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and Institutions Code and amendments to present regulations;

2. FSD will control all absent parent accounts through computerization of these controls, which will eliminate the role of Central Collections;
3. If the absent parent fails to comply with directives, a criminal complaint will be issued. A warrant will be processed and the parent will be taken to court;
4. The violating parent will be placed on court probation and will be supervised by a team from the District Attorney's office;
5. All child support accounts currently handled by Central Collections, both welfare and nonwelfare, will be transferred to the jurisdiction of the Family Support Division.

These changes have necessitated transfer of some staff from Central Collections to FSD, and the addition of 13 new positions to FSD. It can be appreciated, of course, that the move places a law enforcement problem with a law enforcement agency, it eliminates procedural delays in contacting absent parents at point of initial contact or when payments become delinquent, and it clearly demarks departmental responsibility between Welfare and the District Attorney for parts of this problem.

In addition to its major goals of increasing child support from absent parents and encouraging parental responsibility, the new procedures

simplify the work of the eligibility technician. They eliminate the worker's need for specialized interviewing skills and judgment in this area; there is no need for direct contact between the absent parent and the worker; the worker no longer has to set up a support agreement based on limited information and no longer has to determine whether the absent parent is "cooperating." The reader interested in further details under the new procedure should refer to Appendix D.

The new absent parent child support procedures have been commenced with high hopes. Their effectiveness depends upon whatever improvements can be gained through speeding up the initial contact with the absent parent and in delivering a clear indication that the county regards his responsibilities seriously. They also depend upon the effectiveness of probation or the threat of probation as an enforcement device. In this area, experience appears to be mixed. While Probation Department reports that informal probation does not appear to have worked too well as a collections device, the Family Support Division reports that out of 75 cases now on informal probation and responsible to FSD, 55 cases continue to provide support. For these reasons, and generally because we feel it advisable to constantly evaluate any such effort,

46. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A FORMAL EVALUATION OF THE NEW CHILD SUPPORT PROCEDURE BE JOINTLY ACCOMPLISHED BY APPROPRIATE STAFF FROM THE WELFARE DEPARTMENT AND FAMILY SUPPORT DIVISION PRIOR TO THE DEADLINE FOR DEPARTMENTAL SUBMISSION OF 1972-73 BUDGET REQUESTS, AND THAT THIS EVALUATION BE SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED TOWARD

- 1) COST-BENEFIT RATIOS OF THE NEW PROCEDURE;

- 2) COMPARISON OF ALAMEDA COUNTY PERFORMANCE IN ABSENT PARENT CONTRIBUTIONS WITH THAT OF OTHER COUNTIES IN THIS AREA;
- 3) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE OR IMPROVEMENT IN THESE PROCEDURES.

Since the whereabouts of most absent parents is unknown, the above procedure can, of course, apply only to those with whom the county is in contact. Recommendations to improve a county's ability to locate absent parents frequently take the form of relaxation of confidentiality laws pertaining to certain government records, particularly those of the Internal Revenue Service and state income tax agencies. Such a proposal even became an issue in the late deliberations on the recent welfare reform measure in the California Legislature, particularly with respect to disclosure of reported income of children of applicants for aid.

Our review of the possible use of federal and state income tax records to locate absent parents, and for other income data very strongly suggests that further intrusion into these records for absent parent purposes is not warranted at this point. Quite aside from the question of confidentiality, income tax records are a poor locator device, and information derived from these records is generally quite dated.

It may be interesting to note that the 1967 Social Security Amendments do make it possible to tap IRS records in connection with absent parents, provided certain preconditions are met. First, obviously, the inquiry must be in connection with a current AFDC application. Secondly, the local Welfare Department must certify that all other avenues to develop-

ment of information have been vigorously pursued. Thirdly, the inquiry must involve a court order for child support which is not being complied with, and, finally, the Social Security number of the absent father must be known by the mother. After all these conditions are met, the inquiry is forwarded to the Internal Revenue Service through the State Department of Social Welfare. Once every four weeks, Internal Revenue will make an EDP pass to retrieve data related to the inquiry which in any event is restricted to address listed on the absent parent's return and date of last filing. Even this information may not be for the most recent income tax year, depending on time of year inquiry is made. The futility of this effort is underscored by the fact that in a very recent 90-day period in California, only 4 absent parent cases were found to even qualify on all points as valid for IRS referral.

Almost the only information useful in absent parent cases that is possessed by IRS would be the name and address of dependents in order to determine conformity between absent parents' declaration of dependents for income tax with those for which responsibility is conceded in an AFDC case. While the threat of a federal prosecution in cases involving conflicting declarations would possibly be an effective child support enforcement device, this tapping of previously filed tax returns should probably not occur until other changes take place, such as revision of law and regulation to require the declaration of dependents on a tax return (not on withholding statements) to conform to the family budget unit in AFDC cases. This, however, is peripheral to our central purpose in this section of the report.

Our review of this question of finding the whereabouts and other data on the absent parent indicates to us that an excellent device already exists in the Central Registry of the State Department of Justice. The small staff of this office, with access to the records of the Department of Human Resources Development, Department of Motor Vehicles, and Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, has been able to provide an identification on 91% of all absent parent inquiries forwarded. Quite frequently, this identification yields data from all three state sources. While identification is a long way from apprehension and enforcement, the data provided is in most cases quite useful. In our visit to the Central Registry in Sacramento, one case selected at random disclosed, for example:

1. Physical description, photograph, identifying marks of absent father;
2. License numbers, make, and registration of automobiles driven when stopped for motor vehicle violations;
3. Complete arrest record;
4. Other marriages, divorces, and children;
5. Last place of employment, position held, earnings for last two quarters;
6. Most recent (and probably current) address;
7. The fact that the absent father was now receiving unemployment insurance and has a regularly scheduled appointment at an office of the Human Resources Department at a specific date and time and at a specific window of that office to receive an unemployment check.

Central Registry staff tells us that this case is not atypical. In fact, in order to pose an identification problem, an inquiry would have to be made on an absent father who had never worked, never bought a car, or been fingerprinted. This sort of informational capability suggests that before new data sources are sought which further relax confidentiality it would be wise to use and improve what is already available. The improvement has already been made by Alameda - in terms of transferring absent parent inquiry to the District Attorney's office. The Central Registry reports serious problems in responding to inquiries forwarded from Welfare Departments, and comments that District Attorney inquiries are generally more complete. Reminiscent of other findings of this study, standards once again appear necessary - in this case to achieve maximum use of available data.

Our inquiry into the processes of the Central Registry yielded yet another area for legislative attention - the adoption of a uniform statistical report for use in the offices of district attorneys and the Attorney General in administering child support activities. There is a report format which has undergone study by district attorney and legislative committees for at least 10 years. It is brief, contained on one page, and is adaptable to any reporting frequency. We include a portion of it here as an exhibit, and as can be seen it contains summary data on cases, procedures, collections, and dispositions of collections. Because of the significance of the form in analyzing a county's performance in child support activities,

47. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT LEGISLATION BE SOUGHT REQUIRING SUBMISSION TO THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OF A RECURRING UNIFORM STATISTICAL REPORT SUMMARIZING CASE AND COLLECTIONS ACTIVITY IN THE AREA OF CHILD SUPPORT.



# DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORT

## FAMILY SUPPORT DIVISION

TO: CENTRAL REGISTRY  
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL  
ROOM 500, WELLS FARGO BLDG.  
5th STREET & CAPITOL MALL  
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_

COUNTY \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: \_\_\_\_\_

MONTH \_\_\_\_\_

19 \_\_\_\_\_

CASE SUMMARY					
NEW CASES	WELFARE	NON-WELF.	OTHER	O T I 's	TOTAL
OPEN					
REOPEN					
REQUEST NO ACT.					
O T I 's					
TOTAL					
CASES CLOSED					

PROCEDURES					
CIVIL	NEW CASES	CONTEMPTS	ASSIGNM.	ATTACH.	CLOSED
4702 A WELFARE					
4702 B NON-WELFARE					
4703					
URESA RESPONDING					
URESA INITIATING					
231.5 PATERNITY					
OTHER					
TOTAL					

LOCATION ACTIVITY	
CENTRAL REGISTRY INQUIRY (CR-60)	
ABSENT PARENTS LOCATED	

270 P C	VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS	
	COMPLAINTS FILED	
	BENCH WARRANTS	
	EXTRADITIONS	

### COLLECTIONS

#### I. ACTUAL COLLECTIONS

1. Voluntary Support Agreements
2. Criminal Actions (Probation)
3. Civil Actions
4. URESA - Responding
5. URESA - Initiating
6. Other

\$ \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

TOTAL RECEIPTS

\$ \_\_\_\_\_

#### II. DISPOSITION OF MONEY COLLECTED

##### A. WITHIN CALIFORNIA

1. Forward to Welfare
2. Forward to C/W (Welfare Direct)
3. Forward to C/W (Non-Welfare)
4. Forward to Other Calif. Agencies
5. Forward Out-of-State (URESAs Responding)
6. Other

\$ \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

CALIFORNIA TOTAL

\$ \_\_\_\_\_

SECTION VIII  
THE PLANNING PROCESS

## THE PLANNING PROCESS

### INTRODUCTION

After six months of study we believe it is fair to say that this department has operated in a state of crisis for the last year and a half. Furthermore, we believe that it will continue to do so unless it is staffed by a much stronger internal research and advance planning capability which can exert much greater influence on management decisions. We could have discussed organizational planning in the context of different specific problems because there is a definite pattern in the way nearly all problems are presented and resolved by management in this department. We believe we would have made many of the same observations had we been discussing production standards for eligibility workers, workload of eligibility technicians, or the development of a social services program.

The staff of the Task Force chose to make its case for better planning around the planning and implementation of the department's separation plan for AFDC started in January, 1970. We did so because we think it represents probably the largest and most significant planning efforts of the department in recent years and because the outcome of the decisions were still very much in evidence throughout the entire study period. In one sense it was an abnormal period for the study to take place and this review of separation helps to give a perspective on the department that is important in balancing judgments about the study's findings and recommendations. For all these reasons we have tried to provide a fairly detailed account of what happened.

Nearly all planning is done by committees of division chiefs and

their supporting staff holding line positions. The development of the original plan for separation was prepared in that way. That, itself, is an inherent weakness in the organization's ability to plan systematically or well. Division chiefs are line personnel. Planning is a staff function and it is very difficult to mix them successfully.

#### THE FIRST SEPARATION PLAN

The original separation plan contained three key administrative features. Each is important. The first was that intake aspects of eligibility (initial eligibility determination and budget computation) be separated from continuing aspects of eligibility (the long-term and ongoing process of recertifying eligibility and budget adjustment). Administratively it would have involved establishing completely segregated intake and ongoing units with separate supervision up to the Grade II Supervisor in each division.

Secondly, it proposed keeping the positions of trained budget clerks that already existed in the organization. The budget clerks were to be used in central pools.

Thirdly, the plan retained the existing positions of experienced screeners who did initial interviewing of the applicants and maintained certain controls over the application registers which have always been the department's primary source of basic statistical data. This information on applications, denials, and cases pending is the main source of information needed for grant reimbursement. It is also used extensively by the State for their own fiscal projects.

As simply as we can describe it the key concept of the plan was based on the assumption that the handling of intake and ongoing cases were two different administrative processes. Keeping them separate allowed for

some degree of specialization in supervision, narrowed training requirements somewhat, and made it possible to develop a higher degree of competence sooner among individual workers because they performed specialized tasks. Retaining the budget clerks and the screeners was predicated on the knowledge that they were already trained and it was through their paperwork that a good part of the eligibility process was being controlled. Again, there was a degree of specialization possible and the logic was that the whole conversion would be easier if certain, established parts of the existing organization were left intact.

One cannot criticize the department for the effort expended in preparing for separation. Literally, hundreds and hundreds of hours were spent by division chiefs and various committees conducting generalized surveys of other counties and in committee discussions. At least 32 planning meetings were held between July, 1968 and December of 1969. But time alone does not insure good planning. The whole planning effort, it seemed to us, was basically a process of committee deliberation, loosely coordinated by top management.

