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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name THOMAS, W. DENNIS (CHIEF OF STAFF): FILES

Withdrawer

KDB 9/7/2010

File Folder [REYKJAVIK] ICELAND (1)

FOIA

F97-066/17

Box Number 10

COHEN, D

9

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
97350	NOTES	RE RETURN FROM ICELAND (HANDWRITTEN ON BACK OF COPY OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLE)	1	10/12/1986	B1
97351	NOTES	RE RETURN FROM ICELAND (CONTINUATION OF DOC #97350 - HANDWRITTEN ON BACK OF COPY OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLE)	1	10/12/1986	B1

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* Adelman
 * Carle (Ref.) *
 * Koppelman
 * Conway

} also part of del system

* Refuse
 * Asking for Cothran
 * Lisle
 * Conway
 * Four others

} N.S.C. Co said to Ref.
 Carle only

U.S.I.A.

Wick asking for 29 spots

Mem. note

Report to Watson

- Outline has been prepared
- 12-13 minutes
- Oral office

Tues.

- Bi-Partisan Moderating (optional)
- Columnists / Anchor Briefing RR / et al

Format of meeting - Participants

- N.S.C. in line to work smaller rather than larger participation
 - * one on one and / or one "plus" or "plus squared"
 - * "Plus" meaning RR / Shultz and Garbohn / Sherman
 - * Beyond that dependent upon Soviets
 - * ~~Use~~ Utilize planning types for early group sessions to single event / or work out language

Anchor Briefing

Ken Adelman

Ed Rowley

added to list of anchor briefing / per AE

— 9:45 Sat. A.M.

N.S.C. recommending limit this meeting to RR / G.S. / TR / J.P. + Ridgeway & Matlock on study

N.S.C. Personnel to attend

- | | |
|----------------|----------------------------------|
| * John P. | * Peter Aden |
| * Paul T. | * Ty Goo |
| * Florence | * Ann Davis (will also be there) |
| * John Matlock | * Secretary |
| * Bob Lickert | * Secretary |

State (total of 119 in delegation requested)

- | | |
|-----------|------------|
| * Shultz | * Ridgeway |
| * Nitze | * Cairns |
| * Feltman | * Semmes |

Iceland Wally Group Meetings

Thurs. - Departure - 9:20^{A.M.} Revels

Statement 9:30^{A.M.} check up - S. down

- E.O.B. / W.H. Jones Coeders

John C. / Bill to coord. with Johnathan / Kinger - Cabinet

- need N.S.C. statement - 5 min / 3 pages

Fri - 4:30 P.M.

Visit - Pres. Iceland Resid. / no remarks required

Photo of / walk out to see views / church

weather permitting

- Press Background /

"General precedent" - 2-3 experts on issues

perhaps John Pinderster ?? / Shultz

"B" team

Sat.

- Arr. / opening of meeting - coverage

- Blackout begins* / Eve. Wally Dinner optional

Sun. -

1:00 - Open Ceremony - conclusion of First Session / Handshake

- 1st. Statement / optional / Herald for site - Route

- Air Base Signature Ceremony / 5 miles of Service men
(Boys / Shultz to do Sun tell show / Shultz
to brief press)

5:30-7:30 - Arr. Mrs. Andrews /

optional welcome by U.P. / Cabinet

need decision keep U.P. or stand by

* Long requesting a meeting with all appropriate
people in Iceland - spelling out rules - D.T.P. /
J.P. giving word to everyone on trip.

O.K. to schedule Fri Y. _____

N. _____

Tues.

* Congress. Breakfast - / Ireland / C. R.
8:30 - Bi-Cont.

* 3:15 - Orlor - Oval Office / private

3:30 - Human Rights Leaders / 20

Cabinet Rm.

Walks in with Orlor - seated /
1 min opening comment covered by press

3:45 Sen. Hacht - petition to release Jewish prisoners
Oval / closed

and N.G.A. - Dinner / Coverage - open
no news

Wed.

A.M. - N.C. - inserts on:

Joy - T. Amos
Natl. Unity / Ireland

Sat.

Radio Address - cancelled

Mon - Report to Water

Tues / 14th -

1:00 - National Anchor / at post Summit briefing

11:00 - Congress. Briefing / Post Summit

Wed - Chevy / Balto.

Thurs. - ~~Black~~ Ministers meeting

Fri. - North Dakota /

Sat. - Absentee Ballot / Public Service / release pic.

① Next weeks Schedule / pre departure

A. - Jewish Groups / others - Cabinet Room / R. Human Rights
* Abram / + Poles / Lils. / Ukrainians

Schedule
Tues P.M.

* Do a meeting with Abram / D.T.R. / S.P.
with drop by with R.D.

Tues. P.M.

Octave - N.S.C. / Pat

Order meeting - 15 min / send them with Abram

Mon -

Alghunther / Ayala - ?? - Reginal

- Be Stenud - use Vladimir Hromaty event

B. Briefing Schedule

② Tues. - N.S.P.G. Meet

2:00 / Ann Central Briefing

① Mon - Lunch /

General Discussion - Issues / Agenda for meeting

③ Thu - brief on plans

④ Fri - Working Lunch

C. Congressional

Tues. - D.T.R. suggests a liaison leadership

11:30

A.M.

meeting / say why give Iceland -
or appeal press C.R. without restrictions

Bled Havel 4:05

* Spoke with Mrs R.

* very good conversation

* discussed time plans

* she is not, Bled tomorrow if possible

Pre-departure Schedule

Monday

Drop In

* Regional Meeting - Afghanistan / Angola ??

* Briefing Lunch Meeting

~~NSC~~ General Discussion Issues / Agenda

Tues

* A.M. - 11:30? - Bi Partisan Leadership Meeting

* 2:00 . NSPG - Annex Control

* P.M. - color - if possible / over 15 min

* P.M. - color and Group of Abrahams / et al

Wed.

Campaign Day

Thurs.

Departure - just depart for

Arrival - rooms for I.V. camp
lunch if color - Bill

Sat.

