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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder: [Washington Summit Briefing Book:] The Meetings
of President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev, Washington, DC, 12/08/1987-12/10/1987
(1)

Date: 08/25/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (91322)	Colin Powell to Reagan re meetings w/Gorbachev (w/notations), 2p R 10/29/10 F97-066/7 #173	12/2/87	B1
2. memo	George Shultz to Reagan re Washington Summit, 2p R 3/16/06 DLS 97-066/7 #174	12/1/87	B1
3. agenda	annotated agenda re Gorbachev's visit to Washington, 5p R 11 u #175	n.d.	B1
4. list	US-Soviet Issues Checklist, 8p R u #176	n.d.	B1
5. briefing paper	Scene Setter: Tuesday, December 8, 2p R u #177	n.d.	B1
6. talking points	for Reagan's first meeting w/Gorbachev, 10p R u #178	n.d.	B1
7. point paper	re nuclear and space talks, 4p R u #179	n.d.	B1

RESTRICTIONS

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].

B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].

B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].

B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].

B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].

B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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KEN DUBERSTEIN

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

4/26/04 KOB

THE MEETINGS
of
PRESIDENT REAGAN
and
GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV

Washington D.C.

December 8-10, 1987

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BRIEFING BOOK

White House Gui , August 28, 1991

ADR N , Date 8/28/91 TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. OVERVIEW PAPERS
 - Powell Overview Paper
 - Shultz Overview Paper
- II. SCHEDULE
 - Annotated Agenda
- III. US-SOVIET ISSUES CHECKLIST
- IV. SCENE SETTERS
- V. OPENING REMARKS
- VI. POINT PAPERS/TALKING POINTS
 - 1. NST Issues
 - A. Point Papers
 - B. Talking Points
 - 1. INF Treaty
 - 2. START
 - 3. Defense and Space
 - 4. Compliance
 - 5. Follow-on Negotiations
 - 2. Non-NST Arms Control
 - A. Point Paper
 - B. Talking Points
 - 1. Chemical Weapons
 - 2. Nuclear Testing
 - 3. Conventional Arms Control
 - 4. CSCE Follow-up Meeting
 - 5. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
 - 6. Soviet Military Practice
 - 7. Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
 - 8. Gorbachev's Murmansk Speech
 - 9. Confidence Building Measures in Asia

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3. Regional Issues

- A. Point Paper
- B. Talking Points
 - 1. Introduction
 - 2. Afghanistan
 - 3. Iran-Iraq War
 - 4. Middle East Peace Process
 - 5. Southern Africa
 - 6. Cambodia
 - 7. Central America
 - 8. Korea
 - 9. South Asian Nuclear Proliferation
 - 10. Berlin
 - 11. Eastern Europe
 - 12. Comprehensive System of International Security
 - 13. Cyprus

4. Human Rights Issues

- A. Point Paper
- B. Talking Points

5. Bilateral Issues

- A. Point Paper
- B. Talking Points

6. US-Soviet Economic Issues

- A. Point Paper
- B. Talking Points

VII. BIOGRAPHIC MATERIAL

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SYSTEM II
91322

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

December 2, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL 
SUBJECT: Your Meetings with Gorbachev

Following my memo and one from Secretary Shultz are the briefing materials and talking points, arranged by subject matter, for your meetings with Gorbachev. This book is designed to get you up to speed on our recommended lines for the many subjects that will, or could, come up. We are already at work on a much shorter book designed to help you conduct the actual meetings, recommending the order in which subjects should be taken up and tactics to follow.

Current indications are that Gorbachev is coming to the summit in an amiable and generally constructive spirit, but with a troubled political scene at his back in Moscow which probably precludes major new concessions. He wants to sign INF and move ahead on START and the ABM Treaty toward a 1988 summit. He is signalling possible, but not yet concrete, moves on Afghanistan. Pressure is also mounting on the Soviets to move somewhat on the Iran-Iraq war. And he wants to talk about broad improvement in the relationship, recalling in his NBC interview the wartime alliance. Much of this is mood and tone. But it is positive in two senses. It gives us an opportunity to move forward on problems. But it doesn't set excessively high specific standards for success at this summit.

We cannot exclude Gorbachev taking demanding positions, such as insisting that we sign up to a 10-year nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty and strict interpretation, or demanding that we stop aiding the Afghan resistance before the Soviets are irreversibly withdrawing their troops. More likely, however, Gorbachev will try to hide his more demanding positions at this summit. We, on the other hand, may have to smoke him out so we are not confronted with them in the spring of 1988, having committed to an early START agreement or an Afghan settlement.

Gorbachev is playing for the longer haul, for 1988 and beyond. He does not need big new achievements now, but a positive atmosphere and forward movement. This is also good for us. In the longer run, he must have a general relaxation to permit economic revival. Our task is to extract a solid price in terms of

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stabilizing and verifiable arms reductions, protection of SDI, and an end to Soviet foreign aggression and human rights abuses.

Beyond signing INF, your key objectives are:

To move ahead on START under conditions that protect SDI, holding open the possibility of completion in the first half of 1988, but avoiding too firm a commitment to this difficult goal. We may be able to converge on sublimits at this summit. But very tough issues, especially verification, will remain. And we must avoid an outcome on the ABM Treaty (too lengthy a nonwithdrawal period; strict interpretation) that, however disguised, poisons the SDI program in the future.

To increase pressure on the Soviets for constructive moves over the next few months on Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, and human rights issues, moves that would help INF ratification and improve prospects for real, not just cosmetic, solutions.

To create a constructive mood without the euphoria that could undermine support for SDI, our defense budgets, and freedom fighters world wide; and to stick to practical goals consistent with NATO cohesion.

Tactical dynamics, such as order of topics, mix of small and larger meetings, are still being worked out. I believe it is important to do a lot of the serious arm wrestling over arms control and regional issues in meetings with your top advisors present. They will say as much or as little as you wish, but this assures that the Soviets are confronted with a government and that your advisors hear directly how Gorbachev addresses the issues.

