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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1986

DONALD T. REGAN

The attached has been
forwarded to the President.

David L. Chew

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 14, 1986

SITUATION ROOM NOTE

UNCLASSIFIED

In a press conference today, General Secretary Gorbachev gave an extremely detailed presentation of his meeting with President Reagan in Reykjavik. He emphasized that the meeting was an important event and was very useful in preparing the Soviets for a possible "step forward" toward disarmament. However, he stressed several times that any "reconstruction" was contingent on the US adopting a more realistic position than it had in Reykjavik. Gorbachev stated the proposals raised at the summit and reiterated that adherence to the ABM treaty and a nuclear test ban was an organic part of the Soviet proposal package and of any Soviet agreement. With regard to SDI, Gorbachev reiterated that it remains a "sore spot" and stumbling block to progress in the arms control area. He appeared to make jest of the President's remark to share results of work on SDI, commenting that the US does not even want to share dairy plant equipment. Gorbachev added that the Star Wars idea is aimed strictly at US military superiority. He concluded his speech with an assessment of the behavior of the US delegation at Reykjavik stating that its leadership depended on the military industry--and has turned the arms race into a business. (U)

The above is based on a television broadcast of Gorbachev's speech. Transcripts have not yet been received.

UNCLASSIFIED

<TOR> 861014154249

<TEXT>FBIS 088

(USIA ALERT)

USSR: GORBACHEV, IN ADDRESS, SAYS U.S. EMPTY-HANDED IN ICELAND
LD141914 MOSCOW TELEVISION SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1800 GMT 14 OCT 86

(TELEVISION ADDRESS BY CPSU GENERAL SECRETARY MIKHAIL

SERGEYEVICH

GORBACHEV ON "VREMYA" PROGRAM, LIVE OR RECORDED -- VIDEO SHOWS

GORBACHEV SEATED AT DESK FACING CAMERA)

(EXCERPT) IT BECAME CLEAR, COMRADES, THAT THE AMERICANS CAME TO
REYKJAVIK COMPLETELY EMPTY-HANDED. THE IMPRESSION WAS CREATED THAT
THEY HAD COME THERE ONLY TO GATHER FRUIT INTO THEIR BASKET WITH
EMPTY HANDS.THE SITUATION WAS DRAMATIC. THE U.S. PRESIDENT WAS NOT PREPARED
TO DECIDE THE QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE IN A MAJOR WAY, TO COME PART
WAY TO MEET US, SO AS REALLY TO GIVE AN IMPULSE TO TALKS THAT WOULD
PRODUCE RESULTS AND GIVE RISE TO HOPE. AND IT WAS PRECISELY FOR
THIS THAT I CALLED UPON THE PRESIDENT IN MY LETTER IN WHICH I PUT
FORWARD THE IDEA OF HOLDING THE URGENT AND IMMEDIATE MEETING SO AS
TO GIVE A POWERFUL IMPULSE AT THE LEVEL OF THE TOP LEADERS OF THE
TWO COUNTRIES.

14 OCT 1939Z WG

This is all we have
so far

<TOR> 861014152622

<TEXT>FBIS 084

TASS REPORTS GORBACHEV PROPOSALS FORESHADOWED NEW EPOCH
LD141851 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1848 GMT 14 OCT 86

(TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 14 TASS -- A WHOLE PACKAGE OF BIG MEASURES
PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE WAS PLACED ON THE TABLE OF THE SOVIET-
AMERICAN TALKS IN REYKJAVIK, THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU
CENTRAL COMMITTEE MIKHAIL GORBACHEV SAID ON SOVIET TELEVISION
TONIGHT. THESE MEASURES, IF ADOPTED, WOULD HAVE LAID THE BEGINNING
OF A NEW EPOCH IN THE LIFE OF MANKIND, A NUCLEAR-FREE EPOCH.

WHAT WE WERE SPEAKING ABOUT WAS ALREADY NOT THE LIMITATION OF
NUCLEAR ARMS, AS WAS THE CASE IN THE SALT-1, SALT-2 AND OTHER
TREATIES, BUT ABOUT THE LIQUIDATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS WITHIN A
COMPARATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. THE PROPOSAL CONCERNED
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

14 OCT 1912Z WG

1;2;10yDELandscape13.6-@1;2;11yDETitan10-R11m<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 861014152852

<TEXT>FBIS 085

USSR: GORBACHEV -- REAGAN NOT PREPARED TO SOLVE QUESTIONS
LD141858 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1857 GMT 14 OCT 86

(TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 14 TASS -- THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT WAS NOT
PREPARED TO SOLVE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS IN A BIG WAY, TO COVER HIS
PART OF THE ROAD SO AS REALLY TO GIVE AN IMPULSE TO RESULTFUL AND
ENCOURAGING TALKS, STATED THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL
COMMITTEE MIKHAIL GORBACHEV WHEN APPEARING ON CENTRAL TELEVISION
TODAY. BUT IT IS TO THIS THAT I CALLED THE PRESIDENT IN MY LETTER
INVITING HIM TO THE MEETING TO GIVE AN IMPULSE TO THE TALKS ON
NUCLEAR-SPACE ARMS, HE SAID.

14 OCT 1916Z WG

1;2;10yDELandscape13.6-@1;2;11yDETitan10-R11m<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 861014153108

<TEXT>FBIS 086

USSR: GORBACHEV ON CONTRADICTIONS IN U.S. STAND

LD141902 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1859 GMT 14 OCT 86

(TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 14 TASS -- EUROPE DESERVES TO BE RID OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TO STOP BEING A NUCLEAR HOSTAGE, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV,
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, HAS STATED,
SPEAKING OVER THE SOVIET TELEVISION. AS FOR THE PRESIDENT, IT WAS
DIFFICULT TO HIM TO OPPOSE HIS OWN "ZERO OPTION" WHICH HE HAD
BOOSTED FOR SO LONG. AND STILL, WE FELT THE INTENTION OF THE
AMERICANS TO DISRUPT THE AGREEMENT UNDER THE GUISE OF THEIR SPECIAL
CONCERN FOR THEIR ALLIES IN ASIA.

14 OCT 1923Z WG

<TOR> 861014154748

<TEXT>FBIS 090

USSR: GORBACHEV ON PRESERVING ABM TREATY

LD141908 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1901 GMT 14 OCT 86

(TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 14 TASS -- WE MUST CREATE SUCH A SITUATION IN WHICH NOT ONLY IN DEEDS BUT EVEN IN THOUGHTS THERE WOULD BE NO ATTEMPTS TO WAVER STRATEGIC STABILITY AND SIDESTEP ACCORDS, STATED THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MIKHAIL GORBACHEV WHEN APPEARING ON MOSCOW TELEVISION. THAT IS WHY WE MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT THE TIMELESS ABM TREATY WILL BE PRESERVED.
14 OCT 1945Z WG

<TOR> 861014154520

<TEXT>FBIS 089

TASS REPORTS GORBACHEV COMMENTS ON SDI

LD141915 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1913 GMT 14 OCT 86

(TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 14 TASS -- OUR ATTEMPTS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE SDI PROGRAMME FAILED TO PRODUCE RESULTS, THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MIKHAIL GORBACHEV SAID ON SOVIET TELEVISION TONIGHT. THE MORE WE DISCUSSED IT THE MORE OBVIOUS IT BECAME THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD NOT AGREE TO CONFINING RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING UNDER THE SDI PROGRAMME TO THE FRAMEWORK OF LABORATORIES. THEY ARE EAGER TO GO INTO OUTER SPACE WITH WEAPONS.

I FIRMLY STATED, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV SAID, THAT WE WILL NEVER AGREE TO HELP UNDERMINE THE ABM TREATY WITH OUR OWN HANDS. FOR US THIS IS A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE, A QUESTION OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY.

14 OCT 1945Z BR

<TOR> 861014154934

<TEXT>FBIS 091

USSR: GORBACHEV -- U.S. STUCK TO TIME-ERODED POSITIONS

LD141920 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1917 GMT 14 OCT 86

(TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 14 TASS -- OUR PARTNERS LACKED THE BREADTH OF APPROACH, UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE MOMENT AND, ULTIMATELY, COURAGE, RESPONSIBILITY AND POLITICAL DETERMINATION THAT ARE SO NECESSARY FOR RESOLVING VITAL AND COMPLICATED WORLD PROBLEMS, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, SAID IN HIS TELEVISED SPEECH TONIGHT. THEY STUCK TO THEIR OLD TIME-ERODED POSITIONS THAT CONTRADICTED PRESENT-DAY REALITIES.
14 OCT 1947Z WG

1;2;10yDELandscape13.6-@1;2;11yDETitan10-R11m<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 861014160910

<TEXT>FBIS 094

USSR: GORBACHEV -- PEOPLE MUST KNOW TRUTH ABOUT REYKJAVIK
LD141930 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1926 GMT 14 OCT 86

(TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 14 TASS -- BEFORE APPEARING BEFORE YOU I
READ THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ABOUT

REYKJAVIK, THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV STATED ON SOVIET TELEVISION TODAY. WHAT ATTRACTS
ATTENTION IS THAT THE PRESIDENT ATTRIBUTES TO HIMSELF ALL THE
PROPOSALS THAT WERE DISCUSSED. IT MUST BE THAT THESE PROPOSALS ARE
SO APPEALING TO THE AMERICANS AND THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD THAT ONE
MIGHT RESORT EVEN TO SUCH A STRATEGEM. CONCEIT IS NOT GNAWING US.
YET IT IS IMPORTANT FOR PEOPLE TO GET A TRUTHFUL PICTURE OF WHAT
WENT ON IN REYKJAVIK.

14 OCT 2002Z WG

1;2;10yDELandscape13.6-@1;2;11yDETitan10-R11m<ORIG> FBIS
<TOR> 861014161101

<TEXT>FBIS 095

USSR: GORBACHEV -- WE ARE REALISTS...NOT LOSING HEART
LD141941 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1935 GMT 14 OCT 86

(TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 14 TASS -- "WE ARE REALISTS. WE CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT QUESTIONS THAT FOR MANY YEARS, EVEN DECADES HAVE NOT FOUND THEIR SOLUTION CAN HARDLY BE RESOLVED AT A SINGLE SITTING," MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, SAID IN HIS TELEVISED SPEECH TONIGHT.

"WE HAVE SUFFICIENT EXPERIENCE OF CONDUCTING AFFAIRS WITH THE UNITED STATES. WE KNOW HOW CHANGEABLE ITS POLITICAL CLIMATE IS, HOW STRONG AND INFLUENTIAL OVERSEAS OPPONENTS OF PEACE ARE," HE SAID.

"THAT WE ARE NOT LOSING HEART, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MORE THAN ENOUGH GROUNDS FOR THAT, IS ONLY BECAUSE WE ARE SINCERELY CONVINCED ABOUT THE NEED FOR FRESH EFFORTS TO BUILDING NORMAL INTER-STATE RELATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE," GORBACHEV EMPHASISED.

14 OCT 2006Z WG

<TOR> 861014161259

<TEXT>FBIS 096

USSR: GORBACHEV -- REYKJAVIK PREPARED POSSIBLE STEP FORWARD
LD141946 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1941 GMT 14 OCT 86

(TEXT) MOSCOW OCTOBER 14 TASS -- THE MEETING IN REYKJAVIK WAS A MAJOR EVENT. A REVALUATION TOOK PLACE. A QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT SITUATION HAS BEEN CREATED. NOBODY CAN ACT ANY MORE IN THE WAY HE HAS ACTED BEFORE. THE MEETING WAS USEFUL. IT PREPARED A POSSIBLE STEP FORWARD, TO A REAL CHANGE FOR THE BETTER, IF THE UNITED STATES AT LONG LAST MOVES TO REALISTIC POSITIONS AND GIVES UP DELUSIONS IN APPRAISALS, MIKHAIL GORBACHEV SAID WHEN APPEARING ON SOVIET TELEVISION TONIGHT.
14 OCT 2009Z WG

00412-----

u 1 PM-Soviet-US 2ndLd-Writethru 10-14 0775

^PM-Soviet-US, 2nd Ld - Writethru, 0791<

^Superpowers Can Negotiate Reykjavik Accords in Geneva, Commentator Says<

^Eds: New grafs 1-8, Gorbachev speech material. Rewrites prvs to shorten. No pickup.<

^By KEN OLSEN=

^Associated Press Writer=

MOSCOW (AP) — Kremlin leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev told the Soviet people Tuesday that if necessary, the country will respond to the U.S. "Star Wars" program that President Reagan refused to curtail during the Iceland summit.

"Soviet people know this, and all people around the world should know this as well," Gorbachev said in a nationally televised address. "But we are opposed to a power play. This is an extremely dangerous undertaking in the nuclear missile age."

Gorbachev and Reagan, in two days of talks in Reykjavik, Iceland, agreed in principle to radically reduce strategic weapons and eliminate medium-range missiles from Europe.

But the potential agreements were conditioned on Soviet insistence on confining space weapons research to the laboratory. Reagan rejected this, and no final agreement emerged although both sides said they still had hopes that the progress made in Reykjavik will continue in disarmament negotiations in Geneva.

The Soviet leader indicated in his speech that more than the Star Wars program was an obstacle for at least part of the arms control measures they discussed. Gorbachev said the Soviets accepted Reagan's proposal that both sides eliminate all medium-range nuclear missiles from Europe, the so-called "zero-zero" option.

"And still, we felt the intention of the Americans to disrupt the agreement under the guise of their special concern for their allies in Asia," he said, without immediate elaboration.

Gorbachev said Reagan had not been "prepared to solve fundamental questions in a big way, to cover his part of the road so as to really give an impulse to resultful and encouraging talks," according to excerpts of his address transmitted by the official news agency Tass.

"But it is to this that I called the president in my letter inviting him to the meeting, to give an impulse to the talks on nuclear and space arms," he said.

Soviet newspapers today did not publish any major analyses of the summit, the second meeting between the superpower leaders in 11 months.

Vladimir Alexeyev, a commentator for the government press agency Novosti, said the summit will result in more pressure on Washington to alter its policies.

"After this meeting, it will be doubly hard for the United States to cloak its intransigence on arms reduction matters with sterile noble-sounding statements. Thus, Reykjavik might, in the long run, hasten the day when, in order to remain a respected member of the world community, Washington will have to end its obstinance and proceed with concrete actions to meet Moscow halfway on these issues."

The Novosti commentary, sent by telex to Western correspondents, seemed optimistic that agreement is eventually possible.

"Yes, the meeting stumbled, but this does not mean that it completely failed," wrote Alexeyev. "It also does not mean that such an unfortunate outcome of the top-level dialogue precludes the possibility of future progress in arms limitation and reduction endeavors or bars the continuation of such encounters."

In a nationally televised speech Monday night, Reagan said the invitation to Gorbachev to visit the United States this year still stands, and "we continue to believe that additional meetings would be useful."

Reagan also said that American negotiators in Geneva "are prepared to go forward whenever and wherever the Soviets are ready."

Radio Moscow said in an English-language newscast today that Reagan "tried to justify his refusal to make a compromise on the SDI issue by claiming that the program holds the key to a world without nuclear arms."

It said that his "stubborn striving" to prove himself right over SDI had led unidentified analysts to question his willingness to reach arms control accords.

None of today's Soviet newspapers commented on the outcome of the summit, limiting their reports to Gorbachev's news conference held in Reykjavik Sunday night and a roundup of reaction from abroad.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR STAFF

FROM: Larry Speakes

Attached is the transcript of Admiral Poindexter's remarks to the press pool on Air Force One returning from Iceland on October 12. Please note that this is for internal use only.

INTERVIEW OF ADMIRAL JOHN POINDEXTER
ON RETURN FROM ICELAND

Air Force One

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: What we decided to do is be very open with you on the negotiations so our position comes out very clearly. As we said before we got up here, we really didn't expect to get any agreements. We thought the best that we could do was to focus the agenda because we knew that there were substantive differences in the INF area, where the differences were on Asia -- I probably will use a little shorthand here because I think you're familiar with the issues -- Asia, short-range INF, and verification.

On nuclear testing, given the President's latest proposal to the Congress -- of course, that obviously fit in with what we wanted to propose to the Soviets. And are you familiar with that proposal to the Congress? All right, I'll come back to that -- remind me.

But the fundamental difference that we have with the Soviets in the testing area is the Soviets believe that we should immediately enter into a comprehensive test ban. And what we're saying is that we're willing to negotiate toward a comprehensive test ban as the ultimate objective, but only reach that point of banning all tests when we've eliminated the nuclear weapons that we need for strategic deterrence, because as long as we've got to rely on those weapons, we feel we need to test them.

In the SALT area -- or START rather, START -- in the START area, our major areas of difference was how to distribute the 50 percent reduction that we both had agreed to in principle at Geneva -- the mix, the mix of the (inaudible.)

All right, now, let's see. That INF, nuclear testing, START, SDI.

Q SDI --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay. On SDI, of course, we feel very strongly that in order to continue to provide deterrence as we reduce offensive weapons that it's important to have the strategic defensive system eventually.

Now, the President's proposal back in July was that the Soviets join us in a new treaty that we would be willing to sign now, but which would be -- the trigger for implementation would be a future decision after 1991 that either side wanted to proceed ahead with the development and deployment of SDI. The treaty that we were prepared to offer would have required the side that decided to proceed ahead with SDI to offer a sharing plan and would have required that party to share, if both parties would agree to work out a plan to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles.

Q Yes, but --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, I'm going through this part in history right now --

Q That's very good, very useful. Are you saying that both sides were on the side that offered to proceed with the plan?

Q When you say proceed, you mean laboratory testing --

MORE

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: At the end -- you see, for the first five-year period, we were talking about doing the research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. If we wanted to go beyond that point to development and testing not permitted by the ABM Treaty, at that point we would have to transition to this new treaty that we were prepared to sign now. That new treaty would -- the legal word would be a novation for those parts of the ABM Treaty where there was a conflict. But we would -- the main point here is that under our plan, we would have been under a continual treaty.

The question of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would not have arisen. So we would have just had transition from the situation today where we have one treaty, an ABM Treaty, to a situation where we would actually have two treaties. The ABM Treaty would remain in effect, but there would be a new treaty with provisions that would contradict the ABM Treaty and the new treaty would supercede it in those areas.

And our plan was a sincere effort on our part to figure out a way that both countries could transition from a situation where we've got to rely on offensive weapons for strategic deterrence to a situation where we could shift the reliance to defensive systems to maintain the deterrence.

Q In effect, from bad to something else.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right. From mutual assured destruction to defending one's country. In our case, we would have been defending much of the free world.

Now, the Soviets, all along, had wanted to do everything they could to stop SDI. That's why their proposal going into Iceland was that we agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 15 to 20 years. We do not feel that a workable SDI system is that far away. We feel that it's closer to that, and because we think it's a much safer way to coexist, we didn't want to wait that long.

Q Can I ask a question?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes.

Q Why, why are the Soviets so afraid of SDI?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, that's --

Q I mean -- (inaudible) -- thinking it's a first-strike -- Is it because they want the time to catch up or is it because they really fear that it is -- that they're going to be blown up?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's a great question, Helen. I'm not sure I know the answer to that question.

Q What came out of the dialogue with them that made -- showed their fear? What is it that -- are they trying to trick us?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: This afternoon, I specifically asked Shevardnadze that question in one of the meetings. I tried -- I asked him, "What do you fear from SDI?" They simply avoided answering that question.

Q He wouldn't tell you?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right --

Q Do you think they have a good enough understanding, however, of the technology? You say we're much closer than that. Do they know how close we are?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, 15 years is a long time. Ten years is a long time. SDI is not just around the corner. We've got a lot of work to do. I don't want to mislead you that we've got some sort of breakthrough.

Q I just want to ask you one more question on that -- in that respect. What do you think bothers them? Is it because they are so far behind and they feel they'll be outgunned and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, let me go on and you come back to that question, Helen, because --

Q -- what we did in these 72 hours --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Some parts of the negotiations may reveal that. Now, in addition to arms control, of course, coming to Iceland, we wanted to talk about the regional issues, human rights, and the bilateral issues.

On human rights, we're very concerned about the lack of emigration from the Soviet Union. There are several hundred thousand people that want to emigrate from the Soviet Union. Since Geneva, we have made some progress in getting divided families out and well-know dissidents. But really, we have not been able to have much impact on the bulk numbers.

So in the discussions yesterday, the President and Gorbachev reviewed their respective positions and agreed that, last night at 8:00 p.m., that two working groups would convene, one on arms control and one on human rights, regional and bilateral issues.

The arms control group met for ten and a half hours. They went right straight through the night. The other working group went for about five and a half hours.

On the regional, human rights, bilateral issues, the working group was able to reach agreed positions on a work plan for the next several months to make progress in most of our outstanding bilateral issues; agreed to continue discussions on ways of addressing the human rights issues; and agreed to continue the dialogue we've been having with them on the regional issues.

In the arms control area --

Q Over the next several months?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Over the next several months.

Q Where? What area?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: In the same fora we've been using in bilateral talks.

In the arms control area, agreement was reached last night on a way of handling the short-range INF problem in that -- beg your pardon -- in that there was an agreement to freeze at the current Soviet level and continue negotiations on short-range INF, once the long-range INF issue was settled. There was agreement that the

(end of side one)

MORE

(begin side two -- interview in progress)

And that was not just a matter that we would have agreed to pull weapons out and they could immediately place them back in, that they would remain in effect -- in other words, prohibiting the reintroduction of these weapons. The weapons would be destroyed.

Our going-in coming to Iceland was that we were prepared to accept 100 warheads in Europe from each side and, for the Soviets, 100 warheads in Asia and 100 for the U.S. in the United States.

Through last night, the Soviets would agree to come down to zero-zero in Europe, but they wanted to delay a reduction in Asia and let that be dependent upon a future negotiation. We were unwilling to accept that last night because it would simply shift the burden from Europe on to our Asian allies.

Q -- future negotiations unspecified?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Unspecified. Now, probably, rather than going through this chronologically, let me just continue with INF for a moment. Today, the Soviets agreed to come down to 100 warheads on each side globally. Their 100 would be in Asia; our 100 would be in the United States. So that would amount to zero-zero for Europe. That would be 100 percent reduction for Europe for the Soviets and about an 80 percent reduction in Asia, or from 1323 warheads today down to 100 warheads for the Soviets -- a very significant reduction. And we agreed to that.

Q You say we agreed to that -- that means that at the end of the working group you --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, I'm sorry. I transitioned there from the working group last night to the discussions today.

Q Okay. You agreed to that on Sunday?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Right. The Soviets proposed it today and we agreed to it today.

Q At both leadership levels.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Right.

Q That would have been -- (inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, you must remember that what we were trying to achieve here were instructions for the Foreign Ministers of both countries. They would then take those instructions and prepare a framework agreement that could be signed in a Washington summit. And then treaties would have to be prepared from that framework agreement. There are a lot of details to be worked out, Helen, which were not addressed today.

Now, let me just give you a footnote here. As you'll see in a moment, Gorbachev held all of the arms control agreements that both sides were prepared to agree to hostage to our SDI. So, Helen, we do not have this INF agreement now. I'm just telling you what the two leaders were prepared to agree to.

Q So he linked them all?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All.

Q He linked all of the -- (inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right. But that was significant progress in INF.

MORE

On START, last night --

Q Let me just ask -- (inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Last night on START, both sides reached agreement on 1,600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles.

Q 1,600?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: 1,600. And they agreed on 6,000 nuclear warheads. The Soviets were --

Q 1,600 nuclear delivery vehicles, 6,000 nuclear warheads.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles. SNDV.

The Soviets were still resisting the negotiation on sub-limits, but we felt that could easily be a job completed in Geneva. They did agree there would be substantial reductions in their heavy ICBMs.

The agreed that bombers, gravity bombs, short-range attack missiles would count as one reentry vehicle each.

Q Gravity bombs and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Short range attack missiles. In other words, the combination of the bomber with its load of bombs and short-range attack missiles would count as one re-entry vehicle in the 6,000 count. In other words, this was solving the problem of our difference of opinion on how to count. The Soviets in the past had referred to nuclear charges. So that within the 6,000 you'd have the ICBM warheads, the SLBM warheads, the ALCM warheads, and then each bomber with bombs and SRAM that combination, each one of those would count as one. But is that clear? I want to be sure that --

Q Can you run through that again?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, okay. The nuclear warheads that count as one each: ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, ALCMS -- air-launched cruise missiles -- and then the combination of the bomber with its bombs and with its short-range attack missiles, that package together counts as one. That was significant progress in that area.

Q What is our numbers today? Why would this be significant progress?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, because in the past up to this point when the Soviets have put forth a warhead number, they were talking about nuclear charges. So they counted the bomber and each of the bombs and each of the short-range attack missiles as one each rather than the package counting as one, which gives the Soviets a distinct advantage if you count that way because the equating one bomb or one short-range attack missile with the ICBM re-entry vehicle is an unfair equality. All right. Everybody agreed to that.

Q Today?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That was last night. No, they reached all those agreements on START last night, in the working group. The working group was unusual, by the way, in that the Soviet Chief of Staff, Marshall Akramehev, led the discussions.

Q How do you spell his name? A-R-K --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, A-K-R-A-M-E-H-E-V. Akramehev.

MORE

You need to have your staffs check that out. That's about right.

Q It's on the list. We got the list.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right. This was very unusual.

Q To have him sitting in?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: To have him sit in. As the Chairman of the -- the leader, yes.

Q That, to you, I take it, showed seriousness of purpose.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Showed seriousness of purpose and carried on a very business-like negotiation last night for which we are appreciative.

Q (Inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right. But they said last night that the -- well, there was not agreement last night on the INF. That only -- the agreement on that was arrived at today. But last night, especially in the START area, they indicated they were not willing to finally agree to these provisions unless we would agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years and if we would agree to a modified and more restrictive definition as to what research development and testing is permitted under the ABM Treaty.

Q Let's get that straight because that's really crucial. Then they would -- willing to be -- not be willing to agree to these provisions unless the U.S. was willing to not withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Right. And if we would agree to make the restrictions on research and developing and testing more restrictive than presently provided for in the ABM Treaty.

Q Was this -- you mentioned these types of treaties. Was this sort of a drop-in clause that they were working for? What were they --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I would just say, it was a condition -- I mean these are still -- these are not heads -- last night, this was not heads of state agreeing on these issues --

Q This -- it was last night that they laid this out?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right.

Q In the arms control group?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right.

Q Which was headed by whom on the U.S. side?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Paul Nitze.

Q They never made this so clear before?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: They hadn't made all of these provisions in START that they would agree to so clear before. But we knew that -- all along -- that they wanted some linkage between SDI and START. But last night, they also tied START, INF, and nuclear testing all to an agreement on the ABM Treaty view from their side or SDI as viewed from our side.

Q So what were those -- or are those restrictions that are stumbling blocks?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right. Let me get to that a little bit later because I want to cover last night a little bit more.

Q Okay.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: On nuclear testing, there was agreement last night that both sides would agree on starting negotiations on further limitations to nuclear testing with improved verification being the number one agenda item -- number one by -- in terms of priority, with the ultimate objective of providing further limitations on nuclear testing in conjunction with agreement to reduce offensive forces in parallel with agreement to reduce offensive forces, with the ultimate objective being a comprehensive test ban at the point that we no longer had to rely on nuclear weapons for a strategic deterrence.

Now, the elements of this were agreed to. The way of characterizing it, the way I've just characterized it was not agreed to. In other words, to make that clear, both sides are prepared to begin negotiations. The agenda would be improved verification and further limitations on nuclear testing as we reduce offensive weapons, with the ultimate objective being a comprehensive test ban.

We want to characterize that as beginning negotiations on further limitations on nuclear testing. They want to characterize it as beginning negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. But there's an important distinction in that we want it to be made clear to everybody that we are not prepared to enter into an immediate comprehensive test ban, but only reach that point over time as we reduce the nuclear weapons.

Q So substantial difference in interpretation?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, of characterizing it, although, frankly, I think we could have resolved that difference today if we could have solved the SDI problem -- the ABM problem.

All right. The discussions today between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev -- they began at 10:00 a.m. They were supposed to finish at 12:00 p.m. They actually went to about 4:30 p.m. Well, you must have these times.

Q Yes, we have all of them.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: And then broke at 1:30 p.m. Then Secretary Shultz and I met at 2:00 p.m. with Shevardnadze. And we had some people on our side, he had some people on his side. And we met from 2:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. Then the President and Gorbachev reconvened about 3:30 p.m. or so, I guess.

Because when the President came back, Secretary Shultz and I had to brief him on our discussions with Shevardnadze.

Q I'm sorry -- the President and Gorbachev, one-on-one?

MR. SPEAKES: Separately. Each side separately.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Each side separately. No, the meetings began this morning with two-on-two. Shultz and Shevardnadze -- or Shultz and the President and Shevardnadze and Gorbachev. Then that meeting went from 10:00 a.m. until about 1:30 p.m., broke. The President went to get lunch. Shultz and I met with Shevardnadze and his group from about 2:00 p.m. until 3:00 p.m. The President and Gorbachev came back. Each team met with their head of state for about a half hour I guess it was, and then, the President and Shultz and Gorbachev and Shevardnadze began two-on-two discussions that ran until we quit, whatever time that was.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We took one little break.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, there was one break in there where each side caucused with their own people.

Q What were the issues -- (inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: From the morning meeting, the President and Gorbachev came to agreement on INF, on the 100-100 globally. On START and the Defensive Space Component -- SDI and ABM -- the Soviets continued to hold in their position and they would not agree to the START position or the INF positions that had been agreed upon, or the nuclear testing positions that had been agreed upon unless the United States was willing to not withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years and with these further restrictions on what sort of research, development and testing could be accomplished during that ten-year period.

Q I'm sorry -- did that come up in the morning?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: (Inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: So Shultz and I met with Shevardnadze and his people to see if we could work out a counterproposal that protected our interests in SDI. So through that meeting and the meeting with the President when he came back, we prepared a counterproposal in which --

Q A U.S. proposal?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: This was a U.S. proposal. Let me preview this just a little bit in that throughout the discussions, both here and I think you've heard him say it publicly, both the President and Gorbachev have talked about the total elimination of nuclear weapons. So our counterproposal went like this.

We agreed not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for five years, during which time we would conduct research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, while we both achieved the 50 percent reduction in offensive weapons during this five-year period.

Q One is tied to the other?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Right. If the --

Q May I ask -- you're dealing with -- when you say what is allowed under the ABM Treaty, you're talking about the so-called broader interpretation?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: This is an important point. Our position hasn't changed on that. We believe there is a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty that is legal. And we would want to preserve the right to use that broad interpretation during that five-year period but --

Q They don't agree with that, I presume?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We are still, at this point in the SDI program, sticking to the narrow interpretation and have not changed to the broad interpretation. But we want to preserve that right if at some future point the research reaches the point where that becomes important.

Q Not to be argumentative, but -- (inaudible) -- said testing was not a part of the ABM.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That clearly is not true.

Q We don't need to go through that whole argument --

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ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Then our proposal continued -- that if the 50 percent reduction was achieved at the end of five years and if the Soviets would agree to continue reducing offensive weapons at the same rate --

Q This was after five years?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: After five years -- if they would agree to continue reducing offensive weapons at the same rate for the next five years, to reduce the last 50 percent, we would agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for that -- the second five-year period. Thus, in 1996, both sides would have eliminated all of their offensive ballistic missiles which both leaders have said they were prepared to do.

At the end of the ten-year period, both sides would be free to deploy a strategic defensive system unless otherwise agreed by both parties.

Q Can I interrupt for a moment?

Q Do you have another tape?

Q Unless otherwise agreed by both parties?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Right.

Q Does that mean -- would that have meant new negotiations in any case or --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, it just means that there would have to be a specific agreement by both sides not to deploy, in other words. In other words, it would be the obverse of a situation today. Today, if we wanted to deploy, we would have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

Q This counterproposal was presented at the afternoon meeting?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The afternoon session that began at 3:00 p.m.

Q When they agreed to come back, and that was -- (inaudible) -- try to find some way out of the linkage or --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: This would have kept the linkage, but it would have kept the linkage in such a way that a strategic defensive system would have been possible for both sides. But the system would not have been deployed until the offensive weapons were reduced, eliminated.

The General Secretary agreed with a large portion of this counterproposal. The point that he disagreed with was that he wanted us to agree to restrict all research, development and testing of space-based systems to the laboratory.

Q Can I just check that again. He wanted to agree to --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All research, development and testing of space-based advanced defensive systems to the laboratory -- and I'm not just talking about the 100 percent, I'm also talking about the 50 percent -- at this time.

Q So they're not really sincere in their negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to say they're insincere. I'm saying that's a possibility. And it may not -- it may simply be -- and, again, I don't want to question their sincerity, but you know they may have their rhetoric get a little far

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out in front of what they're really prepared to do at this time.

Q But going back to the part that you discussed ON THE RECORD and therefore, if you're willing, going back on the record --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right, back on the record.

Q The explicit American fear here was that if we agreed to their proposal, that you not have any insurance policy on compliance.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Compliance with the reductions on schedule and compliance, once we had both come down to zero ballistic missiles on both sides -- because at that point we've become quite vulnerable unless we've got a defensive system.

Q When you would have had all this verification and on site inspection and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: But the problem there is that the asymmetries that exist between our two societies give us very much a disadvantage here of being able to protect concealment of weapons and unauthorized construction of new weapons in underground facilities and they don't have the same problem with us. Now, they may not believe that but we know damn good and well that if we sign a treaty, the Congress would insist that -- any administration would want to follow the treaty and our Congress would insist on it. But we don't have the same kind of insurance with them. And again, I don't want to challenge the sincerity of the present leaders, but we're talking about, you know, years and years into the future and the security of the country simply cannot rest on an uninsured agreement.

Q -- and probably vice versa?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's probably true, Helen.

Q It's almost a given but -- you couldn't find verification procedures that would be the submission insurance policy.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's our problem.

Q And when you came down to --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You've also got third world problems that would enter it but --

Q Yes, I mean, all of us would immediately wonder, wouldn't that be an odd world if the Soviet Union and U.S. eliminated all of their ballistic missiles and other nations had them -- European, Middle Eastern nations have them. How would you deal with that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, at some point, you know, if we had agreed with these general principles, and if we were going to go off and actually draw up framework agreements treaties, we would have to bring allies into the process at some point.

Q What about non-allies?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Non-allies you would have to try to convince to enter the program. But it, you know, it is possible that if you had a Strategic Defensive System that both sides would be willing, on a bilateral basis, to go down to zero ballistic missiles.

Q Even if India, or Pakistan, or Israel --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, it gets --

Q or anyone --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You see, the other point here that is important to recognize is that many of the criticisms of SDI have been trying to protect broad areas like Europe, the United States, because of the very large number of warheads and penetration aids. Once you get the numbers down small -- like from a third country, or from non-compliance, SDI becomes much more effective. You don't have the same problems with the smaller numbers of warheads and penetration aids. So, it becomes easier it solve the SDI problem. It becomes cheaper to solve it.

Q Was the President tempted by the sweeping proportions of the offer that was under discussion and on the table?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We recognize the historical proportions of what we were proposing. The President was very clear on that point.

Q Because what do you say to people who don't necessarily understand exactly what INF and START and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, that's why I'm going --

Q PBT is all about? What do you think that the general Joe out in --*

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, that's why I'm going on the record --

Q -- thinks about the safety of the world after this?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's why I'm going on the record and being so detailed in telling you what happened -- because we want you to get the story out straight.

Q But, do you believe that --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: And we will have to -- we'll have to -- the President is going to speak to Nation tomorrow night and we -- I guess you'd announced that hadn't you?

? Yes --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay.

Q Yeah.

Q -- in the Oval Office.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: And we'll try to explain as much as we can in that speech. But as you can see, it's a very complex issue. And we're not going to give up, you know, we're going to keep trying. We'll try to find some way to protect the opportunity to have a Strategic Defensive System and still get all these reductions.

Q Did you make any arrangements before you broke up today for further discussions other than those existing forums in, I guess, Geneva?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Nothing specific. But we needed to reflect -- I think both sides need to reflect on what's happened the past couple of days and decide how best to proceed from this point.

Q Would you say there is no animosity?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No animosity would not be the right description.

Q No, I'm saying is there --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, I don't think so. For example,

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in leaving Hofdi House today I shook hands with Marshall Akramehev and we both expressed the pleasure in meeting one another and that we hope to be able to -- well, I don't -- he didn't say quite that. I'm trying to think exactly what we said because I don't want to misquote him. We expressed best wishes to each for the future.

Q Was the atmosphere in the room relaxed --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: It was very businesslike the whole time, Helen. There were few, if any, polemics on either side. It was very serious. Both Heads of State understood the seriousness of the issues that they were addressing and --

Q To understand the sequence -- you drew up this counterproposal by 3:30 p.m. The President presented it. They came back with their more restrictive definition. Did you then break and caucus and decide among yourselves what to do about it?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We modified their counter-counterproposal --

Q In the caucus?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: In the caucus, to remove the more restrictive interpretation of the ABM treaty and I mean that's more restrictive than we're currently following, and put back in the right to deploy at the end of the ten-year period.

Q Came back into the room with that, presented it, and did Gorbachev simply say no at the table when he heard it?

(end of tape one)

(tape two, side one -- in progress)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: -- the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting.

Q -- he would not agree to --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: He would not agree to allow us to do the research, development and testing which we feel is permitted by the ABM Treaty.

Q May I ask -- after today, aren't you, in effect, going to go ahead with this anyway?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Go ahead with what?

Q Go ahead with the research and development and testing.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Oh, yes.

Q So he has been unable to -- from his point of view -- with the United States on --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right.

Q Was this a bitter ending?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't think bitter, I think sadness on our part that the Soviets wouldn't agree to what we thought was an imminently fair, non-threatening, safe, stable position.

Q Do you believe --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Let me -- I want to -- let me just wind up -- the sort of chronology here and then characterize it and then I'll get into your questions about what all this means.

We feel that we made good progress in our bilateral issues work program. We are -- remain disappointed the Soviets will not make progress on the immigration issue. We feel in the nuclear testing area, in INF, we were able to reach positions on both sides in which we could conclude agreements at some future time. And we think that we made significant progress in establishing positions on both sides in START that would allow continued negotiations toward a treaty -- an eventual treaty, much closer.

Q So are you saying that this wasn't necessarily a bitter breakup, that there is a level there that was reached today that you can build on?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's exactly right. I think we were able to break through a lot of obstacles that have existed in the Geneva negotiations, that if we can get over our difference of opinion about the necessity to have strategic defense that we can make progress much faster in the other areas.

On INF, we came to a way to solve the Asia problem. I think we came to an acceptable way of solving the short-range INF. There was an agreement in principle on what is required on verification of INF, but a lot of work would have to be done to have to refine that -- those general principles into a workable agreement.

Q Is that on-site?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: INF.

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Q Did they agree to on-site?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: In principle, they're agreed to some type of on-site inspections.

Our general principles for verification on INF are data exchanges before and after the reduction, observation of the destruction of the weapons, and some sort of followup monitoring that would involve on site inspections.

Q When you come to a stopping point. I have a question.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay, go ahead.

Q So when it all came down in the end to a definition of the ABM Treaty -- the broader versus the more narrow --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, that's not quite right.

Q Well, I thought it did because if I understood you right, you said it was that that they wouldn't accept.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, what they -- what they -- it's not just the difference between the narrow and the broader interpretation, they want to make it narrower. They want to make it more restrictive by limiting research, development and testing of any space-based type system to the laboratory.

Q Let me -- let me try my narrowing. It all came down to that the President would not give up anything on SDI. Is SDI is the most important thing to them?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, that's not true.

Q Well, SDI is the thing that blew up all this.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, but it wasn't true that we weren't willing to give up anything. We did --

Q Oh, all right, I'll rephrase that.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, please. We -- the President agreed -- would have been prepared to agree to withhold deployment of SDI for ten years.

Q Well, he doesn't even have SDI. He won't have it for about 11 years.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That is not necessarily the case.

Q But SDI really is the crux.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Let me finish.

Q Okay.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The important thing here is that -- and the reason that we are so insistent on having an ability to eventually deploy a strategic defensive system, is that the history -- and I don't want to challenge the integrity or the sincerity of the present Soviet leaders -- but based on the history of our relationship we are not confident that the reductions that are proposed would actually be carried out. And so, a strategic defensive system becomes an insurance policy to make sure the reductions occur and that there is future compliance with this type of treaty.

With the national security of the United States and much

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of the free world, depends on compliance with such a START treaty, we think it is only reasonable and prudent that both sides be permitted to deploy a strategic defensive system if they so desire. We fail to see how a defensive system when we would have no ballistic missiles, could possibly be perceived as a threat to the Soviet Union. Therefore, we do not understand what the Soviets are afraid of and why they would not agree to the President's proposal. One has to wonder, indeed, what it is they are afraid of.

Q (Inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: On BACKGROUND now. I'll answer that question on BACKGROUND.

Q What's the question?

Q Why are the Russians afraid -- deathly afraid of SDI?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One could wonder -- one could maybe assume -- this is on BACKGROUND now -- are you on BACKGROUND? One could speculate that maybe they think that we could develop a defensive system in SDI that would somehow be able to damage targets on earth. But we don't really believe that that's the case. They may claim in their propaganda following this meeting that that's one of the reasons. But, their scientists at a very senior level, have told us that they are not concerned about that. The point is, the physical principles that are involved, it wouldn't make any sense to do that because you can't get enough energy down through the atmosphere with a laser beam or an X-ray laser or any kind of a beam weapon to cause significant mass damage. It would be stupid of us to try to do that. It's much cheaper to keep the ballistic missiles. And their scientist, specifically Malikhov's deputy -- again this is on BACKGROUND -- told us some time ago that they weren't really concerned about that.

Q (Inaudible)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There may be a political question in that Gorbachev is so far out on a limb here with wanting to ban SDI that he can't get back in off the limb. The other possibility is that they are not willing -- really willing to make these significant reductions in offensive forces -- and I'm not just talking about the 100 percent, I'm also talking about the 50 percent -- at this time.

Q So they're not really sincere in their negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to say they're insincere. I'm saying that's a possibility. And it may not -- it may simply be -- and, again, I don't want to question their sincerity, but you know they may have their rhetoric get a little far out in front of what they're really prepared to do at this time.

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ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay.

Q Yeah.

Q -- in the Oval Office.

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Q Came back into the room with that, presented it, and did Gorbachev simply say no at the table when he heard it?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't have that detailed a debrief of the President of that last session. But I understand that he agreed -- that Gorbachev agreed to our rewrite of their proposal -- their last offer.

Q You mean put it down on paper or -- what do you mean "rewrite?"

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, in the caucus we took their response to our 3:30 p.m. proposal and we modified their response to move it back in the direction of our 3:30 p.m. proposal. The wording was a little bit different.

Q When it was all over -- how did they know it was all over? Did the President say, well, that's it?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't know the answer to that -- exactly what was said at the very end. But I -- when the President went down at 3:00 p.m. after the caucus, he said this is going to be our final offer.

Q He said it to Gorbachev?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, he said that to us.

Q That was about 3:30 p.m.? -- that was later.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't know what time it was.

MR. SPEAKES: 3:30 p.m. -- 3:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. was Reagan-Gorbachev-Shultz-Shevardnadze session, two-on-two.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: So that the caucus was about 4:30 p.m.

MR. SPEAKES: The caucus started at 4:30 p.m. and then he went back in from 5:00 p.m. until 6:30 p.m. approximately.

Q Did the two leaders express the wish to see each other in the near future, or was that at all brought up in the end?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No. We don't have any prospects of a -- of a near term meeting.

Q Why?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, at this point we simply don't.

Q Was it discussed at all?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: What?

Q Was it discussed at all -- (inaudible) --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Generally through the meetings, Gorbachev talked about his forthcoming trip to the United States. But both sides recognize that -- well, we're prepared -- we were

prepared for him to come at any point, but he wants -- he wanted to wait to see how long it would take to convert these instructions to foreign ministers, which would have come out of Iceland, to a framework agreement that would cover all of these areas that the two heads of state could sign in Washington. And Gorbachev wasn't sure how long that would take.

Q Was it suggested --

Q -- didn't come up with some dates, did they?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: There were no dates mentioned on either side.

Q Yes. Well, in other words, if you didn't reach this -- (inaudible.)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Have I covered about everything for you?

Q Yes. You've covered everything.

Q But I'd like you to just stand up and do one or two question on the camera -- make it very brief.

Q One last question. Did you feel deceived by the extent to which they apparently wanted agreements here or -- had not this been billed simply as a discussion, begin directions or mootness. I mean, did they go farther than you thought here? Did they push this towards agreements?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. They went further than we thought. But I wouldn't characterize this as feeling deceived.

Q Inaudible.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. They were all -- all of the things that they were prepared to move on focused the agenda on how to resolve these problems.

Q There was no -- given the large number of areas in which you say there was agreement reached, why wasn't it possible to come away with a -- the ability to say, okay, we still disagree about SDI and ABM but can't we continue to talk and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, we're -- yes, we're prepared to continue to talk, but from our point of view, we would like to proceed ahead to sign agreements in these other areas that we think are important. But the Soviet side is holding the ball hostage to our agreeing to their very restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Well, it's not really an interpretation. They really want to modify the ABM Treaty to make it more restrictive, because, Ellen, going to back to your point, the ABM Treaty provides for the possibility of research, testing and development on systems that are based on other physical principles that were not thought about when the ABM Treaty was originally signed. And, clearly, the lasers and the particle beams and those kinds of space-based systems would fall in this other physical principles category.

Q And how did they want to limit it specifically? I mean, for example -- one example.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, they would not have wanted us to conduct any research, testing or development of any space-based system.

Q Any --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Any.

MORE

Q Based on any principle?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: On any principles.

Q Want me to do that for you?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You don't have to.

Q Better.

(end of tape two, side one)

(in progress)

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: -- that we were working on issues of historical importance in that we were proposing a reduction of -- ballistic missiles to zero to be achieved in 10 years. And that is clearly historic.

Q You must have been tremendously disappointed when that did not work.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I must say that we were sad that the Soviets could not see fit to give us the opportunity to continue to develop a strategic defense system, which threatens no one, but simply provides a shield against ballistic missiles, when, at the same time, we were willing to withhold deployment of such a system until the ballistic missiles were eliminated. At that point, we feel that because the national security of the country would be so dependent upon compliance with such a future treaty, the President felt it would not be prudent to agree to such reductions unless we could be assured of having a strategic defensive system.

Q So you needed, or felt you needed, an insurance policy to guarantee Soviet compliance to reduce the missiles to zero?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's correct. An insurance policy.

Q And therefore you have doubts about the Soviet willingness to adhere to such an agreement?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We don't want to question the sincerity of the Soviet leaders of today. But based on a history of problems that we have had in our relationship and the compliance with past treaties, the President feels that it's essential, since the national security of the United States and much of the free world would depend on that compliance, that we have a strategic defensive system to make sure that the treaties were followed in reducing the missiles to zero but, also, staying at that level and not reintroducing these -- this type of weapon.

Q And how far, finally, were the Soviets prepared to go? I mean, what was their minimum position?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: They were -- they said that they were prepared to reduce to zero and they were prepared to allow the possibility of future deployment. But they wanted to make more restrictive the ABM Treaty with regard to what type of research, testing and development that could be conducted during this 10-year period that we would be reducing the offensive ballistic missiles.

Q Basically in the laboratory?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right. They wanted to restrict it just to the laboratory, which is more restrictive than the existing treaty -- even the narrow interpretation of the existing treaty. We, and the President specifically -- I agree with him -- feels that that would essentially kill the SDI program.

Q So it came down to that definition of SDI?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's correct.

Q Thank you very much.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You're welcome.

Q Can I ask you a question? Did he ever seem to think -- talk the President out of Star Wars and what was their feeling when it was all over? There was great disappointment on our side --

MORE

or sadness --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Helen, that would be pure --

Q How do you think they felt?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: -- pure speculation on my part. I

--

Q Did they show any emotion or were they unhappy or --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The Soviets, usually in meetings like this, don't show much emotion.

Q You mean they just accepted the blowup of the summit without any --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I just -- I don't really have any color there for you. I --

Q Maybe one final thing's worthwhile. Where do we go from here?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I'm sure that, as we, they are going to go back and reassess what's happened over the past two days. We were able to reach solutions to many of the obstacles to progress in the other negotiations that are going on. At this point, they are holding agreement to these solutions hostage to an agreement in the strategic defense area. But we're going back and reflect and we hope they do and we will work to try to figure out some way to continue the progress that we have achieved here in Iceland but, at the same time, protecting our ability to develop a strategic defensive system and deploying it at some point in the future if we so choose.

Q Thank you.

END

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Reykjavik, Iceland)

For Immediate Release

October 11, 1986

INTERVIEW OF
THOMAS W. SIMONS
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS
ON THE MACNEIL-LEHRER NEWS HOUR

October 10, 1986

Melaskoli House
Reykjavik, Iceland

(In progress)

Q -- because the agreements that had been drawn up in Geneva were not deemed reached, because that was their reason for coming to Reykjavik. How do you respond to that?

MR. SIMONS: Well, I hope it's not the only reason. There hasn't been as much progress since Geneva as we had hoped and, I guess, as they had, for a whole variety of reasons. I think both sides have been trying to put that right.

Since the summer -- (inaudible) -- a whole range in the relationship -- every issue. And we have made some progress on various issues. So it seemed to us that when the General Secretary posed this meeting that it really was a sensible thing to get the two leaders together to review all that work at their level and try to pick out what were the most promising and the most important issues -- the issues that deserve --

Q What can we expect from the next two days? How specific do you think agreements will be?

MR. SIMONS: Well, I'm not sure it's the right question because what you are dealing with here is a process of trying to manage and to improve relations between two very large and very different countries. A lot of people don't realize -- or don't think of it as a process. They think of it rather as a bookkeeping exercise, where really you set yourself benchmarks against which you have a pass-fail grade. It really isn't that, and the meeting really doesn't fit into that kind of a context.

So, in terms of agreements -- how deeply the level the level of detail -- will depend on the two leaders. I think it is probably basing yourself on a false assumption to be looking for agreements and setting out a list of agreements against which you are going to judge success or failure.

Q The Russian public position has been, we have come here to reach agreements, and we think we can reach agreements, particularly on intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Are we less optimistic than the Russians?

MR. SIMONS: I think we have a -- I don't think we're less optimistic than the Russians, but I think we have a more accurate view, perhaps, of what can honestly be expected of a conversation -- an exchange of a day and a half between two leaders, and what level of detail that they can go into.

MORE

Something like INF, for instance, is a genuinely complicated set of issues. The number of issues remaining to be agreed has been reduced. There has been progress. But to expect in this time and in this kind of a meeting to have a handshake and to check off an agreement is unrealistic. So I'm not sure why the Soviets are saying that.

Q What do you see now as the key areas of disagreement on intermediate-range nuclear weapons?

MR. SIMONS: The question of what to do about Soviet missiles in Asia. The question of verification -- which is itself quite complicated. The question of duration -- how long the agreement should go. And the question of what to do about short-range missiles. I think probably those -- that's the basic list. And none of them are easy, and --

Q In terms of the missiles in Asia, do the Asian countries need to be brought into these discussions?

MR. SIMONS: Well, I think everyone accepts that they are bilateral discussions, but certainly the Asian countries make clear their concerns without asking to be brought into the negotiations. There's been a lot of consultation, and there will continue to be.

Q Mr. Kobisch, when I asked him that question, said the problem was that that is a question that needed to be discussed with the Asians. Would you say that is a way to avoid the answer or is that a realistic response?

MR. SIMONS: I don't think it's a realistic response because one of the things the Soviets also said from time to time is the reason they have missiles out there is not so much the Asians, but us. So I think it is a proper subject for negotiation between our two countries.

Q In terms of the numbers that we're looking at, particularly in intermediate-range nuclear weapons, if the numbers are cut down to 100 on each side, do we ourselves know which missiles we would want to remain?

MR. SIMONS: I think that is getting into a level of detail that probably I don't want to follow you on at this point. I think that it is the kind of thing that really ought to be left to negotiators.

Q Will that kind of thing be discussed here, or is that too detailed for Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev? Would that only be discussed in Geneva?

MR. SIMONS: I think you'd have to ask Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev, and I'm the only one here.

Q We'll ask them.

Henry Kissinger and others have criticized the summit, saying there is not enough time, we could not possibly be well enough prepared; therefore, nothing substantive can come out of it. How do you respond?

MR. SIMONS: I think maybe that is based on the same traditional view of what meetings like this are -- must be -- that grew up in the 1970s. I think this is a different kind of meeting. It comes at a different stage in a different kind of relationship. Now a process, as I say, rather than a series of hurdles, which you set to see whether the horse can jump over -- it really is a different kind of meeting between two leaders which ought -- which can, I think, give an impulse on the various issues. It can be fruitful in that sense but is not the traditional kind of summit because we don't have the same kind of relationship that we had when

Mr. Kissinger was in office.

Q How critical is this meeting to the process? Could there be a summit in Washington without success in Reykjavik?

MR. SIMONS: It depends on what you mean by success. Success to me is moving issues forward -- selecting issues, reviewing all this work, giving an impulse and giving instructions to your negotiators to speed things up on the specific issues. Judged in that way, a success in those terms -- it really could bring us closer to a summit in Washington.

Q Is there any doubt in your mind that there will be a summit in Washington

MR. SIMONS: No, because both sides, having agreed to this meeting, agreed that it was preparatory to the General Secretary's visit to the U.S. So I think there is agreement on that.

Q The question is, when will it be?

MR. SIMONS: That's right.

Q Will that be answered in the next two days?

MR. SIMONS: It's hard to tell. It's hard to tell.

Q Is it important that it is answered?

MR. SIMONS: It would be very good if it were answered. How critical or how important -- once again, you're getting back to your benchmark psychology. It would be good because that would mean that you had made enough progress on these issues to foresee what kind of a deadline you had, but if not, you're going to keep working on the issues. And you can still make progress. So I don't see it as a critical question.

Q You know, for most of the world out there, watching this meeting, and no matter if it's part of a process or not, people are going to want to know how to gauge --

MR. SIMONS: Sure.

Q -- what has happened here.

MR. SIMONS: Yes.

Q How do you gauge a process? What are we going to look for on Sunday evening?

MR. SIMONS: I understand the problem, because it is the traditional way of looking at these things. I think people are going to have to decide on what their own measures of progress or lack of progress are. I think you're going to -- hopefully, you will be able to see, coming out of the summit -- out of -- not the summit, out of this meeting, in a very short time, movement on a number of issues toward the kinds of things that one should do at a summit.

Q Knowing the Russians as you do, why would you say they agreed to come? They proposed the meeting. Why?

MR. SIMONS: I think they probably felt as we did, that it was time to review the work done at the level of the top leadership -- that enough work had been done, enough progress has been made, enough sifting had taken place, and there was enough potential for the two leaders to sit down to renew what really was a personal relationship developed at Geneva -- to go over the range, to take stock and see where you can push. And so they proposed it, and we accepted it. I doubt if it's more complicated.

Q If they had not proposed it, would we have at some point?

MR. SIMONS: Probably not. Probably not. We have felt that there was potential, after the meeting between the two foreign ministers in Washington, and we said it, and Mr. Shevardnadze also said it -- that there is real potential on these various issues. And this meeting can give an impulse, can bring that potential nearer to fruition. Whether we would propose it, it's hard to tell.

Q Where would you say the areas of agreement are the most likely in the next two days?

MR. SIMONS: I'm really not in a position to say. I think we have proposals on the table -- good proposals on the table, the Soviets have serious proposals on the table in the area of offensive weapons. That includes both the strategic -- the START area, INF, which has been talked about, space and defense. The President has, as he described it in his UNGA address, has made what is a very serious, and we think interesting proposal that ought to be taken seriously. There are a whole range of bilateral issues we've been working very hard on, probably none of them is spectacular in an individual sense. But cumulatively, you can give an impressive set of areas where the two sides could agree to cooperate in new ways.

Q Where would the United States put human rights on the agenda?

MR. SIMONS: Very high. And very high and very early. Because in a relationship like this, which is -- which we would like to be in, which is turning into, we hope, a process. You really are getting into the crucial differences between the two countries -- the things that they really do need to manage and work on if they are to put this relationship on a more stable basis for the long term.

And when you get to those kinds of issues, you really are dealing with human rights. Because the way -- the differences between the two countries are perhaps greatest in this area. It's the way the Soviets perform on human rights really eats away -- it's a poison in terms of the kind of confidence and trust that Americans need to sustain a relationship like that. So we want to talk about them -- we have to talk about them.

Q Could we expect to see new names released, for instance, of possibilities of people being released?

MR. SIMONS: It's hard to tell. That usually happens. There was the announcement this morning here of the release from prison of Madame Ratushinskaya, the poet -- that's a good sign. So we're hopeful that it will happen. On the other hand, you welcome those kinds of things. But you are talking not only about cases -- humanitarian cases, but about major issue areas in terms of Soviet -- the Soviet approach to human rights. And you shouldn't be distracted, much as you welcome individual case solutions.

Q And once again, the perception is that the Russians are putting forth a much more positive accent on these talks. They are saying, we can come to agreements. The United States seems much more cautious. Why is that?

MR. SIMONS: It's hard to tell. I can't get inside the Soviets' head. I think they recognize that we are a democratic society -- democratic country, that we have a democratic alliance, we're much more open. So it may be in their interest to fuel expectations, in order, precisely, to set up the kinds of benchmarks against which you measure success or failure. I think that's unrealistic for either side to do that. They may be doing it for that reason, but I think you really have to distinguish with the Soviets between someone like Mr. Kovisch and General Secretary Gorbachev.

MORE

Q Although when Secretary -- General Secretary Gorbachev arrived, he again made the statement that we can abolish nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

MR. SIMONS: I'd rather wait for the private meeting.

Q Okay.

END

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TALKING POINTS

-- The Iceland summit saw the first serious discussion ever of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. More dramatic progress was made in arms reduction than at any previous meeting, and the two nations today are closer than ever before to agreements to end the threat of nuclear war.

-- This breakthrough was made possible by President Reagan's restoration of America's defenses, including research into defenses against ballistic missiles (SDI.) The Soviets were brought to the table by the new strength and resoluteness displayed by America in the 80's.

-- It is exciting to see the Soviets at least discussing our agenda of reducing nuclear arms. It is only natural for them to try to persuade us into a one-sided bargain in these first serious discussions.

-- Though Sec. Gorbachev rejected our proposals, they remain on the table, and we are optimistic that they will be pursued at followup meetings.

-- President Reagan's policies are paying off in dealing with a tough, dangerous, and patient adversary. If we are as resolute and patient as we know the Soviets to be, we will see the culmination of the President's dream of a world safe from nuclear weapons. A bad agreement is worse than none; a good agreement is worth waiting for, and Iceland proves that we may not have to wait long.

Q: What is SDI, and why did the President refuse to give it up?

A: The Strategic Defense Initiative would be a non-nuclear, totally defensive system for destroying nuclear missiles. Designed to destroy weapons rather than people, it offers the hope of an insurance policy against either purposeful or accidental nuclear attacks from the USSR or some other country that might develop nuclear weapons. The Soviets, who have a much more extensive missile defense program than we do, are not opposed to strategic defense in concept, only to an American SDI.

For News Media, Blackout Turns Into Blizzard

U.S., Soviet Officials Make Ambitious Round of Appearances to Put 'Spin' on the Story

By Eleanor Randolph
Washington Post Staff Writer

After a news blackout that kept most of the media at bay during most of the Iceland summit, the world's news organizations are facing what could be called a news whiteout—a blizzard of unprecedented, on-the-record interviews as U.S. and Soviet officials put their cast on the outcome of the meetings.

President Reagan, who gave his version on television Monday night, met opinion makers yesterday, starting with congressional leaders, then columnists and television personalities, including Peter Jennings of ABC.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz's schedule looked like that of a political candidate as he was interviewed on the "CBS Morning News," during lunch at The Washington Post, at a State Department news conference at 4:30 p.m., and on subsequent tapings for two evening television shows: CNN's "Crossfire" and ABC's "Nightline."

Meanwhile, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev addressed his nation's television viewers last night, saying the Strategic Defense Initiative that Reagan refused to concede in Iceland "is nothing but a trick."

Chief Soviet arms negotiator Viktor Karpov, who met with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher yesterday, also took time for an unusually amicable chat with reporters. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh answered journalist's summit questions in

"We're in a war of words about who won and who lost," UPI White House correspondent Helen Thomas said here. "It is a massive, massive blitz as both sides try to explain what happened and to take the high ground."

Although some journalists characterized the Soviet media campaign as unusually forceful, they said the Soviets are no competition for experts at the White House.

After Reagan noted summit "progress" in his speech Monday, his spokesmen fanned out to spread the word that the Iceland venture was not the failure first reported by many journalists and key administration officials. Virtually all major news organizations were offered interviews with a U.S. summit participant.

Asked about what one reporter called this "sudden flood tide of availability," Shultz said that soon after the summit ended Sunday, "the president said he wanted to make all the facts of what happened in Iceland known publicly so that people would have all the information and could make up their own minds."

For many journalists, however, the sudden openness by ranking White House officials appeared to be an effort to counter a wave of reports that cited "stalemate" or failure in Reykjavik, especially vignettes about an angry Reagan feeling a lost opportunity as he left the last session with Gorbachev.

White House spokesman Larry Speakes told reporters yesterday that, on this issue, "all comments by administration officials will be on the record If you receive information on a background [unattributable] basis from a senior administration official, from here on out that senior administration official may not be plugged into what is going on."

Thus, the White House began offering on-the-record interviews. Godfrey Sperling of The Christian Science Monitor said, for example, that a White House official called him mid-afternoon Monday asking whether he could arrange one of his newsmaker breakfasts yesterday featuring national security affairs adviser John M. Poindexter.

Sperling said he scrambled to form a group to meet with Poindexter at 10 a.m. and found that "virtually everyone wanted to come. It was a hot one," he said, explaining that about 40 participants, more than usual, attended.

Jack Nelson, Washington bureau chief for the Los Angeles Times, said the White House called Monday offering chief of staff Donald T. Regan for a breakfast interview at the bureau. The session was quickly arranged, and Regan visited after his appearance on NBC's "Today" show.

"As I told Regan coming up on the elevator, I'd read four papers before I came in—The [Washing-

ton] Post, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times and The Washington Times—and I said, 'Your spin is working,' " Nelson said. "They're doing an amazing job of selling their side of the story."

"I've seen media blitzes before but never one quite like this."

Joining the blitz on several television programs yesterday were White House communications director Patrick J. Buchanan and Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle.



Gorbachev making televised speech to Soviet people on outcome of the summit.

NOTED BY DTR

Sunday, Oct. 12, 7 p.m. ~~ext~~ ed

Pool report -- Airforce One --Keflavik Naval Air Base to Andrews AFB

On-the-record briefing in flight by Admiral John Poindexter, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Somber, weary but eager to explain the perplexing events in ~~Reykjavik~~ Reykjavik, Poindexter talked for an hour and 20 minutes with the pool, at first kneeling beside the pool's seats, then settling on a footstool, his elbows resting on the table. He was tieless, stubble on his face and obviously ~~was~~ in need of rest but he stated at the outset that the story was so complex and difficult to understand it was necessary for him and others in the government to explain it fully.

Just before Poindexter began his briefing, ~~Deputy~~ Press Secretary Larry Speakes characterized the negotiations as "long and hard, the President stayed for overtime. He went 99 yards but didn't get across the goal line." Speakes called the meeting "good" because important proposals were aired and "substantial progress" made even though no final agreements were reached. "The ~~President~~ President is disappointed," said Speakes, "But he ~~remains~~ remains determined to pursue what gains were made."

Poindexter then joined us and began the detailed fill-in. "We really did not expect to get agreements," the Admiral explained. "We felt the best we could do was focus the issues for agreements to be negotiated later." Poindexter then reviewed the approach to the mini-summit, how there had been differences ^{IN THE} on the Asian missiles ^{AND} ~~INF~~ verification, ^{AND ON} nuclear testing. On the latter point, which became crucial, it was the U.S. intention to negotiate ~~toward~~ a complete test ban ONLY when the two sides had reached their point of the complete elimination of nuclear missiles. The differences in Start had to do with the "distribution" of the 50% reduction agreed upon in Geneva.

On SDI, Poindexter said: "We feel strongly that in order to continue to provide deterrence as we reduce our weapons it is important to have a defensive system eventually. The President's proposal in July was that the Soviets join us in a new treaty which we ~~were~~ were willing to sign now but with a trigger for implementation in 1991 ~~that~~ that if either side wanted to move ahead and develop and deploy a defensive system they could." ~~Included~~ Included in that was Reagan's idea of "sharing" the defensive system if both sides eliminated their offensive ballistic missiles. The Soviets came back with their idea that we keep the current ABM treaty anywhere from 15 to 20 ~~years~~ years. The U.S. proposal would not have eliminated the old treaty but ~~applied two~~ ^{THE NEW} treaties, with "novation," that is provisions for areas of conflict to be ruled by the new treaty. The ~~Admiral~~ Admiral said that he believed ~~the U.S. proposition was "a sincere effort" to get both nations to move to a transition from offensive weapons to defensive systems. The President felt, according to Poindexter, that a defensive system was necessary for the security of this U. S. and that part of the free world which the U. S. defends. It was plain to the Americans going into the meeting that the Soviets would do everything they could to stop~~

WOULD HAVE BEEN A

Poindexter pool - 2

SDI. At one point, said Poindexter (getting slightly ahead of his chronology), he asked Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze "What do you fear from the Strategic Defense Initiative?" According to the Admiral, the Soviet "avoided answering the question."

The others areas of conflict had to do with regional issues, human rights, particularly Jewish immigration, bilateral issues. Poindexter noted that earlier ^{discussions with} ~~protests to~~ the Soviet Union had not ~~produced~~ had "much impact on the low numbers of immigration."

Mikhail Gorbachev had received the U. S. positions (above) and in turn given the Americans his. Saturday ~~night~~ night the working groups were named. One ^{on} arms control and the other on human rights etc. The arms group worked 10 1/2 hours -- through the entire night. The other group worked ~~approximately~~ 5 1/2 hours. The latter group agreed on positions for a work plan for the next several months that would provide a continuing dialogue on regional, bilateral, immigration and other human rights issues.

The arms issues were, of course, the sticky ones. Saturday night the ^{arms} working ~~admiral~~ group reached agreement on a "way of handling short range INF problem." According to the Admiral, the two sides agreed to freeze the short-range INF level at the current USSR level and continue negotiations once the long-range INF issue was settled. The long-range INF agreement ~~seem to~~ emerged from a proposal that each side accept 100 missiles ^{in Europe}, 100 in Asia for the Soviets, and 100 in the U. S. for the Americans. The bargaining went on through Saturday night and before it was done the Soviets had agreed ~~for~~ to a zero-zero formula for Europe, but they wanted to delay on the Asian cut back. The U. S. team balked on that. By Sunday, however, the Soviets had agreed to come down to ~~zero-zero~~ a hundred missiles ^{globally} for each side, theirs in ~~Europe~~ and ours in the United States. Poindexter felt that agreement was significant for the Soviets, representing a 100 percent reduction in Europe, 80 percent in Asia, in all a reduction from 1300 ~~war~~ war heads to 100. "We agreed ~~to~~ to that," declared the Admiral.

Though all of us in this discussion referred to "negotiations," Poindexter said the talks always were in the framework of "preparing instructions for the foreign ministers for the summit in Washington," ^{TO PREPARE A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT} ~~so that they might draft proposals that would lead to treaties.~~ ^{THAT} All of the above, as indeed, all of what follows, was "held hostage" to SDI, said Poindexter. ^{next came} START.

AGREEMENT
COULD
LEAD TO
TREATY

By Saturday night, by the Admiral's account, both sides had agreed on 1,600 strategic delivery nuclear vehicles. (This was in the talks on START) They also ~~had~~ agreed on 6,000 nuclear warheads. The Soviets, said Poindexter, were resisting the negotiations of sub limits but they thought that could be done in Geneva. One of the ~~significant~~ changes ~~in the~~ in the Soviet position was that they agreed that bombers with gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles constituted one re-entry vehicle. "That meant that we had solved the problem on how to ^{count} ~~count~~ them," said the Admiral. The understanding covered ICBM's, SLBM's,

NOTED BY DTR

Poindexter pool - 3
ALCM's, Bombs, SRAM's.

~~A-10's, Bombers, SCMs.~~ "We made significant progress in that area," added Poindexter. "The Soviets were talking about nuclear charges instead of the whole package." WHERE EACH BOMB AND SRAM WOULD COUNT AS ONE VICE THE AGREEMENT NOW WITH EACH BOMBER WITH BOMBS AND SRAM COUNTS AS ONE.

The Soviet working group was unusual, continued the Security Aide, because the head of it was Sergei Akhromeyev, ~~Army~~ chief of staff and deputy defense minister. The head of the American group was veteran arms negotiator Paul Nitze. Almost immediately Saturday night the problems with SDI emerged. The Soviets were not willing ~~to~~ to move the START understanding ahead unless we agreed not to withdraw from the ABM treaty for 10 years. They also wanted, said the Admiral, to make the ABM treaty more restrictive on the issues of the meaning of research and ~~development~~ development and testing. The Soviet intention to link SDI ~~and~~ and START was, thus, plain. And then that position of the ~~Soviet~~ Soviet's grew into linkage with ~~everything~~ INF also.

AND NUCLEAR TESTING

On nuclear testing, the working arms group agreed ~~that both sides~~ ~~would~~ begin negotiations on further limitations of nuclear testing. The first item on the agenda was to be verification. The U.S. position was to have an agreement that would provide further limitations on testing but ~~have~~ worked out ~~in~~ in conjunction with the agreement to reduce offensive forces. Ultimately, said the Admiral, the idea was to have a comprehensive test ban ~~treaty~~ treaty at that point ~~where~~ when we no longer had to rely on nuclear weapons for strategic deterrence.

Sunday was the crucial day. Reagan laid out the American proposal in the morning meeting which ran over the limit by an hour or so. The President, said Poindexter, ran into the same linkage with Gorbachev, though, again, there was remarkable agreement in other areas like INF. After the Reagan-Gorb meeting ended, Reagan huddled with Shultz ^{Reagan} and Poindexter and refined the proposal. They agreed to abide by the ABM treaty for 5 years and if the Soviets ~~abided by~~ reduced their missiles at the agreed upon rate and continued to do so in the second five years, the U. S. would continue compliance for the ~~sex~~ full 10 years. "By 1996," ^{TEN} said Poindexter, "both sides would have eliminated all their ballistic missiles. At the end of five years both sides would feel ^{BE} free to deploy ~~to deploy~~ and SDI system unless otherwise agreed upon by both parties."

Back at the table, the Soviets still balked. The General Secretary would not yield on the SDI ~~point~~. "He wanted an agreement," declared the Admiral, "restricting research, development and testing of ~~of a~~ of a space based system to the laboratory. The President felt this was essentially killing the SDI program. He was not willing to ~~xxx~~ accept this restriction."

~~I am frankly a little hazy here on the ~~xxx~~ sequence of meetings so I would advise further checking.~~ It appears that after the American 10 yr. proposal was made in the morning by Reagan, the Soviets came back with ~~xxx~~ modifications. The Americans then came ~~xxx~~ up with a counter-counter proposal which moved their position back toward the first. Then, Reagan ~~xxx~~ ~~one on one~~ with Gorbachev. "This is going to be a ^{said}

to be our final offer."

The meeting did end in bitterness, insisted Poindexter. "There was a sadness on our part." He did not question the sincerity of the Soviets, he said, but "the reason we are so insistent that we eventually have a defensive system is that, based on the history of our relationship with the Soviet Union, we are not absolutely confident that the reductions proposed will actually be carried out. The defense system is an insurance policy. Our national security and that of most of the free world depends on compliance with such a START treaty. It is only reasonable and prudent that both sides deploy defense systems if they so desire. ^{ONE SIDE WITHOUT BALLISTIC MISSILES, BUT WITH} We fail to see that a defensive system against ballistic missiles could possibly ~~be~~ constitute a threat. We do not understand what the Soviets fear in a defensive system."

At this point our source went on background. He speculated that perhaps the Soviets feared that ~~xx~~ a defensive system might be used against weapons on the ground, although the Soviet scientists have told Americans they are not worried about that. Maybe, suggests our source, Gorbachev has a political problem, being so far out on a limb now he cannot yield on SDI. Or maybe he cannot really make reductions called for in these negotiations. The ~~be~~ rhetoric may have gotten out ahead of reality, says our man. ~~Bebe~~

Back on the record. Asked about the problems of verification, The Admiral said the asymmetry of our societies made it very difficult for us to detect Soviet weapons development. In the U.S., of course, the press ~~xxx~~ would poke and prod, a President would insist on living up to ~~xxx~~ agreements and Congress could constantly look over his shoulder. We don't have the same checks on them.

Poindexter said that the president understood the "historic proportions" of this meeting and the action he had taken, ~~off~~ "of what was on the table."

^{2/} "We're not going to give up," he declared. "We are going to find some way to preserve SDI and still have reductions in nuclear weapons. Both sides need to ~~xxx~~ reflect on what happened for a few days." There was very little acrimony on either side, continued Poindexter, which is reason for some hope. But there is no prospect now of any near term meeting.

Hugh Sidey, Time



Washington, D.C. 20547

October 9, 1986

Chief
Dear Mr. ~~Regan~~:

Enclosed is a copy of a USIA research report, "Soviet Elite Views: The Gorbachev Leadership," based on recent interviews with Americans and West Europeans.

The study shows that, on the whole, Soviet elite members approve of Gorbachev's performance. Many feel that his extensive cadre changes, calls for "openness," and insistence on the need for economic reform indicate a readiness to tackle the country's problems. The elites agree on the importance of raising living standards, improving relations with the U.S., and curtailing the arms race. Yet, they split over questions of military expenditures, artistic and personal freedom, and human rights.

Many still have doubts about how far economic and political reform will be allowed to proceed. While some intellectuals and artists have been encouraged by signs of greater cultural freedom, others have lapsed into a customary cynicism, having concluded that Gorbachev will turn out to be much like past party leaders.

Sincerely,

Marvin L. Stone
Acting Director

The Honorable
Donald T. Regan
Chief of Staff
and Assistant to the President
The White House