

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Gergen, David R.: Files  
**Folder Title:** [Soviet Union]  
**Box:** OA 9425

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** GERGEN, DAVID: FILES

**Withdrawer**

DLB 4/6/2012

**File Folder** [SOVIET UNION]

**FOIA**

S11-463-4

**Box Number** 9425

SYSTEMATIC

31

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
134733	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO VICE PRESIDENT, SECSTATE, ET AL., RE: HIGH LEVEL MSSION TO EUROPE	2	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

GERGEN, DAVID: FILES

*Withdrawer*

DLB 4/6/2012

*File Folder*

[SOVIET UNION]

*FOIA*

S11-463-4

SYSTEMATIC

*Box Number*

9425

31

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
134733	MEMO  WILLIAM CLARK TO VICE PRESIDENT, SECSTATE, ET AL., RE: HIGH LEVEL MSSION TO EUROPE	2	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

dh 3/30/12

JB<sup>2</sup>  
from AH Bay  
2-26

Statement on the U.S. Response to the Buildup by  
the Soviet Union of Chemical Weapons

Statement: Replacement of Old Chemical Munitions

As a deterrent to discourage Soviet use of their massive chemical warfare capacities and in the absence of a verifiable treaty banning such weapons the United States has concluded that it is regrettably necessary to undertake preparation in the coming year for production two years hence of replacement chemical munitions for those currently in the U.S. deterrent stocks. These would, if produced, REPLACE -- NOT SUPPLEMENT -- older types that are less safe to store and handle. These are not new and they are not biological. They are a retaliatory deterrent. The United States has already renounced first use of such munitions. No deployment is planned. Deployment could only occur after consultations with and approval of our Allies. Such consultations have not occurred.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

-2-

Background: The Growth of Soviet Chemical Warfare Capabilities

For the past thirteen years the Soviet Union has steadily produced massive amounts of chemical weapons, and developed large-scale chemical warfare capacities, including equipment, special decontamination vehicles, and extensive experimentation. At present the Soviets have stockpiled several hundred thousand tons of chemical weapons. Some 50- to 100,000 Soviet soldiers have been trained in the use of and defense against chemical weapons. The USSR has spent large sums of money to equip and protect its forces against chemical war. The Soviet CW capacity is not limited to one region, but could affect any country.

U.S. Restraint

The Soviets have no reason for such build-up. The United States in 1969 renounced the first use of chemical and biological weapons and toxins, and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

-3-

President Nixon in that year ordered the destruction of all existing stocks of biological agents and weapons. The United States closed research and production facilities, reducing its research and development to a strict study of how to defend against attack by an adversary.

#### Soviet Use of Mycotoxins

The world community is now aware that the Soviets have been responsible for the use of new weapons, the mycotoxins — commonly known as "Yellow Rain" — against helpless peoples in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. The testimony of those who have suffered, the chemical analyses, the pattern of use by the Soviets or proxy forces, amount to undeniable proof of Soviet involvement in odious acts. (See attached Department of State report.)

#### U.S. Efforts to Ban Chemical Weapons

Between 1977 and 1980 the United States conducted bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union toward a comprehensive, verifiable

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

-4-

agreement to ban and eliminate chemical weapons. The talks were suspended in 1980 because the Soviets could not agree to adequate verification of both parties' compliance.

The United States stands ready to resume negotiations with the USSR and try once again to achieve an agreement that is clear, equitable and provides for adequate verification.

We hope the decision announced today will prove an incentive to the Soviet Union to negotiate a verifiable ban on chemical weapons, an achievement that will serve the best interests of all nations.

Attachment



Scenario

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ *du 3/30/12*

Public Announcement of U.S. Response to the Soviet Buildup  
of Chemical Weapons

Assuming that the FY 1983 budget request, including items for chemical munitions, will be sent to the Congress in early February and thus be a matter of public record, the following scenario for public affairs treatment is proposed. The scenario calls for a coordinated series of U.S. public affairs initiatives in Washington and overseas that seek to direct public attention overseas to the actions of the Soviet Union.

