B. CARTER AND THE REGIONAL PRIDE HYPOTHESIS

Of course, many will look at the above table and assume that the only reason Ronald Reagan did not win a landslide in Dixie in 1980 was due to regional pride in native son Jimmy Carrter. There is no doubt that regional pride helped Carter, but I believe this argument has been overstated, especially in regard to 1980.

The exponents of the regional pride hypothesis have persuaded themselves that the 1972 Presidential election results represent the new "normal" Republican showing in the South. Advocates of this view argue that all of the third-party Wallace votes in the South in 1968 would have gone to the Republicans in a two-way race. With Wallace out of the picture, according to this view, Nixon would have swept all thirteen Southern states in 1968, not just the seven he actually did take. The 1972 elections, where the Republicans did carry all thirteen states, are seen by this group as confirming this hypothesis. These theorists add that it was only the presence of a Southerner, Jimmy Carter, on the ticket that held the South for the Democrats in 1976 and nearly held much of the region for him in 1980. However, they say, no Northern Democrat such as Mondale or Kennedy can expect to do much better in the South in 1984 than Humphrey of Minnesota did in 1968 or McGovern of South Dakota did in 1972. And after Jimmy Carter, these smug scenarists conclude, no Southerner will be nominated by the Democrats for a long, long time.

The results of the 1982 elections, which had nothing to do with regional pride, do not exactly square with this complacent scenario. More importantly, the Gallup Poll data cited in Section 1 (Table 15), showing Snowbelters Glenn and Mondale besting Sunbelter Ronald Reagan, indicate that Northern Democrats are not automatically doomed to tiny fractions of the vote in Dixie. The main reason for this improvement in Democratic fortunes is the expansion of the Southern electorate, and concomitant changes in its composition.

C. TURNOUT: 1972-1980

As for the South in the 1976 Presidential election, it is easy to say that the chief factor in Carter's favor was regional pride. While this factor obviously did help Carter, I believe that voter turnout was an even more significant factor in his favor.

In 1976, Gerald Ford received some three million fewer votes in the South than Nixon in 1972. However, Carter in 1976 gained six million votes over McGovern's Southern total.

In other words, three million additional voters appeared at Southern polling places in 1976, swelling the electorate by 18%. Outside the South the number of voters increased by less than 2% from 1972 to 1976.

It can be argued that regional pride inspired three million more Southerners to vote for their compatriot in 1976; but what inspired another 2.5 million Southerners to vote in 1980 over and above the already swollen 1976 totals? Were Southerners prouder of Jimmy Carter in 1980 than in 1976?

Table 18 shows aggregate Southern vote totals from 1972-1980 demonstrating the mushrooming of the Southern electorate:

TABLE 18

	1972	1976	1980
Republican votes (millions)	12.2	9.3	12.0
Democratic votes (millions)	5.1	11.1	10.2

Table 19 compares the percentage increases of the total Southern vote from 1976-76, 1976-80, and 1972-80 to the percentage increases in the total vote in the rest of the country:

TABLE 19

	1972-76	1976-80	1972-80
South	+17.9	+12.3	+32.7
Rest of the USA	+ 1.3	+ 3.9	+ 5.3

I will argue later in this section that the explosive vote growth in the South in the last decade has a lot more to do with the relaxation of various de jure and de facto inhibitions on voting than with regional pride. I will also argue that these millions of new voters are strongly inclined to vote Democratic to begin with and that the presence or absence of a Southerner on the Democratic ticket has little impact on their voting behavior.

Note that Ronald Reagan received just 200,000 fewer votes in the South than Nixon did eight years earlier. Yet President Reagan's victory margin was 1.8 million votes across the South, compared to 7.1 million for Nixon. The reason for this shrunken margin was that Jimmy Carter got nearly twice as many votes in 1980 as did McGovern in 1972. Carter polled only 900,000 fewer votes in the South in 1980 than he had in 1976, and he actually gained votes in two states in his second presidential bid.

Such is the peculiar nature of the electoral college that while Carter's popular vote in the South fell by just 8% in his second election bid, his Southern electoral college total fell 91%. Georgian Carter got only one more Southern state in 1980 than South Dakotan McGovern got in 1972, although Carter's popular vote total was twice the size of McGovern's. It was simply too bad for Carter that he went from winning eleven of thirteen Southern states in 1976 to losing twelve of thirteen in 1980. All the close Southern states--recall that seven states were decided by 2% or less of the popular vote--went for Ronald Reagan. In the electoral college, there is no prize for second place.

Some may feel that this unanimity of the close states was merely the good fortune of the Republicans. But I believe that the spirit of the New Solid South was at work in 1980. In a collective sense, Southerners realized that

if the South split down the middle in the electoral college in 1980, then the South would have forfeited its chance to send a message to both political parties. As it was, the Republicans got the message that they could reasonably expect to carry the South if they nominated the right kind of candidate. For the Democrats, the message was that they could not expect to carry the South merely by nominating a Southerner. The Democrats were put on notice that the Democratic standard-bearer would have to reflect the values and attitudes of the South. This is something that the winning Democrat in 1976 had done effectively, but that the losing Democratic nominees of 1968, '72, and '80 had not. If the choice was between a candidate who had the right accent but the wrong values (Carter), the South clearly demonstrated that it would go for the "real thing." Only a unanimous (or near-unanimous) South could have delivered such a message. The South did summon up the collective political will to deliver its electoral votes en masse to Ronald Reagan. The message was heard loud and clear in the inner councils of both parties.

D. TURNOUT IN A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE, 1948-1980

All intangibles aside, what we saw in the 1980 presidential election was merely the continuation of a remarkable trend: the explosion of Southern turnout in the last three decades (see Graph 15). Turnout growth in the South has far outstripped Northern turnout growth and has greatly surpassed the population growth in Dixie, as shown in Table 20.

TABLE 20

	1948	1980	Increase
Southern population	41,730	67,947	+ 63%
Southern vote totals	6,859	22,870	+233%
Rest of U.S. population	109,505	153,558	+ 45%
Rest of U.S. vote totals	42,035	64,391	+ 53%

Traditionally, Southern turnout was scandalously low. Voting was generally limited to an elite of relatively affluent whites. These "Bourbon Democrats" controlled the politics of most Southern states until the 1960's.

Because voting was so limited and because seats in the House of Representatives and votes in the electoral college were (and are) determined by population, a relative handful of votes controlled enormous blocs of congressional and electoral strength, totally disproportionate to their voting numbers. For example, until 1924 Texas, with sixteen congressional districts, cast fewer popular votes than South Dakota, with three. Until the 1950's more South Dakotans were voting than in either Mississippi, Alabama or South Carolina, although each of the Southern states had at least three times South Dakota's population.

GRAPH 15

GROWTH OF THE SOUTHERN ELECTORATE 1948-1980



Now the situation is different. For example, Louisiana cast more popular votes in 1980 than did Maryland, although they have equal numbers of electoral votes.

Interestingly, the fastest growth in Southern voter turnout has occurred not in the fast-growing Outer South which includes Texas and Florida, but in the slower-growing Deep South, which is actually losing population relative to the rest of the country. Using the number of Congressional districts as a convenient way of measuring a state's relative share of the U.S. population, Table 21 shows that the Deep South, even as it shrinks relative to the Outer South and the United States as a whole, is increasing its turnout at a much more rapid rate:

TABLE 21

Region	House Seats 1948	House Seats 1980	Increase in Pres. vote 1948-1980
Deep South	40	36	353%
Outer South	82	93	214%
U.S.A.	435	435	77%

E. BLACK TURNOUT THROUGH 1980

If the massive increase in voter turnout cannot be attributed to population growth, to what can it be attributed? The South had thirteen million registered voters in 1960. In 1980 this had more than doubled to twenty-nine million. Where did those sixteen million registered voters come from?

The answer is that most of these people had been in the South all along, but that they could not or would not vote. Poll taxes, literacy tests and outright coercion played a part, but so did lack of education and interest. In addition, there was no viable Republican Party in most of the South to activate interest in general elections. The real action was in the Democratic primary. Victory there was tantamount to election.

The Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965 but its effect was not felt until the early 1970's. The ratio of registered whites to registered blacks which in 1960 was 12:1 had fallen to 5:1 by 1980, a ratio which closely approximates the actual percentage of voting-age blacks in the South.

It was not just blacks that flocked to the polls in the last decade; it was poor whites as well. But there is no question that the biggest factor in increasing turnout in the South has been the black vote. Table 22 shows clearly just how precisely the percentage of blacks in a given area correlates with increases in turnout.

TABLE 22

Region	Black %	Increase in Turnout 1972-1980
USA	11.7	+11.3%
South	20.7	+32.7%
Rest of USA	7.9	+ 5.2%
Deep South	27.8	+37.2%
Outer South	15.9	+29.8%

F. REPUBLICANS IN THE SOUTH THROUGH 1980

We know that the newly-enfranchised blacks are overwhelmingly Democratic. But the poor whites who also started to vote in large numbers only recently are often no more inclined to stray from the Democratic party than are the blacks.

There is no question that if the Southern electorate were the same in 1984 as in 1964, we would be winning everything in sight. The "Bourbon Democrats" who controlled the South for nearly a century and kept it solidly Democratic for most of that period are now themselves mostly Republican.

At the Presidential level, they are overwhelmingly Republican. Unfortunately for us, they are now a voting minority.

We cannot win in the South any more unless we are able to combine the votes of the now-Republican Bourbons with one of the two groups (blacks or poor whites) that didn't exist as significant electoral forces until this generation.

Of course one of the main reasons why blacks and poor whites did not vote until recently was the ability of the Bourbons to keep them from doing so. An appreciation of that fact is vital to an understanding why the Bourbon Republicans have a tough time forming a coalition with either of the other groups.

The new Bourbon vote, also known as the "country club vote" (although in the South anyone earning over $20,000 per year rates as a country-clubber) serves as the Republican base in the South, along with transplanted Yankees and the inhabitants of the historically Republican areas in the Mountains and the Piedmont.

Because of the difficulty we have had cementing the white working class and/or the blacks to this GOP base, some have argued that the GOP vote "maxed out" in the South. Adherents of this view see the GOP as being able to count on perhaps a third of the vote in most Southern states, large enough to elect a Congressman or two and to occasionally carry the state for the Republicans in a presidential election, but rarely enough to become the dominant political force.

It certainly is true that the most rapid growth for the GOP in the South was from 1962 to 1972. A look at Graphs 1-3 and 5-13 do somewhat support the view that the Republicans in Dixie have stalled in the last decade. However, we are still ratcheting up, as our total number of seats in the Senate suggests.

