

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Tuck, John C.: Files
Folder Title: Drugs I [ca. April 1988 – June 1988] (6)
Box: 2

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Drive Against Narcotics Foiled by Security Fears

WASHINGTON, April 9 — No President has spoken out more against drugs than President Reagan. No Administration has signed more anti-drug treaties or spent more money to stem the flow of drugs into this country.

But as the Reagan years draw to a close, American law enforcement officials acknowledge that they are losing ground in the fight against a new generation of drug smugglers who have the business skill — and capital — to threaten not only the streets of America but even the stability of countries long friendly to the United States.

While drug confiscations and arrests set records each year, the supply of cocaine, the most commonly abused drug, has grown steadily. As for the hundreds of millions spent annually on programs to curb demand, the number of drug users in the United States remains near its all-time peak, having dropped only slightly.

Arrests Grow, So Does Supply

Confronted with the influx of drugs from overseas and the inability of successive administrations to deal with it effectively, legislators and local officials have begun demanding that the United States take more effective action against countries that tolerate or ignore the drug industry.

In interviews, dozens of present and former Government officials say this would mean a change in emphasis. These officials say that, like its predecessors, the Reagan Administration has repeatedly subordinated the drug issue to other American interests, from support for insurgents fighting leftist regimes to the belief that punishing drug-producing countries might destabilize them.

'Balance Priorities'

"You have to balance priorities, but the fact is we have not balanced priorities: we have always put narcotics at the bottom of the totem pole," said Francis J. McNeil, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.

Mr. McNeil and other officials see ample evidence that tough American talk on fighting drugs overseas has not been matched by diplomatic action. In 1986, for example, a law was passed allowing President Reagan to impose economic sanctions against countries that are not cooperating fully with American efforts to reduce the drug trade. But that law has never been used against a nation considered an ally, regardless of any flagrant drug trafficking that may be occurring.

Interviews with dozens of present and former officials also disclose that:

• The Reagan Administration was told that the Honduran military, which was providing critical assistance to the guerrillas fighting the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua, may have been involved in drug dealing, perhaps as early as 1981, according to present and former officials. A former official in the Drug Enforcement Administration said that a United States drug agent stationed in Honduras relayed the allegations to his supervisors from 1981 to 1983 but was never ordered to investigate them. Officials in the agency insist the allegations were unsubstantiated and not worthy of investigation.

• In 1984, Caspar W. Weinberger, then Defense Secretary, did not take action on a recommendation from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Pentagon become more involved in blocking shipments of drugs, even if it required new legislation and a redefinition of the military's mission, according to former senior officials in the Pentagon. Mr. Weinberger has not responded to requests for comment.

• Senior White House officials, in a previously undisclosed effort, sought unsuccessfully in late 1985 and early 1986 to enlist the support of others in the Administration for the removal of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama. John P. Marish, the Drug Enforcement Administration official responsible for Latin America, said that even after General Noriega's indictment on drug-trafficking charges, the American drug agency has continued to work closely in interdiction efforts with Col. Nivaldo Madrián, one of General Noriega's closest associates and a man identified by Panamanian opposition leaders as a principal in the drug trade.

• Attempts to eradicate drug crops overseas have been mired by technical and diplomatic obstacles. Even those officials promoting the policy acknowledge that the difficulties may never be surmounted.

Attorney General Edwin Meese 3d, the Administration's top law enforcement official, reflected the Administration's approach toward using foreign policy as a weapon in the war on drugs when he was asked in a recent interview whether drug trafficking is the foremost foreign policy concern of the American people.

"How to rate it with a lot of other issues is very difficult, because, obviously, the collapse of Central America would have a very dire impact on the American people," said Mr. Meese, who is on a trip to Latin America for talks on drug enforcement issues. "It's kind of silly to make these kinds of comparisons because they are all major threats."

The American people have not hesitated to make such comparisons. In a New York Times/CBS News Poll in March, respondents were asked which of five leading international issues was the most important facing this country. The largest number, 48 percent, cited drug trafficking.

A Clash Of Policies

Afghanistan is one place where the drug issue has been subordinated to the Administration's policy of supporting anti-Communist insurgencies.

Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has skyrocketed as a result of economic dislocation and other factors caused by the Afghan war. In 1987 alone, opium production increased by at least 20 percent over the year before, and may have more than doubled, according to the State Department's 1988 report on the global drug trade. Much of the poppy crop grows in areas controlled by the Afghan guerrillas or on territory where they have influence, according to the report.

Although the guerrilla leaders have spoken out against drug use as a practice contrary to Islam, and although they are not thought to be actively involved in the trade, they — like the Afghan Government and its Soviet backers — tolerate the expanding poppy production and heroin refining in Afghanistan and shipment of drugs into Pakistan because it is a way of life in the country and a principal cash crop.

American intelligence has suspected that planes, trucks and mules ferrying rebel aid into Afghanistan are also used to ship drugs to Pakistan, but investigations have not produced solid evidence of this. Intelligence analysts acknowledge, however, that individual rebels and even small units serve as drug couriers.

Yet the Reagan Administration has done little to press the guerrillas to curb the drug trade, according to senior State Department and intelligence analysts. When President Reagan met with several guerrilla leaders in Washington last November, these officials said, he never raised the drug issue.

A previously undisclosed 1987 intelligence report concludes that even if Pakistan and Afghanistan were to develop good relations after a Soviet troop withdrawal, the rugged terrain and remote areas where the poppy crop is grown and the fiercely independent tribesmen who have controlled the Afghan drug trade for decades would thwart any effort to reduce its pre-war levels.

"We're not going to let a little thing like drugs get in the way of the political situation," said an Administration official who follows Afghanistan closely, emphasizing that narcotics are relatively a minor issue in the context of policy toward the Afghan guerrillas. "And when the Soviets leave and there's no money in the country, it's not going to be a priority to disrupt the drug trade."

Preoccupation With the Contras

In Central America, the Administration's preoccupation with the contra war against the Nicaraguan Government has contributed to a lack of urgency in the war on drugs.

Charges of involvement in the drug trade have swirled around the contras for several years without being proven. At the insistence of Senator John F. Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been investigating the allegations.

No solid evidence has been found to document that the main contra group, led by Adolfo Calero, financed the war with drug profits, although the Central Intelligence Agency suspected that some of the other factions had become involved with drug traffickers.

Interviews with several present and former officials suggest a more subtle connection between drugs and the contras: a less-than-aggressive Administration response to allegations of corruption in the Honduran military.

The seven-year contra war has depended on base camps inside Honduras, and the Honduran military has been an essential supporter of the C.I.A.'s covert efforts to aid the rebels.

According to a former Drug Enforcement Administration official, an American drug agent stationed in Honduras from October 1981 to 1983 sent intelligence reports to Washington charging Honduran military officers, particularly in the navy, with facilitating the transshipment of drugs to the United States.

The agent, Tom Zepeda, was also said to have charged that Honduran military officers, including Col. Leonides Torres Arias, the chief of army intelligence, were protecting drug traffickers. The most prominent of those was Juan Ramón Matta Ballesteros, a Honduran believed to have close links to the major leaders of the Medellín drug traffickers of Colombia and who was returned to the United States this week to face drug-trafficking charges.

John C. Lawn, the head of the Drug Enforcement Administration, said that Mr. Zepeda's charges about corruption in the Honduran military were backed by too little evidence to merit an investigation and were similar to the reports sent regularly from dozens of other countries. He said the agency had never been ordered to ignore the Honduran military's involvement in drug crimes. "That would be a violation of my oath of office," Mr. Lawn said.

In 1983, the United States closed the Drug Enforcement Administration office in Honduras for budgetary reasons and, a Federal drug official said, because it had not been "productive." The office is now being reopened after repeated requests from the Honduran authorities since last year.

"It wasn't that there was a cover-up," said one Administration official. "It's that people knew certain questions shouldn't be asked."

Noriega's Regime: A Case Study

Many current and former United States officials believe this country's policy on Panama is a case study of how the drug issue has been subordinated to other interests.

Intelligence reports linking General Noriega to the drug trade date as far back as 1972, when he was chief of intelligence of the Panama Defense Forces. By 1985, the evidence of the general's role in the drug trade was so strong that several senior officials tried to turn American policy against General Noriega. They failed.

A previously undisclosed study, dated Nov. 1, 1985 and written at the U.S. Army's Southern Command in Panama, cited the involvement of the Panama Defense Forces in the drug trade. Information gathered by American intelligence included transcripts of conversations between Panamanian military officers and drug dealers, and surveillance photographs of Panamanian soldiers loading drugs, according to Norman A. Bailey, former chief economist of the National Security Council, who saw the reports.

After he left government, Mr. Bailey was so distressed by General Noriega's removal of President Nicolás Ardito Barletta in 1984 that he urged the Administration to abandon the general.

Don't 'Rock The Boat'

In an interview, Mr. Bailey said that the State Department's attitude was "lukewarm," and that the Pentagon didn't want to "rock the boat."

The C.I.A. actively opposed doing anything, Mr. Bailey said. "They said, 'He's an important asset for us,'" Mr. Bailey recounted.

As Mr. Bailey was pressing for action in 1985, the American Ambassador to Panama at the time, Everett E. Briggs, began pushing the State Department to support Mr. Barletta by imposing diplomatic and economic pressures similar to those used against General Noriega in recent weeks.

At the National Security Council, one of the officials on the staff, Constantine Menges, was trying unsuccessfully to persuade President Reagan's aides to put the issue on the agenda for a decision by the Cabinet. In an interview, Mr. Menges said that he argued that the threat to democracy in the region posed by the alliance of General Noriega, Cuba and the narcotics traffickers more than outweighed the Panamanian leader's purported value to the United States.

Mr. Menges did not succeed. During a visit to Panama in December 1985, Rear Adm. John M. Poindexter, then the national security adviser, did give General Noriega a stern message, but the momentum to do something about General Noriega slowed soon after and was not revived until 1987 with the rise of a stronger Panamanian opposition.

The Panama case is one of several instances in which the needs of United States intelligence agencies have clashed with drug policy.

Richard Kerr, the C.I.A.'s deputy director for intelligence, said that while C.I.A. regulations require officers to report violations of the law, the issue is often not clear-cut.

"If you knew an agent was a major trafficker or involved in a major shipment, you couldn't sit on that," Mr. Kerr said. "If you knew that he had taken major money to turn his eyes to the side to let something go through, then you're involved in a judgment call. My guess is that you would weigh it, and you might not report it."

William H. Webster, the Director of Central Intelligence, has made it clear that he wants to be personally involved in deciding where to draw the line, according to Mr. Kerr.

