOLVED PIECEMEAL.

C. THE LIEUTENANTS WHO HAD NOT TAKEN PART IN THE DIRTY WAR BUT WHO, PARADOXICALLY, WERE MORE RADICAL AND UNPREDICTABLE THAN THEIR SUPERIORS. THIS WAS BECAUSE THEY SAW NO FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES IN A SERVICE WHOSE MORAL AND MATERIAL RESOURCES HAD SUNK TO SUCH A LOW EBB AND RESENTED THE WAY IN WHICH MILITARY INSTITUTIONS HAD COME UNDER ATTACK.

5. THERE WERE THREE COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO THE GOVERNMENT:

A. TO GRANT AN AMNESTY. PRESIDENT RAUL (ALFONISI) HAD ALREADY GONE ON RECORD AS EXCLUDING THIS OPTION.

B. TO GRANT INDIVIDUAL PARDONS. THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE ONCE SENTENCE HAD BEEN PASSED.

C. TO CARRY ON AS AT PRESENT NEGOTIATING WITH THE JUDICIARY ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. THIS WAS THE GOVERNMENT’S PREFERRED OPTION. SO FAR THE EXECUTIVE HAD HAD LITTLE SUPPORT FROM THE JUDICIARY WHO CONTINUED TO TREAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS TRIALS IN ISOLATION, WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WIDER SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOW ATTEMPTING TO WORK ON THE CONCEPT OF "DUE OBEDIENCE" ("OBEDENCIA DEBIDA") AS A WAY OF EXONERATING JUNIOR OFFICERS ACCUSED OF SPECIFIC CRIMES.
REPORT CLASS SECRET

DIST: 23 APRIL 1987
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA
SUBJ: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT KNEW THAT A NOW FORMER ARMY MAJOR WOULD DECLARE HIMSELF IN REBELLION; EVENTUAL DECISION BY PRESIDENT ALFONSIN TO MAKE A POLITICAL RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION

TEXT:

F L A N T.

1. LATE IN THE WEEK OF 12 APRIL 1987, PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)) ACKNOWLEDGED THAT AS OF 13 APRIL, THE ALFONSIN ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN FULLY AWARE THAT NOW FORMER ARGENTINE ARMY MAJOR ERNESTO G ((BARREIRO)) PLANNED TO DECLARE HIMSELF IN REBELLION, AN ACT WHICH BARREIRO CARRIED OUT ON 15 APRIL WHEN HE SOUGHT REFUGE IN THE ARMY'S 14TH INFANTRY REGIMENT (AIRBORNE) IN CORDOBA RATHER THAN ANSWER A CORDOBA CIVILIAN COURT SUMMONS ARISING FROM ALLEGATIONS THAT HE COMMITTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE COUNTERSUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN OF THE 1970'S.

MALFONSIN ORIGINALLY HAD PLACED HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE ASSURANCES OF NOW RETIRED MAJOR GENERAL (MG) HECTOR ((RIOS)) RENU, THE CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF (EMGE) AT THE TIME, THAT THE SITUATION CREATED BY BARREIRO COULD BE CONTROLLED. WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT NEITHER RIOS NOR THE THEN COMMANDER OF THE ARMY'S III CORPS IN CORDOBA HAD ANY CONTROL OVER THE SITUATION, ALFONSIN ELECTED TO MAKE A POLITICAL RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION BY MEANS OF A MASS DEMONSTRATION IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY, THE DEMONSTRATION OR RALLY WHICH TOOK PLACE ON 17 APRIL. HE COMMENTED THAT BY GOOD FORTUNE -- AS HE SAID IT, EVERYTHING HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR A MASS DEMONSTRATION IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT AND
1. FOR A CALL ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO SUPPORT THE ALFONSIÑ ADMINISTRATION, THE PRESIDENT PLANNED TO USE HIS STRENGTHENED POSITION TO PUT TOGETHER A SOCIAL PACT AND TO CALL FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THAT PRESIDENT ALFONSIÑ’S NEW STANDING WOULD FAVOR THE PASSAGE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD ALLOW ALFONSIÑ TO BECOME THE HEAD OF -- AS HE SAID IT -- A RADICAL CIVIC UNION-PERONIST COALITION GOVERNMENT, BUT HE DID NOT EXPAND ON OR EXPLAIN THIS REMARK.