Given Sat. broadcast / canal radio address

Hurled - 1:55 P.M. / Oct 3

- 1 hr 20 min meeting just concluded with Soviet
→ no surprises /

- in conclusive meeting

- Confirmed acceptance of press blackout

- ^{they} ~~with~~ out in structure from Moscow

- Soviets ^{are} explaining a 2nd ship housing

→ Line not ft. satisfactory¹ for Gorbachev

→ this could well signal neutral site is where
we will end up for meeting

→ by agreement line recommended neutral site
to Moscow - Hopli

- Iceland Dinner - pressure is diminishing

Soviet / Icelandic - both want max. flexibility

- Icelandic were pressing for ass. on press

Exp. / ft. appearance on Sov. -

Soviet / U.S. - both said leave open
+ decide later

- State keeps sending in people - "out of the
wood work" / ~~but~~ violent spirit that

Hurled / W.H. is closing house for arrangements
with total pressure

- But's line agreed to allow us to use

their facility / so senior people accommodated

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97350 NOTES

1 10/12/1986 B1

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PRESERVATION COPY

In Congress, Arms Input Stops Short of Iceland

By STEVEN V. ROBERTS

FRIDAY afternoon, Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill Jr. reached President Reagan in Iceland as he was preparing for his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev. His message was that after weeks of wrangling, House and Senate negotiators had agreed on arms control provisions that were blocking Congressional adjournment.

A few minutes later, in a statement to the press, the Speaker conceded that the agreement "falls short" of a 50-50 compromise between Congressional Democrats and the White House. "There is a reason for that," Mr. O'Neill said. "We in the Congress can legislate arms control up to a point. We can use public statements in support of arms control, up to a point. But we cannot sit at the bargaining table in Iceland."

Mr. O'Neill's statement went to the center of crucial questions raised by the often acrimonious dispute between Mr. Reagan and the Democrats that has dominated the last weeks of the Congressional session. How does Congress go about exerting influence over arms control policy? And how far should it go in exerting that influence?

The agreement capped a running battle that saw Mr. Reagan, on a campaign swing through Atlanta, accuse the Democrats of giving aid and comfort to Soviet negotiators. Mr. O'Neill, back in Washington, accused the President of "playing hardball" and not understanding the Congressional role mandated by the Constitution.

Most lawmakers agree that they have a special obligation to support the President on an issue such as arms control, when he is representing the entire country in negotiations with its principal adversary. At the same time, there is a widespread belief on Capitol Hill that arms control is simply too important for Congress to abandon.

Most legislators share Mr. O'Neill's view of the constitutional obligations of the power of the purse. And, as Representative Thomas S. Foley of Washington, the Democratic whip, put it: "Arms control has an intensity of interest with people; it's an issue of principle with a capital P." Many Democrats feel strongly that they must keep the pressure on the President to negotiate with Moscow, and see the Iceland meeting in part as a victory for their pressure tactics.

Arms control has been at the center of disputes over the MX missile and other strategic weapons programs for years. But it emerged in clearer focus this year, when the House attached five significant arms control measures to bills on military spending in the fiscal year that began Oct. 1.

The measures are now part of the omnibus spending bill, or continuing resolution, that has effectively become the Federal budget for 1987. The Friday agreement broke the logjam, opening the way for Congress to adjourn. In the compromise, most of the original arms controls provi-

sions were dropped, though the Democrats won a ban on the testing of antisatellite weapons and White House agreement to send two long-dormant nuclear testing treaties to the Senate for ratification.

The pressure from lawmakers to leave town to begin campaigning was only one reason why Democratic leaders accepted a lopsided compromise. They were also worried that the President would come home and blame them for any difficulties he encountered in Iceland.

In part, the fact that the Democrats battled for so long against such a ferocious White House campaign reflects the persistence and depth of feeling among an important segment of their constituency. It is instructive that when Common Cause, the large public affairs lobby, was searching for a new issue a few years ago, it seized on arms control as a subject that would keep its members active and involved.

Some lawmakers have also made the issue a major priority. When Gary Hart of Colorado, a candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination, made his farewell speech to the Senate last week, he listed a roster of his heroes, from the late Senator Jacob K. Javits to Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey. "They all were deeply committed to nuclear arms control," he said. "And I suspect, if all could be summoned back for a great debate, most — if not all — would list this central issue, this supreme challenge, as the great unfinished business of our time."

Mr. Foley, the Democrats' chief negotiator with the President's supporters in the Senate on the arms issue, said this depth of feeling causes difficulty within Democratic ranks. "We've got guys who want to charge the guns barehanded," he said. "And we've got to say, hold on, we don't have the troops to do that."

The issue also generates strong feelings among Republicans. The day before Senator Hart spoke, Representative Jack F. Kemp of upstate New York, a Republican Presidential aspirant, spoke in harsh terms about Iceland. "I am concerned," he said, "that what is called progress be progress toward a stable peace, and not toward an illusory détente that becomes a springboard for Soviet superiority and expansionism."

Arms control advocates say they have now cleared the way for President Reagan to "get his shot" at an agreement in Iceland, and at any subsequent summit. "If they don't do anything," warned Fred Wertheimer, the president of Common Cause, "these issues are going to be back in Congress in early 1987."

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PRESIDENT REAGAN

Reagan's Agenda — Beyond Arms

PRESIDENT Reagan flew to Iceland last week for two days of talks with Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader. Both sides said that advancing the discussion on controlling nuclear weapons was their main objective.

But Mr. Reagan made clear that progress on human rights in the Soviet Union, notably by increasing the numbers of Jews permitted to emigrate, was also a priority. Mr. Reagan also said he planned to bring up the Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan and other regional issues including, Administration officials said, the Middle East, southern Africa and central America.

As the result of a deal with Democrats in Congress, the President decided to send two previously concluded treaties limiting nuclear testing to the Senate for ratification, subject to Moscow's agreement on verification. He also took a partial step toward a complete ban on testing, agreeing to negotiate a ban in tandem with cuts in nuclear arsenals. (*Compromise in Congress, page 4.*)

A satisfactory meeting, Administration officials said, could pave the way for Mr. Gorbachev to visit Washington early in 1987. Secretary of State George P. Shultz said agreement on reducing medium-range nuclear missiles would hinge on resolving such issues as how to limit these Soviet missiles in Asia as well as Europe, verification procedures, how long the accord would last, and agreement on further negotiations to remove shorter-range nuclear weapons from Europe. "Top attention needs to be paid to radical reductions of strategic nuclear arms," Mr. Shultz added. If many of these weapons could be eliminated, he said, the problem of defending against them would change "drastically."