Divided Operations And Budget Cuts

Several former officials who have studied United States drug-enforcement efforts overseas said one of the main shortcomings is that operations are divided among a host of agencies, some of which have experienced severe budget cuts.

The Coast Guard, for example, whose mission is to intercept drugs on their way to the United States, predicts it will conduct 55 percent fewer patrols this year because Congress slashed its 1988 budget by \$100 million.

"Here I sit, the primary agency for interdiction, without the money to operate," said Adm. Paul A. Yost Jr., the Commandant of the Coast Guard. "I have men and women sitting at the dock doing nothing."

Moreover, there is no central authority that can force agencies to cooperate with the drug effort, and few incentives — like more money or workers — to encourage an agency to expand its work on the problem.

More than any other agency, the Pentagon has shown a reluctance to embrace President Reagan's drug crusade. Pentagon officials are proud of the fact that the military flew almost 17,000 hours and ships spent a total of more than 2,500 days at sea last year in the effort to stop drug traffickers. But they are quick to cite the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits using the military to pursue or arrest violators of criminal law.

In the past few years, the Pentagon has consistently — though unsuccessfully — opposed various initiatives in the anti-drug fight, including the loan of American military equipment to foreign governments in 1981, the deployment of American troops to Bolivia in 1986 and the President's secret directive in 1986 that labeled drug trafficking a national security threat.

A former senior military aide said, the Pentagon was unwilling to become more involved because of fears the drug effort would take money away from other programs more central to the military's mission.

Reluctance At the Pentagon

Senior Pentagon officials bristle at the suggestion made by the Secretary of Education, William J. Bennett, at a White House drug conference last month that the United States consider the use of broad, unilateral military force abroad to prevent the cultivation and manufacture of drugs destined for this country.

But the Joint Chiefs of Staff once shared the view that the United States military should have a greater role in the war on drugs.

After a secret six-month study in 1984, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the drug war was a potential threat to the national security of the United States because it was undermining the country's social fabric and the discipline of the military services, according to former senior Pentagon officials involved in the study.

The chiefs recommended that the Pentagon take the lead in determining what was needed to combat the drug threat, even if it meant rethinking the military's principal mission of combat readiness or changing the law to allow greater military cooperation in law-enforcement. The report outlined a series of options the Pentagon could have taken in the fight, including training of other countries' anti-drug forces and lending equipment.

"We didn't recommend that the armed forces become police officers, but pointed out that there were things they could do that were consistent with their mission," said retired Gen. John Vessey, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, adding that Mr. Weinberger had always worked hard in the anti-drug fight.

The proposal was never accepted by Mr. Weinberger, in part because of concern that American military involvement with potentially corrupt police forces of drug-trafficking countries might tempt American servicemen to share in the drug profits, according to current and former military officials.

Misgivings On Other Fronts

Officials in other agencies with dealings overseas also voice misgivings about their role in the war on drugs.

American diplomats, for example, are in the embarrassing position of pressing foreign leaders to allow aerial eradication of their drug crops, while American courts, citing environmental concerns, have stopped all aerial spraying of marijuana with paraquat on Federal property. And the United States has pushed Latin American countries to draft laws requiring the licensing of chemicals needed to manufacture cocaine at a time when a move for new American restrictions on the same chemicals is stalled in Congress.

State Department officials praise Secretary of State George P. Shultz for focusing more attention on drugs than did Alexander M. Haig Jr., his predecessor, whose staff rarely even returned the phone calls of officials in the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters.

But drugs sometimes are not even on Mr. Shultz's agenda is his meetings with foreign leaders. In March, when Mr. Shultz and President Hafez al-Assad of Syria met for the first time in nearly five years, Mr. Shultz did not raise the drug issue. Five days later, President Reagan listed Syria as one of four countries that were not cooperating fully in cracking down on the drug trade.

"The State Department is the conscientious objector in the war on drugs," says William von Raab, the Commissioner of the United States Customs Service.

'Certification': An Ineffective Strategy

One of the least effective exercises in cracking down on the drug trade is the annual "certification process."

A 1986 anti-drug law requires President Reagan to certify that the 25 countries identified by the State Department as major drug-producing and "drug-transiting" countries are "cooperating fully" with efforts to crack down on the trade. Those that do not qualify are to lose half of their economic and military aid and could suffer other economic penalties. The penalties can be waived if the President concludes that other "overriding national interests" are at stake.

Mr. Reagan has never used the law to penalize an American ally. This year, Mr. Reagan "decertified" Syria, Iran, Afghanistan and Panama, countries that receive no economic and military aid.

One close American ally, Turkey, which the Drug Enforcement Administration considers a major "drug-transiting" country — a country in which there is the capability to transship large quantities of drugs — is not even included on the State Department list. The State Department blames Congress for not adequately defining a "drug-transiting country." Some State Department officials believe that Turkey is not on the list to avoid any delay in the dispersal of its economic and military aid, which amounts to \$525 million this year.

For many lawmakers, the process is best illustrated by Mr. Reagan's full certification of Mexico, the largest single-country source of heroin and marijuana flowing into the United States. Official corruption in Mexico undermines significant cooperation with the United States, according to the State Department's annual drug report.

Mr. Meese rejected a State Department compromise that would have criticized Mexico for not cooperating fully; the result was no aid suspension because of overriding "national interests." Since aid to Mexico is only \$525,000 this year, such a cutoff would have little effect. This is why Mr. Meese and other Justice Department officials are not comfortable with the law, which they see as a feeble attempt to punish countries.

"I don't think pointing fingers at each other across international boundaries is going to solve the problem," Mr. Meese said.

Enemy Within: Drug Money

Is Corrupting the Enforcers

By PHILIP SHENON

Special to The New York Times

CORDELE, Ga. — Law enforcement specialists say corruption within the American criminal justice system is more widespread now than at any time since Prohibition because of the explosion in the power and profits of the multibillion-dollar illicit drug industry.

The corruption has touched a wide range of law enforcement officials — from agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Customs Service to the self-proclaimed "good ol' boy" sheriffs here in rural Georgia, from the notorious 77th Precinct in Brooklyn to the border crossings of the Rio Grande Valley.

Corruption Reaches Rural Areas

The rising corruption is perhaps most startling in areas far from the big cities, places like this town 120 miles south of Atlanta. According to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the state's chief law-enforcement agency, sheriffs in nearly a dozen of the state's 159 counties have been implicated in drug smuggling cases in recent years.

Enforcement experts say that in cases throughout Georgia, county sheriffs and their deputies have been paid thousands of dollars a night to overlook air drops from the hundreds of small planes that bring illegal drugs here.

Researchers say that in some American communities, corruption among law-enforcement officials — policemen, sheriffs, jailers, even prosecutors and judges — is out of control. Police specialists say there is a simple formula: the more drugs on the street, the more bribery in the precinct house or the courtroom.

"We're at the tip of a corruption iceberg," said Jerome H. Skolnick, a law professor at the University of California, Berkeley, who has studied the corruption threat.

Hubert Williams, president of the Washington-based Police Foundation, a police research and advocacy group, said the amount of drug corruption is "frightening — the power of the drug cartels to corrupt and influence law enforcement officials and political figures is clear."

While there are no exact figures, researchers say there are now more than 100 cases each year in state and Federal courts in which law enforcement officials are charged or implicated in drug corruption. Law enforcement officials note that the amount of cocaine coming into the country has soared from 1,872 kilograms in fiscal year 1981 to 35,970 kilograms in fiscal 1987, and that almost half of all cocaine confiscated on its way into the country enters in small planes like those that fly into Georgia nearly every night.

They say the only comparable period in this century was Prohibition, when several big-city police departments came under scrutiny for corruption involving gambling and the sale of illegal liquor.

The experts say the ways to stop drug corruption are not exotic: Stricter supervision of narcotics investigations; better recruitment and hiring procedures, and efforts to combat the cynicism of drug agents who believe that their work is undermined by an inefficient and overburdened criminal justice system.

But some specialists warn that even with a broadened commitment to anti-corruption measures, the problem may be insurmountable.

"The money that's being offered by the drug dealers is so big it is just hard to visualize," said William Green, assistant commissioner for internal affairs at the United States Customs Service.

Cops Gone Bad: Trust Is a Victim

In some cases, the damage, as well as the potential damage, to law enforcement efforts is remarkable.

In Miami, where the city's police department is the focus of a big Federal narcotics-corruption investigation, there were reports that some law-abiding residents were hesitant to open their doors to police officers who do not produce a warrant.

Dozens of officers in Miami's 1,000-member Police Department have come under investigation for narcotics trafficking. The most important Federal inquiry in Miami dates back to July 1985, when, according to prosecutors, 16 officers raided the a smugglers' boat on the Miami River and stole 900 pounds of cocaine; three men guarding the boat jumped into the river and drowned, the authorities said. The officers were charged with a variety of crimes.

In New York City's most far-reaching police corruption scandal in nearly two decades, 13 current and former officers of the 77th Precinct in the crime-ridden Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood of Brooklyn have been charged or convicted of wrongdoing, much of it related to drugs.

In one of the New York trials, prosecutors played a tape for jurors in which two plainclothes officers assigned to the 77th could be heard barging into the apartment of a suspected drug dealer, taking marijuana and selling packets of the drug to unsuspecting customers who arrived at the door. The officers kept the money. One of the them could be heard to boast, "All in all, a very profitable evening."

In the District of Columbia, local prosecutors announced last fall that they would dismiss 300 to 400 drug cases because of fears that the investigations were tainted. The announcement came shortly after disclosure that the F.B.I. was investigating corruption in a 12-officer vice squad in the District's police department.

The Rural Route: Buying the Sheriffs

Nor is drug corruption limited to the big cities. To an extent that law enforcement specialists describe as startling, bribery and other forms of drug-related corruption have begun to infect law enforcement agencies in small towns and rural communities.

Law enforcement officials say that on clear nights, residents of southern Georgia can lie in bed and listen to the hum of small planes, stuffed with cocaine and marijuana, flying in from the Bahamas, Mexico and Central America.

The planes began coming in large numbers in 1981 and 1982, when Federal authorities began a crackdown on drug shipments in Florida. Narcotics traffickers directed the planes instead to Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas and especially southern Georgia, which became popular for air drops because of its flat terrain and the hundreds of small, isolated airfields that dot the state.

"A lot of our problems are based on our location," said J. Robert Hamrick, director of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, the state's chief law-enforcement agency. "It's a perfect location, near the source countries. They can usually fly to Georgia without having to refuel, and it takes but 30 seconds to unload a plane," putting the cargo into cars bound for drug brokers in Florida.

