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of workers and clients according to the worker's ability to deal with a particular type of youth (a concept supported by 70% of all staff). However, the normal differentiation seemed to be merely the one mentioned in the Parole Agent Manual, viz. "regular supervision cases", which were to be seen once a month, and "special service cases", to be seen twice a month.¹¹

Recommendation. 2. The Youth Authority should strengthen its ongoing development and use of classification systems, with particular emphasis on integrating such efforts between institutions and parole.

Rehabilitation/Reintegration

In Theory. As previously mentioned, the California Youth Authority has long been in the forefront nationally in planning and developing correctional strategies. In keeping with this tradition, the Department has recently drawn up and endorsed one of the most progressive policy statements on program planning in existence. While this document is brief and, in many respects not implemented, it clearly sets forth a series of premises for correctional planning which "represent the conceptual framework and guide used for comprehensive program planning by the Department of the Youth Authority":¹²

1. Divert from the System
2. Minimize Penetration into the Criminal Justice System
3. Maximize Capacity for Differential Care, Treatment and Custody
4. Normalize Correctional Experience
5. Maximize the Involvement of the Volunteer and the Offender as an Agent of Change
6. Minimize Time in Correctional System
7. Maximize Research and Evaluation for Feedback and Organizational Change

The Parole Task Force concurs totally with all these principles and suggests the addition of another, perhaps implied in number 5: Maximize the Use of Community Resources.

In Practice. The Youth Authority has a number of carefully planned, experimental treatment programs in operation, primarily in large urban centers. These programs (notably the Community Treatment Project, Guided Group Interaction, Part Way Homes and Community Parole Centers) have been described and evaluated in regular CYA reports.¹³ Unfortunately, however, the youths participating in these programs comprise only 10% of the total parolee population (approximately 13,500

wards).¹⁴ The great majority of rehabilitation/reintegration efforts take place in excessively large caseloads and are left up to the ingenuity and skills of the individual agent. (The new Increased Parole Effectiveness Program attempts to ameliorate this situation by reducing caseload size and requiring a differential case approach, involving careful and ongoing case planning between agents and supervisors.)

Also noteworthy is increased Departmental effort to integrate institution and parole services. By placing both components of the system in one Division of Rehabilitation Services, and by pilot programs which assign cases to parole agents while wards are still confined, some progress is being made toward coordinating the services of both. Examples of these pilot programs are the Community Parole Centers (evaluated in some detail in Chapter VI), the Ventura Intensive Treatment Program, and the KITE program at Nelles--all of which involve "in-and-out" caseload assignments. Administration feels that another recent program of value is the "temporary detention" program in which wards can be held in one of the institutions up to thirty days at the request of the individual parole agent. Approximately 2,000 youths were so detained between July, 1970 and March, 1971.

While this program has potential for considerable abuse and must therefore be judiciously exercised, it has the definite advantage of handling minor violations expeditiously without the necessity of requesting a Board hearing or the risk of lengthy reinstitutionalization.

Finally, staff were asked to estimate "the general quality of correctional services" in their agency. Only 21% of line workers and 42% of administrators rated it highly while 32% and 15%, respectively, indicated it was of low quality. Since the great majority of respondents were from regular parole units, it is surmised that many of the pessimistic responses reflected frustration about unmanageable caseloads.

To summarize, the California Youth Authority has developed an extremely progressive set of principles by which its operations should be guided. A number of noteworthy programs have been put into effect, and a major reorganizational step has been taken to better coordinate services. It appears, however, that these developments and changes have not overly-impressed the great majority of line workers and administrators. The Parole Task Force urges the Department to continue its quest for providing more effective services especially aimed at reintegrating wards back into their respective communities.

IV. RESOURCES

This section will examine the key resources available to carry out the Youth Authority's mission. "Resources" is used here in a very broad sense, referring to any factor that contributes to the CYA's efforts in accomplishing its goals.

The principle resources to be discussed are staff, training, general working environment, community relations and resources, and fiscal support.

Staff

The consistent impression Task Force members had of Youth Authority staff was that the majority was seriously committed to its work and dedicated to assisting youths make a successful adjustment in society. At the same time, a sizeable minority appeared to be either "burnt out", i.e., coasting on their jobs and trying to expend as little effort as possible, or excessively law enforcement oriented. Perhaps this is inevitable in large correctional organizations whose staff come from widely varying backgrounds and work experience. Nevertheless, many staff expressed frustration with the system's inability to either "revitalize" or remove such persons.

In addition, even highly dedicated line staff, laboring under severe handicaps, were very discouraged. Caseloads are excessively large and the proportion of "hard-core" difficult-to-manage clients has been steadily increasing since the advent of probation subsidy;¹⁵ a strong "hold-the-line" State budget has hampered program enrichment and the development of auxiliary resources; training is minimal; and many staff feel that their agency does not adequately support treatment efforts.

Supervision. Supervisors are generally seen as the pivotal workers in an organization. They are the key link between administration and line workers who carry out agency operations. As such, they are crucial links in the vertical communication network. They are also the primary trainers and enablers of line workers, a role which generally "makes or breaks" the organization. Accordingly, it is essential that these individuals be selected carefully, be delegated appropriate authority and responsibility, and be provided with ongoing training necessary for their job.

While many staff expressed high regard for their supervisors, others complained that either they received too little supervisory assistance, or that their supervisors were too controlling and restrictive. A not infrequent assertion made by line staff and higher administrators was that a number of these critical first-line supervisor positions were filled by persons who were incompetent or "burnt-out".

Questionnaire results, however, indicated that about two-thirds of line staff evaluated their immediate supervisors as being "qualified", "helpful", and "available". In fact, supervisors and administrators were slightly more critical of their superiors than were line workers. It will be recalled in Table I that fully 69% of the supervisors and administrators asserted that they had little or no voice in decision-making matters. Apparently these persons feel more restricted than do the lower echelon personnel.

A number of first line supervisors asserted that they were not allowed as much participation in decision-making important to the organization, such as budget appropriations and personnel decisions, as they should be. Some also mentioned that they needed more training in management and supervisory techniques than was available. The general consensus, however, was that, top level administration did want to involve them increasingly in decision-making processes.

Recommendation. 3. First line supervisors should be carefully selected on the basis of ability to maximize effectiveness of line workers under them and should be retained in such positions only as long as they are doing this. They should be delegated increasing authority and responsibility, should be involved more in decision-making crucial to the agency, and should receive greatly increased training in effective managerial techniques.

Para-Professionals and Volunteers. While there is almost always a certain amount of staff resistance, at least initially, the use of para-professional and volunteer workers is now a well-established and well-accepted resource in corrections.¹⁶

Although the actual hiring or involvement of para-professionals and volunteers was found to vary greatly from office to office, parole staff were generally found to be favorably disposed toward them, both in interviews and in questionnaire responses. Questionnaire results showed that 85% of line workers were willing and able to use para-professionals, and 78% asserted that they could use volunteers in their normal work. In fact, 93% of all staff felt New Careerists "should be allowed and encouraged to work their way up to regular line and supervisory positions....provided they meet the necessary requirements". This support is not to say, however, that there have not been some negative incidents with some of these workers or that there has been no conflict between them and professional staff. As with any other staff, "New Careerists" need to feel that they are an important part of the organization, and they need to receive ongoing training and supervision.

Unfortunately, the "New Careerist" program is being eliminated in July, 1971 due to budget restrictions. Administration pointed out that this program had been poorly planned, e.g., CYA had little or no involvement in the selection process, no career ladder was made available for these persons, and the prohibition against ex-felons becoming parole agents prevented some from ever being promoted to that category. However, administration did indicate that every effort is being made to retain those "New Careerists" who had become formal State employees by reallocating funds from other sources. Additionally, a study is being made of the specific functions of entry level positions to determine if certain tasks could not be handled by para-professionals.

Recommendations. 4. The Youth Authority should make every possible effort to revive and expand its para-professional program. Similarly, it should recruit and involve volunteers to a much greater extent.

5. *The State should amend section 1029 of the Penal Code and any other laws or policies that prohibit the hiring and permanent appointment of ex-felons as peace officers provided they have shown evidence of being rehabilitated and have successfully completed a probationary period of employment.*

Personnel Policies: Hiring and Promotion. Few staff had serious objection to initial employment requirements. About 85% felt that minimum qualifications should be a bachelor's degree in the behavioral sciences, with most staff also favoring a year's graduate training or relevant experience.

However, many complained about promotional procedures and opportunities. Dissatisfaction with the current set-up was pervasive, and clearly surpassed the gripes of a few malcontents or the grumblings of those who had not been promoted. In fact, 81% of all line workers and 76% of supervisors and administrators replied "no" to the question: "Are you basically satisfied with the promotional system in your agency?" Specific complaints included the observations that administration often manipulated civil service lists to promote "favored employees"; that written tests were often irrelevant; that there was little feedback on test results as to why or in what areas individuals performed poorly; and that there were increasingly fewer promotional opportunities due to declining commitments to the State's juvenile institutions.

Minority hiring and promotion has been an issue of special consternation. While many staff declared that the Youth Authority has traditionally been a "white organization", it was generally acknowledged that the current administration was making a concerted effort to hire minority persons. Many staff were found to have strong feelings on this issue and expressed different points of view. On the one hand, a number of minority personnel, particularly militants, asserted that Blacks and Chicanos were not being hired or promoted to anywhere near the degree they should. On the other hand, some Caucasian agents felt that administration was trying to promote minorities even if they were not as qualified as others. Some went so far as to suggest that additional credit was being given to minority persons on the oral exam. The racial issue in the CYA is one that is reflective of society in general, and one would be simply burying one's head in sand to deny that it was a pervasive concern among both staff and clients.

Finally, there was overwhelming support (84% to 87%) for revising the policies of the entire correctional personnel system to allow employees from any part of the system to transfer, without loss of rank or benefits, to any other correctional agency in the State. Similarly, 97% of all staff supported the creation of a separate promotional series for case-carrying agents, parallel to at least the first line supervisor level. In this way, outstanding parole agents would not have to become administrators to be promoted.

Recommendations. 6. *The Youth Authority and the State personnel board should engage in an ongoing re-evaluation of personnel policies and procedures, especially those related to hiring and promotion, with participation in such evaluation by all levels of staff.*

7. *The State should hold "open" examinations, i.e., not restricted to current State employees, for every civil service position. Similarly, the State should participate with the counties in developing a personnel system that would allow the transfer or promotion of employees between various correctional agencies, without loss of benefits, provided they meet the necessary requirements.*

8. *The State should create the equivalent of a Parole Agent III position that would involve direct supervision of clients (i.e., carrying a caseload).*

Training

It seems a strange paradox that there should be almost universal agreement regarding the importance of sound basic training, yet study after study points to the lack of adequate training as a major problem. The present study is no exception. Although three-quarters of all parole staff acknowledged the existence of some in-service training, they rated both its quantity and quality as low. Table III reveals that while most staff acknowledged the existence of some type of in-service training, they did not view it as being pertinent, ongoing, or individualized. Only 17% of line workers and 9% of administrators reported that they received even a full hour of training per week. Verbal assertions repeatedly supported these questionnaire results, with heavy emphasis on the need for more and better training at the crucial point of agency orientation. The major reason given for this situation was a "bare bones" training budget. This indeed seems to be the case since only \$32,165, or less than .4% of the parole budget is allocated for training.¹⁷

Since comprehensive studies of training and manpower concerns were conducted in 1968 and in 1969-70, the reader is referred to those documents for a detailed analysis of the current state of training needs, allocation of resources, gaps in training, and a lengthy series of recommendations which Task Force members generally support.¹⁸

The Youth Authority is well aware of its training deficiencies, and has recently taken steps to strengthen its training resources in parole by the new Increased Parole Effectiveness program. But much more needs to be done. Any significant improvement will necessitate a strong administrative commitment to training; a vastly increased budgetary allocation to cover training time and travel; the hiring of specialized trainers; adequate funds for conferences, workshops, special equipment such as videotape; and accessible library facilities.

An additional problem referred to in the training studies mentioned above is the very poor coordination between the State's various training resources. Specifically, the Youth Authority has its own internal training program and at the same time maintains a separate training program for county probation officers through its Community Services Division. The Department of Corrections also has a probation training program as do many of the county probation departments. On top of this, within both CYA and CDC, there are

TABLE III
CYA STAFF TRAINING
(Percentage distribution*)

QUESTION	ALL STAFF (N=186)	LINE WORKERS (N=145)	ADMINISTRATORS & SUPERVISORS (N=41)
1. Does your agency have in-service training for employees of your level?			
Yes	76	75	80
No	24	25	20
2. Is this training <u>relevant</u> ?			
Yes	48	45	56
No	52	55	44
3. Is it <u>individualized</u> ?			
Yes	20	22	13
No	80	78	87
4. Is it <u>ongoing</u> ?			
Yes	36	35	41
No	64	65	59
5. If you receive in-service training, how many hours per month?			
1-2 hours per month	62	63	59
3-4 hours per month	23	20	31
5-9 hours per month	12	13	9
10 or more	3	4	0

*Columns may not total 100% for a specific question due to rounding.

separate training programs for institutional and parole staff. With training resources at a premium, this duplication is both costly and highly inefficient.