Before leaving Washington, Mr. Reagan met with Yuri F. Orlov, the Soviet dissident who had been freed in the deal that also freed Gennadi F. Zakharov, a Russian employee of the United Nations accused of spying in New York, and Nicholas S. Daniloff, the American correspondent.

1
~~The~~ Good evening. I'm sure most if not all of you know I'm just back from Iceland where at the invitation of General Sec. ^{GORBACHEV} of the Soviet Union, I met with him to discuss the grave problems facing our two countries. I'm reporting to you ^{on} the outcome of those meetings because in a very real sense you are full participants in such meetings. They have to do with the kind of world we'll all live in, whether we'll continue to be free and at peace.

Before I report on our talks though allow me to set the stage by explaining two things that were very much a part of our talks, one a treaty and the other a defense against nuclear missiles which we are trying to develop. You've heard their titles a thousand times. - The ABM Treaty & S.D.I. Those letters stand for ^(ANTI BALLISTIC MISSILE &) Strategic Defense Initiative.

Some years ago the U.S. & the Soviet Union agreed to limit any defense against ~~the~~ nuclear missile attacks to the emplacement in one location ~~of~~ in each country of a small number of ~~missiles~~ anti-aircraft type missiles capable of intercepting & shooting down incoming nuclear missiles. Thus leaving our real defense a policy called Mutual Assured Destruction, meaning if one side launched a nuclear attack the other side could retaliate. This mutual threat of destruction was believed to be a deterrent against either side striking first.

So here we sit with thousands of nuclear war heads targeted on each other & capable of wiping out both our countries. The Soviets deployed the ^{FEW NON NUCLEAR} anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow as the treaty permitted. Our country didn't bother deploying ~~any~~ because the threat of nation wide annihilation made such limited defense seem useless.

(? spelling) For some years now we have been aware that the Soviets have been researching a nation wide defense. They have installed a great Radar system at Krasnoyarsk which we believe is designed to provide radar guidance ^{NON NUCLEAR} for anti ballistic missiles protecting the entire nation. This is a violation of the A.B.M. treaty.

Believing that a policy of mutual destruction & ^{who unkindly} slaughter of their citizens & ours I asked our military a few years ^{ago} to study and see if there was a practical way to destroy nuclear missiles as they left their silos rather than ^{TO JUST DESTROY} ~~destroy~~ people. This is what we call S.D.I. and our scientists researching such a system are convinced it is practical and that several years down the road we can have such a system ready to deploy. Incidentally we are not violating the ABM treaty which permits such research. If & when we deploy the treaty also allows withdrawal from the treaty upon 6 mo. notice. S.D.I. Let me make it clear is not a nuclear weapon.

So here we are at Iceland for our second such meeting. In the first and in the months in between we have discussed ways to reduce and in fact eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. We & the Soviets

have had teams of negotiators in Geneva trying to work out a mutual agreement on how we could reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. So far no success.

On Sat. & Sunday Gen. Sec. Gorbaechov & his foreign minister Sheernadze & ~~the~~ Sec. of State George Shultz & I met for more than 10 hours. We didn't limit ourselves to just arms reduction. We discussed what we call violation of human rights on the part of the Soviets, refusal to let people emigrate from Russia so they can practice their religion without being persecuted, letting people go to rejoin their families, ~~husbands~~ ^{BY NATIONAL BORDERS} & wives separated ~~should~~ be allowed to reunite.

In much of this the Soviet U. is violating another treaty - the Helsinki pact they had signed in 1975. Yuri Orlov whose freedom we just obtained was imprisoned for pointing out to his govt. it's violation of the pact, it's refusal to let citizens leave their country or return.

We also discussed regional matters such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua & Cambodia.

But by their choice the main subject was arms control. We discussed the replacement of intermediate range missiles in Europe & Asia and seemed to be in agreement they could be reduced & possibly eliminated.

Both sides seemed willing to find a way to reduce even to zero the strategic missiles we have aimed at each other. This then brought up the subject of S. D. I. and ^{WHETHER} ~~that~~ deployment of such a system would violate A.B.M. I offered a proposal that we continue our present research and if & when we

reached the stage of testing we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet observation of such tests & if the program was practical we would both eliminate our offensive missiles & ^{THEN} we would make available the S.D.I. system to the Soviets & others.

I explained that even though we would have come away with our offensive weapons, having the defense would protect against cheating or the possibility of a madman sometime deciding to create nuclear missiles. After all the world ^{now} knows how to make them. ~~now~~. I likened it to our keeping our gas masks even though the nations of the world had outlawed poison gas after W.W.I.

We seemed to be making progress on reducing weaponry although the ~~the~~ Sov. Sec. was registering opposition to S.D.I. and proposing ^{a pledge} ~~an agreement~~ to observe ABM. for a number of years as the day was ending.

Sec. Schultz suggested we turn over the notes our note takers had been making of everything we'd said to our respective teams and let them work through the night to put them together & find just where we were in agreement & what differences separated us. With respect & gratitude I can inform you they worked until 2 AM.

Yesterday (Sun. morning) our four came together again and took up the report of our two teams. It was most promising. They proposed a 10 year period in which we began ^{with} the reduction of all nuclear explosive devices, bombs, cruise missiles

intermediate range, short range & strategic missiles. They would be reduced 50% in the next 5 years & totally eliminated in the next 5. During that time we would proceed with research, development & testing of S.D.I. ~~At the 10 year point we would~~ all done in conformity with A.B.M. provisions.

At the 10 yr. point we would invoke the same permitting 6 months notice, at which time we would proceed to deploy at the same time permitting the Soviets to do likewise.

Here the ~~the~~ debate began. The Hon. Sec. wanted wording that in effect would have kept us from developing the S.D.I. for the ^{ENTIRE} 10 yrs. In effect he was killing S.D.I. and unless I agreed all that work toward eliminating nuclear weapons went down the drain - cancelled.

I told him I had pledged to the American people that I would not trade away S.D.I. - there was no way I could tell our people their govt. would not protect them against nuclear destruction.

I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except 2 things, our freedom & our future.

I am still optimistic that a way will be found. The door is open and the opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat is within reach.