It was obvious from our review of the Committee minutes that there had always been great differences among the staff and among the committees on the way separation should be approached. It must be remembered, too, that Alameda County was one of the first counties of its size to separate intake and continuing cases in AFDC. The data collected from the other counties showed little consistency in any of the pertinent factors. It is very clear in hindsight that much of the data collected was terribly misleading. Major administrative questions cannot be resolved through questionnaires.

### THE FINAL SEPARATION PLAN

As the county moved closer to the target date of January, 1970 one faction of the staff still strongly favored a plan that provided for keeping intake and ongoing aspects of eligibility separated. The Director, himself, still supported this basic feature of the separation plan as late as June and July of 1969. Between then and September, however, when the final plan was submitted to the Board of Supervisors, something happened to change the entire concept of the plan which had evolved to that point. All three of the original planning concepts involving separate intake, screeners, and budget clerks were dropped. The circumstances surrounding the decision get somewhat obscure after July, 1969.

Keeping the screeners appears to have met resistance from the State. It was the State's feeling that screeners could be used to disqualify applicants in a pre-emptory manner before they could be interviewed by a regular eligibility worker. How hard the department worked to keep them is not certain but the State did threaten to disapprove of a separation plan that included screeners. Without better evidence to show how screeners would be used or the importance of them it was a difficult element of the plan to defend anyway.

Retaining the budget clerks was abandoned in favor of trying to get approval for smaller caseloads. That part of the decision involved whether it was preferable to have the eligibility worker handle the budget actions themselves over a smaller number of total cases or have a larger caseload with the budgets prepared by the budget clerks. Again there was no pilot data to indicate the advantage of one way or another. This element of the plan was closely tied to the consideration of the third change.

The third change, and really vital one, to the plan was mainly a client service consideration. Instead of regarding intake and ongoing as separate specialized functions, it was decided to integrate intake and ongoing by having the same worker handle both aspects of eligibility. At issue here, we think, was the establishment of one plan intended to emphasize administrative efficiency, more control, and more specialization of function and another that emphasized client service. Those who favored the integrated approach or combining intake and ongoing functions felt that it was desirable and advantageous to welfare clients because it would provide for the establishment of a relationship between one worker and one client which would begin with the intake process and which would continue as long as the client remained in need of financial service. That, as we trace the history, was the central administrative question the department tried to resolve in two years of deliberations and one year of painful experience.

The State, of course, liked, very much, the idea of integration and it was also strongly supported by a faction in the organization we thought was composed mainly of social workers and those voicing the views of the social workers and those of the M.S.W.'s in particular.

Management made its final decision influenced as much, we thought, by a philosophic service notion as it was by a firm indication of what was going to be administratively workable. That is not to say that client considerations are not important but we think subsequent events only bear out that clients' interest are also best protected by having a properly planned and tightly controlled administrative process.

In any event, the alternative integrated plan was finally accepted by management. A weighting standard was devised that allowed one intake



case to count as the equivalent of about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  ongoing cases. The proportions of intake and ongoing cases in a given caseload would vary, depending on the number of intake cases a worker processed. Most of the activity in the department since January, 1970 has been a matter of readjustment to the problems created by the fateful decision made in September, 1969.

### THE RESULT

The absolutely fatal flaw in the logic of the integrated caseload plan soon showed up. It stemmed from the failure to recognize that in a period of rapid growth in caseloads for each incoming or intake case a worker handled 4.5 ongoing cases must go out the other end of his caseload. A caseload was never static as long as a worker took any new cases. As these incoming cases were discharged they were consolidated and given to a new unit or new worker. The continuity that the department hoped to achieve between the worker and her caseload was simply not possible. Transfers kept every caseload in a constant state of movement.

The necessity of staffing for the formation of these new caseloads made it urgent to cover them as soon as possible. The personnel and caseload reporting system which controlled the staffing for new caseloads have never worked in timely conjunction with each other. By the time a new monthly caseload report showed a justification for a new position the caseload had gone uncovered for a considerable period of time.

Ongoing caseloads were transferred into approved but vacant positions with only the supervisor available to handle them. At times the supervisors must have functioned more like eligibility technicians than they did supervisors. They had little opportunity to review the work done by new staff which were constantly coming into their units.



The priority of handling just incoming cases only meant that the continuing cases were being neglected. This, naturally, was reflected by a great jump in overdue renewals which we consider the most critical part of the ongoing caseload function. By July the number of overdue renewals was approaching 35% and was climbing steadily, as the graph illustrates.

ALAMEDA COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT  
Analysis of Overdue Renewals AFDC-FG  
1970-1971

KEY


Total Renewals Overdue

Renewals Overdue one month Only

Renewals Overdue greater than one Month .....

Percent

Percent



The number of pending cases and unresolved applications was increasing also. The law requires an AFDC application be accepted or denied within 30 days. Pending applications increased about 300% during 1970. The number of pending applications was almost 10% of the family groups in AFDC by December, 1971.

This has tremendous consequence to the State. Fiscal projections are based on the number of applications accepted. With such a high percentage of cases in an undertermined status it is obvious that fiscal planning at both the State and local level is taking place with a large element of uncertainty built into the projections. If this county is typical this one table from the Welfare Commission report is illustrative of what has taken place during the first year of separation. It gives some insight as well into the condition of the department at the time this Task Force study was commissioned.

Applications and Requests for Restoration  
Pending at End of Month

<u>Program</u>	<u>December 1970</u>	<u>December 1969</u>
Old Age Security	645	684
Aid to Blind	84	79
Potentially, Self-Supporting Blind	2	2
Aid to Disabled	3,880	2,624
AFDC (Family Group)	2,446	987
AFDC (Unemployed)	855	149
AFDC (Boarding Homes)	129	63
General Assistance	529	297
Medi-Cal	1,987	956
Food Stamps - Non-Assistance	4,161	414
TOTAL	14,718	6,255

The problem of collecting the statistics on applications, denials, and pending cases became practically impossible as a consequence of having the information scattered over all the eligibility technicians. This, of course, had been one of the main purposes in keeping screeners and separate intake units. It would have limited the number of people in the organization controlling the statistical process. Without this data the information could not be fed to personnel which needed it to justify staffing for the growth in caseload. A circle of circumstances had set in that could not be checked. Management had effectively lost control of the information it needed to run the department.

Another closely related problem in having all aspects of eligibility scattered over each worker was in getting enough copies of required directives, interpretative memos and law changes distributed. There were not enough copies to go around. Workers, then, were making decisions on eligibility without the information necessary to do so.

At a time when the organization was hiring hundreds of eligibility technicians the opportunity to evaluate them fully or even at all while still on a probationary status was practically impossible, but it is certain that a large percent of eligibility technicians found their way into permanent status without ever having a performance evaluation. The unit production reports show great discrepancy between the productivity of the eligibility workers. Much of the problem can be traced to the first months of separation when most of the eligibility technicians were qualified.

The combination of all these problems only meant that applications were being handled too quickly with inexperienced, improperly supervised workers and without thorough investigation. A high incidence of overpayments

and ineligible grants were the only possible outcome. By the time separation was completed in July, 1970 it must have been obvious to management the separation plan had not worked. The ratio of denials had reached an all time low of 19% (see chart in Training Section). One review of errors in budget computation and renewals in some sample caseloads a little later showed error rates of 100% in the recorded renewals. It is no coincidence that the hardest hitting part of the public reaction occurred about this time.

#### REACTION

Real cries of distress were coming to management from every level. By July, 1970 some division chiefs were starting to seriously question the basic concept of running intake and ongoing cases together. One of them made an urgent appeal to management to reconsider the integrated idea and set up a pilot project to assess the advantages of separating intake and ongoing.

To be sure, it was written with the benefit of some experience, but the simplicity of the proposal and the obvious necessity of it only made it more apparent to us what the approach should have been in developing a separation plan back in 1969. The Committee staff thought it was a fine example of how internal research can be conducted at little cost and the great value of it. The project was conducted over a two-month period but had it been done earlier we feel it would have changed the whole course of separation, and the department over the past 18 months.

Most importantly, it suggests to us there are ways of monitoring how well these large, internal functions are working and there are very objective types of measurement which management can apply to them. In fact, this outline of the research design presents the main elements of a management

reporting system which must be installed to control the whole eligibility and grant maintenance program.

It also makes us think that there is some research capability existing in the organization. It must, however, at all costs be coordinated better, be used early instead of later, and be given a much broader and far reaching purpose in the decision-making process than it does now. We present one excerpt from the internally-proposed pilot study as it was given to management in about July or August, 1970:

PROPOSALS FOR ATTEMPTING TO REMEDY PROBLEMS AND DETERMINE APPROPRIATE CASELOAD STANDARD.

In an attempt to resolve the problems outlined above, two projects, one immediate and one long-range, are being proposed for implementation:

I. A pilot project will be set up in the Fremont office and in one section of the Central office. In each office, one full Eligibility unit will handle applications only in the month of September; and one full unit will handle continuing cases only in the month of September. In each office, there will be a control unit which will continue to handle the caseload in the present manner.

Further, during the month of September, the caseload standards for the experimental units will be flexible; i.e., the current caseload standard or a higher or lower one can be tested by assessing the actual number of applications or continuing cases that can be adequately handled by the technicians in the pilot units.

The objectives of this pilot project are:

- 1) to test the feasibility of the current caseload standard of 120 cases (including 26 applications) and to provide data for a recommendation to be submitted to the Board of Supervisors on October 20, 1970;
- 2) to test the desirability of separated intake and continuing caseload functions in AFDC eligibility (although the intent

in separating these functions, the theory was that the client should not have to relate to more than one worker, it has become apparent that this goal has been unachievable in many instances, and that the liabilities of an integrated caseload have outweighed the assets).

The data which will be kept and assessed during the September project period will be as follows:

- 1) Length of time in which applications are processed. It appears that there has been a tendency on the part of the over-burdened technicians to approve most of their applications immediately for fear they will forget about them. There has been a much higher rate of emergency approvals since separation.
- 2) Accuracy of investigative work and other paper-work. A check sheet will be devised to grade these points.
- 3) Number of applications, approvals, and denials weekly.
- 4) Accuracy of reports which are required.
- 5) Number of overpayment adjustments caused by administrative errors and cause for errors.
- 6) Number of overdue renewals and current status of renewals.
- 7) Number of budget changes out of period.

At the end of the pilot project month, the data will be evaluated to determine whether the project should be continued for a longer period.

This pilot proposal was accepted by management and started in late August or September of 1970. It was the first piece of controlled study made on the separation issue. Except for the two divisions involved it is not really clear whether management advised the other division chiefs about the project or not. We say this because by the time the research project was underway the problems were so severe in some of the divisions that the chiefs

were starting to take matters into their own hands. At least one division actually started to reorganize its personnel into separate intake and ongoing units as early as September. Management may have given a firm direction on this, but we do not think so. It was more like a tacet, informal approval than it was a firm decision by management to break up the integrated caseloads. It is not absolutely certain either what the effect of the research was on the events that followed. It seemed to us that most of the decisions were made independently of the pilot project's results.

The staff thought this was a rather classic case study of where good research simply came too late. After December the divisions just gradually started to separate the caseloads and the second separation plan was completed during the course of this study.

#### REFLECTION

There are, however, isolated places in the organization where separation has not been completed and it is not a matter of not having enough time. That would be understandable in view of all that has happened. The staff feels that it is largely a consequence of the differences of opinion which still exist among the division heads about the "service" philosophy which should be present in the eligibility function. The fact that management has not acted decisively towards one plan or the other raises the most serious type of concern we have about the influence and central direction management provides. It was our impression that the final decision to separate intake and ongoing functions was made almost independently of top management. Seeing the issue of integrated caseloads from the point of view we did we are inclined to think that it is probably a



credit to the division chiefs that they exercised initiative and took independent action. Other division chiefs, however, feel strongly about the client service feature in having integrated caseloads and this is reflected in their divisional operations.

