

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Regan, Donald T.: Files
Folder Title: [USSR:] President Reagan's Trip to Reykjavik, Iceland, 10/10/1986 - 10/12/1986
Box: 7

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue:
<https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name REGAN, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 3/2/2009

File Folder [PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO REYKJAVIK,
ICELAND, OCTOBER 10-12, 1986]

FOIA

M08-125/3

Box Number ~~92497~~ 7

CHARLES

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
65756	COVER PAGE	FOR BRIEFING BOOK <i>R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES</i>	1	ND	
65757	TABLE OF CONTENTS	FOR BRIEFING BOOK <i>R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES</i>	1	ND	
65732	MEMO	JOHN POINDEXTER TO THE PRESIDENT RE YOUR MEETINGW WITH GORBACHEV IN REYKJAVIK <i>R 4/5/2017 M125/3</i>	2	ND	B1
65758	ANNOTATED AGENDA	FOR BRIEFING BOOK <i>R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES</i>	2	ND	
65759	PAPER	RE MEETING WITH ICELANDIC PRESIDENT FINNBOGADOTTIR AND PM HERMANNSSON <i>R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES</i>	1	ND	
65733	TALKING POINTS	SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FINNBOGADOTTIR AND P.M. HERMANNSSON <i>R 4/5/2017 M125/3</i>	2	ND	B1
65760	BACKGROUND PAPER	RE ICELAND <i>R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES</i>	2	ND	

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name REGAN, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 3/2/2009

File Folder [PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO REYKJAVIK,
ICELAND, OCTOBER 10-12,1986]

FOIA

M08-125/3

Box Number 92497

CHARLES

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
65734	PAPER	RE REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPARTORY MEETING FIRST DAY <i>R 4/5/2017 M125/3</i>	1	ND	B1
65735	TALKING POINTS	RE PRIVATE MEETING <i>R 4/5/2017 M125/3</i>	2	10/10/1986	B1
65736	PAPER	RE REGIONAL ISSUES <i>R 4/5/2017 M125/3</i>	1	ND	B1
65737	PAPER	HUMAN RIGHTS <i>R 4/5/2017 M125/3</i>	1	ND	B1
65761	PAPER	RE AFTERNOON MEETING <i>R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES</i>	1	ND	
65738	TALKING POINTS	ARMS CONTROL <i>R 4/5/2017 M125/3</i>	23	ND	B1
65739	PAPER	RE REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPARATORY MEETING SECOND DAY <i>R 4/5/2017 M125/3</i>	1	ND	B1
65762	PAPER	RE UNITED NATIONS <i>PAR 4/5/2017 M125/3</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name REGAN, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 3/2/2009

File Folder [PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO REYKJAVIK,
ICELAND, OCTOBER 10-12, 1986]

FOIA

M08-125/3

Box Number 92497

CHARLES

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
65763	PAPER	RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEMES <i>R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES</i>	1	ND	
65740	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #4; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65740</i>	3	10/1/1986	B1 B3
65741	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #5; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65741</i>	1	9/9/1986	B1 B3
65742	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #6; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65742</i>	2	10/2/1986	B1 B3
65743	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #7; PAR 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65743</i>	2	8/25/1986	B1 B3
65744	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #8; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65744</i>	4	9/9/1986	B1 B3
65745	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #9; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65745</i>	2	10/2/1986	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name REGAN, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 3/2/2009

File Folder [PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO REYKJAVIK,
ICELAND, OCTOBER 10-12,1986]

FOIA

M08-125/3

Box Number 92497

CHARLES

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
65755	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #10; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65755</i>	2	9/10/1986	B1 B3
65746	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #11; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65746</i>	2	8/7/1986	B1 B3
65747	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #12; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65747</i>	2	8/29/1986	B1 B3
65748	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #13; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65748</i>	1	10/2/1986	B1 B3
65749	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #14; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65749</i>	1	10/2/1986	B1 B3
65750	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #15; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65750</i>	2	10/2/1986	B1 B3
65751	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #16; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65751</i>	1	10/3/1986	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name REGAN, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 3/2/2009

File Folder [PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO REYKJAVIK,
ICELAND, OCTOBER 10-12,1986]

FOIA

M08-125/3

Box Number 92497

CHARLES

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
65752	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #17; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65752</i>	1	7/31/1986	B1 B3
65753	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #18; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65753</i>	1	8/25/1986	B1 B3
65754	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 F99-021/2 #19; D 12/20/2010 M08-125/3 #65754</i>	1	8/1/1986	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Regan, Donald: Files

Archivist: gcc/bcb

EA # ~~92497~~ Box # 7

FOIA ID: F99-021/2

File Folder: President Reagan's Trip to Reykjavik, Iceland, October 10-12, 1986

Date: 3/8/00 [assz]

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	Overall Briefing Book, 60p.	n.d.	P1
2. bio	Bio, 3p. D. 6/22/00 NIS99-021/2 #4	10/1/86	P1, F3
3. bio	Bio, 1p. D. " " #5	9/9/86	P1, F3
4. bio	Bio, 2p. D. " " #6	10/2/86	P1, F3
5. bio	Bio, 2p. D. " " #7	8/25/86	P1, F3
6. bio	Bio, 4p. D. " " #8	9/9/86	P1, F3
7. bio	Bio, 2p. D. " " #9	10/2/86	P1, F3
8. bio	Bio, 2p. D. " " #10	9/10/86	P1, F3
9. bio	Bio, 2p. D. " " #11	8/7/86	P1, F3
10. bio	Bio, 2p. D. " " #12	8/29/86	P1, F3
11. bio	Bio, 1p. D. " " #13	10/2/86	P1, F3
12. bio	Bio, 1p. D. " " #14	10/2/86	P1, F3
13. bio	Bio, 2p. D. " " #15	10/2/86	P1, F3
14. bio	Bio, 1p. D. " " #16	10/3/86	P1, F3
15. bio	Bio, 1p. D. " " #17	7/31/86	P1, F3
16. bio	Bio, 1p. D. " " #18	8/25/86	P1, F3

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].

P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].

P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Regan, Donald: Files

OA # ~~52497~~ 7

File Folder: [President Reagan's Trip to Reykjavik, Iceland , October 10-12, 1986]

Date: 3/8/00

Archivist: gcc/bcb

FOIA ID: F99-021/2

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

17. bio	Bio, 1p. D. 6/22/00 NL SF99-021/2 #19	8/1/86	P1, F3
---------	--	--------	--------

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name REGAN, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 3/2/2009

File Folder [PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO REYKJAVIK,
ICELAND, OCTOBER 10-12,1986]

FOIA

M08-125/3

Box Number 92497

CHARLES

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
65756	COVER PAGE	FOR BRIEFING BOOK R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES	1	ND	
65757	TABLE OF CONTENTS	FOR BRIEFING BOOK R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES	1	ND	
65732	MEMO	JOHN POINDEXTER TO THE PRESIDENT RE YOUR MEETINGW WITH GORBACHEV IN REYKJAVIK	2	ND	B1
65758	ANNOTATED AGENDA	FOR BRIEFING BOOK R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES	2	ND	
65759	PAPER	RE MEETING WITH ICELANDIC PRESIDENT FINNBOGADOTTIR AND PM HERMANNSSON R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES	1	ND	
65733	TALKING POINTS	SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH FINNBOGADOTTIR AND P.M. HERMANNSSON	2	ND	B1
65760	BACKGROUND PAPER	RE ICELAND R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES	2	ND	

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name REGAN, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 3/2/2009

File Folder [PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO REYKJAVIK,
ICELAND, OCTOBER 10-12,1986]

FOIA

M08-125/3

Box Number 92497

CHARLES

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
65734	PAPER	RE REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPARTORY MEETING FIRST DAY	1	ND	B1
65735	TALKING POINTS	RE PRIVATE MEETING	2	10/10/1986	B1
65736	PAPER	RE REGIONAL ISSUES	1	ND	B1
65737	PAPER	HUMAN RIGHTS	1	ND	B1
65761	PAPER	RE AFTERNOON MEETING R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES	1	ND	
65738	TALKING POINTS	ARMS CONTROL	23	ND	B1
65739	PAPER	RE REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPARATORY MEETING SECOND DAY	1	ND	B1
65762	PAPER	RE UNITED NATIONS	1	ND	B1
65763	PAPER	RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEMES R 3/2/2009 GUIDELINES	1	ND	

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name REGAN, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 3/2/2009

File Folder [PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO REYKJAVIK,
ICELAND, OCTOBER 10-12,1986]

FOIA

M08-125/3

Box Number 92497

CHARLES

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
65740	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 NLSF99-021/2 #4</i>	3	10/1/1986	B1 B3
65741	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 NLSF99-021/2 #5</i>	1	9/9/1986	B1 B3
65742	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 NLSF99-021/2 #6</i>	2	10/2/1986	B1 B3
65743	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 NLSF99-021/2 #7</i>	2	8/25/1986	B1 B3
65744	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 NLSF99-021/2 #8</i>	4	9/9/1986	B1 B3
65745	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 NLSF99-021/2 #9</i>	2	10/2/1986	B1 B3
65755	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 NLSF99-021/2 #10</i>	2	9/10/1986	B1 B3
65746	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 NLSF99-021/2 #11</i>	2	8/7/1986	B1 B3
65747	BIO	<i>D 6/22/2000 NLSF99-021/2 #12</i>	2	8/29/1986	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name REGAN, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 3/2/2009