(Reagan)

ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON ICELAND

Good evening. I'm sure most, if not all, of you know I'm just back from Iceland where at the invitation of General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, I met with him to discuss the grave problems facing our two countries. I'm reporting to you on the outcome of those meetings because in a very real sense you are full participants in such meetings. They have to do with the kind of world we'll all live in, whether we'll continue to be free and at peace.

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I am still optimistic that a way will be found. The door is open and the opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat is within reach.

OCTOBER 13, 1986

PRESIDENT'S BACKUP COPY

ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ON ICELAND MEETING

GOOD EVENING. AS MOST OF YOU KNOW, I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM MEETINGS IN ICELAND WITH THE LEADER OF THE SOVIET UNION, GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. AS I DID LAST YEAR WHEN I RETURNED FROM THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN GENEVA, I WANT TO TAKE A FEW MOMENTS TONIGHT TO SHARE WITH YOU WHAT TOOK PLACE IN THESE DISCUSSIONS.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THESE TALKS ARE ENORMOUS AND ONLY JUST BEGINNING TO BE UNDERSTOOD. WE PROPOSED THE MOST SWEEPING AND GENEROUS ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL IN HISTORY. WE OFFERED THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES -- SOVIET AND AMERICAN -- FROM THE FACE OF THE EARTH BY 1996. WHILE WE PARTED COMPANY WITH THIS AMERICAN OFFER STILL ON THE TABLE, WE ARE CLOSER THAN EVER BEFORE TO AGREEMENTS THAT COULD LEAD TO A SAFER WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

BUT FIRST, LET ME TELL YOU THAT, FROM THE START OF MY MEETINGS WITH MR. GORBACHEV, I HAVE ALWAYS REGARDED YOU, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AS FULL PARTICIPANTS. BELIEVE ME, WITHOUT YOUR SUPPORT, NONE OF THESE TALKS COULD HAVE BEEN HELD, NOR COULD THE ULTIMATE AIMS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY -- WORLD PEACE AND FREEDOM -- BE PURSUED. AND IT IS FOR THESE AIMS I WENT THE EXTRA MILE TO ICELAND.

BEFORE I REPORT ON OUR TALKS THOUGH, ALLOW ME TO SET THE STAGE BY EXPLAINING TWO THINGS THAT WERE VERY MUCH A PART OF OUR TALKS, ONE A TREATY AND THE OTHER A DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR MISSILES WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO DEVELOP. YOU'VE HEARD THEIR TITLES A THOUSAND TIMES -- THE A.B.M. TREATY AND S.D.I. THOSE LETTERS STAND FOR ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE AND STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE.

SOME YEARS AGO, THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION AGREED TO LIMIT ANY DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR MISSILE ATTACKS TO THE EMPLACEMENT IN ONE LOCATION IN EACH COUNTRY OF A SMALL NUMBER OF MISSILES CAPABLE OF INTERCEPTING AND SHOOTING DOWN INCOMING NUCLEAR MISSILES. THUS LEAVING OUR REAL DEFENSE A POLICY CALLED MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION, MEANING IF ONE SIDE LAUNCHED A NUCLEAR ATTACK, THE OTHER SIDE COULD RETALIATE. THIS MUTUAL THREAT OF DESTRUCTION WAS BELIEVED TO BE A DETERRENT AGAINST EITHER SIDE STRIKING FIRST.

SO HERE WE SIT WITH THOUSANDS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS TARGETED ON EACH OTHER AND CAPABLE OF WIPING OUT BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. THE SOVIETS DEPLOYED THE FEW ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES AROUND MOSCOW AS THE TREATY PERMITTED. OUR COUNTRY DIDN'T BOTHER DEPLOYING BECAUSE THE THREAT OF NATIONWIDE ANNIHILATION MADE SUCH LIMITED DEFENSE SEEM USELESS.

ON SATURDAY AND SUNDAY, GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AND SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ AND I MET FOR NEARLY 10 HOURS. WE DIDN'T LIMIT OURSELVES TO JUST ARMS REDUCTIONS. WE DISCUSSED WHAT WE CALL VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS, REFUSAL TO LET PEOPLE EMIGRATE FROM RUSSIA SO THEY CAN PRACTICE THEIR RELIGION WITHOUT BEING PERSECUTED, LETTING PEOPLE GO TO REJOIN THEIR FAMILIES, HUSBANDS AND WIVES SEPARATED BY NATIONAL BORDERS BEING ALLOWED TO REUNITE. IN MUCH OF THIS THE SOVIET UNION IS VIOLATING ANOTHER AGREEMENT -- THE HELSINKI ACCORDS THEY HAD SIGNED IN 1975. YURI ORLOV, WHOSE FREEDOM WE JUST OBTAINED, WAS IMPRISONED FOR POINTING OUT TO HIS GOVERNMENT ITS VIOLATIONS OF THE PACT, ITS REFUSAL TO LET CITIZENS LEAVE THEIR COUNTRY OR RETURN.

WE ALSO DISCUSSED REGIONAL MATTERS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, ANGOLA, NICARAGUA, AND CAMBODIA.

BUT BY THEIR CHOICE THE MAIN SUBJECT WAS ARMS CONTROL. WE DISCUSSED THE EMPLACEMENT OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE AND ASIA AND SEEMED TO BE IN AGREEMENT THEY COULD BE DRASTICALLY REDUCED. BOTH SIDES SEEMED WILLING TO FIND A WAY TO REDUCE EVEN TO ZERO THE STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES WE HAVE AIMED AT EACH OTHER.

THIS THEN BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT OF S.D.I. I OFFERED A PROPOSAL THAT WE CONTINUE OUR PRESENT RESEARCH AND IF AND WHEN WE REACHED THE STAGE OF FINAL TESTING WE WOULD SIGN NOW A TREATY THAT WOULD PERMIT SOVIET OBSERVATION OF SUCH TESTS. AND IF THE PROGRAM WAS PRACTICAL WE WOULD BOTH ELIMINATE OUR OFFENSIVE MISSILES AND THEN WE WOULD SHARE THE BENEFITS OF ADVANCED DEFENSES. I EXPLAINED THAT EVEN THOUGH WE WOULD HAVE DONE AWAY WITH OUR OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES, HAVING THE DEFENSE WOULD PROTECT AGAINST CHEATING OR THE POSSIBILITY OF A MADMAN SOMETIME DECIDING TO CREATE NUCLEAR MISSILES. AFTER ALL, THE WORLD NOW KNOWS HOW TO MAKE THEM. I LIKENED IT TO OUR KEEPING OUR GAS MASKS EVEN THOUGH THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD HAD OUTLAWED POISON GAS AFTER WORLD WAR I.