I consider the theory that the Republicans have peaked in the South to be unduly pessimistic. It is, after all, only natural that there should be some short-term corrections in a long-term growth trajectory. However, the plateau hypothesis does serve as a warning of the fate that could befall us if we do not work diligently to expand our political base among the white working class and the blacks.

And I don't think that a Republican "max-out" is possible in those four Southern states where Ronald Reagan actually exceeded Nixon's staggering 1972 totals. These states--Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia--are arguably the richest and most "Yankeefied" of all Southern states. They account for nearly half--72--of the South's 155 electoral votes. These states, along with Oklahoma (with another eight electoral votes), were the best Southern states for President Reagan in 1980 and will probably continue to be the lead states for the GOP in future elections.

G. THE DEMOCRATIC BASE

If the steady increase in turnout that characterized the period 1948-80 continues into 1984, the Democrats will be in a strong position.

Depending on many factors, including the black share of the electorate, the Democrats seem to have a base of 30-45% in each Southern state. This Democratic base is far larger right now than it was a decade ago. The enfranchisement of blacks and poor whites has often made up for the gradual falling away of the middle-and upper-class Bourbon whites from the Democratic party.

Mississippi is a good illustration. This state is presently 35% black, and was more than 40% black twenty years ago. The Magnolia State gave the Democratic presidential nominee an average of 19.4% of its votes in three successive presidential elections--1964, 1968 and 1972.

Obviously, the blacks were not voting in large numbers in Mississippi. We know this because where they were voting, the Democrats were receiving 90% and more of the vote. Thus, had the blacks been voting proportionate to their numbers, the Democrats (even McGovern) would have been in the third decile of the vote, far more than his actual 20% of the vote.

By 1976 the blacks were voting--even in Mississippi--and the fortunes of the Democrats changed dramatically. From the aforementioned average of 19.4%, the Democratic percentage jumped to a 48.7% average in 1976 and 1980.

To argue that "regional pride" was the key factor ignores the fact that Mississippi turnout in 1976 was nearly double that of 1964 and 19% higher than in 1972, and that turnout rose another 16% in the 1980 election.

Mississippi was also that state where the Republicans percentage increase between 1976 and 1980 was the smallest (only 1.7%) and where its major county (Hinds, which includes Jackson) showed a serious drop between Ford's winning majority and Reagan's.

Ask the question: Were Southerners more proud of Carter in 1980 than they were in 1976? Speaking as a Southerner, the answer is NO. Furthermore, the Democratic victories in the South in 1982 clearly had nothing to do with regional pride or Jimmy Carter.

The chief difference between 1972 and 1980 was that 250,000 (38% more) Mississippians voted in 1980. Reagan's vote fell about 50,000 (10%) below Nixon's, but the Democratic vote was up 300,000, a whopping 243%. This suggests that only 50,000 Nixon voters--almost all white--stuck with Carter in 1980 for reasons of regional pride or whatever.

All this proves that the Democrats have a strong base in Mississippi, composed mostly of blacks, but with a substantial number of diehard white Democrats as well. This base will support any Democrat.

I believe that if George McGovern were to run for President in 1984, he'd get 40% of the Mississippi statewide vote. That wouldn't bring McGovern any more of Mississippi's electoral votes in 1984 than he got in 1972. But we should be aware that the Democratic nominee in 1984 will not be George McGovern, but a Democrat with broader appeal.

Carter's vote in the five Deep South states--the states with the greatest increases in turnout in the 1970's and with the highest percentages of blacks, fell a mere 36,000 (about one percent) from 1976 to 1980.

Carter went from winning all five of these states' electoral votes to winning only his native Georgia in his second election. However, the tiny decrease in his vote totals indicates that the Democratic base is in the 40% range across the Deep South. It took a lot of enthusiasm for Ronald Reagan in 1980 to overcome this high Democratic base, meaning it required an alliance of the white country-club vote and the white working-class vote.

This alliance broke apart in 1982. We will have to work to put it back together in 1984 and supply the enthusiasm to fuel its consummation.

Otherwise, we will be hit right between the eyes with this truth: a lot more than regional pride was driving up the Democratic totals in the 1970's.

The question then is turnout. The South lags behind the national average for voter turnout, as a percentage of the voting-age population. However, eight of the thirteen Southern states had higher turnout rates than New York, for example, so the South is not as grotesquely out-of-step as it once was.

H. IMPLICATIONS OF HIGHER TURNOUT IN 1984

Black voter registration still lags 10 to 15 points behind white registration, which poses the question: In the future is it more likely that

black registration and turnout in the South will pull up to the national average? Or, is it more likely that Southern white turnout will surge ahead of the national average? The latter would, of course, require an extraordinary surge in sentiment among Southerners in 1984, at least as strong as that felt in 1980.

If the blacks pull up to the national average Democrats are likely to benefit. If the white vote surges ahead of the national average, we should benefit. There may be a third way: make the increase in black turnout work for us, i.e. get a larger share of the black vote. The 1982 elections do not bode well for this circumstance, with George Wallace and John Stennis winning nearly all of the black votes merely because they ran on the Democratic ticket. However, we must continue our effort to attract more blacks to the GOP.

III. 1982: WHAT HAPPENED?

A. THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE GOP IN THE SOUTH

1. The Democratic Tradition

Despite the Republican sweep of the South in two of the last three presidential elections, the GOP is still far from political parity with the Democrats in Dixie. Table 23 shows the strength of the two parties in the South in 1980 and 1982:

TABLE 23

	Senate			House			Governorships		
	Rep.	Dem.	Rep. Share	Rep.	Dem.	Rep. Share	Rep.	Dem.	Rep. Share
1980	11	15	42%	42	79	35%	5	8	38%
1982	12	14	46%	38	91	29%	2	11	18%

In the House, we went from 35% of the total number of Southern seats in the 97th Congress to 29% in the 98th Congress. This was in spite of the re-apportionment following the 1980 census, which showed substantial growth in heavily Republican areas such as Dallas, Houston and much of Florida. Furthermore, this casts additional doubt on any theories to the effect that "regional pride" hindered our progress during the Carter candidacies.

Although the GOP did gain one Senate seat in 1982, this was really the year of lost opportunity for us. Not one of our Senate seats was at stake, and the chance to win six-year seats in Tennessee, Mississippi, Florida and Texas was missed. All of these seemed within our grasp in the heady days of early 1981.

Republican House candidates in the South fell back to 1976 levels in percentage of votes received. Table 24 shows Republican percentages in Southern Congressional elections from 1976 to 1982:

TABLE 24

	Republican	Democrat
1976	37%	62%
1978	40%	59%
1980	43%	56%
1982	38%	61%

In 1982, with Jimmy Carter out of the picture, the Democrats did nearly as well as they did in 1976, when Southern regional pride should have peaked.

In 1982, our determined assault on four Democratic Senate incumbents was unsuccessful. In 1984, we may not have the luxury of attacking Democratic seats. Rather we must defend six of our Southern Senate seats. That will be the real test of the two-party South.

It is clear from the 1982 election results that the Democrats are very much the "normal" party in the South, and that many Southerners only vote Republican in "abnormal" circumstances, e.g., the 1972 and 1980 presidential elections.

Thus, if we want to do well in the South in 1984, we must give Southerners some overriding reason to vote Republican. Unless the economy is skyrocketing we can't ask Southerners to stay the course, because many of them were never really with us anyway. The 1982 elections prove this.

Merely asking for a renewed four years in The White House will not serve to energize the Southern electorate in 1984. We must offer bold proposals that expand on our 1980 mandate.

Since they enjoy a base of 30-45% in most Southern states, it will be relatively easy for the Democrats to mobilize enough swing voters to prevail.

We Republicans will be under great pressure to deny the Democrats the few votes they need to achieve a majority. If we want to win in 1984, we will have to inject concern into the South about what fate would befall the nation if the Democrats were restored to power. This can be done--Nixon did it to McGovern in 1972.

The Democratic tradition in the South runs very deep. It is a common assertion of conservative Southern Democrats--the "Boll Weevils"-- that if they were to switch parties, their approval ratings would plummet 20 points overnight. (Phil Gramm's 1983 percentage--as a Republican--was 10 points under his previous low.)

The Democratic label is worth at least that much to a candidate almost everywhere in the South. It is this sort of blind loyalty to the party of Jefferson and Jackson that we must overcome.

Boll Weevils flourish only in the House. They vote with Tip O'Neill to organize the House and then vote with the Republicans much of the rest of the time. This seems to be the sure way to build a safe House seat in much of the South.

Statewide elections, on the other hand, produce a different type of Democratic candidate. Because there is more interest and participation in statewide primaries and/or caucuses, it is much more difficult for a conservative to get the nod.

This has enabled the Republicans to do better in statewide elections than in more localized contests, because in the former the liberalism of the Democratic nominee is there for all the voters to see. This is particularly true in Senate elections, which tend to turn more on national issues. Recall that we control twelve of the twenty-six Southern Senate seats.

The Senate career of Strom Thurmond indicates just how important party labels still are in the South. It serves to remind us of his courageous statesmanship. Thurmond was first elected as a write-in candidate in 1954, defeating the regular Democratic nominee. He remains the only man ever elected to the Senate in this manner.

Running as a Democrat in 1956 and 1960, Thurmond faced no opposition. He switched parties in 1964, during the doomed Goldwater campaign. His conscience required him to put principle ahead of party. Thurmond's first electoral test as a Republican came in 1966. The sharp drop in his percentage then, and his depressed margins in 1972 and 1978, remind us of the great sacrifice Thurmond made in 1964.

If we compare Thurmond's election record since his switch to the GOP in 1964 to that of his junior colleague, Democrat Ernest Hollings, we see the luxury afforded the latter for remaining a Democrat.

Since Hollings' close call in 1966, he has been riding to victory on the strength of South Carolina's huge yellow-dog Democrat vote. But Thurmond has had to struggle against it, viz. Table 25:

TABLE 25

Year	Thurmond	Hollings
1980		70%
1978	56%	
1974		70%
1972	63%	
1968		62%
1966	62%	51% (special election)
1964:	Thurmond switches to GOP	
1960	100%	
1956	100%	

Another Southern Republican with a similar handicap is Republican John Tower of Texas. Compare his percentages with those of Democrat Lloyd Bentsen, as shown in Table 26.

TABLE 26

	Tower	Bentsen
1982		59%
1978	50%	
1976		57%
1972	53%	
1970		54%
1966	56%	
1961	51%	(special election)

Both Bentsen and Hollings are able to retain a semi-conservative image at home while clinging to the Democratic establishment in Washington.

2. Socioeconomic Variables and the GOP

Why is the South still so Democratic? To be sure, there is a Democratic tradition dating back 150 years, but most political traditions tend to fade away over a few decades. In attempting to answer this question, perhaps we should examine some of the objective factors--economic and demographic--that help determine Southern voting patterns.

Per capita income is one factor that is worth examining. As the regional breakdown of 1980 per capita income shown in Table 27 indicates, despite all the talk of the booming New South, Dixie is still the poorest region of the country:

TABLE 27

1980 Per Capita Income by Region

East	$10,730
West	$10,369
Midwest	$ 9,651
South	$ 8,457

Interestingly, the national average per capita income is $9,521, which means that the South alone is below the national average.

Another reason for Republican weakness is the high percentage of blacks in the Southern states. Unfortunately, upwards of 90% of the growing black vote is routinely straight-ticket Democrat.

We must do what we can to increase our share of the black vote. In the meantime, however, we are obligated to make our calculations according to the present realities. As Table 28 shows, the South has far and away the highest percentage of blacks:

TABLE 28

Percentage of Blacks, by Region, 1980

South	20.7%
Midwest	9.7%
East	9.0%
West	5.2%

Another measure of Republicanism is education. It is well known that Republican loyalties increase with education levels. The percentage of high school graduates for each region is listed in Table 29:

TABLE 29

Percentage of High School Graduates, by Region, 1980

West	74.4%
Midwest	68.2%
East	67.1%
South	58.7%

Other indices point to continued Democratic strength. The South has even almost caught up with the rest of the country in unemployment. Traditionally the subsistence, agriculturally-oriented Southern economy at least had the advantage of being relatively immune to the fluctuations in unemployment that occurred in industrialized regions more dependent on the business cycle. But as the South industrialized, its unemployment rate began to mirror the rest of the nation's. In November 1982, for example, three Southern states had the dubious honor of being included in the unemployment "top 10."

We could look at a host of other indicators to prove my point that the South is fertile ground for Democratic politicking. But we should turn our attention now to state-specific socioeconomic data.

If we want to look for distinctions within the South, we can examine some of the same objective factors on a state-by-state basis. When we do this, we will find that is an excellent correlation between per capita income, percentage of blacks, etc. and the degree of Republicanism each state displays. There are some exceptions, of course--most notably Kentucky and Tennessee, which have strongholds of traditional Republicanism dating back to the Civil War. People in these areas are not Republicans because they are rich or white, but because they were born that way. However, when we are looking at Southern states with no longstanding Republican tradition, the various measures mentioned above--plus others--serve as a useful guide to our prospects.

Our four best Southern states in 1980 were, in order, Oklahoma, Florida, Texas, and Virginia. Intuitively this makes sense to us. These Outer South states have fairly large white-collar populations, relatively high per capita incomes, relatively low unemployment and relatively few blacks.

But if we go beyond mere intuition and examine some of the indices, our impression is not only affirmed but reinforced. Virginia, for example, is one of two Southern states that has voted Republican in each of the last four presidential elections. In fact, Virginia has gone Republican in every presidential election since 1952, with the exception of 1964. Even then, Goldwater took 47% of the vote in Virginia, his ninth-best showing nationwide.

What has caused the Old Dominion to become so Republican? After all, Virginia, the birthplace of the founder of the Democratic party, Thomas Jefferson, whose capital of Richmond was once the capital of the Confederacy, is one of the most tradition-minded states in the Union. If ever there was a state that would stay loyal to its Democratic past, it would surely be Virginia.

But a look at Virginia's demographics suggests why the old partisan tradition has been turned upside down. Of the thirteen Southern states, Virginia is:

-- 2nd in per capita income
-- 2nd in percentage of resident population born outside the state
-- 7th in percentage of blacks
-- 10th in unemployment
-- 3rd in high school graduates as percentage of population
-- 5th in urbanization

Unfortunately for us, for every Virginia there is a Mississippi. So long as the poor believe that their interests are best served by the tax-and-tax, spend-and-spend policies of the Democrats, the relatively poor South will be rough sledding for the Republicans. Happily, the South does not lag nearly as far behind the rest of the United States as it once did. And it is not nearly as Democratic as it once way.

Our only hope over the long run is to persuade Southerners that conservative policies work better, and that the liberal prescriptions offered by the Democrats tend to make things worse for everyone.

But for the short run, i.e. 1984, so long as the South remains poorer than the rest of the country, it will remain more Democratic. As for 1984, we still have every reason to be optimistic, because the precedents of 1972 and 1980 prove that the GOP can overcome all its hindrances and win big.

Sadly, we cannot hope to win over many blacks until we persuade them that our economic program is also most beneficial to them. So far, we have not been very successful in this persuasion campaign. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't keep trying, or that our efforts will not bear fruit by 1984.

Table 30 draws some distinctions between the Southern states that cast some light on our prospects in each for 1984. The states are ranked in order of their 1980 Reagan percentage:

TABLE 30

States in Order of Reagan %	Per Capita Income	Pop. % Born Outside State	% of Non-Blacks	% of Work Force Employed (lowest unemployment)	Urbanization	% of High School Graduates
Oklahoma	3	3	1	1	4	1
Florida	4	1	4	6	1	2
Texas	1	5	3	2	2	4
Virginia	2	2	7	4	5	3
Louisiana	5	12	11	8	3	6
South Carolina	12	8	12	10	9	7

TABLE 30
(continued)

States in Order of Reagan %	Per Capita Income	Pop. % Born Outside State	% of Non-Blacks	% of Work Force Employed (lowest unemployment)	Urbanization	% of High School Graduates
Mississippi	13	9	13	12	13	13
North Carolina	7	11	8	5	12	10
Alabama	9	10	9	13	8	9
Kentucky	8	13	2	9	11	12
Tennessee	7	7	5	11	7	11
Arkansas	11	4	6	7	10	8
Georgia	6	6	10	3	6	5

The table shows that the populations of the best Reagan states--Oklahoma, Florida, Texas, Virginia and Louisiana--tend to be more affluent, more urbanized and more educated, and have lower percentages of blacks and the unemployed.

Recall that four of the states in the top five--Florida, Louisiana, Texas and Virginia--were the Southern states where President Reagan actually got more votes in 1980 than Richard Nixon got in 1972. These states, plus strongly Republican Oklahoma, are the emerging rock-ribbed Republican bastions of the 1980's.

The remaining eight Southern states demonstrate less uniformity. They are too similar economically and demographically to really be distinguishable in this context. All but Georgia were decided in 1980 by 2.1% of the vote or less--a sure sign they are not fixed in either partisan camp.

B. TURNOUT IN 1982

The South is for historical and economic reasons Democratic and inclined to remain Democratic. But this was always true of the South, and yet the GOP made remarkable progress through 1980.

How can this be? In the past the Southern electorate was not at all representative of the Southern population. Thirty years ago the Southern electorate was overwhelmingly middle- and upper-class--and white. With each passing year turnout has increased, with more blacks and poor whites voting.

In Section II, we examined increased turnout through 1980. Let us now review turnout in 1982.

Because of its unique September primary system, Louisiana did not hold statewide elections last November. Of the remaining twelve Southern states, eleven set all-time records for voter turnout.

These eleven record-setting states include North Carolina, which did not even have any attention-generating statewide elections. Table 31 details the increase in turnout from 1978 to 1932:

TABLE 31

Texas	+ 33.5%
Arkansas	+ 29.6%
Alabama	+ 27.8%
North Carolina	+ 16.4%
Virginia	+ 15.8%
Georgia	+ 11.7%
Mississippi	+ 10.8%
Oklahoma	+ 7.8%
Florida	+ 6.2%
South Carolina	+ 6.2%
Tennessee	+ 4.5%
Kentucky	- 6.4%

Kentucky also did not hold statewide elections in 1982.

The turnout in Texas was remarkable. Even though Governor Bill Clements was defeated in his re-election bid, he received about 270,000 more votes in 1982 than in 1978!

His Democratic opponent received a half million more votes than the Democrat running four years earlier. Similarly, 1982 Senate candidate James Collins received more votes than John Tower did in his 1978 re-election bid--yet, Collins lost decisively while Tower won.

The figures for Texas are provided below:

TABLE 32

		Republican	Democratic	Total	GOP %
Governor's race	1978	1,184	1,167	2,351	50.4%
	1982	1,455	1,684	3,139	46.4%
Senate race	1978	1,151	1,139	2,290	50.3%
	1982	1,248	1,803	3,051	40.9%

In fact, the Republican vote for all Texas statewide offices in 1982 broke records even as the entire slate went down to defeat. (Interestingly, at a lower level, this strong GOP surge bore fruit--the number of GOP county officials stands at an all-time high in the wake of the 1982 elections, including two black Republicans elected locally in Dallas and Lubbock.)

The problem for us was that our record surge in vote totals was exceeded by the Democrats' record surge in the statewide races.

Across the South, the GOP vote was either up or steady while we were swamped by a tidal wave of Democratic votes. Turnout was heavier in many counties in 1982 than it was in the presidential year of 1980!

The Democratic turnout was so strong that it almost did not matter who the Democrats were running. Some bona fide liberals, such as Frederick Boucher in Virginia, Ben Erdreich in Alabama and Jim Hightower in Texas were swept to victory. At the same time, unreconstructed Democrats like Stennis won big victories. Even drunk-driver Ike Andrews edged a determined GOP challenger in North Carolina.

One theory to explain the dramatic upsurge in turnout involves unemployment and its impact on Southern voters. A look at the 1982 statistics, however, does not bear this out.

The state with the highest percentage turnout increase was Texas, which had the second-lowest unemployment in the South.

In fact, there seems to be no correlation in unemployment and voter turnout in the South with high-unemployment states such as Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee showing erratic increases in voter turnout. Furthermore, the hardest-hit Northern states, such as Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania actually showed decreases in voter turnout.

My theory is that the burst in turnout was part of the continuing response to the liberalization of voting rules in the 1960's. Blacks especially are beginning to exercise their franchise, and this changes forever the political character of the South. The high turnout had nothing to do with the economy.

C. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SOUTHERN POLITICS

As I outlined in Section II, there are three main voter groups in the South. The relative size of each of these groups varies from state to state. An understanding of the different characteristics of these three groups is essential to the creation of a winning coalition. The groups are:

1. The Country Clubbers
2. The Populists
3. The Blacks

1. The Country Clubbers

It is unfair to characterize such a large group of voters in this way, but the term has stuck and it serves as a useful classification. Bear in mind that someone making $20,000 per year, particularly in the rural South, automatically falls into the country club category. This is in contrast to the North, where such a salary is considered socially and politically working-class.

The country clubbers are descended from the old Bourbon Democrats (known as Tory Democrats in Texas, and Byrd Democrats in Virginia), who controlled most of the South until the 1960's.