Neither situation can be condoned. The idea of separating intake and ongoing functions in eligibility is either a good idea or it is not. Above all, it is not the type of decision that should be made at the division level. We can accept differences of opinion existing between the staff on every administrative issue. But management's role is to resolve those differences decisively and to be sure that their decisions are the ones controlling line operations and administrative procedures. This management, in our judgment, seems to have a great deal of difficulty in doing that. We see this organization moving around and away from its management and not in accordance with it.

It is important to settle the separation issue on an agencywide basis for other reasons. A uniform management reporting system cannot be developed, for instance, as long as there are basic differences in the way the primary functions of eligibility are handled. The differences in reporting systems and in the way similar functions are organized between the divisions is so great now that it is practically impossible to make meaningful intra-agency comparisons of any kind. This was one of the biggest sources of frustration the staff encountered in the study. It is not an exaggeration to say that the department operates more like six or seven separate organizations than as one unified agency.

We believe the division chiefs feel this way also. The staff's confirmed impression was that they feel alone, isolated with their individual

problems and act without firm direction from above. They are trying to resolve their individual problems without a clear conception of what agency-wide goals are. In this kind of situation one cannot possibly expect to find controls and work procedures which are uniform enough to be effective or information from an agencywide standpoint.

If these observations are valid those readers with management experience know that we are saying something that has serious implications. Our comments are deep thrusts at top management's ability to simply manage and control which is the acid test of administration in welfare or any other enterprise.

It is important, therefore, to balance these assertions and see them in the light of other staffing deficiencies and structural weaknesses in the organization that bear directly on how well management is equipped to function. It was from this perspective that the Task Force formulated several recommendations that follow in the next section. To those who do not know the organization intimately they may seem small and hard to relate but they are not.

SECTION IX  
THE ORGANIZATION PLAN

## THE ORGANIZATION PLAN

The subject matter of this study has been so bewildering in its array of specialized terms and subtle technicalities that we must stop at this point and attempt a summary of our analysis in the simplest words possible. We do this here because our focus will shortly be directed toward major recommendations of this study, which deal with the departmental organization plan.

Aside from the large, important questions of major social and economic policy, all issues in the field of welfare eventually reduce to a question of management. Regardless of major changes in program policies, benefit levels, aid categories, or the controlling governmental jurisdiction, the management problem still remains.

Within that, there are two central concerns for welfare management today -- and for tomorrow: the conduct of an income maintenance system having eligibility controls that are generally accepted as reasonable and reliable, and the provision of social services that are realistic and effective in terms of client needs and the public interest. This simplistic statement of welfare management objectives has a function: it provides a direction for the application of management processes.

The critical concerns for welfare management are not such things as the constant changes in regulations, nor the complicated problems of the federal/state/county relationship, nor the lack of public consensus on welfare goals. These are simply the environment of welfare. It is a tough environment, but it should not be offered as a reason for failure of management. It is an environment, after all, that has in part been created by

management failure throughout the system in the first place. Management is a specialized function, no less than social work. The welfare executive must rely upon training, tested judgment, and specialized sensitivities that are just as unique as those qualities in the child welfare worker with the master's degree in social work. It is hardly any more appropriate to operate large income maintenance systems with veterans of the social service system than it would be to staff welfare adoptions units with graduates of the Harvard School of Business, or M.I.T.

It is useful at this point to back off from our discussion of welfare to see if we cannot look at management as a concept -- to see if it cannot be isolated and defined and then reintroduced and applied to the welfare organizational setting.

Some of the simplest, most incisive observations ever made on the nature of management processes can be found in a small book written 35 years ago by Chester I. Barnard. In the Functions of the Executive, he defined an organization as "a system of consciously coordinated personal activities or forces." The basic functions of the executive in this system are only three: 1) to provide a system of communication; 2) to promote the securing of essential efforts, and 3) to formulate and define purpose.

Barnard talks about these three executive functions as providing the basis for much functional specialization in organization. They are used to establish the specialized responsibilities of executives or leaders. He cautions, however, that these functions "have no separate concrete existence." They are "parts or aspects" of the organizational process as a whole:

The means utilized are to a considerable extent concrete acts logically determined; but the essential aspect of the process is the sensing of the organization

as a whole and the total situation relevant to it. It transcends the capacity of merely intellectual methods, and the techniques of discriminating the factors of the situation. The terms pertinent to it are "feeling," "judgment," "sense," "proportion," "balance," "appropriateness." It is a matter of art rather than science, and is aesthetic rather than logical.<sup>1</sup>

To acknowledge that the executive process is illusive and illogical, and to recognize that executive leadership is more art than science is not to deny the usefulness of administrative analysis or to reject as fruitless the attempt to introduce logical processes into the management of welfare. Rather, these conclusions, applied to the chaotic environment of welfare administration only underscore the need for a more "consciously coordinated" management approach.

Let us now discuss these understandings in the context of welfare. Most income maintenance revisions are made at either the federal or state level. For example, let us say that the welfare department receives a notice from SDSW on May 20 that all AFDC cases must be renewed by June 1 to include a new standard of maximum payments required by a recent court decision. However, another court action later in the same month nullifies this action after the work has been mostly accomplished. The determination of grant levels in particular is constantly subject to modification by court action or new regulation.

The departmental reaction to these problems has been to withdraw personnel from line operations to accomplish studies for implementation of changes. This diverts attention of key line personnel from the operational sector for the purpose of doing implementation studies which in many instances

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
<sup>1</sup>Barnard, Chester I., The Functions of the Executive, Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 235.

are incomplete or late in accomplishment. Operations are thus slighted in the interests of doing incomplete, vulnerable staff work.

It is obvious that goal-setting in a public welfare department must be done with the realization that partial or complete alteration might be required in a short period of time. The department must always be in a position of readiness to alter its basic course on written notice. The argument that it is senseless to plan or set time schedules because of the probability of change is senseless in itself. The fact that a plan to complete renewals by a certain date may be modified by two court decisions and two sets of emergency regulations in two weeks does not necessarily mean that the basic goal is fundamentally altered or that responsibility for accomplishment shifted. The task for the administrator is to reset schedules based on knowledge of workload commitments and departmental priorities at the time. It also requires an understanding and implementation of Barnard's three basic executive functions -- the maintenance of an open, two-way system of communication, the constant formulation and definition of purpose (which is the exercise of decision-making responsibilities), and the executive capacity to secure the essential staff efforts. Organizational and management readiness to accept and implement change without impairment of basic departmental objectives or performance is thus one of the important goals of our proposed departmental organizational plan.

Before getting into that, we should note that in March, 1970, the State Department of Social Welfare, through its Administrative Surveys Bureau, issued a report of an administrative review of the Alameda County Welfare Department. Comment on this last major reorganization proposal, shown in chart form below, will help illustrate the need for alternative reorganization recommendations made in this report.





\* To be integrated gradually



The State had been invited by the department to conduct an administrative review mainly to reflect organizationally the new requirements for caseload separation. The State team consisted of four staff members who spent two weeks in the field analyzing the department and district offices. In a 15-page report and 7-page supplement SDSW identified in a general sense some of the problems found by our own study. It refers to the "lack of built-in machinery for planning" and the extra-curricular use of high-level staff for this function. It talks about the need to maintain coordination between services and income maintenance functions, and to have training "closely identified either with social services or income maintenance." It reported that one of the problems of the department was the heavy involvement of the Director in detailed administrative activities and that his real priorities should be in articulating departmental policy rather than occupation with the means for implementing policy.

The State proposed an "Executive Office of the Director" in which the Director would assume a role as the major departmental spokesman in the community and in relations with control agencies and other departments. In order to give the Director time for these activities, it was recommended he be provided with an administrative assistant and that the primary responsibility for internal management be delegated to the Deputy Director (who is the Chief Assistant Director).

The "lack of staff assistance to top management both in programs and administration" was the basis of the State's recommendation for an Organization and Management Analyst position, attached to the office of Deputy Director. The management function of Departmental Personnel Officer was also attached to the Deputy Director.

The need for coordinating social service and income maintenance programs was recognized by a proposed "Chief of Program Liaison." While we also recognize the need for this coordination, we question the wisdom of casting the position responsible for it in a staff role, outside of a command channel, where the formal exercise of this important responsibility should be located.

Although recognizing the need for a close working tie between training and "social services or income maintenance," the State lodged the Staff Development (or training) Officer with the "Executive Office of the Director." The reasons offered by the State for this are, in our judgment, hardly relevant to the real departmental training needs we found and reported in the Training Section of this study:

There is great need in all welfare departments for improving the quality of social services. The separation of income maintenance provides an opportunity beyond what was possible before when social workers were bogged down with eligibility determinations. In Alameda County, the Director himself has the qualifications and background to provide the impetus needed in identifying goals. The training program should have the full benefit of his professional competence and leadership while the day-to-day supervision should be carried out by the Deputy Director in close consultation with the three Assistant Directors.

The State report also called for a Chief of Special Program Operations who would report to the Deputy Director and be responsible "for a section made up of a variety of miscellaneous functions." One of these functions, properly performed, is so intimately related to services that we cannot understand why the Community Services Coordinator was not placed under the supervision of the Assistant Director for Services; the State report does not discuss it in its narrative sections.

The Chief of Special Programs would also direct another social service activity -- Blind Aid. Interestingly enough, this position would also be responsible for two functions which we propose for inclusion in Management Division: Fraud Prevention and Eligibility Control. Social service program direction should not, of course, be mixed with management controls of a fiscal accountability nature.

The SDSW study also proposed a position of Assistant Director of Administrative Services, who would be responsible for a group of activities centered around direction of fiscal, accounting, and clerical services and controls, in addition to the present Systems and Procedures Unit. The latter functions mainly as a codifier of local policies and procedures and is heavily involved in liaison with electronic data processing and fiscal considerations.

We have gone into this review of the 1970 SDSW organization proposals for Alameda Welfare partly because they typify much that has historically been wrong with the State Department's ideas about local welfare management. We do not know whether the SDSW proposal for Alameda stems from a failure to understand basic management concepts, inability to appreciate the severity of the welfare management crisis, or little compromises worked out to accommodate existing staff. We can say that it is fortunate the county has not seen fit to follow most of the State's recommendations.

One of the major flaws in the plan is its pattern of diffused, decentralized, and uncoordinated management staff. Here is a schematic description:

This Position:

Administrative Assistant  
Staff Development (Training)  
Officer

Reports to:

Director  
  
Director

Personnel Officer	Deputy Director
Organization and Management Analyst	Deputy Director
Chief of Program Liaison	Deputy Director
Chief of Special Program Operations	Deputy Director
Head of Fraud Unit	Chief of Special Program Operations
Head of Eligibility Control Unit	Chief of Special Program Operations
Systems and Procedures	Assistant Director, Administrative Services
Head, Fiscal Office	Assistant Director, Administrative Services
General Services Supervisor	Assistant Director, Administrative Services

The Director, Deputy Director, and proposed Chief of Special Programs would all carry direct supervision workloads under this plan, and access by middle management to departmental administrators and the director would be impeded. With regard to the positions of Director and Deputy (or Chief Assistant) Director, an essential aspect of their organizational role is -- to paraphrase Barnard -- "the sensing of the organization as a whole and the total situation relevant to it." It is a common failing in administrative practice to assume that a greater control is effected by having direct supervision of and responsibility for several subordinate units. Although it is

sometimes not consciously recognized, this compulsive involvement in detail conflicts with the responsibility for making the critical departmental decisions that, while not required daily, are so important to the department and its goals.

The SDSW 1970 proposal, by decentralizing management staff throughout the organization's executive structure, would fail to achieve the coordination of management processes and the quality of management results that would be possible by concentrating this staff in a single unit. Another major failing of the State's proposal is its conception of administration, which is viewed essentially as a constellation of accounting, clerical, and paperwork procedure services, rather than the functions that are connoted by the term "management" with all that implies for decision-making, communication, securing effort from people, etc.

48. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE EXISTING MANAGEMENT STAFF WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT BE CONSOLIDATED WITHIN A UNIT DESIGNATED AS MANAGEMENT DIVISION AND THAT THESE DEPARTMENTAL STAFF BE CONCENTRATED BEHIND A NEW POSITION TO BE DESIGNATED ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR MANAGEMENT. By "existing management staff" we mean the Personnel Officer. We are also referring to staff from Validations, Appeals and Complaints, Special Eligibility Review, and Fraud. All of these specialized units are essentially agencywide staff services. All of them serve the divisions in approximately the same way or handle problems that are common to all divisions. No two of them are supervised in the same place now. Through their operations they all furnish

evaluative data that is important for the Assistant Director for Management to have. Validations and fraud control are basically quality control functions. The real purpose and value of their work and information cannot be applied without much better analytical interpretation, internal coordination to the organization and follow-up. This was the major finding in the extensive review of eligibility which the State Department of Finance made in January.

Special comment on locating validations and appeals in Management Division is necessary at this point. Validations are nothing more than a way of monitoring the reliability and effectiveness of the income maintenance program. It is not logical to have it supervised as it is now by the management of the same program as it is supposed to monitor. The Validations Unit has prepared reports and analyses which are either not used or which have fallen generally into disuse. In a broad sense we view validations as just one of many sources of management information. One of the main purposes of creating the new Division of Management is to fix responsibility in one place for collecting, analyzing, and interpreting the many kinds of quality control data which come out of the organization. The significance of any one type of data can be interpreted better if it is related to a broad background of information. 49. FOR THE SAME REASON WE ARE ALSO RECOMMENDING THAT THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT (SIU) BE PLACED IN THE MANAGEMENT DIVISION.

We have one other reason for doing that. Special eligibility reviews and fraud studies are primarily thought of as investigative functions, yet a knowledge of eligibility law, regulations, and procedures is a most important factor in successful investigative work. It is not our impression that the investigators either like or understand this technical part of their job very well. SIU is physically separated from the Validations Unit and has

different management supervision. It is not a situation that allows much cooperation to take place or an easy flow of information back and forth. We believe that having them tied together organizationally would facilitate the answering of technical questions which we consider to be an important part of fraud review.

At present, the technical judgments on cases referred to SIU are supplied largely by the worker whose case is in trouble. Naturally, this can introduce an element of defensiveness and rationalization about errors and case problems by some workers. Lifting fraud investigation to a level where it is supervised by a departmentwide administrator and where it is in proximity to validations staff should, we feel, improve line worker response to the problem and improve the objectivity and quality of fraud investigation.

To meet this problem we had considered at one time adding some staff in SIU with qualifications very similar to those of the Validation staff instead of the pure investigative types which had been requested. Putting Validations and SIU sections together organizationally gives the investigators easy access to the best source of technical advice available without new additions of staff. We believe this approach should be tried before new positions are added.

Special eligibility reviews and fraud investigations should be able to show patterns in fraud which management should find helpful in the same way validations data is used. In some cases, both are just small but important sources of management intelligence which are not serving the full purpose they might if they were coordinated and administered differently.

50. THE TASK FORCE ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE APPEALS AND COMPLAINTS UNIT BE TRANSFERRED TO THE MANAGEMENT DIVISION. The staff's



decision to locate the Appeals Unit within the Management Division was not made easily. It is a peculiar type of activity, admittedly unrelated to both validations and investigative services. We did so finally because it is as logical to put it in the Management Division as any place else and because we do not like organization plans with little boxes out to the side of main authority centers. We can also cite an instance or two where the outcome of appeals decisions have been handled in quite different ways within the organization. One responsibility of the Director of Management would be to follow up the outcome of such orders to insure that they are implemented uniformly.

51. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES BE REDESIGNATED AS ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR FISCAL AND OFFICE SERVICES, THAT HIS DIVISION RETAIN ITS EXISTING SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES AND FISCAL SECTIONS, AND THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO CREATING A GENERAL SERVICES SECTION FOR SUPERVISION OF OFFICE CLERICAL PROCEDURES. We considered the inclusion of fiscal and systems and procedures services in Management Division because these are also department-wide services that focus on concerns so closely related to those of the proposed Management Division that it might be difficult to maintain a clear line of demarcation. Balancing this consideration, however, was the size of staff and variety of problems this would bring to one division head. The present Assistant Department Head for Administrative Services is already heavily loaded, and we suggest consideration for allocation of still another function to him: the overall supervision and standardization of office clerical practices.

This is one area that was reviewed by the state in its 1970 study that we have not looked at in any depth. We would suggest that this be an area of early inquiry for new departmental research staff, proposed below, and that it take as its starting point the SDSW proposal for a Supervisor of



General Services. If a department-level position for supervision of office clerical procedures is created, great care should be taken to assure that it does not become enshrouded in that soft, limbo-like atmosphere that usually characterizes positions that "coordinate" or provide "liaison." Another approach would involve the review of branch office clerical operations by management analysts proposed below, which would lead to the development of standard departmental clerical procedures, their installation, and subsequent monitoring by periodic field review by management analyst staff.

It seems extremely important to stress the distinction between the operations of the present Assistant Director for Administrative and Fiscal Services and those for the proposed position of Assistant Director for Management. We conceive that the present position will continue to operate virtually as it does now, supervising fiscal, accounting, and procedural matters and directing the fiscal office and the Systems and Procedures Section. The position should continue to play its strong role in these areas. However, as in the case of policy and procedure research by the division heads, this Assistant Director has also been forced to take time from ongoing responsibilities for these brief studies. It is in the interests of freeing him from this and broadening the focus of these efforts beyond fiscal considerations that we propose having them done by management analyst types. Thus, one of the distinctions between Fiscal and Management Division is that Fiscal would be responsible for ongoing, daily, line activities with regard to fiscal operations and systems and procedures. He would also be responsible for compilation of the annual departmental budget and for budget controls, as at present. Management Division would be involved in line activities only to the extent of directing special eligibility

reviews, fraud activities, validations, and appeals. The operational keynote of Management Division must be freedom from daily line activities particularly with respect to its analyst staff, who would be deployed to any points in the organization where priorities for research would exist at a given time.

One difference between Fiscal and Management Divisions, then, is that Fiscal is more "line" than "staff" and Management is more "staff" than "line." To state it another way, Management Division staff would deal in research of departmental management problems in their broadest dimensions, and make recommendations to top departmental management who would decide matters, and refer them to Fiscal Division for design of specific systems and procedures and implementation. To those who are familiar with the overall structure of county government, the distinction between Management Division and the Fiscal Division would be somewhat like the distinction between the County Administrator and the County Auditor with respect to some of their duties.

52. THE MANAGEMENT DIVISION SHOULD INCLUDE A MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS SECTION WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE AS ITS INITIAL STAFF A MINIMUM OF THREE WELL-QUALIFIED, EXPERIENCED, MANAGEMENT ANALYSTS. The actual number of staff for this important unit could be determined only after a complete program of research is worked out by the Assistant Director appointed. The staff should be phased in one at a time as program is developed for them. We offer examples of work that could be accomplished by the management analysts below and elsewhere in this report.

The quality of staff selected for the Management Analysis Section is of critical importance to the future operation of the entire Alameda County Welfare Department. Unless well-qualified, tested, proven people can


be secured for this unit, thereby creating a management research capability that would truly replace that now done by the Division Chiefs and other line personnel, it would be better not to create the unit at all.

We visualize the staff as broadly experienced, general analysts exceptionally strong in organizational theory, analysis, methods, and research procedures. They should not have any line responsibilities and be free to move anywhere in the organization on specific assignments.

This staff should approach every problem it studies with a critical, fresh outlook. It should challenge almost every existing procedure in the organization and above all it should be unencumbered by the traditional thinking about service and client relationships which has dominated welfare for the past 35 years. Emphasis should be on piloting new projects and proving management procedures which can be demonstrated to work before other sweeping changes like separation are undertaken. There are several immediate problems for them to deal with.

53. AS ONE EXAMPLE OF EARLY RESEARCH FOR THE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS UNIT, WE RECOMMEND THE COUNTY CONSIDER THE SEPARATION OF ELIGIBILITY AND SOCIAL SERVICE FUNCTIONS IN GENERAL ASSISTANCE. This category of aid is growing and there are as many reasons for separating eligibility and service functions in General Assistance as there were in any other aid program. It is the only program left where social workers are still controlling grants. To highlight this point we present the graph below.

GENERAL ASSISTANCE SINGLE PERSON AVERAGE GRANTS



The large increase that occurred in the amount of the grant for General Assistant recipients in late 1969 was because of a special higher allowance for housing. It was thought that if a larger allowance was made for housing that the food costs of the recipient could be reduced. Instead of receiving expensive meal tickets for restaurants the client would be able to reduce his food costs by having housing with cooking facilities.

As the graph shows it was some months before management realized what was happening and corrected itself. The only effect was to increase the amount of the recipient's overall grant. We are not implying that General Assistance grants are adequate, they are not and, certainly, recipient housing is inadequate also. We are suggesting, however, that it is improper to make a grant adjustment on the basis of a certain administrative assumption without monitoring it to see if it is working. Catching the mistake in this instance took three months. It is another example of where both a good social service concept and an administrative decision went wrong for lack of internal review.

There is also an urgent need for the implementation of a uniform production standard for eligibility workers which would lead to a more timely personnel reporting system. It would be a mistake to think that good solutions to these kinds of administrative problems can be devised without a different kind of staff input.

54. AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF SUBJECT MATTER FOR EARLY REVIEW BY THE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS UNIT, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE ISSUE OF A WORKLOAD STANDARD FOR ELIGIBILITY WORKERS BE STUDIED AND RESOLVED. This has been one of the major policy items before the Board of Supervisors in the welfare budget this year. Knowing of the Board's desire to have a firm specific recommendation

from the Task Force on this question the staff spent at least three weeks in trying to make a justifiable, definite recommendation. We frankly admit we were unable to do so. We are confident, however, in saying that no one else can either without a considerable amount of further research effort. The time we spent with this problem was not wasted, however. The Task Force staff is secure now with the recommendations we make as to the approach which should be taken in setting a permanent caseload standard for AFDC. A standard cannot and should not be set until consideration is given to a number of other factors which are more important to the proper administration of eligibility than the size of the workload itself.

Of first importance is the fact that all thought to date on the caseload standard has taken place in an abnormal set of circumstances. The eligibility workers have not fully recovered from having to go through two separation plans and it is not entirely certain whether the second phase of separation is over.

For some of the reasons we have already cited the number of overdue renewals got completely out of control during 1970. The department even started separation with a high number of overdue renewals. The social workers, for some months before separation, had slacked off on keeping renewals current, knowing that the responsibility was going to be transferred to the eligibility workers.

Since March the department has made a big push to get renewals current. The graph in the section on the Planning Process shows that progress is being made. The production on renewals may be increasing slightly among the regular eligibility staff, but we believe that the improvement registered is more likely the result of two other things. One is a significant drop in

AFDC applications and secondly, the use of 80 or 90 surplus eligibility workers and floaters who have been concentrating on doing renewals for the last three months. These are eligibility workers who normally would have been dismissed as caseloads declined or new staff hired in anticipation of a caseload growth which did not materialize.

With this additional staff the department is likely to get most of its overdue renewals cleared in the next three or four months. It should be kept in mind, however, that these renewals are being completed by some of the most inexperienced staff, working in what we consider an adverse set of circumstances. They are trying to clean up badly delinquent cases and are working without adequate supervision. Even when the official reports indicate that the cases are current there will be some good reasons to doubt what kind of qualitative condition the cases are in.

Working as long as they have with an impossibly high backlog of overdue renewals and cases in terrible condition generally has brought about a distortion of attitude among the workers as to how they view their jobs. It is responsible to a great extent, we think, for the very low morale among the eligibility staff. Until the regular corps of eligibility workers has had the opportunity to work with cases that are not only current but are in fairly good condition from other qualitative standpoints it is really impossible to know what they are capable of doing on a regular routine basis.

Our second reason for suggesting that the present caseload standard not be changed is that we are convinced that the whole problem has been approached completely backwards. Before the department can set a realistic caseload standard for continuing cases it must first set a production standard indicating how many renewals they expect a worker to do each month.