WE SEEMED TO BE MAKING PROGRESS ON REDUCING WEAPONRY ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL SECRETARY WAS REGISTERING OPPOSITION TO S.D.I. AND PROPOSING A PLEDGE TO OBSERVE A.B.M. FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS AS THE DAY WAS ENDING.

SECRETARY SHULTZ SUGGESTED WE TURN OVER THE NOTES OUR NOTE-TAKERS HAD BEEN MAKING OF EVERYTHING WE'D SAID TO OUR RESPECTIVE TEAMS AND LET THEM WORK THROUGH THE NIGHT TO PUT THEM TOGETHER AND FIND JUST WHERE WE WERE IN AGREEMENT AND WHAT DIFFERENCES SEPARATED US. WITH RESPECT AND GRATITUDE, I CAN INFORM YOU THEY WORKED THROUGH THE NIGHT TILL 6:30 A.M..

YESTERDAY, SUNDAY MORNING, MR. GORBACHEV AND I, WITH OUR FOREIGN MINISTERS, CAME TOGETHER AGAIN AND TOOK UP THE REPORT OF OUR TWO TEAMS. IT WAS MOST PROMISING. THE SOVIETS HAD ASKED FOR A 10-YEAR DELAY IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF S.D.I. PROGRAMS. IN AN EFFORT TO SEE HOW WE COULD SATISFY THEIR CONCERNS WHILE PROTECTING OUR PRINCIPLES AND SECURITY, WE PROPOSED A 10-YEAR PERIOD IN WHICH WE BEGAN WITH THE REDUCTION OF ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS, BOMBERS, AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES, SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES AND THE WEAPONS THEY CARRY. THEY WOULD BE REDUCED 50 PERCENT IN THE FIRST 5 YEARS. DURING THE NEXT 5 YEARS, WE WOULD CONTINUE BY ELIMINATING ALL REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES, OF ALL RANGES. DURING THAT TIME WE WOULD PROCEED WITH RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF S.D.I. ALL DONE IN CONFORMITY WITH A.B.M. PROVISIONS. AT THE 10-YEAR POINT, WITH ALL BALLISTIC MISSILES ELIMINATED, WE COULD PROCEED TO DEPLOY ADVANCED DEFENSES, AT THE SAME TIME PERMITTING THE SOVIETS TO DO LIKEWISE.

HERE THE DEBATE BEGAN. THE GENERAL SECRETARY WANTED WORDING THAT IN EFFECT WOULD HAVE KEPT US FROM DEVELOPING THE S.D.I. FOR THE ENTIRE 10 YEARS. IN EFFECT, HE WAS KILLING S.D.I. AND UNLESS I AGREED, ALL THAT WORK TOWARD ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD GO DOWN THE DRAIN -- CANCELLED.

I TOLD HIM I HAD PLEDGED TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT I WOULD NOT TRADE AWAY S.D.I. -- THERE WAS NO WAY I COULD TELL OUR PEOPLE THEIR GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT PROTECT THEM AGAINST NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION. I WENT TO REYKJAVIK DETERMINED THAT EVERYTHING WAS NEGOTIABLE EXCEPT TWO THINGS, OUR FREEDOM AND OUR FUTURE.

I AM STILL OPTIMISTIC THAT A WAY WILL BE FOUND. THE DOOR IS OPEN AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN ELIMINATING THE NUCLEAR THREAT IS WITHIN REACH.

SO YOU CAN SEE, WE MADE PROGRESS IN ICELAND. AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE PROGRESS IF WE PURSUE A PRUDENT, DELIBERATE, AND, ABOVE ALL, REALISTIC APPROACH WITH THE SOVIETS. FROM THE EARLIEST DAYS OF OUR ADMINISTRATION, THIS HAS BEEN OUR POLICY. WE MADE IT CLEAR WE HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIETS OR THEIR ULTIMATE INTENTIONS. WE WERE PUBLICLY CANDID ABOUT THE CRITICAL MORAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN TOTALITARIANISM AND DEMOCRACY. WE DECLARED THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY TO BE NOT JUST THE PREVENTION OF WAR BUT THE EXTENSION OF FREEDOM. AND, WE STRESSED OUR COMMITMENT TO THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AROUND THE WORLD. THAT IS WHY WE ASSISTED FREEDOM FIGHTERS WHO ARE RESISTING THE IMPOSITION OF TOTALITARIAN RULE IN AFGHANISTAN, NICARAGUA, ANGOLA, CAMBODIA, AND ELSEWHERE. AND, FINALLY, WE BEGAN WORK ON WHAT I BELIEVE MOST SPURRED THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY -- REBUILDING OUR MILITARY STRENGTH, RECONSTRUCTING OUR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE, AND, ABOVE ALL, BEGINNING WORK ON THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE.

AND YET AT THE SAME TIME WE SET OUT THESE FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND BEGAN WORKING TOWARD THEM, WE PURSUED ANOTHER OF OUR MAJOR OBJECTIVES: THAT OF SEEKING MEANS TO LESSEN TENSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, AND WAYS TO PREVENT WAR AND KEEP THE PEACE.

THIS POLICY IS NOW PAYING DIVIDENDS -- ONE SIGN OF THIS IN ICELAND WAS THE PROGRESS ON THE ISSUE OF ARMS CONTROL. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A LONG WHILE, SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE AREA OF ARMS REDUCTIONS ARE MOVING, AND MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: NOT JUST TOWARD ARMS CONTROL, BUT TOWARD ARMS REDUCTION.

BUT FOR ALL THE PROGRESS WE MADE ON ARMS REDUCTIONS, WE MUST REMEMBER THERE WERE OTHER ISSUES ON THE TABLE IN ICELAND, ISSUES THAT ARE FUNDAMENTAL.

AS I MENTIONED, ONE SUCH ISSUE IS HUMAN RIGHTS. AS PRESIDENT KENNEDY ONCE SAID, "AND, IS NOT PEACE, IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, BASICALLY A MATTER OF HUMAN RIGHTS...?"