2. ALSO LATE IN THE WEEK OF 12 APRIL, MINISTER OF DEFENSE JOSE HORACIO ((JAUNARENA)) WAS AWARE OF BARREIRO’S INTENTIONS ON 13 APRIL. TO SUBSTANTIATE LIEUTENANT COLONEL (LTC) JUAN MANUEL ((POLO)), THE COMMANDER OF THE 4TH INFANTRY AT THAT TIME, HAD TOLD RIOS ABOUT BARREIRO’S INTENTION NOT TO APPEAR IN COURT IN CORDOBA. POLO HAD ALSO TOLD RIOS THAT BARREIRO HAD THE SUPPORT OF ALL THE REGIMENT’S OFFICERS AND HAD ASKED THAT RIOS RELIEVE HIM OF HIS COMMAND BECAUSE HE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION. JAUNARENA HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THE INFORMATION OF WHICH HE SPOKE ON 13 APRIL.

3. IN ANOTHER INDICATION THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD ADVANCE INFORMATION THAT SOMETHING WAS AFOOT IN THE ARMY, THE CIVILIAN STATE INTELLIGENCE SECRETARIAT (SIDE) PUBLISHED A REPORT ON 13 APRIL STATING THAT THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (CGT) HAD REPORTED TO CGT SECRETARY GENERAL SAUL ((UBALDINI)) AND HIS ADVISORS THAT THE SITUATION IN THE MILITARY WOULD BECOME MORE TENSE AND THAT A CRISIS WOULD OCCUR, VERY PROBABLY IN THE WEEK OF 12 APRIL. SIDE ALSO SAID THE CGT REPORT HAD POINTED OUT THAT THE CATALYST FOR THE CRISIS WOULD COME FROM MIDDLE-LEVEL OFFICERS WHO WOULD REFUSE TO PRESENT THEMSELVES BEFORE CIVILIAN COURTS AND WHO WOULD FIND SUPPORT FOR THEIR ACTIONS FROM THE MILITARY PEERS.
- Military-civilian relations in Argentina are presently uneasy. The most disruptive issue continues to be the trials of members of the Armed Forces for human rights abuses committed during the so-called "dirty war" against leftist insurgent groups (1976-83). Those on trial are accused of the kidnapping, torture, rape, and murder of some 9,000 people who disappeared during the years of the "war." On 16 April 1987, a few members of the 14th Airborne Infantry Regiment and about 100 members of the Infantry School ignited a short-lived military uprising—the Easter Rebellion—to protect an officer who refused to appear in a civilian court. According to many officers, the excesses committed during the "dirty war" were necessary due to the growing magnitude of terrorist activity.

- Ultimately, the Easter Rebellion ended peacefully on 19 April 1987, when the government made certain concessions, including the resignation of the Army Chief Hector Rios Erenu, to the rebels. The President also agreed to support the Due Obedience Doctrine—a virtual amnesty for junior officers who were deemed to be merely following orders. On 9 June, President Alfonsin signed into law the Due Obedience Bill that was amended by the Senate, due to pressure from the new Army Chief, General Jose Caridi, to include senior officers. In late June, the Supreme Court upheld the Due Obedience Law as constitutional.
b. (S/NF) Military Situation.

- The April 1987 rebellion resulted in the reshuffle of Army leaders; 15 of 29 serving generals were put into retirement, and General Jose Dante Caridi was made the new Army Chief of Staff. The crisis revealed a lack of control by the senior leadership. It seems a dangerous gap has developed between junior--lieutenant colonel and below--and senior officers. There is widespread feeling in the middle and lower ranks that the Armed Forces are being unjustly persecuted over the human rights issue and the Falklands defeat. Senior officers, while also sympathetic, have advocated respect of the constitutional order and cooperation.
- There is a minimal threat from insurgent leaders who fled into exile during the Armed Forces' counterinsurgency campaign "dirty war." While the Montoneros insurgent group still has the capability of conducting isolated acts of terrorism, the organized insurgency has been eliminated. The Argentine Army is concerned about the growing number of Chilean exiles and their connections with leftist groups in Argentina.

COORDINATION: None.