Recommendation. 9. The State should develop a training network of State and county trainers and training resources, similar to the CO-ACT Model,¹⁹ to provide or coordinate necessary training for all parole (and other correctional) staff.

Working Environment

Caseloads. One of the most serious handicaps found within the juvenile parole system was excessive caseload size. Although the State requires that counties must have substantially below 50 cases per probation officer in order to qualify for State subsidy,²⁰ Youth Authority parole agents have been staggering under caseloads averaging 72 boys or 56 girls. This has been the case for 90% of the 13,500 wards on parole.²¹ In view of the fact that virtually all of these cases are youths with whom the counties had been unable to cope, even in local camps or specialized subsidy caseloads, this situation is an absurdity.

The Youth Authority itself has frankly admitted the inadequacy of this program:

"....the present parole program provides a minimum level of surveillance and those limited case work services which do occur are almost an incidental product arising out of other activities."²²

"The total effect has been to substantially reduce the level of protection we offer the public and the level of effective service we are able to offer to clients."²³

The Department also points to related parole deficiencies:

- "(1) insufficient time for case services and supervisory case management;
- (2) case assignment based on geography and insistence on uniform caseload size;
- (3) the lack of meaningful discussion and review of case-services delivered; and
- (4) the systematic development of new alternatives for parolees.

Needless to say, systematic research related to any of these areas is completely missing."²⁴

This situation apparently caused such problems that Task Force members were informed of considerable effort to "beat the system". For example, some staff indicated that directives occasionally came down not to discharge youths

at critical budget times, to transfer cases in such a way as not to lose positions, etc. This type of manipulation seemed to be generally accepted as necessary to protect the work force.

Recommendation. 10. *The standard for parole caseloads should be reduced to at least that set for probation subsidy caseloads (i.e., substantially below 50 cases).*

Morale. Another serious problem in CYA parole today is poor morale. This was a consistent observation of Task Force staff throughout most parts of the State. Many experienced CYA personnel said morale was clearly the lowest it had ever been in their recollection. Fifty percent of all parole staff indicated in the questionnaire that morale was definitely low (compared to 34% of CYA institutional workers and 29% of adult parole staff); only 15% said morale was high.

Oddly enough, reasons for low morale appeared to center around the positive effects of probation subsidy. Since 1965, the number of wards committed to the Youth Authority has declined steadily²⁵ (see Juvenile Institution Task Force Report). Mainly, this has been due to the efforts of county probation departments to work with as many malleable youth as possible, and to refer to the State only those who seem incapable of responding well to probation supervision. The obvious outcome has been an increase in the proportion of difficult hard-core cases in CYA institutions and on parole. Yet parole caseload sizes have remained much the same (until the recent Increased Parole Effectiveness Program), and there has been little, if any, increase in auxiliary services or enriched programming which would make the agent's job more manageable.

Reduced commitment rates have also had the effect of contracting rather than expanding parole operations. In turn, this has resulted in fewer opportunities for promotion. Parole staff are becoming increasingly anxious about these conditions. They no longer see job security or promotional opportunities as something to be taken for granted. In fact, some staff pointed out that the only recent boost to morale was the inclusion of parole agents in the safety retirement program, allowing earlier retirement.

Surprising as it may seem, the morale factor has not yet observably affected staff dedication to the work they are doing. According to questionnaire responses, 70% of all staff were planning to make a career in corrections and would recommend the field to other persons. Only 7% planned to leave corrections and 12% would not recommend it as a career.

In several respects, the future for parole staff is likely to become even more difficult and more uncertain. In a sense, the die has been cast. The direction for correctional services is clearly to move them as much as possible to the local, i.e. county, level. If the State subsidy program is shored up, fewer and fewer wards will be committed to the State. In consequence, there will be fewer jobs for State employees in parole (though there

may well be an increase of jobs in such areas as consultation, training, and other specialized services).

Conditions like these are painful to contemplate and harder yet to accept. It is therefore imperative that administration continue to inform staff, at all levels, of the future direction of their agency and, to the fullest extent possible, provide them with the opportunity of participating in the shaping of its destiny. Administration must also make every effort to provide for the future of its staff, and to develop the kind of staff that will be needed in the State's newly emerging role in corrections. This new role is spelled out in the System Task Force Report.

Recommendation. 11. Administration should continue strong efforts to inform staff of the future direction of the agency together with the full implications for staff, to involve staff in the future shaping of their agency, and to train them for the types of roles that will be played by the State.

Communication. As Table I indicated, communication, particularly upward, was perceived by most staff as generally poor. Many acknowledged, however, that the administration was making a serious effort to improve the flow of information in both directions. Several agents pinpointed the levels of middle-management as the primary obstacle to good communication. They asserted that if this obstacle were removed, "communication would be at an all-time peak".

In a State as large as California, difficulties in developing an effective communication network must be expected. Further, for California, it can be predicted that the problem will worsen, at least for a time, as CYA continues to decentralize. Administration must do everything it can to anticipate the onset of new communication problems, and at the same time seek ways of resolving those already existing. Difficult as this sounds, it is not an impossible task. For when all staff become truly involved in key decisions pertaining to agency function, legitimate claims of communication barriers should no longer be possible.

Working Conditions. Aside from the major problem of excessive case-loads, general working conditions appeared satisfactory. Over 90% of staff, for example, described both their working conditions and salaries as "fair" or "good". Not surprisingly, the major complaint was directed at inadequate clerical help; 25% of staff said such assistance was insufficient. This appears in large part directly due to the ratio of only one clerk-typist position for every 220 cases in a unit, plus one-half position for each unit supervisor. This is barely more than half the mandatory standard imposed on probation subsidy units by the State of three such positions for every unit, all of which must have substantially less than 300 cases.²⁶

Recommendation. 12. A careful evaluation of clerical and stenographic needs should be made to formulate a more realistic ratio of such assistance for parole staff.

Community Relations and Community Resources

According to questionnaire results, 92% of all staff felt that the public does not understand what corrections is all about. A meager 4% believed that society is supportive of correctional endeavors as against 68% who said it is not. These perceptions are considerably more pessimistic than those of the probation officers (see Probation Task Force Report), and indicate something about the community's attitude toward parolees and the agents' anticipations of the type of reception wards receive when released from YA institutions. As all of the Task Force Reports have noted, it is evident that a great need exists for vastly increased public education and improved public relations, not only for parole but for all of corrections.

As for community resources, the most frequently mentioned needs were satisfactory living arrangements (such as group and foster homes), a much wider variety of mental health resources, and more employment opportunities for older wards. Many line staff expressed eagerness to involve the community by enlisting the aid of volunteers in the important job of parolee rehabilitation and reintegration. One of the most promising Youth Authority programs concerned with treating youth at the community level and with community involvement is the Parole Center Program which is discussed in Chapter VI.

Administration has taken a very progressive stance on the issue of community involvement. The Director, in a recent address to the Rehabilitation Services Division, stressed repeatedly that the future direction of corrections is clearly to care for the offender in the community, and to involve residents of the community as agents for change. In his words, "virtually all of the changes confronting us are based on a theme of expanding community-based programs".²⁷ The key question here is whether this philosophy will filter down throughout all levels of staff, and if so, what commitment will staff make to it. The answer (at the county as well as State level) may well be the single most important factor affecting the thrust and success of correctional efforts for years to come.

Recommendation. 13. The State should increase its efforts to inform and involve the public in all levels of correctional services, and to maximize its use of community resources.

Fiscal Support

Compared with other State correctional programs, financially the CYA parole program appears to be faring relatively well. This may be partly due to society's general interest in youth. However, parole programs, like most other State operations, are feeling the financial pinch of increased citizen

opposition to higher taxes. This was dramatically illustrated at an important meeting attended by a Task Force member, and to which all supervisors and administrators from half of the State had been invited to discuss the budget. The principal speaker opened the session with the statement: "Gentlemen, this is an issue of survival. We are talking about saving jobs and preserving the system." He went on to suggest that survival of the system was so uncertain as to necessitate considerable budget manipulation.

A related problem was the feeling of many line and middle-management staff that they had little or no input in budget preparation. Even the above mentioned meeting, apparently the first of its kind, was perceived by some as primarily an attempt to elicit consensus on what was already a fait accompli, rather than true staff involvement in budget planning and decision-making. If parole staff members misconstrued the underlying intent of that meeting, then administration needs to clarify the intent.

V. PAROLE AS THE CLIENT SEES IT

Table IV summarizes questionnaire responses of approximately 253 parolees. Since questionnaires were distributed and returned in a confidential manner and since respondents averaged a full year on parole, the answers are believed to be generally honest and perceptive. The most significant finding was that on virtually every question dealing with the parolee-parole agent relationship, two-thirds (and often more) of the wards gave very positive responses; extremely few expressed negative feelings about their parole agents. However, when a question was raised about the parole system in general, 39% of all respondents gave a negative rating, i.e., "makes little difference one way or the other" or "makes people worse".

Panel (group) interviews brought out additional critical comments. These centered around society's labeling and rejection of the parolee (e.g., schools and jobs were often closed to them and police frequently harassed them), while parole agents did little that was of any significant help. Some comments along this line were:

"The system just tells you lies, passes you along, and puts you back on the street with nothing having been changed."

"The worse thing that happens is coming out and having everybody know you are a parolee. It hurts you in school, especially trying to get a job, and even with the chicks."

"Parole's a joke. It does nothing for you. Keeps a few people employed perpetuating the hoax on the public."

TABLE IV
CYA WARDS' VIEW OF PAROLE

QUESTION	PERCENT RESPONSE
1. How well do you and your parole officer get along?	
Very well	69
Fairly well	21
Not well at all (i.e., poorly)	2
Don't know him well enough	8
2. How interested do you think your parole officer really is in you?	
Very interested	64
Somewhat interested	23
Not interested	1
Don't know	12
3. How much help has your parole officer been to you?	
A great deal of help	57
Some help	29
No help	3
Haven't had him long enough to tell	10
4. Do you think your parole officer is trying to help you?	
Yes	91
No	1
Don't know	8
5. How often do you generally see your parole officer?	
Have never seen him	3
Once a week	20
Every two weeks	18
Once a month	40
Every two months	8
Every three months	3
Less than every three months	8
6. Where does your parole officer usually see you?	
Have never seen him	3
His office	40
Your home	45
A "field" office where he sees other parolees	7
Mail or phone	2
Other	3

TABLE IV (Continued)

QUESTION	PERCENT RESPONSE
7. Has he ever come to your house?	
Yes	86
No	14
8. Do you trust your present parole officer?	
Yes	81
No	3
Not sure	16
9. Do you trust the parole department in general?	
Yes	49
No	19
Not sure	32
10. Would you like to change from your present parole officer to another?	
Yes	4
No	82
Doesn't matter	13
11. If you were to ask for another parole officer, do you think you could get one without any negative consequences, i.e., without it being held against you or hurting you in some way?	
Yes	23
No	32
Don't know	45
12. Overall, how would you rate your present parole officer?	
Very good	65
Generally good	23
Fair	10
Generally poor	1
Very poor	1
13. Frankly, do you feel parole:	
Helps people	61
Makes little difference one way or the other	31
Makes people worse	8

In group interviews, parolees also pointed to the parolee-agent relationship:

"My parole agent was authority-oriented and built more fences than helped me. Each meeting drove us further apart."

"I got a good parole agent. He didn't think he was a cop. He was available but not always on my back."

"Having a damn good parole agent that can relate and listen is the key."

The most common theme was that success or failure was primarily up to the individual parolee:

"If I ever wanted anything, it's me who starts the ball rolling."

"Either an individual will make it or not, but not because of parole."

To summarize, the data clearly suggest that a good deal of rapport exists between the parole agent and his charge. However, the system of parole is viewed with suspicion (e.g., only 23% of the clients felt that they could get another parole officer without having it held against them), and the community is perceived as being rejective. In the view of the parolee, any positive change, therefore, is likely to come about as a result of changing aspects of the system and by changing community attitudes. Because he is viewed in such a favorable light, it would appear that the parole agent is in the most strategic position to effect such changes.