Just two comments on Secretary Shultz's memo (Tab A): Precisely because of political problems at home, Gorbachev may be less willing to move toward our positions than George believes, except in vague terms which leave the fine print for later. We'll soon see. And George may underrate the political risks of too strong a commitment to completing START in early 1988, such as an inadequate agreement, a dramatic failure on the eve of our conventions, and some negative implications for INF ratification. Here the crux will be the language of the final communique which your arms control team is working on.

Attachment

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1987

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *WBS*
SUBJECT: The Washington Summit

Setting

Gorbachev comes to Washington to address an agenda you have defined, against a background of American strength and consistency you have created. As such, his visit reflects a qualitative change in the nature of the U.S. - Soviet relationship you inherited in 1981.

While he is still clearly in charge, the General Secretary's position at home is more ambiguous than at the time of your Geneva and Reykjavik meetings. The mandate for change he brought to the job has worn thin as the gap between the grandiose objectives he has declared and the sobering realities they confront has become more apparent. The Yel'tsin affair has revealed fault lines in the Soviet leadership we do not fully understand, but which probably limit Gorbachev's freedom of action. Success in pushing his reform agenda will generate further domestic strains; failure will compound Moscow's difficulties in keeping pace abroad.

In short, Gorbachev's hands have never been fuller, and he has fewer options. The "breathing space" he has said he wants is probably more important to him than ever. He is thus probably prepared to go even further than he has so far to achieve a predictability in U.S. - Soviet relations which will enable him to focus on getting his own house in order. If sustained, the steps we are asking for as the price for that predictability could bring about real change in Moscow's approach to the world and its own citizens.

Objectives

The Washington summit is an opportunity to lock in the remarkable progress we have made since the Geneva summit across your four-part agenda and to set the stage for even more significant gains before your Moscow visit.

- The signing of the INF Treaty will be the visual high-point of the summit, its asymmetrical reductions and rigorous verification provisions a paradigm of your more realistic approach to arms control.

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- The instructions you and Gorbachev will give Geneva delegations will lay the groundwork for an all-out effort next year to complete an even more far-reaching, and equally sound, START agreement, while securing the flexibility we need to pursue a vigorous SDI program.
- You can welcome Gorbachev's acceptance of human rights as an integral part of our dialogue. But our bottom line is individuals and how they are treated, and you should press for further, sustained progress in family reunification, emigration and greater freedom of expression.
- There may be real opportunities on the regional side. You can pursue recent hints of willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan -- which Shevardnadze reinforced in Geneva -- by urging Gorbachev to set a timetable. You will want strongly to take him to task for allowing Iran to play cat-and-mouse with the U.N. and to explore prospects for a Southern Africa settlement that would get the Cubans out.
- Finally, you can take satisfaction in the expansion since your Geneva meeting of people-to-people activities involving tens of thousands of Soviet and American citizens, including unprecedented numbers of young people, and press for further progress in this area.

Sensitivities

Gorbachev's desire for a more predictable relationship with us does not mean we can take him for granted. We saw during my Moscow trip and at Reykjavik his capacity for bold -- even rash -- moves under pressure. With this in mind, two areas will require particular care while he is here.

First, having overreached and failed in his bid to address a joint session of Congress, Gorbachev may be highly sensitive to protocol treatment -- and particularly any hint that we are patronizing or lecturing him. By the same token, any gestures of special courtesy will have extra impact.

Second, Gorbachev has repeatedly stated that he recognizes your personal commitment to the SDI program and that he has no intention of stopping it. At the same time, he has staked his own credibility on linking 50% START reductions to greater clarity on the ABM Treaty. To get out of that box, he may be prepared to accept ABM assurances less stringent than those he has insisted upon in the past. His bottom line may be low enough to give us what we need for SDI. You will be the first to see it, since he knows this is an issue only you can decide.

11. SCHEDULE

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GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON
December 7-10, 1987

Annotated Agenda

MONDAY, DECEMBER 7

4:40 p.m. # General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev arrive Andrews Air Force Base. Met by Secretary of State and Mrs. Shultz. Brief arrival ceremony.

5:20 p.m. General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev host tea for Secretary and Mrs. Shultz at hotel.

Evening NO FURTHER OFFICIAL EVENTS PLANNED

Evening Working Groups may meet.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8

10:00 a.m. # White House arrival ceremony (South Lawn).

-- Your brief welcoming remarks (3 min) will set the tone for the visit. There will be interpretation.

10:25 a.m. The President and General Secretary Gorbachev proceed to Library for photo opportunity.

10:30 a.m. General Secretary Gorbachev has meeting with President Reagan in the Oval Office. (First Meeting)

-- Opportunity for a broad discussion of where the relationship stands.

-- Gorbachev may stress arms control: START, Defense and Space, chemical and conventional weapons, tactical nuclear weapons.

-- You should emphasize importance of rapid progress on a verifiable START Treaty, and reiterate your commitment to SDI.

-- If Gorbachev lays out the Soviet NST position, you can give an initial reaction and might suggest that working groups immediately begin.

(or, if they have begun Monday evening, continue work on START/Defense and Space instruction.)

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NOTE: Mrs. Reagan hosts coffee on State Floor for Mrs. Gorbachev; attended by spouses of US and Soviet officials. Mrs. Gorbachev departs on separate schedule at 11:00 a.m.

12:00 Noon Meeting concludes. General Secretary Gorbachev departs The White House en route residence/hotel.

Live Television Anticipated

President Reagan has lunch at The White House; General Secretary Gorbachev has lunch at the Soviet Embassy or residence/hotel.

1:30 p.m. General Secretary Gorbachev arrives The White House.