One small airfield in rural Morgan County, Ga., became so popular among drug dealers that it was nicknamed Kennedy International by the state police. A number of smugglers do not even bother with an airstrip, choosing instead to land their planes on stretches of abandoned highway — sometimes, officials say, after sheriffs and deputies have been paid large sums of money to look the other way.

"They can get a fee of \$50,000, maybe \$100,000, for just sitting there and doing nothing," said Ron Caffrey, special agent in charge of the Atlanta office of the Drug Enforcement Administration. "And believe me, most Georgia sheriffs don't make \$50,000 in a year."

In the most recent corruption case, Sheriff Ernest Wyatt Forrest of Crisp County, Ga., was arrested last December on drug smuggling charges following an elaborate sting operation, what Crisp County Administrator W. D. Coff dubbed "Miami Vice comes to town."

According to Federal prosecutors, the 57-year-old sheriff was led to believe he would be paid \$60,000 for allowing a plane load of marijuana to be transported through the county.

Shortly after the plane landed on Dec. 16, Sheriff Forrest was taken into custody and charged with conspiracy to transport half a ton of marijuana. The plane, authorities said, was actually filled with peat moss.

Cordele, the the Crisp County seat, is a town of 13,000 people that calls itself "The Watermelon Capital of the World." Its churches outnumber its liquor stores five to one. But The Cordele Dispatch portrayed a darker side to the town when it said in an editorial in February that the Forrest case was a "bottomless pit," adding, "We have a nag-

ging feeling that there are still those involved in law enforcement and yet unnamed who are connected to the drug scene."

Law enforcement officials in Georgia say they are concerned that drug corruption may soon spread. Gary M. Garner, who oversees drug investigations for the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, said that he would next look for new drug corruption problems "in the statehouse or in the Legislature."

He said he could foresee efforts by drug smugglers to bribe lawmakers, encouraging them to slash the budget of law-enforcement agencies involved in narcotics cases. "When we sit down and drink a few beers, we think about what could happen," Mr. Garner said. "We worry about it."

The Federal Case: Money and Honor

There is also growing concern about drug corruption at the Justice Department and elsewhere among the men and women involved in Federal law enforcement.

In 1986, a former member of the Justice Department's Organized Crime Strike Force in Boston was found guilty of conspiracy charges involving the sale of confidential information to a marijuana smuggler. According to prosecutors, he sold secrets, including the identities of government informants, in exchange for \$210,000.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation was stunned three years ago when an 11-year veteran agent, Dan A. Mitrione Jr., confessed to selling cocaine and agreed to turn over money, real estate and other property worth nearly \$850,000. He also acknowledged stealing more than 90 pounds of cocaine from a shipment seized by the F.B.I.

Federal agents said they seized nearly \$650,000 in cash last year from a part-time customs inspector, José Angel Barron, who worked at a border checkpoint in San Ysidro, Calif. Mr. Barron is now awaiting trial on charges of bribery. According to prosecutors, he was paid nearly \$50,000 for each marijuana-packed automobile that he allowed to cross into the United States from Mexico without inspection.

Perhaps no Federal agency has been so stung by drug corruption as the Customs Service. In the last three years dozens of its employees have been prosecuted or disciplined on corruption charges — yet the Customs Service has won wide praise for an anti-corruption program that has become a model within the Federal Government.

In 1986, the service, recognizing that inspectors at the nation's borders would be obvious targets for drug corruption, launched Operation Clean Sweep, the largest anti-corruption program in the agency's history.

As part of the operation, 35 customs agents from throughout the country were assigned to work with 15 internal affairs specialists to ferret out corruption, using undercover investigations if needed.

By the end of the investigation, 20 customs workers, most of them inspectors, had been charged with crimes; another 60 workers were subjected to disciplinary action that ranged from reprimands to dismissal. (The entire Customs work force numbers more than 16,000; nearly 5,000 of them are inspectors.)

"It was painful," said Mr. Green, the internal affairs official at Customs. "We had thought of ourselves relatively corruption free; before this we had maybe one internal corruption case a year."

Mr. Green said he was convinced that Operation Clean Sweep had deterred corruption elsewhere in the agency. "It hasn't stopped, but we have seen a lessening of this sort of activity," he said.

Internal Affairs: Policing the Police

Authorities in the field say law enforcement agencies that are serious about countering drug corruption must use the same sorts of procedures found at the Customs Service — aggressive investigations, vigorous prosecution and, when necessary, long prison terms.

"Law enforcement officials have to be reminded again and again that corruption is going to happen and that it's going to be investigated," said Dorothy H. Bracey, a professor at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York and the editor of *Police Studies*, a research journal. "Cops have to know that if they're corrupt, they're going to be caught, and their careers are going to be over."

Lawrence W. Sherman, a criminologist at the University of Maryland, said the commitment to rigid anti-corruption measures can be expensive. His studies show that law enforcement agencies must commit as much as 5 percent of their budgets to internal affairs investigations to be effective.

Several authorities point to the success of the internal affairs division of the Los Angeles Police Department. Even though Los Angeles is a drug transit point, the police force has gone largely without major drug corruption scandals.

Cmdr. William D. Booth, a department spokesman, said internal affairs officers in Los Angeles are taught to "react immediately to the slightest hint of corruption. If there is an anonymous call from someone advising us that a member of the department is somehow being compromised, we will devote a lot of hours to following it up."

Three years ago the department created a special 18-member unit within the internal affairs division to deal only with drug corruption investigations.

But experts say that what is most important in controlling drug corruption is the need to address the extraordinary cynicism and frustration of drug agents.

Agents must be constantly reminded, they say, that their often-overlooked work is of value.

Gerald Caiden, a professor of public administration at the University of Southern California who has studied police corruption, said too many drug agents "don't believe that anybody cares."

"They don't believe that society supports them in stopping drugs," he said. "They don't believe that by sticking their necks out, they'll get any help. And when they give up, that's when you get corruption. Somebody, something has to change that."

In many communities, the police and prosecutors are overwhelmed by important drug cases, and prisons are so crowded that drug dealers often spend little time behind bars.

Jerald R. Vaughn, executive director of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, is one of many authorities who believe that government officials must make a new commitment to provide law enforcement agents with the proper resources, including new prisons, to deal with the growing threat of drugs.

He added: "Narcotics work by its very nature is probably the toughest assignment in law enforcement. You have officers who devote months of their time, placing their lives in danger, to carry out very extensive investigations of drug dealers, only to have these people walk out of jail all the time."

"Cynicism comes into play and they start think to themselves, to hell with it," he said.

Getting what America wants and needs. It's like the story of the three fellows who went into a restaurant. I wanted to tell you one last story before I finished. [Laughter] They were ordering their dinner, and one of them ordered a glass of milk. But he told the waitress that he'd been in there the week before, ordered a glass of milk, and he wanted a clean glass this time. Well, the other two also decided to order milk. When the waitress came back with the three glasses of milk, she said, "Now, which of you wanted the clean glass?" [Laughter]

By being clear about what we want and what works, we've stopped the slide in SAT scores. They're on the rise again. By 1990 let's reduce by one-quarter the 40 percent of 13-year-olds reading below skill level. By the year 2000 let's have everyone reading at their skill level. By 1990 let's resolve that SAT scores will have made up half the ground they've lost, and by the year 2000 let's have them exceed their 1963 record high, which still stands. And finally, by the year 2000 let's raise literacy levels so that every American can speak, read, and write English and fully participate in the opportunities of our great country.

I brought Secretary Bennett along with me today. And, Bill, I'm going to give you a little homework assignment. In April 1988 it will be 5 years since we issued "A Nation at Risk," and that's when I'd like you to issue a new report telling us how far we've come and what still needs to be done, what reforms have worked, and what principles should guide us as we move ahead. We need milestones on our road to the 21st century, and in education this report will be the first.

You know, earlier today I visited Fairview Elementary School. It's another of the model schools in this district. I saw what a fine principal, like Fairview's principal Dr. James Wells, and a dedicated and talented staff can mean to children in the early years of learning. I wasn't too surprised that Fairview is a model school. You see, one of the teachers there and I go way back, and I know she's great. Miss Joy Underdown taught my son Ron when he was in nursery school and kindergarten a few years ago. You know, it's a few years ago. [Laughter] But I saw how the children at Fairview are learning through the use of computers. I

even had a few words to say to a sixth grade civics class. I'm a little better than civics than I am on computers. [Laughter] I haven't learned to use a pocket calculator yet. [Laughter] Wouldn't do any good with what Congress is doing. [Laughter]

Well, today I've talked about preparing America for the 21st century. Well, the kindergarten children I saw today at Fairview will graduate from high school in the year 1999. This year's high school graduates will spend most of their working lives in the 21st century. In the life of a man or a woman, or the life of a nation, the 21st century's but a short, short time away. If we begin to prepare for it now, it can be the beginning of America's greatest century, a time when Americans scale peaks of opportunity and achievement that we didn't dare dream of reaching before. Yes, we can set sail on new oceans of challenge and reach new continents of hope. You are the pathfinders. You are the navigators.

So, today let's set our compasses by the fixed star of basic skills and enduring values, and start out the new century together.

Thank you, and God bless you.

Note: The President spoke at 2:28 p.m. in the auditorium of Hickman High School.

National Drug Policy Board

Executive Order 12590. March 26, 1987

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 872, 873, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1202, and 1203 of title 21 of the United States Code, and in order to coordinate the performance of all drug abuse policy functions of the Federal government, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment. (a) There is hereby established the National Drug Policy Board ("the Board").

(b) The Board shall be composed of the following members:

(1) the Attorney General, who shall serve as Chairman;

- (2) the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who shall serve as Vice Chairman;
- (3) the Secretary of State;
- (4) the Secretary of the Treasury;
- (5) the Secretary of Defense;
- (6) the Secretary of the Interior;
- (7) the Secretary of Agriculture;
- (8) the Secretary of Labor;
- (9) the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development;
- (10) the Secretary of Transportation;
- (11) the Secretary of Energy;
- (12) the Secretary of Education;
- (13) the Director of the Office of Management and Budget;
- (14) the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;
- (15) the Director of Central Intelligence;
- (16) the Chief of Staff to the Vice President;
- (17) the Director of the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office; and
- (18) such other members as the President may, from time to time, designate.

Sec. 2. Functions. (a) The Board shall facilitate the development and coordination of national drug policy and shall coordinate activities of Executive departments and agencies to reduce the supply and use of illegal drugs, including international activities, enforcement, prevention and education, treatment and rehabilitation, and research relating to illegal drugs.