VI. EVALUATION OF CURRENT PROGRAM

General Recidivism

How effective is the CYA parole program? This is a critical question not only for CYA parole but for the entire correctional system. Over the past decade, scarcely more than one out of three juvenile parolees in California completed parole without violation. Table V reveals that the violation rate has, in fact, remained fairly stable for at least the past ten years. This picture is not surprising in view of repeated past client failure in local rehabilitation programs, and since CYA must deal with the most "hard-core" offender.

TABLE V

CYA PAROLE VIOLATION RATE: 1961-1970²⁸
(Based on wards removed from parole)

YEAR	VIOLATION RATE
1961	65.1
1962	65.2
1963	64.2
1964	63.3
1965	64.2
1966	62.8
1967	64.0
1968	66.3
1969	64.6
1970	62.9

There has been a slight decrease in violators in the past two years despite the more difficult caseloads occasioned in part by the probation subsidy. But this is not enough. The State of California is in to position to be complacent about its handling of youthful offenders--not even in the face of occasional spurts of success. The reality is that, in today's society, delinquency is here to stay. If any additional progress is to be made in protecting society and successfully rehabilitating and reintegrating juvenile law-violators, an ever increasing commitment to prevention and corrections must be made.

Length of Parole

Table VI indicates that the mean length of stay on parole has been rising steadily. Since nearly 90% of all violations occur within the first two years on parole,²⁹ it is not at all clear why parole supervision for non-violators should be significantly lengthened beyond two years, particularly for girls. If any part of the answer has to do with attempts to preserve parole agent positions, then stronger procedural safeguards will of course be mandatory. Table VI also reveals that the mean number of months on parole for violators has increased from 12.8 in 1965 to 17.2 in 1970. This reflects the YA's increased willingness to retain its parolees in the community as long as possible, and is consistent with the philosophy of reintegration.

TABLE VI

MEAN NUMBER OF MONTHS ON PAROLE FOR WARDS REMOVED FROM PAROLE: 1965-1970³⁰
(By type of removal and sex)

YEAR	TOTAL	NON-VIOLATORS	VIOLATORS
TOTAL			
1965	17.1	24.9	12.8
1966	17.5	25.4	12.8
1967	17.9	25.1	13.9
1968	18.3	25.9	14.4
1969	19.4	26.5	15.6
1970	21.2	27.9	17.2
BOYS			
1965	16.4	23.9	12.6
1966	16.7	24.3	12.6
1967	17.3	24.3	13.7
1968	17.7	25.2	14.3
1969	18.8	25.8	15.4
1970	20.1	26.7	16.7
GIRLS			
1965	22.0	29.2	14.7
1966	22.2	29.9	14.4
1967	21.7	28.4	15.1
1968	21.7	28.9	15.1
1969	23.2	29.2	17.2
1970	27.0	32.7	21.0

Recommendation. 14. No ward should be retained on parole involuntarily more than two years unless it can be demonstrated to the parole board, at least every six months, that the protection of the community is substantially increased by so doing.

Community Treatment Project

Since 1961, the Youth Authority has been piloting a community-based program, in lieu of institutionalization, which has received world-wide recognition. The Community Treatment Project (CTP) classifies youths according to a sophisticated interpersonal maturity (I-level) scale, "matches" them with agents who have been rated most likely to be effective with them, and carries out a highly individualized or differential treatment program in small caseloads. While there are a number of theoretical and practical shortcomings in this program, (a major one being unusually high time demands), results have been very

encouraging.³¹ At fifteen months and twenty-four months, CTP wards had failure rates which were roughly two-thirds that of control groups and all other parolees in the State.³² There is also evidence that "the State has saved several million dollars in capital outlay", due to elimination of initial institutionalization and a much lower return rate.³³

Since volumes of descriptive and evaluative data are available about CTP, this report will name only those factors which have "made a substantial contribution to the comparative effectiveness of CTP."³⁴

1. matching of youths and agents
2. ability and perceptiveness of agents
3. intensive and/or extensive intervention
4. differential and treatment-relevant decision-making
5. working through of the agent/youth relationship as a major vehicle of treatment

Researchers offer this important note of caution:

"CTP's effectiveness is not simply a result of its having operated within a community setting: all available evidence suggests that the avoidance of institutionalization, in itself, contributes little if anything to the experimental-control differences in parole success. In other words, it is the differential or intensive/extensive treatment aspects--as reflected in, and supported by, the above five factors --which appear to be of fundamental importance."³⁵

CYA also claims that 89% of all youth eligible for the program do at least as well as other parolees who are institutionalized (an average of nine or ten months) before parole, that 36% perform better in CTP, and that only 10% do better in the traditional program.³⁶ As Gibbons pointed out several years ago, "these results strongly suggest that community treatment stands as an effective alternative to institutionalization".³⁷ In fact, the Youth Authority has asserted that it "no longer views community treatment in lieu of institutionalization as, largely, an 'experimental' venture".³⁸ If this is a firm position, then the Youth Authority and the State of California must make an even stronger commitment to these findings.

Recommendation. 15. The Youth Authority should make a stronger commitment not only to the further experimentation with but also the implementation of differential community-based treatment, in lieu of institutionalization, particularly with those youths for whom such a program has already been demonstrated effective.

VII. INCREASED PAROLE EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAM

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, CYA initiated its Increased Parole Effectiveness Program (PEP) in April, 1971, several months after the Parole Task Force had completed its field work. However, because of its implications for the future, it merits inclusion in this Report. Since a detailed description of PEP is available,³⁹ attention here will focus mainly on program goals, methods for obtaining those goals, and general program aspects.

Goals and Methods

The Youth Authority has formulated two long-range objectives for PEP, one general and the other specific:⁴⁰

1. reduce crimes committed by wards under its jurisdiction;
2. reduce parole returns sufficiently to enable closure of 400 plus beds by April 1, 1973.

It lists the following as the key methods and procedures to attain these goals:

- "(a) Planned programs of enriched services to parolees on a differential case-by-case, unit-by-unit basis;
- (b) Systematic changes in the decision-making process as it relates to the use of community alternatives for parolees;
- (c) Training and consultation for parole agents to enable them to develop new community alternatives for parolees;
- (d) Special training and consultation to supervisors to enable them to implement new procedures for counseling and case review with parole agents; and
- (e) Ongoing evaluation to: (1) identify effective programs; (2) give feedback for administrators, managers and workers on performance; and (3) measure the degree to which program objectives are achieved."⁴¹

The CYA is receiving \$1,800,000 Federal "seed" money over a two-year period to implement PEP. The expectation is that a decrease in the parole violation rate will make the program self-supporting within that time. Of major significance is the fact that "this plan commits the Youth Authority to reallocating funds presently going into institutional programming to an improved, effective parole services operation."⁴² This type of commitment and reallocation is one that might well be increased within the CYA and duplicated by other correctional agencies in general and by adult correctional institutions in particular.

By reducing caseloads to a flexible average of 50-1, and by significantly strengthening the training program (by \$93,000 over two years), the Department hopes to provide the time, increased skills, and resources necessary to retain more high-risk youth in the community.

Evaluation

Because of its newness, no valid assessment of PEP's effectiveness can be made at this time. However, there is no bar to discussing its emphasis and its potential impact.

Two particularly favorable aspects of PEP are that it decreases caseload size, and that it apparently triples CYA's training capacity for parole staff. Its heavy stress on training and on increased effectiveness of first-line supervisors (intended to change their role from "caseload auditor" to "resource manager"),⁴³ follows the recent statewide training study recommendations.⁴⁴ However, it perhaps leaves unresolved a problem acknowledged by many staff, specifically that a number of supervisors are, in effect, "semi-retired". More aggressive administrative action may still be necessary to remedy this situation if training does not. Action must also be taken to further reduce parole workloads, since they are still in excess of subsidy standards set for the counties, and to correct the earlier mentioned inadequate clerical ratio.

Caution must be exercised with respect to the time and functions of the line worker. While many constructive additions have been made by PEP--increased training, case staffings, supervisory consultation and controls, research, etc.--there is a distinct possibility that, in combined form, they may place such a time burden on the worker as to negate the reduction in his caseload. Conversely, if the caseloads are reduced without these additional resources and more effective supervision, agents are likely to continue handling cases in the same manner they always have (as has occurred in some probation subsidy programs). Methods for accommodating to these issues must be developed, and should include reduced paperwork and increased emphasis on client-oriented activities.

Finally, there is the uncomfortable question as to what will happen to PEP and the overall parole program if the CYA is not able to sufficiently lower its return rate within two years (a goal that will be increasingly difficult if counties drastically reduce their commitments even further as is strongly recommended by the Juvenile Institution Task Force Report). The question is not intended to imply that the required objectives will not be met. In fact, there have already been some reports of a turnabout in staff morale and enthusiasm. Also, despite the questions raised in this discussion, Task Force staff is strongly convinced that PEP has potential for making the most dramatic impact on parole operations in many years. The sincere hope is that this potential can be realized and that concerns raised here will therefore ultimately be completely dissipated.

VIII. WHO SHOULD HANDLE PAROLE?

Assuming that State commitments continue to decline, there is good probability that caseloads will be spread thinly over considerably widened geographical areas. This will necessitate more agent time per individual case, and make it increasingly difficult for agents to make maximum use of local resources. For these reasons, and because local probation departments provide services closely comparable to those of parole, many correctional and public officials are suggesting that county probation departments might well be a more effective and less costly vehicle for providing parole as well as probation services. Many clients were under local probation supervision before commitment to the State, and unless it can be demonstrated that State field services are more effective than county aftercare programs, there seems no logical reason why these clients, once paroled, cannot again be supervised by local authorities.

On the other hand, as pointed out in the Probation Task Force Report, there may be instances where counties, especially small ones, might wish to have the State provide not only parole but probation services as well.

In either case, provided State and county agreement has been reached, there should be no legal barrier to their making respective arrangements on a contractual basis. The financial implications of such a contract, as these relate to the new subsidy program recommended by the Correctional System Study, are discussed in the System Task Force Report.

Recommendation

16. *The State should enact permissive legislation, allowing the State and individual counties to contract with each other for either jurisdiction to handle both probation and parole services in any county.*

IX. SUMMARY

This chapter has described the juvenile parole system in the State of California. It began with an examination of the administrative structure of the Youth Authority in terms of the style of management manifested by the Department. Basic in this was the concern with communication patterns and the extent to which staff participate in the decision-making process. This was followed by a discussion of the Youth Authority's philosophy, policies, and functions.

The section on Resources dealt with staff roles, including those of the supervisor and the para-professional; matters of training, caseloads, and staff morale were also examined. In addition, interview and questionnaire data were presented to depict client views of parole and of the Youth Authority.

The final sections of this chapter dealt with the topic of effectiveness of the Youth Authority, and included an assessment of the Community Treatment Project as well as the newly established Increased Parole Effectiveness Program.

Some of the major findings of the Task Force are as follows:

1. Despite the trend toward simpler and more flexible organizational structures, the Youth Authority continues to be handicapped by its large size and traditional hierarchical structure. Staff at all levels in the hierarchy, particularly line workers, are dissatisfied with communications in the Department. There is also the definite feeling, again among line workers, that they do not have enough voice in important policy matters affecting field operations. In brief, there is the general opinion that the Department is conservative and unwilling to experiment with new ideas.
2. There is a pervasive belief among parole agents that the Youth Authority Board, not the Department, sets important policies and defines the duties of the agent. They feel that Board policies are too conservative and law enforcement-oriented, especially in matters of parole revocation. As a result, many parole agents "slant" their reports and thereby manipulate Board members.
3. The morale of the parole staff is poor. Among the factors responsible for this condition are poor communications, and little or no voice in policy-decisions, both of which are mentioned above. However, perhaps even more important are the changing parolee characteristics leading to serious management problems, and above all, the lack of promotional opportunities. Since 1965, the length of time on parole has increased five months. Thus, despite the fact that greater numbers of youth are being diverted from State institutions, parolees are now serving longer periods of time under supervision. This is resulting in a "piling-up" of parolees in each agent's caseload. In short, it would not be inaccurate to state that the staff feels "locked in" a system where they are overworked, have inadequate clerical assistance, are denied the privilege of transferring from one agency to another, and feel that they do not have the support of the administration.
4. There are a number of "soft spots" in the staffing of YA personnel. One has to do with a number of first-line supervisors who are "coasting", either because they are not capable of providing agents with supervisory leadership, or because they are "burnt out". Another has to do with the underrepresentation of CYA parole agents from racial and ethnic minority groups. This unfortunate situation exists in the adult parole system as well. A third "soft spot" in staffing has to do with the employment of para-professionals and New Careerists, and it is extremely unfortunate that persons of great potential value to corrections may no longer be recruited because of budget restrictions and poor planning.