1:45 p.m. # The President and General Secretary Gorbachev arrive East Room for INF signing ceremony. (Mrs. Reagan and Mrs. Gorbachev attend).

-- Your remarks should stress historic nature of agreement to remove entire class of nuclear weapons, highlight key concepts of the treaty: verification, openness, security for all.

2:05 p.m. Treaty signing ceremony concludes. The President and General Secretary Gorbachev proceed to State Dining Room. Arrive State Dining Room and be seated for televised messages.

2:10 p.m. # Broadcast messages to the American and Soviet people.

-- You can focus on your concept of the broader US-Soviet relationship, your hopes for the future.

2:25 p.m. Conclude broadcast.

2:30 p.m. General Secretary Gorbachev has meeting with President Reagan in the Oval Office. (Second Meeting)

-- In a brief one-on-one, point out that only sustained Soviet progress on human rights will overcome suspicions and open the way for more normal relations.

-- Gorbachev may have new ideas on compliance issues. You should stress that, for INF ratification to be assured, compliance problems (particularly Krasnoyarsk) must be dealt with.

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-- You and Gorbachev could also survey other arms control related issues: nuclear testing, nuclear non-proliferation.

3:30 p.m. Meeting concludes. General Secretary Gorbachev departs The White House en route residence/hotel/Embassy.

NOTE: General Secretary Gorbachev has meeting with 50-60 members of intellectual community at Soviet Embassy 4:30 p.m.

7:00 p.m. State Dinner - General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev arrive The White House for State Dinner, followed by entertainment.

-- You want to underscore that relationship you have sought to build goes beyond arms control. Still room for improvement in regional, human rights fields.

10:00 p.m. Entertainment concludes. General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev depart The White House en route residence/hotel.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1987

9:00 a.m. Congressional Event - General Secretary Gorbachev hosts the Senate and House leadership at the Soviet Embassy.

10:30 a.m. General Secretary Gorbachev has meeting with President Reagan in the Oval Office. (Third Meeting)

-- Possible additional guidance to the working groups on START/Defense and Space instructions.

-- Gorbachev may describe the Soviet human rights agenda (unemployment, racial injustice, etc.) and press for a clearer US stand on his proposed Moscow CSCE human rights conference.

-- You can stress that what counts is progress in the lives of individual people. This will be an important basis of our decision on the Moscow conference.

-- On regional issues, you can probe for details on Afghanistan withdrawal and Southern Africa, also push for UN action on Iran-Iran. Our basic pitch: regional affairs have lagged behind progress in other areas of the dialogue.

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-- If time permits, you and Gorbachev can briefly review accomplishments in the bilateral field.

NOTE: Mrs. Reagan hosts Mrs. Gorbachev for private coffee and tour in Residence. (11:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.) President and General Secretary may drop by at 12:15.

12:30 p.m. Meeting concludes.

1:00 p.m. Lunch at Department of State, hosted by Secretary of State and Mrs. Shultz, for General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev.

2:45 p.m. Lunch concludes. General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev return to Embassy.

NOTE: General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev have meeting with US editors and publishers (4:15 - 4:45 p.m.)

7:00 p.m. President and Mrs. Reagan arrive Soviet Embassy for reciprocal dinner.

-- In your toast, you can review discussions with Gorbachev to this point and draw some preliminary conclusions.

9:00 p.m. President and Mrs. Reagan depart Soviet Embassy.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1987

9:00 a.m. General Secretary Gorbachev has brief meeting with Vice President Bush (Soviet Embassy).

9:15 a.m. General Secretary Gorbachev has breakfast meeting with Vice President Bush and selected Americans.

Theme: The future of US-Soviet relations.

10:15 a.m. Breakfast meeting concludes. General Secretary Gorbachev departs en route The White House.

10:30 a.m. General Secretary Gorbachev has meeting with President Reagan in the Oval Office. (Fourth Meeting)

-- Take stock of discussions and activities of working groups. Tie up loose ends on START instructions and review and approve any statements to be issued.

-- Provide your preliminary view of the Moscow summit.

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12:00 Noon Meeting concludes.

12:05 p.m. Working lunch begins in The White House.
Family Dining Room (Fifth Meeting)

2:00 p.m. Working lunch concludes.

Departure activities TBD (3-5 minute remarks).

-- The departure ceremony would be your first opportunity publicly to offer your assessment of the visit.

2:15 p.m. General Secretary Gorbachev departs The White House en route residence/hotel.

OFFICIAL VISIT ENDS

3:00 p.m. General Secretary Gorbachev hosts meeting with industry and business community at the Embassy; Cocktails.

5:30 p.m. # General Secretary Gorbachev holds press conference (location TBD)

8:00 p.m. # Departure from Andrews Air Force Base.
(Vice President and Mrs. Bush will be in attendance at Departure)

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III. US-SOVIET ISSUES CHECKLIST

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US-SOVIET ISSUES CHECKLIST

I. HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE

Summits

Agreement to summit in Moscow during first half of 1988, to sign START Treaty if possible, but no commitment to linkage.

Foreign Ministers

Agreement to additional meetings as we head toward the Moscow summit.

Defense Ministers

Both sides interested in developing contacts. Defense Minister Yazov and Secretary Carlucci met in Moscow. Yazov will not accompany Gorbachev to Washington.

II. ARMS CONTROL

Nuclear and Space
Talks (NST)

Next round begins January 14.

Strategic Arms
Reduction Talks (START)

Geneva delegations have produced revised joint draft treaty text. Soviets may accept concept of overall sublimit on ballistic missile warheads -- would be a key step. But differences remain on numbers (Soviets hint at 5100, we want 4800). Many other issues remain, including mobile ICBMs, SLCMs, throwweight, and Soviet tactic of holding START hostage to their effort to cripple SDI.

Intermediate Nuclear
Forces (INF)

It's done!