PREPARED BY: [Blank]

APPROVED BY: [Blank]

1 Enclosure

Armed Forces Equipment Inventory - Argentina
(S/MF) 1 Cy

Photocopy Reagan Library
Sunday, April 17

1. No significant developments.

Wednesday, April 20

1. SAIC Mastrovito, USSS, travelled to Buenos Aires.

2. 

and states: (a) Balmaceda is definitely involved in plot regardless of what he said during interview; (b) a key figure in plot is a Chilean, 22 - 24 years of age, whose birthday is 27 August. Chilean is allegedly a "personal attendant of President Carter's, possibly a valet." Chilean will hire a Puerto Rican friend as the assassin; (c) order to assassinate President will come from Switzerland within next seven months. Swiss banker "Kossler" involved as well as a "Klein"; (NOTE: Allegations contradict earlier reports.) (d) motives for plot are Carter's policies re: nuclear energy, weapons sales, and coffee exports. (NOTE: Motives appear unusually broad).
Thursday, April 21

1. Former Chilean President Eduardo Frei's name surfaces in investigation due to bank dealings with Klein. Frei also suspected of dealings with international terrorists.

2. Investigation begins to uncover numerous discrepancies. Theory of counterintelligence or misinformation operation by Chile and Argentina emerges.
4. FBI provides background information on banking operations of Klein, Graiver, and Frei.

9. FBI-Buenos Aires provides following surmise of case:

"... agrees that the Klein reportedly involved in the plot may be Jose Klein Konigstein, who is associated with the Swiss-Israeli Trade Bank in Geneva.

Swiss-Israeli Trade Bank has possibly changed its name to the Continental Trade Bank and that one Arturo Klein "of Chile" is the director of that bank. The Swiss-Israeli Trade Bank is one of the banks mentioned in the Buenos Aires press
Thursday, April 21
    (continued)

coverage of the David Gravier case. Graiver, a wealthy Jewish businessman, was killed in a plane crash in Mexico in 1976. The Argentine Government is attempting to prove that Graiver was heavily involved in providing financial support to the Montonero Terrorist organization. Graiver was allegedly one of the owners of the Swiss-Israeli Trade Bank. The Argentine and Chilean Governments could conceivably be manipulating the report of a plot against President Carter, thereby tarnishing Graiver (for the Argentines) and Eduardo Frei (for the Chileans). Jose Klein is reportedly a close friend of former Chilean President Frei.

Friday, April 22

1. 

2. USSS in Buenos Aires, in concert with CIA and BND, decide that Balmaceda should be reinterviewed. (BND Staff Officer specifically said he saw no problem in the interview.)

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

Photocopy Reagan Library
2. CIA-HQS teletype to Germany and Buenos Aires: "If BND agrees to direct CIA contact to its field Case Officer, we confident this will satisfy USSS require-
ments and no further access to the chain of information will be required. (Reference AD Burke's conversation in which Secret Service expressed desire that door to Secret Service access to
SITUATION: FALKLAND
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE X

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
EIA108
DD RUEADWW
DE RUEAIIA #0388 1351752
ZNY SSSSS
D 1517542 MAY 82

RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEATRS/TOBESURY DEPT
RUEAIJU/NPIC
RUEHSE/SECRET SERVICE
RUEHFB/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RUEBWA/DEPT OF JUSTICE
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
RUEADWW/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF

RUEOPAA/CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
RULPAI/JUSCINCO QUARRY HTS PA
RUCBSAA/CINCLANT NORFOLK VA

SECRET

DIST: 15 MAY 1982

REPORT CLASS SECRET
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA/UNITED KINGDOM
SUBJECT: CASUAL INVESTIGATION OF THE TEMPORARY KIDNAPPING OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS IN ARGENTINA (DOI: ABOUT 14 MAY 1982)

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED ON ABOUT 14 MAY 1982 BY A MEMBER (------- --------) THE TEMPORARY KIDNAPPING OF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS IN BUENOS AIRES DURING THE WEEK OF 9 MAY:

Photocopy Reagan Library
SITUATION: FALKLAND
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE X

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

A. President Leopoldo ([Galtieri]) is personally interested in the investigation of the kidnappings that are being carried out by the internal security section of the SIE. The leadership of the army believes the actions were carried out by members of the psychological warfare component of the 601st intelligence battalion, the operational arm of the SIE. The SIE is hopeful it will be able to arrest two of the kidnappers during the weekend of 15-16 May, and the SIE will try to get them to identify the other persons involved.