5. Despite the above problems within the YA staff, parole agents have been able to maintain good rapport with their clients. The questionnaire data clearly indicate that the parolees have very positive attitudes toward their agents. However, they are not nearly so positive toward the system, and view it with a good deal of uncertainty and suspicion.
6. While a precise statement regarding the effectiveness of the YA's program is not possible, available data indicate that the violation rates over the past ten years have remained relatively constant. In fact, since 1968 they have decreased slightly, even though there are more "hard-core" cases under supervision. In addition, the period of time spent on parole before violation has increased steadily since 1965, suggesting a concerted effort on the part of the parole agents to retain their charges in the community.
7. The Community Treatment Project, now formally a part of the Youth Authority program, has shown consistently that it is superior to institutionalization as a method of programming Youth Authority wards. In addition to the CTP, the Youth Authority has recently launched the Increased Parole Effectiveness Program (PEP). One of PEP's specific goals is to close approximately 400 institutional beds by April 1, 1973. The achievement of this goal will be facilitated through increased staff training and reduced caseloads, both to be important ingredients of PEP.
8. As will be evident in the next chapter, many of the observations made by the Task Force in this chapter, and summarized above, also apply to the Parole and Community Services Division of the Department of Corrections. The CYA and CDC have many problems in common. For example, as will be seen in the following chapter, the adult parole system is encumbered by five administrative layers that encourage rigidity and bureaucratic "red tape". The Division is also plagued by communication problems. Policies are not clearly stated, and line staff report little or no voice in important decision-making matters, and, in general, feel "locked in" their positions.

FOOTNOTES

¹President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 16.

²Department of Youth Authority, Parole Manual, State of California (Sacramento, revised August 1, 1966), Section 501.

³Loc. cit.

⁴Department of Youth Authority, Staff News, State of California (Sacramento, April 16, 1971).

⁵California Welfare and Institutions Code, Article I, Chapter 937, Section 1700.

⁶Department of Youth Authority, Parole Manual, op. cit., Section 521.1.

⁷Department of Youth Authority, "Program Planning Policy", State of California (Sacramento, April 12, 1971), p. 1. (Mimeographed.)

⁸Department of Youth Authority, Parole Manual, op. cit., Section 502.10.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Department of Youth Authority, A Guide to Treatment Program, State of California (Sacramento, April 1970).

¹¹Department of Youth Authority, Parole Manual, op. cit., Sections 520.2 and 521.7.

¹²Department of Youth Authority, "Program Planning Policy", op. cit., pp. 3-6.

¹³Department of Youth Authority, A Guide to Treatment Programs, op. cit.; Department of Youth Authority, The Status of Current Research in the California Youth Authority, State of California (Sacramento, July 1970).

¹⁴Department of Youth Authority, "Project Proposal: Increased Parole Effectiveness", State of California, Submitted to California Council on Criminal Justice, January 21, 1971, p. 34. (Mimeographed.)

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 24-26.

¹⁶See: Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and Training, Offenders as a Correctional Manpower Resource (College Park: reprinted November 1970); President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, op. cit., pp. 102-104.

Footnotes

¹⁷CYA Budget, 1970-71.

¹⁸California Task Force on Correctional Manpower and Training, Mobilizing Correctional Manpower (Sacramento, September 1968); Department of Youth Authority, Training for Tomorrow, State of California (Sacramento, July 1970).

¹⁹See: Training for Tomorrow, Ibid.

²⁰Department of Youth Authority, Rules, Regulations, and Standards of Performance for Special Supervision Programs, State of California (Sacramento, revised November 1969), p. 4.

²¹Department of Youth Authority, "Project Proposal: Increased Effectiveness", op. cit., p. 34.

²²Ibid., p. 21.

²³Ibid., p. 26.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 26-27.

²⁵Department of Youth Authority, A Comparison of Youth Authority Wards: 1961-1970, State of California (Sacramento, September 1970), pp. 6-7.

²⁶Department of Youth Authority, Rules, Regulations, and Standards of Performance for Special Supervision Programs, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

²⁷Department of Youth Authority, Staff News, op. cit.

²⁸Department of Youth Authority, Annual Statistical Report: 1969, State of California (Sacramento, 1970), p. 27; 1970 statistics obtained from Division of Research.

²⁹Department of Youth Authority, State of California, statistics to be published in 1970 Annual Statistical Report of Division of Research.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹See: Don C. Gibbons, "Differential Treatment of Delinquents and Interpersonal Maturity Levels Theory: A Critique", The Social Service Review, 44 (March, 1970), pp. 22-33; James Robison, The California Prison, Parole and Probation System, Technical Supplement No. 2, A Special Report to the Assembly. (Sacramento: California Office of Research: undated), pp. 56-62.

³²Ted Palmer, "California's Community Treatment Project for Delinquent Adolescents", accepted for publication in 1971 issue of Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, p. 14. (Mimeographed.)

³³Ibid., p. 16.

Footnotes

³⁴Ibid., pp. 18-19.

³⁵Department of Youth Authority, The Status of Current Research in the California Youth Authority, op. cit., p. 5.

³⁶Palmer, op. cit., p. 21.

³⁷Don Gibbons, Society, Crime, and Criminal Careers (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 528.

³⁸Palmer, op. cit., p. 15.

³⁹"Project Proposal: Increased Parole Effectiveness", op. cit.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 32.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid., p. 30.

⁴³Ibid., p. 37.

⁴⁴See: Department of Youth Authority, Training for Tomorrow, op. cit.

CHAPTER IV

THE ADULT PAROLE SYSTEM: STUDY FINDINGS

I. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

The adult parole system in California is a function of the Parole and Community Services Division of the Department of Corrections. The Division is administered by a Deputy Director, responsible to the Director of the Department. The Deputy Director is assisted by an Assistant Deputy Director and various administrative and staff personnel in the headquarters office in Sacramento. He is also supported by Departmental Services, such as the Management Services Division, the Research Division, and so on.

At the next level of administrative structure are six Regional Offices, each headed by a Regional Administrator. Regions I through IV are constituted primarily on geographic lines, covering the entire state; while Regions V and VI are primarily constituted functionally, to administer certain specialized programs, such as the Narcotic Addict Outpatient Program, the Parole Outpatient Clinics, etc.

The Regions, in turn, are subdivided into Districts, and the Districts into Units, administered by District Administrators and Unit Supervisors respectively. Thus there are five administrative levels of staff in the Division, including the line staff level.

In any administrative structure as large and as complex in its functions as this one, one of the major maintenance tasks is communication. The expectation that communication problems will arise is heightened when the large and complex organization is a professional one, in which the decision-making process must take place at every level, including the line workers. In the final analysis, it is the line worker who delivers the service to the division's clients, both parolees and community. He must, therefore, apply decisions made at all levels to the specific case situation. Thus, if there is any breakdown or distortion of communication, in either direction, between the line worker and the top level of administration, it will have a negative effect on the line worker's ability to implement the division's mission.

To add to the division's problems of communication and of administrative control and supervision, the number of parolees assigned to adult parole agents for supervision has shown a marked and accelerating increase over the past few years. On February 1, 1965, adult male felon parolees totaled 10,127 (this figure excludes adult female felon parolees and civilly committed narcotic addict parolees). Over four and a half years later, on June 30, 1969, this group of parolees had increased by 8%. Just one year after that, on June 30, 1970, they were up almost 19% over the 1965 figure.¹ And as of April 1, 1971, the increase in this group had grown to about 40% above the 1965 figure. When adult female felon parolees and civilly committed narcotic addict parolees are added, the April 1, 1971 total of parolees under supervision is 19,922.²

According to a study made by the Department's Research Division, certain key characteristics of felon offenders committed to the Department of Corrections, the vast majority of whom are ultimately released on parole, have apparently been changing over the past decade.³ The changing characteristics will be discussed at a later point in this chapter, but the pertinent point here is that changes in the characteristics of the parole population require corresponding changes in programs and staffing patterns in the division.

The need to adapt both to rapidly increasing volume and to changing program needs has put a tremendous strain on the whole structure of the Parole and Community Services Division. The following sections will attempt to identify those spots at which this strain may become, or already has become, evident and will suggest ways in which remedial action may be taken.

II. COMMUNICATION

Since the quality of its communication system directly affects the ability of any organization to fulfill its mission, the Parole Task Force staff devoted a substantial proportion of its time to assessing the quality of communications within the Parole and Community Services Division. Findings were somewhat mixed.

Divisional field staff, from regional administrators to line staff, were in general agreement that dissemination of information from the top levels of administration was good with respect to the substance of new policies, procedural changes, and legislation. However, since some policies, procedures, and legislative changes are subject to interpretation before being converted into action, and since there are three administrative levels between division administration and line staff, some problems have arisen regarding the intent of such communications. Line staff, in particular, expressed the feeling that communications from department or division administration sometimes became distorted (though perhaps unintentionally) by the time they were received.

In general, the division's field staff viewed upward communication as more of a problem than downward communication. At each level, the feeling was expressed that efforts to communicate upwards were frequently either intercepted or diluted at the next higher level, with the result that top administration frequently remained uninformed regarding the problems and frustrations of the division's "lower echelons".

Table VII reproduces the responses to two items in the confidential questionnaire distributed to staff in the areas covered by the California Correctional System Study. These responses generally support the verbal feedback received by Task Force staff, and suggest several observations. First, only a minority of the staff would rate the quality of communication in a very favorable light. About one-third of the staff--line workers, supervisors, and administrators--evaluated the quality of communication

(downward or upward) as being "good" or "excellent". Fully 33% asserted that downward communication was either "bad" or "poor" and 43% rated upward communication in the same unfavorable light. Second, the line staff is more dissatisfied with the quality of communication, in either direction, than are the supervisors and administrators. Third, the supervisors and administrators are more dissatisfied with upward communication than with downward communication.

This evidence of dissatisfaction with communication in the division, while not overwhelming, is sufficient to serve as a warning of possible impending trouble. It is not unreasonable to assume that much of the dissatisfaction expressed is due to the cumbersome, multi-layered administrative hierarchy of the division described at the beginning of this chapter.

TABLE VII
STAFF PERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATION IN THE DIVISION
(Percentage distribution*)

QUESTION	ALL STAFF (N=268)	LINE WORKERS (N=204)	ADMINISTRATORS & SUPERVISORS (N=64)
1. Estimate how good the <u>downward</u> communication in your agency is.			
Excellent	7	6	11
Good	24	23	27
Fair	37	36	40
Poor	21	24	13
Bad	11	12	10
2. Estimate how good the <u>upward</u> communication in your agency is.			
Excellent	6	5	6
Good	27	27	27
Fair	24	24	27
Poor	29	28	30
Bad	14	15	11

*Column totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

While the Parole Task Force recognized that responsible administrators were aware of a problem in this area and were taking steps to resolve it, the following recommendations are made to lend support to, and perhaps to increase, the efforts now being made.

Recommendations

17. *The administrative structure of the division should be reviewed to assess the advisability of reducing the number of administrative levels through which communications must be channeled.*

18. *Whenever a particularly important or possibly controversial change in policy, procedure, or legislation is to be communicated, the communication should be made by the appropriate headquarters administrator on a face-to-face basis (at regional or district staff meetings) with all divisional staff concerned, to allow for questions from those who need interpretation of the change, and to avoid possibly conflicting interpretations by intermediate administrators.*

19. *The deputy director, assistant deputy director, and other appropriate headquarters staff should spend the maximum amount of time possible in direct contact with field staff, especially the line workers, to increase opportunities for direct two-way communication and to enhance the line worker's feelings of importance and "belonging".*

20. *Division administrators should constantly place great emphasis, in their contacts with regional and district administrators and with unit supervisors, on the vital importance of their responsibility to maintain open, two-way communication between top management and line staff.*

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIVISION'S MISSION

The Mission

As with other components of any modern, progressive corrections system, the basic mission of the adult parole component is the protection of society through reduction of the probability of continued or renewed illegal behavior by parolees. In a parole system, the two major elements of this mission are the rehabilitation and reintegration into law-abiding society of the maximum possible number of parolees; and the removal from society and reincarceration of those who have committed, or are in imminent danger of committing, further aggressions against society. The multiplicity of techniques, programs, and resources developed to achieve the parole mission preclude a full description here; but, for an excellent and brief description of adult parole supervision in California, the reader is referred to the introduction of a report made to the Legislature by the Department of Corrections in December, 1970.⁴ The extent to which a parole system is able to increase the number of parolees reintegrated into society and to reduce the number reincarcerated, while maintaining a consistent or increased level of protection of society from criminal acts by parolees, constitutes its "success" rate. The following subsections, then, will briefly review two of the more noteworthy programs inaugurated during the past decade by the Parole and Community Services Division to achieve its mission; look into the division's "success" rate; discuss some of the problems related to the division's program expansion; and suggest actions needed to reduce or resolve those problems.⁵

The Work Unit Program

The stated objectives of the Work Unit Program, which was inaugurated as of February 1, 1965, were "to serve the public interest by a reduction in new crime and aggressive acts committed by parolees; by providing increased assistance to the parolee; and by a reduction in the cost of handling offenders within the correctional system."⁶ Between 1965 and 1970, substantial progress has been made toward all these objectives and is statistically demonstrated in the study already cited.⁷ Of even more significance, however, are the statistically verified indications, in the same study, that, coincident with the creation of the Work Unit Program, there was a general increase in the "success" rate of the whole adult parole system. Why this came about is a matter of speculation at this time, but the implication remains that a powerful thrust toward keeping the parolee out of prison has been generated in the entire adult parole system, and some thoughts on the subject will be presented later.