(b) In furtherance of its responsibilities, the Board shall:

(1) review, evaluate and develop United States Government policy, strategy and resources with respect to illegal drug law enforcement, prevention and education, treatment and rehabilitation, and research efforts, including budgetary priorities and national plans and strategies;

(2) facilitate coordination of efforts of all Executive departments and agencies to halt national and international trafficking of illegal drugs and to reduce drug abuse;

(3) coordinate the collection and evaluation of information necessary to implement United States policy with respect to illegal drug law enforcement and to the reduction of drug abuse; and

(4) provide policy guidance to the agencies and facilitate resolution of differences in this area concerning interagency activi-

ties and other matters affecting two or more agencies.

(c) In order to help coordinate the activities of Executive departments and agencies with responsibility for drug law enforcement and drug abuse reduction, and to supervise implementation of the determinations of the Board, the Chairman shall:

(1) advise the Board in matters concerning its responsibilities;

(2) make recommendations to the Board for the coordination of drug enforcement and drug abuse reduction activities;

(3) correlate and evaluate intelligence and other information to support the activities of the Board;

(4) act as primary advisor to the President and the Congress on national and international programs and policies and the implementation of those policies; and

(5) perform such other duties as the President may direct.

(d) The Board shall carry out all duties and responsibilities of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, as set forth in Chapter XIII (The National Narcotics Act) of Title II of Public Law 98-473.

(e) Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to affect the authorities or responsibilities of the Office of Management and Budget, or any Office or official thereof.

Sec. 3. Coordinating Groups. The Board shall establish a Drug Enforcement Coordinating Group and a Drug Abuse Prevention and Health Coordinating Group. The membership and chairman of each Coordinating Group shall be designated by the Chairman of the Board.

Sec. 4. Conforming Amendments. (a) Section 1 of Executive Order No. 12368 is amended to provide as follows:

"The Office of Policy Development has been assigned to assist the President and the National Drug Policy Board in the performance of the drug policy functions contained in Section 201 of Title II of the Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act, as amended (21 U.S.C. 1111). Within the Office of Policy Development, the Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office shall be primarily responsible for assisting the President and the Board in the performance of those functions."

(b) Section 2 of Executive Order No. 12368 is amended by deleting "Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office" and inserting in lieu thereof "National Drug Policy Board" and by deleting "he" and inserting in lieu thereof "the National Drug Policy Board."

Ronald Reagan

The White House,
March 26, 1987.

[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 10:31 a.m., March 27, 1987]

Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987

Remarks on Signing the Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R. 2 Without Approval. March 27, 1987

The President. If the American people need any further proof as to who's responsible for the deficit, all they have to do is look at this \$87½ billion budget-busting highway and transit bill passed by Congress last week. The bill's a textbook example of special interest, pork-barrel politics at work, and I have no choice but to veto it.

In doing so, let me stress that I'm not only willing but anxious to sign a responsible bill to continue highway and transit programs. And, in fact, the Secretary of Transportation, Elizabeth Dole, at my direction, has drafted legislation that addresses our most serious objections. The Congress need only pass this cleaned-up version, send it down next week, and I'll sign the bill within the hour.

I also want to reaffirm my strong support for allowing the States the authority to return to the 65-mile-an-hour speed limit. It's long past due. But I'm not going to sacrifice this country's economic well-being, and that's the issue—jobs and economic growth. And it's time for me to start writing. And that is the veto on top of the bill.

Reporter. Are you going to give the bad news to the Japanese today—retaliation?

The President. I don't know just what time we're making that, but I think we're going to be speaking on that subject pretty soon.

Q. Are you going to do it?

Q. Are you worried that the question yesterday asked by Heather Watson took attention away from your education message?

The President. I'm worried that I seem to be the only one that interpreted the question correctly. I am convinced in my own mind that she asked specifically about the trouble and was the cause worth it. And I answered in that way. I was shocked and surprised to find that the other guy—he thought that there—she was just asking generally about is the whole job worth it. And if I'm wrong, I was wrong. But I believe that I answered her question. As a matter of fact, I heard the word Iran.

Note: The President spoke at 11:01 a.m. in the Oval Office at the White House.

As printed above, the remarks follow the White House Press release.

Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987

Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.R. 2 Without Approval. March 27, 1987

To the House of Representatives:

I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 2, the "Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987." I want to make clear that I strongly favor an adequate and fiscally responsible Federal-aid highway and transit program, and I support the provisions in H.R. 2 that would provide essential funds for legitimate transportation construction and safety projects. I also support allowing the States to raise their speed limits on rural interstate highways to 65 miles per hour. However, the bill authorizes excessive funding levels of \$87.5 billion over 5 years, \$10.1 billion more than my original request and more than is brought in by highway user taxes. It includes unjustifiable funding for narrow, individual special interest highway and transit construction projects, and it unfairly distributes transit funds. All of these reasons force me to veto H.R. 2.

a0739-----

r a AM-Bennett-Drugs 12-16 0529

^AM-Bennett-Drugs, 0540<

^Bennett Invites Principals to Call New Hotline for Anti-Drug Help<

^By LEE MITGANG=

^AP Education Writer=

NEW YORK (AP) _ Secretary of Education William J. Bennett on Wednesday invited school principals to call his department if they feel hobbled by 'unresponsive' school bureaucracy in their fight against drug abuse.

Bennett said approximately \$2 million from his department's discretionary funds was being set aside to help schools facing a serious, immediate threat from illegal drug use _ especially schools where 'the forces of inertia or unresponsive local and state education bureaucracies are standing in the way of getting drugs out of a school.'

He invited principals or others who feel they need federal help in fighting their drug problems to call a special number at his department: 202-732-3566, 'tell us what you need, and we will work to see that resources and assistance are provided up to the limits of our legal authority.'

Bennett's offer, made in an address before the White House Conference for a Drug Free America which is meeting here this week, drew an immediate angry response from a spokesman for the American Association of School Administrators, who called it 'just part of his ongoing attack on the public schools.'

'I don't believe it's appropriate for the secretary to insinuate that the people who deal with these problems every day aren't giving it a great deal of attention. It's the kind of heroics that we've seen from the department ever since Bennett became secretary,' said Gary Marx, associate executive director of the school administrators' group.

MORE,,

BENNETT-DRUGS continued...

Bennett told reporters following his speech: "We go out on school visits, and I can tell you that in more than one situation we talk to school officials who say there's no problem, and the next conversation we have is with the police and local narcotics officials who say there is a very serious problem."

Bennett aimed his offer mainly at principals of drug-ridden schools. But he told reporters he hoped teachers, parents, or anyone else who believed that their school has a drug problem that local school authorities were unwilling or unable to solve would call his department as well.

"We'll still need some kind of piece of paper which gives us a legal entity to which to send the money. But yeah, we want to hear what's going on," he said.

Asked what kind of help his department might provide, he said, "anything that the law allows. Supposing somebody needs an adviser quick on a law enforcement situation. Supposing you have a situation where drugs are pouring into the school and they haven't been able to keep pushers out, or keep outsiders from getting into the schools. There are people who know about those things."

"We can help hire someone to come in for a few days to supplement local security. Or it can be in the area of curriculum. It can be to build a fence, it can be locks."

Asked if principals might be risking their jobs by calling the federal government to inform them of "unresponsive" local school authorities, Bennett said: "That's obviously an individual matter. Everyone will want to make their own judgment."

AP-BA-12-16 1542EST<

MRS. REAGAN'S REMARKS
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE FOR A DRUG FREE AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1988

-- THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT. I KNOW WHO'S BOSS IN THIS FAMILY.

-- BUT I CAN'T TELL YOU HOW GOOD IT FEELS TO BE HERE AT THIS CONFERENCE WITH SO MANY PEOPLE UNITED IN COMMON PURPOSE. ALTHOUGH THE DRUG PROBLEM IS STILL DESTRUCTIVE, THE NATION HAS COME A LONG WAY IN ITS BATTLE AGAINST DRUGS, AND YOUR PRESENCE HERE TODAY PROVES IT.

-- AT LEAST WE REALIZE THERE IS A DRUG PROBLEM TODAY. IN SATURDAY'S "WASHINGTON POST," THERE WAS ONE PAGE IN WHICH EVERY ARTICLE WAS A LOCAL DRUG STORY -- AND THERE WAS ANOTHER LOCAL DRUG STORY ON THE FRONT PAGE. WE MUST FACE THE FACT THAT DRUGS ARE TEARING OUR COMMUNITIES APART.

-- ALTHOUGH I'VE BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS PROBLEM SINCE MY DAYS IN SACRAMENTO, OVER THE PAST NEARLY 8 YEARS, I'VE FOCUSED MAINLY ON EDUCATION, ON PREVENTION, AND ON THE NEED TO CHANGE ATTITUDES. ALTHOUGH WE'RE MAKING PROGRESS, STILL MANY IGNORANT IDEAS PERSIST. ONE OF THE WORST IS THE CASUAL USER'S JUSTIFICATION THAT DRUG USE IS A VICTIMLESS CRIME, THAT DRUGS DON'T HURT ANYONE EXCEPT THE PERSON WHO'S USING THEM. YET THERE ARE CONSEQUENCES TO DRUG USE BEYOND AN INDIVIDUAL'S PERSONAL AND SELFISH HIGH. AND THAT'S WHAT I WANT TO TALK WITH YOU ABOUT THIS MORNING.

-- A FEW WEEKS AGO, THE DRUG CARTEL MURDERED COLOMBIA'S ATTORNEY GENERAL, CARLOS MAURO HOYOS, WHO WAS ACTIVE IN TRYING TO HALT COCAINE TRAFFIC TO THE UNITED STATES. HALF A DOZEN MEN IN

THREE JEEPS RAN HIS CAR INTO A CURB, SPRAYED IT WITH MACHINE GUN FIRE AND KILLED HIS TWO BODY GUARDS. MR. HOYOS WAS LATER FOUND, BLINDFOLDED AND HANDCUFFED, HIS SKULL SHATTERED WITH BULLETS.

-- AND, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE PEOPLE WHO CASUALLY USE COCAINE ARE RESPONSIBLE, BECAUSE THEIR MONEY BOUGHT THE BULLETS. THEY PROVIDED THE HIGH STAKES THAT MURDERED THOSE MEN, PLUS HUNDREDS OF OTHERS IN COLOMBIA, INCLUDING SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 21 JUDGES HANDLING DRUG CASES AND SCORES OF POLICEMEN AND SOLDIERS.