Renewals and ongoing maintenance are the most important parts of the continuing worker's caseload responsibility. Renewals are just one component of a production standard. Administratively speaking, a production standard is something distinctly different from a caseload standard in the sense we are referring to it here.

By simple arithmetic it is obvious that with a caseload standard of 120, 20 renewals must be done each month to keep up with the requirement that eligibility be recertified every six months if the worker is to remain current. If it is the department's goal in administering eligibility to stay current it must insist on 20 recertifications each month per worker. If the department's suggested caseload standard were 104 instead of the present 120 it would be approximately  $1\frac{1}{2}$  cases less per month. The Board of Supervisors must understand that this is really all that is actually accomplished in reducing the standard from the present 120 to 104. To do so, we estimate it would require about 30 to 35 additional workers plus their supervision at a cost of probably in excess of \$250,000.

Even if the department's recommended caseload standard had been in effect for the last year the present situation on delinquent renewals would not be much different. There are probably not more than 5% of the eligibility units throughout the whole department that are consistently doing anything like 20 renewals per month or the number required if the standard were 104. Yet, there are enough to make the Task Force believe that a standard of 20 renewals per month is not unrealistic. The overall average in the agency is probably closer to 10 and not more than 13 renewals per worker per month. With production on renewals this low it would mean that the caseload standard would have to be dropped to 60 in order for the workers to stay current.



Knowing that the department recognizes renewals as the most important factor in the management of continuing caseloads it was very distressing to the Task Force to find the department operating without a definite production standard on renewals. Even if one were set too high we felt one should have been expressed as a specific goal. Until management states its expectations in definite terms there can be no accountability for performance from anyone. It is one thing to say that 20 renewals per month is excessive and caseloads are too high after asking a worker to make 20 renewals per month and another thing to say they are excessive without ever asking the worker to make 20 renewals per month. That is the situation here. If management feels it is justified in recommending an overall caseload standard with the information available it should certainly be as capable of specifying a production standard on renewals in as explicit terms as it expresses the overall caseload standard it desires.

The department's present attitude on renewals is very vague. There is a tacet understanding that they should be kept "current." To do that means, in terms of numbers, doing 20 renewals per month. Yet, that interpretation of what is current is not evident. The division chiefs interpret current as meaning the number they actually do.

In only one division did we find a specific and absolute standard on renewals expressed and it was 20 renewals per month. In that division there is also a good indication that 20 renewals per month can be done. In the short time that we followed the progress of the effect of simply working towards a stated standard there was a rapid and marked improvement in the number of renewals completed in that division. Two other divisions, Fremont and Hayward, report being current on renewals, which suggests that whatever

standard is required to maintain currency in these offices can be met.

The Task Force suggests again that the critical, missing ingredient is management and the way it conceptualizes its problems and presents its objectives to the larger organization. Unless management presents its expectations of performance in unequivocal, simple, understandable terms it is foolish to expect good performance. Unless the department makes an effort to impose and enforce a standard on renewals, dropping the caseloads to 104 is not going to improve the overall situation one bit. Is it really an improvement to have overdue renewals at 25% of total caseload rather than 35%? It is the Committee's estimate that this would be just about the condition of the caseload today had the department's recommendation been adopted 18 months ago without imposing a standard on renewals at the same time.

55. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A PERMANENT STANDARD FOR AFDC CONTINUING ELIGIBILITY CASES NOT BE SET UNTIL AFTER THE DEPARTMENT HAS INSTALLED AND ACQUIRED SOME EXPERIENCE WITH UNIFORM, DEPARTMENT-WIDE PRODUCTION STANDARDS FOR THE ELIGIBILITY WORKER. We have only discussed renewals but a production standard also includes other factors affecting eligibility such as the number of home calls, number of days in field, and the number of budget transactions. The department must build its overall caseload standards around knowledge about the specific components that make up the continuing casework function. Unless it has success in imposing standards on these smaller, sub-functions of eligibility there is little point in trying to administer a much more general standard regardless of how low it is. More of these aspects of caseload management are discussed in the section of the report dealing with classification of caseloads.

Our third reason for recommending against a lower caseload standard at this time is the quality of training provided the eligibility workers up to this point. We treat the subject extensively in the training section but until it is demonstrated that the eligibility workers know how to work the budget system, make warrant holds, fill out forms, and compute special needs and generally perform the whole range of complex tasks that makes up the list in our Training section a lower caseload will not improve the eligibility process.

There is no comparison between the costs of improving the quality of training and permanently lowering caseloads by 13%. Dropping the caseload size by itself will not reduce administrative errors, overpayments, or insure better eligibility certifications among untrained workers. It will only distribute the errors over a greater number of people and increase training costs. No one can say how many more cases a worker could properly handle if she were thoroughly trained.

The awful dilemma facing this department is that better caseload classification, setting renewal standards, and better training must occur simultaneously and work in conjunction with each other. The real test of management in this department is how quickly they can get these crucial sub-functions of the eligibility process working together. The Task Force, more than anything else, wants to impress upon the Supervisors, County Administrator, and the public that focusing attention on such things as a gross caseload standard is terribly misleading and only diverts attention from the real issues involved such as training, caseload classification, production controls, etc.

When these sub-functions are in order then and only then can a caseload standard be set with some degree of assurance that it is correct. This really involves a whole new concept about managing the eligibility and grant control process. The overall problem must be approached in terms of the daily manageable component parts of the process and not in terms of some arbitrary, amorphous number like 120 or 104. The Committee's feelings on this point are so strong that: 56. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE SUPERVISORS STOP DELIBERATING WITH THE DEPARTMENT AND THE UNION REGARDING THE OVERALL SIZE OF THE CASELOAD IN ANY OF THE CATEGORICAL AIDS UNTIL IT IS SATISFIED THAT THE COMPONENT SUB-FUNCTIONS OF THE ELIGIBILITY PROCESS ARE WORKING BETTER. THE BUDGET INCREASES REQUESTED FOR DROPPING CASELOADS SHOULD BE, INSTEAD, ALLOCATED TO SIMPLIFYING THE BUDGET SYSTEM, CREATING UNIFORM WORK PROCEDURES, UPGRADING TRAINING, AND CLASSIFYING CASELOADS DIFFERENTLY.

The department's latest research, building to a justification of a lower caseload standard, was extensively reviewed by the staff of the Task Force. We prepared and intended to include a detailed critique in the study. Our decision to leave it out was based on the conclusion that the problem of the caseload size is completely over-shadowed by all these other management considerations. We mention the study here only as another specific illustration of the problem the organization encounters in trying to conduct vital research in the manner it does.

The study of caseloads was, as always, assigned to one of the division chiefs. We believe the department would readily admit that it lost control of the project after it was started. It was plagued fatally, we think, by personnel transfers, unit number changes, inadequate instruction

of the control study units, and generally from the same problems the Task Force staff encountered in trying to develop a recommendation on caseload size. The design of the study did not include certain elements that might lead to alternatives other than a simple reduction of caseload size from 120 to 104. The Board of Supervisors must make their own decision on whether the study supports a justification for increasing continuing eligibility costs by \$250,000 but we must say it is not adequate for a decision of that magnitude.

In spite of that, the study was important in the sense of the approach taken to a management problem. Much more of this type of thing must be done, as we have emphasized throughout this section. It is absolutely essential, however, to give this work more direction and more day-to-day attention than any division chief can possibly provide. The Board of Supervisors directed this caseload study to be done 10 months ago, but in the judgment of the Task Force the county is still without data adequate to make the major policy decision in this year's Welfare Budget. That will continue to be the case unless the research function in the department is strengthened in the manner we recommend.

We have offered here and in other sections of this study examples of the kind of research that we envision a competent management analysis staff undertaking. We would also look toward this staff as a means of introducing a new kind of management capability to the department, one that has been specifically trained in management and is capable of conceptualizing the complex management problems posed by the welfare system.

We have repeatedly suggested in this study that management functions require specialized training and experience, just as social services do. We

have suggested that public welfare management has been historically dominated by the social service component and we cannot see how a Master's Degree in Social Work, possessed by four of nine ACWD Division Chiefs can necessarily improve management's capability in addressing the complex problems of an income maintenance system. We do not say an MSW cannot be an effective administrator, but the division chiefs do reflect a strong services background. Seven of the nine chiefs started as social workers in the department and average about three years experience at the worker level, four years as Grade I Supervisors, and six years as Grade II Supervisors. As the department has rapidly expanded in the past five years, management has had to frequently tap its reservoir of Grade II Supervisors who have qualified for division chief under civil service procedures. Under circumstances of rapid program expansion and increasing complexity, the welfare department's ability to develop staff for middle management has been severely taxed. Thus, one of the reasons for proposing a Management Division and a Management Analysis Unit is to introduce into the department a new management resource that does not rely exclusively on the departmental promotional ladder.

Having said all this, we must caution that it would be a great mistake to assume that the departmental problems we have discussed in this study could be easily resolved by the simple expedient of recruiting more staff with obvious, surface qualifications of management expertise. As suggested, unless good staff is secured, installed, and properly utilized, it would be better not to recruit at all. We say this because of the special review we gave departmental level staff -- which consists of eight key administrative positions, some of whom work under supervision, but all of whom carry department-wide management responsibilities. It cannot be said

that this group is dominated by evidence of old line social service concepts. Only two have ever been social workers. Half of them entered the department in the mid-1960's or later. In educational background, the group includes two Political Science degrees, and one degree each in Business and Public Administration. While department level administration reflects individual instances of real management ability, it is by no means nor in all cases proportional to academic achievement, nor is previous experience in social work necessarily a handicap. Because of some harsh judgments in this study, candor compels acknowledgement that management ability depends on more than mere possession of a professional credential. We, nevertheless, contend that the influence of management as a specialized body of knowledge, techniques and concepts, needs stronger representation in this organization.

We have tried to support management recommendations in this study with specific examples of problems as well as solutions. It should be obvious that we feel quite strongly about management's obligation to evaluate not only program but staff performance in meeting program goals. In our review of division head and departmental staff profiles, we also requested information on the last performance evaluation of each staff person. With respect to formal performance evaluations of the division heads, here is what we found:

Division Head Performance Evaluation Data

Most recent evaluation	(1)	6/30/69
Next most recent evaluation	(3)	1966
Next most recent evaluation	(1)	2/26/64
Nest most recent evaluation	(1)	12/11/62
Next most recent evaluation	(1)	6/ 4/56
Never been evaluated by Department	(2)	--
	(9)	

\*Two division heads have less than four months experience in these duties.

No division head appears to have been evaluated for performance as a division head. Most civil service or public employee merit systems, even though noted for strong tenure guarantees, either specifically provide



for performance evaluations or make provision for removal, suspension, or reduction in rank on the basis of written specification. We acknowledge that personnel adjustments under civil service rules are difficult. We also have documented at some length the lack of objective criteria in this department against which performance can be measured. If there is little in the way of performance criteria for operation of an income maintenance system, how is it possible to hold management staff accountable for their own performance? But we also would think that management's own awareness of specific staff shortcomings would motivate them toward a performance evaluation system for key departmental staff. If divisional management fails to perform, departmental management need look no farther than to its own procedures for the answers.

57. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A FORMAL SYSTEM OF ANNUAL EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION INVOLVING SUPERVISOR-EMPLOYEE DISCUSSION AND WRITTEN REPORTS BE DEVELOPED, INSTALLED, AND APPLIED TO EACH ACWD EMPLOYEE UP TO AND INCLUDING THE CLASSIFICATION OF CHIEF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR.

One seemingly minor but very important aspect of the utilization of staff in the proposed Management Division would be their physical location together, and we would propose that the necessary space adjustments be made to bring the staff together at the main office at 401 Broadway. The task of bringing some existing units together that have been somewhat uncoordinated up to now, adding new staff, and developing new approaches to improving departmental management requires a good Management Division communication system, which means daily eyeball-to-eyeball contact.

We should also caution, however, that Management Division should not confine itself to a pattern of activity that is heavily main office-centered.