Use of Trainees and Para-Professionals

Some of the most disturbing and most frequently discussed trends of the past decade have been the combined urbanization and suburbanization of the nation's population, the rapid increase in the proportion of minority group members in the inner city populations, and the growing alienation of these sub-cultural groups from the majority culture. When recognition of these trends is related to the fact that approximately 50% of California's CDC population consists of minority group members, it adds up to a major problem for an organization expected to "rehabilitate and reintegrate" its clients. The simple answer would seem to be, "Hire more staff from among the State's minorities", especially since 77% of the 199 line workers and 81% of the 64 supervisors and administrators who checked the ethnic group item on the questionnaire indicated that they were Caucasian. But the answer is not that simple. Among minority group members who could qualify for positions as parole agents, not enough apply. In an attempt to alleviate this problem, the division has employed three kinds of para-professional personnel: (1) student professional assistants; (2) correctional casework trainees; and (3) parole aides. The parole aides, in particular, are recruited predominantly from economically depressed sections of urban areas to help bridge the communications gap between a largely Caucasian middle-class parole staff and the largely minority group populated communities in which they must function. As yet, it is only a small beginning, but in the next decade, it may prove to be one of the most important steps yet taken by the parole system.

The Division's "Success Rate"

When measured by the percentage of parolees still in parole status two years after release from prison versus the percentage that had to be reincarcerated, as well as the percentage who had committed new felonies, the success rate of the parole division showed a remarkable improvement following inauguration of the Work Unit Program.⁸ From a high of 47% returned to

prison within two years of their release in 1962, the rate dropped to 32% returned to prison within two years of their release in 1967. At the same time, 20% of those released in 1962 had committed new felonies within two years of release, while only 12% of those released in 1967 had committed new felonies within two years of release. In short, while reducing the number of parolees returned to prison by almost 33%, they had also reduced the number of new felonies by over 41%.

As stated earlier, however, the most interesting aspect of this improved success rate is that it occurred in both Conventional Units and Work Units.⁹ Of the parolees released between May, 1965, and June, 1968, 34% had been returned to prison within two years from Conventional Units, and 33% from Work Units. The Work Units, however, did have a somewhat better record in protecting society, since 15% of those returned from Conventional Units had committed new felonies, as compared with 12% from the Work Units. Thus, of the 9,145 parolees in Conventional Units, 1,335 committed new felonies whereas of the 8,392 in Work Units, 982 had new felonies.

Just why the Conventional Units began to show a marked improvement in success rate quite soon after the establishment of the Work Unit Program is a matter of speculation. It may have reflected motivation through competition. It may have reflected the desire of line workers to prove their right to be transferred (or "promoted" as they perceive it) to the smaller, more professionally rewarding caseloads in the Work Units. It may have reflected an increased conviction among parole agents that top administration was sincerely interested in keeping parolees out of prison as long as they did not pose a serious threat to society. In all likelihood, it was a combination of all of these factors. Whatever the reasons, it is clear that the introduction of a new program, with emphasis on the belief that parole supervision can work if given a real chance, greatly improved the functioning of the whole system. It also raises the question whether the gains already made will be lost if this program is not expanded and strengthened. A return to the prior (and much lower) level of success rates would cost the State's taxpayers millions of dollars (to say nothing of the human cost). Considering the cost differential between parole and incarceration, it has been estimated that to date the savings in operational costs under the new program have exceeded five million dollars. The savings in capital outlay for institutional building may be as high as 45 million, part of which is attributable to the Probation Subsidy Program.¹⁰

Some Problem Areas

As was indicated earlier in this chapter, there have been a number of "growing pains" related to the parole division's rapid expansion, both in numbers of parolees under supervision and in new program development. These changes have consumed tremendous amounts of administrative time, thought, and energy, with the result that regular organizational maintenance tasks may have been partially neglected. In this section, some of the problem areas noted by the Parole Task Force, both in on-site interviews and through returns on the questionnaire, will be discussed.

One of the foreseeable results of a combined increase in overall parolee caseload and development of new programs is that a substantial number of parole agents would be relatively new, either recently recruited or recently assigned to their current jobs. And, as a matter of fact, the Task Force found that, of 204 parole agents responding to the questionnaire issued in October, 1970, 114 (56%) had been on their present assignment for two years or less. When this finding is combined with those in Table VII, on communications, the results obtained in Table VIII, are not too surprising. It is likely that the weighting toward the "unclear" end of this scale among parole agents indicates an expression of anxiety about making decisions on specific cases. In interviews with Task Force staff, a substantial number of parole agents expressed the feeling that it was the parole agent, not the supervisors or administrators, nor even the Adult Authority, who was "blamed" if a parolee got into serious trouble. Yet they also felt that they were evaluated on the basis of how many parolees they can keep out of prison. Adding to this possible anxiety was the feeling, expressed by a number of parole agents, of the existence of conflict between the philosophy of the Adult Authority (which they perceived as punitive) and that of the division. Apparently, then, there is a real need to give increased support and security to parole agents, particularly those who are fairly new, with respect to the division's "new" thrust.

TABLE VIII
STAFF PERCEPTION OF CLARITY OF PHILOSOPHY
AND POLICY IN THE DIVISION
(Percentage distribution*)

QUESTION	ALL STAFF (N=268)	LINE WORKERS (N=204)	ADMINISTRATORS & SUPERVISORS (N=64)
1. Estimate how clear the philosophy and policies of your agency are.			
Very clear	6	4	13
Clear	27	24	36
Average	36	36	34
Unclear	21	25	11
Very unclear	10	11	6

*Column totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

The Task Force found that, in spite of its apparent generally favorable influence on overall parole outcome, the existence of the Work Unit Program caused some dissension among parole agents supervising Conventional caseloads. As indicated earlier, most parole agents considered assignment to a Work Unit caseload as a promotion, not just a lateral transfer. In addition, they have seen the figures on parole outcomes showing that agents with the smaller caseloads are really not much more successful than those

with the much larger Conventional caseloads. As a result, many feel that the total divisional caseload should be redistributed so that caseloads would be more or less equalized. To accede to this feeling without further research might prove to be a mistake--a step in the wrong direction--but the fact that the feeling is there does constitute a warning that some action should be taken. The ultimate answer probably lies in continued intensive research to determine more precisely than is now known what kinds of offenders can profit most by assignment to caseloads of various sizes, and what types of supervision are most effective for different types of offenders. It is very likely that some parolees will profit by intensive supervision, while others would fare better under less direct methods; some need help with environmental problems and others do not; still others would profit by frequent contacts whereas others would not. Research would indicate the number and kinds of units that would best meet the needs of different types of parolees. For the Department of Corrections to move in this direction will, of course, require the understanding and the help of those who draw up the budgets and those who approve them.

One impediment to implementation of the division's mission is the small, but statistically significant, minority of parole agents who consciously oppose the principle of keeping as many parolees out of prison as is possible within reasonable limits of public safety. Task Force staff, in interviews with parole agents, found an estimated 15% to 20% who contended that the adult parole system was not providing adequate protection to society under present policy. In light of the steadily declining number of new felonies committed by parolees over the past five or six years, it is difficult to understand the reasoning behind this point of view; but nevertheless, it continues to exist. To staff conducting the interviews, this point of view seemed to reflect, not the factual situation, but rather a personal feeling that "wrong-doers must be punished", and that the most appropriate place for law violators is in prison. A few of these parole agents seemed to consider themselves to be strictly law enforcement officers rather than helping agents, and even believed that they should carry guns in their work, which is contrary to agency policy. Removal of this impediment would seem to require either a thorough reorientation of the parole agents involved or their release, so that they might seek employment in more compatible lines of work.

While it is true that someone at the top of any organization must have the ultimate responsibility and authority to make policy decisions, it is also true that the greater the participation in the decision-making process on the part of those delivering services, the more committed they will be to their tasks. The Parole Task Force questionnaire included an item on this matter, and the divisional field staff were asked to estimate the degree of their participation in the decision-making process. The results are presented in Table IX. While the responses of the supervisors and administrators are slightly weighted toward the upper end of the scale, line staff responses are heavily weighted toward the lower end. Fully 58% of the line workers, and 30% of the supervisors and administrators, claimed that they had little or no voice in decision-making. These responses reveal rather strong feelings among line staff that they are left out of the decision-

making process, and these feelings constitute a threat to the quality of the agency's delivery of services.

TABLE IX
STAFF PERCEPTION OF EXTENT
TO WHICH THEY HAVE A VOICE IN DECISION-MAKING
(Percentage distribution*)

QUESTION	ALL STAFF (N=268)	LINE WORKERS (N=204)	ADMINISTRATORS & SUPERVISORS (N=64)
1. Estimate to what extent you have a voice in the decision-making of your agency.			
Very strong	6	4	10
Strong	18	14	29
Fair	26	24	32
Little voice	30	32	25
No voice	21	26	5

*Column totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

The point at which parole agents said they felt the greatest degree of conflict between policies of the division and policies of the Adult Authority was the revocation process. In Chapter VII, recommendations are made for certain changes in the Adult Authority's revocation procedures, and these changes, if adopted, should alleviate a part of this conflict. It must be borne in mind, however, that the difference between the proper functions of the Adult Authority and those of the parole agents will naturally result in (sometimes serious) differences of opinion on specific cases; and this can occur when neither side is actually "wrong".

Another problem area of the division's mission is being engendered by the changing characteristics of adult felons committed to the Department of Corrections by the superior courts of the State. In a study referred to earlier, the Department's Research Division found that those committed over the past decade are becoming younger, have more prior offenses, have used weapons more frequently in their offenses, started breaking the law earlier in their lives, and so on. Thus, inmates released to parole over the past few years are tending to be more impulsive and assaultive than the parolee population of preceding years.¹¹

The Work Unit Program, started in early 1965, with its smaller caseloads and more intensive supervision (caseloads are set at 35 compared to an average of 70 for Conventional Units), seems to have dealt successfully with this phenomenon to date. However, inadequate financial support for

the WU Program is now forcing the division to place a higher and higher percentage of the parolee population in Conventional Units and a smaller and smaller percentage in Work Units. In 1965, 56% of the parolee population was in Work Unit caseloads and only 44% in Conventional caseloads. By June 30, 1969, 48% were in WU caseloads and 52% in Conventional caseloads; and by June 30, 1970, the 1965 figures had been exactly reversed. This forced redistribution of the parolee, due to inadequate finances, into much larger caseloads could eventually result in reversing the "success rate" of the division. On the other hand, the fact that the Conventional Unit success rate caught up with and is now virtually identical with that of the Work Unit Program suggests that caseload size is not the sole factor in determining parole failure or success. Rather, it is now commonly accepted by correctional authorities that it is the nature and quality of treatment efforts, and their relevancy for individual offenders, which are the key factors in program effectiveness. In short, while excessive caseload size hampers any meaningful rehabilitative or surveillance efforts, differential handling and individualized treatment are far more important than the number of clients.¹² As the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice concluded in 1967:

"Those experiments with reduced caseloads have shown that to reduce recidivism requires classification of offenders with differential treatment for each class."¹³

The Youth Authority's Community Treatment Project and recent Increased Parole Effectiveness Program, discussed in Chapter III, are viewed as progressive steps in this direction. While caseloads of 70 are well above the standards set by virtually all recognized correctional authorities¹⁴ and 40% above the mandatory maximum limit for probation subsidy programs,¹⁵ the California Department of Corrections should strive not simply to reduce more of its caseloads, but also to develop more sophisticated strategies of differential treatment.