Defense and Space

Soviets propose 10-yr nonwithdrawal commitment and strict observance of ABM Treaty as signed and ratified in 1972; if desired, sides can also agree on "list". For first time, Soviets explicitly acknowledge that ABM research could occur in space, but they still would go beyond the ABM Treaty and ban some research and associated testing.

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Nuclear Testing Talks

Round I November 9-20 in Geneva. Agreed on exchange of experts' visits to testing sites in January 1988, in preparation for Joint Verification Experiments (JVEs). US priority is improved verification for TTBT/PNET.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC)

Agreement signed 9/15 in Washington.

Nuclear
Non-Proliferation

Last bilaterals held late July. Current issues: sale of reactor to India without full-scope safeguards (Soviets have rejected US demarches); Soviet request that US encourage South Africa to accept full safeguards.

Conventional Stability
Mandate Negotiations

Current round began 9/28. At Vienna, Soviets still pressing for inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons, but indicate some flexibility.

Mutual Balanced Force
Reductions (MBFR)

Last round 9/24-12/3. West stands on 12/85 proposal.

Conference on Security
and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE)

Follow-up conference underway since September. Drafting of concluding document slowed by Soviet foot-dragging on human rights language. Soviets pushing for Moscow meeting on humanitarian issues.

Chemical Weapons (CW)
Treaty

Soviets pressing to conclude CW treaty; have proposed joint summit statement expressing commitment to sign a treaty. Have accepted principle of prompt mandatory challenge inspection. Sides have conducted reciprocal visits to US, Soviet CW facilities.

Chemical Weapons (CW)
Proliferation

Talks in Bern 10/7-8. US stress on export controls, UN investigation of suspected CW use.

III. REGIONAL ISSUESGeneral

Quality of expert exchanges has steadily improved, but no substantive progress. Comprehensive meetings held at political level (Armacost-Vorontsov); and region-specific meetings at "senior experts" level on Afghanistan, Middle East, Southern Africa, East Asia & Pacific, and Central America and the Caribbean.

Afghanistan

Resistance enjoys increasing military success and international support (UNGA vote). Soviets and Afghans hinting at flexibility on withdrawal timetable (12 months, still too long) but have not responded to our call for a date certain for completion of troop withdrawal by end of 1988.

Iran-Iraq War

Soviets stalling on second UNSC Resolution implementing Resolution 598, which called for end to Gulf War. Their support for provocative Iranian policy could damage US-Soviet relations. Arab summit condemned Iran, implicitly rebuking Soviets.

Cambodia

Key to a settlement rests in the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops.

Mideast Peace

Process stalled, partly due to continued Soviet encouragement of intransigent positions by their friends in region. Soviets still pushing international conference, PLO roles, also making inroads with moderate Arabs.

Central America

While rhetorically supporting Guatemala Agreement, Soviets continue to pour over \$500 million per year in arms to Nicaragua. We insist Soviets must cut off arms supply, and we have warned against Soviet or Cuban bases in Central America.

Angola/Namibia

Recent Savimbi victory underscores military stalemate. Soviets hinting that they won't stand in way of Cuban troop withdrawal (CTW). MPLA has not yet proposed adequate timetable for CTW.

Berlin

On June 12, President proposed to improve air access to the city, promote exchanges, and encourage sport events and international meetings in Berlin. Soviets have reacted negatively.

IV. HUMAN RIGHTSGeneral

Welcome progress made on release of some political prisoners and willingness to review human rights issues regularly, but still much to be done. Recent tightening of screws on demonstrations is disappointing.

Deputy Secretary Whitehead was in Moscow November 16-17 for pre-summit human rights review. Soviets appear ready to cooperate on some issues important to us, e.g. psychiatric abuse.

Since April, Jewish emigration at plateau of 700-900 a month. German and Armenian averages still rising, but Jewish emigration rate well below that of late 70's. Release of political prisoners slowed to a trickle after over 200 let out.

Representation List

Some progress on divided families, but 12 departures promised at Bern remain. Five dual-national cases resolved this year; 18 remain. We asked Soviets to resolve all cases before Summit.

V. BILATERAL - COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIESGeneral

Bilateral Work Program, progress in almost every area.

Basic Sciences

Exploratory talks held in Moscow Oct. 5-6. Soviets agreed to our approach. Seeking conclusion of agreement after summit.

Fisheries Agreement

Secretary Verity has asked the Soviets to consider removing their objections to the International Whaling Commission moratorium on whaling as a condition for reaching an agreement on Fisheries.

Global Climate and
Environmental Change
Initiative

US proposed cooperation under Environmental Agreement and Space Agreement.

Transportation Agreement

Soviets have accepted US proposal for talks Jan. 18-20

Energy Agreement

DOE not interested in pursuing 1986 Soviet offer to resume energy cooperation without better proposals.

World Ocean

NSC has authorized one-year renewal to be announced at summit.

Environmental

Cooperation successful but with problem in Nature Conservation: Initiative in global climate and environmental change to be announced at summit.

Health

Pleased with cooperation but would like to see expand into other areas. Will cooperate in AIDS research only if disinformation campaign ends. Research in alcohol and drug abuse now possible since Soviets disassociated it from Serbskiy Institute.

Fusion

October 18-19 meeting under IAEA auspices prepared quadripartite (US, USSR, Japan, EC) design effort on fusion test reactor. Next step: four-party acceptance of letter from IAEA inviting us to begin design work in early 1988 (our original proposal). Want to announce our intention to do so at summit.

Housing

Secretary Pierce traveled to USSR Oct 4-18. Protocol on Construction in permafrost areas could be ready in time for summit.

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Civil Space Cooperation

Agreement signed in Moscow during Secretary's April visit. Implementation begun. US initiative to study global climate and environmental change, with space component, to be announced at summit.

Coast Guard Issues

Soviets studying revised US draft on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) agreement.