I MADE IT PLAIN THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT SEEK TO EXPLOIT IMPROVEMENT IN THESE MATTERS FOR PURPOSES OF PROPAGANDA, BUT I ALSO MADE IT PLAIN, ONCE AGAIN, THAT AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE HUMAN CONDITION WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION IS INDISPENSABLE FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. FOR A GOVERNMENT THAT WILL BREAK FAITH WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE CANNOT BE TRUSTED TO KEEP FAITH WITH FOREIGN POWERS. SO, I TOLD MR. GORBACHEV -- AGAIN IN REYKJAVIK AS I HAD IN GENEVA -- WE AMERICANS PLACE FAR LESS WEIGHT UPON THE WORDS THAT ARE SPOKEN AT MEETINGS SUCH AS THESE, THAN UPON THE DEEDS THAT FOLLOW. WHEN IT COMES TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDGING SOVIET INTENTIONS, WE ARE ALL FROM MISSOURI: YOU HAVE GOT TO SHOW US.

ANOTHER SUBJECT AREA WE TOOK UP IN ICELAND ALSO LIES AT THE HEART OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND AMERICA. THIS IS THE ISSUE OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS. SUMMIT MEETINGS CANNOT MAKE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FORGET WHAT SOVIET ACTIONS HAVE MEANT FOR THE PEOPLES OF AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, AFRICA, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. UNTIL SOVIET POLICIES CHANGE, WE WILL MAKE SURE THAT OUR FRIENDS IN THESE AREAS -- THOSE WHO FIGHT FOR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE -- WILL HAVE THE SUPPORT THEY NEED.

FINALLY, THERE WAS A FOURTH ITEM. THIS AREA WAS THAT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS. IN GENEVA LAST YEAR, WE WELCOMED SEVERAL CULTURAL EXCHANGE ACCORDS; IN ICELAND, WE SAW INDICATIONS OF MORE MOVEMENT IN THESE AREAS. BUT LET ME SAY NOW THE UNITED STATES REMAINS COMMITTED TO PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE PROGRAMS THAT COULD LEAD TO EXCHANGES BETWEEN NOT JUST A FEW ELITE BUT THOUSANDS OF EVERYDAY CITIZENS FROM BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.

SO I THINK THEN YOU CAN SEE THAT WE DID MAKE PROGRESS IN ICELAND ON A BROAD RANGE OF TOPICS. WE REAFFIRMED OUR 4-POINT AGENDA; WE DISCOVERED MAJOR NEW GROUNDS OF AGREEMENT; WE PROBED AGAIN SOME OLD AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT.

AND LET ME RETURN AGAIN TO THE S.D.I. ISSUE.

I REALIZE SOME AMERICANS MAY BE ASKING TONIGHT: WHY NOT ACCEPT MR. GORBACHEV'S DEMAND? WHY NOT GIVE UP S.D.I. FOR THIS AGREEMENT?

THE ANSWER, MY FRIENDS, IS SIMPLE. S.D.I. IS AMERICA'S INSURANCE POLICY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD KEEP THE COMMITMENTS MADE AT REYKJAVIK. S.D.I. IS AMERICA'S SECURITY GUARANTEE -- IF THE SOVIETS SHOULD -- AS THEY HAVE DONE TOO OFTEN IN THE PAST -- FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THEIR SOLEMN COMMITMENTS. S.D.I. IS WHAT BROUGHT THE SOVIETS BACK TO ARMS CONTROL TALKS AT GENEVA AND ICELAND. S.D.I. IS THE KEY TO A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THIS. THEY HAVE DEVOTED FAR MORE RESOURCES FOR A LOT LONGER TIME THAN WE, TO THEIR OWN S.D.I. THE WORLD'S ONLY OPERATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE TODAY SURROUNDS MOSCOW, THE CAPITAL OF THE SOVIET UNION. WHAT MR. GORBACHEV WAS DEMANDING AT REYKJAVIK WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES AGREE TO A NEW VERSION OF A 14-YEAR-OLD A.B.M. TREATY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALREADY VIOLATED. I TOLD HIM WE DON'T MAKE THOSE KINDS OF DEALS IN THE UNITED STATES.

AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SHOULD REFLECT ON THESE CRITICAL QUESTIONS.

HOW DOES A DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES THREATEN THE SOVIET UNION OR ANYONE ELSE? WHY ARE THE SOVIETS SO ADAMANT THAT AMERICA REMAIN FOREVER VULNERABLE TO SOVIET ROCKET ATTACK? AS OF TODAY, ALL FREE NATIONS ARE UTTERLY DEFENSELESS AGAINST SOVIET MISSILES -- FIRED EITHER BY ACCIDENT OR DESIGN. WHY DOES THE SOVIET UNION INSIST THAT WE REMAIN SO -- FOREVER?

SO, MY FELLOW AMERICANS, I CANNOT PROMISE, NOR CAN ANY PRESIDENT PROMISE, THAT THE TALKS IN ICELAND OR ANY FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. GORBACHEV WILL LEAD INEVITABLY TO GREAT BREAKTHROUGHS OR MOMENTOUS TREATY SIGNINGS.

WE WILL NOT ABANDON THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE WE TOOK TO REYKJAVIK. WE PREFER NO AGREEMENT THAN TO BRING HOME A BAD AGREEMENT TO THE UNITED STATES.

AND ON THIS POINT, I KNOW YOU ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANOTHER SUMMIT. THERE WAS NO INDICATION BY MR. GORBACHEV AS TO WHEN OR WHETHER HE PLANS TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES, AS WE AGREED HE WOULD LAST YEAR IN GENEVA. I REPEAT TONIGHT THAT OUR INVITATION STANDS AND THAT WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE ADDITIONAL MEETINGS WOULD BE USEFUL. BUT THAT'S A DECISION THE SOVIETS MUST MAKE.

BUT WHATEVER THE IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS, I CAN TELL YOU THAT I AM ULTIMATELY HOPEFUL ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS AT THE SUMMIT AND FOR WORLD PEACE AND FREEDOM. YOU SEE, THE CURRENT SUMMIT PROCESS IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF PREVIOUS DECADES; IT IS DIFFERENT BECAUSE THE WORLD IS DIFFERENT; AND THE WORLD IS DIFFERENT BECAUSE OF THE HARD WORK AND SACRIFICE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DURING THE PAST 5-1/2 YEARS. YOUR ENERGY HAS RESTORED AND EXPANDED OUR ECONOMIC MIGHT; YOUR SUPPORT HAS RESTORED OUR MILITARY STRENGTH. YOUR COURAGE AND SENSE OF NATIONAL UNITY IN TIMES OF CRISIS HAVE GIVEN PAUSE TO OUR ADVERSARIES, HEARTENED OUR FRIENDS, AND INSPIRED THE WORLD. THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND THE NATO ALLIANCE ARE REVITALIZED AND ALL ACROSS THE WORLD NATIONS ARE TURNING TO DEMOCRATIC IDEAS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FREE MARKET. SO BECAUSE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE STOOD GUARD AT THE CRITICAL HOUR, FREEDOM HAS GATHERED ITS FORCES, REGAINED ITS STRENGTH, AND IS ON THE MARCH.

SO, IF THERE IS ONE IMPRESSION I CARRY AWAY WITH ME FROM THESE OCTOBER TALKS, IT IS THAT, UNLIKE THE PAST, WE ARE DEALING NOW FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH, AND FOR THAT REASON WE HAVE IT WITHIN OUR GRASP TO MOVE SPEEDILY WITH THE SOVIETS TOWARD EVEN MORE BREAKTHROUGHS.

OUR IDEAS ARE OUT THERE ON THE TABLE. THEY WON'T GO AWAY. WE ARE READY TO PICK UP WHERE WE LEFT OFF. OUR NEGOTIATORS ARE HEADING BACK TO GENEVA, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO GO FORWARD WHENEVER AND WHEREVER THE SOVIETS ARE READY. SO, THERE IS REASON -- GOOD REASON -- FOR HOPE.

I SAW EVIDENCE OF THIS IN THE PROGRESS WE MADE IN THE TALKS WITH MR. GORBACHEV, AND I SAW EVIDENCE OF IT WHEN WE LEFT ICELAND YESTERDAY, AND I SPOKE TO OUR YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN AT OUR NAVAL INSTALLATION AT (KEFF-LA-VICK) -- A CRITICALLY IMPORTANT BASE FAR CLOSER TO SOVIET NAVAL BASES THAN TO OUR OWN COASTLINE. AS ALWAYS, I WAS PROUD TO SPEND A FEW MOMENTS WITH THEM AND THANK THEM FOR THEIR SACRIFICES AND DEVOTION TO COUNTRY. THEY REPRESENT AMERICA AT HER FINEST: COMMITTED TO DEFEND NOT ONLY OUR OWN FREEDOM BUT THE FREEDOM OF OTHERS WHO WOULD BE LIVING IN A FAR MORE FRIGHTENING WORLD -- WERE IT NOT FOR THE STRENGTH AND RESOLVE OF THE UNITED STATES.

"WHENEVER THE STANDARD OF FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE HAS BEEN... UNFURLED, THERE WILL BE AMERICA'S HEART, HER BENEDICTIONS, AND HER PRAYERS," JOHN QUINCY ADAMS ONCE SAID. HE SPOKE WELL OF OUR DESTINY AS A NATION. MY FELLOW AMERICANS, WE ARE HONORED BY HISTORY, ENTRUSTED BY DESTINY WITH THE OLDEST DREAM OF HUMANITY -- THE DREAM OF LASTING PEACE AND HUMAN FREEDOM.

ANOTHER PRESIDENT, HARRY TRUMAN, NOTED THAT OUR CENTURY HAD SEEN TWO OF THE MOST FRIGHTFUL WARS IN HISTORY. AND THAT "THE SUPREME NEED OF OUR TIME IS FOR MAN TO LEARN TO LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE AND HARMONY."

IT IS IN PURSUIT OF THAT IDEAL I WENT TO GENEVA A YEAR AGO AND TO ICELAND LAST WEEK. AND IT IS IN PURSUIT OF THAT IDEAL THAT I THANK YOU NOW FOR ALL THE SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN ME, AND I AGAIN ASK FOR YOUR HELP AND YOUR PRAYERS AS WE CONTINUE OUR JOURNEY TOWARD A WORLD WHERE PEACE REIGNS AND FREEDOM IS ENSHRINED.

THANK YOU AND GOD BLESS YOU.

MEMORANDUM FOR PATRICK J. BUCHANNAN

FROM MARI MASENG

SUBJECT POST-ICELAND CAMPAIGN

As everyone agrees, the President needs the support of all to regain the upper hand with the Soviets. As was the case with Grenada, the liberals in the Congress will quickly come around when they see the swing of public opinion behind us. We need to put together a bipartisan show of strength to first affirm the President's decision and then define it as tough, rather than obstinant (as our opponents are already characterizing it). The following are some ideas our operation could execute to contribute to such a campaign of support:

Former Presidents -- If Carter could be convinced (and he should since we just did him such a big favor and Brzenski is on our side) we should arrange for the three living former Presidents to come to the White House to meet with the President and proclaim support, or at least issue simultaneous statements. Nixon and Ford at least should be willing to do television interviews in support.

Former NSC advisors: At this level, they should be willing to brief jointly at the White House, appear on Nightline and do other interviews.

Former secretaries of state: Obviously we have some overlap here, and depending on who was willing to participate we may wish to eliminate one of the categories. However, this does pull in Haig who is usually willing to be vocal.

Retired generals, admirals and selected defense secretaries. (We need to stay away from Brown, and this grouping would allow us to.)

Allies: Margaret Thatcher, Kohl and others should be willing to praise the President for his stance. After all, they could not have felt comfortable with the prospect of total disarmament in the face of continued arms in the Soviet Union. The NATO countries have only token conventional forces and have relied almost totally on the nuclear umbrella. Shultz should be pressed to arrange a chorus of support in Europe. The left has already begun to vocalize attacks there.

Members of the Congress: We must move quickly here as almost all index fingers on the hill are already testing for the wind.

We could start with some of our stalwarts on Armed Services -- like Thurmond, et al, and pick up as we go along. Statements should be read on the floor, members should go the the galleries, etc.

Democrats for a strong defense -- As with Grenada, we may be able to benefit from the philosophy of some Democrat leaders, particularly those from the South. Robb was early to our defense in Grenada, for example. We should plumb the Governor ranks.

