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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder: Legislative Affairs [4 of 7] ~~OA 10514~~ Box 8

Date: 3/1/99

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	M.B. Oglesby to Baker re legislative effort on MX 2 p.	5/1/84	P5 B1 B1
2. memo	Nancy Kennedy to Baker, et al. thru Oglesby re ambassador to Jordan Xp 4p.	4/17/84	P6, F6 B6 60 10/5/00

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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April 30, 1984

Dear Senator Baker:

Thank you for the recent letter to the President which you cosigned with 13 of your Republican colleagues, indicating your serious concerns regarding the level of textile and apparel imports, and the impact which these imports are having on the domestic industry.

Please know that your comments and your specific recommendations are being brought to the President's attention. I have also asked the President's advisers on these matters to provide a further review of the actions which you suggested to address this situation. In the interim, let me assure you that we are aware of and appreciate your concern in this important matter.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

cc: w/copy of inc to Bill Maroni, Legis Affrs. USTR - for DIRECT
response

cc: w/copy of inc to Paul Vander Myde, Cong Affrs, Commerce - FYI

NBO/KRJ/ech-MBO6

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 9, 1984

224062

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

A rapid and unprecedented surge in textile/apparel import growth since the beginning of this year has created an emergency that threatens the very survival of the United States domestic textile and apparel industry and the jobs of an enormous number of textile and apparel workers.

Textile and apparel imports increased 45% in January and February of this year over levels in the same period a year ago. This increase follows the 25% increase in textile and apparel import growth in 1983, the biggest single year of imports ever. In human terms, the 1983 increase alone represents 140,000 jobs lost. Already this year the growth in imports represents 50,000 textile and apparel workers that could have been employed. Total textile and apparel imports now displace some 800,000 U.S. workers.

High levels of textile and apparel import growth have contributed disproportionately to our trade deficit. The 1983 trade deficit in textiles and apparel of \$10.6 billion accounts for 15% of the total record U.S. trade deficit of \$69.3 billion that year. The textile and apparel trade deficit in two months this year is a record \$2.6 billion, up 67% over the same period a year ago.

There is every indication that these trends will continue. For example, Ambassador Brock reportedly stated recently that he expects the textile import surge to continue "for a good part of this year." If so, based on the rate of import growth already this year, the rate of import growth in 1984 would be 36% higher than in 1983.

In view of this emergency situation, we urge you to take the following actions:

1. Freeze textile and apparel imports at 1983 levels to correct the balance of trade. Such action is permitted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and authorized in Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. Other nations have taken similar action: for example, in 1981 the European Community

rolled back imports from non-EC countries from 4,079 billion pounds to 3,191 billion pounds.

2. Establish a system of import licensing for all textile and apparel imports from all sources. Such action is authorized in Section 204 of the Agriculture Act of 1956 and Section 1102 of the Trade Agreement Act of 1979. This will improve enforcement of existing U.S. laws requiring country of origin labeling, prohibiting transshipments, and so forth.

3. Direct the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to begin negotiations to create global import controls for textiles and apparel with the major low-wage exporting countries and to permit import growth at no greater than domestic market growth in keeping with your 1980 pledge to limit the growth of textile imports to the growth of the domestic market.

These actions are the minimum required if our domestic textile industry is to survive the onslaught of imports and if the declines in U.S. textile and apparel employment are to be reversed. We urge you to give them your prompt attention.

Sincerely,

✓ 92 Strom Thurmond

✓ 92 James Helms

✓ - 94 1 Phil Dole

✓ 94 10 John D. Dingell

✓ - 97 John Warner

✓ 97 40 Glen H. Roegner

✓ 97 40 J. J. Pickens

✓ 30 John P. East

✓ 97 40 Mark W. Miller

✓ 97 40 Fred Cochran

✓ 97 40 Robert C. Byrd

✓ 97 40 William V. Roth

The President
April 9, 1984
Page Three

4-7-84 ✓

82-100-100 ✓



STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

RALEIGH 27611

JAMES E. HUNT, JR.
GOVERNOR

April 6, 1984

Dear Mr. President:

The record high totals for imports of textile and apparel products for January and February of this year are of grave concern to North Carolina. Ours is the number one textile state in the nation and a major producer of apparel. Both industries already have been hurt by imports and, if the upward trend continues, more jobs will be lost and more plants will close.

North Carolina cannot afford for any more of its jobs to be exported. I urge you to call for a total reexamination of our trade policies and to take whatever steps necessary to guarantee that imports not continue to increase at such unreasonable rates.

Earlier, I had thought the United States should allow import increases in proportion to domestic market growth. Unfortunately, for our industries, import growth has been many times greater than market growth in recent years. I now would urge consideration of global quotas based on import levels of several years ago and that some more effective means of accountability be instituted.

I recognize that such changes take time, but our problem is serious and warrants immediate action.


It is apparent that some of our competitors are disregarding the intent, if not the letter, of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement; that they are taking advantage of loopholes in the bilateral trade agreements; and that our response is often only after market disruption has occurred. Based on the January-February import figures, we continually lose more and more of our market because of these factors.

The President
Page Two
April 6, 1984

I suggest, Mr. President, a reaffirmation of your 1980 statement that import growth should not be greater than domestic market growth, a conveying of your concern to all 100-plus textile and apparel exporters to the United States of the seriousness of the present situation to the entire American economy, and a stronger, more unified response to the import problem by all administrative departments and agencies involved with international trade.

My best personal regards.

Sincerely

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to Ronald Reagan, written over the word "Sincerely".

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

20506

May 4, 1984

The Honorable James B. Hunt, Jr.
Governor
State of North Carolina
Raleigh, North Carolina 27611

Dear Jim:

The President has asked that I respond to your recent letter to him concerning the increase in textile and apparel imports.


Since the beginning of this Administration we have recognized the vital importance of the textile and apparel industry to our nation's economic well-being. We have been in frequent communication with Senator Helms and Congressmen Broyhill and Martin of North Carolina as well as Senator Thurmond and Congressman Campbell of South Carolina and others concerning the problems confronting the domestic industry. These members of Congress in particular have been tireless and articulate spokesmen on behalf of the textile and apparel industry and its workers. I am sure you have been working closely with them.

I would like to point out, however, that during the first three and one half years of this Administration, a great deal has been accomplished out of concern for the domestic textile and apparel industry and its employees. We began by strengthening the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) in 1981. We negotiated tighter, more restrictive bilateral agreements with our four largest suppliers in 1982 and 1983, and established more than 100 additional quota limits with various suppliers last year. On December 16, 1983, we issued new government guidelines which will enable us to act even more quickly to sharp increases in imports. Where we have discovered loopholes in the system which may be used to circumvent our bilateral agreements, we have acted swiftly to resolve the problem. A recent example is the reclassification of apparel parts from basket categories to specific apparel categories (see enclosed Federal Register Notice of March 20, 1984).

In addressing the problems of the textile and apparel industry, we must, of course, adhere to our international obligations as confidence in our integrity is essential in preserving a wide range of our economic interests. The MFA, while not a perfect instrument, provides us the advantage of not paying compensation to countries with which we have textile and apparel quotas.

We are confident that as the economic recovery moves forward, the textile and apparel industry, along with other sectors of the economy, will continue to experience gains in employment, productivity, and profits. Needless to say, we will continue to vigorously enforce the textile import program.

Very truly yours,



WILLIAM E. BROCK

WEB:Inf

Enclosure

The Charlotte Observer

Foremost Newspaper of the Carolinas

Saturday, May 5, 1984

For Home Delivery Assistance 379-6666, 6:30 a.m.-11 a.m.

Price: 25¢

Backlash Threatens Textile Industry's Calls For Quotas

By STEVE MATTHEWS

The textile industry, which has won protection against imports from every president since John F. Kennedy, appears to be losing a battle for greater protection it insists is essential for its "very survival."

Despite indisputable evidence of increasing imports and expected further job losses for Carolina textile workers, calls for protection are being on deaf ears.

"I don't think they have a chance," Dr. Jeffrey Arpan, University of South Carolina international business professor, says of the industry's proposals. "If anything, it might go the other way" — toward less protection.

What's more, the industry's appeals for more protection have generated a backlash of organized opposition from foreign countries, importers and retailers who warn that any greater import restrictions could increase some clothing prices as much as 50% to 100%.

Two key Reagan administration textile figures — Richard Lums, chief U.S. textile negotiator, and Walter Lenahan, chief enforcer of textile agreements — said in interviews this week the administration opposes much of what the industry is proposing.

"Certainly, the general free-trade posture of the administration would militate against further action to provide protection for the domestic industry," says Lenahan, a Commerce Department assistant secretary, who stresses the administration hasn't yet

developed a formal response to the industry's requests.

But anything could happen during an election year. Textile-state members of Congress are harboring hopes they'll again persuade Reagan to ignore his key advisers and approve greater protection.

"Many Republicans feel that the issue is a very, very powerful issue in the hands of the Democrats," one textile-state congressional staffer says. "It's not

See CALLS Page 8A

Page #1 of 3

Calls For Textile Quotas Face

Continued From Page 1A

providing greater protection) sending them an effective message.

"It's a political issue; it's going to get pushed in a political time," says Sid Smith, president of the National Association of Hosiery Manufacturers. "Whatever's going to get done is going to get done in the next couple of months."

Four years ago, Sen. Strom Thurmond, R-S.C., won the textile industry a campaign commitment from President Reagan to the textile-apparel imports to the growth in U.S. consumption of textile products. Now the industry's supporters are trying to cash in on that promise as Reagan seeks reelection.

Fourteen textile-state senators, led by Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., wrote Reagan in April that rapid growth of imports "has created an emergency that threatens the very survival of the U.S. domestic textile and apparel industries and the jobs of an enormous number of textile workers."

This week, Reps. Jim Broyhill, R-N.C., Carroll Campbell, R-S.C., and Ed Jenkins, D-Ga., began circulating a letter among House members in the hope of getting between 100 and 150 members to sign it before sending it to Reagan. The letter, warning that "the situation has reached crisis proportions," calls for Reagan to impose a freeze on textile-apparel imports at 1983 levels.