During our staff interviews with workers at the branch offices, we received the clear impression that "downtown doesn't know what is going on in the department," and that management was unrelated to real administrative needs. Thus, it is vital that the new Division's work on management problems take them into the field, to the branch offices, and to the basic worker levels in the organization. In light of past expressions of worker activism, it may seem strange to note that Task Force staff concludes that top management presence in the department is not only needed but desired by workers at every level. Such comments from workers were expressed not only in terms of seeing departmental management staff, but in terms of desiring more decisiveness in basic management functions.

To present the department's own view of solutions to some of these central management problems, a memorandum to all departmental employees from the Director on April 1, 1971, entitled "Departmental Administrative Modification" is instructive. The memo refers to the survey conducted by SDSW in the Spring of 1970. It noted, however, that "...a myriad of developments affecting Alameda County both generally and specifically have caused the department to delay implementation of the survey recommendations which it found acceptable..." The memo commented that at this point in time the "Department can begin to rearrange its administrative and organizational structure," which would enable the department to:

1. More effectively achieve desirable program goals;
2. Fully implement the Services-Income Maintenance Separation Concept;
3. Increase the responsiveness of the Department to program, organizational, and community problems; and,

4. Enlarge the department's decision-making base while at the same time increasing the accountability factor of department operating units and the department as a single organizational unit.

The next paragraph in the memo indicated:

Effective immediately there is established an Office of the Director which will include the Welfare Director and the Chief Assistant Welfare Director. Specifically, it is expected that the Welfare Director will give more weight and concern to the development and articulation of policy. The Chief Assistant Director will be involved in the implementation of policy toward the objective of departmental goal achievement. Thus, all elements of the department will report through the appropriate line to the Chief Assistant Welfare Director.

In the judgment of the Task Force staff this paragraph only compounds the already ambiguous administrative environment of welfare; the personal leadership of the Director would appear to have been replaced by an administrative fiction (Office of the Director), which is in turn occupied by two positions, but in which the Assistant Director is delegated the primary role for decisions affecting the department.

This paragraph of the memo sent us back to the State's 1970 survey for background on the "Office of the Director" recommendation. We found that the State had said:

A director's responsibility for community understanding, acceptance and involvement in welfare programs always has top priority. The wide differences among the various segments of Alameda County make this responsibility particularly sensitive and critical. This, together with the need for real channels of communication with local and state governing bodies, commissions, and professional associations so that he is always aware of the milieu in which he operates, makes the director's job one where "outside" activities demand the greatest part of his time. The separation of programs will make the need for community understanding even more acute. Internally, the director

needs a structure which will free him to give more weight and concern to articulating policy rather than involving himself in the steps necessary to achieve objectives or to implement them. The latter phase of administration should be delegated to a deputy.<sup>2</sup>

The "latter phase of administration" just happens to be the total control of departmental management, and we are appalled with what we see in this presentation by SDSW of its "Office of the Director" recommendation which has now been officially implemented within the department. An analogy which occurs to us would be to have the President of the United States decide that his most important priorities rest with improving the national image in the world and that he should spend the rest of his term abroad on public relations junkets, meanwhile delegating matters of "lesser" importance, such as the economy, all domestic affairs, the national budget, and when, where, and under what circumstances we go to war to the Vice President.

Whatever is meant by "community understanding, acceptance, and involvement in welfare programs," it cannot be as important as the awesome executive tasks involved in directing a \$150 million welfare program with a current annual local cost of \$36 million. Whatever the 'wide differences among the various segments of Alameda County" are, they are likely to become wider and more alienated from each other if constantly subjected to the polarization of opinion stemming from repeated exposes of a malfunctioning welfare system. The separation of programs has very little to do with "increasing the need for community understanding." Most of the community has never heard of caseload separation, and the clients directly affected

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<sup>2</sup>Administrative Review of ACWD, State of California, Department of Social Welfare, Administrative Surveys Bureau, March, 1970, page 6.

either do not understand it or cannot allow it to become a major concern in their life struggle.

Because we write these words from the perspective of eight month's study of the department, we can only say that the State's recommendation for an "office of the director" is nothing short of sheer nonsense.

The public relations of a welfare department do not depend upon luncheon speeches to service clubs, they are more a result of effective internal management which is a responsibility assigned by a Board of Supervisors to a Welfare Director, not to an administrative fiction such as an "Office of the Director." Executive leadership is not just public relations and tedious mechanical details that can be delegated.

Another aspect of the Director's April 1 memorandum gives us some concern, and that is the concept it reflects with respect to use of internal analyst staff. In the interests of allowing the Assistant Director for Administrative and Fiscal Services added time to work on departmental budget and fiscal activities, the plan was to remove such functions as central index, input documents, purchasing, inventory, transcribing, mail, and supply from his responsibility and assign them to the direction of the department's single existing position of organization and management analyst. This assignment of duties that are essentially of a housekeeping nature and those that could be well handled by a lesser technical classification raises doubts about management's intention to properly utilize internal analytical staff. It is the organization and management analyst position, after all, that should have formed the beginnings of an internal planning capability that addresses the problems that division chief committees have had to handle, and that have been the focus of much of this study. Therefore, if

the revision should be a matter of assigning work on the basis of judgment of individual proficiency or preference, a reclassification to a line-type position seems warranted. To maintain the fiction on organization charts and elsewhere that the department now has a specific internal management analysis capability is to obscure and compound some very real problems in personnel management and organizational functions.

58. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE WELFARE DIRECTOR RESCIND HIS DEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF APRIL 1, 1971 RELATIVE TO THE "OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR."

We now turn to the specifics of a reorganization proposal for the Alameda County Welfare Department. We will first focus on administrative considerations related to the department's social service and income maintenance delivery systems, in which slightly over two-thirds of the department's existing personnel are directly involved. The composition of the basic units of these two systems consists of six eligibility technicians, one clerk, and one Grade I Eligibility Supervisor for each eligibility unit, and seven social workers, a clerk and one Grade I Social Service Supervisor for each social service unit. Based on positions filled in June, 1971, the department contained approximately 760 eligibility technicians, clerks and Grade I Supervisors in 95 eligibility units. The department also had 477 social service workers, clerks, and Grade I Supervisors in 53 social service units. Assuming a Grade II Supervisor for every six units, this would call for about 16 Grade II Supervisors in the eligibility series and eight or nine in the social service series. We will not present the units in terms of aid category or function, but it is important to note that 11 of the 53 social service units cover the as yet unseparated General Assistance caseload,

providing both social services and eligibility work to this category. There are also three social service units assigned to Highland and Fairmont Hospitals for determining medical eligibility. There are two units of eligibility technicians assigned to child welfare for work exclusively on the foster home component of AFDC (the caseload here is 240, double that of the eligibility technician in a regular AFDC caseload).

The essential points to keep in mind are the size and composition of the basic eligibility and service units, and the overall ratio of eligibility to service units which is now almost two to one. Although the number of basic delivery units dramatically favors the eligibility side, supervisory and administrative changes have not kept pace. While the department feels it has an acceptable class specification (briefly, a statement of duties and qualifications for a position) for a Grade II Eligibility Technician, a specification for a Supervising Eligibility Technician II has not yet been written. This is in part a result of current debate between the department and the Civil Service Commission regarding qualifications, which in turn is a result of the historical linkage of the eligibility technician series to the clerical series. This linkage tends to underrate the very complex knowledge of regulations and procedures which the ET must understand, as well as the quality of judgmental skills which must inevitably be exercised. It is to the department's credit that they recognize this as an important matter and have taken a strong position with the Civil Service Commission with regard to it. It is the Task Force's hope that some of the findings of this study will convince the Civil Service Commission that the eligibility technician supervisory series demands urgent attention. In fact, we join with the department in its conviction that the distinction

between social service and eligibility series at the Grade II Supervisory level should be eliminated and education and experience in management be introduced as a basic qualification in a class specification, which directly supervises 42 to 48 positions:

59. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE GRADE II SUPERVISORY LEVEL IN THE SOCIAL SERVICE AND ELIGIBILITY TECHNICIAN SERIES BE REVIEWED BY THE ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION WITH A VIEW TO 1) ELIMINATING ALL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE SOCIAL SERVICE AND ELIGIBILITY SERIES NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW OR REGULATION, 2) AND THAT THIS COMMON GRADE II SUPERVISORY CLASS REQUIRE EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE IN SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT, AS A PRIMARY QUALIFICATION, AND 3) THAT FUTURE RECRUITMENT FOR SUCH POSITIONS BE NOT ONLY ON A PROMOTIONAL BASIS BUT OPEN TO APPLICATIONS FROM OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT AND THE COUNTY.

If the development of income maintenance supervisors is still inadequate or undefined in terms of position specifications for the Grade I and Grade II levels, it must be said that the question of an administrative classification for the income maintenance series at the Division Chief level has barely been addressed. Each branch or area Division Chief in the department supervises, on the average, nearly twice as many eligibility technicians as social service workers. It is generally understood in the department that about 85% of a Division Chief's time is spent on eligibility matters. The class specification for Division Chief strongly emphasizes the complex administrative and management content of the position. The minimum qualifications, however, state as follows:



MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS

Either I

Two years of experience in the class of Social Work Supervisor II or in an equivalent or high level social work class in the Alameda County service.

Or II

Four years of experience in a supervisory capacity in the field of social work.

Or III

Some acceptable combination of education and appropriate experience.

NOTE:

The Civil Service Commission may modify the above Minimum Qualifications in the announcement of an examination.

60. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE DIVISION CHIEF (WELFARE) CLASS SPECIFICATION BE BROADENED TO REQUIRE EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE IN SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT, AND THAT THE PRESENT EMPHASIS ON PROMOTION UP THROUGH THE SOCIAL SERVICES SERIES BE ELIMINATED, OR alternatively, if the county should follow recommendations below which call for separation of services and income maintenance throughout the organization,

IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT TWO KINDS OF DIVISION CHIEF (WELFARE) BE CREATED -- ONE FOR INCOME MAINTENANCE THAT EMPHASIZES MANAGEMENT SKILLS, AND ONE FOR SOCIAL SERVICES WHICH, IN ADDITION TO MANAGEMENT SKILLS, MAY ALSO REQUIRE A MASTER'S DEGREE IN SOCIAL WORK.

The essential point here is to recognize that the essential administrative problem of welfare is income maintenance. We feel that point cannot be overemphasized, especially when we read in the State's 1970 report on the department:



Separation provides many benefits ... with the specialization of the eligibility function, it is possible to employ technical workers who have less than four years of college, thus opening the way to jobs for many persons who could not formerly gain employment...<sup>3</sup>

Expansion of the labor market is an important priority. One does not have to go to college to become a good eligibility technician. But, the fact that these are the only benefits of separation listed by the State suggests to us that the potential in separation for improving overall income maintenance management has not yet registered as much impact with State staff as it has with the county department.

Thus, one of the facts confronting our proposed department reorganization at this point is a definite lag in recognizing separation administratively and in developing an income maintenance supervisory/administrative group. There is nothing to prevent the department and the county from taking steps in this direction, however.

There is another fact, however, which limits the flexibility of organizational planning, and that is the bricks and mortar of the department's branch offices. Welfare branch office planning is virtually a study in itself. Its history during the 1960's in any large California county is but one more example of the effects of rapid growth and change in welfare during this decade. Adjustments in staff and procedures can be made fairly easily; buildings require advance planning and long-term financing and do not have similar flexibility. Because there is always a lag between program requirements and facilities, buildings themselves have a tendency to shape

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<sup>3</sup>Supplement to Administrative Review of the ACWD, by State Department of Social Welfare, March, 1970, p. 1.

organizational structure. We will see shortly the effect of this tendency in Alameda County. Our brief review of this phenomenon in other California counties suggests that welfare branch office planning is either not yet a very sophisticated art or it simply does not submit to a careful planning approach. To have come through the 1960's with branch office arrangements that permit organizational groupings suitable to the 1970's is probably as much due to luck as anything else.