-- THE NOTION THAT THE MELLOW MARIJUANA USER DOESN'T HURT ANYONE IS JUST AS PHONY. AS A RESULT OF AN INTENSIVE EFFORT BY THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION IN GUADALAJARA, MEXICO AND PARTICULARLY SPECIAL AGENT ENRIQUE CAMARENA, OVER 10,000 ACRES OF MARIJUANA THAT WERE READY FOR HARVEST AND EVENTUAL SALE IN THE U.S. WERE DESTROYED. THIS CAUSED A MAJOR FINANCIAL LOSS FOR A NOTORIOUS TRAFFICKING GROUP.

-- ON FEBRUARY 7, 1985, LESS THAN THREE MONTHS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE 10,000 ACRE PLANTATION, SPECIAL AGENT CAMARENA WAS KIDNAPPED BY THE TRAFFICKERS. HE WAS TORTURED AND BEATEN TO DEATH. AND THIS COUNTRY'S CASUAL MARIJUANA USERS CANNOT ESCAPE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR FELLOW AMERICAN'S DEATH, BECAUSE THEY, IN EFFECT, BOUGHT THE TOOLS FOR HIS TORTURE.

-- AS YOU KNOW, MANY OTHERS HAVE HAD THEIR LIVES TAKEN TO PROTECT OUR SOCIETY FROM THE CORRUPTION OF DRUGS. TWO DEA AGENTS IN CALIFORNIA WERE KILLED JUST THIS MONTH. LAST WEEK WHILE GUARDING THE HOME OF A WITNESS IN A DRUG CRIME, A ROOKIE

POLICEMAN IN NEW YORK WAS ASSASSINATED IN HIS PATROL CAR. THE TRAFFICKERS AND DEALERS WILL MURDER ANYONE WHO STANDS IN THEIR WAY. RECENTLY, A INNOCENT YOUNG GIRL IN LOS ANGELES WAS SHOT TO DEATH IN THE CROSS FIRE BETWEEN TWO RIVAL DRUG GANGS. WHO WILL TELL THE GRIEF-STRICKEN FAMILIES THAT DRUG USE IS A VICTIMLESS CRIME?

-- THE CASUAL USER MAY THINK WHEN HE TAKES A LINE OF COCAINE OR SMOKES A JOINT IN THE PRIVACY OF HIS NICE CONDO, LISTENING TO HIS EXPENSIVE STEREO, THAT HE'S SOMEHOW NOT BOTHERING ANYONE. BUT THERE IS A TRAIL OF DEATH AND DESTRUCTION THAT LEADS DIRECTLY TO HIS DOOR. THE CASUAL USER CANNOT MORALLY ESCAPE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTIONS OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND DEALERS. I'M SAYING, THAT IF YOU'RE A CASUAL DRUG USER, YOU ARE AN ACCOMPLICE TO MURDER.

-- THE CASUAL USER ALSO CANNOT MORALLY ESCAPE ASSOCIATION WITH THOSE WHO USE DRUGS AND THEN ENDANGER THE PUBLIC SAFETY. THE MESSAGE FROM CASUAL USE IS THAT DRUGS ARE ACCEPTABLE, THAT THEY CAN BE HANDLED, THAT SOMEHOW IT'S SIMPLY A MATTER OF DOSAGE. CASUAL USE SETS THE TONE FOR TOLERANCE AND THAT TOLERANCE HAS KILLED.

-- ANNE AND ARTHUR JOHNSON ARE FROM POTOMAC, MARYLAND. THEY'RE WITH US TODAY AND I'LL INTRODUCE YOU TO THEM LATER. ON JANUARY 4, 1987, THE JOHNSON'S DAUGHTER -- 20-YEAR-OLD CHRISTY -- WAS TAKING THE TRAIN TO NEW YORK TO VISIT HER SISTER BEFORE HEADING BACK TO CLASSES AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY. THE SUNDAY AFTERNOON AMTRAK TRAIN WAS CROWDED WITH STUDENTS RETURNING TO

SCHOOL AND FAMILIES RETURNING HOME FROM THE CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR'S HOLIDAYS.

-- UNKNOWN TO THE PASSENGERS, A CONRAIL LOCOMOTIVE PASSED SEVERAL WARNING SIGNALS AND CROSSED INTO THE PATH OF THE AMTRAK TRAIN. THE CRASH KILLED 16 INNOCENT PEOPLE AND INJURED 175 OTHERS. CHRISTY NEVER MADE IT TO HER SISTER'S; SHE WAS KILLED IN THE CRASH.

-- THE INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THAT THE ENGINEER AND BRAKEMAN ON THE CONRAIL TRAIN WERE SMOKING MARIJUANA PRIOR TO THE CRASH -- SIXTEEN PEOPLE KILLED BECAUSE OF AN ENGINEER'S PERSONAL INDULGENCE IN A JOINT OF MARIJUANA. DON'T TELL THE JOHNSONS THAT CASUAL DRUG USE IS A VICTIMLESS CRIME. DON'T TRY TO TELL THE JOHNSONS THAT DRUGS HURT NO ONE BUT THE USER.

-- SEVERAL OF THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS WHO WERE KILLED IN THE WRECK TESTIFIED BEFORE THE SENATE LAST WEEK IN FAVOR OF MANDATORY DRUG TESTING FOR RAILROAD PERSONNEL. THE ENGINEER AND BRAKEMAN ALSO CALLED FOR SUCH TESTING, SAYING THAT ALCOHOL AND DRUG USE WAS WIDE SPREAD WITHIN THE INDUSTRY. SENATOR DANFORTH TOLD THE FAMILIES "YOU WILL NOT WIN THIS QUICKLY; YOU HAVE TO FAN THE FLAME OF RAGE." AND THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT WE MUST DO -- "WE MUST FAN THE FLAME OF RAGE."

-- LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I WANT TO MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR CASUAL USERS TO ESCAPE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY INNOCENT DEATH DUE TO DRUGS. I WANT TO MAKE THEM FULLY FACE THE BRUTALITY OF DRUG USE. I DON'T MIND ADMITTING THAT I HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT TELLING THE FOLLOWING TWO STORIES, BECAUSE THEY ARE REAL STORIES

OF ANGUISH AND INHUMAN BRUTALITY. YET, BETTY JEAN SPENCER, AND VINCE AND ROBERTA ROPER CANNOT IGNORE THE BRUTALITY OF DRUGS; THEY LIVE WITH IT EVERY DAY. THEY ARE WITH US TODAY, AND IF THEY CANNOT FORGET, NEITHER SHOULD WE.

-- FIRST, LET ME TELL YOU ABOUT BETTY JEAN SPENCER. MRS. SPENCER WAS AT HOME IN HER RURAL FARM HOUSE IN INDIANA WITH HER FOUR SONS. THEY WERE 14, 16, 18, AND 22 YEARS OLD. FOUR MEN BARGED INTO THE HOUSE, MEN OUT ON BAIL ON DRUG TRAFFICKING CHARGES. THE MEN DID NOT KNOW HER. THEY DID NOT KNOW HER SONS. MRS. SPENCER SAYS THEY WERE OBVIOUSLY HIGH ON SOMETHING; THEY WERE LAUGHING ABOUT THE OTHER PEOPLE THEY WERE GOING TO KILL WHEN THEY FINISHED THERE.

-- THEY ORDERED MRS. SPENCER AND HER FOUR SONS TO LINE UP FACE DOWN ON THE FLOOR, AND THEN THE MEN BEGAN SHOOTING THEM AT POINT BLANK RANGE WITH A SHOTGUN. MRS. SPENCER MIRACULOUSLY SURVIVED TWO SHOTGUN BLASTS TO THE BACK OF HER HEAD. HER SONS WERE MURDERED. THE MEN ARE IN PRISON.

-- THAT IS A BRUTAL, BRUTAL STORY. IT MAKES ME ANGRY. AND NO ONE -- ABSOLUTELY NO ONE -- SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SAY THAT DRUG USE IS A VICTIMLESS CRIME. NO ONE SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH THE ARGUMENT THAT DRUGS ARE A HARMLESS, PRIVATE, INDULGENCE.

-- FINALLY, LET ME TELL YOU THE NIGHTMARE THAT VINCE AND ROBERTA ROPER MUST ENDURE. THEIR DAUGHTER STEPHANIE, A 22-YEAR-OLD STUDENT, WAS RETURNING TO SCHOOL IN MARYLAND WHEN HER CAR BROKE DOWN. TWO MEN OFFERED ASSISTANCE. THEY DROVE HER A SHORT DISTANCE IN THEIR CAR, PULLED A GUN ON HER AND EACH RAPED HER. THEY DROVE TO ANOTHER LOCATION AND RAPED HER AGAIN.

-- THEY THEN DECIDED TO KILL HER. I DON'T WANT TO REPEAT WHAT THEY DID TO HER, BUT WE CANNOT IGNORE THE BRUTALITY OF DRUGS. . . ONE OF THE MEN WHIPPED STEPHANIE ON THE HEAD WITH A CHAIN. AS SHE TRIED TO RUN AWAY, HE SHOT HER. HE THEN POURED GASOLINE ON HER AND SET FIRE TO HER. BOTH MEN WERE USERS OF PCP, LSD, AMPHETAMINES, BARBITURATES AND VIRTUALLY ANY DRUG THEY COULD OBTAIN.

-- WHO WOULD DARE STAND BEFORE THE ROPERS AND TELL THEM DRUG USE IS A VICTIMLESS CRIME? WHAT APOLOGIST FOR CASUAL DRUG USE WILL LOOK THE ROPERS IN THE EYES AND SAY IT'S ALL A MATTER OF MODERATION? WHO COULD BE SO BRAZEN? YET THE ATTITUDE PREVAILS.

-- APPLAUSE ISN'T APPROPRIATE -- A HUG OR A SQUEEZE OF THE HAND WHEN YOU LEAVE WOULD MEAN MORE -- BUT I'D LIKE TO INTRODUCE YOU TO BETTY JEAN SPENCER. . . ANNE AND ARTHUR JOHNSON. . . VINCE AND ROBERTA ROPER. LET EACH OF US HERE PROMISE THEM THAT WE WILL NOT LET ANYONE FORGET THE BRUTALITY OF DRUGS.

-- YOU KNOW, IN THE FIELD OF DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE THERE'S SOMETHING CALLED THE ENABLING CONCEPT -- IF I DON'T DO SOMETHING ABOUT YOUR BEHAVIOR, THEN I ENABLE IT TO HAPPEN. SOCIETY'S ATTITUDE HAS ENABLED THE CASUAL USER TO AVOID FACING HIS ROLE IN THE MURDER AND BRUTALITY BEHIND DRUGS. WE CAN NO LONGER LET THE CASUAL USER CONTINUE WITHOUT PAYING THE MORAL PENALTY.