B. There is only circumstantial evidence available to identify the persons involved in the kidnapping. If suspects are arrested, it will be difficult to obtain confessions from them because their friends and colleagues would be the persons interrogating them, and the latter can be assumed to be less than zealous in their pursuit of the facts. Many people in the 601st battalion know the names of the persons involved in the kidnappings, but the "code of honor" of the 601st battalion would not permit them to inform on their friends. In addition, there is divided opinion within the internal security section of the SIE that is doing the investigating, some personnel are not seriously investigating at all, and those who are trying to do the investigation are considered outsiders and are getting no cooperation from their colleagues.

C. No information is available on the motivation for the kidnappings; within the SIE, there is speculation that the persons involved did it because of their personal anti-British and anti-U.S. response to the Falkland Islands problem. There is also no information available on whether senior levels of the 601st battalion authorized the kidnappings; if there were such authorization, it is speculated, it could have been designed to destabilize Galtieri because of his assumed concessions to the British or to force a breakdown in the talks with the British at the United Nations.

D. Regardless of whether there is progress in determining the identities of the persons responsible, the Argentine government intends to make a statement that it has determined their identities; this statement could be made as early as the weekend of 15-16 May, in making such a statement, Galtieri obviously has the following options open to him: to admit that personnel or even officials of the SIE were involved and will be brought to trial; to claim that it was the work of a renegade group that had been separated from the security services during the "dirty war" against terrorists; or to claim that it was done by terrorists who were trying to embarrass the government.

2. [Redacted] Kidnappings, the journalists who were seized were simply targets of opportunity; there were no advance plans to seize those particular journalists.
SITUATION: FALKLAND
SUBJECT CATAGORY: FILE XI

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
EIA603
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DE RUFALLA #1233 1402313
ZNY SSSSS
D 2023157 MAY 82

RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE
RUEKJCS/DIA
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT
RUEHSE/SECRET SERVICE
RUEHFB/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RUEBWA/DEPT OF JUSTICE
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
RUEADWW/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF
ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS
RUEOFAA/CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC
RULPAJ/USCINCOS QUARRY HTS PA
RUCBSAA/CINCLANT NORFOLK VA
BT

REPORT CLASS-SECRET
COUNTRY: ARGENTINA/UNITED KINGDOM
SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED [[ ]] PLOTTING AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT; ROLE OF TWO JOURNALISTS EMPLOYED BY THE NAVY IN SPREADING REPORTS OF INVOLVEMENT (DUI: EARLY, MID-MAY 1982)

1. DURING THE SECOND WEEK IN MAY 1982, THE ARGENTINE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INTELLIGENCE (SIDE) AND THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIE) WERE VERY CONCERNED OVER REPORTS
SITUATION: FALKLAND
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE XI

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

1. WAS PLOTTING THE OVERTHROW OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT. BY ABOUT 15 MAY, THE REPORTS WERE STILL BEING STUDIED, BUT CONSIDERABLE DOUBT HAD ARISEN AS TO THEIR VERACITY, NEVERTHELESS, THE SIE HAD NOT RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE REPORTS WERE TRUE.

2. THE ORIGINAL INFORMATION ON THE ALLEGED PLOTTING WAS DETERMINED THAT HE HAD SOLD HIS BELONGINGS AND WAS MOVING OUT OF HIS APARTMENT, CLAIMING THAT HE HAD SPENT 18 MONTHS IN ARGENTINA AND HIS TOUR WAS FINISHED. HE WAS OBSERVED IN CONTACT WITH SEVERAL ARGENTINE LEFTISTS: THIS LED TO...

3. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT HE HAD SOLD HIS BELONGINGS AND WAS MOVING OUT OF HIS APARTMENT, CLAIMING THAT HE HAD SPENT 18 MONTHS IN ARGENTINA AND HIS TOUR WAS FINISHED. HE WAS OBSERVED IN CONTACT WITH SEVERAL ARGENTINE LEFTISTS: THIS LED TO...

4. WHILE THE INVESTIGATION WAS UNDERWAY, THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIM) REPORTED IT HAD OBTAINED INFORMATION ON THE PLOT AGAINST THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT.

5. THE INFORMATION ON RELATING TO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEGED PLOTTING IS BEING HELD VERY CLOSELY WITHIN THE ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: APPROPRIATE INFORMATION HAS BEEN GIVEN TO SIE.