At about the time that the Bourbons' grip on the South (and the Democratic party) was broken by the surging turnout of blacks and poor whites, the Bourbons themselves shifted to the GOP. This shift has been most pronounced at the Presidential level, as Republican nominees have won the Bourbon vote with regularity since 1952.

The country clubbers can be subdivided into two main groups:

a. Strong Conservatives: early supporters of Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan and Jesse Helms; and

b. Socially Respectable Republicans: Yes, the South has its Volvo voter set. Naturally the Southern version isn't as liberal as its Northern counterpart. These people are not in tune with the New Right. They focus their conservatism on economic and foreign policy. As believers in good government, they are particularly appalled by Wallace Democrats and the inbred cronyism still displayed by statehouse cliques, "pork-chop gangs" and other remnants of the one-party South.

In the South the country clubbers vote disproportionate to their numbers, with a total share of from 25-40% of each Southern state.

It should be noted that the country clubbers are usually most comfortable with urbane and urban-based Republican candidates. When GOP candidates move too strongly towards populism by expounding "redneck" virtues, they risk losing their base country-club vote.

This happened to the Republicans in North Carolina in 1982, when the GOP House candidates relied too heavily on social issues, and turned off the "respectable" voters.

2. The Populists

These are lower- and working-class whites, by far the largest of the three groups, comprising 40-60% of the population in each Southern state. "Redneck" is a disparaging term, commonly applied to populists. It is also misleading, since most populists now work in mills, factories and offices, and not in the fields.

The populists were once ardent Democrats. While their ardor has cooled in the last twenty years, their basic loyalty is still to the party of their old heroes--colorful demagogues like "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman, Huey Long, Theodore Bilbo and George Wallace.

These political leaders upheld the populist dogma--higher farm price supports, the minimum wage, the 40-hour work week, regulation of utilities and more spending on health, education, public works, etc.

As for race, it was hardly an issue--it went without saying that the populists' chosen leaders were hardcore segregationists.

a. Turnout

Back twenty or thirty years ago, however, the populists didn't

vote much, because the Bourbons threw roadblocks (i.e. literacy tests and poll taxes) in their way, and because the general election results were a foregone conclusion. (Why pay to vote when the election is already decided?)

The big explosion in populist voter turnout occurred in 1964 and the years thereafter. The social engineering features of the Great Society were so offensive to the populists that they rushed to the polls to vote against Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, George McGovern--and any other liberal on the ballot.

This anti-liberalism did not help the GOP much in state and local elections, since the Democrats running in those races generally shared the populists' views. Thus GOPers couldn't get much political running room.

However, the GOP did go from two Senate seats in 1960 to twelve seats in 1982 and from nine House seats to thirty-eight in that same period. So great progress was made in spite of our handicaps.

In all of these elections, the Republican formula for victory was to combine populist votes of the populists with country club votes to reach a majority.

In 1976 Jimmy Carter brought the Southern populists back into the Democratic camp after three straight Democratic losses. But in 1980 Carter lost them to Reagan and the GOP. Then the populist pendulum swung back in 1982, however, leaving the GOP with little besides the country-club base in elections from North Carolina to Mississippi.

b. Ideology

It is critical to our future success in the South that we understand the reasons for our inroads into the populist vote. As their name implies, populists are not laissez-faire free-marketers--they are not "laid back," not swayed by calm appeals to logic and reason.

Populists believe in activism. They believe the government should solve their problems for them. They believe in candidates who promise to shake up the establishment--leaders who promise bold, decisive action.

This profile fits the Democratic mold. To appeal to the Southern populists, we Republicans must come to grips with the deeply embedded ideology that has created many generations of these "yellow-dog" Democrats.

Populists have always been liberal on economics. So long as the crucial issues were generally confined to economics--as during the New Deal--the liberal candidate could expect to get most of the populist vote.

But populists are conservative on most social issues, including abortion, gun control and ERA. Also, populists usually lean conservative on foreign policy and national security issues. The South has always led the nation in volunteers in the military, particularly in the Vietnam War, giving rise to the joke about our troops being stationed in "South" Vietnam!

Thus, when Republicans are successful in getting certain social issues to the forefront, the populist vote is lost to liberal causes and the Democrats. The trick we must master is choosing those social issues which do not alienate the country clubbers since, again, we need their votes and the populists' to win in the South.

For Southerners, the presidential elections of 1968 and 1972 were referendums on social issues and foreign policy. Such elections proved progressively better for the Republicans as we achieved our desired coalition of the country clubbers, populists and also those blacks who shared our principles.

The elections of 1976 and 1980 were a mix of these issues as we held the upper strate of white society, but fell short of a majority among the populists. In 1980 we were able to get enough of the populist vote to carry the South, but in most Southern states we still fell short of a majority. Recall that Ronald Reagan's regionwide percentage was just 51.3%.

The Democrats recaptured the populist vote in 1982, and Republicans were dealt defeat from Southwest Virginia to Southwest Texas.

After Carter's defeat the Democrats backed away from their Great Society rhetoric and diverted public attention from busing, affirmative action, etc. and toward clear economic issues, e.g. "fairness."

In 1982 we discovered we could not hold the populist vote on economic issues alone. When social and cultural issues died down, the populists were left with no compelling reason to vote Republican.

In 1981 Democrats built an alliance of blacks and populists to win their first statewide election in Virginia in sixteen years and recaptured a House seat in Jackson, Mississippi. In 1982 the Democrats continued this coalition, and won enough of the populist vote to carry areas with only small black populations, i.e. Western Virginia and North Carolina.

c. Wallace

The resurrection of George Wallace, arch-demagogue of the South for a generation, is illustrative of the Democrat's move from social and foreign policy issues to economic issues. Wallace built his reputation as the man who literally stood in the way of Southern desegregation. Capitalizing on this social issue, Wallace staked out a career as a five-term Alabama governor (including that of his late wife, Lurleen).

After milking the establishment's discomfiture over social and foreign policy difficulties for everything they were worth in the 1960's, Wallace began to emerge as a major political force and then as a presidential candidate in 1968.

His economic views were always in the shadow of his other themes, but a reading of his 1968 platform reveals a liberal economic streak amidst all the conservative and pseudo-conservative rhetoric about social and foreign policy.

The American independent platform called for 100% farm parity, for higher social security payments, for more spending on education, for higher taxes on the "rich," etc.

Thus, Wallace's emphasis on liberal economics in 1982 is not inconsistent with his past. He did recant his old racism and totally ignored national security and defense issues as he won his fifth term as Governor. Keeping in mind that Alabama suffered from 15% unemployment, Wallace's populism appealed to both blacks and populists in 1982. Having healed that cleavage Wallace had an unbeatable formula for victory.

Wallace is not and never was a leader. He is a follower, a politician who follows the mob. Wallace is a mirror, endlessly polishing his image so that it perfectly reflects the majority of his audience. This he did in 1982 by choosing economics to spearhead his anti-establishment crusade.

Wallace is always an "agin'er," running against some perceived evil imposed on his constituency by the "big mules" in Birmingham or the "fat cats" in New York. Reaganomics was the punching bag in 1982, and Wallace abandoned his "not-a-dime's-worth-of-difference-between-the-two-parties" concept for the most blatantly anti-Republican race in his long career.

It enabled him to win both black and populist support, and while he lost nearly all of his country-club vote, he swept to an easy victory. Wallace has always found the necessary key to victory in Alabama, and this time he triggered the growing black constituency, moving from 4% of their votes in 1970 to about 90% in 1982.

3. The Blacks

a. 1982

When two arguably-reconstructed Southern Democrats like John Stennis and George Wallace rake in 90%-plus of a record-breaking black vote against credible Republicans in 1982, we know that something is going on.

That something is the increasing black loyalty to the Democratic party. and blind opposition to the Republicans on a scale that even Deep South Democratic whites have not displayed in a generation.

b. The Republican Past

Once upon a time, Southern blacks were Republicans--loyal adherents of the party of Lincoln and Emancipation. Republican blacks held office at all levels in the South during Reconstruction. When the last Federal troops left the South in 1877, white Democrats seized control of local governments, and eventually blacks were almost totally disenfranchised.

The last black Republican officeholder from the South was Congressman George White of North Carolina, elected for the last time in 1898. After that, Jim Crow ruled firmly in the South and no black was elected from the South for more than seventy years. (In the North, blacks elected their first Member of Congress as a Republican in Chicago's South Side. Oscar de Priest, who served from 1928 to 1934.)

Blacks were solidly Republican through 1932, voting overwhelmingly for Hoover's re-election in the midst of the Depression. By 1934, however, FDR's New Deal and the plethora of political social workers brought the black vote solidly into the Democratic camp.

The GOP machines in Philadelphia, Chicago and Cleveland were smashed. Republican vote totals in Northern cities plummeted as blacks switched their allegiance to the Democrats in massive numbers. Although Hoover had carried about 80% of the black vote in Philadelphia in 1932, the Democrats won 75% in 1934, a switch of monumental proportions.

Southern blacks (such as they were) remained more loyal to Republicans than their Northern cousins. Eisenhower did well among Southern blacks, winning heavily in Memphis, Atlanta and Little Rock. Bo Callaway, a Goldwater conservative, beat Lester Maddox by 10-1 in black precincts in 1966, and Winthrop Rockefeller regularly won in excess of 90% of the Arkansas black vote in his four gubernatorial runs.

c. The Democratic Present

The blacks who came into the electoral process in the South in the 1970's generally shared the intense devotion of Northern blacks to the party of Hubert Humphrey, Adam Clayton Powell, and Shirley Chisholm. By the early 1980's the difference between Northern and Southern blacks in terms of their Democratic allegiance was negligible--both were solidly Democratic.

Most alarming to Republicans are the numbers in which blacks are now regularly delivering Democratic majorities. Although Mississippi blacks are believed to have supported LBJ in 1964 with 98% of the vote, the total black turnout was 35,000, giving Johnson a 34,000 vote majority among blacks.

In 1980 black turnout in Mississippi is estimated at 300,000, giving Carter an appro mate 275,000 vote edge among blacks. Percentages here are academic--raw vote totals show the real and serious threat to our electoral success in the South.

To win in the South, Republicans must win up to 70% of the white vote to offset the phenomenal black majorities for the opposition. We must forge alliances between the country clubbers and the populists to achieve success, though the interests of these two groups are from from similar.

The soaring black turnout gives the Democrats a still-expanding base in every Southern state. This 30-45% base vote in each state gives them a leg up in nearly all Southern elections. It was the substantial size of the Democratic bases in each state that enabled so many questionable Democrats to win in 1982.

Obviously, remedial action is required. It is wrong for us to "write off" the black vote, especially as we have more to offer blacks than do the Democrats.

d. The Uncertain Future

Some black leaders are fearful of the consequences of total Democratic allegiance by their followers. Rev. Jesse Jackson lamented the 1982

elections stating that blacks loyally supported all white Democrats in the South, but that in the one major election (the 2nd District of Mississippi) involving a black Democrat, whites abandoned him for a white Republican.

Jackson has advocated a separate black party in the South, such as that present in 1978 in Mississippi when then-Representative Thad Cochran was elected Senator--the Magnolia State's first Republican to hold statewide office in this century.

A black third party would certainly damage the Democrats, but in my opinion it will be a long time before Southern blacks realize how the Democrats exploit them, and then break away. When they do, I predict they will join the GOP, not a third party.

4. The Fundamentals and the Republican Coalition, 1960-1982

Thus, we have as the main voting groups in Southern politics:

1. Country clubbers
2. Populists
3. Blacks

The first group--the former Bourbon Democrats who controlled the South by excluding groups two and three--are today reliably Republican. The third group--blacks--are reliably Democratic. In no state does either group have the numbers to assure a statewide victory.

Both groups must contend for the votes to the second group--the populists.

Actually, the populists are uneasy about alliances with either group. Their resentment of the wealth and status of the country clubbers offsets their historic antipathy for blacks.

The class struggle in the South continues, with the populists serving as the trump card in the game of politics. Table 33 presents in simplified form where the Southern populist vote went in the last six presidential elections, and also in 1982:

TABLE 33

	Republican	Democrat	Wallace
1960		x	
1964	x		
1968			x
1972	x		
1976		x	
1980	x		
1982		x	

Populists were still loyally Democratic in 1960 and were responsible for the election of John Kennedy. Such populist havens as Anderson and Spartanburg

Counties in South Carolina delivered massive majorities to JFK, offsetting the country-club Republican majorities of Charleston and Columbia.

Blacks, of course, were a minimal force in this election in the South. Goldwater swept the populists in the Deep and Outer South in 1964, giving the GOP five Southern states that had eluded Nixon in 1960. (Interestingly, if Southern indignation over liberal Democratic policies had advanced a little faster, giving Nixon the Deep South states in 1960 that Goldwater carried in 1964, Nixon would have been elected.)

In 1968 George Wallace, the candidate of Southern populism, carried five states, losing South Carolina and winning Arkansas, but otherwise duplicating the 1964 Goldwater Deep South sweep. Only the efforts of Strom Thurmond kept the Palmetto State in the GOP column.

In 1972 McGovern was unacceptable to populists, and was left with an almost exclusively black vote in much of the South.

The populists returned to the Democrats with Jimmy Carter in 1976, helped in part by Carter's conservative religious stance.

The South is the most overtly religious section of the country, and the political power wielded by conservative religious groups is unique in the United States. The South is a full generation "behind" the North in repealing prohibition statutes, and such issues as Sunday blue laws, prayer in school, etc. are much more prominent in the South than elsewhere, due to this strong religious influence.

Populists lost their ardor for Carter in 1980 although Ronald Reagan fell short of sweeping their vote. And in 1982 they returned overwhelmingly to the Democrats, with one exception, the 2nd District of Mississippi, where the Democratic nominee was black.

D. THE URBAN-RURAL SPLIT IN THE SOUTH

1. Historic Tensions

After decades of undisputed Democratic control of the South the Republicans first started showing signs of strength in 1920. Carrying the Outer South states of Tennessee, the GOP scored reasonably well in urban areas of the South.

Less Southern in heritage and outlook and with a growing quantity of transplanted Yankees, the urbanites of the South began edging away from blind Democratic allegiance after World War I. The countryside, however, continued to be overwhelmingly Democratic, and the Democratic grip was ironclad in rural areas well beyond the New Deal.

If anything, the increasing Republicanism of the cities reinforced Democratic strength in the rural areas. The historic urban-rural split was as pronounced in the South as in the North--although the South was the reverse of the North in this sense. In Dixie the city-dwellers were more Republican and countryfolk were more Democratic. The cities were not sufficiently

Republican to affect statewide elections, but a glance at election returns throughout the New Deal shows that Republican growth--such as it was-- was found almost exclusively in the urban areas of the South.

Several states have historic urban-rural splits which opened up opportunities for the Republicans to flourish in the cities. Atlanta has always stood apart from the rest of Georgia; Miami looks on itself as different from the remainder of Florida; and the urban-rural split in Texas is legendary.

In 1928, at the high tide of Jazz Age Republicanism, the national GOP ticket swept virtually all of the urban areas in the Outer South and even won a number of Deep South cities, including Birmingham, Atlanta and Augusta. All this prohibition-era Republican strength was wiped out in the Depression, but when Republican strength resurfaced under Eisenhower, it emerged strongest in the cities.

Eisenhower conquered Southern cities from Richmond to Lubbock and Louisville to Miami. Eisenhower carried the largest city in each of eight Southern states even though he carried only five states in the entire South. In 1956 he won the largest city in each of ten states. Even Nixon captured eight of these in 1960. Ike had carried all five major cities in Texas in 1956, and Nixon took three of them in 1960, although he lost Texas narrowly to Kennedy and Johnson.

The Republicans began to be competitive in the cities three decades ago. The GOP captured a Dallas House seat in 1954, and has held it all but two terms since then. The Texas GOP added a Houston seat in 1966, occupied by one George Bush. St. Petersburg, with its large retired Yankee population also elected a Republican to Congress in 1954, and the seat has been safely Republican since then.

Throughout the South it was in the cities the Republicans were predominant--and, thus, Birmingham, Atlanta, Mobile, Richmond, Charlotte, Columbia, Montgomery, Jackson, Little Rock, Louisville, Fort Lauderdale, Oklahoma City and Norfolk have joined the aforementioned cities in regularly electing Republicans to Congress.

Republicans were less successful in winning statewide. Georgia is a case in point. Such rural heroes as Eugene Talmadge and later his son Herman built majorities as the paladins of the Georgia "woolhats." For half a century, Georgia had an electoral-college-like system that greatly exaggerated the political strength of rural Georgians, who united in fighting Atlanta and the "threat" of cosmopolitanism. Of course, the whole purpose of the so-called unit-vote system was to cripple Atlanta's political power.

By the early '60's the cities in the South were markedly Republican. In 1962 Republican Jim Martin carried every urbanized area in Alabama but was defeated by 6,000 votes statewide as rural voters went 2:1 for old-time populist Democrat Senator Lister Hill.

In 1966 Senator John Tower swept every Texas county that cast more than 10,000 votes, but he nonetheless lost in more than 100 Texas counties, holding his margin to 56% in that strongly Republican year.

The only Republican candidates who have carried both urban and rural areas decisively were Goldwater in 1964 and Nixon in 1972. Aside from these aberrations, the Democratic faith seems to burn strongly in rural areas throughout the South. In contrast, Republicans have carried Tulsa in every election since 1936. Charleston (South Carolina) has supported Republicans in seven of the last eight presidential elections.

As we face the conundrum of building a coalition of country clubbers and populists, we have a similar problem in bridging the urban-rural dichotomy in the South. Rural Democrats disliked the city candidates when they were Bourbon Democrats and this dislike has extended to the Bourbon's descendants: country-club Republicans.

Since Republican strength is in the cities, and nearly all of Republican strength in the state legislatures is from the cities, it is inevitable that GOP candidates for statewide office hail from the cities. Similarly, the urban voters show great disdain for the "rednecks" who live beyond the suburbs.

a. Texas

In some states this is more of a problem than in others. Texas, despite its wide-open spaces, is a relatively urbanized state. The 1980 census reports that nearly 80% of all Texans live in cities, compared to a national average of 73.7% and a Southern average of 66.6%. Few people realize that three of the ten largest cities in the country are in Texas (Houston, Dallas and San Antonio).

It should be no surprise that Texas is one of the most Republican states in the South--as illustrated by the 1980 election returns. In Texas a Republican can win by concentrating on the burgeoning urban areas, and can write off 150 to 200 rural counties where "yellow-dog" Democrats still dominate.

b. Arkansas

Texas contrasts sharply with neighboring Arkansas, which is the seventh most rural state in the Union. Not surprisingly, Arkansas is among the strongest Democratic states in the South. It has the distinction of being the last Southern state to join the Republican presidential column in the 20th century, waiting until Nixon's 1972 landslide. It is also one of two states (Louisiana is the other) that has failed to elect a Republican senator in this century.

Actually, the urban-rural split in the South is now complicated by the advent of Southern suburbia. The central cities in the South have, as in the North, become increasingly black and thus less Republican. The suburban vote is now becoming substantial in the South, however, and is staggeringly Republican.

Lexington County (suburban Columbia, S.C.) alone provided Ronald Reagan with his 1980 majority in South Carolina, and suburban Richmond (Henrico and Chesterfield counties) are as astoundingly Republican as DuPage County, Illinois or Orange County, California.

At the same time, Republican fortunes are on the wane in central Richmond, which now has a black Democratic mayor, and in Richland County (Columbia proper), South Carolina where our majorities have been drastically cut in the past decade. In areas lacking a major suburban vote, e.g. Arkansas and Mississippi, Republican growth is minimized; while in the galloping suburbs of Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia Republican fortunes are soaring.

c. Georgia

Some Southern states have a reputation for urbanization that they don't deserve. Most of us think that Atlanta is Georgia and that this vibrant and dynamic city must now control most of Georgia's voting population. True, Atlanta ranks 16th in size among SMSA's (Standard Metropolitan Statistic Areas) in the country and third in the South. However, the great majority of Georgians live in "Jimmy Carter country" where the voters would elect a yellow dog before they would support a Republican.

i. Mattingly and Talmadge

It requires hugh percentages in metro Atlanta for a Republican to win in Georgia.

This did happen in 1980 when GOPer Mack Mattingly won overwhelming majorities in urbanized Georgia to beat the long-standing hero of rural Georgians, Herman Talmadge, by 27,000 votes statewide. Talmadge had, of course, been weakened by allegations of impropriety and a sloppy divorce. He won 136 of Georgia's 153 counties, which wasn't quite enough to combat Mattingly's huge leads in the seventeen urbanized counties of the state. The urban-rural hostility cuts both ways, thus helping Mattingly in the cities.

Mattingly won Fulton County with 54% of the vote, even though it is 51% black. Obviously many blacks were motivated more by the traditional antagonism against rural candidates to vote Republican this one race. Mattingly won the state by 27,543 votes; Fulton County gave Mattingly almost all that margin--26,861 votes--even as Carter carried Fulton County by 54,000 votes in the presidential race.

ii. The Georgia Gubernatorial Races of 1966, 1970 and 1982

The 1980 Senate race was a fluke --the first statewide election office we have ever won. The 1982 governor's race was more true to the general pattern of statewide races in Georgia. That pattern is: the Republican candidate wins in the Atlanta suburbs, and loses in the central city and in the rest of the state outside the metropolitan region.