Maritime Boundary

New proposal given to Soviets Oct. 5-6 in Moscow. Soviet counter-proposal does not resolve issue but shows Soviet interest in moving forward. Wrangel Island a sticking point domestically; any final deal implicitly recognizes Soviet claims.

Maritime Agreement

Talks in Moscow October 12-15 made progress on key issues. May meet in early December, but awaiting Soviet response.

EXCHANGES

Cultural

Academic, most other exchanges proceeding smoothly. Performing arts imbalances improved some. General exchanges agreement review in May productive, least acrimonious ever. US "Info-USA" exhibit opened in Moscow in June, went to Kiev, now open in Rostov. Soviet exhibit opens in D.C. November 25.

People-to-People

New youth and educational exchanges high on our agenda. Prepared to call for "youth Chautauqua" at summit. Number of Sister cities increased.

Other Exchanges

Working to ensure discipline among participating agencies. Congress conducted hearings on Administration policy last summer, focusing on tech transfer issues.

Bilateral Review
Commission

Second session held 3/23-4/3. Next round in Moscow in March 1988.

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BILATERAL - PROBLEM AREASEmbassy Moscow

Renovation of existing building top priority. White House decision on new office building (NOB) asks for study of full range of deconstruction and renovation options. On TDY visas and logistics, Soviets relatively cooperative so far, but firm procedures for visas for existing office building (EOB) repair workers still badly needed.

Embassy Goods/Services

Close to an understanding on the package. Shultz and Shevardnadze agreed Matlock and Dubinin will discuss these issues on margin of summit.

Soviet Mission to
UN Reductions

Soviets complied with October 1 reduction requirement. Only April 1, 1988 tranche remains.

Consulate Exchange Kiev
and New York

Time not ripe to push ahead with full-scale Kiev project until technical and security problems in Moscow solved.

Jamming/Free
Flow of Information

Gorbachev raised this at Reykjavik. Wick to lead discussions on media reciprocity at the summit with Yakovlev. Renewal of Mariel agreement has set stage for renewal of US-Cuban discussions to prevent interference with US broadcasts. Soviets have stopped most VOA jamming, but not RFE/RL.

VI. ECONOMICSTrade

Tight hard currency and internal reorganizations have limited Soviet-West trade; 1986 Soviet total foreign trade turnover dropped 8%, trade with West and LDCs fell 28%, US exports (grain) fell 46%.

US participated in oil/gas trade fair in Moscow this fall. Nickel certification essentially resolved, but we await Soviet response. Urea dumping case went against Moscow, hits their #4 export hard. Our bill to drop ban on fur skins going nowhere. Trade legislation concerns Soviets.

Soviets continue to push joint ventures. Combustion Engineering and Occidental Petroleum have just penned JV deals, may be followed by other blue chip firms in "American Trade Consortium" pushed by US/USSR Trade & Econ Council Pres. Giffen.

Agricultural Trade

Soviets buying soybeans and soy meal on eve of summit comes as surprise, have also bought nearly 2 million metric tons (mmt) corn and some wheat. Moscow will buy more wheat. Soviets fell 760,000 tons short of their 1987 commitment to buy 9 mmt of grain, but bought the full 4 mmt wheat after we offered the EEP in April.

Agricultural Cooperation

Science & Technology working groups met 9/9-11 in Washington, drew up exchange program for next 18 months.

Textiles

Third round of textile talks in Moscow Oct 22-23 resulted in agreement on quota for Soviets.

GATT

Soviets continue to claim they want to participate in GATT despite rebuff on the new round and firm US opposition due to incompatibility of their econ/trade system. Soviets will pursue matter with other GATT members.

Airport Security

Soviets team in US Oct. 25-30 continued Moscow talks from last April, assess security procedures at JFK and Dulles.

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SCENE SETTER: Tuesday, December 8

- The pomp of the official arrival ceremony and your brief welcoming remarks will set the tone for the visit: respect for Gorbachev as the leader of the other superpower; a realistic appraisal of the differences between our two systems and values; an openness to resolving problems of common concern through frank but constructive dialogue.
- Shevardnadze has indicated that Gorbachev hopes in your first meeting to engage you in a broad discussion of where the relationship stands in the wake of your previous exchanges in Geneva and Reykjavik and of the conclusion of the INF Treaty. He may use the opportunity to stress the growing importance of dealing with chemical and conventional weapons, as well as tactical nuclear weapons, now that the INF Treaty is complete. He could also open discussion of what instructions should be given our START negotiators to enable them to produce a Treaty for signature at a Moscow summit, and of what these instructions should say about the ABM Treaty.
- Although START is also high on your agenda, the first meeting, especially its one-on-one element, should be used for an overview of the relationship and prospects and to make especially sensitive points about human rights (see attached talking points for first meeting). Your "strategic" objective is to drive home the points that you seek a broad and lasting improvement in US-Soviet relations, not a temporary detente, and that this requires problem solving across the whole agenda. Your "tactical" objective is to show Gorbachev that, while you respect him and his country, and sympathize with efforts at reform in the USSR, Gorbachev should understand that problems in US-Soviet relations are real; they must be addressed head on, not papered over.
- After you've made your overview statement and the key points on human rights -- i.e., your concern about recent backsliding and hopes for impressive progress after the summit -- it would be appropriate to suggest moving the meeting to the Cabinet Room for a "plenary" with top advisors. After briefly recapping the one-on-one exchange, you should make introductory points on regional issues and arms control. If working groups on arms control and other issues have not already begun to meet, this first plenary session is the place to commission them. This should close out the first meeting.