-- WE MUST BE ABSOLUTELY UNYIELDING AND INFLEXIBLE IN OUR OPPOSITION TO DRUG USE. THERE IS NO MIDDLE GROUND. WE MUST BE AS ADAMANT ABOUT THE CASUAL USER AS WE ARE ABOUT THE ADDICT. AND WHEREAS THE ADDICT DESERVES OUR HELP, THE CASUAL USER DESERVES

OUR CONDEMNATION. HE COULD EASILY STOP AND YET CHOOSES NOT TO DO SO. HE MUST BE MADE TO FEEL THE BURDEN OF BRUTALITY AND CORRUPTION FOR WHICH HE IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE. WE MUST GET OUT THE MESSAGE -- WE WILL NOT STAND FOR ILLICIT DRUG USE OF ANY KIND, PERIOD.

-- AND THERE'S ANOTHER MESSAGE THAT I WANT TO GET OUT TO ALL OF YOU HERE TODAY. AND THAT IS A MESSAGE OF GRATITUDE FOR YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS. YOU'RE THE PEOPLE WHO WILL EVENTUALLY TURN THE TIDE. YOU'RE THE ONES WHO WILL MAKE THE DIFFERENCE.

-- MANY OF YOU HAVE BEEN WITH ME FROM THE VERY BEGINNING IN ONE CAPACITY OR ANOTHER. AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT WHEN MY HUSBAND AND I RETURN TO CALIFORNIA, I'M NOT GIVING UP MY INTEREST AND CONCERN ABOUT THIS. YOU'RE NOT GOING TO LOSE ME. IN FACT, I'LL BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE NANCY REAGAN CENTER IN LOS ANGELES TO BE RUN BY PHOENIX HOUSE. THE CENTER WILL INCLUDE A RESIDENTIAL HIGH SCHOOL FOR YOUNG PEOPLE IN TREATMENT. . . A TRAINING UNIT. . . AND A RESEARCH UNIT. I HOPE THE CENTER WILL BECOME A PLACE WHERE WE CAN DEVELOP NEW METHODS, TEST NEW APPROACHES AND DISCOVER NEW ANSWERS.

-- ANNE MORROW LINDBERGH WROTE, "ONE CAN NEVER PAY IN GRATITUDE, ONE CAN ONLY PAY 'IN KIND' SOMEWHERE ELSE IN LIFE." I'M HOPING THAT THIS CENTER WILL BE ONE WAY I MAY REPAY ALL OF YOU FOR THE SUPPORT AND LOVE AND ENCOURAGEMENT YOU'VE GIVEN ME OVER THE PAST 8 YEARS.

-- THANK YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND THANK YOU FOR WHAT YOU'RE DOING FOR OUR NATION.



U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Attorney General

3/8/88

Pam:

This is unedited.

Carol Miles
633-2107

J:
Per your
request.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

THE SECRETARY

March 21, 1988
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.3(a)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By NARA COB Date 12/21/07

MEMORANDUM FOR TOM C. GRISCOM
Assistant to the President
for Communications and Planning

SUBJECT: Drug Policy

As a follow-up to my earlier memorandum to Ed Meese you asked for my thoughts on what we should do to make a better case for our efforts against illegal drugs.

I do not believe we can defend our position merely by more aggressively placing our record before the public. This just won't sell. We have done a lot, and much of the credit for what we have done belongs to Ed Meese. Nonetheless, our case is hard to make for two reasons: 1) we are not solving the drug problem -- in particular, the consumption of cocaine and crack has greatly increased on our watch; and 2) we are not doing all we can to reduce the drug trade.

I know that some will say all that can be done has been done regarding the use of the military and our intelligence resources. But I do not agree. I understand the military's reluctance to enter this area; they have been burned and want to avoid an unclear and open-ended responsibility that could get them burned again. Nevertheless we must do more and I believe we can do more on the supply side using military resources. Getting tougher on supply is a necessary part of getting tougher on demand.

TWO IMMEDIATE STEPS

1. We must create a clear, coherent plan for reducing the drug trade that we can effectively present in public. Without such a plan we are in a losing position every time our critics raise the issue. The public is convinced of the President's and Mrs. Reagan's deep concern about the drug problem, but that does not mean they are convinced the rest of the Administration has done all it should have done. When pressed, our spokesmen generally claim we are working to reduce both supply and demand without

demonstrating that we have realistic plans for substantially reducing either. And it is not enough to say simply that we have spent more money on this problem than any other Administration.

2. It is time to get off the defensive and take the initiative away from our opponents. This Wednesday, March 23rd, Senators DeConcini and D'Amato will introduce a new omnibus anti-drug bill with a variety of provisions, most of which I think we should support. Why not announce Administration support for the broad principles embodied in the bill when it is introduced? We can work to improve the legislation as it moves through Congress, but we should get out front on this issue and completely remove the charge that we are complacent about the sufficiency of our present efforts against drugs.

Creating a defensible account of our policy and aggressively supporting a major Congressional legislative proposal to strengthen anti-drug efforts are two immediate things I think we should pursue.

I would be happy to discuss these proposals at greater length if you wish, and I am enclosing a summary of the DeConcini-D'Amato bill.



William J. Bennett

JOHN C. STENNIS, MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN

ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
WILLIAM PROXMIRE, WISCONSIN
DANIEL K. INOUE, HAWAII
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
LAWTON CHILES, FLORIDA
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, LOUISIANA
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, NORTH CAROLINA
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT
JIM SASSER, TENNESSEE
DENNIS DYCONCINI, ARIZONA
DALE BUMPERS, ARKANSAS
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, NEW JERSEY
TOM HARRIS, IOWA
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND
HARRY REID, NEVADA

MARK O. HATFIELD, OREGON
TED STEVENS, ALASKA
LOWELL P. WICKER, JR., CONNECTICUT
JAMES A. MCCLURE, IDAHO
JAKE GARN, UTAH
THAD COCHRAN, MISSISSIPPI
ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR., WISCONSIN
ALFONSO M. D'AMATO, NEW YORK
WARREN RUOMAN, NEW HAMPSHIRE
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
PETE V. DOMENICI, NEW MEXICO
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA
DON NICKLES, OKLAHOMA

FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN, STAFF DIRECTOR
J. KEITH KENNEDY, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6025

March 17, 1988

Dear Colleague:

On Wednesday, March 23, 1988 we will introduce the "Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988" -- a comprehensive bill that will attack the national drug abuse and drug trafficking problem on multiple fronts. We hope that you will join us in resurrecting the momentum of the successful, bipartisan Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-570) and cosponsor this important follow-on legislation.

The bill that we will introduce next Wednesday contains a number of new, innovative and balanced approaches to addressing both the demand and supply sides of the narcotics problem. A detailed summary of the bill is attached for your reference, but here are a few of the highlights of what this important legislation does:

- Resurrects and streamlines the State and Local narcotics control grant program by providing \$1.5 billion over 3 years, including \$250 million next year, to help State and local law enforcement agencies attack the drug problem where it is most acute -- at the local level;
- Provides \$600 million over three years for a new international economic incentive grant program to encourage drug source countries, particularly in Latin America, to eradicate 40 percent of their illicit drug crops over a three year period;
- Launches a major frontal assault on the demand side of the drug threat, by providing an additional \$485 million over the President's budget next year for alcohol and drug abuse bloc grants, including, for the first time, authority to spend up to 40 percent of these grants for construction of new and renovation of existing alcohol and drug treatment facilities;
- Increases the President's drug education effort by \$50 million in fiscal 1989 and tightens controls so that the most effective and innovative programs are funded and closely monitored.
- Increases funding authorization for additional drug enforcement personnel, drug interdiction assets, and operations money for the Coast Guard, the D.E.A., the Customs Service, Border Patrol, and other law enforcement bureaus; and

- ° Authorizes, for the first time, \$400 million over three years for direct assistance to State and local governments for construction of new jails and prisons and aid to eliminate jail overcrowding (80-20 matching program/Federal-State)

It is our hope that the House and Senate leadership will move promptly to take up this omnibus drug bill at the earliest opportunity this Spring so that the Budget Committees, the Appropriations Committees, and the appropriate authorizing committees can incorporate the provisions of this bill into their legislative plans for fiscal year 1989 and beyond. We believe that our bill hits every important aspect of the anti-drug effort and carefully allocates resources between the supply and demand sides of the drug problems.

On March 23rd, at 2:00 P.M. in Room SD-192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, we will be holding a press conference following the introduction of the bill. You are, of course, cordially invited to attend and participate in that event. If you or your staff have any questions about the bill or our strategy for moving this legislation through the Congress this year, please call on us or the following members of our staffs: Bobby Mills of Senator DeConcini's Appropriations staff, 4-6280; Tim Carlsgaard of Senator DeConcini's staff, 4-4521; or Morgan Hardiman of Senator D'Amato's staff, 4-6542.

We look forward to your cosponsorship and participation in the Wednesday press conference.

With best wishes.



Dennis DeConcini
United States Senator



Alfonse D'Amato
United States Senator

Summary Analysis of the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988

Title I-- Drug Enforcement and Personnel Enhancement

Subtitle A. Asset Forfeiture Fund Amendments Act of 1988.

- makes certain changes to the Treasury and Justice Department Asset Seizure funds to allow those funds to be more easily provided to state and local agencies which contributed to the seizure
- allows some of those funds from the Justice account to be used for prison construction.
- removes caps from those funds and takes the use of those funds off-budget.

Subtitle B. State and Local Narcotics Control Assistance.

- authorizes the Bureau of Justice Assistance (which expires this year) and requires that the BJA Administrator be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate
- requires each state to submit a "master" plan or strategy which encompasses demand reduction, education, and law enforcement programs and delineates 30 different purposes for which these funds can be used
- establishes an expedited grant system for metropolitan areas with a population over 500,000.
- provides accountability by implementing reporting and feedback requirements (providing funds to carry out the same), while identifying those programs which are successful, with the intent of encouraging similar programs.
- sets up a three-year approach by which a program funded in the first year would receive the same funding for the following two years, and authorizes \$250 million the first year, \$500 million the second year, and \$750 million in the third year.
- authorizes \$100 million in fiscal 89, \$150 million in fiscal 90, and \$200 million in fiscal 91, for criminal justice facility construction for state and local governments.

Subtitle C. Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988.

- identical to S1861, a bill to suppress the diversion and trafficking of precursor chemical and other chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of controlled substances.

Subtitle D. Comprehensive Federal Law Enforcement Officer Improvements Act of 1988.

- makes certain provisions for law enforcement officers, including increased death benefits for all federal, state, and local officers.
- establishes a National Advisory Commission on Law Enforcement to report to the President within six months.

Subtitle E. Deportation of Convicted Foreign Drug Inmates.

- provides for the deportation of "violent criminal aliens" who have been convicted of an aggravated violent felony, while providing safeguards.

Subtitle F. Customs Enforcement Amendments Act of 1988

-- provides for the inspection of vessels by Customs officers under certain conditions on the high seas.

-- clarifies current law regarding transfer of seized assets to contributing state and local law enforcement agencies and foreign governments.

-- authorizes the Secretary of State to revoke the passport of any individual convicted of a felony narcotics violation.

Subtitle H. Authorization of Additional Appropriations for Drug Enforcement Personnel, Fiscal Year 1989

-- Coast Guard. \$45 million and 800 FTE's above the President's request.

-- Border Patrol. \$20 million and 500 FTE's above President's request.

-- INS. \$3 million and 50 criminal investigator FTE's above President's request.

-- ATF. \$8 million and 140 FTE's over President's request, including 10 FTE's to establish a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Drug Education officers program, and certain reimbursements for state and local personnel.

-- DEA. \$60 million and 224 FTE's above the President's request, including five FTE's for program similar to above.

-- FBI. \$38 million and 400 FTE's above the President's request, including five FTE's for program similar to above.

-- Marshals Service. \$73.8 million above the President's request to be used as follows:

- 1) \$11.5 and 230 FTE's for asset seizure and forefieture activities
- 2) \$30.7 and 20 FTE's for jail cell renovations including Cooperative Agreement Program projects.
- 3) \$10 million and 188 FTE's for criminal justice support activities.
- 4) \$6.2 million and 104 FTE's for protection of the federal judiciary and federal courts due to increased drug-related trials.
- 5) \$4.6 million and 60 FTE's for Witness Security Program.
- 6) \$10.8 and 139 FTE's for fugitive programs.

Subtitle I.

-- authorizes \$150 million for new federal prison construction

Subtitle J.

-- authorizes rewards for information on narcotics fugitives

-- prohibits dangerous weapons in federal courthouses

-- establishes Marshals Service offices in foreign countries for fugitive apprehension programs

-- authorizes payments to state and local jurisdictions for the housing and care of persons in Marshals Service custody.

Title II. International Narcotics Control and Assistance to Foreign Countries

Subtitle A. International Drug Eradication Improvement Program

- establishes an International Special Operations Drug Eradication Squadron within State for use in source countries.
- authorizes an additional \$12 million for the procurement of aircraft, equipment, O&M, and salaries and expenses for the Squadron
- requires the Secretary of State to establish strict criteria and guidelines for employing the squadron.

Subtitle B. International Narcotics Matters Improvement and Special Assistance Programs.

- establishes a three-year grant program under AID for source countries which meet specific eradication goals (15 percent verifiable in the first year, 40 percent by the third year to be determined by DEA)
- authorizes \$200 million for the program for each of the three years
- directs the Comptroller General to monitor the program, and provides for a panel of Administration and Congressional representatives to assess the program after three years.

Subtitle C. Amendments to Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended.

- implements certain changes to the reporting requirements of the Act concerning the cooperation of source and transshipment countries in narcotics control.

Subtitle D. International Narcotics Matters Authorization of Appropriations.

- authorizes \$138 million in the first year and \$150 million for the second year for INM
- \$500,000 to be used for coca eradication research
- \$900,000 to provide protective equipment for aircraft used in narcotic eradication and interdiction efforts in source or transshipment countries upon notification of Congress
- \$2 million to be used for training in foreign countries relating to narcotics control
- allows funds withheld from non-cooperating countries to be used for narcotics control in cooperating countries.
- provides certain assistance for Bolivia; limits amount of funds which can be made available to Mexico; provides other foreign assistance programs involving education and reporting.

Subtitle E. Latin American Anti-Drug Strike Force

- creates within State an Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Western Hemisphere Anti-Drug Efforts
- directs the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a plan for a Latin American strike force to eradicate and interdict narcotics in the Western Hemisphere (outside the U.S. and its territories)

-- would involve Latin American personnel using U.S.-provided resources

Title III. Drug Interdiction Asset Improvement and Enhancement.

Subtitle A. Coast Guard.

-- provides \$186 million for marine and air interdiction assets and for O&M.

Subtitle B. Customs.

-- provides \$110 million for Air Interdiction assets and \$15 million for salaries and expenses.

Subtitle C. Department of Defense.

-- provides \$75 million for four aerostats, \$15 million for surveillance flights and related purposes, and \$10 million for assets in establishing the Latin American Strike Force.

Subtitle D. DEA.

-- provides \$84 million for the establishment of an International Drug Interdiction helicopter force similar to OPBAT; \$4 million will go to EPIC for enhancing tactical intelligence.

Subtitle E. INS/Border Patrol

-- \$10 million for Border Patrol equipment.

Subtitle F. Establishment of Interagency Southwest Border Drug Interdiction Mobile Corridor Task Force.

-- provides \$15 million for 100 Border Patrol, 25 Customs, and 25 DEA agents assigned to two mobile corridor operations forces, with line authority given to joint commanders.

Subtitle G. U.S.-Bahamas Drug Interdiction Task Force.

-- authorizes \$13 million for joint efforts.

Subtitle H. Special Drug Interdiction Support.

-- authorizes grant programs for procurement of assets to to Puerto Rico (\$7 million), Jamaica (\$7 million), Dominican Republic (\$5 million), Hawaii (\$7 million).

Title IV. Demand Reduction.

Subtitle A. Treatment and Rehabilitation.

-- authorizes \$20 million for grants to emphasize community based residential treatment services such as halfway houses and therapeutic communities, including the purchase of land and construction of facilities.

Subtitle B. Alcohol and Drug Abuse Treatment and Rehabilitation Act of 1988.

-- authorizes \$558 million in first year, and \$583 million in the second year, and \$608 million in the third year for Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Bloc Grant program

-- authorizes \$600 million in the first year, \$625 million in the second year, \$650 million in the third year for Substance Abuse Emergency Drug Treatment Programs.

Subtitle C. Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act Amendments of 1988.

-- authorizes \$300 million in the first year, \$350 million in the second year, and \$350 million in the third year with specific reporting and accountability requirements.

Title V. National Drug Enforcement Agency Reorganization and Coordination.

Subtitle A. National Border Coordination and Reorganization Act of 1988.

-- establishes Office of Enforcement and Border Affairs within the Department of the Treasury, and places Coast Guard and Customs within that office.

Subtitle B. Department of Defense Drug Interdiction Reorganization.

-- establishes within ISA a Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Drug Interdiction and Enforcement with the overall duty of DoD drug interdiction and enforcement activities.

Subtitle C.

-- establishes Senate Select Committee on Narcotics

Title VI. Research and Development for Law Enforcement Agencies

Subtitle A. Establishment and Development Programs to Assist Federal Law Enforcement Agencies.

-- directs the establishment of a Research and Technology Group under the National Drug Policy Board and creates an advisory board to report to the Group

-- designates 10 existing facilities under the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Energy and other agencies as "National Technology Development Centers" to develop technologies for federal law enforcement applications.

Subtitle B. Cargo Container Drug Detection Research and Development.

-- authorizes \$5 million for developing technology.

Title VII. Drug Enforcement Training Improvement.

Subtitle A. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Improvement Act of 1988.

-- expands and improves the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and provides an additional \$10 million for fiscal 89, a total of \$45 million in fiscal 90, and a total of \$50 million in fiscal 91.

Subtitle B. Department of Justice Training Facilities Improvement Act of 1988.

-- provides an additional \$10 million for existing Justice facilities, and \$10 million for new facilities.

Subtitle C.

-- provides a total of \$11 million to establish a foreign language training program for special agents of federal civilian drug enforcement agencies within the Departments of Defense and State.

Subtitle D. Special Training Centers.

-- provides \$10 million for the establishment of a National Training Center in El Reno, Oklahoma, to train Federal, state, and local prison officials in drug rehabilitation programs targeted to criminals convicted of drug-related crimes.

Subtitle VIII. Drug Testing in the Private Workplace.

-- requires that laboratories performing drug testing for the private workplace meet certain minimum standards, and that no action be taken against an employee or applicant based on a test from a laboratory not meeting those minimum standards.

Title IX. Congressional Policy Regarding Additional Funding For Fiscal Year 1989 For Anti-Drug Abuse Programs.

-- provides for the continuity of funding for the programs authorized in the Act.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

SPEECH BY THE HONORABLE EDWIN MEESE III

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

AT THE

WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE FOR A DRUG FREE AMERICA

March 2, 1988

Washington, D.C.

P R O C E E D I N G S

ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE: Thank you very much, Gil. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. It's a pleasure for me to be here this morning and to have this opportunity both to speak to you, and also, to commend you for the interest and dedication you've shown by participating in this conference.

Let me just take a moment to say that I can't think of a better way of looking at and seeking solutions for our number one social problem than the system that Lois Harrington worked out, of having a series of regional conferences, and then culminating in this national conference, to bring the best thinking, the new ideas, and the creative approaches to dealing with what is--as you've all heard many times during the conference--the major scourge that we face at the present time.

I'd like to give a brief overview of the federal effort, and the details about the different programs will be filled in by my colleagues that will be speaking after me.

But let me just say that in 1981, my predecessor, William French Smith, after being appointed Attorney General by President Reagan, sent a task force headed by Governor Jim Thompson of Illinois, and Griffin Bell, who had been Attorney

General during the previous Administration--they went all over the country and talked to police chiefs and district attorneys, and sheriffs, other law-enforcement officials, city officials, community people--and they said what is the one thing that the federal government can do most to help you with solving the problem of violent crime in your city.

And the overwhelming response was: Do something about the drug problem. Because even 7 years ago, there was a recognition throughout the country, that the relationship between drugs and crime was a very close one. And that if we were going to have any major impact on what had been a spiraling crime rate, that had increased dramatically over two decades, we would have to do something about drugs.

Well, today, we have seen the crime rate somewhat level off. At least the dramatic growth has been somewhat curtailed, but the problem of drugs is as great as we've ever faced, and that's why, over this past 7 years, a great deal has been done since Ronald Reagan made it the number one domestic priority of his Administration.

We've taken an approach to drugs, at the federal level, that involves three basic principles. The first one is not at all a stranger to you because you've been discussing

it, and that is that it requires a two-pronged approach, working on the supply of drugs, to be sure, but also, working on the demand by taking away the market for drugs.

Secondly, that in order to be successful, we have to mobilize resources at all levels of Government, federal, state and local, and that we also have to be sure that Government is working very closely with the private sector--again, nothing new to this crowd.

And thirdly, that we recognize that it is essential to change attitudes among the public, and that's one place where I think we can see measurable progress over the past 7 years, and that as a result of attitude changes, we then can work on behavioral changes.