Mention has already been made of the difficulty, as well as the vital importance, of recruiting members of racial and ethnic minorities for the adult parole system. Task Force staff view the increased hiring of minority group members who can effectively communicate and work with the State's growing minority population is crucial to the further progress of the system. Private industry, faced with the same problems, has resorted to programs very similar to the trainee and parole aide programs of the parole division. As mentioned in the Probation Task Force Report, such programs often seem quite costly in terms of immediate returns, but their real value lies in long-range results. If California's adult parole system is going to be relevant and effective in dealing with changes in the broader society, as well as in the parolee population, it is imperative that these forward-looking programs which facilitate greater hiring and training of minorities be budgeted for continuation and expansion.

Recommendations

21. In view of the heavy pressures exerted on parole agents as a result of both volume and program expansion, they should be given continuous and explicit support and assistance at the level of their major decision-making responsibility--the application of philosophy and policy to the specific case.

22. A strong and continuous effort should be made to develop much greater participation by all staff in the decision-making process, both as to expression of opinion on important issues and as to feedback to staff regarding the reasoning behind decisions made.

23. The California Department of Corrections should establish an overall caseload standard at least equal to that of probation subsidy programs (substantially below 50), but should at the same time develop more sophisticated strategies of differential treatment.

24. Parole agents should be given every possible encouragement to make recommendations completely consistent with their honest opinions in cases up for revocation hearing. Whenever a parole board decides contrary to staff recommendations, the board should indicate the basis for its decision.

25. The California Department of Corrections should expand its efforts to hire, train, and promote minority group members.

IV. PERSONNEL MATTERS

Recruitment

One of the most important recruitment issues is the one already touched on in the preceding section--the recruitment of staff from minority cultures and ethnic groups. But the problem of recruiting correctional staff is actually much broader than that. A study made by the Harris Poll a few years ago showed that only a very small fraction of young people today are interested in entering the correctional field as a profession because the work is too difficult and frustrating, and the rewards are inadequate. Interestingly enough, when the division's field staff were asked, "Would you recommend corrections as a career to a young person?" 73% of 204 parole agents and 81% of 64 supervisors and administrators said "yes"; 10% of the agents and 8% of the supervisors and administrators said "no"; the balance of both groups were "not sure". Thus the great majority of those with experience in the field would recommend it to others, and this suggests the need for vigorous support of programs such as student professional assistants and correctional casework trainees, to give young people a chance to judge for themselves after having had some actual experience. It also suggests the possibility of a staff position at the departmental level which would be devoted full-time to working with high schools and colleges to inform students

of the many kinds of job opportunities in corrections and to serve as a recruiter for existing vacancies. This staff person could also advise interested students and others on the areas of knowledge with which they should become familiar before taking the Personnel Board examinations for various correctional positions.

Promotions

When asked "Are you basically satisfied with the promotional system in your agency?", 71% of line staff and 63% of supervisors and administrators said "no". To conclude that all of those persons dissatisfied were those passed over for promotions or were malcontents would be an oversimplification - although it is conceded that some of the expressed dissatisfaction may come from this source. Interviews with staff elicited a number of specific complaints about the promotional process. Some staff felt that too much emphasis was placed on a person's ability to pass written tests, to be articulate before a review panel, and to "pass" a supervisory evaluation which may or may not be objective. Other concerns among employees were the variation between different raters for the same position, and suspicion (justified or not) that key administrators were exerting pressure upon departmental representatives serving on oral panels to rate candidates in a predetermined manner. The amount of dissatisfaction suggests that ongoing reevaluation of the entire promotional process should be maintained, with participation by all levels of staff.

As was the case with Youth Authority parole staff, there was extremely strong support (93%) for creating the equivalent of a Parole Agent III case-carrying position so that outstanding caseworkers would not have to become administrators in order to be promoted. A clear majority (though not as high a percentage as Youth Authority staff) favored allowing workers to compete for promotional openings in other correctional agencies in the State (70%), and permitting them to transfer, with the same rank and salary, to other agencies (57%).

In-Service Training

In a professional organization, the in-service training program serves three purposes, two generally recognized, and one frequently overlooked: (1) orientation of new staff or staff recently assigned to new responsibilities; (2) continuing education of staff in their profession; and (3) the development of staff through the exchange of ideas and experiences, of common convictions, goals, and methodology. Without such a program, provided regularly in sufficient quantity and quality, new or recently assigned staff will rapidly become "stagnant", all staff will tend to fall behind on recently developed knowledge in their field, and the various units of the agency will tend to "ride off in all directions" rather than pursuing commonly perceived objectives through well-tested methods.

While the parole division has an in-service training program, both the quality and the quantity appeared to be somewhat spotty. Sixty-three percent of all staff indicated that training was ongoing; 53% felt it was relevant; and only 19% said it was individualized. Of the 86% reporting that they had received any type of in-service training, roughly one-half received 1 or 2 hours per month and only one out of five received a full hour or more per week. The recent expansion in case volume and in program diversification makes it all the more important that the training program be strengthened and intensified. One possibility that should be given serious consideration is that training capabilities might be increased by pooling the resources of the Department of the Youth Authority, the Department of Corrections, and other correctional agencies in the State. Another is that funds be budgeted to send selected members of staff, on a regular basis, to institutes and seminars established to train "trainers". These trainers could then be used to upgrade the training techniques of supervisors and administrators with ongoing in-service training responsibility. Generally speaking, the content of training can better be acquired at institutes and seminars established for that specific purpose.

Recommendations

26. *The Department of Corrections should develop its own fully staffed recruitment program.*

27. *Funds should be budgeted and approved to allow for substantial expansion of trainee and parole aide programs.*

28. *Every effort should be made to re-vitalize and strengthen the department's in-service training (or staff development) program.*

29. *A plan should be developed and funded for the systematic, specialized training of staff with in-service training responsibilities.*

In addition, Recommendations 6 through 9 and 16 in Chapter III on the California Youth Authority are also applicable to the California Department of Corrections.

V. A LOOK AT THE FUTURE

In order to consolidate and expand gains made by the Parole and Community Services Division during the past five or six years, and to avoid the possibility of losing its present momentum toward an increasingly successful correctional program, several aspects of the division's program need substantially increased financial support. In an undated memorandum addressed to the California Council on Criminal Justice, entitled "Problems and Needs", a copy of which was provided the Parole Task Force in October, 1970, the Department of Corrections listed a number of problems and what was needed

to alleviate them. Three of these "problems and needs" are particularly pertinent to this discussion and will be quoted verbatim:

"Problem

To increase public protection by strengthening parole supervision. A new system, called the Work Unit Parole Program was introduced in 1964 [sic], which strengthened parole supervision and increased parole success.

Need

The Work Unit Parole Program is limited to the supervision of less than half the adult male felons. The need is to place the entire felon group under Work Unit parole supervision.

Problem

Inmates leaving prison on parole and parolees having problems frequently require temporary support and assistance to make their adjustment in society.

Need

Fifty-bed Community Correctional Centers strategically located throughout the State will establish a more orderly and success-prone transition from prison to community living for selected parolees and inmates. Economic and program support will be provided at these centers, and a portion of the center will be used for work and training furloughs.

Problem

A large percentage of the Department of Corrections inmate and parolee population are minority group members who live in poverty areas. In working with individuals from this population, the Department confronts communication barriers and client-worker cultural differences which are serious obstacles to client rehabilitation.

Need

In order to increase the effectiveness of Corrections in this difficult area, the following resources are required:

1. Parole Agent Assistants who are recruited from poverty areas and have experience and communication skills in working with minority group members.
2. Employment of Community Organization Specialists to develop training programs for Parole Agents

regarding minority group relations and community resources, the specialist to act in a liaison capacity between the Parole Division and the indigenous groups and local community organizations.

3. In recent years emergence of volunteer organizations and self-help groups in the field of corrections represents a community resource in treatment of parolees, including emergency housing, family subsidies, and narcotic and alcoholic recovery programs. Contracting for services with these organizations will result in better parole outcome."¹⁶

In addition to the three quoted above, there are two other "problems and needs" requiring attention if California's non-institutional corrections programs are to be even better in the future than they are in the present.

Problem

As a result of many factors, the "glue" that holds the parole division together is beginning to loosen. While the far-flung staff of the division seem, in general, to have a good idea of what is going on in the division's program, many raise questions as to why or how. Doubts about "why" arise from inadequate two-way communication, and those concerning "how" result from inadequate orientation and on-the-job training.

Need

To maintain a unified (not "uniform") approach to new and expanded programs, it is requisite that every individual with any kind of responsibility for implementation of those programs have two things: (1) understanding of, and belief in, those programs; and (2) fundamental knowledge of the theory on which the programs are based and of the recommended methodology for their implementation. To meet the first need, there must be continuous, open, two-way, participatory communication. To meet the second requires a greatly expanded, and more continuous, orientation and in-service training program.

Problem

As the rehabilitation and reintegration programs for offenders become a larger and larger part of the corrections system in California, the rigid demarcation between State and local jurisdictions becomes more and more unrealistic. Sometimes the best (and most effective) State programs and the best local programs are functioning in the same locality, while the weakest of each is functioning in some other locality.

Need

There is a need to find some way of making the very best service, whether provided by a State or by a local agency, available in every county of the State. Therefore, there is a need for permissive legislation to be enacted permitting State and local corrections agencies to contract with one another for provision of rehabilitative and reintegrative services in a given locality. Such legislation could significantly reduce unnecessary duplications, increase the utilization of the most effective elements of both State and local agencies, and reinforce the present momentum toward reducing the probability of continuing or renewed illegal behavior by the system's clients.

VI. SUMMARY

This chapter has described the system of adult parole in California. Some of the major Task Force findings are as follows:

1. As is true of the California Youth Authority, the Parole and Community Services Division of the California Department of Corrections is handicapped by its large size, its traditional chain of command, and especially by its multi-layered administrative structure. Within this type of bureaucratized setting, many of the problems observed in the Youth Authority were also observed in the adult parole system. Operations are hindered by poor communications, little or no voice in important decision-making matters, and lack of clear statements of policy and philosophy.
2. The adult parole staff believes that the Adult Authority is working at cross-purposes with the division. (This was also a pervasive belief among Youth Authority parole staff vis-a-vis the Youth Authority Board.) The philosophy of the Adult Authority is seen as being too punitive and retributive. The greatest area of conflict is seen to lie in the parole revocation process which is also the greatest source of conflict between the Youth Authority parole agents and the Youth Authority Board.
3. Despite a recent statement in the administration's policy, to retain parolees in the community as long as possible, not all of the staff subscribe to it. There is a definite split within the staff among those who view parole primarily in "law enforcement" terms, and those who view it primarily in terms of "service". The former group believes that the administration's posture is too permissive, while the latter group whole-heartedly endorses it.
4. The division's Work Unit Program was designed to provide more effective supervision by reducing caseloads. Since its inaugu-

ation, violation rates, due to the commission of new crimes, have been decreasing. However, the same trend has also been observed in the division's Conventional Units, suggesting that the existence of the Work Unit Program has had an overall salutary effect upon parole service. However, some dissension has been noted among agents supervising Conventional caseloads primarily because assignment to the Work Unit Program is considered to be a promotion and not simply a lateral transfer.

5. As was true for the Youth Authority parole staff, the adult parole division staff was found to be dissatisfied with promotional opportunities. In both systems there is an overwhelming endorsement of the idea of creating a Parole Agent III case-carrying position, which would allow outstanding parole agents to be promoted without having to go into administration.
6. Again, as was true of the Youth Authority staff, there is a marked underrepresentation of adult parole agents drawn from various racial and ethnic groups. Approximately 80% of the adult parole staff is white, and yet 50% of California's parolees are non-white.¹⁷ The division has been attempting to recruit agents from the various racial and ethnic groups, but has not as yet had a great deal of success. It is also attempting to expand its program of recruiting para-professional persons, but as yet it operates only on a small scale.

FOOTNOTES

¹Department of Corrections, Parole and Community Services Division, A Report to the Legislature on the Work Unit Program, State of California (Sacramento, December, 1970), p. 8.

²Figures as of March 31, 1971, obtained from Statistical Unit, California Department of Corrections, on June 7, 1971.

³Department of Corrections, Research Division, A Study of Inmates at Intake -- 1960-1969, State of California (Sacramento, March, 1971).

⁴Department of Corrections, Parole and Community Services Division, op. cit., pp. 1-4.

⁵For additional programs, see Chapter VI, "Community-Based Correctional Programs".

⁶Department of Corrections, Parole and Community Services Division, op. cit., p. 5.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., Table A3, p. 12.

⁹Ibid., Table B3, p. 16.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 25-26.

¹¹Department of Corrections, Research Division, op. cit.

¹²Don Gibbons, Changing the Lawbreaker (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1965); Robert Carter and Leslie Wilkins, "Some Factors in Sentencing Policy", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Policy Science, Vol. 58, No. 4, 1967), pp. 503-504; Department of Youth Authority, The Status of Current Research in the California Youth Authority, State of California (Sacramento, July, 1970), p. 5.