At stake are the jobs of 2 million workers in the textile, apparel and fiber industries, including 313,000 jobs in the Carolinas. The textile industry, the Carolinas' largest, has lost 75% of its jobs in the past decade, and the industry blames much of the loss on imports.

Also at stake, for U.S. consumers, are higher prices for clothing and other textile products. Restrictions on imported textiles increase the prices of U.S.-made clothing because lower-wage foreign countries can make cheaper goods, retailers say.

The textile industry is pressing for the government to freeze textile-apparel import quotas at 1983 levels, to impose a comprehensive system of global quotas, to renegotiate 14 bilateral textile trade agreements and to license imports of textiles and apparel.

But the industry's campaign, coming only five months after Reagan's beefed-up enforcement of textile-apparel import quotas last Dec. 16, has generated strong opposition.

Consider:



Lenahan Smith

• Six U.S. retail groups on April 23 formed the Retail Special Trade Coalition to oppose government protection of the textile and apparel industries. The coalition plans to raise \$750,000 a year for lobbying, public relations, advertising and legal fees.

• The textile and apparel group of the American Association of Exporters and Importers announced plans on April 12 to raise \$1 million for an intensive lobbying and advertising campaign against new limits imposed by Reagan's Dec. 16 order.

• Foreign governments strongly criticized the Reagan or-

der in January before a specially called meeting of the textiles committee of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

• The U.S. government is under pressure to live up to its stated policy in favor of free trade. Reagan will meet next month in London with Western trading partners in an effort to ease protectionist pressures. U.S. Trade Representative Bill Brock said this week he opposed extension of Japanese import quotas that have helped the U.S. auto industry.

• Textile and apparel manufacturers, recognizing much-broader protection from imports is unlikely, are increasingly setting up foreign apparel manufacturing operations and importing goods into the United States. In April, Charlotte's Stanwood Corp. announced plans to open a sewing facility in Costa Rica by year's end.

In a survey of about 80 apparel manufacturers conducted last month by the Atlanta-based consulting firm Kurt Salmon Associates, 79% viewed operations in the Caribbean as an option they're more likely to use.

These factors, coupled with the improving economy that has lessened the impact of imports on U.S. textile makers, make it unlikely that the textile industry's campaign for greater protection will succeed, industry experts say.

Freddie Wood, senior vice president at Kurt Salmon, says his consulting firm is advising clients in the textile and apparel industries not to expect more protection.

"Realistically," he says, "we have other interests that are sometimes more strategically important to the government than what we would lose" in the textile industry.

"I don't think we'll be moving to more and more protection" of textiles, adds Dr. Denney Freeston, a Georgia Institute of Technology professor who headed the National Academy of Engineering's study of the textile-apparel-fiber industry in 1983.

The industry's politically powerful lobby, however, has overcome such long odds before. In last December's debate within the Reagan administration over beefing up the quota system, only Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige among cabinet members supported the industry proposal. But Reagan sided with the industry after a meeting with Thurmond, Helms and U.S. Reps. Carroll Campbell, R-S.C., and Jim Broyhill, R-N.C.

For 22 years, Democratic and Republican administrations have given the industry more protection than has been given to other U.S. manufacturing industries, Commerce official Lenahan says.

The textile industry won protection against Japanese imports before World War II, long before Japan became a major industrialized nation. In modern times, every president since John Kennedy has protected the industry through negotiated trade agreements.

Reagan administration officials say they have negotiated the most protection of any administration, curbing textile and apparel imports under a series of bilateral agreements negotiated in 1982. The administration imposed unilateral textile import quotas on China for six months until an agreement was reached in mid-1983.

On Dec. 16, Reagan ordered beefed-up enforcement of the quota system. Since then, the government has issued nearly 80 interim quotas — known by the government as "consultation calls" — compared to only five calls in the same period of 1982-83.

Despite stepped-up protection, results have lagged. In 1983, the textile and apparel industries suffered a \$1.06 billion trade deficit, accounting for 13% of the nation's record \$69.4 billion merchandise trade deficit. Textile-apparel imports rose 37.4% in the first quarter of 1984 on top of the 28% growth in 1983.

"The industry sees better action but less results," says Lenahan, who heads the government panel that enforces textile agreements. The reasons, says Lenahan, are a strong dollar that makes imports cheaper, the lagging economic recovery outside the United States and Third World debt problems.

So the industry is pushing for broader measures to restrict imports. It's a battle that matches the interests of textile workers against the interests of retailers and consumers.

Jim Martin, president of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute and chairman of Georgia-based textile manufacturer Ti-Caro Inc., says import growth and "the government's failure to correct it are beyond comprehension. Four years ago, the president made a commitment to hold import growth to the growth in the domestic market (about 2% annually in recent years). This obviously is not happening and will not happen under current policies."

Without new import curbs, Martin foresees further textile plant closings and loss of textile-apparel jobs. Though the industry is enjoying much better sales and profits this year, Martin says that's deceiving because improvements are based on comparisons with the recession.

Retailers sharply disagree. "We are emphatically opposed to the notion of freezing quotas at 1983 levels or a new system of controls," says Verrick French, senior vice president of the National Retail Merchants Association. "You would see a major increase in the price of textiles and apparel. You're cutting off supply in the face of a growing worldwide demand. If you impose a freeze, you can imagine price increases of 30% to 100%."

Martin responds that "greedy" retailers, not consumers, benefit from lower-priced imports.

Textile industry critics are worried that the debate's outcome may largely be decided by political considerations in the Reagan administration. They fear Reagan will take broad actions to help Republican members of congress in textile states.

But Martin, expressing frustration with the Reagan administration, says he sees "no indication this administration would try to help on this. I hope and pray... Hopefully, whatever contribution we make today will help downstream. You have to put in 4 miles of effort to make a yard and a half of result."

Page # 273

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 7, 1984

TO: JAMES A. BAKER III ✓
BUD McFARLANE
FAITH WHITTLESEY
THRU: M.B. OGLESBY, JR. 
FROM: PAMELA J. TURNER 
SUBJECT: Central America

I thought you might be interested in the attached piece from the CHICAGO TRIBUNE on the issue of Central America. It was written by Jeff Bergner, Administrative Assistant to Senator Dick Lugar.

Attachment

Perspective

A forum—ideas, analysis, opinion

Chicago Tribune, Friday, May 4, 1984

Section 1 27

Forestalling another Vietnam

By Jeffrey T. Bergner

Critics of the President's policy in Central America say that Central America is about to become "another Vietnam." Presumably, they do not mean that it is about to become a communist concentration camp from which people flee by the thousands in leaky boats. What is meant, of course, is that the United States will become involved in a military mission without rhyme or reason, and that our interests are ill-served by any form of military involvement.

Is this true? Can the United States avoid substantial military involvement in Central America? It is hard to say.

What is not hard to say is that the present policy is designed precisely to prevent the commitment of U.S. combat forces in the region. Those who believe that the United States can or will stand by as Central America becomes allied with the Soviet Union are either perverse or just plain mistaken. The fact is that there surely will be direct U.S. military involvement in Central America if the current policy does not work.

This is not a threat. It is surely not a prescription. It does not depend upon which political party or which president occupies the White House. Whatever the candidates may now be saying, no sitting president can afford to stand idly by as one nation after another in this hemisphere allies itself with our principal adversary. This is a fact of life, rooted in our history, our values and our interests.

Our current policy is not one of massive involvement; it is a policy on the margin of things. It calls for the major sacrifices to be made by the people of the region itself. We supply money, advice and training; we do not supply American blood.

The United States has many friends in Central America. These friendly nations wish to resist external efforts to impose a Marxist regime upon them. The current configuration of forces and interests is such that reasonableness might still prevail without massive American effort to ensure that it does. Helping those who wish to help themselves is a policy

that deserves support because it offers the only realistic chance of avoiding deeper military involvement in the region.

Is there not another way? Can we not somehow achieve peace and justice in Central America without recourse to arms? It is perhaps comforting to think that if one is pure enough in one's intentions and clever enough in one's approach that all problems will recede without sacrifice or difficulty. This is a fascinating view of the world, but one totally useless in practice.

Responsible leaders owe the American people more than this. It is not possible to placate dedicated ideological opponents with economic assistance. It is

"Helping those who wish to help themselves is a policy that deserves support."

not possible to buy friends. And it is not possible to win over people who seek a whole loaf with promises of half a loaf.

Central America is close to the United States and vital to it. It is an integral part of a hemisphere with which we have always had a special relationship. It contains millions of people who will come here—on foot—if things turn for the worse. The future of Central America will have real consequences for how each American lives in the future. The United States cannot and will not walk away from this one without consequences that will make the memory of Vietnam fade into the distant past.

If we are successful in helping the nations of Central America oppose Marxist tyranny, there is at least a chance that peace and prosperity will emerge there. If we are not successful with our current policy, the problem will not go away. It will persist, and it will become worse. Those who ritually oppose the current policy have some obligation to consider what they are wishing upon young Americans in the next decade. If we are unable to make very small sacrifices now, there is every prospect of that which critics of current policy profess most to abhor: another Vietnam.

Jeffrey T. Bergner is administrative assistant to Republican Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1984



MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER III

FROM: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Attached Letter from Senator Charles Grassley

I called Senator Grassley in Iowa and told him I was calling at your request. I informed him I was the bad guy and that we were sorry.

In order to keep the attendance manageable, we determined to limit attendees to members of the Agriculture Committees. This worked with the House -- but Nickles called when he heard that Boren was invited -- so we included him. Pressler called at the last minute saying it was important to him politically -- and we included him.

Grassley's not happy -- but no further action is needed on his letter.

721 FEDERAL BUILDING
210 WALNUT STREET
DES MOINES, IOWA 50309
(515) 284-4890

206 FEDERAL BUILDING
101 1ST STREET S.E.
CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA 52401
(319) 399-2555

United States Senate

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY

135 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

(202) 224-3744

228 POST OFFICE AND COURT HOUSE BUILDING
320 6TH STREET
SIOUX CITY, IOWA 51101
(712) 233-3331

210 WATERLOO BUILDING
531 COMMERCIAL STREET
WATERLOO, IOWA 50701
(319) 232-6657

Mr. James Baker
Chief of Staff
White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Jim:

On April 10, 1984, President Reagan signed into law new farm legislation that he described as the "first installment of the deficit down payment," with about \$3.2 billion in savings. The reason this bill was possible is because last winter I held hostage H.R. 4072 which was unfair in that it ignored the concerns of Iowa corn farmers and drought victims. I would also point out that the Administration requested that I take this action.