6. DURING THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION, SIE LEARNED THAT TWO ARGENTINE JOURNALISTS HAD WRITTEN AND COVERTLY DISTRIBUTED TO THE PRESS SEVERAL ARTICLES ATTACKING THE U.S. AMBASSADOR FOR ALLEGED CONTACTS WITH OPPOSITION POLITICAL...
SITUATION: FALKLAND
SUBJECT CATEGORY: FILE XI

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

7. [Redacted]

ALLICA IS A JOURNALIST WHO DESCRIBED HIMSELF IN MID-1980 AS AN UNDERCOVER JOURNALIST FOR SIDE WHO WAS TRYING TO ENCOURAGE OTHER JOURNALISTS TO WORK UNDERCOVER FOR SIDE. NO INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON PORTALES.


8.
Argentina:
The Politics of Counterterrorism

The amnesty and antiterrorism laws just issued by Argentina's military government are viewed by many civilian leaders as self-serving and are, in our judgment, likely to be the focus of debate within the civilian congress when it convenes in 1984.

The new amnesty law (officially, the Law for National Pacification) is designed to protect the armed forces from punitive action by the civilian government following the upcoming October elections. It covers the period from the beginning of the last constitutional government in May 1973 to the installation of President Bignone in June 1982. The law specifically exempts from prosecution police and military personnel who participated in the violent campaign against leftists during the 1970s: Moreover, the decree is sweeping: it orders that all ongoing investigations into the hundreds of deaths and more than 6,000 political disappearances be immediately dropped if they involve members of the police or armed forces.

In contrast, the law is much more exclusive in its treatment of subversives and benefits only those who have not yet been legally charged with antigovernmental activity. In addition, it leaves the door open for future legal action against some of the more notorious terrorist leaders by excluding from its amnesty provisions those subversives living abroad. The decree also exempts from amnesty those suspects who have shown their "intention to continue" their association with guerrilla or terrorist organizations and those already convicted of terrorism.

Interservice disputes among the armed forces—over who should be covered, the date of issuance, and the period of time that should be covered by the amnesty—delayed the amnesty decree for months. Many officers opposed the amnesty on the grounds that it implicitly acknowledged that the military had committed crimes. Some junior officers also opposed the law because actions taken during the "dirty war" were in response to orders from superior officers, and they had believed this would be a justifiable defense of their actions.

Promulgation of the amnesty was quickly followed by presidential signature of another law assigning special antiterrorist powers to the military. The government intends the antiterrorist law (officially, the Law for the Judgment of Subversive Acts) to streamline the judicial system and provide a legal apparatus for "preventing and punishing subversion and terrorism." It grants police broad powers to tap telephones, open mail, search houses, and make arrests without a warrant. The law also allows police to detain terrorist suspects incommunicado for up to 48 hours, if a judge is notified of the detention, and for up to 15 days with a judge's permission. Terrorist and subversive acts committed by civilians will no longer be subject to military law, but are to be decided by the Federal Court of Appeals, whose decisions cannot be appealed.

Public reaction to the amnesty and antiterrorism laws has been swift and harsh: leading civilian politicians, lawyers, and churchmen have denounced the laws as unconstitutional and reactionary and predict their repeal once a civilian congress convenes. Several trial judges have termed the amnesty law invalid, stating that, because the current government seized power in a coup, it does not have the constitutional authority to decree political laws such as the amnesty. Two judges have already refused to forward political disappearance cases to the Federal Appeals Court for possible dismissal as is required by the terms of the amnesty.
Repeal of the laws—a time-consuming and legally difficult process—seems unlikely, though some attempts at modification by the new congress can probably be expected. According to Embassy reporting, there appears to be a general consensus among political leaders that a strong legal apparatus is needed to deter terrorism. In addition, most politicians recognize that the new civilian government could be destabilized were it to attempt to prosecute military officials. Human rights activists, however, will continue to protest both the abridgment of civil liberties inherent in the antiterrorism law and the denial of military culpability in the amnesty law.

In the final analysis, the future of the new amnesty/antiterrorism package will largely depend on the outcome of the October national elections. Although leaders of both major political parties have publicly predicted the repeal of the laws, the Radicals have been more strident than the Peronists in their condemnations. One of the first orders of business for the new civilian congress, therefore, is likely to be a debate on how best to modify the new antiterrorism program to finally close the “dirty war” chapter in Argentina’s history, while at the same time guaranteeing a modicum of civil liberties.