While we would like to have seen evidence of more thoughtful planning of branch offices commencing with the first moves out of the main branch at 401 Broadway in the mid-1960's, we must say that the best of planning might have made little difference, and the county has taken a comparatively cautious approach toward branch office development. The county's plan, until recently, has been toward development of 150-man branch offices, and six such units have been established. By contrast, Sacramento has followed a program of 40 to 50-man branches; Contra Cost 50 to 100; Santa Clara 75 to 100; San Diego 200 to 225. In late 1969, the County Administrative Office rejected the department's proposal for further 150-man offices, and the department conducted a careful study of the matter which resulted in a recommendation for 300-man branch offices. The new North Oakland and Hayward branches, scheduled for opening in late 1971 or January, 1972 will make it possible to pull approximately 300 staff scattered in six smaller office locations in central Oakland and Hayward. The chart below is introduced at this point for several reasons -- it shows the branch locations scheduled for occupancy approximately January 1, 1972 and locations scheduled to be released in 1971. It shows the capacity of these offices based on State standards of 125 square feet per position and current occupancy levels. We have also shown the terms of lease arrangements and expiration dates in order to indicate the county's commitments on specific structures.

BRANCH OFFICE DATA  
ALAMEDA COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT

I. Branch locations as of January 1, 1972	Rated Capacity (Positions)	Estimated Occupancy June, 1971	Lease Term	Expiration Date	Square Footage	Monthly Payment
1. Main Office 401 Broadway	826	822	Lease/Purchase		103,000	\$12,500
2. East Oakland Area 7800 MacArthur	109	109	7 yrs.	7/74	13,750	3,050
3. Fremont Area 4333 Hansen Ave.	128	137	10 yrs.	5/79	16,000	4,080
4. Berkeley Area 2530 San Pablo	142	139	10 yrs.	2/79	17,700	4,083
5. Bond Street Area 4340 Bond St., Oakland	158	154	10 yrs.	3/79	18,000	4,167
6. 3rd & Adeline Sts. Oakland	160	160	5 yrs.	10/74	20,000	4,000
7. Hayward Area Amador St., Hayward	300	--	15 yrs.	11/86	37,500	10,250
8. North Oakland Area 4801 Broadway	300	--	15 yrs.	1/87	40,000	8,700
Sub-totals	2123	See Below			265,950	\$50,830

II. Branch locations to be released in 1971		Unit Identification	Proposed Relocation
17th & Broadway	70	Social Service Units	Bond, East Oakland, Main
1212 Broadway	35	Training Div. & SIU	Main Office
Hayward:			
Main	78	Hayward Area Offices	New Hayward Area Office
Southland Center	40	"	
Atherton Street	38	"	
Eastmont Center	50	Social Service Units	East Oakland
Filled Positions 6/71	1813	(Excludes 31 in Medi-Cal Units at Hospitals)	
Space Available 11/72	2123		


As the department acknowledges in their January, 1970 branch office study, the branch office pattern has a profound effect upon standardization of administrative structure and upon administrative costs, particularly for building management positions (division chiefs, secretaries, screeners, clerical supervision, switchboard operators, etc.), for maintenance costs, for standardization of architectural design, and for lease terms -- in addition to considerations related to delivery of services and coverage of geographic areas.


When we first looked at this pattern of branch office development and projected it in terms of facilities and needs by the end of this year, we despaired of making a reorganization proposal that would be an optimal compromise between the demands of caseload separation, the most effective geographic distribution of staff, a balanced span of control at division chief level, the logistics of serving more extended geographic areas at both ends of the county, and the fact of having to do all this within existing lease commitments that extend from 1974 through 1987. After further review, we now think it is possible to achieve a good compromise between these competing demands and, in the process, reduce the number of division chiefs from their present total of nine to six.

A review of branch office development over the past decade clearly indicates that one of its results has been to generate a new division chief with each new branch. Instead of looking at division chief needs in terms of a balanced span of control or division of functions in the organization, it has historically been felt that each new building required a separate chief. As one of the guidelines to our proposal, we felt that programs and people to be supervised were more important to creation of division chiefs

than bricks and mortar. We also felt that allowing a 150-man branch office concept to govern some division chiefs' span of control has created a considerable disparity in division chief workload (one division chief at the main office, for example, is responsible for about 25% of the total service and eligibility worker staff in the department). As we have already expressed, we very strongly feel the need for stronger representation of income maintenance in the top management councils of the department, and we look to the creation of division chiefs with concerns that are exclusively in this area. We also feel, partly as a result of our interviews with social service staff, that there is also a need to create at the division chief level departmental administrators who can provide administrative attention to social services unimpeded by preoccupation with income maintenance concerns. Finally, we see in separation, with its functional specialization and its simplification of the Division Chief's responsibilities, the possibility for increasing span of control at this level.

It will be helpful, as this discussion is read, to refer to existing and proposed organization charts which we insert at this point. It should be noted that the "existing" chart is the Task Force staff's notion of how the organization works presently, rather than the department's idea. The proposed organization plan is reduced to base essentials for clarity. The proposed chart indicates basic divisions and sections only, reserving to the discussion part of this report indication of organizational refinements.







The final draft of this report which staff presented to the Task Force for their last review and approval before going to press, included the position of Chief Assistant Director. The organization chart presented to the Task Force also proposed four Assistant Directors in place of the current two. The Task Force membership was satisfied that the four Assistants represented a logical, more sharply defined allocation of duties to top departmental staff than is now possible with just two Assistants and one Chief Assistant. The Task Force membership accepted and agreed with the concept that separation of services and income maintenance should be reflected at the Assistant Director level. They agreed with the differentiation of duties between the Assistant Director for Fiscal matters and the Assistant Director for Management. The Task Force accepted the reallocation of miscellaneous supervision responsibilities, such as Personnel, Training, and Resources Development, to positions below the Assistant Director level which would free positions above this level for the broader departmental concerns, such as coordinating Services with Income Maintenance, etc.

The Task Force membership, after review of these several factors, raised the question as to the continued need for a position of Chief Assistant, particularly in light of the proposed four Assistant Directors and the fact that some of the direct supervision duties of the Chief Assistant have been proposed for reallocation farther down the line. Another factor which persuaded the membership to this view was the wish to refocus the Director's attention to internal concerns of the department. The feeling was that if there was no position to whom the Director could delegate administrative responsibility for internal management, he would then be forced to assume this role because the Chief Assistant position would not be available to serve as a buffer between him and internal management concerns.

The immediate response of staff to these expressions by the Task Force members



was that even though there are four Assistant Directors proposed there would still be a need for a Chief Assistant to act for the Director in his absence and to assist in the very critical coordination of departmental programs and operations. The Task Force membership in response suggested the position of executive assistant or "assistant to" the Director. Staff, in turn, responded that this type of staff position was out of the command channel and was definitely not of the same character of position as a Chief Assistant Director. The Task Force membership then generally expressed the view that if acting for the Director in his absence was a problem it could be assigned to one or more of the assistants. Staff, on the other hand, felt that if the position of Chief Assistant were not to be retained, it would be better to specifically designate one of the four proposed assistants as the position to act for the Director in his absence and that this should probably be the position of Assistant Director for Management. Staff concedes the validity of the observations of the Task Force membership relative to the need for a position of Chief Assistant. However, Task Force staff retains its reservations regarding the wisdom of such a move in a department of nearly 2,000 employees which has had almost disastrous experiences in assigning critical executive functions to a very limited staff, and in which a substantial reorganization is proposed.

Although not unanimous in their position, Task Force members present at the final draft review were overwhelmingly in favor of the proposed organization chart included above.

One of the concepts of the proposed reorganization, as far as direct delivery of services and income maintenance is concerned, is to allow the new 300-man offices and the main office to serve income maintenance functions over relatively large territories and to convert smaller offices to virtually exclusive decentralized delivery of social services.

Thus, the new North Oakland branch and the main office would provide income maintenance functions to a territory that receives social services from smaller satellite offices in Berkeley, East Oakland, and Bond Street. The concept would have to be compromised slightly at the Main Branch, where it would seem advisable to maintain at least two emergency social service units to accommodate needs which will probably always be presented to the main branch because of its high visibility as "the welfare department." We would also propose move of the management of Medi-Cal eligibility functions from the East Oakland branch to Main as a means of bringing coordination of this matter, which is department-wide in scope, closer to top management of the department. Moving south, the concept would have to be compromised a bit further in Hayward, where it would make sense to detach to this income maintenance center at least as many (5) social service units as are presently working out of Hayward. Finally, Fremont, because it is the outermost extension of the department, covering an area of relatively low population density, with poor public transportation facilities, should probably remain organized much as at present, with five service units and 12 income maintenance units.

Below, then, is a comparative breakdown of present and proposed staffing patterns for social service and eligibility positions expressed in terms of units with position counts reflected through the Grade I Supervisor

level. No non-unit positions are reflected (Grade II supervision, non-unit clerks, department-wide staff, etc.). The proposed staffing pattern is also based on occupation of new buildings and release of existing short-term or monthly leased facilities.

EXISTING AND PROPOSED STAFFING PATTERNS  
Based on Shift to 300-Man Offices  
(Eligibility and Social Service Units Only)

Location	EXISTING STAFFING PATTERN						PROPOSED STAFFING PATTERN					
	Eligibility		Social Service		Total		Eligibility		Social Service		Total	
	Units	Position	Units	Positions	Units	Pos.	Units	Positions	Units	Positions	Units	Pos.
Main* (All except G.A.) Gen. Asst./Medi-Cal	38	304	20	180	65	547	27	216	2	18	32	261
			7	63					3	27		
North Oakland	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	240	-	-	30	240
Berkeley (All except G.A.) Gen. Asst.	10	80	3	27	14	116	-	-	11	99	14	126
			1	9			-	-	3	27		
East Oakland All except Medi-Cal Medi-Cal/Gen. Asst.	13	104	4	36	20	167	-	-	8	72		
			3	27					3	27	24	216
Bond (All except G.A.) Gen. Asst.	11	88	4	36	16	133	-	-	10	90		
			1	9			-	-	3	27		
Hayward (All except G.A.) Gen. Asst.	12	96	4	36	17	141	26	208	4	36	31	253
			1	9					1	9		
Fremont (All except G.A.) Gen. Asst.	11	88	4	36	16	133	12	96	4	36	17	141
	—	—	1	9	—	—	—	—	1	9	—	—
Total	95	760	53	477	148	1237	95	760	53	477	148	1237

\*All staff in offices satellite to Main included in Main office total (i.e., 3rd & Adeline, 17th and Broadway, etc.). Propose two emergency social service units at Main plus transfer of Medi-Cal units from East Oakland to Main office.

As can be seen from the chart the proposed staffing pattern presents an equalization in span of control (in terms of staff supervised by Division Chiefs) and at the same time achieves physical caseload separation and the specialization made possible by it. The existing groupings of eligibility and service staffs are now in a configuration of one large group in excess of 500 at the Main office with five small branch office groups in the 100-150 range. The proposed pattern would involve four administrative groupings of 200-250 with only two in the 100-150 range. In addition, the proposed pattern would consolidate all income maintenance functions into three major locations (North Oakland, Main, and Hayward) with a small income maintenance sub-unit at Fremont. The present staffing pattern places income maintenance functions in six branches; the implications of reducing the number of income maintenance centers for standardizing procedures, improving management controls, reducing reporting requirements, etc. should be obvious.

The proposed staffing pattern also presents three branch offices which would be devoted exclusively to social services -- Berkeley, East Oakland, and Bond. As indicated before, it would still be necessary to retain a few service units at Main, Hayward, and Fremont. The administrative arrangement for these outlying social service staff would involve their direction for program purposes by the Assistant Director for Services. All matters pertaining to their housekeeping accommodations would, however, be the responsibility of their income maintenance division chiefs.

The six division chiefs in the department would involve two Chiefs for Services and four Chiefs for Income Maintenance, which is a rough approximation of the total staffing ratio between services and income maintenance. It should be noted that we have proposed a single division chief

for a social service branch located in two existing facilities at Bond Street and East Oakland. Although this chief would be split between two headquarters they are reasonably close and the overall staff in service units would be slightly over 200. He would probably wish to make his headquarters at Bond Street since it is the larger office. We would also propose that the Blind program and Child Welfare be placed with this division chief.