My action led to negotiations this spring which involved a number of Senators and Administration officials. I was deeply involved with these negotiations and the general process throughout this period.

Because of my key role in creating this new bill, I was placed by USDA upon a list to be invited for the signing ceremony. For some reason, someone at the White House decided to strike my name while at the same time inviting others such as Senator Pressler and Senator Nickles. Although the latter participated in some of the negotiations, the former played no role at all in developing this legislation.

I would appreciate the courtesy of being informed as to why I was not invited and who removed my name from the list. You may want to check with Pamela Turner from whom I have already requested an explanation.

Pl: What I want to know as a bottom line is who did not want me at that ceremony.

CEG/scn

Sincerely,

Chuck

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY
U. S. Senator

Committee Assignments:

BUDGET

LABOR AND HUMAN

RESOURCES

CHAIRMAN, Aging

FINANCE

CHAIRMAN, Oversight of the Internal
Revenue Service;
Estate and Gift Taxation;
International Trade

JUDICIARY

CHAIRMAN, Administrative Practice
and Procedure;
Immigration and Refugee Policy;
Constitution

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER III

FROM: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. *bo*

Congressmen George O'Brien and Ed Madigan have requested a meeting with you to discuss the Joliet Army Ammunition Plant (see attached).

Both are strong supporters (O'Brien has been shaky on MX) and are good Illinois politicians.

OK I recommend that you meet with them. It will be 15 minutes well spent -- even if we can't solve their problem.

Please advise.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 4, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR M. B. OGLESBY, JR.

FROM: W. DENNIS THOMAS

SUBJECT: Congressman George O'Brien (R-Ill.) request to meet with James A. Baker regarding Joliet, Illinois Army Ammunition Plant

BACKGROUND

Beginning with the Illinois delegation letter to Secretary of Defense Weinberg of April 12 (attached), Republican Illinois Congressman George O'Brien, Ed Madigan and Senator Charles Percy have pressed hard for DoD/Army consideration to reactivate the Joliet Army Ammunition Plant (JAAP).

The Joliet facility has been closed since 1976. It is on the Army's list of potential suitable sites for production of new high explosive (RDX/HMX) ammunition beginning in 1989, although the DoD backgrounder (attached) indicates that other sites rank ahead of Joliet.

Sen. Percy, Rep. O'Brien and Rep. Madigan met with DoD Deputy Secretary Taft and Assistant Secretary Rourke on May 1, 1984. Also on May 1, Army Secretary Marsh met with the Kankakee, Illinois Chamber of Commerce regarding JAAP.

Subsequently, Senator Percy, apart from Congressmen Madigan and O'Brien, submitted a proposal that the Army consider reopening JAAP to produce 105 MM HE M1 howitzer ammunition. The Army says that is not feasible.

The O'Brien Request

Congressman O'Brien has placed several calls for Mr. Baker. In his explanation to us, he stated that he has very sensitive information, which much be discussed with Mr. Baker. Mr. O'Brien would not divulge this information.



RESEARCH AND
ENGINEERING

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D C 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Joliet Army Ammunition Plant

The attached background material was prepared for our meeting with Senators Percy and Dixon and Congressmen Madigan and O'Brien on May 1, 1984 regarding the Illinois delegation's request to explore alternatives for reactivating Joliet. Subsequent to receipt of their request, we received a separate inquiry from Senator Percy which (in addition to RDX/HMX) concerns the potential for production of 105mm tank and howitzer ammo at the facility.

Joliet AAP is not compatible with production of tank ammunition. The Army does not have requirements yet for the 105mm HE M1 howitzer ammo. If requirements materialize, the production would be sited at current active plants (Kansas and Lone Star) before Joliet would be considered.

We have passed the attached package through Legislative Affairs and they concur.

Attachment

TALKING PAPER
30 April 1984

SUBJECT: Meeting with Illinois Congressional Delegation

PURPOSE: To provide information regarding possible reactivation of Joliet Army Ammunition Plant (JAAP) and the potential economic impacts of Defense spending in the state of Illinois

FACTS:

Joliet Army Ammunition Plant (JAAP)

- Location - Comprises approximately 23,500 acres in Joliet, Illinois
- Operating Contractor - Uniroyal, Inc.
- Mission - Maintenance and/or layaway of standby facilities for manufacture of explosives and chemical materials. Load, assemble and pack (LAP) of ammo items as required. Joliet Army Ammunition Plant (JAAP) Profile (attachment 2).
- History - The JAAP is a consolidation and redesignation of the Kankakee Ordnance Works and the Elwood Ordnance Plant. In 1945, the government operated the plant in the ammo LAP area for production of conventional ammo until termination in 1965. In 1966, the plant was reactivated and was in production until 1976 when the production ceased. During peak employment, Joliet had a work force of 8,000.
- Current Status
 - a. Since 1976, when production ceased, JAAP has been in an inactive status. Because ammo buys are low, there are no plans to reopen the plant. It is currently in a mobilization standby status.
 - b. Honeywell Defense Systems Division has made arrangements to use buildings in six separate areas at JAAP as a site for a LAP facility for their small caliber ammo business. Grand opening ceremony is scheduled for 30 May 1984.
 - c. Current employment is about 517 Government and contractor personnel. FY 84 OMA budget is about \$13M.

Potential Work at JAAP

- ✱ - The Department of Army developed a plan to remedy RDX/HMX base inadequacies to meet projected peacetime and mobilization requirements. This plan included a list of 15 suitable sites. JAAP is on this list.
- This plan has been sent back to Department of Army for further revision.
- The site of the production facilities for both HMX and RDX are to be selected based on cost to the DoD from a list of candidates that meet

all the established technical criteria and that consideration will also be given to proposals from private concerns or local governments.

- Impacts of Defense Expenditures in the State of Illinois

- At attachment 3 is background data on the economic impacts of defense expenditures in the State of Illinois. This portrays information of DoD Prime Contract Awards and a summary of Direct and Indirect dollars going into Illinois. The following is a synopsis:

Value of DoD Contract Awards

	FY 81	FY 82	FY 83
Total	\$1.22B	\$1.32B	\$1.53B

Preliminary Data on Direct and Indirect Dollars

	FY 83	FY 84	FY 85	FY 86	FY 87	FY 88
Direct	\$4.0B	\$4.3B	\$4.7B	\$5.0B	\$5.4B	\$5.6B
Indirect	\$9.6B	\$10.6B	\$11.5B	\$12.5B	\$13.3B	\$13.8B

Largest Sectors

Direct Federal Government Wages and Salaries
Defense: Radio, T.V. and Communications

Indirect
Defense: Business Services, Wholesale and Retail Trade

Most Rapid Growing Sectors:

Direct: Glass and Glass Products
 Service Industry Machines

Indirect: Office Computing and Accounting Machines
 Aircraft and Parts

- Additional Information

- Secretary of the Army Marsh is meeting with the Kankakee Area Chamber of Commerce on 1 May 1984 at 1600 hours regarding JAAP.
- We have informed Mr. Takakoshi (Army staff) of this Congressional Delegation meeting and the subject matter. He will alert Secretary Marsh's office.

Hugh Bradley/OIBA/756-2310/30 April 1984

FRANK ANNUNZIO
CARLOS COLLINS
TOM CORCORAN
DANIEL B. CRANE
PHILIP M. CRANE
RICHARD J. DURBIN
JOHN N. ERLINGER
LANE EVANS
CHARLES A. HAYES
HENRY J. HYDE
WILLIAM D. LIPINSKI

EDWARD R. MADIGAN
LYNN MARTIN
FREDERICK M. MICHEL
GEORGE M. O'BRIEN
JOHN EDWARD PORTER
MELVIN PRICE
DAN ROSTENKOWSKI
MARTY RUSSO
AUGUSTUS SAVAGE
PAUL SIMON
SIDNEY R. YATES

United States Congress

The Illinois Delegation

Washington, D.C. 20510

April 12, 1984



The Honorable Casper W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Illinois Congressional Delegation requests your assistance in reactivating the Joliet Army Ammunition Plant (JAAP), one of the Nation's largest producers of munitions during World War II and the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.

This 23,500 acre facility, 60 miles south of downtown Chicago, has been on inactive status since 1976. It is located in an area where unemployment has continued at abnormally high rates despite economic recovery elsewhere. Joliet's unemployment rate peaked at 26.6% in February, 1983, and was still 14.4% in February, 1984, compared with the 7.8% national rate and Illinois' average rate of 9.5%.

Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh met with the Illinois Congressional Delegation on February 23, at our request, for a discussion of possibilities for fuller utilization of JAAP, including a proposal by Senator Charles Percy for using it as a site for the Army's new light infantry division.

On March 22 Secretary Marsh visited the plant with Senator Percy and Representatives Edward R. Madigan and George M. O'Brien. They inspected the facilities, on the ground and from the air, and met with local officials and business leaders who expressed strong support for the Percy plan.

Secretary Marsh indicated, however, that lack of troop facilities and space for field training would put JAAP at a competitive disadvantage with various Army posts being considered for the light infantry division. Most of the sites being considered have in excess of 100,000 acres available for training purposes as well as barracks and other troop facilities.

Although disappointed by this assessment, we were encouraged by Secretary Marsh's assurance that consideration would be given to other options that could put people back to work and give the Army a better return on its investment in a facility that has a replacement value of almost \$1.8 billion. He suggested the possibility of future ammunition contracts for JAAP, and particularly its potential for producing new and more powerful explosives, such as PDX-HMX.


The Joliet Plant has excellent facilities for loading conventional ammunition such as artillery projectiles, land mines or aerial bombs. Perhaps it could be arranged at this time to schedule these Joliet production units for some of the Improved Conventional Munitions (ICM) that are currently a part of the military procurement program. Such action would be consonant with Secretary Marsh's comments on the desirability of "work-loading" the Joliet plant.

The Army has modernization plans for JAAP calling for construction work costing more than \$303 million beginning in fiscal 1989. These plans were disclosed in an Army briefing during Secretary Marsh's visit. We hope that these plans can be advanced, and perhaps modified if necessary, to equip the plant to handle RDX-HMX and other ammunition contracts that may be coming up in the not too distant future.

It is our understanding that the Department of Defense is the final authority in ammunition procurement matters because such facilities as JAAP produce for all the armed services, not just the Army. For this reason, Mr. Secretary, we urge you to heed our plea and assist us in our effort to bring JAAP into production again.

Our delegation is concerned that for years Illinois has been getting the short end of the federal spending stick. Enclosed is a copy of an article from the April 6 issue of the Chicago Tribune showing that in 1982 Illinois once again ranked last among the 50 states in the amount of federal taxes it gets back from Washington. We need and deserve a better break, Mr. Secretary.

Sincerely,



Charles H. Percy, U.S.S.




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
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
Edward R. Madigan, M.C.



Paul Simon, M.C.



Frank Annunzio, M.C.




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
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
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
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
Richard J. Durbin, M.C.




John N. Erlenborn, M.C.




Lane Evans, M.C.



Charles A. Hayes, M.C.




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
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
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
Robert H. Michel, M.C.




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
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
Dan Rostenkowski, M.C.



Marty Russo, M.C.



Augustus Savage, M.C.



Sidney R. Yates, M.C.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 4, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES BAKER ✓
MIKE DEEVER
RICHARD DARMAN

FROM: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. 

SUBJECT: MX

In addition to next Saturday's radio speech, we would hope that we could take advantage of opportunities available to include comments of support and need for the MX in other public speeches prior to the vote.

The April 16 speech planning schedule does not appear to offer much opportunity, but I will forward some suggestions on Monday when the revised schedule is distributed.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 4, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM BAKER

FROM: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. *Bo*

As we discussed, I think it would be beneficial for you to meet with Bob Michel and Trent Lott. Topics of discussion would include politics, the convention, the legislative agenda for the rest of the year, etc. Please advise of a time and I will set it up.

Thanks.

*BH: Pls
schedule. Thanks
JAB*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NON-SECURE FAX #

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1. THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. MR. KIMMITT FOR MR. MCFARLANE/FAIRDANKS SITTO # 267 TOR: 020242

2. MR. BAKER/FAIRBANKS

3.

4.

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

LEGISLATIVE EFFORT ON MX

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAS = 23/99

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National Security Council
The White House

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Bob Kimmitt		OK	
John Poindexter	2	J	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	4		A
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room	3		DACOM

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Note this is to both Bud and
Jim Baker.

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

ARMS CONTROL AMENDMENT PACKAGE

HON. LES ASPIN

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, April 11, 1984

● Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, the MX gets most of the attention when we speak of nuclear weaponry. Regardless of how we feel about the MX, several other issues of grave concern to arms control lurk in the defense budget and will be ignored only at our peril. I am speaking of such systems as the anti-satellite missile, prospective American violations of the SALT II agreement, and battlefield nuclear weapons, among others.

I would like to discuss a dozen possible amendments to the defense bills that will address seven arms control issues. These amendments were worked out with my colleagues, NORM DICKS and AL GORE, and their staffs. The theme that links these amendments is stability. This concept is too rarely understood. Our concern should not be with mere numbers—a la Time magazine charts that show big red missiles and little blue missiles—but rather with a configuration of weapons systems that does not tempt one side or the other to resort to nuclear weapons. That involves more than numbers.

Contrary to popular opinion, massive reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons could actually harm us. Reductions could be destabilizing. Why? Fewer weapons make the possessor fret more about the survivability of the limited numbers he has left. Large numbers bother the public, but the thought of small numbers ought to worry them if they would envision presidents and politbureauocrats confronting crisis with such a small number of nuclear weapons that they would considering using them for fear their weapons might otherwise be knocked out in a war. Or put starkly, let us say both we and the Soviets give up the capability to destroy each other seven times over and cut our stockpiles back to the point where neither can destroy more than one-fourth of the other's population and industry. Would we better off? Or would leaders in a crisis be willing to resort to nuclear arms because now they would know that civilization could not be wiped off the map? Some facile solutions can make the nuclear world a less stable one in which to live.

A number of the amendments in this package will look familiar. For many Members have already done work in these areas. For example, AL GORE has done yeoman service in developing the counterforce issue, and GEORGE BROWN and JOHN SCRIBERLING pressed Asat last year when few people even knew what the term meant. My goal here is to bring together the major arms control issues that can be dealt with legislatively—issues that we tend to deal

with in isolation but which ought to be look at as a whole.

The package presented here today is not meant to be the final say on the matter. Congressmen GORE and DICKS and I will be talking with Members on both sides of the aisle—and both sides of the Hill—to refine and improve the amendments. While I use the term package, I do not mean to suggest that the amendments will be presented in one place at one time. Some could go on the Defense bill and others on the Energy Department bill, some would go on appropriations and some on authorizations, some will be presented in committee, others on the floor. It is a package in the sense that it is a unified whole philosophically and endeavors to provide a useful and workable legislative agenda in the arms control area.

ANTISATELLITE MISSILES (ASAT)

The Soviets have long had a very crude antisatellite missile (Asat) system. We have been developing a far more sophisticated one. Our missile is relatively small—only about 18 feet long—can be carried under an F-15 fighter, and fired directly at an opposing satellite. It carries no explosive; it simply collides with the opposing satellite like a bowling ball mowing down tenpins. We have fired the missile once, but only to see if the system for launching it from an F-15 would work. Later, we are due to make the key test—from an arms control standpoint—by firing the missile at an object in space in order to check out the homing device, which is the key to whether our Asat works or fails.

Once we have proven that Asat works, it will be very difficult for arms control to come to grips with the weapon. Arms control relies on the verifiability of agreements. But our Asat is very small and every F-15 is a potential launcher; verification of Asat's—once they are proven workable and put in production is thus virtually impossible. Testing in space is easier to verify and thus the key to Asat control.

We have a major arms control interest in preventing an Asat race. And we have some rather fundamental military interests in doing so, too.

First, reliable Asat's make satellites vulnerable, and thus the use of nuclear weapons are more likely. At the start of a crisis, it would be tempting to blind the other side first by knocking out his spy satellites. This is an act that does not draw any blood but is nonetheless severe. The satellites we keep at the highest altitudes are there to detect the launch of a Soviet missile attack on us. The Soviets have similar satellites that are essential for early warning. Without them, the country would face a crisis blinded. Not knowing what the other side is doing and fearing the worst generates pressures to go nuclear before the other side can strike out of the blue. Thus, Asat's are inherently destabilizing. They threat-

en to make a crisis situation worse, rather than better.

Second, satellites are more important to us than the Soviets and we stand to lose more if satellites at high altitudes eventually become vulnerable. It is not only a matter of our launch detector satellites. About 70 percent of U.S. military communications move by satellite. The Soviets, on the other hand, can more easily resort to overland communications because they sit astride the Eurasian land mass. Thus, it is in our military interest to forestall the development of sophisticated Asat's.

Third, while the Soviets have more satellites in orbit and thus present more targets to us, they can also replace their losses more easily. Their satellites are short lived compared to ours. They are constantly replacing theirs. In 1982, for example, we launched 7 military satellites; they launched 81. They are in a far better position—with stocks of satellites and launchers on hand—to make up for losses incurred in an Asat war in space.

I should note that the Soviet Union declared a unilateral moratorium on Asat's last August. They recognize that our Asat will be a major advance over their large, lumbering, and outdated system, which first entered the test stage 16 years ago. There is no doubt that they would seek to match or leapfrog our antisatellite capability if we prove it out by hitting an object in space.

Amendment No. 1 is designed to preclude that development—I will insert the texts of the proposed amendments at the conclusion of my speech. Amendment No. 1 would forbid the testing of our Asat against an object in space so long as the Soviets continue to abide by their own moratorium. As I said, verification is the core of successful arms control; this bans testing against an object in space, which is the kind of activity both we and the Soviets can observe and verify.

While our Asat is far more sophisticated than the aging Soviet system, it is not the end-all-and-be-all. Like the Soviet system, our Asat can only reach low-altitude satellites. Thus, even if we successfully test and deploy our Asat, we and the Soviets know we cannot threaten all their satellites—nor they ours. It is difficult to put a fixed number on our capability, but we can say it is declining as the Soviets put more of their satellites in higher altitudes. Recognizing that, there is interest in the military in perfecting the Asat so that we can knock out of the sky anything they can put up there. Another amendment, amendment No. 2, is designed to obviate that development, which would combine the horrors of nonverification with the evils of a system posing a major threat to the Soviets. The amendment would forbid the expenditure of funds to develop an advanced, high-altitude version of our Asat. The ban would auto-

matically be lifted if the Soviets start testing their Asat.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI)

A year ago, the President launched a major research effort aimed at giving us the capability of using space to defend against a Soviet missile attack, a proposal dubbed "Star Wars" in the media and the "Strategic Defense Initiative" by the White House.

This is a difficult issue to come to grips with for two reasons. First, the funds for the program are spread all over the budget like so many bread-crumbs on a tablecloth. And, second, while the fundamental concept of "Star Wars"—sort of a Buck Rogers ABM—is destabilizing and a threat to arms controls, virtually everyone agrees that some research work in this realm makes good sense.

With regard to the first problem, the President's SDI package does not contain everything that logically comprises his SDI. For example, within his SDI program, there is \$489 million for directed energy weapons, mainly lasers. But scattered elsewhere in the defense budget is another \$404 million for directed energy weapons. One proposal, amendment No. 3, would simply direct the Defense Department to put all the related research programs together in a separate title in the annual budget. Thus, in future years, when we will have to deal in detail with SDI to prevent any of the components from getting out of hand, we will have the required information at hand.

A second SDI amendment, amendment No. 4, gets to the substance of the issue by limiting the funding for the research effort. Exactly how much we might seek to cut the program will depend on what action the committees take to trim it. There is broad agreement that some research in this area makes sense. Lasers may well play a key role in the 21st century battlefield, and we cannot afford to fall behind. The issues are the focus of these programs on antiballistic missile defense and the intense level of effort. A funding limit is a direct cap on the level of effort and an indirect approach to the focus of the programs.

Our challenge to the President's Star Wars program need not take on a partisan cast. In fact, we are actually fighting to preserve a Republican position. It was the Nixon administration that negotiated and signed the ABM Treaty of 1972. It reasoned that the world was a safer place if we avoided an arms race in defensive systems. If one power gains a temporary advantage in the ability to destroy incoming missiles, then it may be tempted in a crisis to hide behind that shield and attack the other side. In theory, Star Wars would give us the ability to "fight and win" a nuclear war. In practice, of course, neither side could gain a permanent advantage, and the Star Wars defense, like all defenses, would have its holes. Just a single hole in the Star Wars defense, however, could allow through more destructive power

than all the belligerents unleashed throughout World War II.

SALT II TREATY

In all the debate over weapons systems and negotiating positions, we have tended to forget about the unratified SALT II Treaty. It contains a 1985 expiration date. That date envisioned a successor treaty would be in place by then, just as the SALT I agreement envisioned that a successor treaty would be ratified before the 1971 expiration date of SALT I.

Before the 1980 election, candidate Ronald Reagan was highly critical of the Carter administration for adhering to SALT I after it expired and to SALT II although it was unratified. On taking office, President Reagan agonized over the issue and, after several months, quietly announced that he would do just what he had criticized President Carter for doing.

The issue now, however, is whether President Reagan is reverting to candor. News leaks from the administration make clear that it is seriously thinking about launching new Trident submarines without dismantling the requisite number of old Poseidon subs, as would be required to adhere to the SALT II limits on the number of submarine-based missiles. We are thus facing a step backward—as opposed to the absence of any step forward—in the arms control arena.

The proposed amendment is to have Congress declare our adherence to the provisions of the two SALT agreements. This is amendment No. 5. The House approved this amendment as part of the Defense Authorization Act 2 years ago, but it did not survive the conference.

This amendment would simply enact the President's own words about refraining from actions that undercut SALT I and SALT II so long as the Soviets behave similarly. It allows the President to lift the ban in the amendment if he certifies to Congress that it is in "the supreme national interest" of the United States to do so. Clearly, if allegations of Soviet violations of those agreements are proven, it could be in the supreme national interest to cease adhering to SALT I and SALT II.

SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (SLCM'S)

The next two amendments, amendments No. 6 and No. 7 are similar. They both address the sea-launched cruise missile in the same manner. One amendment, written for the Defense Authorization Act, deals with deployment of nuclear-tipped SLCM's; the other is written for the Department of Energy bill and deals with production of nuclear warheads for the SLCM.

The two amendments would permit the President to move forward with nuclear SLCM's if he can design a nuclear system that is distinguishable from a conventional system, that is, where one can easily judge whether this SLCM is nuclear or conventional.

and will remain that way. The clincher is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence would be required to certify in writing that the President's proposed system of differentiating is acceptable to them if applied to the Soviet Union in an arms control agreement.

SLCM's are not automatically destabilizing. In fact, in some ways they are a stabilizing weapons system, in the sense that all cruise missiles are slow and, therefore, have no first-strike potential.

In the strategic arms talks, the Soviets have always expressed concern over our cruise missiles—ground-, air-, and sea-launched. Any comprehensive arms accord will likely have to include some ceiling on numbers to win Soviet acceptance. With air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's), we already have a counting system agreed to and included in SALT II. Ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM's) do not pose a serious counting problem; they are relatively few in number and locatable. But SLCM's pose a problem of immense proportions such that they could scuttle any agreement.

The Navy is planning to place between 7,000 and 8,000 launch tubes for a variety of weapons on a variety of ships. These tubes will then carry, in addition to conventional weapons, several thousand SLCM's, both nuclear and conventional. The design of such a dual-capable that is, nuclear or conventional weapon is a nod in the right direction when one is concerned about dollars. Arms control is not unmindful of budget considerations, but from an arms control perspective, dollars are not the principal concern, and they must not drive the decisionmaking process to undermine arms control. The current SLCM design does just that. Dual-capable systems are a verification nightmare. The Soviets would have to consider every SLCM a nuclear threat—but for us to count several thousand SLCM launchers as nuclear for purposes of an arms control agreement could eliminate virtually all other strategic weapons in our arsenal.

Furthermore, from a strictly military position, one must ask whether nuclear SLCM's make sense for us. A glance at the map shows that SLCM's are far more threatening to us than to the Soviets; most of our major population and industrial centers are easily reachable by cruise missiles launched from the Atlantic, Pacific, or Caribbean. Most Soviet targets, on the other hand, are well inland. Do we really want to push ahead with nuclear SLCM's and thereby encourage the Soviets to do the same?

BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS

This problem with dual-capable forces is already with us in Europe and poses another threat to stability. Nuclear weapons there are intermixed with conventional forces. Many of our units train with such emphasis on nuclear conflict that it takes precious time away from their most important

function—presenting a credible conventional deterrent. Many of our nuclear weapons are deployed so far forward that they risk capture by attacking forces unless they are used; this forces a decision in the early moments of conflict when decisionmakers are most prone to panic. We should not be designing a system that requires an early decision on using nuclear power.

One proposal, amendment No. 8, is designed to concentrate minds in the Defense and State Departments on just that issue. It requires a report to the Congress on how American forces could be redesigned to limit or eliminate these problems. I think we should, first, pull our nuclear weapons far back from the front, and procure delivery systems with longer ranges; second, eliminate dual capable systems; and third, segregate troops who deal with nuclear weapons from those who train conventionally. The proposed study should lead us in that direction.

Amendment No. 9 would keep the problem from getting worse while the process set in motion by amendment No. 8 seeks to find a way to make things better. Specifically, amendment No. 9 would delete funds for all tactical nuclear warheads that are not already deployed. Our desire is to prevent a future war from going nuclear. It is, therefore, very much in our interest to be less dependent on nuclear weapons in Europe. Most particularly in the tactical arena, it makes no sense to do nuclearly what you can already do conventionally—like strike at tank concentrations or ships or an advancing infantry division.

The other proposal, amendment No. 10, deals with the recent administration decision to remove 1,400 tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. The administration has provided a general outline of the plan, geared primarily to the removal of aging landmines, artillery shells, and the like, which are deteriorating; they probably pose a greater danger to our troops than the Soviets. This amendment would require the administration to supply Congress with the details on what it will take out and when after the detailed decisions are made.

SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBM's)

Any description of our missile submarines invariably begins by describing them as the most invulnerable leg of our nuclear deterrent. There are problems with bombers, leading to work on and debate over the B-1 and Stealth. There are problems with the land-based ICBM's, which opened wide the infamous "window of vulnerability" and gave birth to the long debate on the MX. But liberals and conservatives alike cozy up to the sea-based deterrent. It is the epitome of a stabilizing system; it must have been dreamed up by an arms controller. The key is the invulnerability of our subs.

What if they are not quite so invulnerable? We are putting a lot of our

eggs into that one basket. The next proposal, amendment No. 11, would require the administration to review the entire sea-based deterrent and report back to Congress. The goal is to look at any adjustments we might need to make—and should begin working on now—to maintain the invulnerability on which we are so dependent. Instead of waiting until we have to sweat out a threat to SLBM's, let us try to keep the threat from developing in the first place.

Those adjustments could involve submarine design—for example, a larger number of smaller subs. They could involve adjuncts to the submarine—for example, better ways to control them in a crisis situation. They could involve arms control strategies we could pursue to enhance submarine survivability—for example, mutual agreement on antisubmarine warfare techniques so that neither side would threaten to eliminate the other's missile subs in a conventional war while battling attack submarines that do not carry missiles and would be a major element in any conventional war.

It is not in our interest to see the SLBM go the way of the ICBM and the bomber.

COUNTERFORCE

Last year, in a letter to several Members of Congress, President Reagan declared that he had no intention of seeing the United States develop a "counterforce" or "first-strike" capability. Even he understood how destabilizing this would be. Sometimes there is some confusion over just what constitutes "first strike." Often the MX is described as a first-strike weapon because it has sufficient accuracy and throwweight to knock out Soviet missile silos. In reality, however, no weapon, per se, provides a first-strike capability. It requires a sufficient number of weapons with sufficient accuracy and throwweight to gain that capability. The United States may be about to deploy such weapons in such numbers. Alone, the MX, which will be deployed in the late 1980's, will not give us that capability. But in conjunction with two other weapons we could get a capability we do not need or want.

The D5 missile, which will be placed in our Trident submarines in the 1990's, is one. The Midgetman missile, which will be deployed in the same timeframe, is another. We want to be sure that we do not deploy a combination of these systems in such numbers that before the end of the century we are threatening the Russians in the same way we say they must not threaten us.

The final proposal, amendment No. 12, one that has been proposed by Congressman GORE, requires the President to review all our deployment plans with a view to defining clearly when we would build up sufficient counterforce capability to present a first-strike threat.

The goal here is to establish a clear threshold beyond which we shall not pass.

CONCLUSION

This is a large number of amendments. As a group, I would describe them in two ways:

First, they are not simple or simplistic. This country craves some comprehensive way out of the arms control thicket with its maze of intricate concepts and counting systems. That is what gave birth to the freeze movement. It answered the public's need for some clear means to voice its firm advocacy of arms control as a priority on the national agenda. In talking about a dozen different amendments, I am certainly not helping the cause of simplicity. But the choice is really between advocacy of practical arms control or resort to rhetoric that is not merely simple but also simplistic. I feel we have the responsibility to opt for the former even though we may still pay appropriate obeisance at the altar of the latter.

Second, and most importantly, these proposals are aimed at providing genuine stability in the strategic realm. Their goal is to make it less likely that anyone would resort to nuclear arms in a crisis.

They are geared to allow both the Soviet and American leaderships to act more calmly in the difficult moments that will undoubtedly confront us in the decades to come.

They are geared to eliminate those fears that "if I don't use it, I'll lose it."

They are not part of some neat numbers game, but rather a package of concepts that can give the superpower relationship some stability regardless of the weapons system bean count.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5167

(Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985)

At the end of title II (RDT&E) add the following new section:

LIMITATION ON TESTING OF ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS

Sec. — No funds appropriated pursuant to authorizations of appropriations in this title may be used for the flight testing against an object in space of any anti-satellite weapon so long as the Soviet Union continues to observe its existing moratorium against testing anti-satellite weapons in space.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5167

(Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985)

At the end of title II (RDT&E) add the following new section:

LIMITATION ON DEVELOPMENT OF ADVANCED ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS

Sec. — No funds appropriated pursuant to authorizations of appropriations in this title may be used for development, test, or evaluation of an advanced anti-satellite weapon so long as the Soviet Union continues to observe its existing moratorium against testing rocket-boosted interceptor anti-satellite weapons in space. For purposes of this section, an advanced anti-satellite weapon is a rocket-boosted missile interceptor designed to be capable of disabling or destroying a satellite in space at distances further than can be reached by an anti-satellite missile

launched from an F-15 aircraft (as developed under the Strategic Defense Program of the Department of Defense).

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5167

(Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985)

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

REPORT ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE

Sec. — The Secretary of Defense shall include with the budget request of the Department of Defense for each fiscal year from fiscal year 1988 through 1990 a detailed report on the funding of programs forming the Strategic Defense Initiative program of the Department of Defense and other programs of the Government relating to the strategic defense of the United States. Each such report—

(1) shall set forth—

(A) the amounts obligated and expended for each such program during the previous fiscal year;

(B) the amounts expected to be obligated and expended for each such program during the fiscal year during which the report is submitted;

(C) the amounts requested to be appropriated for such programs for the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted and expected to be expended for such programs during such fiscal year; and

(D) the amounts programmed to be requested to be appropriated for the following fiscal year for such programs and expected to be expended for such programs during such fiscal year;

(2) shall include a narrative description of program objectives for each such program and how such program relates to the overall strategic defense of the United States; and

(3) shall include detailed information on expenditures for any ground-based directed energy or laser program that could be used for anti-satellite purposes.

Any request transmitted to Congress for the enactment of legislation to authorize appropriations for military functions of the Department of Defense for a fiscal year to which the reporting requirements of this section apply shall set forth as a separate title in any draft legislation submitted with that request all amounts requested to be authorized for appropriation to the Department of Defense for programs to which such reporting applies.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5167

(Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985)

At the end of title II (RDT&E) add the following new section:

LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS FOR STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

Sec. — The total of the amounts that may be appropriated for fiscal year 1985 for programs forming the Strategic Defense Initiative program of the Department of Defense may not exceed \$—, such amount being the total of the amounts appropriated for such programs for fiscal year 1984 adjusted for inflation and an additional amount to allow no more than 5 percent real growth in any such program for which an increase was requested in the Budget of the President for fiscal year 1985.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5167

(Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985)

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS

Sec. — (a) None of the funds appropriated pursuant to authorizations of appropriations in this Act may be used for the procurement, testing, deployment, or operation and maintenance of any strategic nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon system, or of a launcher for a strategic nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon system, if that procurement, testing, deployment, or operation and maintenance would contravene existing strategic arms policies of the United States as declared by the President in his Memorial Day address of May 31, 1982, as follows: "As for existing strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint."

(b) The limitations set forth in subsection (a) shall not apply after the date that is 30 days after the date on which the President transmits a report in writing to Congress (1) containing the President's certification that it is in the supreme national interest of the United States that such limitations no longer apply, and (2) setting forth the reasons for the certification.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5167

(Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985)

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES

Sec. — (a) The Secretary of Defense may not provide for the deployment of any cruise missile designed to carry a nuclear warhead and to be launched from a naval vessel or for the assembly of nuclear warheads onto such a cruise missile until—

(1) the President submits to Congress a report describing a method—

(A) by which it is possible to determine whether a cruise missile designed to be launched from a naval vessel is conventionally armed or nuclear armed and by which it is possible to verify a limitation on the number of cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads and deployed on naval vessels; and

(B) which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence have certified in writing is a high-confidence method as applied by the United States to cruise missiles of another nation and is an acceptable method for use when applied by another nation to cruise missiles of the United States; and

(2) Congress specifically authorizes such deployment or assembly in legislation enacted after such report is received by Congress.

(b) Nothing in this section affects the authority to carry out deployment of conventionally armed sea-launched cruise missiles.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. —

(Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization for Fiscal Year 1985)

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

LIMITATION OF FUNDS FOR NUCLEAR WARHEAD FOR TACTICAL LAND ATTACK MISSILE

Sec. — Funds appropriated pursuant to authorizations of appropriations in this Act may not be obligated or expended for production of the W80 nuclear warhead for the tactical land attack missile-nuclear (TLAM-N) or to modify any other warhead to make it suitable for that missile until—

(1) the President submits to Congress a report describing a method—

(A) by which it is possible to determine whether a cruise missile designed to be launched from a naval vessel is convention-

ally armed or nuclear armed and by which it is possible to verify a limitation on the number of cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads and deployed on naval vessels; and

(B) which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence have certified in writing is a high-confidence method as applied by the United States to cruise missiles of another nation and is an acceptable method for use when applied by another nation to cruise missiles of the United States; and

(2) Congress specifically authorizes such obligation or expenditure in legislation enacted after such report is received by Congress.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5167

(Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985)

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

REPORT ON THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Sec. . Not later than January 19, 1985, the President shall submit to Congress a report setting forth reasons why the United States should or should not initiate a long-term program for the renovation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear deterrent in a manner designed to reduce pressures for early first use of tactical nuclear weapons and to substantially reduce the theater nuclear arsenal to types and numbers of weapons whose characteristics make for a more stable and credible force. The report (in addition to any other matter covered) should specifically address the following issues:

(1) Whether NATO should not eliminate its reliance on short-range battlefield nuclear weapons (such as the atomic demolition bomb and 155-millimeter and 8-inch nuclear artillery rounds), the exposure of which to early loss from enemy action promotes pressures for early use.

(2) Whether NATO should not refurbish its nuclear deterrent by designing and deploying specific dedicated nuclear launchers of a range which permits the coverage of all potential targets from locations in the rear of the European NATO territory in the territory of the Warsaw Pact south of the territory of the Soviet Union, thereby reducing pressure from enemy action for early first use of nuclear weapons.

(3) Whether NATO should not, as a consequence of a change in policy described in paragraph (2), eliminate its inventory of dual-capable nuclear/conventional weapons in order to allow early use of artillery, aircraft, and surface-to-surface missiles for conventional missions rather than causing them to be withheld for possible nuclear use.

(4) Whether NATO should not place control and operation of tactical nuclear weapons in a single specialized command established for that purpose so that all other NATO force elements could be free to con-

centrate on pursuing conventional military missions with maximum efficiency.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. —

(Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization for Fiscal Year 1985)

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

PROHIBITION OF TESTING CERTAIN NEW TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS

Sec. — (a) None of the funds appropriated pursuant to authorizations of appropriations in this Act may be used—

(1) for the testing and production of the W81 warhead for the air defense missile for the Navy known as the Standard Missile-2; or

(2) for research and development for warheads for the anti-submarine weapons for the Navy known as the anti-submarine warfare standoff weapon, the anti-submarine warfare vertical launch anti-submarine rocket, the anti-submarine warfare nuclear depth bomb, and the advanced air intercept missile warhead.

(b) Not later than January 1, 1985, the President shall submit a report to Congress presenting a justification (in light of recent technological developments in conventional weapons) for the development of, and continued reliance by the United States on, nuclear warheads for tactical battlefield use. The report shall discuss the rationale for the United States Navy having a nuclear capability for air defense and submarine defense and shall discuss conventional alternatives to the warheads referred to in subsection (a).

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5167

(Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985)

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

REPORT ON WITHDRAWAL OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE

Sec. — The President shall submit a report to Congress not later than 30 days after the final decision is made (based upon the recommendations of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) regarding the net reduction to be made by the United States in the number of tactical nuclear warheads in the territory of North Atlantic Treaty Organization European member nations pursuant to the decision of the Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of October 17, 1983. The report shall—

(1) specify the types of warheads to be withdrawn in accordance with that decision, the number of each such warhead to be withdrawn, the schedule for the withdrawal, and the rationale for the selection of the particular warheads to be withdrawn; and

(2) any changes in force structure to be made resulting from the changes in the tactical nuclear warheads positioned in Europe.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5167

(Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985)

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

REPORT ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUBMARINE FORCE

Sec. — Not later than January 19, 1985, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the survivability of the United States strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarine force. The report shall address whether there are grounds for adjusting, in short or long-range terms, strategic force plans of the United States based on any vulnerability or potential vulnerability of such force and the survivability of command, control, and communications systems with respect to submarines in such force. The report shall also examine the feasibility and desirability of enhancing the survivability of such force through arms-control measures that would affect anti-submarine warfare, including the nature of the patrols and the rules of engagement of attack submarines and the nature of the patrols and the rules of engagement of ballistic missile submarines.

AMENDMENT TO H.R. 5167

(Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985)

At the end of the bill add the following new section:

REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY

Sec. — (a) Not later than January 19, 1985, the President shall submit to Congress a report discussing the required strategic counterforce capability of the United States consistent with existing United States policy as expressed by the President in his letter of May 11, 1983, to Representative Albert Gore, Junior, (printed in the Congressional Record of —, 1983, at page H—) in which the President—

(1) explained his understanding of the report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces ("the Scowcroft Commission") dated April 11, 1983; and

(2) agreed with the recommendation in that report that the United States not develop a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union.

(b) The report under subsection (a) shall be developed taking into consideration current and proposed United States intercontinental ballistic missiles having an accuracy of the order of the MX missile and shall discuss the number of each such missile (including specifically the MX missile, the D5 Trident missile, and the small single-warhead missile) intended to be procured for United States strategic force modernization and the rationale for the overall counterforce capability that would be attained as a cumulative result of those procurements. The President shall include in the report a specific definition of what United States counterforce capability would constitute a so-called "first-strike capability" against the Soviet Union.

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Action Plan

Friday, May 4

McFarlane meeting with Congressmen
Aspin, Gore and Dicks. (RLehman)

Tuesday, May 8

Breakfast meeting at White House
- House Members. (Oglesby)
(Blair House not available)

Wednesday, May 9

McFarlane Press Backgrounder for
President's speech. (RLehman)

Presidential Address - China, MX,
Central America, Terrorism -
Bipartisanship.

Thursday, May 10

Breakfast meeting at White House
- House Members. (Oglesby)
(Blair House not available)

Friday, May 11

Blair House Breakfast - House Members.
(Oglesby)

Saturday, May 12

Presidential Radio Speech - Defense
Spending/MX/Arms Control. (Weinberger)

Possible Camp David Luncheon for
Selected Members of Congress. (Oglesby)

Sunday, May 13

McFarlane, Shultz, James Baker on talk
shows - Defense Budget, MX, Arms
Control, Central America. (Small)

Tuesday, May 15

Presidential meeting with House Swing
Vote Democrats and Republicans - Cabinet
Room - Shultz, McFarlane, Weinberger to
attend. (Oglesby)

Breakfast meeting at White House - House
or Senate. (Oglesby)
(Blair House not available)

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DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

NARA, Date

3/22/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1984

TO: ✓ JAMES A. BAKER
BUD McFARLANE
FAITH WHITTLESEY

THRU: M.B. OGLESBY, JR. *Bo*

FROM: PAMELA J. TURNER *jt*

SUBJECT: Denton/Domenici Comments on Central America

Following the attached colloquy on the Senate floor, Senator Domenici's staff tracked me down to say that the Senator wanted to make sure these comments were brought to the attention of the "proper people at the White House." Domenici's concern is that despite the volume of information and talking points we disseminated concerning Central America, there are certain events and incidents occurring which would bolster our point of view, but which never seem to be reported through official channels. This is the kind of information which Domenici, Denton, and several other Senators (who talked to Domenici after his speech) feel would be really helpful in the overall debate. Note particularly the bracketed comments.

Attachment

about nuclear power safety is that it obscures questions like these that so urgently demand answers and remedial action.

Concerns about safety need to be balanced with concerns about the long-term viability of this industry. At present, nuclear energy appears to be the only practical source of electrical energy for industrialized societies of the future. Decades from now, we may dearly regret letting the technological advantage move from America to France and Japan.

NICARAGUA

Mr. DENTON. Mr. President, this is not a routine request to enter something in the RECORD.

In connection with the security situation which confronts us in Central America, indeed the economic consequences of failing to meet that properly, as well as the security consequences which confront us daily, as we continue our necessary debate on how to confront our deficits, I invite the attention of my distinguished colleagues, all of whom, like me, are capable of rendering judgments only on the basis of the information they receive, this rather significant article.

It is an article in today's Washington Times, entitled "U.S. Officials Black Out Anti-Sandinista Rally." The article is by Phil Nicolaidis of the Washington Times. I will read four paragraphs and ask that the article be printed in the RECORD.

On Good Friday, a crowd of some 100,000 Nicaraguans thronged the plaza in front of Managua's National Cathedral for three hours to express, in the words of ABC's Peter Collins, "their passionate solidarity with the Catholic Church and opposition to the Sandinista regime." Some 8 1/2 million Americans watching the ABC-TV Evening News last Friday witnessed the event and heard the veteran network correspondent report it.

But if Americans had to rely on all other news sources singly or combined, they would never know it happened.

And if Americans had to rely on the State Department, they would be told it didn't happen.

None of the wire services carried the story or transmitted a single photograph to their hundreds of subscribers. None of America's newspapers reported it. Neither did NBC or CBS.

In summary, the rest of the article says that top administration officials confirm that such an event did take place, and there were erroneous reports on the part of people in our Embassy down there that it did not take place.

I ask my colleagues, as I shall do, to study carefully what is going on here.

Bishop Obando y Bravo went before the crowd and said, "Free Nicaragua! Christ forever!" He is a man who originally sympathized with the Sandinista regime, and he was at the forefront of that rally.

This is a very important piece of information for us. I happened to speak to that bishop and to the editor of La Prensa, whose father was killed by the Somoza people, and this heroic son is being threatened with death by the Sandinistas.

So I hope that we can recognize that this information is not only a presentation of information but also the withholding of information as characterized by the title of the book "Despite" and this is something we should all direct our attention to and try to sort out.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD this article which I previously mentioned.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. OFFICIALS BLACK OUT ANTI-SANDINISTA RALLY

(By Phil Nicolaidis)

On Good Friday, a crowd of some 100,000 Nicaraguans thronged the plaza in front of Managua's National Cathedral for three hours to express, in the words of ABC's Peter Collins, "their passionate solidarity with the Catholic Church and opposition to the Sandinista regime." Some 8 1/2 million Americans watching the ABC-TV Evening News last Friday witnessed the event and heard the veteran network correspondent report it.

But if Americans had to rely on all other news sources singly or combined, they would never know it happened.

And if Americans had to rely on the State Department, they would be told it didn't happen.

None of the wire services carried the story or transmitted a single photograph to their hundreds of subscribers. None of America's newspapers reported it. Neither did NBC or CBS.

When The Washington Times asked State Department spokesman Joseph Becelia for information about the demonstration, he said he had not heard of it and would have to telephone the U.S. Embassy in Managua for a report. U.S. diplomats in Managua had apparently not cabled to Washington anything about the huge demonstration.

Quoting Roger Gambel, the deputy chief of the U.S. mission, Mr. Becelia sharply challenged the accuracy of the ABC report. "This was not an anti-Sandinista demonstration," he said. "By no means—neither in its origin nor in its nature."

When pressed to explain the loud chants from the crowd and the placards clearly visible on the television screen in the Collins report, Mr. Becelia replied that "any anti-Sandinista character or manifestations were peripheral to the religious nature of the gathering—although there may have been scattered anti-government shouts and a few placards."

He also said the crowd numbered "only 50,000, not 100,000." The larger figure, he said, "was a church estimate."

An ABC spokesman said, "Our crowd estimates were based on a careful review of the capacity of the plaza—the size of two football fields—and the density." In fact, he said, "some church officials were saying the crowd numbered 200,000. That 500,000 figure you got from the embassy is a Sandinista estimate. I don't know why anyone would take it as reliable."

A top administration official said the handling of this affair by the American embassy in Managua "unfortunately confirms the view of some of us that our 'experts' are not expert enough. It casts new light," the source continued, "on the reasons the Kissinger Commission was so dissatisfied with the attitudes and the abilities of our people down there."

A highly placed White House source, told of the State Department explanation, called

it "absolutely incredible—those embassy people must be asleep at the switch."

"A disgusting performance," was the reaction of a former high government official closely involved in Latin American policy matters. "But the problem goes beyond embassy ineptitude," he said.

"The real question is why is State's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs putting this curious negative spin on events in Nicaragua which should be playing into our hands and supporting our position?"

"It took great courage for those people to join in such a tremendous popular manifestation," he said. "They risked being physically attacked by the turbas divinas [divine mobs]—Marxist goon squads who frequently assault people, even in church buildings, when there is any complaining about the regime."

ABC News officials stood by their story. One reporter on the scene said the State Department's attempt to downplay the political significance of this event—the people of Nicaragua rallying around their church and their bishop in defiance of the Sandinista regime—must be because they don't know what's going on, or don't want to know.

"Anyone who saw what we saw and heard what we heard would have grasped the fact that this was an outpouring of religious fervor, but also that feeling was directed against the regime, which has been fighting the church. The leaders of the demonstration, Bishop Obando y Bravo and Father Bismarck Carballo, are symbols of resistance and frequent targets of the Sandinistas," the network reporter said.

One of the frequent chants, ABC, said, was, "We are Christians, not Marxists." That ought to tell you something."

A high administration official confirmed this account and agreed that the State Department's view was "way off base." He recalled how American embassy staffers in Moscow "showed the same kind of blindness when they failed to read the unmistakable signs that Yuri Andropov had died. Dusko Doder [of the Washington Post] filed the story, and eight hours later our embassy there was still denying it," he recalled.

Some highlights of the original ABC report:

"The crowd of 100,000 . . . led by Archbishop Abando y Bravo, in an exquisite rebuff to Sandinista leaders who had said he was out of touch with the people . . . shouted, 'Free Nicaragua' and 'Christ Forever!'"

"None of the Sandinista leaders was present. Most are declared atheists. In a defiant gesture, the march was organized by Father Bismarck Carballo, the director of communications, a priest the regime tried to discredit last year. . . . The church has begun to take on the role of the church in Poland. It is becoming the focus of opposition to the Sandinista regime."

"No police were present, because the Sandinistas know the church is the one force that can rally the people against the government. For their part, the church leaders said nothing against the regime, but emphasized the need for Catholic faith which here, as in Poland, means 'No' to Marxism."

Two days after the demonstration, the bishops of Nicaragua issued an Easter pastoral letter sharply critical of the regime. The letter was bitterly attacked in the government controlled newspaper Barricada for failing to condemn "North American imperialism," and for urging the regime "to enter a dialogue with the murderers of our people."

The bishops' letter was one of the strongest ever issued by the church against the

Sandinista regime. It condemned press censorship, the detention of political prisoners, violence against the Indian minority, restrictions on religious freedom, and the collapsing economy which has caused acute shortages and rationing.

Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Alabama (Mr. DENTON) for bringing to the attention of the Senate the account found in the Washington Times of April 26 under the byline of Phil Nicolaidis.

I know the distinguished Archbishop Obando y Bravo, a leader of the Catholic Church in Nicaragua. I met and visited with him at length as part of the Kissinger Commission investigation and finding of facts which took us to Nicaragua in October of last year.

I must say that I have not had as many opportunities in my life to see brave people as the distinguished Senator from Alabama. As a matter of fact, clearly, I have not had an opportunity to be brave as he was as a prisoner of war for over 7 years. The distinguished Senator has far exceeded what I have done and hopefully would have to do.