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- The INF signing ceremony, with statements and short broadcasts by you and Gorbachev, will be the public highlight of the day.
- The second meeting, following lunch and the INF signing ceremony, is scheduled to be rather short (45 minutes). At this meeting, you should respond to major themes Gorbachev raised earlier and begin getting into the specifics of the arms control agenda. But the real negotiating or arm-wrestling over START and Defense & Space issues should be deferred until the long meeting of Wednesday morning. Experts will have labored during the night, and we shall have time before the morning meeting to brief you thoroughly.
- Following the second meeting, Gorbachev plans to meet with a group of 50-60 American intellectuals and academics, who will then begin adding their voices in the news to those of official spokesmen on how the summit is going.
- The State dinner will have a formal and informal side, both important to the Soviets and to you. As a formal occasion it provides another symbol of our willingness to deal with the USSR respectfully and on an equal plane. Your toast is an occasion soberly to note the difficulties of the relationship along with our determination to surmount them where possible to build a better relationship that endures. The informal side puts the human relationship of the two "first families" on display. It also gives you an opportunity to draw out Gorbachev on some of his problems and accomplishments at home during the past year.

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Wednesday, December 9

Scene Setter to be provided

Thursday, December 10

Scene Setter to be provided

V. OPENING REMARKS

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TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT'S FIRST MEETING WITH GORBACHEV
MORNING OF DECEMBER 8

- Well, Mr. General Secretary, here we are at last. Welcome!
It is the greatest pleasure to have you in Washington. Our work together will be fruitful for our people and for the world.
- Political courage and statesmanship on your part helped make this meeting possible. I thank you for that and so do my fellow citizens. The American and Soviet people are united in their gratitude for our meeting and in their hopes for results.
- Our main business, of course, is to build together on the understandings we have already achieved an even larger and firmer structure of peace and cooperation.
- In my opening remarks, I want to survey our relationship, both where we are in accord and where we disagree, and to give you my perspective on its future prospects. But as you are my guest, may I give you the opportunity to speak first.

(Gorbachev speaks.)

- Thank you for your statement. I shall respond fully during our meetings. It is important to get behind the events and achievements that make headlines to assess underlying developments that are actually guiding events.

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- Both of us seek to make the world a safer and better place, and we agree that improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are a vital -- indeed the most vital -- element of a safer world. This is of great importance.
- We agree on very important aspects of how we should seek to improve our relationship. We agree that we must seek stabilizing arms reductions and resolution of dangerous and tragic regional conflicts. We agree to address how our governments respect the rights of our citizens as recognized in international agreements. And we agree on more free contact between our peoples as befits civilized, modern countries.
- It is inevitable that, along with these areas of agreement, there are important areas of disagreement, some going to the roots of our national values, objectives, and interests.
- But we are engaged in constructive dialogue across the board to narrow those differences, to find compromises that really work, to prevent continuing differences from blocking possible improvements in our relationship. The remarkable Treaty we shall sign this afternoon is a product of this great effort.
- When you think of our relations as recently as 1983, not to mention 1953, these political developments are both profound and dramatic. They have already made the world a safer place.

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- Why have these welcome developments come about? The desire of both our peoples for a safer relationship has been a major factor. But that desire has always existed, even in times of bad relations. No, I have in mind two other, more dynamic factors.
- The first factor is your government's policy of reform. Sometimes Soviet commentators complain that we Americans do not recognize the importance of this policy. They are wrong. We are intensely interested in and deeply hopeful about it. We are also, for reasons you fully understand, uncertain as to what it will ultimately produce.
- But we see that your policy does, as you yourself have often stated, involve a deep reexamination of the relationship between your government, your society, and also the surrounding world. Therefore, your policy of reform has contributed to the possibility of new, perhaps fundamental, improvements in our relations. I know you believe this, and I agree with you.
- A second factor has been my policy of realism, strength, and dialogue.
- I have always been ready for engagement and negotiations with you. My policy has also involved many elements which Soviet spokesmen have labeled anti-Soviet.
- These policies have not been anti-Soviet in the sense they were intended to threaten the USSR. They have been intended, however, in the first place, to give my country a

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confident basis for managing our relations with the USSR effectively, whatever policies it pursues; and in the second place, to help persuade the USSR to reexamine some policies which we have found dangerous. They are not aimed at perpetuating the Cold War, nor a smoke screen to distract American conservatives.

- I was elected twice by substantial majorities to pursue these policies, and they have contributed greatly to the basis for improved US-Soviet relations.
- This brings me to the most important questions for our meeting. Will the better relationship that we want to build together be truly stable and lasting? Or will it be a temporary and misleading detente, as in the 1970s? I want, and I believe you want, a stable and lasting improvement in our relations, one that does not fall victim to episodic troubles or to the revelation that we have only superficially papered over continuing fundamental conflict between us.
- That is exactly what happened in the 1970s, and neither of us should want a repeat performance. We should not settle for a mere breathing space in a continuing struggle. The breathing space is likely to be short and its ending just as disillusioning for us both than it was the last time.
- This means, it seems to me, that we must, like good builders, construct the foundations of a better relationship very deeply and very broadly. It means we must sink pillars that

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survive our terms in office. Precisely because my remaining time is rather short and your term of office is, if I may say so, indeterminate, we must build with care that our successors, whoever they are, not repudiate our work.

-- We must, therefore, combine far-seeing visions with immediate practicality across our entire agenda. We must recognize that nuclear force reductions, however dramatic, cannot bear the entire burden of a better relationship. In fact, the more ambitious are our goals for arms control, the more they depend upon improvements in all other areas to assure confidence that our arms control agreements can really work.

-- When I leave office, I hope we shall have met together four times. I hope that the foundations we have laid last for decades beyond, and that the Spirits of Geneva and Reykjavik, Washington and Moscow carry us safely into the 21st Century.

-- Now let me turn to a number of specific topics on our agenda. We shall discuss all issues in later meetings. But I want to give special stress now to matters where positive developments would bring lasting improvement in our relations, while failure to progress could slow and even jeopardize such improvement.