¹³President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Corrections (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 29.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 189; Department of Youth Authority, Standards for the Performance of Probation Duties, State of California (Sacramento, February 1970), p. 11.

¹⁵Department of Youth Authority, Rules, Regulations, and Standards of Performance for Special Supervision Programs, State of California (Sacramento, revised October, 1969), pp. 4-5.

Footnotes

¹⁶Department of Corrections, "Problems and Needs", a memorandum addressed to the California Council on Criminal Justice (undated).

¹⁷Department of Corrections, California Prisoners: 1968, State of California (Sacramento, 1969), p. 66.

CHAPTER V

THE CIVIL NARCOTIC ADDICT PROGRAM

I. INTRODUCTION

California's Civil Narcotic Addict Program is an unusual and complex operation whose basic function is the control and treatment of narcotic addicted individuals. Jointly responsible for the program are the Narcotic Addict Evaluation Authority (NAEA), the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) and its affiliate branches, and the Narcotic Addict Outpatient Program (NAOP).

In this chapter, the job of the Task Force staff was to provide a general assessment of the NAOP. Meeting that requirement called for a somewhat different approach from that used in other parole component tasks. This was due to the fact that the program has undergone many changes since its inception ten years ago, and even now is feeling the impact of recently amended law and a shift in philosophical emphasis and program objectives. Task Force staff saw these changes as good and necessary, but many of them are so current that it was not possible to measure their effectiveness at the time field work was in process. By the same token, there seemed little to be gained by examining in any detail past practices which presumably would soon give way to new ones. (This is, of course, an oversimplified statement. Change normally takes place only over a period of time, and even then not without considerable overlap between the old and the new.) Based on these conditions, it was concluded that the best course was to examine the differences between past and present program characteristics, then to assess the significance of these differences in terms of current program operations.

The chapter will be divided into four parts: (1) a condensed review of the history of national narcotic laws (as groundwork for the main discussion); (2) a review of California law in connection with civil commitment provisions; (3) an overall description of the Civil Narcotic Addict Program; and (4) a description and discussion of NAOP structure and function.

II. NARCOTIC LAWS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

In 1932, the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act was promulgated by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. This Act is still in use, and except for California and Pennsylvania, has been adopted by all states, though with various kinds of modifications through the years.^{1,2} Arizona, for example, inserted a section providing for confinement and treatment in the state mental hospital of persons convicted under the Act.³ Delaware inserted sections relating to confinement and treatment of addicts, and manufacture, possession, and sale of hypodermic needles.⁴ Florida provided for examination and treatment of habitual users of narcotic drugs, and in 1970 passed an entirely new Act relating to drug abuse.^{5,6} The purpose of the 1970 Act is "to provide a comprehensive program of human renewal for drug dependents

and rehabilitation centers and after-care programs . . . [and to] protect society against the social contagion of drug abuse and to meet the needs of drug dependents for medical, psychological and vocational rehabilitation, while at the same time safeguarding their individual liberties."⁷

During the past decade, three very important pieces of drug legislation were enacted at the Federal level. One was the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965 whose main provisions are "the limited manufacture, sale, and distribution of any controlled drug to certain designated classes of persons . . . and requirement . . . that inventories be taken and records of receipts and dispositions be maintained."⁸

The second was the Model State Drug Abuse Act. "Under this Act, which automatically subjects a drug to State control upon its designation under the Federal law, State and Federal authorities could immediately combine to control the drug."⁹

Third was the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 which authorized \$15 million for each of the following three years for grants to state and local governments for narcotic programs and facilities.¹⁰

The purpose in citing these Federal Acts, and the varying state accommodations to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act as well, is to emphasize that "the nation's approach to narcotic addiction has changed fundamentally in the past few years."¹¹ For even if the application of penal sanctions still predominates in most jurisdictions, the effort toward the greater understanding and better control of addiction is increasingly evident.

This trend is further exemplified by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice statement that "the enactment of laws authorizing or compelling commitment of drug addicts for purposes of treatment has been the most important development in recent years in the drug abuse field."¹² This point of view was based on the recognition that addiction is a medical illness and that customary methods of dealing with it were proving most unsatisfactory.

In some part, what accounted for poor results in early addict programs was insufficient provision for follow-up treatment and the tendency of volunteers to abandon treatment efforts long before any benefits could be derived from them.¹³ It was the effort to correct these and related problems which gave birth to the concept of "civil commitment", a term defined by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice as follows:

"Civil commitment is generally understood to mean court-ordered confinement in a special treatment facility followed by a release to an outpatient status under supervision in the community, with provision for final discharge if the patient abstains from drugs, and for return to confinement if he relapses."¹⁴

III. THE CALIFORNIA CIVIL ADDICT PROGRAM: LEGAL HISTORY

California was the first state to initiate civil commitment procedures when the legislature enacted the original law establishing the California Civil Addict Program under direction of the California Department of Corrections and the Adult Authority for the commitment and treatment of narcotic addicts in 1961.¹⁵ At that time, the main provisions of the act were as follows:

1. civil commitment for treatment
2. establishment of the California Rehabilitation Center to house those committed
3. a mandatory aftercare program, including reduced case-loads, chemical testing to determine narcotic use, and authorization for a halfway house
4. a mandate for research into the rehabilitation of narcotic addicts.¹⁶

On the premise that legally enforceable commitment is the only way to get addicts to undertake treatment, and to make post-institutional treatment available to them, the act included:

- a. a program of civil commitment for treatment of volunteers who believe themselves addicted or about to become addicted, for non-volunteers identified as narcotic addicts or in imminent danger of addiction, and for persons convicted of misdemeanors and certain felonies whose basic problem appeared to be narcotic addiction or excessive use of narcotics.
- b. a compulsory period of legal control (institutional and outpatient) for therapeutic reasons.¹⁷

Several amendments to the original law have been made since 1961. In the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. California in 1962, the law's interpretation of addiction as a crime was struck down as unconstitutional, and legislative amendment was accordingly made.¹⁸ In 1963, many of the indices of criminality found objectionable by the California Supreme Court in re De La O were removed from the original statute. At that time also, in addenda to the De La O decision, the Narcotic Addict Evaluation Authority was established and provision made for administrative responsibility for the release program to be transferred from the Adult Authority to the Narcotic Authority. In 1965, legal provision for the law was removed from the Penal Code and placed in the California Welfare and Institutions Code.

Significant statutory revisions made in 1970 are as follows:

1. The deletion of the six months minimum confinement period prior to release to outpatient status
2. The authorization to discharge civilly committed addicts after two years (instead of the original three) abstention from narcotics in the community and otherwise compliance with conditions of release
3. Authorization for civilly committed addicts to participate (on a voluntary basis) in approved Methadone Maintenance Research Programs. In addition, Senate Bill No. 1271, approved by the governor and filed with the Secretary of State in September 1970, provides in Section 5617:
 - a. that a county mental health service may include a program for the continuing treatment of narcotic addiction by methadone, and
 - b. that the Department of Mental Hygiene shall establish guidelines for the arrangements between local mental health facilities and county probation departments enabling methadone maintenance to serve as an alternative to commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center in Corona.
4. Assembly Bill No. 472, approved by the governor and filed with the Secretary of State on June 1, 1970, provides that where release to outpatient status is warranted the Director of Corrections shall so certify to the Authority. If certification has not occurred in the preceding twelve months in the anniversary month of the commitment of any person committed under Chapter 167 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, his case shall automatically be referred to the Authority for consideration of the advisability of release in outpatient status.

As will be discovered at a later point, these statutory changes substantially influenced program goals and directions.

IV. CALIFORNIA'S CIVIL ADDICT PROGRAM: ITS FUNCTIONS AND PURPOSE

Administratively, the Civil Addict Program provides that the NAEA, CRC, and NAOP shall be separate bodies. However, their respective functions are highly interdependent as is implicit in the Welfare and Institutions Code which states: "The narcotic detention, treatment and rehabilitation facility referred to herein shall be one within the Department of Corrections."¹⁹

The issue of interdependence is an important one. For even though the Civil Addict Program is a multiple operation, any action taken at one level will automatically affect the remaining portions of the program. The following condensed description of respective NAEA, CRC, and NAOP responsibilities will help to illustrate the point.

CRC staff prepare case history data on inpatients which are subsequently used by institutional officials for classification and treatment purposes. In addition, CRC staff provide treatment and counseling for institution residents. Both individual background information and treatment results are used by NAEA as an aid in making release decisions. Although CRC staff are administratively responsible to institutional authorities, their work is generally based on tasks and policies articulated by NAEA, and on the needs of residents in terms of release preparations.

NAOP staff (field parole agents) work with releasees or outpatients in the community and are charged with the responsibility of supervising clients and keeping records on them. When necessary, they also make appropriate reports to NAEA for consideration of return to the institution, or any other factor which would modify the individual's current outpatient plan. The parole staff is also under separate administration, but the impact of NAEA's broad range leadership role is recognized, particularly as it relates to the retention of individuals on outpatient status for long periods of time.

In the performance of its duties, NAEA, as the paroling board, draws heavily upon the services of both institution and parole staff. Although the board has statutory responsibility for making release, revocation, and discharge decisions and policies, it has no statutory responsibility for the administration of the Civil Addict Program itself. However, through action on cases being considered for release or return, the Authority does contribute indirectly to the making of administrative policies governing the control, treatment, and release of outpatients.²⁰

It should also be noted that the three bodies share a common purpose, namely:

"the receiving, control, confinement, education, treatment, employment, and rehabilitation of persons under the custody of the Department of Corrections or any agency thereof who are or have been addicted to narcotics or who by reason of repeated use of narcotics are in imminent danger of becoming addicted."²¹

It is hoped that this discussion will convey the intended message, specifically that the Civil Addict Program is closely integrated as to function and provides, of itself, a given continuum of services.

Of Special Note

At one juncture, the Task Force staff strongly felt that the total addict program should be removed from the jurisdiction of the California

Department of Corrections, and such action was tentatively recommended. The main rationale was: (1) that there was no true provision for voluntary entry to the program inasmuch as "volunteers" are locked into the system immediately upon acceptance, with no option for later withdrawal other than at the expense of paying legal penalty; (2) there appeared to be undue disparity as to length of institutionalization between non-criminal addicts and criminal addicts; and (3) narcotic addiction is a medical problem, and except for addicts who do or have constituted a clear danger to society, should therefore be treated under medical rather than correctional aegis.

On further reflection, Task Force staff reversed its decision for the following reasons:

1. There has been recent statutory provision which provides that a person committed to the Civil Addict Program may be released from the courts to the community if it is determined by appropriate CRC-NAOP staff that the individual does not require medical or therapeutic treatment in the institutional setting. This substantially reduces concern about voluntary commitments.
2. Even at the time field work was in progress, but also since that time, amended legislation and program developments have headed the entire Civil Addict Program in a much more flexible direction. For the addict, the issue is now much less a matter of either/or, but rather one of: "What are your particular needs, and how can we best help you with respect to those needs?"

Very likely, this is an oversimplified version of current developments. Nevertheless, according to the NAEA, the intention is to make every effort toward increased program flexibility and more individualized client management.

3. Task Force staff would still maintain that not all addicted persons "need criminal or civil process for medical care to be made available to them."²² However, the fact that eighty percent of the Civil Addict Program's addicted clients are also felons cannot be ignored. Were the program to be removed from CDC jurisdiction, frequent recourse to correctional procedures would still be necessary. Finally, any recommendation for change should be accompanied by a specific plan as to where the program might be better located. Developing such a plan was not within the purview of the Task Force, and would require extensive time and study far beyond the scope of the present study.

V. THE NARCOTIC ADDICT OUTPATIENT PROGRAM

Administrative Structure

Chart I shows the present organizational structure of the Narcotic Addict Outpatient Program (NAOP). In brief, there are two regions in Southern California exclusively operating civil addict outpatient programs. In addition, there are two NAOP units in Northern California as well as individual caseloads in other portions of the State which are directly responsible to the regular parole regional administrators in those areas. The regional administrator of Region V has a functional responsibility of administering the overall NAOP operation; this responsibility includes instruction of all NAOP agents on NAEA policies and requirements, planning training programs, incorporating policy changes in the manual, and general coordination of the program. However, the deputy director of the Parole and Community Services Division is the person with direct line authority and responsibility over the entire Narcotic Addict Outpatient Program.