But I suggest that the subject of the article, this man, Archbishop Obando y Bravo, is a true hero. And I think he is in danger every day of his life in Sandinista Nicaragua, just as we were in danger in Somoza's Nicaragua.

I am delighted that the archbishop presided over or was part of this rally of the faithful that was reported by ABC and then repeated here in the Washington Times, because I think that the international visibility does give him an opportunity to survive in Sandinista Nicaragua, which is, with the passage of each day, growing more and more an armed camp, with no basic freedom whatsoever. It is more and more like Nazi Germany in its beginning days, really, than anything else.

I do not know why we seem to get multiple versions of every little item that happens in Central America when it is against the interests of those we are trying to help. For instance, we, properly, learn about every deficiency of the new democracy that is trying to establish itself in El Salvador, but it is so difficult for us to get news about what the Sandinista Commandantes are doing to freedom-loving individuals and the churches in Nicaragua.

I commend the Senator for putting us on notice here, and, while I am not an expert on embassies, or ambassadors, which are good and which are not, I concur that the Embassy in Nicaragua just has to report events more objectively and more fully than they have in the past.

I was not very pleased with what I saw there when I went down for that visit to Central American countries. Here again, I do not know how the Embassy could miss 100,000 Nicaraguans meeting with church leaders, not Nicaraguan Marxist leaders, but merely church leaders and others out-

side of the Government. How we could miss reporting that from our Embassy is something rather significant, especially since the cry of the meeting was a simple one—freedom and Christ. I guess these Nicaraguans are trying to tell us that some of their leaders are trying to do away with these ideals in that country. Both freedom and Christ would be replaced by Marxism and Sandino.

So I commend the Senator for bringing this meeting to our attention.

CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, a year ago our distinguished colleague from Connecticut, Senator CHRIS DOBB, carefully addressed the issue of Central America and told us where the President's policy was taking us. It was a tough statement and it created a lot of controversy. And it created a lot of controversy because Senator DOBB had the guts "to tell the emperor he had no clothes" and a lot of folks around Washington thought that was improper, if not downright impolite.

Improper and impolite, well, I for one wish we had been a lot more improper and impolite on the issue of Lebanon. If we had, we might have saved a few hundred American lives. But we were not and those lives were lost.

Let us not do in El Salvador, or in Central America what we did in Lebanon or in other misguided military adventures. Let us not rely only on a military solution to complicated problems. That was Senator DOBB's message a year ago to the American people, and it is a message that is well worth repeating. Let us use our trade markets to bring a needed stimulus to the stagnant economies of Latin America. Let us take advantage of the political options open to us, for example, the Contadora process. Let us take advantage of the negotiating framework established by some of our closest allies in this region—Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama. And let us do it before the quagmire of a military solution in Central America closes around us and we are left to claw our way out.

For those who need a roadmap on how to get from here to there, I urge them to take another look at Senator DOBB's statement delivered April 27, 1983. And, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of that statement be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEMOCRATIC RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ADDRESS TO JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS

(Remarks delivered by Senator CHRISTOPHER J. DOBB)

Good evening. I want to thank the networks for the opportunity to offer a different viewpoint. While there is no unanimity in Congress—on either side of the aisle—in Central America, tonight I am speaking for the many Americans who are concerned

about our ever-deepening involvement in the military conflict in that part of the world.

I am pleased to note that the President this evening was willing to recognize an economic and political dimension of the problems in Central America, including the possibility of negotiations. Concerned Members of Congress have been pressing this point of view since he came to office. Regrettably, however, as his statement tonight demonstrates, the fundamental view continues to emphasize military problems and the search for military solutions.

In the months and years that follow this evening, after the applause has faded and the ringing phrases are forgotten, Americans will have to live with the choices we make in this fateful time of decision.

In the past, we as a nation have learned painfully that the truth is never as simple as some would paint it. Charts and statistics can be used or misused to prove any side of a case. And speeches can sound very good without being very right.

So first of all, let me state clearly that on some very important things, all Americans stand in agreement.

We will oppose the establishment of Marxist states in Central America.

We will not accept the creation of Soviet military bases in Central America.

And, we will not tolerate the placement of Soviet offensive missiles in Central America—or anywhere in this hemisphere.

Finally, we are fully prepared to defend our security and the security of the Americas, if necessary, by military means.

All patriotic Americans share these goals. But many of us in Congress, Democrats and Republicans, respectfully disagree with the President because we believe the means he has chosen will not fulfill them.

Those of us who oppose the President's policy believe that he is mistaken in critical ways. To begin with, we believe the Administration fundamentally misunderstands the causes of the conflict in Central America. We cannot afford to found so important a policy on ignorance—and the painful truth is that many of our highest officials seem to know as little about Central America in 1983 as we knew about Indochina in 1963.

I've lived with the people in this region. Let me share some facts with you about Central America.

Most of the people there are appallingly poor. They can't afford to feed their families when they're hungry. They can't find a doctor for them when they're sick. They live in rural dirt shacks with dirt floors of city slums without plumbing or clean water. The majority can't read or write. Many of them don't even know how to count.

It takes all five Spanish-speaking countries of Central America more than a year to produce what this nation does in less than three days. Virtually none of even that meager amount ever reaches the bulk of the people. In short, a very few live in isolated splendor while the very many suffer in shantytown squalor. In country after country, dictatorship or military dominance has stifled democracy and destroyed human rights.

If Central America were not racked with poverty, there would be no revolution. If Central America were not racked with hunger, there would be no revolution. If Central America were not racked with injustice, there would be no revolution. In short, there would be nothing for the Soviets to exploit. But unless those oppressive conditions change, the region will continue to seethe with revolution—with or without the Soviets.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER ✓
MICHAEL DEEVER
JOHN HERRINGTON

FROM: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. *Bo*

SUBJECT: Tennessee Valley Authority Board Vacancy

As indicated in my April 10 memorandum to you, I have attached the resume of Mr. John Waters.

This is Sen. Baker's 1st choice -

John B. Waters

HOME:
Waters Edge
Sevierville, Tennessee 37862
(615) 453-3913

OFFICE
Hailey, Waters, Sykes, & Shar
Attorneys
Professional Building
Sevierville, Tennessee 37862
(615) 453-2877

Family: Born, Sevierville, Tennessee, July 15, 1929; father, John B. Waters, Senior, deceased; mother, Myrtle Paine Waters, deceased; sister, Mary Louise (Mrs. R.B.) Hailey; brother, David Paine Waters, Sevierville, Tennessee; married the former Patsy Temple (1953); two children, John B. Waters, III, born 1955, and Cynthia Beth, born 1957. Mrs. Waters is a graduate of the University of Tennessee. John B. Waters, III an attorney, is a graduate of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville and Georgetown Law School; Cynthia, a professional photographer, is a graduate of the Art Institute of Atlanta. All the family are members of the First Baptist Church of Sevierville, Tennessee.

Education: Graduated from the University of Tennessee with a B.S. degree in Finance in 1952. Doctor of Jurisprudence, 1961. After serving three years in the United States Navy, returned to the University of Tennessee Law School, receiving J.D. degree in 1961. While attending the University, was a member and Vice President of Phi Sigma Kappa Fraternity; Vice President of the Student Body; member of Athletic Council; Sevier Senior Society; chairman of campus political party; member of Pi Alpha Delta Legal fraternity; listed in Who's Who in American Colleges and Universities in 1952.

Military: Joined the United States Naval Reserves in 1948 at age 17, while a student at University of Tennessee. Commissioned as Ensign in 1952 and served on U.S.S. Conway (DDE 507) from 1952 to 1955 as Gunnery Officer in the Atlantic and Sixth fleet. Now Lt. USNR Hon. Ret.

Business and Professional; Engaged in the practice of law as a general partner in the Law Firm of Hailey, Waters Sykes and Sharp, Professional Building, Sevierville, Tennessee. Member Sevier County, Tennessee and American Bar Association.

Licensed to practice in Tennessee, District of Columbia and U.S. Supreme Court; President of Sevier County Bar Association, 1972 - 1974. Vice President for East Tennessee, Tennessee Bar Association, President of Tennessee Bar Association, 1983-84. Fellow, American College of Probate Council. Member, American Judicature Society. Fellow of the American Bar Foundation.

Community and Civic: Member, American Legion, Masons, Sons of the American Revolution, Gatlinburg Elks Lodge (Exalted Ruler, 1960). Member of Sevierville Housing Authority, 1958 to 1968; member and Chairman of Sevier County Industrial Development Board, 1964 to 1968; Chairman, Sevierville Library Foundation; Vice-Chairman, Sevierville Chamber of Commerce, 1962-1966; Member Governor's Committee on Economic Development 1971; Member State of Tennessee Industrial and Agricultural Commission, 1971; Tennessee Representative to Southern Growth Policy Board, 1971-1975; Trustee, East Tennessee Baptist Hospital, Knoxville. 1976-1982; Member, Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Authority, 1978-present.

Political: Republican. Member of the State Executive Committee, 1962 to 1968; Vice Chairman, 1962-1966; in 1958 made unsuccessful campaign for Republican Nomination for Congress against the late Carroll Reece. State campaign Chairperson for Senator Howard Baker's 1964 and 1966 campaigns. Delegate to 1968 Republican National Convention. Member of State Nixon Committee, 1968.

Governmental: In 1969 President Nixon nominated Waters as Federal Co-Chairman of the Appalachian Regional Commission. He was confirmed by the United States Senate on March 26th, 1969. Justice Potter Stewart of the U.S. Supreme Court Administered the Oath of Office to Mr. Waters. The Appalachian Regional Commission consists of the governors of the 13 Appalachian states and the Federal Co-Chairmen.

The commission engages in a broad spectrum of economic development programs including highways, health, vocational education, sewer and water projects, land reclamation, housing in the Supplemental of other federal grant-in-aid programs. Waters served as Federal Co-Chairman until March 1971, when he resigned and returned to Sevierville to resume his law practice and business. A joint resolution honoring Waters was passed by the Eighty-Sixth General Assembly of the State of Tennessee.