State Legislatures: Again in a bipartisan manner, if there are any still in session, these bodies would probably be willing to pass resolutions in support of the President.

Scientists for SDI: We have a schedule proposal approved but pending a date to bring scientists in to discuss the program with the President. This could be either a cabinet room or 450 meeting designed to demonstrate how realistic the program is.

Young scientists: This event would take the opposite format of the one above and would be spun toward the idea of preserving our freedom for the next generation. *(Many youth events could arranged at this time)*

Site visit: As has been proposed, the President should visit a facility where the program is being researched and tested.

Demonstration of commitment: I don't know enough about the program to suggest specifics, but when that test was launched this summer it went miles toward convincing the public that this was a viable program. It was obviously expensive, but I'm sure that if we put our minds to it there are many things we could do with similar impact.

450 Briefings: There is no end to the groups we could brief at the White House to provide a continuing forum for our messages. We could also turn a myriad of other events to this purpose. Generally we should echo the comments of Brzenski this morning when he declared the Soviet focus on this program "ominous". We should remind the public at every opportunity of their outrageous and aggressive behavior over the years and around the world. We should point out that the Soviets are well along the way to having their own defense and they want to rob us of ours. We should point out the unsettling manner in which they tried to trick/trap the President. We should remind people how they walked out of Geneva and then walked back in when we stood firm. Our surrogates should attack our opposition for siding with the Soviets; make them appear weak (as they are). We should evoke the same images we did in the past -- peace through strength, deeds not words, dangerous world, etc. After all, the President was not negotiating with Great Britain in Reykjavik, and some people seem not to see the difference.

POST-SUMMIT SURVEY
October 13-14

Decision/Making/Information
Contacts: Richard Wirthlin
Dee Alsop
556-0001

Q 3: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling ...

HIS JOB AS PRESIDENT

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	<i>Pre Summit</i>	OCT 13	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE		500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	- -	- -
**Difference Score		209 42%	440 44%	230 46%	- -	- -
Total Approve	64	352 70%	717 72%	364 73%	- -	- -↑6 (↑3)
Total Disapprove	34	143 29%	277 28%	134 27%	- -	- -
Strongly Approve (1)		204 41%	411 41%	208 42%	- -	- -
Somewhat Approve (2)		148 30%	306 31%	156 31%	- -	- -
Somewhat Disapprove (3)		73 15%	127 13%	54 11%	- -	- -
Strongly Disapprove (4)		70 14%	150 15%	80 16%	- -	- -
No Opinion		5 1%	7 1%	2 *	- -	- -
Mean		2.0	2.0	2.0	-	-
Standard Deviation		1.06	1.07	1.08	-	-
Standard Error		0.05	0.03	0.05	-	-
Standardized Performance Score		66	66	66	133	133

Q 14 Some people say that the collapse in arms talks in Iceland was a major setback in arms negotiations with the Soviet Union and that we missed a historic opportunity to end the arms race. Other people say that the collapse in arms talks in Iceland was NOT a major setback in arms negotiations. They are just a small part of a larger process which actually helped both sides recognize areas of agreement and identify more clearly points of agreement. Which is more closer to your opinion -- that the collapse in the Iceland summit talks was a major setback or was not a major setback?

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	OCT 13 -----	OCT 13- OCT 14 -----	OCT 14- OCT 15 -----	OCT 15- OCT 16 -----	OCT 16- OCT 17 -----
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	- -	- -
Setback	108 22%	199 20%	91 18%	- -	- -
Not a setback	383 77%	784 78%	402 80%	- -	- -
No opinion	10 2%	16 2%	6 1%	- -	- -

POST SUMMIT TRACKING / 379001 / OCTOBER 13, 1986

Q 20: Ronald Reagan missed his best chance so far to negotiate a meaningful nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union.

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	OCT 13	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17	
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	- -	- -	
**Difference Score	-142 -28%	-333 -33%	-187 -37%	- -	- -	
Total Agree	175 35%	327 33%	155 31%	- -	- -	
Total Disagree	317 <u>63%</u>	661 66%	342 <u>68%</u>	- -	- -	
Agree strongly (1)	82 16%	154 15%	73 15%	- -	- -	
Agree somewhat (2)	93 19%	174 17%	82 16%	- -	- -	
Disagree somewhat (3)	149 30%	299 30%	150 30%	- -	- -	
Disagree strongly (4)	167 33%	361 36%	192 38%	- -	- -	+ 5
No opinion	9 2%	12 1%	3 1%	- -	- -	
Mean	2.8	2.9	2.9	-	-	
Standard Deviation	1.08	1.07	1.07	-	-	
Standard Error	0.05	0.03	0.05	-	-	

Q 19: If the Soviets feel so strongly about the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative, then they must feel it has a good chance, if developed, to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles.

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	OCT 13	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	900 100%	1000 100%	900 100%	-	-
**Difference Score	236 47%	476 48%	244 49%	-	-
Total Agree	353 71%	709 71%	359 72%	-	-
Total Disagree	116 23%	233 23%	115 23%	-	-
Agree strongly (1)	184 37%	394 39%	209 42%	-	-
Agree somewhat (2)	168 34%	315 31%	150 30%	-	-
Disagree somewhat (3)	61 12%	131 13%	70 14%	-	-
Disagree strongly (4)	55 11%	102 10%	45 9%	-	-
No opinion	31 6%	58 6%	27 5%	-	-
Mean	2.0	1.9	1.9	-	-
Standard Deviation	1.00	0.99	0.98	-	-
Standard Error	0.05	0.03	0.04	-	-

↑ + 5

Q 26: Some people say that research on a defense against nuclear-armed missiles, such as SDI, is a good idea because it will help deter a Soviet attack, increase the chance of reaching an arms control agreement, and reduce the risk of war. Other people say that research on a defense against nuclear-armed missiles, such as SDI, is a bad idea because it will upset the balance of power between the U.S. and the USSR, accelerate the arms race, and increase the risk of war. Which statement is closer to your own opinion -- that research on a defense against nuclear-armed missiles is a good idea or bad idea?

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	<i>Presummt</i>	OCT 13	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE		500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	- -	- -
Good idea	62	377 75%	745 75%	370 74%	- -	- -
Bad idea	36	112 22%	233 23%	119 24%	- -	- -
No opinion	2	11 2%	21 2%	11 2%	- -	- -