This organizational structure poses a dilemma. On the one hand, a number of agents felt that there was too much autonomy and individuality among the various units and caseloads, due partly to the lack of a single administrator whose sole responsibility would be the overseeing of the NAOP. The NAEA also commented on the "present fragmented situation" and suggested that a single administrator might provide more coherence to the program. In short, the present organization of the NAOP is presenting a problem of coordination and uniformity of practices and procedures. On the other hand, however, establishment of a separate administrator for NAOP would add another bureaucratic layer in a structure that this Task Force has already questioned in Chapter IV. It would also run counter to a major thrust of the System Task Force Report which stresses the need to "flatten" traditional hierarchical pyramid structures.

The feeling of the Parole Task Force is that the present organizational structure is sound; but ongoing care must be taken to promote a teamwork atmosphere which will facilitate coordination and sufficient uniformity of practice to assure uniform treatment for all outpatients. The concept of functional responsibility, while not an ideal one in this situation, is a common organizational phenomenon and one that can and often does work effectively.

NAOP does have official provision for a research function whose potential for guiding program direction and for influencing program effectiveness should be of sizeable magnitude. Unfortunately, although the NAOP Guide fully endorses the importance of measuring program effectiveness, it is apparently not possible at the present time to provide ongoing evaluation of the total addict program. Along with the rapidly changing program units and specialized problem areas, it seems likely that inadequate funds for the research function may also be a limiting factor. Should this in fact be a major determinant, the problem should promptly be rectified. In view of the desperate need for the development of a precise body of knowledge con-

CHART I

NARCOTIC ADDICT OUTPATIENT PROGRAM: ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE*



*In addition to Regions V and VI, which are totally NAOP, there is one NAOP unit in San Francisco, one unit in Oakland, and individual agents with NAOP caseloads scattered throughout the rest of the state. The Region V Administrator has functional responsibility for the total NAOP operation.

cerning drug addiction and accompanying unlawful behaviors, the allocation of ample funds for research operations seems imperative.

Another deficiency within the program is lack of administrative provision for a community relations unit. This is an unfortunate oversight since parole agents and addicts are both extremely dependent on how the community responds to their presence in the community and on the degree of help it is willing to extend. In a program of this sort, administrative structure should quite definitely include a community relations position.

Finally, most parole agents interviewed said that the positioning of authority, as it now stands, leaves too little room for release decision-making at the service level. The immediate reference was to the fact that authorization for entry into NAOP comes from the Authority rather than from persons most intimately familiar with individual clients.

This kind of issue is not new to the correctional field, but it is one for which no really satisfactory solution has yet been found. In the present instance, the Authority's counter argument was: (a) that it is legally responsible for release decisions; (b) that there are monthly combined CRC, NAOP, and NAEA staff meetings in which program needs are jointly discussed and solution sought, and (c) that the Authority's overview of the entire program places it in good position to introduce and implement new policies and procedures, and that its suggestions have moreover been favorably received by program staff.

There would appear to be valid concerns on both sides. The Authority has indeed made valuable contribution to the overall Civil Addict Program. It was, for example, at its instigation that a new law was introduced providing for the retention of "limited placements" in the community in an appropriate facility for treatment (as opposed to straight institutional return). The new law will greatly facilitate continuity of treatment for those cases where extended institutionalization is not required. On the other hand, institutional and parole agents normally do have the most intimate knowledge of individual case needs and problems.

In weighing these several factors, Task Force staff concluded that a possible aid to all parties might be to formalize the monthly combined staff meetings by establishing a liaison committee whereby institutional, Authority, and parole staff could work on mutual problems and concerns.

Recommendations. 30. *The State should provide funds adequate to the development and continued operation of a meaningful and efficient research program for the NAOP.*

31. *A community relations program should be incorporated in NAOP's organizational structure.*

32. *A liaison committee concerned with decisions concerning clients should be formed with representatives from both the Authority and program staff.*

Underlying Philosophy

Any program designed to help people requires a philosophical base for the development of treatment methods and techniques. At the time field work was in process, philosophy as expressed by the then existing NAOP Parole Manual was as follows:

"The basic philosophy of the Narcotic Addict Outpatient Program is to provide the addict with help so that he can maintain a drug-free adjustment as he moves back into the community from the institutional setting.

". . . Reinstitutionalization of addicts who are unable to utilize their release experience and who have used narcotics or are withdrawing from the program to the extent where re-addiction or criminal involvement seem imminent should be an integral part of the rehabilitative process. Maximum control can be achieved by the prompt isolation of the addict and his return to a drug-free environment. The removal of the addict from the community prior to his re-addiction to narcotics or his involvement in criminal activity should be considered a prime goal in accord with the philosophy designed for control, treatment and rehabilitation."²³

Task Force staff reaction to this latter statement was that the emphasis on institutionalization was more suggestive of punishment than treatment, and that at least in part it went contrary to Section 3000 of the Welfare and Institutions Code which states:

". . . such treatment shall be carried out for non-punitive purposes not only for the protection of the addict, or persons in imminent danger of addiction, against himself, but also for the prevention of contamination of others and the protection of the public."²⁴

However, when the new NAOP Guide was issued in February 1971, it was found that institutionalization had been significantly de-emphasized and that present administrative policy much more closely reflects contemporary thought with reference to case management of narcotic addicts. The new Guide states:

"Our objective is to keep persons committed to the Civil Addict Program in the community in such ways that they will be able to continue to remain in the community and to encourage the creation of conditions which will support the addict in his efforts to accomplish this goal."²⁵

Further:

"Inherent in an effective treatment plan is the realization that individual worth and human dignity must be pre-

served as inalienable rights of all persons. Concern for the dignity of the individual is demonstrated by our behavior in assisting the client in his effort to reach those personally valid goals which have meaning and value to him, without imposing our own prejudices and values, unless the matter involves clearly illegal acts. We must, therefore, thoroughly involve the client in planning for his own future, and avoid trying to 'run' his life for him."²⁶

Parole Agent's Reaction to Administrative Philosophy and Policy

In connection with this current official statement of philosophy, Task Force staff was advised by parole staff that the NAOP Manual Revision Committee had been working on the new Guide for several months, and that feedback from all staff had been encouraged all along the way. There was, of course, no way of knowing the degree to which non-committee members took advantage of this opportunity, but there was considerable evidence that not all staff were in accord with the Committee's product.

To begin with, parole agents declared that the philosophical shift (from institutional to community-based treatment) widened an already existing gap between what was designated as the "conservative" versus the "liberal" point of view. Those of conservative bent favored the original concept of tighter controls whereas those of liberal persuasion favored administrative provision for greater flexibility in the management of narcotic addicted persons.

But the most pressing complaint--primarily among conservatives--was that the Committee had in essence issued a mandate for them to "change their thinking". The general feeling was that this is in opposition to the laws of learning. One agent stated: "People can't be made to learn. They have to make up their minds for themselves".

Administrative staff acknowledged to Task Force staff that resistance to change is causing difficulties, and advised that they had taken action to reduce philosophical polarization by matching parole agents and supervisors believed to share common beliefs and attitudes. At first blush, this seemed a good idea, but it is producing unanticipated negative results. For now, due to already mentioned unit autonomy, the door is wide open for units comprised of conservative-minded members to work in opposition to administrative policy. Moreover, it gives unit supervisors every opportunity to hire new staff whose attitudes reflect their own philosophy. This would, of course, also apply to liberal units, but in both cases it serves only to increase the professional distance between middle management and upper level administration.

Task Force staff fully endorses the philosophical stance enunciated by the Manual Revision Committee. It is very much in line with other correctional programs such as Work Furlough and Probation Subsidy, and it makes clear what the client/parole agent relationship must be if treatment plans are to carry potential for successful outcome. But it is not expected that

this endorsement will correct or even ameliorate the problems under discussion. Feelings and attitudes will change only when personal experience and training make change both attractive and congruent with personal values. As one agent put it: "If we were told what to do instead of what to think, many of our problems would cease to exist."

In a very real sense, this comment gets to the heart of the whole matter. Its implicit meaning is that the real issue is not whether parole staff are or should be entirely of one accord in their thinking, but rather that they should to the best of their ability carry out administrative policy in daily practice. Disagreement and the ability to meet the demands of the job need not be mutually exclusive.

Training Needs

Literature pertaining to drugs and the multiple manifestations of their use has been increasingly in evidence during the past several years. Today, with the advent of numerous psycho-active drugs, it is nearly impossible to read even a newspaper or magazine which does not contain one or more articles describing the adverse effect of the current "drug scene" on the American public.

Unfortunately, there is no comparable supply of information as to how best to cope with narcotic addicted individuals. Clinics designed to help such persons are increasing in number, but most work done is of necessity based on trial and error methods. For parole agents, the problem is even more complicated since they must consider the interests of both society and the addicted persons under their care. Also, although addiction is not itself a crime, most clients are both drug addicted (or in danger of becoming so), and guilty of misdemeanors or felonies. There is no known academic program designed to train narcotic parole personnel for their unique and demanding work. Yet clearly there is need for a specially tailored program whose prime objective is to produce specialists in a field of great importance.

NAOP does attempt to provide some in-service training. However, according to questionnaire data pertaining to training, less than half of fifty respondents believed the program was relevant to their needs. In interview situations, a plea for continuous and more meaningful training was voiced by NAOP staff at all levels. They cited the following as crucial training needs:

- a. basic orientation to the system and its philosophical foundations
- b. sharply increased specificity as to operational requirements
- c. improved casework methods

There can be no question that the development of both a general and specific body of knowledge would lend guidance and credence to what at the very least is an extremely difficult job. Granting that this is easier said than done, it is not necessarily an impossible endeavor. Certainly the present state of limbo cannot be allowed to continue. As it has done in so many other instances, California could well take the lead in constructing a viable training model which would provide adequate preparation for coping with addiction and its socially unacceptable counterparts.

However, no state should tackle the job all alone, for the problem is not indigenous to any particular area of the country. Nearly all states are struggling with the same lack of vitally needed information. It seems logical, therefore, that the best approach is for California to join hands with other states and proceed in concerted fashion to discover--invent if necessary--a training model appropriate to the purpose. Only when this or comparable action is taken can job performance be upgraded and a path for orderly change be paved.

Recommendation. 33. It is recommended that California's top correctional administrators appoint a select body of persons whose sole and specific job, in conjunction with academicians and correctional and medical practitioners across the nation, is to design, within a specified but adequate period of time, a training model for those engaged in the handling of drug addiction.

The NAOP in Operation

Client Entry. The client enters CRC as an inpatient through court-ordered civil commitment procedures. In this drug-free environment, the process of detoxification is begun, along with efforts to reshape those behavioral patterns considered damaging to the client's general welfare. Originally, the required minimum length of stay at CRC was six months, but amended law, which came into effect in November 1970, deleted this provision. The Task Force views this as a very progressive step. Many persons require at least six months, sometimes more, before they are ready for release. For those who do not, the amended law now makes it possible for them to get an early start on the important business of drug-free readjustment to community living. California Department of Corrections administrative statistics show that the median stay before first release to parole in 1970 was 11 months for men and 9 months for women (compared with 36 months and 18 months, respectively, for convicted felons in state prison).

At the point where correctional counselors concur in a favorable recommendation for release consideration, and a subsequent Release Study Program and related procedures are completed, NAEA makes a release decision. If the decision is to release, the client is then eligible for outpatient supervision.

Supervision Goals. According to the NAOP Guide, there are five main program goals. They are as follows:

- "1. Maximize efforts toward dealing with the addict in the community so that periods of remission are increased.
2. Emphasis on what to do when relapse occurs with the goal of minimizing the incidence of re-addiction.
3. Distinguish between re-use and re-addiction. When relapse to addiction has occurred or the person is in imminent danger of re-addiction, some form of external control will be utilized for the protection of the addict from the extreme consequences of his uncontrolled addiction behavior.
4. The systematic production and dissemination of reliable and valid knowledge concerning the nature of drug addiction, the problems of treatment and control under current conditions and the result of our treatment and control techniques.
5. The mobilization of energy in the community (relatives, neighbors, agencies, etc.) to contain and treat the phenomenon. A long range goal is changing socio-cultural situations which foster the incidence of addiction"²⁷

These goals are seen as most satisfactory with the one exception that greater specificity would be desirable. In the first and second goals listed, for instance, some examples of methods to be used would strengthen the underlying intent of the stated objective. This is easily corrected and is mentioned only in the interest of insuring that goals can and will be realized.

The Guide also provides standards for minimum case contacts with clients.²⁸ These appear to be adequate in number, particularly since parole agents are at liberty to increase the number of their field contacts wherever appropriate.

Treatment Methods. What is missing from the Guide, perhaps by design, is reference to treatment methods other than those used for detecting drug use. The original NAOP Manual does mention the importance of individual counseling, and goes into considerable detail regarding group counseling.²⁹

Commonly known as "grouping", parole staff explained to Task Force staff that this form of treatment represents an attempt to extend institutional methods of treatment: