

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Reagan, Donald T.: Files
Folder Title: [USSR:] Gorbachev Meeting
with Senators 09/03/1985
Box: 7

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories
visit: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue:
<https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name REGAN, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

KDB 1/24/2006

File Folder [USSR: GORBACHEV MEETING WITH SENATORS
09/03/1985]

FOIA

1997-066/13

Box Number 47

COHEN, D

15

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
23139	REPORT	RE 9/3/85 MEETING WITH GORBACHEV (PAGES 1-18 ONLY, W/NOTATIONS) <i>R 11/4/2010 F1997-066/13</i>	18	9/4/1985	B1
23405	LIST	LIST OF SPOUSES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO HAVE BEEN DENIED PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE USSR	4	ND	B6
23406	LIST	LIST OF US CITIZENS WHO HAVE BEEN DENIED PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE USSR (NUMBERED AS PAGES 2-5)	4	ND	B6
23407	LIST	LIST OF NAMES PRESENTED TO GORBACHEV BY US SENATE DELEGATION ON 9/3/85	6	ND	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

September 4, 1985

To: Codel

From: Staff

Subj: Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, September 3, 1985

The following are the staff notes of the remarks made at your meeting with Gorbachev. It does not include Senator Byrd's opening statement, which is available separately. The meeting lasted about 3 hours, 35 minutes (from 11:00 AM to 2:35 PM).

Mr. Gorbachev started the meeting by asking Senator Byrd how he liked Moscow. Senator Byrd replied that he liked the city and that he also liked Kiev. Gorbachev asked if the delegation had had a chance to see Kiev, and Senator Byrd replied that the delegation had seen some of it, and liked what they saw -- the greenery, the clean streets, the hospitality of the people. Gorbachev indicated that he also like Kiev, and that in the USSR "there were many cities; it is a vast land, a diverse land, much like the U.S. In the north, it is very beautiful; the Ukraine is a country in and of itself; the Caucauses are old, colorful with much culture; Central Asia presents a different picture, as does the Far East. There are places I've never seen. This vastness is a common feature. Vastness leaves an impact on the national character and on the broad scale of thinking of our two nations. Our large-scale thinking and approaches are shaped by this large scale. Thus on a broad scale, I guess it is true to say we have much in common. We more than any other nation are able to understand your nation and to build a bridge from the other side. The U.S. should be able to understand us better than anyone else.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-DW/13#23139

BY RW NARA DATE 11-4-10

"Let me greet you all. It is a pleasure to meet and have an opportunity to converse. I wish to say at the outset that relations between our two nations must be visible in all fields of contacts. Realistically, for the last 5-6 years, it has not proved possible to make a move forward and in many areas things have contracted. Relations are at an all-time low. The last 1-2 years -- there has been a little headway, but too little. In this situation, Parliaments are the most active ties. It proves that they are all the more important. It is entirely wrong to break off all ties, irresponsible on all sides, as I tried to set out in a very long interview in Time. I don't know if you had the patience to read to the end, but that's what I tried to do.

"Several months ago, I met with a delegation headed by Speaker O'Neill. I told the delegation that the Soviet leadership has the political will to make every effort to normalize relations and we are indeed prepared to act in that direction, and as it applies to our relations to take them off dead center but this will require efforts by both sides. Given all the radical, cardinal differences in the functioning of our societies, way of life, our assessments of the international situation, in the treatment of global and regional problems, we are convinced we must not allow these differences to bring us to a confrontation. The logic of life has acted in such a fashion to make the Soviet Union and the U.S. the major states in the world, with immense economic potential, immense military potential. I cannot imagine a future of our two countries without cooperation. Any other approach is fraught with danger and would be irresponsible in present-day circumstances. Science and Technology are developing with such a speed that we must act more energetically in politics.

Otherwise, we might lose the opportunity. It will be hard, if not impossible, to come to terms. It is hard to date, but we can make efforts on both sides to sit down and across the table, reverse the arms race and bring relations back on a normal track.

"Current methods of political pressure on the Soviets will not yield any benefits for U.S. policies. The Soviet Union will not be intimidated, not be brought to our knees. We will find a response to any challenge and that is not where answers should be found. We must find a way leading to normalization of relations. It is not useful to pursue our present list of our claims. We look to the future and call on the American side, the U.S. Congress as well, and we can draw on the lessons of the past as they pertain to the present situation. I will now stop and listen to what you have to say."

Senator Byrd presents a letter from President Reagan to Gorbachev

Gorbachev: "Thank you. Please convey to the President my very best wishes. I don't know what's in the letter but I will study it most attentively."

Senator Byrd indicates the President would want him to know what's in the letter before the discussion proceeds.

Gorbachev: "I will certainly avail myself of that opportunity" (Interpreter reads the letter to Gorbachev). "It's a good letter. In the coming state of preparation for the summit, we both need to deepen the dialogue, if that's what the President is saying. I

welcome the President saying that we need a deeper understanding of the viewpoints of the two sides. I've said that is necessary, so I've said that and I agree. The visit of you all can lead to a broader political dialogue. As the President said and I noted, we should work towards putting our relations on a more constructive footing. The letter should be examined more closely. It is important to want to proceed from a correct policy line to consistent conduct on the practical side. That is where the problems all too often occur. We should learn to deal in such a way as to promote an improvement in the relations of our two countries and the entire political climate. Also, I would draw attention to the President's high regard for this Senate delegation. I am very pleased to hear of this.

"I am strongly convinced
Senator Byrd: /President Reagan is sincere and serious in this letter, and he would have been pleased to hear your statement that we need a dialogue and if we sit down and reason together, we can achieve some goals. He's asked me to express orally his high regard for you and how much he looks forward to meeting you. He's asked us to report back to him and we will do that.

Gorbachev: "We must use the opportunity provided by the summit to make some real and serious steps forward in improving our relationship, not only between our two countries but give satisfaction to other nations of the world as well. Jointly, we should do all we can to safeguard the atmosphere for the summit. That is why I spoke so resolutely about those groups in the U.S. and Congress and those surrounding the President who tried to prevent the

meetings and now are sticking to their old line. Since they have not succeeded in thwarting the meeting, they are doing everything they can to let the blood out of the meeting and make it sterile. Those groups are irresponsible and are even present in high places in the U.S. government. Their mood is different than that of the U.S. public. In this country, the entire leadership is in favor of the summit succeeding.

"We cannot afford to continue the line prevalent in our relations. Those who are trying to spoil the prospects for our meeting are thinking of nothing other than their own narrow interests and not the world. We must safeguard the summit opportunities and must bring about real gains and I will do everything to protect that meeting from those hawkish concerns, and will rely on the President's wisdom to act in a like manner.

Senator Byrd indicated that he would like to read a statement and stated that all members of the delegation would then like to make a contribution.

Gorbachev: "I know that, although not everyone believes that we have democracy in the Soviet Union -- it is socialist democracy, so I'll agree to that. Incidentally, I would convey to your colleagues in Congress to come any time. Being a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, I trust the Supreme Soviet will support this. Any member is free to come any time."

6

Senator Byrd reads his statement. Gorbachev interrupted once, during Senator Byrd's remarks on Afghanistan. He said: "And this is especially serious since Congress appropriates money to continue the fighting. The money sacks are all open and you spend no time to untie the money sacks." Senator Byrd responded: "If there are any money sacks, it is easy to resolve. There will be no money sacks if the Soviets leave Afghanistan, and my use of these words is no concession to what the General Secretary has said" (referring to whether or not Congress has provided money).

After Senator Byrd concluded his statement, Gorbachev replied at length, for about 1 hour and 15 minutes:

"Well, I have some contradictory impressions. I listened very carefully to you and I understand that you have to report back to your colleagues and you have covered all the usual

ground and have pulled out all the old claims, and your colleagues will be pleased with the way you've done and listed all the claims. You have my vote as a witness that you have covered all the ground in a very broad manner.

"Frankly speaking, I heard nothing new and, therefore, I don't see any great reason to discuss anything. I spoke very broadly in the interview with Time on our relations. On the one hand, it seems Congress is in favor of dialogue and improved relations between our two countries. That should be taken as the starting point, and we should then think about how to do it. We should speak not only about what the Soviets should do, but what the U.S. should do. This is what reciprocity is all about, and it appears from your statement that in all concerns the Soviet Union is black and in all concerns the U.S. is white. Surely this

7

means blackening the Soviet Union's policies and actions and whitewashing U.S. policies and actions.

"What then is the conclusion that one can draw? It is the same as one draws from the public address by Presidential Assistant McFarlane on how to improve relations with the Soviet Union -- the Soviet Union must change its policies and even its society. This is capitulation. I already mentioned that in Time. What is this? Is that the way to search for a better dialogue? On all the questions you have raised, you have pointed out that you are right and we are wrong.

"Human rights cannot be discussed productively. Until the U.S. signs and Congress ratifies the six pacts on human rights which you have not ratified -- on political rights, human rights, racial discrimination, apartheid, etc. On the eve of the elections, the President suggested that the U.S. should sign one of them. There has been no more mention since then. It must have been made to attract support of one or more political groups. The whole thing fell through since then and no more mention has been made. So how can we talk to you about human rights if you don't sign them?" ?

"We are not at all sure the U.S. has the generally accepted understanding of human rights -- if you believe it is possible to interfere in the internal affairs of another nation Then you are not observing Helsinki -- it gives no such rights. What moral right does the U.S. have? There is lots wrong in the U.S. in this area. If the U.S. is so concerned, why does it take a selective attitude in alleging all that happens in socialist democracies is a violation. You have submitted this claim to the Soviet Union,

8

but what about South Africa and the attitude of constructive engagement? Thousands of black people have been killed. You do not mention Chile, so that apparently causes you no concern. This is a very interesting approach.

"You have organized a parliamentary group to examine human rights, and specific aspects can be examined there. But you want to exploit it so as to deal a propaganda blow to the Soviet Union -- this is a futile exercise. If one listens just to you, the Soviet Union is to blame for all crises in the world and the Soviet Union has to change to bring about any improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations. Surely that is the conclusion that one can draw from your statement. That is not a proper approach to improve the situation. Perhaps the White House and Congress forget who it is dealing with. You are dealing with the Soviet Union. That is the first point I want to make and I will now continue.

"I will react in brief to some of the specific problems you have raised. The first point is that there is a need for a dialogue. A political dialogue is essential between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. I liked what you said about the proper atmosphere in our relations. You mentioned that we need to proceed in a proper atmosphere. That is very important and I emphasized myself that this is the way to proceed.

"Now in this connection, we have not failed to react to attempts made in recent weeks to inject a serious aggravation in the affairs of our nations. Some observers have noted: why pay so much attention to American representations? It is normal in the American democratic process that anyone and anybody can say what he thinks fit. But as we understand it, democracy does not mean freedom from responsibility, especially when it comes to the

White House and Congress, who are responsible for the destinies of their nations.

"Truly, sometimes when I look at information emanating from Washington, some political figures act irresponsibly. It's incredible that such things are possible. It surely is one thing when it comes to the media; they can engage in assessments and contradictions, but another thing when it emanates from the President, Congress and other highly-placed persons. Here statesmanship should prevail. And there should be governmental wisdom and responsibility and an understanding of the importance of practical steps. We have a different position. There has to be a differentiation between media statements and the practical acts of political leaders.

"I hope I am wrong, but I have the impression today that in Washington, it is the overt anti-Sovietists who have the most success.

"You are quite right to point out that an historic opportunity has now appeared in the Geneva negotiations and the summit. We must endeavor to avail ourselves of that opportunity and starting from today, Geneva and the summit must culminate in some serious results. We are in favor of insuring the negotiations in Geneva are businesslike and serious and not used as a screen from implementation of your military programs.

"If the U.S. were prepared to discuss the question of preventing the militarization of space, it would then hear from the Soviet side the most radical proposals covering strategic arms and medium range weapons. Today the U.S. says it is only prepared to discuss what type of weapons are to be deployed in

space. This is different from the original intent of the Geneva negotiations. We are prepared to discuss the question of the non-militarization of space and we have proposals on this score. We are prepared to take the most radical steps in strategic offensive and medium range weapons. We have proposals to put on the negotiation table and you will hear them the very next day after you agree to prohibit the militarization of space.

"You have devoted a lot of your time to questions of verification. We too are interested in effective verification and control, but to raise the issue of verification without the proper accord on what should be verified is like putting the cart before the horse. So both sides are equally interested in serious accord bringing an end to the arms race, and having a serious system of verification. We sometimes think the U.S. raises verification simply to bypass the substance of the issues at hand.

"Now let me return to outer space. My impression of the U.S. position is that it seems to be that somebody is trying to convince the White House and the Congress that there is an opportunity to delude the Russians. There have been countless attempts to do this in the past and everyone knows how they ended up. There are some who say: 'See how frightened the Russians are -- how deeply they are concerned about star wars and the militarization of outer space?' Some say this is a Soviet weak point -- let's bring maximum pressure there so as to get a U.S. advantage. It would be very dangerous indeed if such illusions were allowed to prevail and if they were accepted as the linchpin for such policies and an approach in the Geneva talks.

-11-

In my interview with Time, I described how we see SDI research, because the White House, Congressional circles and the U.S. press have asked how research can be verified. Now I am emphasizing this matter -- What's all the furor about? You say you cannot verify research. Certainly you cannot verify what goes on in a scientist's brain when he fiddles with equations, and when he is studying problems in space. Maybe there is a difference in our terms and what we call basic or fundamental research. But as soon as this kind of work goes beyond the walls of the laboratory, comes down to fashioning or making of scale models and mockups, and the stage when contracts are handed out by the military departments, verification is possible. So it is possible to verify the research stage. So we are against research, ~~and we are against the research stage~~ especially when research leads to design work. If billions of dollars and rubles have been spent on research, it is hard to stop designing and manufacturing -- and this is the lesson to learn from past experience.

"An arms race in space. This is what bothers us and concerns us most of all. You should be concerned as well and see the unacceptable elements in the U.S. position in Geneva. The U.S. has suggested that the Soviet Union debate and decide what specific kinds of systems should and should not be deployed in space -- who is going to verify this? That is why we want a ban on the research stage. If these systems enter space, you cannot verify them. If the U.S. is interested in preventing a spiral in the arms race, in preventing those kinds of weapons in space, progress can be made in Geneva.

"You raised questions of compliance with SALT II and the ABM Treaties. Let me say I would like to confirm our position of

principle in favor of compliance with these two accords. These are the very last limitors that are still working and holding back the arms race. If anyone here was to assault these accords, it would be very dangerous indeed. If there is any lack of clarity or any doubt, we have a standing mechanism to iron out doubts: the SCC. If any doubts arise, we can clarify them and remove them in that mechanism. We are advocates of compliance with those accords. Both sides know that there is compliance. Any doubts should be clarified and removed in a timely way.

"I heard your arguments about the U.S. position on the moratorium on more nuclear tests. It certainly is my position that you do not have any arguments to bolster your stand. Now perhaps when you say to others that the U.S. has fallen behind in tests, it may be saleable to some but not when you are here with us. The U.S. has conducted one-third more nuclear tests than the Soviet Union, and the U.S. has conducted one test more than the Soviet Union this year. It strains credibility that you would know better than I about why we are and are not testing. You have taken too much onto yourself to say that we completed a testing series. We suspended an uncompleted testing series. Our military was not all that pleased and our military had some objections to suspension of testing. It was a political decision to suspend. I am not accountable to the U.S. Congress to say what tests we did not complete. If we want to break the vicious circle, agreeing to a moratorium would be a substantial and major step forward. Your side is at a loss for convincing arguments, and only yells 'propaganda.'

"If the U.S. were to join us in a moratorium and were to publicly declare that was the position of the U.S. Administration,

-43-

such an agreement would have tremendous importance. We could resume work with the same 3 powers - the Soviet Union, U.S. and U.K. - when we were very close to an agreement for a comprehensive test ban. Under such an accord we could resolve all issues of verification.

"A joint moratorium would permit a return to the negotiating table and while negotiations are ongoing and prior to agreement we could make progress on the main issue -- prohibition of qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons. Existing stockpiles grow old. Quality control is important to systematically test their state. On the one hand, we could create no new weapons without testing, and at the same time the process of growing old of existing stocks would be underway.

"The attitude of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to this issue would be a true test of which side is truly interested in the process of arms reduction. This is why we made a political decision, and notified the President the day before and gave the U.S. the opportunity to join in such a moratorium. At the political level there is profound awareness in the Soviet Union that if we were ever to submit a proposal that was not in the security interests of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R., such a proposal would be unrealistic and unviable. We need to have a similar awareness in the U.S. Were the proposal in accord with the security interests of the U.S. but not in accord with the security interests of the U.S.S.R., such a proposal would be unviable.

"Also, if we see that the U.S. is against the moratorium, and is in favor of continued tests, our conclusion is that the U.S. wants and will go on improving and developing a new generation of missiles and develop new types of weapons like lasers and X-ray

weapons for which they need nuclear space primers. So we proceed from the assumption and hope that all that the U.S. has said on this moratorium is not the last word. We are looking forward to Washington understanding the situation and we have patience and we want the U.S. to act in all responsibility, and join a moratorium on nuclear testing.

"Let me conclude my reaction and say in different words what I emphasized at the outset. We are in favor of switching our relations onto a constructive track, and if we both want to do this, let us both act in practical steps to implement it.

"The U.S. is neither prosecutor or judge to pass judgement on the U.S.S.R., and vice versa. The process of shaping relations requires an awareness of that fact. It requires meeting half-way and compromises. That is not what has happened up to now. Surely you must understand it is not only the Soviet Union that has to change and I am not denying that we have to make some changes. Surely the steps that the U.S. has to take are no less, perhaps even greater than those the Soviet Union must take.

"We are all people well-steeled in the art of sitting at long meetings, but our time is drawing short. You can continue your discussions with the Supreme Soviet and the with the Trade Ministry. I want to express the hope that ahead of us is not the worst of possible prospects. There are a number of possibilities for cooperation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. -- cooperation in the economic, scientific and cultural fields. Bear in mind one overriding fact -- the U.S. people have their own way of life and one of their choosing. The Soviet people enjoy their own way of life and one of their choosing. As the proverb goes, you should

not go into another's monastery with your own charter. It is up to the American people to choose what kind of political parties and institutions you want. The U.S. should respect the Soviet right to decide on our own domestic matters. Our country and people have a history which is surely not shorter, but longer, than your own.

Senator Byrd: "I am sorry to hear you say that you did not hear anything new in the statement I have read on behalf of our delegation. In listening to your statements, I have seen a great deal of the same old invectives and rejection, out of hand, of proposals we make. In reality, you did hear something new. You heard a fair and sound statement representing the feelings of the American people, and you heard for the first time the viewpoint of the U.S. Senate. After all, under our constitution, while the President negotiates and we do not, no treaty can go into effect unless two-thirds of the members of the U.S. Senate -- not the House, not Mr. McFarlane, not the White House, but the Senate -- vote to approve the resolution of ratification of a treaty. The Senate is no rubber stamp for any President.

"So, you did hear something new.

"Although you said you saw no reason to respond, I am glad you went on to address the points I made. We have heard from the new leader of the Soviet Union. We would have traveled twice as far to see and hear you. Now, I hope you will hear Senator Thurmond, President of the U.S. Senate."

Senator Thurmond:' "I endorse fully the statement made by Senator Byrd. He was the able Majority Leader for many years and now is the Democratic Leader of the Senate. Six of our group are Democrats; Senator Warner and I are Republicans, the same party as the President.

"We respect you as the leader of one of the two greatest nations in the world. You have the reputation for comprehending world affairs better than any Soviet leader since World War II, and being the ablest.

"The people of the United States look upon you as a leader with new ideas and vision in world affairs; new aspirations for the betterment of the lives of your people; and new faith for improving relations with the United States and relieving tensions.

"The United States and the Soviet Union have had differences in the past, have now, and will have in the future, but this is no reason why we cannot iron out those differences and work together for world peace. We feel that the first important step should be taken at the coming Summit meeting in November with our great President, Mr. Reagan. This meeting offers a unique opportunity for both nations to take steps to preserve peace, and we feel the first great step to be taken to reach an agreement on arms reduction. Other agreements can come later.

"It would be very beneficial if your country would get out of Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Central America. This would assist greatly in reducing tensions.

"Just as the United States and the Soviet Union fought together in World War II, we should now stand together to further peace in the world. You were too young to be in that war, but I was there, and our troops met up with Soviet troops in Germany when the Nazi surrender came. Both of our countries know the sacrifices and hardships of war, and should take every step possible to prevent a conflict occurring in the future. This would be to the benefit of the people of both countries, as well as the people of the entire world.

"The United States has no desire to control any people or any land, anywhere in the world. I think it would be helpful if you and President Reagan would meet once a year at a summit, to negotiate on matters of vital interest to both countries in a manner that will help promote peace in the world.

"President Reagan had advocated a strong defense for the U.S. and believes in pursuing a policy that will preserve our country, but he will not use these armed forces for aggression, and only to protect our people. He is a strong man, like you, and I predict that you will like him. The people of our country are behind him. Again, I hope the Summit will be of benefit to both countries and to the world."

Gorbachev, in response to Senator Thurmond:

"I take what you say to mean you want better relations between my country and the U.S. I did not participate in the war but did live during the Nazi occupation. Where I lived it rolled one way first and then rolled back. I was 13 or 14 at the time and have very vivid memories of that.

"On the whole, I like what you have to say."

Senator Pell made a statement supporting bilateral cooperation on an international environmental assessment treaty, an exchange program funded under a 1972 Lend-Lease Agreement, U.S.-U.S.S.R. leadership of an international children's immunization program, and bringing the Bolshoi ballet to the U.S. He also said that no one believed that any thinking person in the U.S. or U.S.S.R. intends to start a nuclear war.

Gorbachev, in response to Senator Pell: "I basically share your views on the need for cooperation. Neither side can allow itself to contemplate the utter madness of nuclear war. When we hear statements that there are some things more important than peace, that is utter madness. The Soviet Union will not start war. I say that in my dual capacity as chairman of the Defense Council and as General Secretary. I say this in utter seriousness.

Senator Nunn: "We read your excellent Time interview with interest and appreciate your gracious hospitality. In that interview you stated there are some situations in which both sides would be losers. There are some situations in which both sides would be winners. In the area of preventing war by accident or miscalculation, both sides can be winners. For the last three years, Senator Warner and I have worked on a proposal related to nuclear risk reduction. Both sides need to do everything possible to prevent nuclear war which could start by accident or miscalculation.

, "The Reagan Administration has agreed to an initial phase of what we call nuclear risk reduction centers. I will leave



Press

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE

HON. ROBERT C. BYRD
CHAIRMAN

HON. STROM THURMOND
VICE CHAIRMAN

Statement by U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd, Senate Democratic Leader, at a meeting with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on Tuesday, September 3, 1985, in Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Mr. General Secretary, on behalf of the Senate of the United States, the people of the United States, and the President of the United States, I bring you greetings and warm wishes for improvement in the relations between our two great nations.

I thank you for your country's hospitality to us and our wives during our visit to Kiev and Moscow. My wife and I have visited the Soviet Union on two previous occasions. My last visit was in July, 1979, to meet with Mr. Brezhnev on the SALT II treaties. Several of the Senators with me have previously visited the Soviet Union. Two years ago, I arranged a visit with the late Mr. Andropov for a Senate delegation headed by Senator Pell.

My delegation and I welcome this opportunity to discuss matters which will be conducive to peace at this crucial time.

Our delegation has had fruitful meetings during our visit. And we have looked forward to our discussion with you today, particularly on the subject of arms control. I was pleased to note your comments on this important issue in your interview with TIME magazine of September 1, 1985. You stated:

"I have been reckoning on having an honest and unbiased conversation imbued with a desire to find a way leading back from the edge of the nuclear precipice. To discuss not myths and stereotypes of which we have had enough, but the real problems, the real interests of our countries, our future and the future of the entire world community."

Our mission here today is to help facilitate that dialogue and advance the search for realistic solutions to the common problems confronting both of our nations.

The past few years have been disappointing for all of us in terms of the Soviet-American dialogue. Those years have been marked by an increase in tensions, a high level of propaganda and rhetoric, and -- worst of all -- an increasingly dangerous environment of misunderstanding. I will not review the painful episodes here because we are all too familiar with them. We believe steps can and should be taken on both sides to improve this climate.

The goal of all Americans is to live at peace in a world in which the legitimate interests of all nations are respected. And this is the same goal to which you alluded in your TIME interview. We also share the conviction that although we may compete philosophically and politically, we should do so with ideas -- not arms.

In a world in which both sides possess powerful conventional forces and awesome nuclear weapons, Americans know that aggressive military actions by either side can only threaten the existence of both sides.

Our two nations are in a position of historic opportunity. The arms control talks underway in Geneva and the summit scheduled for November between you and President Reagan give us a framework for progress. Now is the time to seize the opportunities that history has presented us. It is to the mutual benefit of both nations to cooperate, to coexist, and to deal fairly with each other. The weapons of destruction that are in place remind us of this fact daily. It is entirely within our means to deal with each other in a constructive way, to give our peoples the means to enrich their lives, to realize their potentialities and live at peace.

We come here as a bipartisan group of Senators. As Leader of the opposition party in the Senate, I have made no secret of my displeasure with certain Soviet actions. Likewise, I have not avoided criticism of President Reagan or his predecessor on occasions when I felt that their actions and words did not contribute to progress in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

I suggested to the President and the Republican leadership of the Senate earlier this year that we form a Special Observer Group composed of 12 Senators to permanently monitor the negotiations in Geneva. There are several Senators here with me who are members of the Observer Group. This group of Senate observers has no historical counterpart. Its purpose is to monitor and assess the negotiations and report regularly to the full Senate.

In the event that agreements are reached, the group intends to be fully informed to advise the Senate as to whether the agreements are in our national interest.

The American people, the Congress, and the President all agree that our nation should pursue mutual, verifiable, and equitable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union -- which both countries will respect and with which both will comply.

We believe that adherence to such agreements can contribute to the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and, thus, to the rest of the world.

But to begin this process of reducing offensive forces and restraining defensive forces, which would be in our common interests, both sides must begin bargaining about specific proposals at the table in Geneva.

The U.S. has made such a proposal. Our negotiators have proposed specific limits on the total number of ballistic missile warheads.

Senior officials of your government have informally indicated that the Soviet Union is willing to consider a 25 percent reduction in strategic forces -- both in delivery vehicles and in warheads -- but these suggestions have not been followed up in Geneva with a detailed proposal that precisely defines key terms and specifically indicates how many delivery vehicles and warheads would be permitted each side if the proposal were accepted.

This ambiguity needs to be resolved if progress is to be made. Both nations have talented, able negotiators in Geneva. We should put them to work trying to explore whether there are common areas of interest of reciprocal benefit to both sides. This exploration cannot begin until we have specific counter-proposals at the Geneva table and until Soviet negotiators are authorized to discuss those counter-offers in detail.

Reciprocity is a key to progress in Geneva. But there is another area in which reciprocity needs to be addressed -- verification. You understand the importance of public opinion in our country. The Administration's emphasis on effective verification and on compliance with existing treaties reflects the feelings of the American people, and their opinions are vital if we are to have meaningful arms control. These deeply held American principals form the basis for our position on the SALT and ABM accords and on the verifiability of the unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Treaty.

The Senate, any time it considers arms control matters, will focus its attention on verification questions. We are aware that the development of new technologies emphasizing mobility and dispersal of systems poses increasingly difficult verification questions. But without adequate verification procedures, which today cannot be fulfilled exclusively by satellites, Senate approval of agreements becomes more difficult. On-scene techniques are essential. Again, referring to public pressures on our Senate, verification is perhaps the most critical single ingredient in our deliberations on arms control measures.

Negative perceptions and beliefs put tremendous pressures on the way Senators approach agreements with other nations. A striking example, from my own personal experience, was the problem of the SALT II agreement. After the agreement was signed, I evaluated it carefully, and I finally judged that it was in our national interests to ratify it. As the Senate Majority Leader, during 1979, I was working to generate the two-thirds majority of Senators necessary to consent to the ratification of the SALT II treaty. We were short of the two-thirds majority needed, but I believed that there was a good chance of getting the needed votes. In July, 1979, I visited with Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko in the Soviet Union and urged that we all lower our voices. You mentioned earlier today that you would not be intimidated. This was precisely the same message I brought to them -- that the United States Senate would not be intimidated by threats from Soviet leaders. They both agreed to cool the rhetoric. My message to Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko produced the desired result. But when Soviet military forces moved into Afghanistan in December of 1979, severe public opinion pressures

developed on all Senators to link Afghanistan and SALT II. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had a very negative effect on public opinion. When this happened, my judgment was that the necessary two-thirds vote could not be obtained, in the light of the Soviet Union's sending troops into Afghanistan, and at the end of December, I visited privately with President Carter to inform him that the Senate would not consent to the treaty. Because of lack of public support brought on by that event, I advised him that the treaty should not be called up for Senate consideration, despite the fact that I personally believed that ratifying it would be beneficial from the standpoint of our national security. Shortly thereafter, President Carter publicly asked that the Senate not take up the treaty.

President Reagan recently decided -- after the Senate encouraged him to support an extension of the "no undercut" policy relating to the SALT II Treaty -- that the U.S. would continue to abide by it so long as the Soviet Union did.

Americans attach great importance to full application of the law. The perception that one side or another is taking advantage of the interpretation of the terms of an operative treaty to gain advantage, even though the long-term effect of that gain may be inconsequential, has a dramatic impact on our Senate. I would like to refer to the text of basic principles of relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., signed by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev on May 29, 1972. One provision states that "both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with 'the objectives of improving our mutually advantageous development across the board.'"

Any President knows that the American people, and their elected representatives in the Senate, will not support and will not consent to the ratification of any arms control agreement about which there are reasonable doubts on verification. Even the possibilities for signing arms control agreements in the future are lessened in the current environment of doubts about compliance with existing agreements.

For example, a great deal has been said about questions of violations of the terms of the ABM treaty, particularly the radar at Krasnoyarsk. This is an obstacle to our movement in arms control and must be overcome.

The way to begin this process is to encourage serious negotiations at the table in Geneva. This Senate delegation is not here to negotiate these issues.

Our nation hopes that the Soviet Union will take the initiative and lay on the table detailed proposals and numbers on offensive force reductions. The question of SDI will play a role. We should talk seriously about it. We are both doing vigorous research in this field -- this is acceptable under the ABM treaty.

Both sides must negotiate specific proposals for reducing significantly their offensive nuclear forces. Offensive forces and defensive forces must be discussed together.

Let me emphasize that the Senate is serious about treaty commitments. We would view poorly any unilateral attempt by either side to violate the limits of the ABM treaty without a renegotiation of that treaty.

You have recently offered proposals for moratoria on further deployments of nuclear missiles in the European theatre and on nuclear weapons testing. Our long-term goals should certainly include a comprehensive test ban treaty and a stable balance of forces in Europe. Naturally, neither side can accept any proposal which would put it in a permanent position of disadvantage in the European theatre. Your proposal for a moratorium comes at a time when you have already deployed a large number of SS-20 missiles, which has thrown the European situation out of balance. I believe actions must be taken to redress that balance, and that, of course, is the reason for the NATO deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. Serious proposals in this regard would be extremely helpful at the appropriate negotiating table in Geneva.

Likewise, you proposed mutual moratorium on nuclear testing came immediately after the Soviet Union completed a series of tests. If the United States were to agree not to do the testing we regard as necessary in the near future, we would be agreeing to a unilateral disadvantage. Therefore, it certainly would not be in our interest to put ourselves in that position. The testing question, again, should be the subject of serious negotiations, with particular attention to the long-term goal of a test ban which is fair and leaves neither power at a disadvantage.

Nothing would be gained by the Soviet Union's wasting time, waiting for the next American Administration in the expectation of striking a better bargain. As you so clearly pointed out in your interview with TIME magazine, the advance of technology is rapid, and our problem will be easier to resolve if we begin now.

Timing is crucial. We should begin talking now -- before we have the technology in hand -- so that we can plan to use it wisely. The President has said these discussions should begin today.

Confidence building measures are another important matter. The Senate, led by Senators Nunn and Warner, has initiated various proposals for our two nations to help avoid accidental nuclear war, or the initiation of nuclear conflicts by third parties or third nations. These take the form of better information exchange and better procedures for mutual action to mitigate potentially disastrous misunderstandings or accidental events. The development of such mutual exchanges and actions, we believe, would not only be in the interest of peace, but would also be a step to further confidence building measures between our nations. The upgrading of the "hot line" is a good example of this kind of action.

We also have a common interest to reduce the possibilities that conventional conflict will occur between us. The practical measures to achieve this would be for progress to be made in the talks on confidence building measures in Stockholm, on chemical weapons in Geneva, and on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna.

Your public statements give every indication that you seek these same ends. We all understand that security is not measured in deterrence of force projection alone. It is not solely an issue of military power. The security of any nation also depends upon its economic vitality. No country can call itself secure if it fails to meet the needs of its people on housing, education, health, and welfare. Both our nations are aware of that fact. Both our nations have made economic security a priority. You have demonstrated your strong desire to assure the Soviet people of that hope, and to allow your country to achieve even greater economic potential.

We all recognize the serious penalty that the spiraling arms race exacts on our economies. The Soviet Union and the United States enjoy a wealth of domestic resources. But a continued head-long arms race propelled by mutual suspicion will waste those great resources.

On the question of the third world, it is clear that we each have our own interests. We will each pursue them, but that should not get in the way of reaching accommodations on the critical matters that face us directly. When, however, actions in the third world present serious roadblocks for our mutual relationships, we must pay attention. We are seriously concerned about the integrity of Pakistan, and encourage an accommodation related to Afghanistan involving the removal of Soviet troops. I have already described the impact that Soviet actions in Afghanistan had on SALT II. And so we hope that you will be able to reach a resolution of the Afghanistan situation and that a mutually acceptable resolution can be reached with an early end to the fighting.

Human rights is a matter of critical concern to the people of the United States. Regardless of the fact that you view this as an internal matter, there is the question of fulfilling political commitments made in the international arena, such as the 1975 Helsinki accords. This is something that goes beyond the specific question of human rights and relates to the broader question of abiding by solemn commitments made by Soviet leaders.

As a nation, the Soviet Union has stated time and time again its support for family reunification. Certainly the failure to issue visas because of arbitrary reasons does not take into consideration the individuals and their specific circumstances. We are leaving lists of some cases with you. These are examples; there are many others. We urge you to personally be involved in reviewing the policies and these cases.

It is important that special consideration be given those citizens, both American and Soviet, whose family reunification rights have been denied.

It is important to understand that issues like these are serious obstacles to good U.S.-Soviet relations, because the American people know about and care about Soviet actions.

Cultural, environmental, and scientific cooperative projects and exchanges for the mutual benefit of our two societies, such as will be elaborated on by Senator Pell, are always welcome developments.

I would reflect for a moment on some things that unite us. More than 150 years ago, a famous Frenchman, Alexis DeTocqueville, made an extensive visit to the United States. His book, called Democracy in America, written in 1833, was a brilliant insight into American character. He said:

"There are at the present time two great nations in the world... I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and whilst the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly placed themselves in the front rank among nations... Their starting point is different and their courses are not the same, yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."

DeTocqueville's comments are still relevant. Our great mutual interest is in peace and the enlightened use of all of our resources for our two peoples. In the long run, both of us can win. Neither of us need lose. It all depends on our attitudes, energies, and wisdom.

You are in a position of historic opportunity. The challenges you face, in leading your great nation, must be invigorating for you. The challenges we both face, in forming mutually beneficial arrangements between our two great nations are formidable -- but now is the time to seize the opportunities that history has presented.

DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE

Moscow, USSR

September 3, 1985

His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
General Secretary
Central Committee
Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

We are pleased that you have taken the time to meet with the delegation headed by Senators Byrd and Thurmond. We are here because we believe it to be vitally important to work to improve relations between our two great countries. Because of the limited time available, our discussions will focus on issues which affect the future of life on this planet. We are also concerned about and wish to bring to your attention matters which affect the lives of a small group of individuals, persons who according to our law are American citizens, and persons who are married to American citizens.


Our constituents, the American people, have made us aware of the plight of these individuals, and during our visit we have had an opportunity to meet with many of them. They are not dissidents, and in their conversations with us, they have spoken only of their desire to return to the land of their birth to be reunited with their families, or to join their American spouses. We are enclosing a list of names of persons whom we consider to be American citizens. They have repeatedly been denied the opportunity to emigrate. We are also enclosing a list of Soviet citizens who are married to American citizens and who have also repeatedly been denied the right to emigrate to join their American spouses in the United States. We would like to ask that these cases be examined again with a view toward favorable resolution.


We are serious in our commitment to work for a more positive relationship based on mutual respect. Discussing the critical issues of arms control and the improvement of relations between our two countries is difficult in the face of these continuing personal tragedies.

The emigration of these individuals and their families poses no threat to the Soviet Union and it is a small step for a great country. Such a decision would improve the atmosphere in which we can discuss those problems which affect not only the future of our two countries, but that of the whole of mankind.


We urge you to take this small step.


Respectfully,



Strom Thurmond, Vice Chairman


Robert C. Byrd, Chairman



Sam Nunn


Claiborne Pell


Paul S. Sarbanes


Dennis DeConcini


George J. Mitchell


John W. Warner

SPOUSES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS
WHO HAVE BEEN DENIED PERMISSION TO
LEAVE THE U.S.S.R.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

REGAN, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

KDB 1/24/2006

File Folder

[USSR: GORBACHEV MEETING WITH SENATORS 09/03/1985]

FOIA

1997-066/13

COHEN, D

Box Number

4

15

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
23405	LIST LIST OF SPOUSES OF AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO HAVE BEEN DENIED PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE USSR	4	ND	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNITED STATES CITIZENS

WHO HAVE BEEN DENIED

PERMISSION TO LEAVE

THE U.S.S.R.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

REGAN, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

KDB 1/24/2006

File Folder

[USSR: GORBACHEV MEETING WITH SENATORS 09/03/1985]

FOIA

1997-066/13

COHEN, D

Box Number

4

15

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
23406	LIST LIST OF US CITIZENS WHO HAVE BEEN DENIED PERMISSION TO LEAVE THE USSR (NUMBERED AS PAGES 2-5)	4	ND	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE

ION. ROBERT C. BYRD
CHAIRMAN

HON. STROM THURMOND
VICE CHAIRMAN

September 3, 1985

His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
General Secretary
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

We appreciate the opportunity you have afforded us to meet with you for a free exchange of concerns important to both our nations. We believe our meeting is a positive sign for the improvement of relations between our governments and our peoples.

The peace of the world depends on better relations between our two nations, and that peace is an important factor in the ability of our two countries to devote much of their energy towards improving the quality of life of their respective citizens. Thus, both the Soviet Union and the United States have a common interest in improving their relations.

In recognition of this area of common interest, we believe every opportunity should be taken to resolve differences between our nations. In that spirit, we would like to discuss, in this letter, one of the issues which has a profound and continuing effect on our relations, and on the prospects for improving those relations.

That issue is "human rights." We have no desire to interfere with the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union and the United States both have signed a number of international "human rights" agreements -- including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act, the tenth anniversary of which occurred recently. These agreements have made human rights a legitimate international concern.

As a nation of immigrants which was created and nourished by those seeking to exercise freely their human rights, the United States, and its citizens, take very seriously the international commitments nations have made in this area.

Mr. General Secretary
September 3, 1985
Page 2

The American people attach great importance to Soviet fulfillment of its "human rights" commitments under the international agreements both nations have signed.

Americans want a lessening of the tensions -- on a broad range of issues -- between our countries, and we are confident that this feeling is held by the Soviet people and their new leadership. The Soviet Union did take a step forward in the human rights area, recently, by releasing Isaak Shkolnik, and your nation deserves positive recognition for that decision. We earnestly urge you to take further, positive steps.

The outcome of such a policy will be to the mutual benefit of both our nations.

There is particular compassion in our country for those of Jewish ancestry and various religious faiths who wish to emigrate from the Soviet Union and are precluded from doing so. We further express concern for other individuals and groups in the Soviet Union seeking to exercise their basic "human rights" including Pentacostals, Baptists, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians.

Americans have great concern for the welfare of individuals such as Anatoly Shcharansky, Andrei Sakharov, Raoul Wallenberg, and Yuri Orlov, who have been imprisoned, placed under house arrest, or whose fate is unknown.

These concerns create an objective, political fact-of-life that the Soviet Union's adherence to its freely-accepted human rights commitments will be a factor in future Senate consideration of other matters affecting the U.S.-Soviet relationship.


Although protestations have been made that all those people who wish to leave the Soviet Union have been permitted to do so, we must take issue with these contentions. Some members of this delegation have met personally with individuals who have applied for permission to emigrate and have had that permission denied repeatedly; in some instances, for more than ten years.

Soviet citizens who have attempted to monitor their own government's adherence to the Helsinki Final Act have been imprisoned and exiled. Individuals who have attempted to practice their religious faith have been harassed by the authorities and tried for anti-Soviet behavior, even though the international agreements referred to earlier, and signed by the U.S.S.R., explicitly grant minorities the right to practice their religious beliefs free of official harassment.


Mr. General Secretary
September 3, 1985
Page 3

With these points in mind, we wish to leave you with the attached list of specific individuals each with a unique case which we believe deserves your sympathetic consideration. We respectfully urge positive action by the Soviet Union in each case. Under your new leadership, the Soviet government has a unique opportunity not only relieve human suffering but to send a strong message to the entire world about its concern for human rights.


Sincerely yours,


Strom Thurmond, Vice Chairman


Sam Nunn



Paul S. Sarbanes


George J. Mitchell


Robert C. Byrd, Chairman


Claiborne Pell


Dennis DeConcini


John W. Warner

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

REGAN, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

KDB 1/24/2006

File Folder

[USSR: GORBACHEV MEETING WITH SENATORS 09/03/1985]

FOIA

1997-066/13

COHEN, D

Box Number

4

15

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
-----------	---	------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------------

23407 LIST

6

ND

B6

LIST OF NAMES PRESENTED TO GORBACHEV BY
US SENATE DELEGATION ON 9/3/85

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- 1-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- 2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- 3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- 4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- 5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- 6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- 7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- 8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.