File Folder [PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO REYKJAVIK,
ICELAND, OCTOBER 10-12,1986]

FOIA

M08-125/3

Box Number 92497

CHARLES

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description		No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
65748	BIO	<i>D</i>	<i>6/22/2000</i>	<i>NLSF99-021/2 #13</i>	1	10/2/1986	B1 B3
65749	BIO	<i>D</i>	<i>6/22/2000</i>	<i>NLSF99-021/2 #14</i>	1	10/2/1986	B1 B3
65750	BIO	<i>D</i>	<i>6/22/2000</i>	<i>NLSF99-021/2 #15</i>	2	10/2/1986	B1 B3
65751	BIO	<i>D</i>	<i>6/22/2000</i>	<i>NLSF99-021/2 #16</i>	1	10/3/1986	B1 B3
65752	BIO	<i>D</i>	<i>6/22/2000</i>	<i>NLSF99-021/2 #17</i>	1	7/31/1986	B1 B3
65753	BIO	<i>D</i>	<i>6/22/2000</i>	<i>NLSF99-021/2 #18</i>	1	8/25/1986	B1 B3
65754	BIO	<i>D</i>	<i>6/22/2000</i>	<i>NLSF99-021/2 #19</i>	1	8/1/1986	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
TRIP TO
REYKJAVIK, ICELAND
OCTOBER 10-12, 1986

OVERALL BRIEFING BOOK

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By cat NARA, Date 3/2/99

~~SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO REYKJAVIK

OCTOBER 10 - 12, 1986

O V E R A L L B R I E F I N G B O O K

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. OVERVIEW PAPERS

Poindexter Overview Paper

II. SCHEDULE

Annotated Agenda

III. ICELAND

Friday, October 10

Courtesy Meeting with President Finnbogadottir and Prime Minister Hermannsson

- Scene Setter
- Talking Points
- Background paper on Iceland

IV. SCENE SETTERS AND TALKING POINTS:

Saturday, October 11:

Morning Session (Emphasis on Human Rights and Regional;
Limited Bilateral)

Afternoon Session (Emphasis on Arms Control)

Sunday, October 12:

Morning Session (Arms Control and Wrap-Up)

V. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEMES

VI. BIOGRAPHIC MATERIALS

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CH NARA, Date 3/2/99

57-6

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *JP*

SUBJECT: Your Meetings with Gorbachev in Reykjavik

Gorbachev's immediate objective in meeting you in Iceland is to define one or more agreements in the arms control area which can be completed during his trip to the United States. Your objective will be to impress upon him the necessity for progress across the range of issues as you have defined them, and to determine how far he is likely to go to reach concrete agreements.

The most favorable outcome from our point of view would be an agreed date for Gorbachev's trip to the United States. However, the best way to maximize the odds that Gorbachev will commit himself to a date is to avoid seeming too eager. If Gorbachev feels that the fact of a meeting in the United States is supremely important to you, he is more likely to try to extract a substantive payment for it. It will be best to maintain the attitude that Gorbachev is welcome to come at any reasonable time convenient to him, and that you wish his visit to be as productive as possible (thus your agreement to the meeting in Reykjavik), but it is up to him to make agreements possible on fair terms if he seeks them.

In Geneva, you engaged him in considerable debate about philosophical attitudes and historical experience. In Reykjavik, Gorbachev is likely to be more goal-oriented, concentrating on what can be achieved -- though he will doubtless rise to sharp debate if he feels challenged on matters affecting his pride or the prestige of his country.

Since time will be severely limited, you will want to concentrate on a few key issues which either seem good candidates for further movement on the Soviet part, or else are of such importance that firm markers must be set down. Several arms control issues fall in the first category, while regional issues like Afghanistan and Central America fall in the second. Human rights issues fall somewhere in between: they are unlikely to be candidates for formal agreements, but Gorbachev must be convinced that more progress is required in this area if some of the other things he wants are to become feasible.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M12513 #65732
BY *bw* NARA DATE 4/5/17

Although Gorbachev may possibly throw in a few "sweeteners" at the outset, he probably will reserve most of his real concessions (if he is bringing any) until late in the day (or rather, until the second day). Therefore, it will probably be wise to use the first day to lay out and defend our current positions and listen carefully to what he says. By your final session, it should be clear whether we are near closure on any important points -- and whether Gorbachev is prepared to move enough on some key issues to justify movement on our part.

The people Gorbachev has named to his "official delegation" are all very close to him personally and bureaucratically: all, except for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, come from his immediate office or the Central Committee Secretariat which is under his direct command. This means that he retains considerable flexibility to interpret the results of your meetings as he wishes in reporting to his Politburo colleagues.

My guess is that he has a keen interest in a "successful" meeting, which would enhance his prestige and authority at home and prepare the way for a visit to the U.S. -- which could bring further domestic benefits. If so, you will enter the meeting with a very strong hand, and should be able to secure some significant movement in some Soviet positions. On the other hand, if Gorbachev turns out to be unyielding, your willingness to meet him in Reykjavik should make clear to U.S. and allied publics that Gorbachev is the problem.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

SCHEDULE

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO REYKJAVIK
October 9-12, 1986

ANNOTATED AGENDA

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9

9:30 a.m. President departs White House.
7:05 p.m. Arrive Iceland (Brief Arrival Ceremony).
(local time)
8:05 p.m. Arrive Ambassador's Residence.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 10

Morning Briefing and private time.
Briefing to focus on general strategy for the meeting.
12:30 p.m. Briefing lunch at Residence
Afternoon Briefing and private time.
Briefing to focus on arms control issues.
4:30 - Meetings with Iceland President, Prime
5:00 p.m. Minister and Foreign Minister.
General discussion of U.S.-Icelandic relations.
Evening Private dinner at Residence.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 11

10:30 a.m.- First Session. Emphasis: Overview, concentrating
12:30 p.m. on human rights and regional issues; listen to
Gorbachev's arms control proposals. At Hofdi
House.

You will host this session, which means you will arrive first, greet Gorbachev and initiate the meeting.

1:00 - Briefing lunch. At Residence
2:00 p.m.

3:30 - Second Session. Emphasis: Arms control,
5:30 p.m. including comment on Gorbachev proposals. At
Hofdi House.

Gorbachev will host this session, which means that he will arrive first to greet you and initiate the meeting.

Evening Private dinner at Residence.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By 15 NARA, Date 3/2/09

~~SECRET~~

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 12

11:00 a.m. Third Session. Emphasis: Wrapup.
1:00 p.m. At Hofdi House

You host this meeting.

1:00 - Private Lunch. At Residence
2:00 p.m.

3:00 p.m. Drop-by event for U.S. military and Embassy
personnel and families.

This will be an opportunity to thank them for the
job they are doing, and particularly for their
assistance in helping with the meeting this
weekend. It will also provide a forum for any
post-meeting public remarks.

3:00 - Farewell ceremony at Keflavik.
3:20 p.m.

3:45 p.m. Depart Iceland

5:50 p.m. Arrive at Andrews

6:05 p.m. Arrive at White House

~~SECRET~~

ICELAND

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 10

SCENE SETTER

MEETING WITH ICELANDIC PRESIDENT VIGDIS FINNBOGADOTTIR AND
PRIME MINISTER STEINGRIMUR HERMANNSSON

Setting

- You will meet for a brief courtesy call with President Finnbogadottir, Prime Minister Hermannsson and Foreign Minister Mathiesen. All Icelandic participants speak English.
- Mrs. Finnbogadottir was elected to the largely ceremonial post of President in 1980 and was re-elected in 1984 without opposition. Prime Minister Hermannsson, a member of the Progressive Party, is the head of a center-right coalition that came into office following elections in 1983. New elections are scheduled to be held no later than the spring of 1987. Foreign Minister Mathiesen is a member of the senior coalition partner, the Independence Party.
- The government has turned around a long period of poor economic performance. Inflation has been brought down to a projected 10% this year from a high three years ago of 80%. Unemployment is negligible and real economic growth for this year is projected at 3.5%.
- Although there is a strong tradition of isolationism and support for a neutralist foreign policy, Icelandic support for NATO has strengthened in recent years.
- You will want to thank the Icelandic government for its many efforts to make the meetings with Gorbachev a success. Other possible discussion topics include East-West relations and bilateral issues, such as the military cargo transport treaty and civil aviation. The Icelanders are not expected to pursue any substantive issues in detail during your courtesy call.

TALKING POINTS

65733
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR
THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FINNBOGADOTTIR
AND PRIME MINISTER HERMANNSSON

GENERAL: -- I want to relay to you Madame President, our gratitude for all you have done to assist us in our preparations for this week's meetings, especially in light of the very short notice we were able to provide.

BILATERAL
ISSUES -- I am very pleased that we were able to resolve the military cargo transport issue. As you are aware, a Treaty has been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

 -- I am pleased to inform you that we are planning to act positively on Icelandair's request to move some of its operations to Boston. The Department of Transportation will be in touch with Icelandair in Washington with further details.

EAST-WEST
RELATIONS: -- My meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev represents another step in the dialogue which started at Geneva. We are realistic--our differences can not be resolved through a single meeting. But we can take steps wherever the other side is willing. We are hopeful that this meeting will lead to a productive summit in Washington later this year.

 -- We are going to cover all the items on our agenda: arms control, human rights, regional issues, trade and bilateral issues. In particular, we wish to make clear the importance human rights play in our relationship. There is a fundamental difference in how our two nations regard

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M12513 #65733
BY RLW NARA DATE 4/5/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~-2-~~

this issue. The Danilooff case has reminded us that our attempts to develop our relationship can be endangered if we do not deal forthrightly with these differences.

ARMS

CONTROL: --

After considerable delays, we seem to be making progress, and we believe there is potential for more. We need to continue our give-and-take at the Geneva negotiations. We remain committed to deep cuts in offensive arms. We believe that an interim agreement on LRINF missiles, leading to equal numbers of warheads on both sides, is possible.

NATO: --

We are pleased by Iceland's continued strong support for common Alliance goals. Iceland's willingness to make available the base at Keflavik is a crucial part of NATO's strategy for protecting the Alliance's northern flank. We will continue our close consultations with Allies on NATO concerns.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BACKGROUND PAPER

ICELAND

Iceland is one of Europe's smallest and least populated nations, with only 240,000 people. Nearly one-half the population is found in the capital of Reykjavik. Iceland is a NATO member, but it has not joined the European Economic Community. However, due to its shared heritage, culture and similar language with other Nordic states, it is a member of the Nordic Council. Iceland has a very high standard of living, comparable to other Northern European states. Icelanders are very nationalistic and sensitive to any impression that they are being treated in a less than equal manner.

During World War II Iceland was occupied first by U.K. forces and later by the U.S. in order to prevent this strategically located island from falling into the hands of Nazi Germany. Icelanders are particularly proud of their sacrifices during the war and point out that they had one of the highest per capita mortality rates of any ally.

Following the war, Iceland became a charter member of NATO. In 1951, NATO requested that the U.S. and Iceland make arrangements for the defense of Iceland and the NATO area. The U.S.-Icelandic Defense Treaty was signed, providing a framework for the establishment of a base and the stationing of U.S. military forces. Today there are approximately 3,000 American military personnel in Iceland from all four services along with 2,000 dependents. The forces are under the command of a U.S. Navy Rear Admiral and are referred to as the Icelandic Defense Force (IDF). Iceland has no military forces of its own; however, there is a Coast Guard which is part of the Ministry of Justice.

Our largest defense facility is at Keflavik, headquarters of the IDF; it is co-located with the international airport. There are several communication and radar facilities at other locations. The United States does not pay any compensation for the use of Keflavik or other sites. Although the 1951 Defense Agreement is subject to review by either side at any time, there is no requirement for periodic renewal.

Iceland's political spectrum ranges from conservative to far-left, including a small but active Communist party. The present coalition (Independence Party and Progressive Party) is the most favorable to U.S. and NATO interests in recent years. As a result, several long-pending matters, such as defense upgrades to the base at Keflavik, have been successfully resolved after being long stalled. Nevertheless there remains important internal opposition to the U.S. activities in Iceland undertaken in support of NATO objectives. This makes it especially important to manage carefully our relationship with Iceland.

While the current coalition government is pro-U.S., there have been a number of contentious and complex bilateral issues over the last three years that strained overall relations. These issues include a 2-1/2 year-long dispute over the transport of military cargo to and from Keflavik, whaling, civil aviation and various base-related matters. Although none of these issues command widespread attention in Washington, they are central to Iceland's foreign policy and receive intensive attention from the public, media and Parliament. Progress has been slow and difficult on all these matters, although they now seem to be heading for resolution. The most persistent and politically dangerous of the disputes has been the military cargo transport issue.

In 1984, a newly formed American company availed itself of the monopoly rights under the 1904 Cargo Preference Act for the carriage of military cargo and largely displaced two Icelandic lines which had carried all cargo for the previous 14 years. Intensive efforts to resolve the matter between 1984 and 1986 were unsuccessful. Earlier this summer, the Icelanders threatened unilateral legislation that would have denied entry to Icelandic ports for U.S. military cargo ships if the transport had not been subject to competitive bidding. This was averted by the negotiation and subsequent September 24 signing of a Treaty providing a unique exemption to the 1904 Cargo Preference Act for the Keflavik route so that competitive bidding can occur between U.S. flag vessels and Icelandic lines. The Treaty has been submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

The other major bilateral issue was a dispute over Iceland's whaling program. The U.S. position was a result of legislation (the Pelly Amendment) that calls for sanctions against nations which undermine international fisheries agreements. Although a compromise was reached, the issue left a strong impression among Icelanders of U.S. insensitivity and interference in their domestic affairs. The matter will almost certainly be reopened at the 1987 International Whaling Convention meeting. The importance of the dispute is made clear by Iceland's heavy dependence on its fisheries sector for exports -- nearly 80% in 1985. The U.S. is Iceland's largest market for fish, with approximately \$200 million worth of imports last year.

Like most other Western European nations, Iceland's economy went through a very difficult period in the late 1970s and early 80s. However, the present government has made remarkable strides in bringing inflation under control -- down from 80% three years ago to an expected 10% this year. Unemployment remains negligible, while real economic growth is expected to reach 3.5% for 1986. This good news will help strengthen the position of the Independence Party in elections, which are scheduled to take place no later than next spring.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 11

1
SCENE SETTER
(Morning)

~~SECRET~~

REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPARATORY MEETING

First Day
October 12, 1986

DECLASSIFIED

NLRB M125/3 #65734

BY AW NARA DATE 4/5/17

Setting and Goals

Morning Session

Since Gorbachev hosted your last meeting, you will be the "host" at this meeting. Following the photo op, you will probably wish to engage Gorbachev in a private conversation long enough to make your initial points and for him to make his -- perhaps an hour -- after which you might wish for Secretary Shultz and Shevardnadze to join you for a more detailed discussion of the initial points.

Your goals in this first meeting should be: (1) to indicate to Gorbachev that you are serious about planning a successful visit to the United States for him; (2) to make clear that a "successful meeting" will require more than an agreement or two on approaches to arms control; (3) to cover a couple of the more delicate of these issues; (4) to stress that, so far as arms control is concerned, strategic arms reduction remains our first priority -- and should be his; and (5) to get across the idea (indirectly) that you really do not need the meeting just for its own sake and will not pay a price just to get it.

Afternoon Session

With respect to arms control, our objective is to move the discussion to our agenda. During the first day's session, you will want to lay out the rationale for our positions on START, INF and, especially, for your proposal with respect to the mutual movement to advanced strategic defenses.

- Regarding START, we want to make it clear that our priority is on immediate reductions in existing levels of strategic systems, and that a common framework for such reductions is now close at hand.
- Regarding INF, we wish to press for Soviet movement with respect to reductions of Soviet SS-20s in Asia, limitations on Soviet shorter-range INF missiles, and on the duration of an interim INF agreement so that we can reach such an agreement promptly.
- Regarding the Defense and Space area, we would like to hear Gorbachev's views of your proposal so that if there are additional concerns, you can return to this subject and show how Gorbachev's concerns can be met within the context of your proposal -- and do this during the second day's meetings.

You also have points to make regarding nuclear testing, risk reduction, and verification and compliance. You have contingency points to use if Gorbachev raises other subject like ASAT, US interim restraint policy, chemical weapons, or conventional arms control.

~~SECRET~~

TALKING POINTS

TALKING POINTS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M12513 #15735

~~SECRET~~

revised 10/10

45735

BY lw NARA DATE 4/5/17

TALKING POINTS: PRIVATE MEETING

- Glad you proposed meeting. Important to make sure your visit to the U.S. is as productive as possible.
- Note he seems to feel U.S. has been dragging feet since Geneva. Not the case -- actually we have the same feeling re USSR. (Took you until June to make a concrete proposal on offensive weapons reduction -- the area we agreed at Geneva to concentrate on.)
- Important thing here, however, is to look ahead, and to find practical solutions to problems.
- Suggest that we alternate private sessions and sessions with foreign ministers [or with other advisers if seems appropriate].
- Ask what he thinks. [He presumably will agree.]
- Ask which issues he feels you should concentrate on. [He will presumably name INF, Space Arms (ABM Treaty), and nuclear testing.]
- Ask if he has any new proposals to make in these areas.
- These are very important issues, and we certainly need to discuss them in detail. However, there are others that are equally crucial to a successful meeting.
- Some may not be suited to formal agreements -- actions on these are more important than words.
- For example, unless there is a substantial improvement on issues such as family reunification and emigration, your visit cannot be as successful as we both want it to be.
- An example in another area is Afghanistan. Realistic movement toward Soviet withdrawal would make all the other issues much easier.
- And, of course, if you don't scale back on your military involvement in Nicaragua and distance yourself from that crazy man Qadhafi, some incident could make our meeting very difficult.
- Now, when it comes to arms control, it is no secret that our highest priority is reducing the level of strategic nuclear weapons. We both agreed at Geneva that we should aim for a 50% reduction, but you seem to be backing away -- and always finding other issues to distract us.
- Is there anything you can tell me now about your approach to these issues in general?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- I must be frank and say that progress in these other areas is going to have some effect on how far we can go on the arms control issues.
- Suggest we break for a few minutes: I'd like to consult my advisors on your proposals. Why don't we reconvene with our foreign ministers for a look at the issues outside the arms control area. We can take up arms control in more detail this afternoon.

Break for five or ten minutes to brief Secretary Shultz and John Poindexter on Gorbachev's proposals, then reconvene with Secretary Shultz for more detailed discussion of human rights and regional issues.

Continuation of Morning Meeting with Secretary Shultz

~~SECRET~~

REGIONAL ISSUES

~~SECRET~~

65736

-- Many regional issues where our approaches and interests differ. My 3-step UN proposal (negotiation by warring parties, US-Soviet talks, economic rebuilding) a flexible formula for many of these conflicts.

-- Today focus on a few conflicts: Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Libya.

Afghanistan:

-- Most important regional case. Your term: "bleeding wound." But long timetable, tiny (maybe phony) withdrawals won't end war.

-- Key: short timetable plus self-determination. These -- not small meaningless gestures -- are real test of your seriousness. I told this to freedom fighter delegation that visited me.

-- We won't exploit Soviet decision to get out (e.g., no bases). Non-aligned Afghanistan can protect both sides' interests.

-- Until then resistance will have all the support it needs. And Pakistan will have our help in protecting itself.

Nicaragua:

-- Two crucial points: 1) we won't accept Soviet beachhead in Central America, 2) real democracy taking root in the region.

-- These guarantee our policy has support by Central American governments and by American people and Congress.

-- Your involvement in Nicaragua (and especially upgrading military presence or equipment) will bring you no gain.

Libya:

-- Qadhafi has launched a war against us. That's why we acted in April. And now have increasing European cooperation against him.

-- He continues to act. We'll use force again if needed.

-- Since you don't seem willing to restrain, your support only exposes you to risk.

Middle East (If raised by MSG):

-- Promising trends in peace process: Israel-Morocco, Israel-Egypt summits; moderate Palestinian leadership emerging.

-- We don't rule out international conference, but skeptical: might deepen paralysis, delay direct talks.

-- Look for constructive signs from you: relations with Israel, increased emigration. Stop supporting those whose actions block peace (Syria, Libya, radical Palestinians).

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR M125/3 #65736
BY RW NARA DATE 4/9/17

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

65708

MAY 13 #65737
BY RW NARA DATE 4/5/17
HUMAN RIGHTS

- Last several months have shown that we can narrow differences and resolve some problems. Record in human rights area, however, has been deeply disappointing.
- We noted and welcomed new willingness on part of Soviet Union to consider human rights legitimate topic of discussion.
- Americans care about this issue at a very profound level. The strong American reaction to Daniloff should tell you something about the importance we attach to individual rights and the lengths we are prepared to go to when individual rights are violated.
- The Daniloff affair seriously damaged our relations. I am concerned that if there is not early and substantial improvement in human rights, particularly emigration, reunification of divided families, and better treatment of prominent human rights activists such as Sakharov, we could be moving toward the same result.
- In Geneva you made a commitment to resolve humanitarian cases in a spirit of cooperation and consistent with Soviet law. Resolution of a large number of our divided family cases this year reflects that spirit, and we welcomed it, and other steps.
- But this represents a small fraction of the problem: it is important to resolve the remainder of these American divided family cases now, especially separated husbands and wives.
- Emigration is today at a 20-year low, and Soviet Jewish activists subjected to increased persecution. There is growing domestic political pressure to do something about it. Influential American groups and many members of Congress have been asking us how we can sign agreements with you on cultural and scientific cooperation while this situation continues.
- On the positive side, if emigration rises to levels of 1978-79 -- and is sustained -- this would open the way to increased U.S.-Soviet cooperation in many areas. Prompt resolution of several hundred "long-term" refusenik cases would remove a major irritant. There will be strong public and Congressional support for more normal economic relations if emigration returns to the levels of the late 1970's and harassment ends.
- Improve treatment of prominent human rights activists such as Sakharov and others would also go a long way toward improving atmosphere.
- I urge you to act now. The sooner we can resolve these issues, the easier it will be for us to create the most propitious atmosphere for your visit.

~~SECRET~~

SCENE SETTER
(Afternoon)

Afternoon Meeting

The afternoon session will focus on arms control. The setting and goals are outlined above in the introduction.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Date 3/2/09

~~SECRET~~

TALKING POINTS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ARMS CONTROL INTRODUCTION

- Secretary Shultz has reported to me on his meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, on the experts meetings in Moscow in August and in Washington in September, and on the current status of the negotiations in Geneva.
- We were hoping for more, but believe some progress was achieved. There now appears to be common ground in some areas.
- We now should consider how to build momentum and get concrete results in the weeks ahead.
- Propose we review this area with an objective of finding elements that we can agree upon.

START

- Stabilizing and verifiable reductions in strategic offensive forces should be our highest priority. After several years of negotiations, both sides understand many of the major issues and concerns. Time to take practical steps.
- 18 months ago when these negotiations began, you were talking about Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs) and nuclear charges (weapons), we were talking about ballistic missile warheads and throwweight, and there was very little common ground.
- Although a number of significant issues remain for resolution, we have made considerable progress. This is no small achievement, to which both sides have contributed. Our job is to accelerate this process.
- The heart of the matter is the reduction of ballistic missile warheads. These represent the majority of strategic weapons on both sides and the primary threat to stability. If we are to reduce, and do so significantly, in a manner which enhances stability, we must focus on ballistic missile warheads and destructive power.
- You and I agreed in Geneva to the concept of 50% reductions. In this context, we have proposed a level of 4500 ballistic missile warheads, roughly half the current Soviet number.

[FYI: US has about 7800 ballistic missile warheads today. Soviets have about 9000.]

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR M125/3 #65738
BY pu NARA DATE 4/5/17

[START continued]

- Your delegation has made a suggestion which would have the effect of placing a ceiling of 6400-6800 on ballistic missile warheads. Your recognition of the need for constraints on this category of weapons, the most destabilizing in times of crisis, is a constructive step, but 6400 is too high.
- In response to the proposal you made at the last round in Geneva, I made clear in my letter to you that I am prepared to consider initial reductions less sweeping than 50%, as an interim measure and a step toward 50% and still lower levels. In this context, we can accept a limit of 5500 ballistic missile warheads. Our negotiators in Geneva have put forward a proposal including such a limit.
- If we can agree on this ceiling on ballistic missile warheads, sublimits to deal with special concerns about stability (e.g., warheads on heavy ICBMs and heavily MIRVed ICBMs), and appropriate verification measures, we can build the basic elements of an agreement around this core.
- Missile throwweight should also be reduced. 50% is a figure that both sides have used, and we believe that there should be a reduction in ballistic missile throwweight to no more than 50% of the current Soviet level.
- Throwweight is a measure of the destructive potential of ballistic missiles and the number of warheads that can be deployed on any one missile, so it makes sense to reduce throw weight to ensure predictability and verifiability in the way we reduce warheads.
- We cannot ignore verification. Discussion of and agreement on verification provisions must proceed concurrently with discussion and agreement on other elements.
- You have expressed the need to limit air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).
- We don't accept your contention that ALCMs are particularly troublesome. They take hours to reach their targets, and hence are useful only for retaliation and deterrence. We deploy them only because your air defenses, which are not limited by treaty, threaten the ability of our bombers to reach their targets.
- But as part of a package sharply reducing ballistic missile warheads, we are prepared to constrain ALCMs.

[START continued]

- In the context of agreement on 5500 ballistic missile warheads and the sublimits we have proposed in Geneva (including a 50% reduction in Soviet ballistic missile throwweight), we can accept a ceiling of 7500 ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs. This is a major step we are prepared to take to meet your concerns.
- Once again, we are prepared to accept a limit of 7500 ballistic missile warheads and Air Launched Cruise Missiles, not a 7500 limit on all "nuclear charges" (i.e., all nuclear weapons including the gravity bombs and Short Range Attack Missiles [SRAM] carried by our bombers) as you have proposed.
- Your past proposals have dealt with "nuclear charges", including bomber weapons. Again, bombers take hours to reach their targets, so they do not pose the disarming first-strike threat of ballistic missile warheads, and our bombers face vast, unconstrained Soviet air defenses, which are being modernized. It makes no sense to equate bomber weapons with missile warheads, and this was not done in past arms control agreements. But in the context of reductions along the lines I have discussed here, we can consider a sublimit on the number of bombers. This would bound the number of bomber weapons which can be carried.

[FYI: The sublimit we propose is a maximum of 350 heavy bombers. We currently have 541 bombers (B-52s and B-1Bs) that would count under SALT; however, 257 are actually older bombers in long-term storage -- 284 are active bombers.]
- We can begin to see the structure of an agreement that meets both sides' concerns. In the context of the limits and sublimits we propose on warheads, we can accept your proposed aggregate ceiling of 1600 on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. This can be the basis of a significant agreement to reduce offensive forces and enhance the stability of the strategic balance.
- If we can work out such a useful agreement, it should not be held hostage to progress in other areas.
- Prepared for intensive work in the coming weeks to produce an agreed package of basic elements. Your side could also contribute with a prompt and positive response to our proposal made last month in Geneva.

[If he raises Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)]

- We are prepared to consider your suggestion of a separate treatment of SLCMs; you should give some thought to how SLCMs can be verified, and make some suggestions.

[START continued]

[If mobile ICBMs are raised]

- Mobile ICBMs present unique verification concerns.
- Thus far your negotiators have been unable to suggest an effective verification scheme that would promote stability and address our concerns about the refire and reconstitution provisions of mobile ICBMs.
- Our concerns about verification of mobile ICBMs are heightened by your substantial concealment activities regarding both the SS-24 and the SS-25 mobile missile.
- As a result, I see no alternative to a ban on mobile ICBMs.

[If pressed on why the U.S. is willing to allow mobile medium range missiles in INF but wants to ban mobile ICBMs in START]

- Our preferred INF outcome is zero US or Soviet LRINF missiles. Until a complete ban can be implemented, interim numerical limits are preferable to no limits on LRINF missiles.
- Mobile ICBMs pose different and additional considerations than do LRINF missiles:
 - Mobile ICBMs present a direct threat to targets on your national territory and ours.
 - Mobile ICBMs are just now entering the force, unlike mobile medium range SS-20s which are an established part of Soviet force structure. Therefore a ban on mobile ICBMs in START would be both logical and a practical place to begin.
- Of course the United States remains prepared to listen to Soviet ideas concerning the verification of limits on mobile ICBM systems that could meet our serious concerns about verification and stability.

INF

- We still prefer the total elimination of the entire category of land-based, LRINF missiles; and that remains our objective.
- However, we are prepared to pursue an interim agreement which moves us toward that goal.

~~SECRET~~

- Progress has been made on INF. We both agree there should be an interim INF agreement with equal ceilings on US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe, and an equal ceiling on US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads worldwide, and that such an agreement must be subject to effective verification, including by national technical means (NTM), cooperative measures, and on-site inspection (OSI). Both sides have contributed to this movement toward an agreement.
- You proposed 100 warheads on each side in Europe. If we can agree on the other aspects of an interim agreement, we have no problem with that number.
- I noted that in your most recent letter you said that verification is no longer a problem. I assume by that you mean that you are prepared to be constructive in finding common ground that will allow a solution of our verification concerns. As we jointly noted in Geneva when last we met, "during the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon."

Asia

- You propose to limit SS-20 levels in Asia. You have said privately that you have a formula to propose to help resolve this issue. I assume that your formula goes beyond your Vladivostok statement (which involved a commitment to freeze LRINF forces in Asia) and involves reductions in Asian SS-20s. If, on the other hand, you only mean to freeze current Soviet SS-20 levels in Asia, we cannot accept that.
- Reductions in Europe increase the significance of SS-20's in Asia; their range and mobility allow them to threaten the security of our Allies in Europe as well as Asia.
- Simply to freeze SS-20's in Asia would discriminate against Asian states, and would represent a massive shift to Asia in the distribution of Soviet LRINF missiles and, because of the mobility of the SS-20, would still constitute a continuing threat to Europe. As I have just said, this we cannot accept.
- As regards reductions in Asia, the US position has long been, and remains that SS-20's in Asia should be reduced concurrently and in the same proportion as reductions in Europe. Anything short of proportional reductions would have the effect of both retaining a threat to Europe and shifting the relative weight of Soviet LRINF missile forces from Europe to Asia.

~~SECRET~~

[INF continued]

- We cannot be a party to what would be seen as a discriminatory move against our Asian Allies. You might consider how it would appear from the standpoint of your effort to improve your relations with Asian nations.
- If we reduce to 100 warheads in Europe, and reduce Asian systems in the same proportion, the Asian ceiling would be something like 63. That would be a much better outcome because it would lead to a lower global total, reduce the potential impact on Europe, and not lead to a discriminatory outcome with respect to Asia.
- In the right context, however, we are prepared to settle on 100 in Europe and 100 in Asia.
- We are not asking for unilateral reductions:
 - a lower Soviet level will result in a lower worldwide ceiling on US forces.
 - if you reduce SS-20's overall and in the Asian and confine all such deployments to Soviet territory, as a part of an acceptable INF agreement like the one I have just proposed, the US is prepared to accept an approach under which the US right to deploy LRINF missiles outside of Europe would be restricted to U.S. territory.

[If he offers a reduction in Asian SS-20s which is either less than proportionate and/or not tied to our 100 in Europe /100 in Asia offer]

- I welcome your understanding of the need for reductions in areas outside of Europe. However, the number you have proposed does not solve the problems that I have just outlined.
- I suggest our negotiators work now to develop a mutually acceptable number.

[If he raises restrictions on US LRINF missiles being placed in Alaska]

- The US could consider a commitment not to deploy its LRINF missiles in Alaska if the Soviet Union would undertake a reciprocal commitment to reduce its Asian and overall LRINF missiles to a level acceptable to the US and not to deploy its LRINF missiles outside the USSR or east of 110 degrees east longitude.

[INF continued]

[If he raises US aircraft and naval forces in Asia]

- The Soviet Union has large numbers of its own aircraft and naval forces in the Asian Pacific region. On both sides there are forces not appropriately part of the INF negotiations. We should stick to dealing with comparable systems, i.e., US and Soviet INF missile systems.

Shorter-range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (SRINF)

- I understand that you want to defer this question, but it is essential to the interim agreement to deal adequately with SRINF. At a minimum, you should certainly agree limiting SRINF, including an overall ceiling on SRINF at an equal level.
- There can be no question that the effectiveness of an agreement reducing LRINF missile systems would be undermined if there were no effective and verifiable concurrent constraints on SRINF missile systems. This is a matter of concern to our Allies as well as to me.
- The Soviet Union once included constraints on shorter-range systems in its own INF draft treaty. Your reluctance now to agree to constrain SRINF systems is troublesome, and suggests a possible interest in increasing them, perhaps offsetting LRINF reductions through SRINF systems.

[If he offers to freeze Soviet SRINF at current Soviet levels in Europe (about 90), provided that the U.S. agrees to freeze at its current level in Europe (0)]

- I welcome your willingness to place constraints on SRINF missiles concurrently with constraints on LRINF missiles.
- However, these systems are even more mobile and transportable than LRINF, so the constraint should be global and we cannot be a party to a nuclear arms reduction agreement which is based on such an unequal outcome between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
- Your proposal would thus be acceptable if it were to provide for a U.S. right to have the same number of SRINF missiles as the Soviet Union and applied to SRINF missiles regardless of their location.

[If he shows no flexibility on this critical point]

- Perhaps we should tell our negotiators to move the ball forward on the basis of our now agreeing that SRINF should be constrained concurrently with LRINF, and let them resolve remaining differences on numbers and geographic scope.

[INF continued]

GLCM/PERSHING II Mix

- Our negotiators in Geneva can discuss the mix of Pershing II and GLCMs.
- A ban on Pershing II missiles, leaving you with ballistic missiles in your LRINF force but us with none, is not acceptable.

Duration

- Both sides recognize an interim agreement as a step toward further reductions and eventual elimination of LRINF missiles.
- That said, we want an agreement with substantial reductions that would provide substantial benefits to ourselves and other countries, and we want those benefits to endure until we can work out further reductions on the way to zero.
- The Soviet draft INF agreement of May 15 itself contains a clause referring to its remaining in force until replacement by a follow-on agreement. That is the concept we support. And, we believe the follow-on agreement should be negotiated as quickly as possible.
- We are prepared to undertake a joint commitment to begin negotiations with the objective of further reducing and eliminating LRINF missiles as soon as the interim agreement enters into force.

Verification

- The U.S. negotiators have laid out key elements necessary to verify an INF Treaty. Such an effective verification regime is absolutely essential to an acceptable INF approach.
- Discussions on verification elements must proceed concurrently with those on other treaty provisions as we agreed at our meeting last year. We therefore don't understand the unwillingness of your negotiators to even react to our approach, let alone to engage in specific discussion of the issues.

INF Summary

- We are getting somewhere. You suggested 100 LRINF missile warheads in Europe. We have no problem with that, if you make comparable reductions in Asia. If you can't make a proportional reduction in Asia (i.e., to about 60-65), why not 100 warheads in Europe and 100 warheads outside Europe with a concurrent freeze on shorter-range systems at your current level? The basis for an agreement is within reach.

DEFENSE AND SPACE

- I have listened to the concerns that you have expressed about the U.S. SDI program, and have sought to take them into account in my July 25 proposal.
- It offers a constructive way forward that would enhance the stability of our strategic relationship in a manner that would leave both sides and the entire world more secure at every stage, while diminishing the burden we are both assuming in the continuous modernization and expansion of strategic offensive missile forces.
- My proposal envisions a careful management of a transition to forces in which there is a stabilizing balance of offensive and defensive weapons.
- It would lead to the total elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.
- It would accommodate your concerns, and would carry forward a process in which each new stage would be safer and more stable than the one that preceded it, beginning now.
- Let me begin by discussing the concerns that you have addressed to us. They fall into two categories.

Offensive Use of Defensive Systems

- First, you have suggested that our defenses might be used offensively to attack targets on Soviet territory.
- I can assure you that they are not being developed for that purpose.
- I have heard the argument that the SDI program will inevitably lead to the development of space-based weapons which will have an offensive capability against earth targets. But the quickest, surest and most effective way to strike earth targets is through earth-based systems such as ballistic missiles.
- We already have in place agreements which prohibit the placing of weapons of mass destruction in space. However, if you have additional concerns on this subject, we are prepared to work with you to resolve them.

Elimination of Ballistic Missiles

- Second, you have suggested that we might launch a first strike against the Soviet Union and use our defenses to defeat your retaliatory strike.

[DEFENSE & SPACE continued]

- This is just another way of saying that certain force configurations made up of both offensive and defensive systems could be used in combination to defeat your strategic forces.
- That is not our objective. But your concern on this point has led me to propose that we sign a treaty now that would lead to the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles.
- Eliminate the offensive missiles, and the issue of a combination of offensive and defensive forces giving one side or the other an advantage would not arise.
- We would both have eliminated those weapons which can strike in a matter of minutes and which cannot be recalled.
- We would have ended once and for all the instability that results from fears of a disarming missile first-strike.
- And we will have relieved both sides of the need constantly to improve its missile forces to keep pace with potential developments on the other side.
- The defenses that we could possess under my proposal would reinforce the stability that we both could achieve by the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. And they would protect each of us against cheating or the ballistic missiles of third countries.
- What we are seeking, above all, is the replacement of offensive ballistic missiles with defensive arms in a phased manner that provides greater stability at each stage in the disarmament process.
- And we are prepared to go so far as sharing the benefits of strategic defenses in conjunction with the elimination of ballistic missiles by agreeing now to a Treaty that would provide for both sides of the equation: elimination of offensive ballistic missiles and the transition to defensive weapons.
- Obviously, if we agree to the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles, our deployments of defenses required to maintain stability could be adjusted accordingly and the level of defenses required to maintain stability would be relatively modest.
- And equally obvious would be the need to reduce significantly those other strategic weapons, bombers and cruise missiles, on which we would rely for deterrence.

[DEFENSE & SPACE continued]

- Neither bombers or cruise missiles are suitable for surprise attack due to their long flight times to target and vulnerability to unconstrained Soviet air defenses.
- Deterrent forces based on these weapons would be far more stable than the current situation in which the technical possibility of instantaneous launching of ballistic missiles causes such understandable concern.
- Important issues of timing and phasing a transition to strategic defenses need to be considered.
- I can assure you that the principle on which we would engage on those issues would be an equitable search for stability at every stage.
- I realize that this is a very significant step. It will require serious negotiation, but I am convinced that it gives us our best chance to put the security of both our nations on a better, more stable long-term basis.

[If he raises non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty]

- We both have programs to explore new defensive technologies.
- Our program is being carried out strictly within the ABM Treaty. Prepared to agree to confine our program through 1991 to research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty as a part of the proposal I made to you last July.
- The right to withdraw from a treaty if extraordinary events should occur that jeopardize the supreme interests of the nation is a fundamental element of international law. I have a basic problem with foreswearing that right.
- Our proposal is positive and forward looking. It contemplates an agreement entered into now that would modify the way the parties would act with respect to the ABM Treaty.

[If he presses his idea of non-withdrawal for up to 15 years.]

- If either our research and development program on advanced defenses or yours indicates success, both sides should have the option to make timely decisions. This would be blocked by your proposal.

[DEFENSE & SPACE continued]

[If he raises the subject of sharing the benefits of Defense]

- We are committed to our SDI program for peaceful purposes. As I have repeatedly emphasized, we do not seek strategic advantage over the Soviet Union. Proof of this can be found in my proposal that a side which chooses to deploy strategic defenses must submit a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defenses and for the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.
- This proposal also reflects my conviction that a commitment to share the benefits of strategic defenses makes sense only if the two sides begin moving toward our commonly stated goal of the total elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.
- Such sharing should be of a nature that neither side could use it to gain unilateral advantage over the other during or after a transition to greater reliance on defenses, or to undermine the effectiveness of the defenses.
- Can't be precise at this time as to the specifics of this sharing program, since I don't know the nature of the systems you or we may wish to pursue. But the idea would be to proceed in a stable and cooperative way, with new defensive technologies used in the cause of peace and stability. We do not seek unilateral advantage.
- We propose a mutual undertaking that if and when the occasion arises, the sides would enter into negotiation with this objective. And I'm ready now to commit the United States by Treaty on this point.
- We envision that this sharing must be accompanied by a plan for the elimination of ballistic missiles, which would in itself be a step, a very significant step, toward our agreed goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
- When we talk of sharing the benefits of advanced defenses, we are talking about a situation in which our countries have agreed upon a program for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles.
- In the context of elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, defenses take on a new character -- protecting against violations, third countries, accidents. Your concerns about defenses augmenting the offense could not arise.

NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS SUMMARY

- We see potential for concrete results in time for the summit in the form of agreed basic elements of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) areas: START, INF and Defense & Space. I wish to stress the potential contribution our negotiators in Geneva can make in achieving such results.
- Prepared to work intensely in all three NST areas. We are prepared to make progress in any and all areas; but we do not believe that progress in any one area should be held hostage to progress in any other.
- We are interested in any ideas you may have for ensuring that the time between now and our next meeting is used most productively.

NUCLEAR TESTING

- The top priority of the United States in the nuclear testing area is to fix the defective verification protocols of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET).
- We have held two useful technical experts meetings in Geneva. At those meetings our experts described in detail a yield measurement system called CORRTEX which is both sufficiently accurate and minimally intrusive and would permit effective verification of the two treaties.
- As I have repeatedly made clear, if the Soviet Union agrees to use the CORRTEX yield measurement system to verify the TTBT and PNET, then I would be prepared to move forward on ratification of these two treaties.
- You should now be ready to make the political decision to accept CORRTEX. If your experts have any remaining questions on CORRTEX, they can be resolved simply by accepting my invitation -- which I renew to you now -- to come to the Nevada test site for an operational demonstration.
- Let us make immediate progress in the nuclear testing area by agreeing here to fix these two treaties. This would be a sound and logical approach.
- I have also told you explicitly that upon ratification of the TTBT and PNET, "and in association with a program to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons," the U.S. "would be prepared to discuss ways to implement a parallel program to achieve progress in effectively limiting and ultimately eliminating nuclear testing in a step-by-step fashion."

[NUCLEAR TESTING continued]

- Whether we start moving or stay where we are now depends on your willingness to focus on practical first steps focused on existing agreements.
- I am very serious about making progress on testing, but you should know by now that neither a test moratorium nor a comprehensive test ban is in the cards for the foreseeable future.
- Instead, let us start to make genuine progress by reaching agreement on deep and verifiable cuts in offensive nuclear arms and on verification improvements to the two existing treaties.

[If pressed for the U.S. view on a comprehensive test ban]

- As for cessation of nuclear testing, a comprehensive test ban is a long-term objective of the United States. But before we can consider this objective, certain conditions must exist:
 - Broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions.
 - Substantially improved verification capabilities.
 - Expanded confidence building measures.
 - Greater balance in conventional forces.
 - Nuclear deterrence no longer required to ensure international security and stability.
- In this context, we need to work on the underlying reasons why we both maintain nuclear arsenals, so that we can make real, steady progress toward that solution.
- We both know that this is not something that we can move to quickly or without first laying the foundation to ensure our security.

[If he raises the Soviet nuclear testing moratorium]

- For many of the same reasons we cannot agree to a comprehensive test ban in the near future, we cannot accept a moratorium. As long as we must depend on nuclear weapons for our security, we believe we must continue testing.
- Our experience with the 1958-61 testing moratorium, when the Soviet Union broke out with the most extensive series of nuclear tests in history, reinforces our view.
- Finally, like a comprehensive test ban, a moratorium poses very serious verification problems. We cannot trust our security to arms control agreements that cannot be effectively verified, nor do we expect you to.

[NUCLEAR TESTING continued]

- I urge you to stop your propaganda campaign on this subject. It isn't going to work and it diverts us from the real issue of seeking genuine, substantial arms reductions.

RISK REDUCTION

- I am pleased there has been such good progress in following up on the commitment we made last year to examine the question of nuclear risk reduction centers.
- There seems to be a close proximity of views on the potential value of such centers. This represents a small but important step toward our common goal of a safer world.
- As I understand it, our two governments have agreed in principle that:
 - Such centers should be established in each national capital,
 - They should be linked by a permanent, dedicated communications link,
 - Initially, this link could be used to notify each other of ballistic missile launches and major military exercises, in accordance with existing agreements to which we are both parties; and
 - The staffs of the centers should meet once or twice a year.
- I see no reason, given the progress we have made thus far, we cannot agree on the goal of signing a formal agreement to establish these centers when you come to the United States.

[If asked about timing of negotiations]

- We had proposed to begin negotiations in Geneva on October 2. I understand that the Soviet side suggested waiting until later this month. We can be ready to begin negotiations as soon as you wish.

VERIFICATION

- You and I both understand how significant, militarily and politically, verification is to our two government, both for existing agreements and for those we jointly seek.
- I want to reaffirm the importance of working out effective verification measures concurrently with the limits on weapons. Last year in Geneva, you and I agreed on such an approach.

[VERIFICATION continued]

- I believe it is time to act in concrete, positive ways. We are ready to engage in a serious dialogue.
- Verification, and the closely-related issue of compliance, are central elements today in all the arms control arenas.
 - Failure to provide for effective verification was one of the major flaws of previous offensive arms agreements.
 - You must understand that I will not agree to, and the United States Senate will not consent to, arms control agreements that do not provide for effective verification.
- In the proposals we have made in Geneva, my negotiators have outlined a concept involving the use of National Technical Means, data exchange and other cooperative measures, and on-site inspection. You have also said that an approach incorporating these elements could be followed. It is time to move from the discussions of general principles to serious, detailed negotiations.

COMPLIANCE

- Strict compliance with arms control agreements is essential if we are to make progress in arms control.
- We are sad to say that there is a clear pattern of Soviet noncompliance with existing agreements, with increasing consequences for United States and allied security.
- My policy decisions regarding SALT I and II were in large part a result of Soviet noncompliance.
- One of the clearest and most important Soviet violations involves the radar at Krasnoyarsk.
 - It erodes the viability of the ABM Treaty and the entire arms control process and hampers many other aspects of our bilateral relationship.
 - Together with a number of other Soviet actions, it suggests that your country may be preparing a territorial missile defense that is specifically prohibited by the treaty.
- Soviet attempts to justify this radar, which is clearly illegal, rather than taking the corrective action we have requested has profound implications for the future of arms control and U.S.-Soviet relations.

ADDITIONAL CONTINGENCY POINTS

If needed, additional contingency points are provided on the following subjects starting on the pages indicated.

PAGE 17 -- ASAT
PAGE 18 -- DEFINITIONS & INTERPRETING THE ABM TREATY
PAGE 18 -- INTERIM RESTRAINT
PAGE 19 -- CHEMICAL ISSUES
PAGE 21 -- CONVENTIONAL FORCE ARMS CONTROL
PAGE 22 -- NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
PAGE 22 -- BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

ASAT

- Any limitations on anti-satellite (ASAT) systems must be effective, verifiable, and consistent with our national security. So far, we have not been able to identify any such limits on ASAT capability.
- We both understand the underlying reasons for this.
- ASAT systems are difficult to define. A ballistic missile, the GALOSH interceptors surrounding Moscow, or even another satellite, could all be used to damage or destroy satellites.
- In part because of these definitional problems, but also for other reasons, limitations on ASAT systems may present insurmountable verification problems.
- Finally, the Soviet Union is using satellites as gun sights for its forces. Just as reconnaissance planes were not accorded special sanctuary during World War II, the United States does not see the logic in according sanctuary to satellites.

[If the issue of a ASAT testing moratorium arises.]

- The Soviet Union has had an operational ASAT system for years. The United States system is still in the testing stage. Any moratorium on testing would simply perpetuate this inequity.

INTERPRETING THE ABM TREATY & DEFINITIONS

- The treaty is clear and we are respecting it.
- The key terms and definitions of the ABM Treaty are already understood and agreed. Definitions of terms that do not appear in the Treaty are neither necessary nor desirable.
- The United States cannot accept direct or indirect amendment of the ABM Treaty that would narrow the range of activities permitted under the Treaty through new definitions.

[If broad vs. narrow interpretation issue is raised]

- Our view of the legally correct interpretation of development and testing activities permitted under the Treaty, as stated last October, remains unchanged. During the ABM Treaty negotiations in 1971 and 1972, the Soviet side successfully resisted any limitations on the development and testing of ABM systems and components based on "other physical principles."

A MUTUAL PROGRAM OF INTERIM RESTRAINT

- My basic message has been that the two sides need to build a sound new foundation of truly mutual restraint and real arms reductions. We continue to seek constructive Soviet steps as we work to substitute a new framework for one that was not working and that was increasingly obsolete.
- We therefore continue to seek Soviet action in each of the three major areas identified in my June, 1985, and May, 1986, statements on US interim restraint policy: (1) the correction of noncompliance; (2) reversal of the Soviet military buildup; and (3) serious negotiations in Geneva.
- My highest priority remains the achievement of an agreement on significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arms.
- The United States regret that at the special session of the SCC in July, the Soviet representatives rejected my call to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint as we continue to work for agreement on arms reductions.
- We also regret that at the SCC session, the Soviet representatives criticized as unsatisfactory and unfair my stated intention, assuming no significant change in the strategic threat we face, not to deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

[INTERIM RESTRAINT continued]

- We believe this is an important expression of the U.S. desire for restraint. Yet you have made no corresponding suggestion.
- Recognizing that SALT is behind us, we would be prepared in the future to discuss other methods that would foster restraint even as we seek progress in the START negotiations. For example, there may be other ideas that would be consistent with our mutual objectives in START. As our representatives indicated at the special session of the SCC, we would welcome any new ideas you may have.
- I wish to emphasize that a regime of truly mutual restraint can best be facilitated by Soviet compliance with existing arms control agreements, by Soviet reversal of its military buildup, and by progress in the Geneva negotiations. We should also understand that interim restraint cannot substitute for our shared goal of 50 percent reductions and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

CHEMICAL ISSUESChemical Weapons Treaty

- The chemical weapons negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva have shown some movement. That is useful, since, as you know, we view progress toward a comprehensive treaty effectively banning chemical weapons from our globe as a most important objective.
- However, it seems the negotiations in Geneva repeatedly falter over one central verification issue: mandatory challenge inspections.
- I want to be very clear on why this matter of mandatory challenge inspections is so crucial for us. A relatively small stock of illegal chemical weapons or production capability would have extremely serious military implications. That is why the only regime we have been able to devise that would provide effective enough verification to give us reasonable assurance about compliance with a treaty is the mandatory challenge inspection provision we have proposed in Article X.
- If you can devise an alternative that you can demonstrate to be an equally effective safeguard, we would be prepared to discuss it constructively.

[CHEMICAL ISSUES continued]

- You are aware that the United Kingdom has proposed a less comprehensive alternative inspection regime to Article X. I must candidly tell you, however, that the US position remains firm and unchanged -- we have not yet seen an alternative that would provide essential assurances equal to those that would be obtained by our Article X provisions on mandatory challenge inspections.

[FYI Only: The UK has long wanted us to weaken the core of the US position on Article X by abandoning the "no refusal" element of challenge inspections called for under this article. They have come up with an alternative that allows the challenged state the opportunity to offer other ways they think might "satisfy" the challenge, and then refuse the inspection if the challenging state rejects such an alternative. Thus, the British suggestion fundamentally undercuts our insistence on mandatory inspections. We argued long and hard with the British, asking them not to present their alternative in the Conference on Disarmament negotiations in Geneva. This spring, however, the UK decided to go ahead despite our serious objections. We finally agreed that we would not oppose their presentation and would not attack them publicly, but made absolutely clear that we would continue to support our own firm requirement for mandatory inspections.]

- On a separate point, we could accelerate our effort on bilateral arrangements for data exchange, special inspection procedures (including visits), and mechanisms for bilateral consultations.

Chemical Weapons Proliferation

- We seem to have made some progress in our talks on non-proliferation of chemical weapons.
- We must coordinate our efforts to limit the dangerous spread of chemical weapons. We can do this informally.
- You should understand, however, that further progress in this area would be aided by your own actions in preventing the use of chemical weapons by your friends and allies, and by ensuring that they do not get such chemical weapons.

[FYI: We need to exercise some caution on this matter. The Soviets are trying to use this issue to block US deployment of chemical weapons to Europe. They are also trying to reduce allied cooperation on allied chemical weapons or allied chemical weapons production in Europe.]

[CHEMICAL ISSUES continued]

[If he raises US binary chemical weapons]

- We have unilaterally refrained from producing chemical weapons for the last seventeen years, a restraint that you have not matched.
- I would remind you of our overall policy with regard to chemical weapons. Our first priority is to achieve an effective global ban on such weapons. If we can achieve that, the question of binary production becomes moot.
- Binary weapons are not a radically new and more dangerous type of chemical weapon. Quite the contrary, they are safer variations of the same kind of weapon that is in your large chemical inventory.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

- Both East and West have voiced publicly a commitment to undertaking serious efforts to reduce conventional forces over the whole of Europe, if that can be done while strengthening the security of both sides.
- The North Atlantic Council, in its Halifax statement of May 30, stressed the objective of establishing a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of forces at lower levels.
- We have also heard the appeal issued in Budapest at the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact meeting in June.
- The NATO study won't be completed until December. We'll be in a better position to discuss future conventional arms control then.
- In the meantime, we should concentrate on the opportunities at hand.

CDE/CSCE

- We were pleased that the Stockholm conference produced an acceptable agreement.
- However, you surely realize that because of the fundamental differences between an agreement on confidence-building measures and one dealing with more central issues of arms control, the verification principles established in Stockholm cannot serve as a model for other agreements.

[CONVENTIONAL ISSUES continued]

- As a part of the CSCE process, the CDE has accomplished its goals. We now need to turn to progress in the other CSCE areas. I remind you that the CSCE process, requires balanced progress. We are not satisfied with your actions in the human rights basket.

[FYI Only: The Conference on Confidence-and-Security-Building Measures in Europe (CDE), which was formed in 1984 to negotiate confidence-building measures as a means of pursuing the security "basket" part of the Helsinki accords, recently concluded in Stockholm with a formal agreement. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the "parent" body to the CDE, will begin its third Review Conference in Vienna in November. Questions before the CSCE Review Conference will include Human Rights, and how to continue to pursue the security basket now that the CDE mandate has expired. End FYI.]

MBFR

- The U.S. Government refuses to give up hope in MBFR, but we were deeply disappointed by the lack of results over the summer.
- The U.S. won't sacrifice what we consider essential elements of a sound agreement, including effective verification measures, just to reach an artificial "symbolic" accord.
- Soviet authorities must realize by now that we will require effective monitoring and verification, regardless of the forum in which conventional arms control agreements are negotiated.
- The West's December 5, 1985, proposal represented a very serious attempt to address a number of stated Eastern concerns. The West made an historic move at that time and remains disappointed by the lack of a constructive Eastern response to our efforts.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

- Our consultations on this issue were constructive, as usual.
- I understand that our representatives will meet again this fall.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

- The Soviet Union should cease violating the Biological Weapons Convention.

[BIOLOGICAL ISSUES continued]

- These weapons are particularly dangerous -- a fact that was recognized when they were prohibited in the Biological Weapons Convention.
- The Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare capability in violation of this agreement.
- It has used or supplied for use, lethal toxin weapons.
- This conduct is not acceptable.

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 12

SCENE SETTER
(Morning)

REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPARATORY MEETING

Second Day
October 12, 1986

Setting and Goals

The principal objective of your final meeting with Gorbachev will be to sum up agreed elements of the discussion from the first day, approve any "joint instructions" to negotiators which may be appropriate, and to settle on dates for Gorbachev's visit to the United States.

In addition, it is important for you to set out a strong marker with Gorbachev regarding Soviet misuse of United Nations installations for intelligence purposes. This should be done with him in private, in order to stress the importance of the issue and to minimize Gorbachev's temptation to argue the point.

Talking Points

Talking points on most issues must be developed in light of the first day's discussions.

Talking points on Soviet misuse of the UN are attached.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M125/3 #65739
BY RW NARA DATE 4/5/17

TALKING POINTS

SOVIET MISUSE OF UNITED NATIONS
(For Private Session)

- There is one matter which has rarely been discussed between our governments, but which is very important. Since we are pledged to candor, I want you to know how I feel.
 - For decades the Soviet Union has assigned large numbers of intelligence officers to the United Nations.
 - Soviet practice has created problems in past, and has potential for major problems in future.
 - Soviet practice is not consistent with dealing as equals, or dealing on the basis of parity or reciprocity. (There are no international organizations in USSR and, anyway, U.S. does not use them for intelligence operations.)
 - Recent events have shown how Soviet intelligence operations under cover of UN can blow up into major confrontation.
 - In addition to using UN for cover, Soviet Union stations many more people in U.S. than U.S. does in USSR.
-

- This situation and recent events have caused me to draw these conclusions:
 - a. The U.S. can no longer tolerate the Soviet practice of assigning intelligence officers to the UN or its missions attached to the UN.
 - b. Under no circumstances will the U.S. tolerate retaliation against its installations in the Soviet Union or against private American citizens when Soviet intelligence officials attached to international organizations break our laws.
 - c. If such retaliation occurs, I will have to take steps to see that there is real numerical parity in our respective bilateral representation.
- You must see to it that, over the coming months, remaining Soviet intelligence officials are withdrawn from the UN and from your missions accredited to it.
- I have no desire to make this a public issue, but have nothing to lose if it should come to public attention. Would be best for all concerned if you quietly took the necessary steps.
- In final analysis, I will be watching this situation for signs as to whether the Soviet Union is really prepared to deal with the U.S. as an equal, and on the basis of parity and reciprocity.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLRR M125/3 #65762
BY W NARA DATE 4/5/17

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEMES

Themes

- Reykjavik meeting is not a signing ceremony or media event but a pre-summit planning session.
 - o no signed agreements expected or necessary;
 - o objective is to identify areas where progress is possible by accelerating negotiating efforts;
 - o Iceland meeting is to lay groundwork for Gorbachev's visit to the US, not a substitute for it.
- We will not sacrifice US interests in order to have a summit, or, to obtain agreements.
- Focus is to be on broad agenda essential to true peace and a more productive relationship, including human rights, arms reductions, regional issues and bilateral matters.
- US has positive proposals in each of these areas:
 - o Human Rights: to encourage respect for human rights and fulfillment of international commitments;
 - o Achieving Arms Reductions: to reduce , as a priority, offensive nuclear weapons and eventually eliminate them; to move toward a more secure world in which strategic defenses strengthen peace; to reduce the imbalance in conventional weapons and limit the risk of war by accident or miscalculation; and to ban chemical and biological weapons from the face of the earth;
 - o Ending Regional Conflicts: a three-pronged proposal (first made at UN in October '85) to end regional conflicts by negotiated settlements among the parties, withdrawal of foreign military intervention, and international economic and political support. Until Soviet policies change, our efforts to counter them must continue.
 - o Expanding Bilateral Contacts: to broaden and deepen contacts and cooperation between our peoples, especially young people.
- These are the objectives of all the American people;
- Unity at home, as well as allied unity and strength are essential to achievement of our objectives.

USSR

[REDACTED]

Yuriy Vladimirovich DUBININ
(Phonetic: dooBEEenin)

USSR

Ambassador to the United States
(since May 1986)

Before his arrival in Washington, Yuriy Dubinin had no direct experience with US affairs, although he dealt with US officials frequently in Geneva as deputy head of the delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) during 1973-75 and as a representative to the 1980 CSCE review, held in Madrid. A West European specialist, he was Ambassador to Spain from 1978 until his appointment as Permanent Representative to the UN in March 1986. Dubinin was elected to the Central Auditing Commission of the Communist Party (CPSU) at the 27th Party Congress in March 1986—a largely honorary distinction a step below candidate membership in the Central Committee (CC). His selection as Ambassador to the United States probably means that he will be elected a CC member at the next party congress, likely to be held in 1991.1 [REDACTED]



Dubinin has career ties to First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Kovalev, to whom he reported in three consecutive jobs from 1965 until 1986. Kovalev, in turn, is a protege of former Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Soviet Union wanted to understand Spanish views. Under his stewardship, top government leaders on both sides exchanged visits. Dubinin generally avoided political controversy—except when he lodged a futile protest decrying Spain's intention to join NATO. He enjoyed good relations with the Spanish Communist Party, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(cont.)
LDA M 86-11485

Career

Dubinina holds a candidate's degree in history from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, and he apparently was active in Komsomol (youth) and party activities there. Entering the foreign service in 1955, he worked first on France, serving twice in Paris: during 1955-60 he was a foreign service trainee and then a translator for UNESCO; and during 1963-68 he was a first secretary and then a counselor of embassy. Between these tours he served on the French desk at Foreign Ministry headquarters.

In 1968 Dubinin became deputy chief of the First European Department, which has responsibility for France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, and the Benelux countries. Three years later he was appointed department chief, succeeding Kovalev, and from 1972 until his departure for Spain he was a member of the Ministry's collegium (governing board). As department chief he headed the Foreign Ministry group responsible for negotiating the reestablishment of relations with Spain in 1977.

During his CSCE service in Geneva, Dubinin was responsible for Basket Three issues (cooperation in humanitarian matters).

Personal Data

Dubinina, who will be 56 on 7 October, likes fine food and drink. He speaks Spanish and French. He can converse comfortably in English but occasionally needs an interpreter.

Dubinina and his wife, Lyana Zevinovna,

The couple has three children. A daughter, Nataliya, is believed to be married to Aleksandr Yakovenko, an attache at the Soviet Mission to the UN in New York.

Most ambassadors to countries politically significant to the USSR—such as West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, India, and the USSR's client states—are full or candidate members of the CC. However, not all of them had CC status at the time of their appointments. For example, Anatoliy Dobrynin was named Ambassador to the United States in 1961 but was not elected to the CC (as a candidate member) until the next party congress, in 1966. The current Ambassador to Italy, Nikolay Lun'kov, was appointed in 1980 but was not elected to the CC until the 1981 congress.

25 August 1986

[REDACTED]

Eduard Amyrosiyevich SHEVARDNADZE
(Phonetic: shehvardNAHDzeh)

USSR

*Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Member, Politburo, Central
Committee, Communist Party
of the Soviet Union
(since July 1985)*



Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze executes Soviet foreign policy but does not formulate it. Policy formulation is the province of the ruling CPSU Politburo. We believe Shevardnadze's appointment gives CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev greater freedom to impart a more subtle and persuasive tone to diplomacy than was the case under the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Andrey Gromyko, who had been Foreign Minister for almost three decades. Shevardnadze was also probably chosen to preside over a reorganization and housecleaning of the Foreign Ministry. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Shevardnadze rose to national political prominence as leader of the Georgian party organization during the reign of Leonid Brezhnev, and after Brezhnev's death he was in the forefront of those praising Brezhnev's ally Konstantin Chernenko. At the same time, his policies and activities as Georgian party leader probably commended him to Gorbachev and accounted for his promotion in July 1985 to full membership in the Politburo. In Georgia Shevardnadze fostered economic and social innovations that matched the spirit of what Gorbachev had been advocating, and his forceful campaign against corruption in the republic probably boosted his stock even further in Gorbachev's eyes. Since becoming General Secretary, he has publicly praised Shevardnadze's accomplishments.

[REDACTED]

(cont.)

LDA M 86-11490

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(b)(1)
6.2(e)

BY ALU NARA DATE 12/29/10
ALRR 108-12513 #65747

[REDACTED]

As first secretary of the Georgian party organization during 1972 - July 1985, Shevardnadze made no public effort to build any international affairs reputation and had little exposure to the West. He periodically played host to diplomats and government officials from Eastern Europe and Soviet Third World client states. He received Senator Edward Kennedy in Georgia in 1974. In his speech accepting nomination to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet (to which all Politburo members belong) in February 1985, he ignored foreign policy issues entirely save for a few boilerplate sentences that are stock themes in Gorbachev's public remarks. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Career and Personal Data

Shevardnadze holds degrees from the Higher Party School of the Georgian Central Committee and from a pedagogical institute. He became first secretary of the republic's Komsomol in 1957. The following year he became a full member of the Central Committee in Georgia. In 1961 he was elected to the bureau of the All-Union Komsomol. [REDACTED] he was then relegated to low-level party posts in Georgia. In 1964, however, he was appointed first deputy minister of what is now the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, and from 1965 until 1972 he was minister. His return to prominence may have resulted from his Komsomol association with then Politburo member Aleksandr Shelepin. As minister, Shevardnadze worked to expose corruption among Georgian party officials. His campaign eventually led to the political demise of the republic party chief. His promotion to the CPSU Politburo as a candidate member in 1978 appeared to have been a vote of confidence in his handling of persistent religious and nationalist issues in Georgia.

[REDACTED]

Shevardnadze is married. His wife, Nanuli, has been studying English on her own. The couple has two children. Their son, Pata, is a physicist who has studied in London. As of 1974, their daughter, Monana, was married and had a daughter. [REDACTED]

29 August 1986

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2-13 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

ICELAND

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 14-17 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.