Behavioral changes in terms of the average American citizen, including the drug user, by trying to wean them away from drugs, on the one hand, or prevent them from getting involved, on the other, and changing behavior on the part of the drug dealers by putting them in jail, confiscating their profits, and try to take some of the profit factor out of their activities.

Now, we've done this in several ways. We have increased the resources. In 7 years, we have more than

tripled the resources that the federal government has put into all aspects of combatting drugs.

We have marshaled those resources better. For the first time in history we have a coordinated organizational mechanism in the federal government to bring together all the 37 agencies that have something that they can contribute to the battle against drugs.

The President has created the National Drug Policy Board of which I am the chairman. Dr. Bowen, who will speak in a minute, is the Vice-Chairman.

Every Cabinet member is a part of that National Drug Policy Board at the Cabinet level because we feel that every department of the Government has something that they can contribute to dealing with drugs.

Immediately beneath this we have two coordinating groups: one to coordinate the enforcement activity; the other to coordinate the prevention and health resources. And these groups do provide a tightly organized and well-coordinated effort among the agencies of Government to deal with this problem.

The third thing that we have done is we have developed a comprehensive strategy. Starting in 1982, with

the President's first strategy document, which was revised in 1984, and then with comprehensive strategic plans which were developed for enforcement in 1986 and which have since been modified by a series of implementing plans in nine fields-- everything from intelligence and interdiction, and others in the enforcement field, to treatment, prevention and research in the health and education aspects.

All of these strategies have one thing in common, and that is the recognition that the federal government has to work very closely with state and local Government, and the private sector.

Jack Lawn will tell you something about what DEA is doing to work with local police and state police organizations, so that we can have that close cooperation.

In your crowd here are eight of the United States Attorneys, because in the 93 federal judicial districts, each U.S. Attorney has been charged to develop a Law Enforcement Coordinating Council which will bring together all of the DAS and sheriffs and police chiefs in federal agencies, so that they can have a comprehensive and coordinated plan in that particular district.

We have a National Narcotic Border Interdiction

system under the leadership of the Vice President, so that we can have an effective interdiction program to try to intercept the planes and the ships, and the container cargoes that are coming into our country, in which drugs are involved.

Within the country we have the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces which operate on a regional basis to deal with the major international and interstate cartels that are operating within our border.

On the Southwest border we have Operation Alliance, where we increase the resources there, particularly of the Border Patrol and the Customs Service, where we have tried new and more flexible techniques, and where the states on our side of the border are working with their counterparts on the Mexican side of the border to improve our ability to counteract the drug smuggling that takes place along that part of our country.

And perhaps most important, we have been able to find a new source of revenue to help support both the local law-enforcement agencies in their prevention as well as their investigation and apprehension activities, as well as of course the federal agents, and that is through the asset forfeiture program.

When we go after and arrest a drug dealer or a major drug cartel, it is only too easy for those who have been arrested, as they drop out, to see others take their place and continue the enterprise.

But by going after the assets, whether they're in the form of boats or planes or cars, or bank accounts and cash, or gold bullion, or real estate, or businesses, or other forms of property, by taking away the assets, we, number one, take the profit out of the drug dealing, and secondly, we prevent somebody else from going in and using those assets to continue the criminal enterprise.

The assets that we seize and forfeit are then shared with local law enforcement that has participated in that particular investigation. So we get a double benefit out of it, both in attacking the drug dealer, and in providing additional resources for local law enforcement.

Well, these are some of the things that have been done under the drug enforcement and drug prevention and health program of this Administration.

My colleagues will go into more detail, as I mentioned, but I would just like to say one thing. As you'll notice, in each of the steps that I have described, I have

talked about improving and making progress.

I get awfully tired of having people say are we winning or losing, as though this was some kind of a sports content. This is far too serious to think of it in terms of a score at a particular point in time.

Whether or not we're going to win or lose in the long-run is going to be measured by whether we are willing to provide the resources, over a sustained period, whether we will have the dedicated commitment of Government officials and citizens, and whether we are going to be willing to stay in for the long fight.

About 15 months ago you could not pick up a news magazine without seeing a cover story talking about drugs, and then the news magazines and the newspapers and television forgot about drugs for 15 months, and all of a sudden, recently, somebody else has brought the subject up again, and they try to wake up to the fact and say, what's happened?, nobody's talked about it.

Well, a lot of people have been talking about it. It's just that some people in the media weren't listening. A lot has been done during this period of time, but the important message is a lot more needs to be done. That's why

you're here, that's why we're here, and I'm convinced that with the creative ideas that will come out of this conference, with the continued dedication and commitment on the part of you, and your colleagues in your communities, as well as those of us here in Washington, in the federal government, along with our colleagues at the state and local level, we can make progress, and ultimately--there's no doubt in my mind--that if the commitment continues, we will win. Thank you.

- - -



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

THE SECRETARY

March 14, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III

SUBJECT: Drug Policy

This Administration has done a great deal to fight the drug problem. The President and Mrs. Reagan have personally led a major change in national attitude toward illegal drug use. You have worked tirelessly to coordinate our efforts against illegal drugs, and the National Drug Policy Board has done much of what such a Board can do.

MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

But the nature of policy-making by a Board tends to limit what can be done. Instead of taking a comprehensive look at the problem and deciding what needs to be done, a Board tends to adapt its activity to the desires and capacities of the participating agencies, and tends to take as given current institutional boundaries and preferences. (I realize there have been some exceptions to this.) The tendency is to end up with an agglomeration of decisions by different agencies, rather than an overarching plan leading to directives derived from such a plan to each of the agencies.

Because of this, our actions against the drug problem have not directly followed from a comprehensive assessment of the threat. We have addressed areas of the problem within the limits of commitments that can be negotiated among participating agencies facing competing demands on their resources. These limits sometimes restrict effective planning and operational management. In some areas resources are lacking, and in others we do not respond quickly to tactical challenges. Where resources and tactical freedom are granted, it is for particular operations of limited scope and duration. What we need is a comprehensive plan for substantially reducing the drug trade and better means of overall direction.

As you know, the drug trade reacts to pressure against it like a half-filled balloon. When pressed in one area, it expands in an area of less pressure. Sudden, harsh actions in one area

may break up the drug traffic in a particular area, and this can be useful. But anti-drug efforts must seek to apply overwhelming and sustained pressure across all fronts, and must be ready to adapt to changes in tactics by the traffickers. The effectiveness of almost every action taken against a part of the problem (production, shipment, sale, and use) depends upon effective pressure simultaneously and continuously being applied, and maintained, on the other parts. I'm afraid our current structure isn't suited as well as it might be to the mounting of such comprehensive, sustained, and effective pressure.

SUGGESTIONS

What follows are some specific suggestions for strengthening our fight against drugs. These are suggestions of policies to consider; some would have to be modified or perhaps rejected upon examination. But they give a sense of the lines along which I think we need to proceed. I acknowledge that we are doing some of these things already, but not as fully or as aggressively as we might.

PRODUCTION AND SHIPPING

1. Greater intelligence resources should be devoted to gathering information on drug trafficking, particularly in Latin America, and to analyzing that information to identify critical points in the trafficking structure that can be used to disrupt drug production and shipments. Establishing effective interagency liaisons will be critical if information is to be useful for the diverse needs of the agencies working against the drug trade.
2. Formulate expanded plans for overt and covert operations to support efforts by foreign political, law enforcement, and military forces against drug traffickers. Plans should include aid to friendly foreign forces in screening and training personnel and for protecting their officials.
3. Although the military is the most capable agency for the interdiction of drug shipments, it acts only as a supporting party in our interdiction effort. It has cooperated by supplying resources when requested (chiefly to the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS), and those resources have usually been assigned for limited periods of time. It is time to give the military the mission of leading the interdiction effort and have them integrate the resources

of other participating agencies in an overall mission plan. (This would include the creation of coordinated command, control, communications and intelligence capability between the military and other interdiction forces). We know that interdiction by itself will not stop the flow of illegal drugs, but it is a necessary part of a comprehensive attack on the problem. We should therefore deploy greater military resources against the production and shipment of drugs and make this mission an important part of the mission of U.S. troops, where appropriate.

4. Implement the Customs Service recommendations for expanding the search of cargoes and mail entering the U.S., and restricting air traffic to specific, constantly monitored air lanes.
5. Build more prisons and provide additional prosecutorial resources to insure that those involved in the drug trade are punished to the full extent of the law. Insure that foreign nationals caught in the U.S. in connection with drug trafficking are tried and not merely deported, and thus permitted to resume their drug dealing. Putting individuals with trafficking skills and knowledge in prison can help disrupt the drug trade.

FIGHTING THE PUSHERS AT HOME

6. Expand forfeiture laws, raise fines to cover enforcement, court costs, and jail costs. Complete the drafting of model state and local legislation in these areas and mount a White House led campaign to have all states and localities enact such legislation.
7. Apply full White House pressure for legislation increasing sanctions for major drug dealers, including the death penalty where appropriate, and mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole for adults who involve minors in drug trafficking.
8. The easy access to firearms has put increasing fire-power in the hands of drug traffickers. We should consider supporting legislation to better manage the production, importation, and sale of automatic weapons and other firearms, as sought by the major law enforcement organizations.
9. Insure that the necessary prison space is available at the federal level to punish drug offenders as an important example for other jurisdictions, and accompany this by an

Administration effort to encourage state and local authorities to do the same. As a part of this campaign we should seek to establish the practice at all levels of requiring drug testing for extended periods for anyone given probation or parole on a drug offense.


REDUCING DEMAND

10. Rapidly expand federal, state, and local sanctions against users. Use fines and forfeiture to require all users, to the degree possible, to pay for the law enforcement and court costs to arrest and prosecute them. Set extended probationary periods and include regular drug tests as a condition of staying out of jail or avoiding further fines.
11. Make the establishment and maintenance of effective prevention programs by educational institutions a condition of receiving any federal funds. These programs should include measures such as: an annual assessment of the scope and character of drug use by students and staff; sound policies that would require firing staff and expelling or moving to a reform school those students caught selling drugs or using them repeatedly, and suspending those caught using drugs; and drug education prevention efforts.

IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DRUG TREATMENT

12. Introduce accountability in the funding of treatment programs; fund only programs that work, and establish minimum levels of performance for continued funding. Require drug testing of all those in treatment and introduce stiff sanctions for those who return to drug use after being sent to treatment in connection with criminal activity.

I look forward to discussing these suggestions with you and others as we all continue to work together on this issue of vital importance to our country and our children.


William J. Bennett

cc: Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr.