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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 18, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DIANNA G. HOLLAND

FROM:

C. DEAN MCGRATH, JR.

Wm. J.

SUBJECT:

Correspondence -- Mary E. Williams: Iceland
Summit

Ms. William's letter regarding the Iceland summit has been overtaken by events and does not, in my opinion, require a response. Therefore, I recommend that this file be closed without any further action.

**WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

☐ O - OUTGOING

☐ H - INTERNAL

☐ I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 1

Name of Correspondent: Mary E. Williams

☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Does not want news blackout in Ireland
and other concerns

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>Carroll</u>		ORIGINATOR	<u>86/10/08</u>			<u>1 1</u>
<u>CURT 24</u>		Referral Note:	<u>A/I</u>			<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:				<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:				<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:				<u>1 1</u>
		Referral Note:				<u>1 1</u>

ACTION CODES:

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to be used as Enclosure

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FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer
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Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

Royal House of Williams
837 E. Clinton St.,
Eastings, Michigan 48050

451089CU

October 5, 1986

Pres. Reagan Attornies,
White House Executive Bldg.,
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Sirs:

I am sending this letter because the National security of these United States in what democracy represents, is at stake, in regards to the "pre-Summit" or "Summit" meeting next weekend at Iceland.

I do mean that at Iceland Pres. Reagan is to "meet" and discuss certain things with Mr. Gorbachev, of the Kremlin.

The news is (1.) there is to be a "blackout" of the Press(news) during this meeting.

Stating this is denial of the press, which is Freedom of the press.

So I must state that this is not correct for the American freedom of the press to depart, for a Communist Dictator(Gorbachev).

(2.) A democracy uses a Council; a Congress and Senate with the President. This is because a President is not a Dictator.

I point out the following: BUT a DEMOCRACY CAN BE TURNED INTO A CONDITION OF TYRANNY AND NO JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE, THUS JUST AS DANGEROUS AS IN A COMMUNISTICALLY RUN COUNTRY SUCH AS THE SOVIET UNION.

IN OTHERWORDS: THE SOVIET "SYSTEM" IS OVERTAKING OUR DEMOCRACY, AND ITS ROOTS STARTED A LONG TIME AGO. SO I DECLARE THE ONLY FAULT WHICH THE MAN NAMED SEN. JOSEPH MCCARTHY HAD WAS TO OPENLY CALL CERTAIN PERSONS COMMUNISTS.

As you might be interested in learning just how a Government goes tyrannical later; but for now I am pointing out the very unacceptable that cannot, and must not be allowed at Iceland next weekend.

Those two things I listed in point one and two, above.

What this means is: a Council of men and/or women from the Washington, D.C. Congress and Senate with the Secretary of State, or whomever he delegates, must be in attendance with the President, whom is Reagan. (If this does not occur, it will be similar to just Pres. Roosevelt seated at the WW II Treaty with Churchill and Stalin; and it is not correct, and was not good enough. I mean this Council must be 100% with Pres. Reagan in what is discussed, and what is signed, next weekend at Iceland. I also mean we Americans cannot allow a blackout of the news, or a Summit without a news media. If we do, this is the allowing of Soviet system of secrecy, plus denial of the press.

I ask that you honor my words written here, for I assure you this is what the "Summit" which the Soviets badly want, is all about. And this means Freedom of the Press, and a Constitutional democracy(ours of the U.S. will have agreed to the Soviet system and how they perform, thus we will not have been the winner, at Iceland. I know because I know just how Communism works, and thus far, I feel Washington, D.C. Officials are very pacified regarding how the Soviet bosses work so they win and we lose.

Already: Washington, D.C. has America on the atheism road and denial of our Christian foundation, which even the Government is supposed to be of.

Signed: Mary E. Williams. *Mary E. Williams*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY DOLAN
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF SPEECHWRITER

FROM: C. DEAN MCGRATH, JR. 
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presidential Remarks: Dropby Briefing for
Network Anchors and Columnists on Iceland Summit

This will confirm our oral advice that Counsel's office has reviewed the above-referenced Presidential remarks and has no objection to their presentation by the President.

cc: David L. Chew

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☐ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 / 1 / 1Name of Correspondent: David L. Chew☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Presidential Remark: Display briefing for network anchors and columnists

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>CUHOLL</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>86110114</u>			<u>1</u> / <u>1</u> / <u>1</u>
<u>CUAT 24</u>	Referral Note: <u>R</u>	<u>86110114</u>		<u>S</u>	<u>86110114</u> <u>9:00</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>1</u> / <u>1</u> / <u>1</u>			<u>1</u> / <u>1</u> / <u>1</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>1</u> / <u>1</u> / <u>1</u>			<u>1</u> / <u>1</u> / <u>1</u>
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WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/13/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 9:00 a.m. October 14th

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROPBY BRIEFING FOR NETWORK ANCHORS AND COLUMNISTS

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☒	MILLER - ADMIN.	☐	☐
REGAN	☒	☐	POINDEXTER	☒	☐
MILLER - OMB	☐	☐	RYAN	☐	☒
BALL	☒	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☒
BARBOUR	☐	☐	SPRINKEL	☐	☐
BUCHANAN	☒	☐	SVAHN	☐	☐
CHEW	☐	☒	THOMAS	☒	☐
DANIELS	☒	☐	TUTTLE	☐	☐
HENKEL	☒	☐	WALLISON	☒	☐
KING	☐	☐	<u>DOLAN</u>	☐	☒
KINGON	☐	☒	_____	☐	☐
MASENG	☒	☐	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS:

Please provide any comments/recommendations directly to Tony Dolan by 9:00 a.m., Tuesday, October 14th, with an info copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

1986 OCT 14 AM 7:53

(Judge/ARD)
October 14, 1986
7:30 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROPBY BRIEFING FOR NETWORK ANCHORS AND
COLUMNISTS
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1986

Welcome to the White House. It's a particular pleasure to have you here so soon after returning from meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union.

That meeting marked new progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. For the first time on the highest level, the Soviets have talked seriously about real arms reductions for both strategic and intermediate range weapons. I can't help remembering being told just a few years ago that arms reduction was an impossible dream, but now it sets the agenda for both sides.

As you know, after a great deal of discussion, our talks came down to S.D.I. I offered to delay deployment of strategic defense for 10 years while both sides moved to eliminate all ballistic missiles. But General Secretary Gorbachev said that his demand that we give up all but laboratory research on S.D.I. -- in effect, to abandon the program -- was non-negotiable.

Now, the Soviets have had an S.D.I. program for years. They have gone beyond testing to deployment, and, as I noted last night, may be preparing to put in place a nationwide system. For us to abandon S.D.I. now would leave them with an immediate, permanent advantage and a dangerous one. This I would not do.

Abandoning S.D.I. would also leave us without an insurance policy in the event of Soviet violations of an arms reduction agreement. The Soviets have a long history of playing fast and

loose with agreements, whether it's the testing moratorium of the late fifties and early sixties, or the A.B.M. Treaty, or the SALT II agreement or, just as importantly, the Helsinki Final Act on human rights. We need protection in any general arms reduction agreement in case they should decide to burst out of it -- as they burst out of the testing moratorium -- or should find ways to stretch and distort its meaning. My guess is that Mr. Gorbachev and his colleagues understand our needs in this area. As they have so often before, they'll see if they can make us back off with a little propaganda, and then, once they find they can't, they'll return to the table and talk.

So, this is how I would sum up my meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland. We moved the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on arms reduction to an entirely new plane. We laid a strong and promising foundation for our negotiators in Geneva to build on. I am disappointed, of course, that Mr. Gorbachev decided to hold all agreements hostage to an agreement on S.D.I. During our Geneva summit, he had specifically promised not to do that with I.N.F. talks. I hope he'll at least remember that commitment in the next few weeks, because, for our part, we'll seek right away in Geneva to make actual the potential progress we made on I.N.F. in Iceland.

Now, I think you have a few questions.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY DOLAN
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
CHIEF SPEECHWRITER

FROM: C. DEAN MCGRATH, JR. *WJH*
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presidential Remarks: Dropby Briefing for
Executive Branch Officials on Iceland Summit

This will confirm our oral advice that Counsel's office has reviewed the above-referenced Presidential remarks and has no objection to their presentation by the President. We have, however, marked several editorial suggestions directly on the attached copy.

cc: David L. Chew

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☐ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 1Name of Correspondent: David L. Chew☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____

(B) _____

(C) _____

Subject: Presidential Remarks: Display Briefing for Executive Branch officers

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>IN HOLL</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>86110114</u>			<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:				
<u>CURT 24</u>	<u>R</u>	<u>86110114</u>			<u>86110114</u> <u>9:00</u>
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	Referral Note:				
		<u>1 1</u>			<u>1 1</u>
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WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/13/86 , ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 9:00 a.m. October 14th

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROPBY ICELAND BRIEFING FOR EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OFFICERS
(10/13 8:00 p.m. draft)

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☒	MILLER - ADMIN.	☐	☐
REGAN	☒	☐	POINDEXTER	☒	☐
MILLER - OMB	☐	☐	RYAN	☐	☒
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BARBOUR	☐	☐	SPRINKEL	☐	☐
BUCHANAN	☒	☐	SVAHN	☐	☐
CHEW	☐	☒	THOMAS	☒	☐
DANIELS	☒	☐	TUTTLE	☐	☐
HENKEL	☒	☐	WALLISON	☒	☐
KING	☐	☐	<u>DOLAN</u>	☐	☒
KINGON	☐	☒	_____	☐	☐
MASENG	☒	☐	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS: Please provide any comments/recommendations directly to Tony Dolan by 9:00 a.m., Tuesday, October 14th, with an info copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

1000 OCT 14 11 18

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

(Judge/ARD)
October 13, 1986
8:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROPBY ICELAND BRIEFING FOR EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OFFICERS
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1986

Welcome to the White House complex. I wanted all of you to come over this afternoon to hear first hand about our meetings in Iceland. But before I turn to my report let me first say that I couldn't have gone to Reykjavik without the hard work and dedication above and beyond the call of duty of you men and women I see before me. You labored night and day to get us ready for that meeting. And I know we sort of sprung it on you at the last minute. I'm grateful to all of you for the fine work you did.

Let me say thanks as well to the members of the small team I took with me to the meeting. They worked around the clock. A few of them got no sleep at all while we were there. I've long had great respect for every one of them, and that respect grew even stronger in those four days. They were an outstanding team, and all Americans can be proud of them and the work they did.

And you can be proud of the fruit your work is bearing for the Reykjavik meeting has set the stage for a major advance in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. At Reykjavik the Soviet Union went farther than ever before in accepting our goal of deep reductions in the level of nuclear weapons. Some are now saying that since in the end we didn't sign agreements, the talks were a failure. Well, they couldn't be more wrong.

The Soviets have approached all their past talks with us in just the same way. Before they've made agreements at the bargaining table, they've tried to win even more through public

peace offensives aimed at dividing American and European opinion. They've trumpeted sweeping proposals to the media that didn't stand a chance in private talks. They've used these to try to put us on the defensive with our publics.

In the past, only after the Soviets were convinced that the West was united on every point have they got down to serious bargaining. The significance of the meeting at Reykjavik is not that we didn't sign agreements in the end. The significance is that we got as close as we did before the Soviets again began to play to the galleries.

On issue after issue, particularly in the area of arms reduction, we saw that General Secretary Gorbachev was ready to make serious concessions. For me concessions on arms reduction were especially gratifying. Just 5- $\frac{1}{2}$ years ago, when we came into office, I said that our objective must not be regulating the growth in nuclear weapons, which is what arms control, as it was known, had been all about. No, I said that our goal must be reducing the number of nuclear weapons, that we had to work to make the world safer, not just to control the pace at which it became more dangerous.

At first there were those in Congress and the media who said that I wasn't serious about reducing arms. They said that all I wanted to do was make demands that were so extreme that the Soviets would never agree to them. Well, now the Soviets, too, are talking about real arms reduction. In Reykjavik Secretary General Gorbachev and I came close to cutting nuclear arsenals in half and to reducing the number of intermediate nuclear weapons

held by each side to 100, with none in Europe. This represented historic progress over past talks between our countries, and let me say that it wouldn't have been possible without the support we've had from the American people over the last 5- $\frac{1}{2}$ years.

Because the American people have stood behind us as we worked over the years to rebuild our nation's defenses, we went to the Iceland meeting in a position of strength. And the Soviets knew that we had the support ^{of} not only a strong America but a united NATO alliance that was going ahead with deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. They knew that their propaganda campaign ~~to get Europe~~ ^{Europe} to stop ^{from} putting INF missiles in place had failed. So, yes, it was this strength and unity that brought the Soviets to the bargaining table. And particularly important, of course, was America's support for the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Now, as you know, I offered Secretary General Gorbachev an important concession on SDI. I offered ^{to} put off deployment for a decade and I coupled that with a ten year plan for eliminating all ballistic missiles from the face of the earth. This may have been the most sweeping and important arms reduction proposal in the history of the world. But that wasn't good enough for Mr. Gorbachev. He wanted more. He wanted us to stop all but laboratory research on SDI, to do no field testing and to agree never to deploy a strategic defense at all, that is, he wanted us to kill strategic defense entirely, which has been a Soviet goal from the start. Of course, the Soviet Union has long been engaged in an extensive strategic defense program of its own.

And unlike ours, the Soviet program goes well beyond research, even to deployment. So in contrast to the proposals we came so close to agreeing on at Reykjavik, this proposal would have given the Soviets an immediate one-sided advantage and a dangerous one. I could not and would not agree to that.

And just as important, America and the West need SDI for long-run insurance. We know the Soviet record of playing fast and loose with past agreements. We know how they burst out of the nuclear testing moratorium in the early 60s. We know how they've violated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the SALT II agreement. We know how they've ~~even~~ violated the Helsinki Final Acts, basic human rights agreements that they signed with great fanfare eleven years ago and have never made the faintest effort to abide by. Only last week I was reminded of this when I met with Yuri Orlov, who was imprisoned in the Soviet Union for setting up a citizen's organization for monitoring human rights, an organization specifically sanctioned by the Helsinki agreements.

America can't afford to take a chance on waking-up in 10 years and finding that the Soviets have an advanced defense system and are ready to put in place more ~~or~~ more modern missiles and we have no defense of our own and our deterrence is obsolete because of the Soviet defense system. If arms reduction is to help bring lasting peace, we must be able to maintain the vital strategic balance which has for so long kept the peace. Nothing could more threaten world peace than arms reduction agreements with loopholes that would leave the West naked to a massive and

sudden Soviet build-up in offensive and defensive weapons. My guess is that Mr. Gorbachev understands this, but wants to see how much farther he can push us in public before he once again gets down to brass tacks in private.

So here's how I see the meeting in Iceland adding up. We made historic advances in the arms reduction process. We took discussions into areas that have never before been put on the table. The Soviets finally began serious talk on real reductions in nuclear arms. The next step will be in Geneva, where our negotiators will work to build on this progress.

The biggest disappointment in Iceland was that Mr. Gorbachev decided to make progress in virtually all areas hostage to his one-sided and dangerous demand that we kill our strategic defense program. Forgive me for saying it, but in doing this he was going back on an agreement he made with me in Geneva. There he promised, at the very least, not to hold up INF negotiations for an agreement on SDI. Well, I hope that the Soviets will once again drop SDI as a precondition for progress, so we can indeed eliminate the threat posed to our friends in Europe and Asia by Soviet intermediate missiles. And I promise you that we will seek right away at Geneva to build on the potential progress in this and other areas made at Reykjavik.

You know, one of my past jobs was as a negotiator of labor agreements. I got used to one side or another walking out of contract talks. It didn't mean that relations had collapsed or that we had reached an insurmountable impasse. It just meant that a little grand-standing was going on. It's important for us

right now to look beyond the Soviet grandstanding, to see the real progress that we made at Reykjavik and to unite so that we'll be strong for the next stage in negotiations. If we do that, I believe that we have it within our grasp to achieve with the Soviets some truly historic breakthroughs.

CLOSE HOLD

Document No. _____

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/13/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: ASAPSUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: ICELAND MEETING

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	MILLER - ADMIN.	☐	☐
REGAN	☐	☒	POINDEXTER	☒	☐
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HENKEL	☒	☐	WALLISON	☒	☐
KING	☐	☐	DOLAN	☐	☒
KINGON	☒	☐		☐	☐
MASENG	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS: The attached will be forwarded to the President at 1:00 p.m. today. Please provide any comments directly to Tony Dolan as soon as possible, with an info copy to my office. Thanks.

RESPONSE:

CLOSE HOLD

1986 OCT 14 AM 7:17

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

CLOSE HOLD

(Dolan)
October 13, 1986
11:30 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

But first, let me tell you that from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. This faith in the intuitive wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are the founding principles of our Republic. And it is for these principles, I went the extra mile to Iceland.

So, let me assure you, the talks with General Secretary Gorbachev -- lasting more than 10 hours -- were hard and tough but extremely useful. During long discussions on both Saturday and Sunday, Mr. Gorbachev and I made considerable headway on a number of arms reduction issues.

We moved toward agreement on drastically reduced numbers of intermediate range nuclear missiles in both Europe and Asia. We approached agreement on sharply reduced strategic arsenals for

both our countries. We made progress in the area of nuclear testing.

But there remained toward the end of our talks one area of disagreement. While both sides seek reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviets insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me -- and to future Presidents for 10 years -- the right to develop, test, and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the United States. This we would not and could not do.

That was the deadlock at Hofdi House late Sunday afternoon. Then, the American delegation recessed and caucused, and returned to the table with the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in American history.

We offered the Soviets a 10-year delay in American deployment of S.D.I., and a 10-year program for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- from the face of the Earth. We took that proposal downstairs to Mr. Gorbachev, and Mr. Gorbachev rejected it.