-- I want to mention human rights, first, in our private meeting because they are so important and sensitive. You

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know our arguments and the cases we raise. And I have here a list of individuals seeking to leave the USSR; I plead with you to give these cases your sympathetic attention.

- But I want to make a broader point. In your NBC interview you asked the people of the United States to try to understand your history, with its dangers and struggles. We try to do that.
- But the more we understand about your country and its history in the light of our own experience and values, the more we believe what many people in your country also believe: That the cause of peace and international understanding must go hand in hand with the cause of human freedom and justice, the cause of human rights.
- The pace at which the cause of human rights advances to a great extent sets the political pace of our relationship. Thus, the positive steps you have taken in releasing prisoners of conscience, raising somewhat the level of Jewish emigration, and allowing more freedom of expression have helped to improve our relationship already.
- I am, therefore, saddened and somewhat worried by recent signs of stagnation and even sliding backward in some of these areas, especially Jewish emigration.
- I appreciate the political difficulties involved here. But it is vital for us both that we see steady progress. I very much hope that soon after this summit, we can see complete

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solutions for all the individual cases and a steady rise in the level of Jewish emigration and more liberal conditions for future applicants.

[This is a natural point in the substantive flow to shift to the Cabinet room for plenary including top advisors.]

-- At this point, I'd like to suggest that we move to the Cabinet Room to let our top advisors join us. But first, Mr. General Secretary, would you like to respond to my remarks in this private setting?

[Move to Cabinet Room.]

-- Welcome again to the entire Soviet delegation. The General Secretary and I have already begun a rich and constructive dialogue. I think we are agreed that, while our summit time is short, we are determined to build for the long-term a fundamental and lasting improvement of our relations, that a fragile and transient detente is not good enough.

-- I want to continue making some preliminary points to guide our later discussions, especially on regional affairs and arms control. But first, let me invite the General Secretary to address our two senior delegations.

[Gorbachev Speaks.]

-- Regional issues will greatly influence the long-term character for our relations and their immediate future as well. Afghanistan is at the top of the list. I need not

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remind you of the fate of the SALT TWO agreement following the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. There are more Soviet troops in that country today than when I entered office.

- Our governments have had extensive discussions about Afghanistan; we understand each other's points of view. I welcome your declarations of intent to withdraw. It is long since time to act fully on these declarations. This could make a great difference in Senate debates on ratifying the INF Treaty. This would signal the beginning of a new era in East-West relations and in international affairs generally.
- The nature of the conflict means that a settlement depends mostly on you. We shall do our part to help if you actually withdraw. You can hardly expect a friendly Afghanistan after such a war. But we and other governments can help assure that Afghanistan is not a threat to your security after you withdraw. It is time, now, here, at this summit, to set dates for the starting and ending of your withdrawal of troops.
- The Iran-Iraq war must also be addressed. We must return to the pattern of cooperation when we voted together for UNSC Resolution 598. I am worried that your subsequent policies are a departure from that cooperation, that they deepen Iranian intransigence and belligerence. We have a situation in which Iran could be encouraged by a sense of Soviet support to take violent action against the United States.

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This could set back our relations profoundly. Now is the time for our cooperation on a second, enforcing resolution. Let's instruct our UN ambassadors to begin work immediately.

-- I want to mention Berlin because it could be the site of very positive developments. I believe you could and should tear down the Wall today. But in any case, we should take smaller, practical steps to ameliorate the division of the city and to symbolize our desire to overcome the division of Europe in a humane and stabilizing way. My government is working with the British and French on such proposals, and will soon present them to you. I hope you will respond favorably.

-- Now let me turn to the challenges of arms reductions.

-- While you and I must deal with all aspects of our relationship, the world will pay particular attention to arms control. This is no surprise; the treaty we will sign today is a major accomplishment that has captured world attention.

-- Our next task must be to turn to strategic arms and to make progress toward the goal we established in Geneva of a verifiable treaty providing for a 50 percent reduction in those arms.

-- I look forward to signing such a treaty in Moscow next year. Nevertheless, both of us should appreciate the complexity of this task and take care that the calendar encourages but does not distort the work.

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- The INF treaty is good for both of us because we took the time to do it right. Thus, while I would be disappointed to leave office without a START treaty, I would far rather do that than agree to an unsound treaty. A good, verifiable treaty will be an historic accomplishment; a poor treaty will serve neither your interests, nor ours, nor the cause of world peace.
- Much will depend on our willingness to work together. We are ready. You too must be ready for serious work; in particular, you cannot use our hopes for a START treaty as a lever to cripple our Strategic Defense Initiative. I must tell you frankly; that simply won't work.
- Finally, I must tell you, as I have before, that issues of Soviet compliance with existing treaties continue to trouble us. We will speak more of this later, but I must be able to explain to the Senate why it should ratify new treaties when there are so many questions about your compliance with old ones.
- So while we have much to be proud of and much to be hopeful for, we must approach this area as we approach others -- with the same mix of openness and realism of which I spoke earlier.

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POINT PAPER: NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS (NST)

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

- Basic agreement on final issues associated with the INF Treaty was reached by Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Geneva on November 24.
- Last issues settled involved verification.

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

- Expectations rising for START agreement by Spring; can be done, but no time to waste.
- On sublimits, should try to pin down numbers during summit:
 - On Ballistic Missiles, US wants 4800, Soviets 5000-5100
 - On ICBMs, US proposed 3000, Soviets 3000-3300
 - On heavy ICBMs, US proposed 1650 limit that includes heavy ICBMs plus missiles with 6 or more warheads; Soviet offer would cap heavy ICBMs only at 154 -- equivalent to 1540 warheads -- we should try to pocket this proposal.
- Soviets have succumbed to US insistence on 50% cut in throwweight, but are only offering unilateral statement; should get commitment to write 50% level into Treaty.
- Soviets see our demand to ban mobile ICBMs as disingenuous. Should put burden on them to prove limits can be monitored; should also seek agreement that if acceptable verification regime can't be agreed upon, mobiles would be banned.
- Agreed at Reykjavik to find way to limit nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) outside 6000 limit. Soviets want numerical limit of 400 on two submarine types, none on surface ships. No way to verify their proposal -- should press instead to exchange data on deployment plans.
- Verification is key tool to resolving remaining issues. INF showed again that "devil is in the details." Solutions to many US and Soviet agenda items may emerge from intensified focus on verification. Want Soviets to propose measures, not just react to ours.
- Soviets may raise - "obstacles" introduced by US:
 - Backfire bomber: US wants it included as strategic bomber; Soviets do not. In SALT II, Soviets made unilateral statement that Backfire was medium-range bomber and would not be given intercontinental capability; also

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promised to limit production to 30 per year -- seem to have kept both promises. President Carter said US considered Soviet commitments essential obligations of SALT II; signed Treaty on that basis.

- Air-launched Cruise Missiles: US says range permitted under SALT (600 km. maximum) may not be adequate, but has not yet tabled alternative. Soviets concerned we may seek to raise the limit to exempt future US long-range conventional ALCMs; internal USG decision is near.
- Counting Rules: Soviets not pressing this issue, but US says SALT-era rules (which Soviets want) are not good enough for warhead-limiting START Treaty; we haven't tabled proposals because USG is still considering alternatives.

Defense and Space (D&S)

- Shevardnadze said in October that the Soviets no longer want to discuss SDI but rather find mutually acceptable language on the ABM Treaty that will ensure "strategic stability" as we move ahead with offensive reductions.
- In his October 30 letter to you, Gorbachev said that "what remains is, in effect, to agree on the period of nonwithdrawal."
- Gorbachev's first priority at the Summit will likely be to get a formal US commitment to observe the ABM Treaty regime.
- It is not clear whether he will seek an understanding now on what "observance" would entail or propose to leave that for the future. The recent trend suggests the Soviets may prefer putting it aside.
- Gorbachev's approach will likely combine some of the following:
 - Affirmation of Adherence to the ABM Treaty: In the October 30 statement, we agreed that an objective for the Summit is to consider instructions to delegations on "...the observance of and non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period."
 - Emphasis on Resolving the Duration Issue: Shevardnadze and Gorbachev have stressed that agreement on 10 years is the key issue. In his October 30 press conference here, Shevardnadze said this was an issue "to be discussed."

- Factors influencing the Soviet position on duration seem to include how long START reductions will take, when and if subsequent negotiations will occur, and when the results of the SDI program will emerge.
- Compliance with the ABM Treaty During Period: In lieu of an explicit agreement on what it means to "observe" the ABM Treaty, the Soviets have suggested two ideas for ensuring compliance with the ABM Treaty during the period:
 - using a "rejuvenated" Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) for settling disputes over ABM Treaty compliance during the period; and,
 - having the right to terminate START obligations should a side grossly violate the ABM Treaty.
- These concepts are likely to remain integral to the Soviet approach if Gorbachev is counting on US domestic pressures -- political, budgetary -- to constrain SDI in the future.
- D&S Contingency: Possible Wild Cards. Possible variations that Gorbachev could push include the following:
 - Sensors vs Weapons: In the context of the Soviet "list," Gorbachev could offer a more relaxed regime on sensors (such as for early warning) in exchange for no development or testing of "weapons" in space. Keeping "weapons" from space has been a recurrent theme since the Geneva summit.
 - Defining Other Physical Principles (OPP): Gorbachev could argue that the real problem is that no one knows what OPP systems and components are and that this is the issue to which the sides should now turn their attention.
 - Role for Defense Ministers: Since the April Ministerial, the Soviets have hinted at involving Defense Ministers in the permitted/prohibited activities dispute. Gorbachev could suggest that Yazov (if he comes), Akhromeyev, Carlucci and Crowe get together at the Summit or thereafter.
 - Combining START and D&S: Several Soviet officials have plugged the idea of a "one-Treaty" formulation involving essentially two obligations on D&S: adherence to the ABM Treaty for the duration of the START agreement and the right to escape a START Treaty in the event of a serious breach of the ABM Treaty.
 - New Ideas on Verification; Soviet scientists/academics say that having observers witness a Soviet space launch, perhaps even inspecting a payload, is under consideration in Moscow. At NST, Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), and elsewhere, the Soviets have urged pre-launch inspection of space payloads.

Compliance

- Although not one of the areas of negotiation at the Nuclear and Space Talks, Soviet compliance with past arms control agreements, especially the ABM Treaty (Krasnoyarsk), must be considered as we move forward with new treaties.
- Your annual report to the Congress on Soviet compliance, due on December 1, has just been completed. We have found an additional violation -- the Soviets have violated the ABM Treaty by moving certain radar equipment to a prohibited location (Gomel).

Follow-on Negotiations

- During the negotiation of the INF Treaty, the Soviet version included a provision which would commit both sides to follow-on negotiations on nuclear systems below the 500 km range.
 - Such negotiations would focus on dual-capable tactical aircraft, short-range missiles, and nuclear artillery.
- The Soviet Union has tried to include these systems within the new talks on conventional stability, but the US and NATO have resisted.
- A number of our key NATO allies (especially the UK and France) are firmly opposed to moving towards further reductions in NATO nuclear forces until the conventional and chemical imbalances have been resolved.
 - Mrs. Thatcher has written to you recently on this point.
- Germany does not want to delay further negotiations on the short-range nuclear missiles that directly threaten the FRG until the conventional and chemical issues are settled, but they are not pushing us to commit immediately to further negotiations. Rather, they feel that the next necessary step is for NATO to consider its options for the future.
- We would not recommend that you raise this subject. However, you should expect Gorbachev to do so.
 - When he does, you will need to deflect him since we cannot and should not commit to further negotiations on nuclear systems below 500 km at this time.