- 1) Any additional evidence or reports on the Soviet use of mycotoxins should be made available to the press prior to the submission of the budget to the Congress. However, the USG should not attempt artificially to generate attention to mycotoxins because it would be reported as a transparent effort to distract world attention from our impending decision on chemical weapons. Reports or statements from Congressional leaders, other private American sources, particularly scientists and leaders and experts from other countries, would be useful.
- 2) Shortly before release of the budget, a number of senior U.S. officials should have deep background briefings on an exclusive basis with a few leading columnists or editors, explaining the forthcoming decision with emphasis on our intent to use binaries as a deterrent and an incentive to the Soviets to attain a verifiable agreement.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~



~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

- 2 -

3) The State Department Spokesman at the noon briefing on the day of release of the budget should make a brief, forceful statement on U.S. plans regarding chemical weapons (draft attached). He should of course be prepared for questions with a briefing paper drawing on the cables already prepared by State and DoD and talking points consolidated by USICA (drafts attached).

4) At the same time White House, NSC, DoD and State Department senior officials and briefers should brief the press corps including meetings at the Foreign Press Center and followup exclusives for leading foreign press. U.S. officials should have in hand the briefing papers that focus on Soviet buildups and actions, U.S. interest in negotiations and the deterrence intent of our weapons.

5) The Department should instruct Ambassadors in key countries to seek statements from foreign leaders that fix the onus for the buildup of chemical weapons on the USSR and support a US call for renewed negotiations. Similar statements from other public figures should also be sought.

6) A Presidential statement should be prepared either for delivery by the President personally before the press corps or as part of a press conference, in which the President:

-- Regrets the need for US preparations;

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

- 3 -

- Places the responsibility for our decision on Soviet actions;
- Calls strongly for resumed negotiations;
- Emphasizes that we have consciously built in time for negotiation before being forced to proceed to production;
- Asks the Soviets to account to the world for their stocks and military preparation;
- Seeks support from the international community for a treaty that is verifiable;
- Stresses the deterrent and retaliatory nature of US weapons.

7) Coincident with the actions directly related to the U.S. decision, the USICA Wireless File or USINFO and Voice of America should carry stories on previous U.S. actions and agreements attempting to ban and eliminate biological and chemical weapons, and more general accounts of major U.S. arms reduction and peace initiatives, as well as analyses of Soviet chemical warfare strategy.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

- 4 -

8) It will be valuable for the Voice of America and the File to cross-play to the field texts or summaries of any supportive media reaction and public statements from abroad and from the U.S.

9) At every opportunity senior U.S. officials should voice their commitment to search for ways to make progress in arms reduction and guarantee world peace and security.

Drafted by: PGM/G:MDSchneider:hg 1/20/82

Clearances: PGM/G:JThurber  
PGM:GDMalone  
C:JShirley  
DD: Mr. Robinson

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~



*2/20/72*  
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~  
INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNICATION AGENCY

*M. Thorne*  
INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02 STATE 013843  
ORIGIN PH-09

#23701 ICC026  
20/0612Z

STATE 013843

#23701 ICC026

INFO TCO-01 DSO-02 AF-03 AR-03 EA-03 NEA-02 EU-03 PGMR-01  
PGMP-04 VOA-05 /027 A3

AND DEMILITARIZATION OF EXISTING STOCKS.

THE CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM HAS BEEN: (\$M)

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
TOTAL	111	123	157	259	455

RD&E RETALIATORY	7	6	6	7	29
RETALIATORY PERCENT	6	5	4	3	6

- THE ARTICLE IS BASICALLY CORRECT IN THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE RECOMMENDING AND EMPHASIZING MODERNIZATION OF BOTH ITS DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES.

- THE PROGRAM WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE FUNDING FOR:

- - RD&E OF DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT AND DRUGS FOR ANTIDOTES OR PRETREATMENTS.

- - RD&E OF BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOR RETALIATION TO ENEMY USE OF CW.

- - PROCUREMENT OF DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

# PRIOR YEAR PROGRAM COSTS (\$M)

	81	82
RD&E, DEFENSIVE	81	173
RD&E, RETALIATORY	7	29
PROCUREMENT, DEFENSIVE	72	174
PROCUREMENT, RETALIATORY	20	0
O&M	79	79
TOTAL	259	455

NOTE: THE 1982 REQUEST HAD NO FUNDS FOR PROCUREMENT OF RETALIATORY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS. THIS PROGRAM IS NEEDED TO REDRESS THE EFFECTS OF YEARS OF NEGLECT WHILE THE SOVIETS WERE EXPANDING THEIR CAPABILITIES. THE SOVIETS ARE THE BEST-EQUIPPED NATION IN THE WORLD TO WAGE CHEMICAL WAR.

- WE RECOGNIZE THAT DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING ALONE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE A DETERRENT TO THE USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE. CW WILL BE AN ATTRACTIVE OPTION TO THE SOVIETS AS LONG AS THEY CAN USE IT WITHOUT FEAR OF RETALIATION.

- IN ADDITION WE BOTH RECOGNIZE THAT WITHOUT A CREDIBLE US OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY, THE SOVIETS CAN ACHIEVE A MAJOR QUOTE FORCE MULTIPLIER UNQUOTE EFFECT OVER PROTECTED US AND ALLIED PERSONNEL BY FORCING ALLIED FORCES TO OPERATE ENCUMBERED BY PROTECTIVE CLOTHING WHILE THE SOVIETS CAN OPERATE UNENCUMBERED. (THIS IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT FOR DEEP TARGETS SUCH AS AIRBASES, DEPOTS, PORTS, AND STAGING AREAS.)

- BOTH THE US AND SU ARE PARTIES TO THE GENEVA PROTOCOL. WE HAD BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN 1977 AND 1980 TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE, VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO BAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HOWEVER, MAJOR DIFFERENCES EXIST IN THE AREA OF VERIFICATION. GIVEN SOVIET RESISTANCE TO EFFICACIOUS VERIFICATION MEASURES, THE US HAS BEEN FACED WITH NO PRUDENT ALTERNATIVE BUT TO DEVELOP LONG RANGE PLANS TO REDUCE THE ASYMMETRY OF CAPABILITY THAT NOW EXISTS.

- THE NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE PROVIDES ESSENTIALLY CORRECT FIGURES. HOWEVER, THESE FIGURES ARE VERY MISLEADING SINCE THE MAJORITY OF THE EXPENDITURES AND THE

DRAFTED BY PH/TMP:FCELEC  
APPROVED BY PH:RBURT  
OSD/AE: HGEINSEL  
OSD/ISP: MR. McDONALD  
OSD/RE: MR. DASHIELL  
OSD/PA: LT. COL. DELORME  
ICA: GROBINSON (INFO)  
ACDA: R. MIKULAK (INFO)  
S/S-O: ESHERMAN

-----227737 200613Z /21

O 200254Z JAN 82 ZEX  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE  
USNMR SHAPE BE  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT  
USAREUR WEIDELBERG GE  
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA

J G

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ STATE 013843

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: NATO

SUBJECT: DOD PRESS GUIDANCE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS  
MODERNIZATION

REF: STATE 011311

1. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS RELEASED BY DOD REGARDING NYT ARTICLE ON CHEMICAL WEAPON MODERNIZATION THAT APPEARED ON JANUARY 15, 1982. (NYT ARTICLE BEING SENT SEPT.)

- THE US OFFICIALLY RENOUNCED THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN 1969 AND SINCE THEN HAS DESTROYED ALL STOCKS OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. THERE ARE CURRENTLY NO PLANS TO INITIATE PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. THERE ARE ALSO NO PLANS TO BEGIN PRODUCTION OF A NEW TYPE OF CHEMICAL NERVE AGENT. AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC, WE ARE DEVELOPING BINARY MUNITIONS ONLY FOR RETALIATION TO ANY ENEMY USE OF CW.  
FYI: THE BINARY MUNITIONS REFERRED TO ABOVE WILL CONTAIN NERVE AGENT SIMILAR TO EXISTING NERVE AGENTS, AND THUS WE TYPES OF NERVE AGENTS WILL NOT BE PRODUCED. END FYI.

2. THE FOLLOWING MEMORANDUM WAS PROVIDED TO DOD PUBLIC AFFAIRS TO ASSIST IN RESPONDING TO INQUIRIES ON THE NYT ARTICLE, AND TO CORRECT INACCURACIES IN THAT ARTICLE.  
- THE TOTAL BUDGET FIGURES QUOTED IN THE NYT ARTICLE FOR THE CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAM ARE ESSENTIALLY CORRECT, HOWEVER, THE ONLY MONIES EXPENDED FOR RETALIATORY WEAPONS (OTHER THAN THE \$20M FOR EQUIPMENT AND \$3M FOR PLANT RENOVATION) HAS BEEN FOR RD&E. BASICALLY 94-97 PERCENT OF ALL FUNDS EXPENDED FROM 1978 TO 1982 HAVE BEEN FOR DEFENSIVE ITEMS; MASKS, COLLECTIVE PROTECTION DETECTORS, ALARMS, TRAINING,

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~  
INTERNATIONAL  
COMMUNICATION AGENCY

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 OF 02 STATE 013843

023701 ICC026

PLANNED PROGRAM IS LARGELY DEVOTED TO DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT PROGRAMS. FOR EXAMPLE 95 PER CENT OF FUNDS FOR FY 79 (\$123M) ARE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE DEFENSIVE POSTURE OF FORCES. IN FY 80, RETALIATORY PROGRAMS WERE 4 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL BUDGET, WHICH INCREASES TO ABOUT

10 PERCENT IN 83 AND TO 19 PERCENT RETALIATORY PLANNED FOR FY 84.

THIS PROGRAM REPRESENTS A WELL PLANNED EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE DOD TO MEET WHAT WE PERCEIVE AS A SERIOUS NATIONAL SECURITY DEFICIENCY. ONE ERROR IN THE ARTICLE WHICH SHOULD BE CORRECTED IS THE STATEMENT THAT THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD (DSB) RECOMMENDED STORAGE IN BRITAIN. THE DSB SUPPORTED MODERNIZATION OF THE CW STOCKPILE; HOWEVER, IT DID NOT REPEAT NOT RECOMMEND STORAGE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE UK.

THE PLAN FOR APPROVAL OF ANY PRODUCTION NOTED IN THE ARTICLE IS WELL KNOWN AND CERTIFICATION BY THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE REQUIRED BY PUBLIC LAW. MODERNIZATION OF THE US CW STOCKPILE HAS BEEN STRONGLY RECOMMENDED BY ALL WHO HAVE STUDIED THE MATTER. MODERNIZATION OF OUR CW STOCKPILE DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY CHANGE IN OUR STRATEGY -- BUT IS NEEDED TO REPLACE OBSOLETE WEAPONS. WHICH HAVE BEEN A PART OF OUR DETERRENCE. A PRODUCTION DECISION IS INDEPENDENT OF ANY DEPLOYMENT ISSUE.

3. FOLLOWING IS PRESS GUIDANCE PROVIDED DOD PRESS SPOKESMAN IN RESPONSE TO WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE BY WALTER PINCUS ON JANUARY 16, 1982.

- QUESTION - WILL GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES BE EQUIPPED WITH A CHEMICAL WARHEAD?

ANSWER - THE U.S. HAS CURRENT PLANS FOR PRODUCING ONLY THE 155MM BINARY ARTILLERY PROJECTILE AND THE BIGEYE AERIAL CHEMICAL BOMB. WE ARE EVALUATING A WIDE VARIETY OF POTENTIAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AS MODERNIZATION OPTIONS TO INCLUDE MULTIPLE LAUNCH ROCKET SYSTEMS AND CRUISE MISSILES. THESE HAVE NOT PROGRESSED BEYOND FEASIBILITY STUDIES.

THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE PROPOSED CHEMICAL MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND THE CURRENT DISCUSSIONS ON THE GLCM DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE. THE GLCM'S UNDER DISCUSSION HAVE NO CHEMICAL CAPABILITY NOR IS ONE PLANNED.

4. POSTS MAY DRAW UPON ABOVE AND GUIDANCE PROVIDED REFTEL IN RESPONDING TO PRESS INQUIRIES.

5. POSTS SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT A CORRECTED COPY OF REFTEL WAS TRANSMITTED ON JANUARY 17, 1982. ORIGINAL TRANSMISSION DROPPED FIRST TWO LETTERS FROM WORD QUOTE UNWILLINGNESS UNQUOTE IN THIRD ANSWER OF PARA 4. CORRECT TEXT SHOULD READ QUOTE -- AND SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE A VERIFIABLE BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- UNQUOTE. POSTS SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT PARA 4 OF REFTEL (Q'S AND A'S) IS UNCLASSIFIED. HAIG

2/2

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~