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**Collection:** Duberstein, Kenneth M.: Files  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Duberstein, Kenneth M.: Files:  
Office of the Chief of Staff

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**OA/Box:** Box 4

**FOIA ID:** F1997-066/7, D. Cohen

**File Folder:** [Washington Summit Briefing Book:] The Meetings  
of President Reagan and General Secretary  
Gorbachev, Washington, DC, 12/08/1987-12/10/1987  
(3)

**Date:** 08/25/2004

| DOCUMENT NO. &<br>TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                   | DATE     | RESTRICTION |
|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|
| 1. point paper         | re human rights, 1p<br><i>R 3/16/06 USF 97-066/7 #210</i>       | n.d.     | B1          |
| 2. talking points      | re human rights, 7p<br><i>R " " #211</i>                        | n.d.     | B1          |
| 3. point paper         | re bilateral issues, 1p<br><i>R " " #212</i>                    | n.d.     | B1          |
| 4. talking points      | re bilateral issues, 3p<br><i>R " " #213</i>                    | n.d.     | B1          |
| 5. point paper         | re US-Soviet trade and economic issues, 1p<br><i>R " " #214</i> | n.d.     | B1          |
| 6. talking points      | re economic issues, 2p<br><i>R " " #215</i>                     | n.d.     | B1          |
| 7. talking points      | re trade and economic issues, 2p<br><i>R " " #216</i>           | n.d.     | B1          |
| 8. report              | (2p) <i>D " " #217</i>                                          | 11/23/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 9. report              | (2p) <i>D " " #218</i>                                          | 11/24/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 10. report             | (2p) <i>D " " #219</i>                                          | 11/25/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 11. report             | (2p) <i>D " " #220</i>                                          | 11/25/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 12. report             | (2p) <i>D " " #221</i>                                          | 11/23/87 | B1<br>B3    |

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- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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|------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------|-------------|
| 13. report             | (1p)<br>D 3/16/06 NLSF 97-066/7 #222 | 11/25/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 14. report             | (2p)<br>D " " # 223                  | 11/25/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 15. report             | (2p)<br>D " " # 224                  | 11/24/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 16. report             | (1p)<br>D " " # 225                  | 11/25/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 17. report             | (1p)<br>D " " # 226                  | 11/27/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 18. report             | (1p)<br>D " " # 227                  | 11/30/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 19. report             | (1p)<br>D " " # 228                  | 11/23/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 20. repport            | (1p)<br>D " " # 229                  | 11/25/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 21. report             | (2p)<br>D " " # 230                  | 11/23/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 22. report             | (2p)<br>D " " # 231                  | 11/23/87 | B1<br>B3    |

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| 23. report             | (2p)<br>O 3/16/06 NLSF 97-066/7 # 232 | 11/23/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 24. report             | (2p)<br>D u ~ #233                    | 11/25/87 | B1<br>B3    |
| 25. report             | (1p)<br>D ~ ~ #234                    | 11/30/87 | B1<br>B3    |

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POINT PAPER: HUMAN RIGHTS

OVERVIEW: HUMAN RIGHTS AND US AGENDA

- The people of the United States deeply believe in the cause of human rights everywhere in the world. Governments which respect human rights internally are more trustworthy externally.
- Human rights performance tends to set limits on what is politically possible in other areas, including trade and arms control. (All 100 Senators signed pre-summit letters to you and Gorbachev on human rights.)
- Imprudent for Soviets to expect we could move rapidly ahead in other areas if not supported by progress on human rights.

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE REYKJAVIK AND GENEVA

- There has been limited progress on resolving individual cases and releasing some prisoners of conscience, emigration rates are up from last few years and -- at least for a while -- there was not only increased openness in official media, but a certain tolerance of unofficial demonstrations and publications. But, over the past 60 days, there seems to have been a retreat from this tolerance.
- US-Soviet dialogue on human rights more frequent, but results have fallen short of our expectations.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE

- Much remains to be done, both to help individuals and to change Soviet laws and practices:
  - o A number of cases we have raised with Soviets at highest level have not been resolved (you can hand over short list).
  - o Want to urge Gorbachev to resolve all remaining cases of divided families and American citizens, as well as refuseniks on lists we gave Soviets in September.
  - o Urge him to increase religious freedom, end psychiatric abuse, and give human rights gains some degree of permanence by reforming Soviet laws and practices.