In 1982 Bob Bell won the suburban Atlanta area by 15,000 votes, lost Fulton County by 24,000 votes and was swamped in the rest of the state by 291,000 votes. The net deficit for Bell--one of the most attractive Republicans ever to run statewide in Georgia--was a cool 300,000 out of 1.1 million cast.

The 1982 race suggests that the Republicans are firmly entrenched in the cellar of Georgia politics. This does not mean that we can't

win in the Peach State, but it does mean that the preponderant rural population, with its rabidly anti-Atlanta bias, is going to continue to vote its Democratic proclivities. The Republicans seem unable to increase their vote total by much in the Atlanta area, while they are running substantially worse in the rural areas than they did a decade-and-a-half ago.

A look at the three gubernatorial campaigns in Georgia where the GOP has made a serious effort to win is instructive as to the problems Republicans face not only in Georgia but also in other Southern states where the Republican cities (Tulsa, Jackson, Birmingham) look out into a countryside burgeoning with Democrats.

The three races in question are 1966, 1970 and 1982. Prior to 1962 the Republicans had not contested the statehouse in nearly a century, while our candidates in 1974 and 1978 got an average of less than 25%--about what any second name on a ballot can get!

The 1966 race between Republican Bo Callaway and Lester Maddox is famous because Callaway got 3,000 more votes than Maddox--and lost. Under the dubious laws of the time, if neither candidate won a majority of the vote in the general election, the decision went to the state legislature, which chose Maddox. (The Democrats put a write-in candidate into the race--against his will--specifically to drive Callaway's percentage of the total vote below a majority. But that bit of skullduggery is water under the bridge.)

The relevant point is that not only did Callaway do well in the Atlanta area, but he got 45% of the rural vote, which then was nearly three-fourths of the total Georgia vote. This respectable showing in the rural areas, continued with his 64% showing in metro Atlanta netted Callaway a 3,000-vote statewide plurality, which was stolen away from him as described above.

What has changed since 1966? Why have we gone from 50.1% of the two-party vote to 37.2% in 1982? For two main reasons:

First, the howling outrage of white Southerners against the Democratic party over civil rights peaked in 1964-68 and then subsided.

Callaway was riding a wave of hostility toward the Democrats when he was elected to Congress in 1964 and was still riding on it in 1966. In the ensuing years, not only have most rural whites calmed down, but rural blacks have started voting, further strengthening the Democrats.

Second, in Atlanta the black vote has become pre-eminent. Callaway got 78,000 votes in Fulton County in 1966, while Bell got just 56,000 in 1982. The suburban Republican vote has grown larger--from 78,000 in 1966 to 120,000 in 1982--but this is simply not enough in this rural state.

Graph 19 shows how the stagnating Republican vote has been outstripped by the Democratic vote. The raw numbers (in thousands) shown in Table 34 are:

TABLE 34

	Republican	Democrat	Republican	Democrat	R % of 2-party vote
1966	Bo Callaway	Lester Maddox	453	450	50.1%
1970	Hal Suit	Jimmy Carter	424	620	40.6%
1982	Bob Bell	Joe Frank Harris	434	734	37.2%

Thus the Republican candidate in 1982 got fewer votes than his predecessor did sixteen years before. And this in a state where turnout is up 29% in that period! Admittedly, 1982 was a tough year, but Bell was a good candidate. These points are illustrated by Graphs 16-19.

The problem for the GOP is that the vote in metropolitan Atlanta is too small to outweigh the huge rural vote. Tables 35 and 36 indicate that while the suburban vote is the fastest-growing in Georgia, it is still relatively small.

TABLE 35

Changes in Turnout in Georgia 1966-1982

Whole state	+ 29%
Suburbs	+ 77%
Rest of State	+ 22%
Fulton County (Atlanta)	+ 18%

TABLE 36

Share of the Total Georgia Vote: By Region, 1966 and 1982

	1966	1982
Rest of State	73%	69%
Suburbs	14%	19%
Fulton County	13%	12%

What does all this prove? One thing it does not prove is that Republicans are doomed in Georgia. Mack Mattingly proved that in 1980 and will likely prove it again in 1986. But the example of Georgia does show what happens to a state Republican party when it is ghettoized in the suburbs of the major metropolis.

When the GOP is isolated, then the country folk who dislike big cities and the country clubbers who inhabit them are even more attracted to the Democratic party. The experience of the GOP in Georgia demonstrates

GRAPH 16

GUBERNATORIAL

GEORGIA VOTE BY REGION

1966 - 1970 - 1982

FULTON COUNTY (ATLANTA)



LEGEND:

= DEMOCRATIC VOTE IN THOUSANDS

= REPUBLICAN VOTE IN THOUSANDS

GRAPH 17

ATLANTA SUBURBS (Cobb, Cherokee, Clayton, Dekalb, Douglas, Forsythe, Gwinnett, + Rockdale counties)



GRAPH 18

REST OF THE STATE



GRAPH 19

TOTAL GEORGIA VOTE 1966 - 1970 - 1982 GUBERNATORIAL RACES



LEGEND

= DEMOCRATIC VOTE IN THOUSANDS

= REPUBLICAN VOTE IN THOUSANDS

how advantageous it is for us to have a political base in the country to neutralize the anti-urban bias, as in Tennessee, where the Republican grip has been strong since the Civil War. If we don't have such a base, we should make the creation of one a major project. John Paul Hammerschmidt and the Republicans of Northwest Arkansas have done a fantastic job in building up Republicanism on the Ozark Plateau.

Thanks to their efforts, the GOP is actually a statewide force for the first time in a century. Now we know that if we can win a large enough share of the Little Rock area vote, we can win even if we get swamped in the area bordering the Mississippi River.

d. South Carolina

South Carolina also has a pronounced urban-rural dichotomy, which has been evident in close presidential elections.

In 1960 Nixon swept the three major South Carolina counties--Charleston, Greenville and Richland (Columbia)-- with more than 60% of the vote. The Republican total in these three large counties was 64,000, compared to 37,000 for the Democratic nominee, John Kennedy.

But the Democratic tradition prevailed in the rural remainder of the state, where Kennedy won 161,000 to 124,000. Kennedy's surplus of 37,000 votes in the countryside exceeded his 27,000-vote deficit in the three large counties, and thus he carried the state by less than 10,000 votes.

In 1980 Ronald Reagan also prevailed in the cities and lost in the boonies, but this time the Republicans had the votes to spare. President Reagan's vote in the big three counties--Charleston, Greenville, and Richland--was 126,000 to 97,000. Note that this margin of 29,000 votes was only 2,000 votes larger than Nixon's margin in the same counties in 1960. The black Democratic vote is gaining ground on the white Republican vote in the established cities, just as in Atlanta.

However, there was a significant GOP shift in some of the smaller and newer urban areas in South Carolina. Five counties (Aiken, Anderson, Florence, Lexington, and Spartanburg) gave the Republicans a 109,000 - 87,000 vote victory in 1980, compared to the 37,000 - 50,000 vote defeat the Democrats inflicted on us in these counties in 1960.

Indeed, Lexington County, which encompasses the suburbs of Columbia, and has emerged as one of the strongest Republican areas in the South (Nixon got 86% of the vote there in 1972), gave Ronald Reagan a margin of 15,979 votes in a state he won by 13,647 votes.

E. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE SOUTH

1. Populism and Conservatism in the Past

Too much has been written about the "conservatism" of the South. The South is not conservative. If one label had to be ascribed to the whole South, that label should be "populist."

Populists are "conservative" on defense and social issues, but "liberal" when it comes to economics. This was never more apparent than during the 1930's, when Southerners delivered to Roosevelt his highest victory percentages and the largest delegation of loyal New Dealers in Congress.

The South was poor. Even the Bourbon Democrats, who were affluent relatives to their fellow Southerners, were poor relative to the North. The Bourbons greatly appreciated the TVA, cotton price supports, better roads, more money for education, etc. All this went double for the really poor whites and the even more impoverished blacks.

Most of the better known Southern politicians of the period--Bilbo, Johnston, Sparkman, Black and Pepper (the same Claude Pepper, elected to the Senate in 1936), and of course Huey Long--were ardent New Dealers.

It has even been argued that Huey Long's threat of a third-party candidacy in 1936 was what drove Roosevelt to the left in the last two years of his first term, after having run in 1932 on a conservative, budget balancing platform.

Thus we got Social Security, higher income tax rates, the Wagner Act and greatly expanded public works in 1935-36. Remember that civil and equal rights were not salient issues in the 1930's. If the Northern Democrats had raised the issue in the '30's, as they did in the '40's, the Solid South would undoubtedly have fragmented even sooner.

But the race question was never seriously addressed, and Southern populism flourished, with its Achilles heel of civil rights never touched.

2. Populism and Conservatism in the Present

We have discussed what did happen to the South and the Democrats during the two decades of fragmentation that commenced in 1948. We have seen how the South reunified in the early '70's, flip-flopping unanimously between the GOP and the Democrats and back again.

After all this, how much of the old populist fervor still beats in the hearts of Southerners? Apparently a great deal.

On social issues, the South is still the most conservative area, as per the populist mold. Table 37 shows responses to a Gallup Poll question on gun control, asked in June 1982.

TABLE 37

Gun Control

	Favor	Oppose
East	74	23
Midwest	67	30
West	64	32
South	59	35

On foreign policy, the South also demonstrates its populist bent with its extreme hawkishness, per a December 1982 Gallup poll shown in Table 38.

TABLE 38

Improve Relations with the USSR

	Favor	Oppose
West	79	15
Midwest	74	19
East	72	17
South	59	29

But on economics, the liberal side of Southern populism shines through, viz. Table 39:

TABLE 39

Percentage of Respondents Listing Unemployment as the Most Serious Problem

Midwest	58
South	45
East	44
West	36

The ranking by region in Table 39 may not seem that remarkable until the reader learns that of the four regions, the South has the lowest unemployment rate. Admittedly, Alabama has the third-highest rate in the nation, but it is far outweighed by Texas, whose unemployment rate is well below the national average. In November, the last month for which state-by-state breakdowns are available, the overall unemployment rate for the South was 9.5%, against 10.4% nationwide.

On question after question--from willingness to raise Social Security taxes to maintain current benefits, to guaranteeing each able-bodied American a job, to spending more on education and health care--the South rates as the most economically liberal region in the country.

3. The Image of the GOP

The Republicans, still regarded by many Southerners as the party of Wall Street, will have to work to keep the loyalty of Southerners who came to the GOP because of their disenchantment with Democratic foreign and social policies, not out of enthusiasm for supply side economics.

I certainly believe that an economic boom awaits the country in the 1980's, thanks to the tax and budget legislation of 1981-82. As the economy moves

toward full recovery in the next few years, we should look for opportunities to score some points with Southern populists, who are today still unconvinced about our economic recovery program.

F. CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTH

It is clear that the days of Bourbon/Tory/Byrd Democratic control of the South are over for good. Not only has the old conservative Democratic class lost its numerical advantage over the populists and blacks, but they no longer exert much political leadership.

This was especially true in Texas in 1982, where Republican Governor Bill Clements got the endorsement of a slew of establishment politicians--all of them former or present Democrats--and got walloped.

Much of the Republican strength in the Deep South and in those Outer South states without a strong GOP tradition (e.g. Texas) comes from Bourbon/Tory/Byrd Democrats who became fed up with their ancestral party and switched.

It also should be recalled that poor whites and blacks never liked this group when they all were under the same partisan roof. Now that the Bourbons have migrated to the GOP, the remaining two classes of Democrats don't miss them at all.

In addition, the huge surge in turnout we saw over the last decade has mostly served to strengthen the populists and blacks. This has weakened the relative strength of those conservative Democrats who remain. I predict that we will see either a gradual leftward drift among the Boll Weevils or else a series of successful primary challenges launched by insurgent Democratic liberals.

If in 1984 we were confronting the Southern electorate as it was demographically composed in 1964, i.e. mostly Bourbon Democrats, we would be winning every race in sight.

If in 1984 we were to go before the Southern electorate circa 1972, we could easily duplicate the GOP triumph of that year.

However, such is not the case. We face a three-part Southern electorate--country club Republicans, populists, and blacks, with the populists being the swing group. It is on the cultivation of this middle group that our hope for a Republican South rests.

APPENDIX

I. LOUISIANA: DEEP SOUTH STATE IN TRANSITION

When people think of Louisiana politics, they think of Huey Long. His legend and his left-wing populism still influence the state. But Long's notoriety--almost 50 years after his death--obscures a pronounced conservative trend in the state in recent decades.

Louisiana is a Deep South state, and as such, it voted solidly Democratic in every presidential election from 1880 to 1944. True to its Deep Southern racial preoccupation, the Pelican State went with Thurmond and the Dixiecrats in 1948. In 1952 it and the rest of the Deep South swung back in unison to the Democratic fold, even as the Outer South went overwhelmingly for Eisenhower.

Then, in 1956, the unthinkable happened--Louisiana went Republican. Even as the other four Deep South states went Democratic, giving the General an average vote of 36%, the man from Abilene won 53% of the vote in Louisiana. Louisiana's breaking of ranks represented the first time that a Deep South state had gone Republican in 80 years.

But, if one had to pick one of the five Deep South states that is least like the other four, it would have to be Louisiana. The most salient distinction is the French influence. One sixth of the people in the state speak French as their native tongue; twice as many have French surnames. About one-third are Catholic.

Another important difference is oil. Petroleum is such a major factor in the state economy that some geographers no longer include Louisiana in the Deep South, they list it under a new rubric--"the oil patch"--along with Oklahoma and Texas. Louisiana used to be one of the poorest states in the Union as the other heavily black Deep South states still area. But oil has pulled Louisiana up to where it now has the fifth highest per capita income in the South.

Thus it should not come as a great shock to learn that Louisiana was President Reagan's fifth-best state in 1980, just beyond four markedly Republican Outer South states--Florida, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia. Interestingly, these four Outer South states are the same four that rank ahead of Louisiana in per capita income.

Louisiana also shares with the aforementioned Outer South quartet the distinction of being the only Southern states to give Ronald Reagan more than 50% of the total vote in 1980. In addition, Louisiana joins with Florida, Texas, and Virginia as being one of the four Southern states where President Reagan received more total votes than did Richard Nixon in 1972. I take this last measure to be a good indicator of booming Republican strength.

Although the Democrats control both Senate seats and six of the eight House seats at present, I am optimistic that we will seize a larger share of the state's delegation in 1984.

Of course, the GOP can never be complacent about a state that is 30% black--so long as the blacks are voting overwhelmingly Democratic. But if we can prove to the blacks that our policies work for them, too (after all plenty of once dirt-poor blacks are getting rich after President Reagan's oil decontrol policy inspired oil companies to buy the mineral rights to their land along the Tuscaloosa Trench), then we can look forward to a bright future in the Pelican State.

II. THE APPALACHIANS: DECLINING REPUBLICAN STRENGTH

The Appalachian Mountains were the bastion of the Republican party in the South for a century after the Civil War. The mountaineers in Eastern Tennessee and Western North Carolina never saw any need to secede from the Union in 1860-61. They had no slaves, and thus no interest in defending the slave system. It was the Democratic plantation owners in the flat Mississippi valley in Western Tennessee and in the Tidewater in Eastern North Carolina that forced their states into secession along with the rest of the South. All except for Kentucky; where the forces arrayed against the plantation owners in the Jackson Purchase and the Pennyrile were strong enough to keep that slave state from seceding.

Even as the planters flocked to the Confederate colors, the mountaineers joined the Union. Eastern Tennessee even continued to send Congressmen to Washington--Republicans of course--of whom the best known was Andrew Johnson. Not surprisingly the cleavages between the mountains and the lowlands were sharp, and the loyalties to the respective parties, tempered by the fire of war, have proven to be lasting. Eastern Tennessee has not sent a Democrat to Congress from either of its two districts since 1859. Similarly, the lowland districts in Tennessee and North Carolina--at opposite ends of the Appalachians--have never elected Republicans to the House.

The flatland areas of Tennessee and North Carolina have all the common characteristics of the Deep South--relative poverty, high black populations (a legacy of the plantation days), and ardent loyalty to the Democratic party. On the other hand, the mountain areas in East Tennessee and Western North Carolina resemble the rest of Appalachia--relative poverty, very few blacks (the mountains were never suitable for plantation-style agriculture) and ardent loyalty to the Republican party. The Republicans in Tennessee were particularly strong. The Volunteer State was the first Southern state to go Republican since Reconstruction when it broke ranks with the Solid South to vote for Harding in 1920.

Parts of Appalachia (and all of West Virginia) moved decisively to the Democrats in the 1930's, when the miners became Democratic United Mine Workers, but much of the area--including some of the most impoverished territory in the U.S.--stayed with the alleged party of the rich, the GOP.

The political convulsions of the South from 1948 to 1968 broke down some of the old loyalties, as has the passage of time. Lifelong Southern Democrats in Western Tennessee and Eastern North Carolina find that their old political faith no longer sustains them. They feel closer to the GOP now on most issues.

On the other hand, the mountain folk can no longer quite remember why they are Republicans, especially when the Democrats seem more in tune with welfare and food stamp recipients, as many in the barren hills and hollers are.

Thus the political proclivities of the highlands and lowlands are starting to even out. The old white Democrats are trending Republican although in areas with particularly large black populations this trend has been stopped in its tracks as the blacks start to vote. At the same time, the old Republicans are moving toward the Democratic party.

The net result has been a weakening of the GOP in the Southern states through which the Appalachians run--Tennessee, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia. Consider the political line ups in the two most Appalachian-influenced states in 1970 and in 1982.

TABLE 40

1970

	Kentucky		Tennessee		Total, both States	
	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	Dem.
Senate	2	0	2	0	4	0
Governorship	1	0	1	0	2	0
1982						
Senate	0	2	1	1	1	3
Governorship	0	1	0	1	0	2

The core problem seems to be that we are losing our grip on the Appalachian vote at a slow pace, while the Democratic vote in the lowlands seems to have held firm (although the composition of that Democratic vote has changed, as more and more blacks start to participate in elections). In the 5th District of Kentucky, which the GOP has held continuously since the Civil War (except for the 1932 election, which was held before the legislature got around to redistricting following the 1930 census; in that year, all nine Kentucky House seats were elected on at-large basis. By 1934 the new lines were in place and the 5th went back to the GOP. The Depression had nothing to do with this one defeat!) Congressman Hal Rogers was re-elected with the lowest Republican turnout in this district in this century. Rogers did not come even close to losing last year, but the low turnout does suggest flagging enthusiasm for the GOP in this area. In 1982 we lost two House seats we had held in the upcountry of Virginia for sixteen and thirty years, respectively. We also lost two in the hills of North Carolina. We lost two more in mountainous West Virginia although that state is outside the scope of this study.

Obviously, if we can't deliver healthy margins for our candidates in our core areas, we can't expect our candidates to win in the hardcore Democratic areas. Thus our declining performance in statewide elections in Kentucky and Tennessee.

A look at the GOP in statewide races in Tennessee since 1966 suggests strongly that declining Republicanism in the Eastern Tennessee mountains is

starting to hurt us. As Graph 21 shows, in elections from 1966 to 1974 the GOP candidate ran around ten points better in the 1st and 2nd Congressional Districts (the mountains) than he did statewide. Since then, however, the GOP edge in the two Eastern Districts has been more in the area of five points. Graphs 20 and 21 illustrate the declining contribution of the East Tennessee mountains to the Republican totals.

Taken by itself this trend might not mean much. But combined with data we have about declining Republicanism in the Southern mountains, we should monitor this trend closely and redouble our efforts to hold this critical political base. Recall that the curse of Southern GOP's such as the one in Georgia is the fact that they are locked into the major urban center, where they fall victim to traditional urban-rural antagonisms, genuine questions of political philosophy are obscured. To thrive in the South, the GOP needs to spread its roots.

THE DECLINING REPUBLICAN VOTE IN THE TENNESSEE MOUNTAINS 1966-1982

GRAPH 20



GRAPH 21



IV. THE SOUTH IN 1984 & BEYOND

A. THE REPUBLICANS WITHOUT KENNEDY

Immediately after the 1982 elections we said that the GOP doesn't have any problem in Dixie that can't be solved by a Teddy Kennedy candidacy in 1984.

The Southern electorate has changed much since 1972, and the changes have been beneficial to the Democrats. Thus Kennedy would run a lot better in 1984 than did fellow Northern liberal George McGovern in 1972, but Teddy's negatives are so legendary that he would still get clobbered by a solid white vote that would overwhelm the virtually unanimous black vote.

Kennedy is an unrepentant liberal in a region that is hostile to overt (as opposed to covert) liberals. "Moderate" Southern Democrats don't usually have a hard time getting re-elected, even when most of the time they support the policies of Kennedy or Tip O'Neill. The 1982 victories of Senators Bentsen (Texas), Chiles (Florida), and Sasser (Tennessee) and Governors Clinton (Arkansas) and Riley (South Carolina) prove this.

If he gets the nomination, Mondale might successfully position himself as a moderate in 1984. If he does manage to remake his ideological image, we may have trouble in the South. The same conservative Democrats and independents--the populists--that have kept the Democrats on top in the South could lift Mondale in 1984.

Consider the Gallup Poll's January results as a warning shot for 1984. They showed Mondale besting President Reagan in the South by 52% to 33%.

Our strategy, of course, must be to portray Mondale as what he is--a Kennedy liberal. Mondale is the man who a few years ago, for example, said that America looked more and more like South Africa every day.

The same goes for any other Democratic nominee. I don't believe they will nominate anyone but a liberal in 1984.

B. THE PERFECT REPUBLICAN NOMINEE

In 1980, Ronald Reagan persuaded Southerners to vote against one of their own. Southerners are fiercely proud of their region, and yet they cooperated in the ouster of the only President from the Deep South this country has had in 120 years.

If Southerners ever feel that the Republican for whom they broke tradition to vote for has let them down, the backlash could be overwhelming.

To be sure, Ronald Reagan has tremendous appeal in the South. He's much more popular than his Party and would run better in Dixie than any other Republican. But there is as yet no certainty that he will run again.

Whoever heads the GOP ticket in 1984 will have to inspire Southerners to once again violate their Democratic heritage and vote Republican. The South's gut instincts are still Democratic. Southerners only vote Democratic when they feel they must.

Richard Nixon always ran well in the South, precisely because the South feels an affinity for leaders who show hostility towards the establishment. Nixon's great political achievement in 1972 was that he preserved that stance, when he was running as an incumbent.

In 1980 Ronald Reagan had a tinge of populism in his speeches, and this did not hurt him with the masses of working class whites from Virginia to Texas.

Since President Reagan has not changed his fundamental values and beliefs since coming to Washington, there is no reason why he should not also be able to project a winning "outsider" image in 1984.

C. CONGRESSIONAL RACES

In 1984, twelve of the twenty-six Senate seats from the South will be contested, as shown in Table 41.

TABLE 41

Republicans	Democrats
Baker - Tennessee	Boren - Oklahoma
Cochran - Mississippi	Heflin - Alabama
Helms - North Carolina	Huddleston - Kentucky
Thurmond - South Carolina	Johnston - Louisiana
Tower - Texas	Nunn - Georgia
Warner - Virginia	Pryor - Arkansas

Six of the twelve Southern Republicans in the Senate are up for re-election in 1984. Of those planning to seek re-election, only Warner has the results of a statewide election (Trible vs. Davis) to offer encouragement. Four of the others whose seats come up in '84--Baker, Cochran, Thurmond and Tower--saw Democrats win major statewide races last year. The sixth, Helms, saw the Republicans lose two House seats in North Carolina as well as several promising challenge races. A Reagan landslide should hold all these in the GOP column and maybe add more.

In the House, we will want to at least recapture the ground lost in 1982. We have shown that we can win most of the 129 Congressional districts in the South. For example, at one time or another in the last twenty years we have won four of the five districts in Mississippi, four of seven in Alabama, and eight of eleven in North Carolina. As recently as 1980 we won four of the six seats in South Carolina and nine of ten in Virginia.

D. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE 1984 SOUTH

To win in 1984, we must remember the fundamentals of Southern politics. The Southern electorate divides into three fundamental groups:

1. Country clubbers (Republican)
2. Populists (usually Democratic; will swing to the GOP under the right circumstances)
3. Blacks (Democratic)

In 1984 we must assemble coalitions in every Southern state largely based on the country clubbers and the populists. We must stave off Democratic attempts to forge a strong coalition of populists and blacks, by targeting both.

1. The Country Clubbers

The country clubbers will go Republican in 1984. "Stay the Course" works with them, their taxes are lower, inflation is lower, and their jobs were never in jeopardy.

2. The Populists

a. The Question

The populists remain a mystery. Ronald Reagan won the bulk of them in 1980 and the GOP lost most of them in 1982. The President inspired them in 1980, but the Democrats ignited them in 1982, as the turnout figures attest. Whose issues dominate--theirs or ours--will determine the populists' allegiance in 1984.

b. The New Right

No discussion of Southern populism is complete without some examination of the New Right, which is strongest in the South. Some say that the results of the 1982 elections, particularly in North Carolina, show that the New Right is dead. I disagree.

If the New Right agenda was just a constellation of issues--ERA, abortion, gun control, etc.--then one might argue the New Right's time had come and gone--like the Temperance League and Prohibition.

The New Right's strength comes from deep within the nation's psyche. So long as there is an Establishment there will be populists to oppose it. Conflict is inevitable. From the 1820's Jacksonian "revolt of the rustics" to the 1890's agrarian populist rebellion to today's New Right, there have been and will be issue-specific movements against the stale status quo.

Nobody knows which issues will divide the "ins" from the "outs" in the 1980's. Some say the issues will be the "three i's"--imports, immigration and isolationism. Whatever the key issues turn out to be, shrewd political

strategists will seek to harness the zeal and dynamism of the "outs" to use against the "ins."

In the 1980's the "outs" will be stronger than ever, since they have a pronounced numerical advantage.

c. Middle American Radicals

As we make preparations for 1984, we must ask ourselves: which issues will motivate the outsiders? Economic issues? Social issues? Foreign policy?

Populists are by no means unique to the South. Not only is the average Southerner a conservative Democrat, but so is the average American! In difficult times populists above and below the Mason-Dixon Line become alienated and somewhat radicalized.

Today the Northern equivalents of Southern populists are known as "Middle American Radicals" or "Center Extremists." These middle- and working-class Americans feel so alienated from both parties that many list themselves as Independents.

In their guts they probably feel closer to the Republicans on most issues. However, traditional antipathies and memories of the Depression and the New Deal skew them toward the Democrats. Result: ticket-splitting.

In any case, the Middle American Radicals, Northern and Southern, can be won over by either party. They are the critical swing group across the nation. Thus a well-conceived campaign to win the Southern populists would, with a few modifications, win the North Middle American Radicals as well.

d. Negative Advertising

The most effective single campaign tactic for winning populist votes is negative advertising. Just as the advantage in warfare continually shifts between the offense and defense (e.g. the stirrup aiding the offense at one point, the machine gun aiding the defense, and the tank helping the offense), so too in politics the advantage shifts between the positive and the negative.

We need to hit the Democrats for preaching higher taxes as the solution to our problems. We then should blast the Democrats for their special interest-oriented social engineering schemes. Finally we lay into them for their weak-kneed and irresolute foreign and national security policies.

We must paint a vivid picture of what things would be like if Jimmy Carter-type policies were brought back to The White House. This is the only way that we can tear the populists from the Democrats' embrace. Richard Headlee and Lew Lehrman exemplified this full-bore approach, and both did far better than most expected.

e. Values and Issues

To contrast the "ultimate beliefs" of each party to the voters, we should emphasize the deep, traditional, values of Ronald Reagan and his Party vs. the shallow, trendy, notions of the national Democratic Party. Note the way that fundamental values are translated into potent issues, as depicted in Table 42.

TABLE 42

Values	Issues
Peace	defense
Neighborhood	crime, private ownership, busing
Work	taxes, regulation, enterprise zones
Freedom	defense, regulation
Security	defense, homeownership, crime
Church	school prayer
Patriotism	defense
Opportunity	taxes, regulation
Fairness	inflation, taxes, regulation

If we can cut through the Democratic rhetoric to communicate our superior values and issues to the voters, we should be in good shape for 1984.

If we successfully slice through the Democratic posturing we will win the votes of Independents and those who think conservative but vote Democratic. Then we will have achieved the conservative realignment that has been stalled for almost two decades.

In the South, this means uniting the populists and the country clubbers, even as we bid for a higher share of the black vote.

Once the Democrats are fingered as the party of the liberal establishment, the likes of Mondale, Chiles, Hunt, and Sasser will have trouble posing as "moderates." We will have isolated the Democrats into the extreme left of the political spectrum.

3. The Blacks

The black vote was disappointing for us in 1982, as in recent years. In 1982 every consideration save party label was irrelevant to Southern black voters. We must take action to break up this solid phalanx of black votes.

Our best hope for inroads into the black vote is with the black middle class which shares the same ultimate beliefs, in terms of work and family, as does the white middle class.

Since the Republican Party ably represents the white middle class, there is no reason why it shouldn't represent more of the black middle class; as America and the GOP continue to move toward the goal of a color-blind society.

In the South blacks comprise 20.7% of the population. They represent 20% or more of the population of 57 of the 129 Congressional districts in Dixie. Black voters broke records for turnout in 1982, and we must expect them to continue this trend in 1984. One of our key objectives for 1984 and beyond must be to garner a larger fraction of the black vote.

E. PARTY BUILDING

We should devote more attention to building up our various state GOP organizations in the South. To assure that our victory in 1984 extends to all levels, we need stronger grassroots activity, more broadly-based organizations, and pure and simply: more registered Republicans!

It is noteworthy that four of the five Senators the GOP elected in the South in 1980 were born elsewhere and moved South as adults (Denton is from Maryland, Hawkins is from Utah, and both East and Mattingly are from Illinois, only Nickles is from the state that elected him--Oklahoma).

Clearly many of the Republican parties around the South are still dominated by transplanted Northerners. There is nothing wrong with this--we need to run the best candidates we can find. But we will never truly be on an equal footing with the Democrats in the South until we develop credible, indigenous candidates.

F. PLAYING UP OUR MILITARY STRENGTH

As we saw in Table 38 in Section III, the South is our most hawkish region. Even as our national security policies are under attack in Washington, I can say with certainty that our defense buildup is popular in Dixie.

The military tradition runs deep in the South. Southerners have made more than their share of the collective national sacrifice to keep our nation free and strong. Southerners believe strongly in America and the flag and they don't care who knows it.

The South has innumerable defense installations, providing jobs and income from one end of the region to the other. The South is also heavy with military retirees, who are particularly sympathetic to this GOP Administration as it struggles to restore America's strength. We should not be bashful about tooting our horn on this subject, if only in the South.

G. THE NEED FOR MORE STUDY

Like stock market analysts and weather forecasters, politicians tend to exaggerate their individual powers of clairvoyance and intuition. The truth is that nobody knows the future.

I have done my best to examine past trends and to deduce what they portend for the future. But, as Ben Franklin said, two things--and only two things--are certain.

I hope to be able in the next year or so to devote further study to the Southern political situation. This memo outlines some of my recent research, together with some thoughts about 1984. But there is plenty of intellectual spadework to be done between now and the election.

The real contest--for the "hearts and minds" of the voters--has already begun. The outcome of 1984's collision of ideas and ideologies could well depend on the nation's largest and most cohesive region--the South.