Instead, he made a non-negotiable demand that the United States end at once all development of a strategic defense for the free world -- that we confine our program strictly to laboratory research. Unless we signed such a commitment, he said, all the agreements of the previous 12 hours of negotiation were null and void.

That would have killed America's defensive program in its cradle. That would have forfeited our children's opportunity to live in a world free of the fear of nuclear attack. That would

have sacrificed the future security interest of the American people, in exchange for a Soviet promise. And this we could not do.

My fellow Americans, my most solemn duty as President is the security of these United States and the safety of the American people. So, a one-day headline or a glowing cover story was never an issue. The only issue in my mind was my duty to my country and those I had sworn to protect. So again and again we kept offering and the Soviets kept accepting.

And again and again, we hit the same obstacle. The Soviets told us their proposals were a single package. They said there would be no deals unless we also agreed to their terms on the Strategic Defense Initiative. They held other issues hostage while trying to kill the possibility of research progress on strategic defense.

Why did Mr. Gorbachev reject our offer?

Why are the Soviets afraid of S.D.I.? Not a single Soviet citizen has anything to fear from an American S.D.I. That defensive system -- even if developed and deployed -- would harm not people, but only ballistic missiles, after they had been fired. It threatens nothing and would harm no one.

In refusing our offer and making his non-negotiable demand on the United States, Mr. Gorbachev refused an historic opportunity to rid the world of the threat of nuclear war. Nevertheless, we remain dedicated to continuing the peace process. We have come too far to turn back now. So tonight I call on the Soviet Union to build on the agreements we reached

and not to tear down the nearly-complete structure we erected in Iceland because of our differences over the single issue of S.D.I.

We made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. Let me remind you that, from the earliest days of our Administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions; we were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We said that the principal objective of American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world; that is why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning work on the strategic defense initiative.

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

This policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. I cannot

predict the nature or dates of future agreements. I can only repeat that, for the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction: not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues under discussion on the table in Iceland, issues that are even more fundamental. For some time before our talks began, I had been saying that arms control negotiations alone could not bear the full weight of Soviet-American relations; that, as I said, the real cause of the arms competition was political tensions growing out of our deeper differences. In short, doing more about arms control meant talking about more than arms control. So I proposed "umbrella talks" with the Soviets -- to expand the agenda, to go to the real source of the conflict and competition between the Soviets and the West.

One such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "Is not peace, in the final analysis, a matter of human rights...?" Only last week, here in the Oval Office, a heroic champion of human rights, Yuri Orlov, described to me the persecution he suffered for leading an effort simply to get the Soviet government to live up to the solemn commitment on human rights it had signed at Helsinki in 1975. Mr. Orlov's suffering is like that of far too many other individuals in all walks of life inside the Soviet Union -- including those who wish to emigrate.

In Iceland, human rights was a critical part of our agenda. I can report to you that I made it plain to Mr. Gorbachev that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. If the best and brightest inside the Soviet Union -- like Mr. Orlov -- cannot trust the Soviet Government, how then can the rest of the world? So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we are all from Missouri: you have got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. I told Mr. Gorbachev that the summit cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item besides arms reduction, human rights, and the resolution of regional conflicts. This

area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed the signing of several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our 4-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

Now, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or our future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

We still believe that no agreement is better than a bad agreement. And we must bear in mind the nature of the Soviet regime itself will put many obstacles in our path as we go along. When that happens, we must be prepared, not surprised. We must not permit such developments to disorient our policy or derail our initiatives. We must be deliberate and candid and make it clear that the Soviet Union will be held responsible for its actions. And we must persevere.

And on this point, I know you are also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in

Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it is different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past 5-1/2 years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might, your support has restored our military strength, and your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.

So, if there is one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we are dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets toward even more breakthroughs.

I know such optimism in a century that has seen so much war and suffering seems unwarranted to some. Yet this confidence is based on more than an easy optimism; it springs from a quiet

appreciation for what British author Paul Johnson calls the "enormous reserves" of democratic societies, societies where national unity springs from popular consent.

The resiliency of a free society is one of the comforting lessons of history. And because of you, the American people, those enormous reserves are now making their presence and power felt throughout the world.

I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our Naval installation at Keflavik [KEF-la-VICK] -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

"Wherever the banner of liberty is unfurled, there shall be America's heart, her prayers and her benedictions," John Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a Nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

It is in pursuit of that dream I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week; it is in pursuit of that dream I have invited Mr. Gorbachev to visit us here for further discussions.

And it is in pursuit of that dream that I thank you now for all the support you have given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.