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NLS F97-066/7 #210  
BY CIS NARA, DATE 3/16/06

## B. TALKING POINTS



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F97-066/7 #211

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NARA, DATE 3/16/96

TALKING POINTS: HUMAN RIGHTS

WHY TALK ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS?

- The INF agreement shows we can make progress even when our starting positions are far apart. But movement on arms control alone cannot provide a solid basis for our relations.
- Human rights is a central issue for us. There is a solid consensus in the US that a country's human rights performance should affect our policy toward it.
- In Geneva and Reykjavik I touched on some basic reasons for this.
  - o The personal ties to other lands enjoyed by many in the US -- a nation of immigrants.
  - o Belief in the principle that there are basic standards of decency all states should respect.
  - o Our conviction that countries which respect basic human rights are more trustworthy in international affairs.
- So human rights influence what is politically possible in our relations.
- This may well apply to our ability to obtain Senate ratification of the INF agreement or any other treaty.
- Also affects our trade relations. As you know, the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments have their origin in Congressional concerns about human rights, specifically emigration.
  - o Every single Senator of both parties signed separate letters to me and to you, asking us to put a discussion of human rights high on the agenda.

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- So human rights is a concern that will not go away until the problems are resolved. It would be a serious mistake to think progress in other areas can substitute for that.

HOW FAR HAVE WE COME?

- I take some satisfaction in what has been accomplished since we began our dialogue in Geneva in November 1985.
  - o A number of individuals have been helped (Sakharov, Shcharansky, Feltsman and others).
  - o Emigration rates have increased.
- You have begun to experiment with greater openness in media and public discussion, and -- at least until recently -- greater tolerance of demonstrations and other expressions of dissent.
- We now have a US-Soviet dialogue on human rights. I hope it will become more meaningful, and accept the fact that it is a two-way street. We are prepared to examine issues raised by your side.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

- Dialogue, while valuable, is not an end in itself, and, in the human rights area, we sometimes seem to be talking about different things:
  - o We raise violations of fundamental political and civil rights, but you focus on social and economic rights. You did this in your interview last Monday.
  - o We are also concerned about economic and social rights and we are willing to discuss them, but not to divert

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the subject or confuse social well being with the fundamental rights addressed in the Helsinki Final Act.

- o In fact, many Soviet citizens who have tried to exercise basic rights such as freedom of conscience, assembly, and movement have been deprived by your government of the economic and social benefits -- such as higher education -- that you speak about so often.
- In the area of ensuring fundamental political and civil rights, much remains to be done.
- We have the impression that sometimes high-level instructions to change procedures are not carried out by lower-level bureaucrats.
- Emigration is up for Americans, Germans, and Jews. This is encouraging. But Jewish emigration (at 700-900 per month) seems to be held below natural levels by artificial barriers such as refusals for so-called security reasons. You have pointed out that a wait of five to ten years should be sufficient for someone who had access to secret materials, but we know of cases lasting much longer. Alexander Lerner has not done classified work since 1971. He is now 74 years old. And why should a son be told he cannot leave for security reasons because his father held some sort of clearance!
- Most of the Jews getting permission seem to be old refuseniks with longstanding applications -- but by no means have even all of them received permission.
- This is troubling because Jewish emigration is seen by many as a barometer of our relationship. Steady, determined

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progress on this issue could do much to improve the domestic climate here toward your country.

- Another area is the greater tolerance for various ideas and activities your government has shown recently under glasnost and "democratization."
- These programs have generated much good will and some optimism in the West.
- But that good will is fragile. It is threatened by disturbing signs of some reversal of the gains so recently made -- signs of a return to tighter controls, preventive detention of demonstrators and interference with press coverage of events.
- Many hundreds of persons remain incarcerated for religious or political activities, activities protected by international standards which Americans feel very strongly about.
  - o We would hope for greater respect for freedom of religion in your country, such as permission for bible-study groups and after-school religious instruction for children. Your Minister of Religious Affairs even told a US Senator that all prisoners of faith would be freed. We would like to see this.
  - o We would also like to see you end the practice of committing to psychiatric institutions political dissenters, religious believers and "whistle-blowers."
  - o We still await a full accounting of the fate of Swedish diplomat and honorary US citizen Raoul Wallenberg.
- Not only must a reversal be averted; we also hope that the gains you have made will be consolidated, by being embodied

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in the laws, institutions and established practices of your country.

OUR BOTTOM LINE

-- To sum up: human rights is a central, permanent element of our agenda. Progress on the concerns we raise under this heading is essential to set the stage for progress in other areas.

- o We seek resolution of the individual cases we bring to your attention, particularly those on the list presented to your government last September.
- o Let me also bring to your personal attention the following individuals, in whose situations my Government has previously expressed special interest.

[HAND OVER ATTACHED LIST]

- o As I've said, we need to see a consolidation of progress through the reform of Soviet laws, institutions and procedures. You have already begun this process in a number of areas, and we have welcomed that. But clearer results would impress us even more. This would eliminate uncertainty about how permanent the positive changes may be.
- Such reversals on human rights issues have caused ups and downs in our relationship.
- I know that changing laws and practices is not easy. What gives me confidence is my sense that you perceive the sort of changes we are talking about to be in your country's self-interest as well -- good for domestic creativity and for a positive reaction from other countries. It is simply the right thing to do -- in every respect.

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HUMAN RIGHTS (Contingency)

(If Gorbachev says the United States has not signed and ratified international covenants relating to social and economic rights:

- There are some international documents on social and economic rights which the United States has not ratified for many different reasons.
- In some cases, the problem is conflict with our Constitution. Important, however, is not ratification of agreements but the fulfillment of the commitments included in these documents.
- We believe that our performance in this area is very good. When we identify problems, we work in good faith to resolve them. We are ready to see social and economic conditions in the United States compared factually with those in any other country.
- The Soviet Union seems more willing to ratify such agreements than to implement them. It makes great use of loopholes in the Covenants, which renders many of the provisions meaningless.

(If Gorbachev says social protection in the Soviet Union is much higher than in the United States:)

- I am very much interested in social and economic advancement. But I am sure you will agree with me that guarantees on paper which are not carried out are worse than useless.
- What we all want to do is to ensure that people have a real opportunity to enjoy a better life, to have a job, to get a good education, to get high quality medical care, to get good housing, etc.

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(If Gorbachev presses for a Human Rights Conference in Moscow:)

- We have not said yes or no to your proposal to host a CSCE human rights conference in Moscow.
- But we have explained in detail what human rights progress we would need to see fully demonstrated before considering a positive response.
- We also would require specific guarantees of access and openness for anyone interested in participating in such a conference.
- I must tell you honestly that if pressed for a decision at this time we could not agree to a Moscow conference.
- But we will keep an open mind as to when conditions are right for CSCE meetings in your country as well as in ours. We need not always let others be the hosts.

(If Gorbachev raises the Brazinskas hijacking case:)

- The US condemns all acts of terrorism and deplores the tragic loss of life in the Brazinskas hijacking.
- We cannot prosecute the pair because when the hijacking took place US courts had no jurisdiction over terrorist incidents occurring outside the US.
- We have no legal grounds for deporting the Brazinskases to the Soviet Union or any other country.

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CASES OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Naum Meiman

Leyla Gordiyevskaya and family

Abe Stolar and family

Alexander Lerner and family

Benjamin Charny

Divided Spouses: Mariya Jurgutiene, Vladislav  
Kostin, Petras Pakenas, Sergey Petrov

Blocked Marriages: Tatyana Alexandrovich,  
Yevgeniy Grigorishin, Lyubov Kurillo



**BILATERAL ISSUES**



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POINT PAPER: BILATERAL ISSUES

EMBASSY MANAGEMENT

- Want to resolve problems affecting our embassy because they severely cramp our activities in the USSR and have magnified political effects. Soviets told Whitehead they would be cooperative. We must test this.

COOPERATIVE EXCHANGES

Possible areas for progress by or at summit:

- World Ocean Agreement: US proposed one-year renewal of agreement in scientific research of world oceans.
- Basic Sciences: Want to negotiate agreement at earliest possible time on cooperation in basic scientific research, e.g., theoretical physics, mathematics, science policy.
- Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative: US proposed initiative to pursue cooperation under Environmental Agreement and Space Agreement.
- Fusion Initiative: Progress towards acceptance of US proposal for four-party design (with EC, Japan) of a fusion test reactor.
- Nuclear Reactor Safety: Progress under Atomic Energy Agreement in establishing permanent working group in nuclear reactor safety.
- Transportation: Exploratory talks in Washington January 18-20 in areas such as civil aviation, railroad and highway safety.
- Universal Childhood Immunization: UNICEF has urged joint endorsement of this World Health Organization/UNICEF goal.
- Cultural and people-to-people exchanges: Want to continue expansion, particularly among young people.
- New Year's Day Greetings: Want to make tradition of exchange of televised messages.
- Housing: Protocol on construction in permafrost may be ready in time for summit.
- Media Reciprocity and Exchange Issues: USIA Director Wick will meet with Soviet counterparts to discuss these issues during summit.
- Maritime Agreement: Prepared to hold another round of talks in Washington the first week of December.

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NLS F97-066/7 #212

at US NARA, DATE 3/16/06



## B. TALKING POINTS

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TALKING POINTS: BILATERAL ISSUES

EMBASSY MANAGEMENT

- The smooth functioning of our missions in each other's countries is a fundamental element of good relations. If they can't operate, it is very hard to have a normal relationship.
- We have had some serious problems with respect to our embassy in Moscow, and look for cooperation from your side in getting them straightened out.
- I am pleased that Deputy Secretary Whitehead and Ambassador Gary Matthews had positive meetings in Moscow on this subject.
- I take a personal interest in this matter and hope you will do the same.

COOPERATIVE EXCHANGES

- I understand there is good news and progress on exchanges between our two countries: talks soon on some new scientific exchanges, an initiative in global climate and environmental change, renewal of World Ocean Agreement.
- Large numbers are involved in people-to-people exchanges. Over a hundred thousand Americans have gone to the Soviet

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By CL NARA, DATE 3/16/06

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Union to learn about your country since you and I together launched our people-to-people exchange initiative at Geneva in 1985.

- We want this to continue.
- USIA Director Wick is planning to meet with your representative this week to discuss media reciprocity and cultural exchanges. He'll be able to address the question of Soviet broadcasts to the US.
- The short answer is we have no objection as long as it does not interfere with our own broadcasting.
- I would like to suggest we make a tradition of televised New Year's messages between us.
- Although glad you have stopped jamming VOA, I am concerned you still jam other Western radios, such as "Radio Liberty." We do not jam your broadcasts in any way.
- UNICEF has urged us to endorse Universal Childhood Immunization in a joint summit statement. I believe that would indeed contribute to reducing the appalling number of preventable childhood deaths.

#### MEDIA RECIPROCITY

(If Gorbachev raises an objection to U.S. Government-sponsored publications that disclose information about Soviet disinformation activities:)

- We are the ones who should object. You say we are being "anti-Soviet" and unfriendly when we tell people we don't

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like being falsely accused of creating the AIDS virus in a laboratory or creating a bomb that kills only non-whites. Frankly, your disinformation about us is a lot more unfriendly and anti-American than our objections to it are anti-Soviet. We do not engage in spreading disinformation about the Soviet Union. But official Soviet media spread these horrible and totally false stories about the U.S. Even if you claim Soviet papers merely reprint articles from foreign media, let's not kid ourselves: we know that the KGB planted them there in the first place. Why don't you stop?

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## A. POINT PAPER

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POINT PAPER: US-SOVIET TRADE AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

BILATERAL TRADE ISSUES

- Although trade with Soviets is less than 2 percent of total U.S. trade, it is an important element of the bilateral relationship, but certain aspects (MFN, credits) tied to Soviet performance on human rights through legislation.
- In part due to trade embargoes since the late '70s, Soviets have shifted trade away from us toward Western Europe and Japan.
- Soviets showing renewed interest in trade with us, but they allege we are unreliable and complain about COCOM controls, other trade restrictions.
- Soviets now pressing joint ventures as means to acquire modern technology, management techniques, and capital.
- US firms interested, but cautious. Only two joint ventures have been reached (Occidental Petroleum, Combustion Engineering), but more may be in the offing.
- Quick turn-around in US-Soviet trade unlikely for political and economic reasons.

SOVIET EFFORT TO PLAY LARGER ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

- Gorbachev has sought to secure role in international economic institutions, particularly GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs). Soviets feel we block their entry.
- Closed Soviet economy and potential that Soviets will seem to politicize this organization argues against GATT membership. Our major trading partners agree there are few, if any, advantages for us or other members.

NEXT STEPS FOR THE BILATERAL ECONOMIC AGENDA

- Despite uncertainties, forward movement on some economic issues within existing framework is attainable. US/USSR Joint Commercial Commission should be convened soon to explore specifics.
- Have just reached agreements on textile quotas and expansion of civil aviation contacts. May be close on a fisheries accord that could give US fishermen access to Soviet waters. Agreements also possible on maritime shipping, search and rescue, and Bering Sea boundary dispute.
- We have agreed to hold discussions early next year on the Long Term Grain Agreement which expires in September 1988.

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F97-066/7 #214

at: AS NARA, DATE 3/16/06

## B. TALKING POINTS

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NLS F97-066/7 #215  
5. CAS, NARA, DATE 3/16/06

TALKING POINTS: ECONOMIC ISSUES

- I firmly support the expansion of mutually beneficial economic and commercial relations. I believe non-strategic trade can be an important way to improve our overall relationship.
- We have seen some solid progress:
  - o Our Joint Commercial Commission has been meeting for 3 years.
  - o We have concluded a textiles agreement and an agreement expanding commercial air links.
  - o We are close to a fisheries agreement, also to one on maritime shipping. Progress in tourism is possible.
- As I have stressed before, progress in trade should parallel progress in other areas, including human rights and emigration. But, I am willing to work on this privately and quietly without a lot of public rhetoric.

Joint Commercial Commission

- I propose that we instruct our Commerce Ministers to convene the next US-USSR Joint Commercial Commission session to explore specific measures for increasing trade.

Other Possible Steps in the Economic Area

- Since we met in Geneva our two governments have taken encouraging steps toward several new agreements. We should now accelerate work on concluding:
  - o a reciprocal fisheries access and general fisheries

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framework agreement,

- o a maritime shipping agreement,
- o a maritime search and rescue agreement,
- o an exchange in the area of transportation,
- o a resolution of the Alaskan/Siberian boundary dispute.

-- We should also work to find ways to increase tourism.

(Contingency points are attached covering Soviet charges of trade discrimination, US export controls, US-Soviet joint ventures, the issue of Soviet GATT membership, and US-Soviet grain trade.)

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TALKING POINTS: TRADE AND ECONOMIC ISSUES

(Contingency)

(If Gorbachev Raises Charges of US Trade Discrimination:)

- Although imports from countries like the Soviet Union that do not have Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status face higher tariffs, this is not discrimination against Soviet goods. We are proud of our free trading system, and it is open to competition from Soviet goods.
- We do have laws that protect our markets from unfair competition. Some Soviet exports have faced dumping charges. We have always examined these charges in a fair and open manner, in accordance with our laws.
- I am against proposed laws now before Congress that would curtail US-Soviet trade. We are working to see that these measures do not pass.
- Despite opposition in Congress, we will continue efforts to remove the fur skin embargo.

(If Gorbachev Questions US Export Controls on High Technology:)

- Export controls are a matter of national security for us and our allies. We do not want such controls to interfere with peaceful trade and are looking at ways to streamline export procedures. But, we will continue to restrict trade that undermines our security.

~~SECRET~~

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CS NARA, DATE 3/16/06

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- 2 -

(If Gorbachev Raises the Question of US-Soviet Joint Ventures:)

- We are not opposed to commercially-viable joint ventures in the USSR between US and Soviet firms as another way to develop bilateral trade and economic relations. But whether US firms enter into joint ventures is for them to decide, not us.
- Any joint venture, however, must be consistent with U.S. laws and policies, including export control regulations.

(If Gorbachev Raises Grain Trade:)

- Agricultural trade is important to our economic relationship. I am pleased that we have agreed to meet early in 1988 to discuss the future of the Long-Term Grain Agreement.

(If Gorbachev Raises the Issue of Soviet GATT Membership:)

- We have carefully examined your interest in the GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs), taking into account the internal economic situation in the USSR, our own economic interests, and the interests of the GATT and its members.
- Our conclusion is that we are unable to support Soviet membership at this time because your present economic and trading system is not compatible with the free market trading principles of the GATT.
- If, at some point, the Soviet Union demonstrates a more open, market-oriented system, things could change.

~~SECRET~~





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# Soviets at the Summit: Washington, 8-10 December 1987

## Legend

E= Speaks English <sup>a</sup>

G=Attended Geneva Summit November 1

## Principals



Mikhail **GORBACHEV**




Sergey **AKHROMEYEV**  
R  
Marshal; First Deputy  
Minister of Defense and  
Chief of the General  
Staff; principal  
military adviser  
on arms control



Vladimir **KAMENTSEV**  
Chairman, Foreign  
Economic Commission,  
Deputy Chairman,  
Council of Ministers;  
oversees foreign  
economic activity;  
formulates trade policy;  
major role in joint  
venture efforts



Anatoliy **CHERNYAYEV**  
E,R  
Personal adviser  
to Gorbachev;  
key player in  
formulating policy  
toward US



Eduard **SHEVARDNADZE**  
G,R  
Politburo member,  
Minister of Foreign  
Affairs; key role in  
formulating INF treaty



Anatoliy **DOBRYNIN**  
E,G,R  
Party secretary;  
chief, International  
Department, CPSU  
Central Committee; top  
Gorbachev adviser on  
foreign policy;  
spokesman for "new"  
political thinking



Aleksandr **YAKOVLEV**  
E,G,R  
Politburo member,  
party secretary for  
ideology, propaganda,  
culture; foreign affairs  
specialist; proponent  
of *glasnost* policy.




Yuriy **DUBININ**  
E,R  
Ambassador to the  
United States;  
specialist on West  
European issues

<sup>a</sup> Where known.

## Advisers



**Abel AGENBEGYAN**  
E  
Academician secretary,  
Economics Department,  
Academy of Sciences;  
Gorbachev economic adviser



**Viktor KARPOV**  
E,G,R  
Chief, Problems of Arms  
Limitation and Disarmament  
Administration; arms control  
expert



**Yevgeniy PRIGORIN**  
E,G,R  
Director, Institute of  
World Economics and  
International Relations;  
expert on missile and  
arms control




**Georgiy ARBATOV**  
E,G,R  
Director, Institute of the  
USA and Canada;  
expert on US domestic,  
international politics



**Dmitriy LISOVOLIK**  
E,G,R  
Head, USA Sector,  
International Department,  
CPSU Central Committee;  
specialist on Middle East



**Roald SAGDEEV**  
E,G,R  
Director, Space Research  
Institute; leading civilian  
scientist; top expert  
on SDI




**Aleksandr BESSMERTNYKH**  
E,G,R  
Ambassador; Deputy  
Foreign Minister; major  
player in US-Soviet  
bilateral affairs, arms  
control



**Lem MASTERKOV**  
E  
Ambassador; head,  
current START  
delegation at the  
nuclear and space  
arms talks; arms  
control specialist



**Yevgeniy VEKSHIN**  
E,G,R  
Vice president,  
Academy of Sciences;  
Gorbachev's science  
advisor; research efforts  
nuclear energy  
computerization



**Nikolay CHERVOV**  
G  
Colonel general; chief  
of Directorate of  
General Staff; arms  
control expert



**Yuriy NAZARKIN**  
E  
Chief, Questions on  
Peaceful Use of Atomic  
Energy and Space  
Department, Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs; expert  
on chemical warfare,  
nuclear testing



**Vitaliy GUSENKOV**  
R  
Staff official, CPSU  
Central Committee;  
adviser on European  
affairs



**Aleksey OBUKHOV**  
E  
Ambassador; deputy  
head, nuclear and  
space arms talks  
delegation and  
unofficial head, INF  
group at NST

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## Others



Aleksandr **AKSENOV**  
Chairman, State  
Committee for  
Television and Radio  
Broadcasting; oversees  
implementation of  
*glasnost* campaign in  
Soviet media



Gennadiy **GERASIMOV**  
E,G,R  
Chief, Information  
Department, Foreign  
Ministry; press  
spokesman



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Geliy **BATENIN**  
Major general;  
consultant, CPSU  
Central Committee;  
arms control expert



Vladimir **KUDRYAVTSEV**  
Director, Institute of  
State and Law,  
Academy of Sciences;  
legal expert, specialist  
on human rights issues



Fedor **BURLATSKIY**  
E,G,R  
Political commentator,  
*Literaturnaya Gazeta*;  
reform-minded  
journalist; unofficial  
adviser to Gorbachev



Sergey **LOSEV**  
E  
Director general, TASS;  
veteran journalist;  
foreign affairs specialist



Vitaliy **CHURKIN**  
E  
Employee, CPSU  
Central Committee;  
arms control expert;  
former interpreter at  
arms talks; media  
spokesman at Soviet  
Embassy in Washington  
in mid-1980s



Vladimir **POZNER**  
E,R  
Radio, television  
commentator;  
broadcasts in English;  
host of telebridge  
exchanges



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Valentin **FALIN**  
E,R  
Head, Novosti Press  
Agency; leading  
spokesman on  
domestic, foreign  
affairs and arms  
control; Ambassador to  
West Germany 1971-78



Nikolay **SHISHLIN**  
E,G,R  
Deputy chief,  
Propaganda  
Department, CPSU  
Central Committee;  
spokesman on foreign  
affairs, particularly  
East-West and arms  
control issues



**Gennadiy GERASIMOV**  
E,G,R  
Chief, Information  
Department, Foreign  
Ministry; press  
spokesman





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**Stefan SITARYAN**  
First Deputy Chairman,  
State Planning  
Committee (Gosplan);  
career in economic  
bureaucracy



**Sergey ZALYGIN**  
Chief editor, *Novyy  
Mir*; author; leader of  
USSR's environmental  
protection movement

**Vladimir KUDRYAVTSEV**  
Director, Institute of  
State and Law,  
Academy of Sciences;  
legal expert, specialist  
on human rights issues



**Viktor SUKHODREV**  
E  
Deputy chief, USA and  
Canada Department,  
Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs; interpreter



**Vitaliy ZHURKIN**  
E  
Deputy director,  
Institute of USA and  
Canada; spokesman on  
arms control, general  
international issues

**Sergey LOSEV**  
E  
Director general, TASS;  
veteran journalist;  
foreign affairs specialist



**Sergey TARASENKO**  
E,R  
Aide to Foreign  
Minister; specialist on  
Third World,  
disarmament issues



**Nikolay ZINOV'YEV**  
E  
Chief, Administration  
for Trade With Western  
Countries, Ministry  
of Foreign Trade; the  
Ministry's specialist  
on the US

**Vladimir POZNER**  
E,R  
Radio, television  
commentator;  
broadcasts in English;  
host of telebridge  
exchanges



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**Mikhail UL'YANOV**  
Chairman, RSFSR Union  
of Theatrical Workers;  
director of Moscow's  
Vakhtangov Theater;  
actor

**Nikolay SHISHLIN**  
E,G,R  
Deputy chief,  
Propaganda  
Department, CPSU  
Central Committee;  
spokesman on foreign  
affairs, particularly  
East-West and arms  
control issues



**Yegor YAKOVLEV**  
E  
Chief editor, *Moscow  
News*; leading *glasnost*  
proponent