We have proposed retention of a Berkeley Branch as a distinct unit because to include it in the responsibilities of a Bond Street East Oakland Division Chief would perhaps spread him too thin. The Berkeley Branch should be retained as a services branch because it is too small for efficient income maintenance.

We move on now to reorganization proposals related to department-wide staff. These proposals in effect summarize recommendations made earlier in this study in sections pertaining to specific problem areas. As noted in our section on Social Services we have proposed that the Community Resources Coordinator be responsible to the Assistant Director for Services. We have also recommended that the departmental training be specialized and separated in terms of income maintenance and social services and we propose that the training function be immediately supervised at a Grade II Supervisor level under the Assistant Directors for Services and for Income Maintenance. Earlier in this section of the report we discussed the functions of the Assistant Directors for Management and Fiscal Office Services and we have reflected this schematically in the organization chart.

We recognize that we have made a major reorganization proposal. We acknowledge that the scope of the change proposed will have a far-reaching

effect on many smaller functions and processes of the department which we have not had an opportunity to thoroughly review. For example, although we have called for the separation of services and eligibility in General Assistance, our proposed staffing pattern does not, at this point, reflect this. For another example, we have not considered what implications there may be in this reorganization for Child Welfare. Consider also the present arrangement of having the foster home component of AFDC eligibility within the Child Welfare Division. The proposed reorganization has not addressed this question. For another example, we have based our proposed branch office staffing patterns primarily upon the need to separate services and income maintenance and to consolidate income maintenance functions as much as possible within building capacities. We have not done any study with census tract data, caseload geography, etc. for the purposes of perfect coterminous balancing of services and eligibility caseload.

All that we are saying here is that we have been forced to apply some limitations to the depth of our study of departmental reorganization, and we acknowledge that further review will have to be given to the impact of these large recommendations upon some of the sub-functions and processes of the department. We do feel quite confident, however, in the main thrust of our organization proposals and are firmly convinced that:

61. THE ALAMEDA COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENT SHOULD SEPARATE SERVICES AND INCOME MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS THROUGH THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR LEVEL WITH THE DIRECTOR ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROGRAM LIAISON;

THE NUMBER OF DIVISION CHIEFS SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM NINE TO SIX, AND THE REVISED DIVISION CHIEF STRUCTURE SHOULD REFLECT A REVISED DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN INCOME MAINTENANCE AND SERVICES;

INCOME MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED WITHIN THE LARGER OFFICE FACILITIES WITH SOCIAL SERVICES PROVIDED PRIMARILY FROM SMALLER SATELLITE OFFICES;

A FOURTH POSITION AT THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR LEVEL SHOULD BE ADDED FOR THE PURPOSES OF DIRECTING AND COORDINATING DEPARTMENT-WIDE MANAGEMENT AND QUALITY CONTROL FUNCTIONS.

In conclusion we recognize that we have called for additional staff in the course of making these recommendations on departmental reorganization; we propose four Assistant Directors where there are now only two Assistants plus the Chief Assistant; we have called for the creation of a three-position Management Analysis Unit which does not presently exist. We do feel that these recommendations can be more than counter-balanced by the need for a stronger management presence in the department, and in proposals that we have made in connection with reducing the Division Chief number by three and in proposals which we have made in connection with the Employment Rehabilitation Service.



SECTION X

WORK INCENTIVE PROGRAM/~~EMPLOYMENT~~ REHABILITATION SERVICE

## WORK INCENTIVE PROGRAM/EMPLOYMENT REHABILITATION SERVICE

This study of welfare in one major California county has led us to the inescapable conclusion that our efforts to resolve our unemployment problems through current manpower programs have failed. The programs of the early 1960's -- the Community Work and Training provisions of the 1962 Social Security Amendments, the Manpower Development and Training Act, the "unconditional War on Poverty," -- are typical high expectation-low yield efforts that have not only been costly, but counter-productive. A recent effort -- the WIN Program, administered through the State Department of Human Resource Development -- appears, on the basis of its 30-month record in California, to be no more successful than its predecessors. These programs have failed due to reliance on the concept that people are unemployed mainly because of personal "barriers" such as lack of motivation, poor attitudes about work, limited child care facilities, inadequate transportation, etc. The operational implementation of this concept has been: to solve unemployment we must concentrate on the unemployed, who are out of work because they are "disadvantaged." Alameda County manpower programs represent a microcosm of the national experience with the personal barrier concept, and we feel that our studies within just two of the systems in Alameda County (Welfare and HRD) support the conclusion that this concept is a failure.

We would also suggest that one of the most telling body-blows to the personal barrier theory, especially in California, has been the significant intrusion of unemployment into suburbia, as a result of aerospace industry cutbacks and general cooling of the economy. The growing incidence of

unemployment among the relatively well-educated, highly motivated middle class is emphasizing a simple fact known by many of the "disadvantaged" for some time: that the biggest barrier to employment is a lack of jobs. Most of those recently laid off in aerospace cutbacks would probably also agree that personality disfunctions are primarily a result, rather than a cause of unemployment. Further evidence on a national scale of the impact of broad economic factors upon employment is the fact that one act -- the tax cut of 1964 -- probably had more impact on employment than all of the manpower programs of the 1960's; the economic expansion generated by that move actually brought the nation below the full employment index of 4%.

It is our contention that the most effective manpower strategy is to concentrate not on the unemployed, but on the employment market, and to reduce unemployment by increasing the demand for labor. At the conclusion of this discussion, we will propose recommendations for action at local, State and federal levels. These recommendations will not call for expenditure of new money, but for radical redirection of some of the enormous outlays being channelled through existing manpower programs.

Let us first take a short journey back through the 'sixties, to the high-water mark for the personal barrier theory of unemployment -- the Social Security Amendments of 1962, and, in particular, the provisions therein for "Community Work and Training Programs." These provisions were designed to encourage the states to establish programs which would offer training and job opportunities to employable individuals over age 18 in families receiving AFDC. The federal standards stipulated that recipients must be offered training and work at not less than minimum or prevailing wage on projects which served a useful public purpose. Recipients were not to be

employed if the work would otherwise be done by public or private employees, and assistance would be denied anyone refusing work without good cause.

Community Work and Training Programs were conducted by county welfare departments through units such as the Employment Rehabilitation Section (ERS) in the Alameda County Welfare Department. This unit received referrals of cases from individual workers and tested, screened, and counseled recipients and in turn referred them to a specific work experience or training project, or work assignment. We will discuss certain measures of the success of this unit in Alameda County below. Whatever its record was between 1963 and 1967, the Congress in 1968 felt that Community Work and Training was a failure, as well as the 1962 Amendments relating to social services:

Thus convinced that social services and voluntary-compliance work programs do not solve the problem of rising AFDC costs, Congress in the 1967 amendments redirected the thrust of the AFDC and other federally assisted welfare programs. By developing extensive employment programs, making them mandatory upon the states and expanding the scope of required recipient participation, the legislation increases the federal government's role in meeting the needs of welfare recipients.

The shift in focus is evidenced by the shift in control from HEW to the Department of Labor. Thus the solution to the poverty problem is being sought in employment rather than in social services. The objective of these programs is to "assure, to the maximum extent possible, that such relative, child and individual will enter the labor force and accept employment so that they will become self-sufficient."<sup>1</sup>

The shift in control from HEW to Department of Labor was reportedly also a result of a struggle for management of the new manpower program at the

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<sup>1</sup>Columbia Journal of Law & Social Problems, "Compulsory Work for Welfare Recipients under the Social Security Amendments of 1967," Third Quarter, 1968, p. 199.

Departmental Secretary level.

The Work Incentive Program provisions of the 1967 Amendments (PL 90-248; 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 602) were implanted in California law through AB 210 (Chappie), 1968 Session. In a statement on his bill in January, 1968, Assemblyman Chappie commented that it was probably the first implementation in any state of the new federal work incentive procedures. An early release on the bill claimed that it would "transform thousands of hopeless, hard-core, unemployed into hopeful, taxpaying, job holders." The bill carried out the Congressional intent for transfer of program responsibility from the welfare to the employment system. It was characterized as a three-pronged effort which would: 1) find jobs or on-the-job training for employable AFDC recipients; 2) provide training and rehabilitation for those whose employment potential can be improved; and 3) establish special projects with public or private non-profit agencies to provide jobs for persons who would otherwise be welfare recipients.

An analysis of AB 210 by the California Taxpayers' Association on February 6, 1968 noted that it "abolishes community work and training programs under the Department of Social Welfare..." The analysis noted that Mr. Chappie said that California legislation should go farther than simply paralleling the Social Security Amendments; "since these persons will draw paychecks, pay taxes and, in effect, become independent citizens, we should distinguish them from unemployables remaining fully dependent on welfare rolls." AB 210 at this stage apparently did go beyond the federal provisions. According to the Cal-Tax analysis:

What is being said in that aspect of the bill is that every person in a welfare caseload transferred to the Department of Employment as an eligible under the Social

Security Amendments will no longer be classed as a welfare recipient. The recipient clearly becomes the responsibility of the Department of Labor and the Department of Employment and would no longer be carried in a welfare department caseload nor require the activities or social studies heretofore required by a caseworker. What is being sought here is a clean break with the welfare caseload, and a definition of departmental responsibility with respect to work incentive programs.

The bill also required the Director of the State Department of Social Welfare to report to each regular session of the Legislature on the cost effectiveness of the program. As we shall see, somewhere between the introduction of AB 210 and its passage as Sections 11300-11308, Welfare and Institutions Code, and Sections 5000-5403 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, this cost effectiveness reporting by SDSW was dropped. Also the "clean break" with the welfare system actually resulted in rather sloppy surgery, and the wounds are still not healed. Of significance to our later discussion is Section 5014 of the Unemployment Insurance Code:

It is the intent of the Legislature that the department shall make maximum use of the accumulated experience of personnel who were employed by county welfare departments in job training and placement programs immediately preceding the effective date of this division.<sup>2</sup>

How does WIN work? We should start with WIN's statements of purpose and intent which, although lengthy, are worth reviewing for their emphasis on the personality disfunction theory of poverty. Emphasis is added:

The purpose of this division is to establish a program utilizing all available manpower services ... under which individuals receiving aid to families with dependent children will be furnished incentives, opportunities, and necessary services towards the employment of such individuals in the regular economy, the training of such individuals for

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<sup>2</sup>Unemployment Insurance Code, Section 5014, Vol. 65, 1971.



work in the regular economy, and the participation of such individuals in special work projects, thus restoring the families of such individuals to independence and useful roles in their communities. It is expected that the individuals participating in the program established under this division will acquire a sense of dignity, self-worth, and confidence which will flow from being recognized as a wage-earning member of society and that the example of a working adult in these families will have beneficial effects on the children in such families.

It is the intent of the Legislature to concentrate maximum state efforts on providing increased employment opportunities and upgrading of employment skills in order to open the way to permanent self-support for persons who have been or otherwise might become dependent on public aid. To this end the Legislature intends that persons affected by this chapter shall be assigned to the primary jurisdiction of the Department of Human Resources Development, which shall be responsible for implementing and executing the provisions of this chapter.

Consistent with the intent of the Legislature to promote and achieve permanent employment of persons qualifying for work incentive programs under this division, it shall be the responsibility of each state agency and the political sub-divisions of this state to cooperate by providing as many opportunities as possible for the permanent employment of such persons.<sup>3</sup>

Section 5013 of the Unemployment Insurance Code sets out the following priorities for assigning persons to WIN programs:

- (1) Persons who were in training or employment under a community work and training program immediately preceding the effective date of this division.
- (2) Unemployed fathers.
- (3) Unemployed mothers whose children are school age or older.
- (4) Unemployed mothers with pre-school age children.

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<sup>3</sup>Unemployment Insurance Code, Sections 5000 and 5001, Vol. 65, 1971.