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Gov. Reagan on Human Rights

Reagan's attitude toward human rights stems from the belief that while the Soviet Union drives for world dominion, we confuse our friends and allies with the selective application of our policy of human rights, making it that much easier for the Soviets to attain their goals:

"While the Soviets arrogantly warn us to stay out of their way, we occupy ourselves by looking for human rights violations in those countries which have historically been our friends and allies."

Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

Latin America

Reagan's disregard for the basic precepts of human rights is obvious in the admiring way he speaks on Argentina after three years of rule by a military dictatorship. Reagan quoted an economic advisor to the junta.

"...in the process of bringing stability to a terrorized nation of 25 million, a small number (of people) were caught in the cross fire, among them a few innocents."

Radio Transcript
August, 1979

African - Southern Africa

As for South Africa, Reagan favors a hands-off policy:

"Isn't it time we laid off South Africa for awhile?...As for letting South Africans work at solving their problems while we solve our own, all in favor say 'Aye.'"

Radio Transcript
October 22, 1976

Gov. Reagan on Non-proliferation

A Reagan Administration might not be concerned with pursuing a non-proliferation strategy:

"I just don't think it's (non-proliferation) any of our business."

Washington Post
January 31, 1980

Reagan clarified his assertion by adding:

"I think that all of us would like to see non-proliferation, but I don't think that any of us are succeeding in that. We are the only one in the world that's trying to stop it. The result is we have increased our problems would be eased if this government would allow the reprocessing of nuclear waste into plutonium..."

Monterey, Peninsula Herald
February 3, 1980

September 18, 1980

Global Issues: Non-Proliferation Policy

Q: Your Administration seems to be retreating from its strong commitment to pursue tough nuclear non-proliferation policies. Many say the technological genie is out of the bottle, and that this is why your policy of denying US technology is a failure. How do you assess proliferation dangers now, after four years in office, and what actions do you intend to take to slow the spread of nuclear weapons in a second term?

Response

Non-proliferation has been a key objective of my Administration. It will continue to be. American leadership in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and explosive technology is essential. Governor Reagan has stated that he does not believe non-proliferation is "any of our business." I could not disagree more.

Non-proliferation is a vital American security interest. The spread of nuclear weapons could create or exacerbate regional instabilities. It multiplies the chances that nuclear weapons will be used.

Progress in non-proliferation is difficult. Nations are being asked to accept international inspection of their nuclear activities, and to forego the option of nuclear weapons. This is a great deal to ask of sovereign nations. That the vast majority have done this -- 114 nations have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- indicates widespread agreement that the spread of nuclear weapons or explosive technology adds to no one's security. But in return for this limitation, non-nuclear-weapon-states demand -- rightly, in my judgment -- that the nuclear-

weapon states make progress in curbing the nuclear arms race. Nonproliferation and nuclear arms control are inter-related, and I intend to continue to press forward on both fronts. Apparently Governor Reagan would not.

Important progress has been made toward U.S. non-proliferation objectives in the last four years.

-- Working with Congress, we have developed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, which requires that nations working to enjoy the benefits of U.S. nuclear cooperation must accept controls on their nuclear activities.

-- We are renegotiating existing bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements to bring them into conformity with the strong non-proliferation policies contained in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.

-- The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, which I initiated in 1977, successfully concluded in March 1980. It demonstrated that nuclear suppliers and recipients can work together, and it heightened international understanding of the technology, risks and economies of the nuclear fuel cycle.

-- We have concluded the Second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The conference reaffirmed the continuing value and importance of the NPT, and their determination to strengthen it. There was considerable dissatisfaction, which we share, with the pace of nuclear arms control negotiations. But progress was made on a number of issues, and I am convinced that the NPT regime remains fundamentally sound and healthy.

Global Issues: Arms Transfer Policy

Q: As a candidate in 1976 you stated that the United States should cease being the arms merchant of the world. Soon after you took office, a restrictive policy on conventional arms transfers was applied.

What has become of your goal of limiting conventional arms transfers? Haven't you abandoned this effort after it caused serious problems with friendly governments and lost US defense industry sales markets to European arms producers? What is present US policy on arms transfers? Are you going to take a more pragmatic approach to US arms transfers, giving arms to regimes which support US interests, even if they are not as democratic as we would like?

Response

I remain committed to a policy of restraint on arms transfers. This has been a principal objective of my Administration and it will remain so.

From the outset of my Administration, I have tried to make US arms transfer serve two basic goals:

-- To facilitate those transfers that clearly serve the security interests of the United States, our allies and friends;

-- To restrain transfers which are clearly in excess of legitimate security needs, which could promote regional arms races or increase instability.

In short, our purpose in supplying arms is security, not profit.

Frankly, I have been disappointed at the failure of other major arms suppliers to respond to our efforts to promote international restraint. Based on this lack of multilateral cooperation, this year I directed that the

ceiling on the dollar value of US arms transfers outside NATO, Japan, Australia and New Zealand not be reduced; it will remain at last year's level. In addition, I have approved the development and production of the FX export fighter. This exception to my policy of not producing weapons solely for export was justified by the need by our allies and friends for a sophisticated aircraft to replace the F-5E, but who do not need aircraft as advanced as the F-16.

I emphasize that these actions do not mean that our policy of restraint has ended. The basic guidelines for US arms transfers that I established in 1977 remain in effect, and I intend to continue to apply them.

-- We are working to encourage regional cooperation and restraint. I have sent to the Senate Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which will contribute to the lessening of nuclear dangers for our Latin American neighbors. I urge its ratification by the Senate.

-- The Senate has ratified the Treaty with the International Atomic Energy Agency to permit limited inspection of U.S. peaceful nuclear facilities, though not nuclear facilities with a national security significance. This action will help us strengthen the IAEA's inspections capabilities. It will also help us to argue to other states that the Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards are not discriminatory and that we, along with Britain and France, also accept them.

More countries will approach the nuclear weapons threshold in the decade ahead, some with uncertain intentions in regions of tension and conflict. The time remaining to reduce the appeal of nuclear weapons and to develop safer ways to address legitimate energy needs is slipping away. Our non-proliferation efforts are more vital now than every before.

Persian Gulf Oil

Q: In the energy field we import, as you know, 50 percent of our domestic petroleum requirements. The economics forced upon us are clear: we need to reduce demand and increase supplies. The hard part is doing this. How successful has the Carter Administration been?

What would happen to the U.S. economy if the Persian Gulf oil was cut off? What would happen to Europe's economy if its Persian Gulf oil was cut off?

Response:

The current hostilities between Iran and Iraq -- and the threat this conflict poses for world oil resources -- clearly demonstrates the need for stability in the Persian Gulf. This region supplies 60 percent of world oil imports, which is equivalent to:

- 40 percent of world oil consumption
- 15 percent of U.S. oil consumption
- 60 percent of Western Europe's oil consumption
- 85 percent of Japan's oil consumption.

The conflict between Iran and Iraq has caused considerable concern that world oil supplies might be severely reduced, therefore driving up oil prices and endangering the economic security of the consuming nations. This concern is not justified by the present situation. It is true that oil companies and shipments directly to Iran and Iraq have been interrupted or suspended during the outbreak of

the hostilities. But even if this suspension of Iran and Iraqi shipments should persist for an extended period of time, the consuming nation's can compensate for this shortfall.

Oil inventories in the world's major oil-consuming nations are now at an all time high. The world's margin of oil supply security is much greater today than in the winter of 1978 and 1979, when the Iranian revolution reduced oil supplies at a time when reserve oil supplies were very low.

Our greater security today is due in part to energy conservation and also to the substitution of other fuels for oil, both in the United States and in other consuming nations.

This has facilitated the building up of reserve stocks to much more satisfactory levels than in 1979. Hence, there is no reason for a repetition of the shortages or the price escalation that resulted in 1979. Of course, a total suspension of oil exports from the other nations who ship through the Persian Gulf region would create a serious threat to the world's oil supplies and consequently, a threat to the economic health of all nations.

It is for this reason that we must continue to reduce our dependence on foreign oil. We have been aware of this need for some time, since the 1973 oil embargo. Only within the last three years, however, have we as a nation taken action. Today, the United States is importing 20 percent less oil than the day I took office. That amounts to one-and-a-half million barrels of oil less every day. We cannot, however, rest on this accomplishment. We must do more. Our national security requires it.

September 29, 1980

North/South: Helping the Poor Nations

Q: Recent reports on the state of the world (the Brandt Report, e.g.) are bleak indeed, pointing to a growing gap between the rich and the poor countries, hinting at the inevitability of mass famine, and raising the spectre of wars of redistribution.

Is there any cause for optimism about the future of North/South relations? What, specifically, can the United States do to assist the world's poor? Has the United States moved toward meeting its part of the Bonn Summit commitment to increase development assistance?

Response:

The conditions in the Brandt report and other reports are not inevitable. The projections should be seen as timely warnings that will alert the nations of the world to the need for vigorous, determined action, at both the national and international levels.

To avert global disaster, I believe the United States must assist the developing world to:

- slow the rate of unchecked population growth;
- combat world hunger;
- increase energy production and conservation.

To do this, my Administration has taken the following steps:

- U.S. bilateral programs administered by A.I.D. for agricultural and nutrition have increased from \$474 million in 1977 to \$758 million planned for 1981;

-- U.S. bilateral assistance to increase energy production in developing nations has doubled in the past two years.

We have also assisted the World Bank in its efforts to meet these problems:

-- World Bank lending for agriculture and rural development during the 1977-1979 period exceeded \$8 billion;

-- World Bank lending for fossil fuel development in poor countries is projected to reach \$5.6 billion over the next five years;

The problems that the Brandt report points to are of concern to every American. They can be solved only through cooperation among the developed and developing nations of the world. Let me give you an example of some successes we could have in the area of world food production. By the mid-1980's we could help Thailand export an additional five million tons of grain, bring four million acres under irrigation in Bangladesh, double cereal production in Peru, and bring a number of African countries to food self-sufficiency. I might add that in India, through the "green revolution" and the work of the International Rice Research Institute, agriculture has been built up sufficiently so that the country can now feed its huge population.

The United States, of course, cannot assure a world without poverty, disease, and deprivation. But we can be certain that without technical and financial assistance from us, these aims will become immeasurably more difficult to attain.

Trade: Disincentives

Q: Are there too many government "disincentives" in the trade area and, if so, which ones do you propose to curtail?

A: There may be disincentives that need to be pruned out of our laws and regulations to allow the United States a competitive opportunity in the world marketplace. My Administration has already overturned hindersome government regulations in the automobile industry and is presently reviewing other industries to see if outdated, unfair, or unreasonable regulations exist.

In a report I sent to Congress last month, I outlined several new initiatives in the export area. I have set in motion plans to provide tax relief for Americans working abroad for U.S. companies; we will work to remove ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; and, we are determined to improve Eximbank financing. I have also taken steps to ensure that the Government stops issuing separate U.S. re-export licenses in cases where we already approved re-export of the same product as part of COCOM.

But, disincentives are only the tip of the iceberg; our trade problems are much more broadly based, and require a truly major effort on several fronts if we are to be successful in meeting this challenge.

In the auto industry, for example, we need a new tax policy, with major changes in depreciation and investment opportunities (including a refundable investment tax c

to spur the modernization of our nation's factories. We need more attention to research and development to stimulate the great American genius for technological innovation in the private sector, especially toward more fuel-efficient automobiles. Greater investment in R&D may lead to breakthroughs in battery technology which would make the electric car more competitive. We need increased attention to export promotion, using the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and other agencies more energetically in this field. The formation of trading companies, on the Japanese model, is also an intriguing possibility.

In a word, we need a new U.S. industrial policy, consisting of a unified effort by government, industry, and labor to restore the United States once more to its preeminent position as a world trader. One of the most hopeful signs I have seen in this regard are the recent efforts of management and labor in the auto industry to seek together new ways to work as a team, each dedicated to enhancing the quality of the product and the morale of the working man and woman.

Trade: Access to Foreign Markets

Q: Trade, ideally, is a two way street; yet, Japan exports in large volume to the United States but seems reluctant to open her market equally to our products.

Is this an accurate assessment and, if so, what would you do about it if reelected?

A: From 1950 through the early 1970s, Japan was a highly protectionist country. Lately, though, the Japanese have opened their market considerably in response to pressures from the United States and the Third World. Despite this encouraging sign, I intend to press upon the Japanese, through negotiations, the importance of prompt removal of residual barriers to imported automobiles and spare parts from the United States, as well as other products, including telecommunications equipment, processed foods, cosmetics, medical devices, and cigarettes. The trade barriers against U.S. agricultural products are particularly notorious. Japan must open its market more fully and do more to facilitate imports from our country if we are to continue our liberal trade relationship with the Japanese.

Nowhere could the Japanese demonstrate goodwill better than by a decision to adhere to the Government Procurement Code negotiated in Geneva -- including a decision to make all procurement of the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Company subject to the obligations of the Code. The Japanese auto companies must also overcome their reluctance to pursue actively opportunities for marketing American cars in Japan and purchasing American-made new and replacement parts -- efforts which could help to reduce protectionist pressures against Japanese autos.

At the invitation of my Administration, a Japanese Auto Components Buying Mission visited the United States in September. The full benefit of this mission will not, of course, be realized overnight. With U.S. parts-making capacity readily available, however, it should be possible soon to see tangible results in the form of contracts in some cases, and in other cases, concrete steps toward contracts. I regard concrete results from this mission to be an extremely important contribution by Japanese firms to improving the present climate, creating jobs, and improving the prospects of the depressed U.S. auto parts industry.

A second mission from Japan also visited the United States in September to explore opportunities to license U.S. production of official Japanese auto parts, and to explore joint ventures or other forms of investment opportunities in the United States. This mission provided another opportunity for positive steps to restore better balance to automobile trade through economically viable production arrangements and investments in the United States.

The Japanese Government has agreed on the need for significant and lasting results from the auto parts buying and investment missions. Our two governments will monitor closely the missions' results.

The U.S. automobile industry must meet its responsibilities, too, by manufacturing automobiles

suitable for mass sales in foreign markets and adopting a more aggressive and intelligent marketing approach. As former Special Trade Representative Bob Strauss has noted, there are 1,250 to 1,500 representatives of Japanese firms in New York today and every one of them speaks English well and presents his products and sales arguments effectively. They are selling Japanese merchandise, and this is in New York City alone. In Tokyo, there are probably 20 or 25 -- certainly less than 100 -- Americans selling American products, and scarcely any of them speaks Japanese. We can do better than this.

With government, industry, and labor working more imaginatively together, we can compete with the best here and abroad.

September 29, 1980

Trade: Export Promotion

Q: The GOP Platform paints a dark portrait of the Carter Administration's competence -- and sheer interest -- in matters of export promotion. What has your Administration done to help U.S. trade performance?

Response:

The truth of the matter is that there has been almost twenty years of neglect in our export program, crossing party lines and the public and private sectors. Since the Kennedy Round in 1963, we have been slipping backwards.

We have had an accumulation of complacency, of ignoring the problem. There is enough blame to go around to industry, labor, various administrations and the Congress. We have had the luxury of a large market right here in the United States, and we have relied on it. Too heavily.

My Administration has begun to reverse these years of neglect. Under the direction of my Special Trade Representative, we brought to a successful conclusion the multilateral trade negotiations, the most ambitious set of negotiations to reduce barriers to international trade in a decade.

The reorganization of the Federal government trade agencies which I directed will assure more effective and prompt governmental action to exploit the export opportunities afforded by the MTN agreements.

On another front, the Administration and the United States coal industry are launching joint marketing efforts to make this country a major exporter of steam coal. With assurance of a reliable United States coal supply at competitive prices, many of the electric power plants to be built in the 1980's and 1990's can be coal-fired rather than oil-burning. Coal exports will help us pay for our declining but costly oil imports.

I have also directed the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to give special emphasis to export promotion in all of their new projects.

In this connection, it is important for us to keep in mind that American exports have been increasing more rapidly to Third World countries than any other nations except Japan. This new market means jobs for Americans. It also demonstrates why we must continue to work with the Third World and to assist these financial institutions, such as the World Bank, in their efforts to provide help to the developing nations.

Trade: Increasing Productivity

Q: There is a good deal of talk these days about the lack of investment and productivity by American industry. Certainly we lag behind our major competitors, especially the Japanese. What can the Federal Government do to increase investment and worker productivity, or is this a problem for industry alone to resolve?

Response: I am very pleased to see that in the United States there is a growing consensus in favor of developing a new industrial policy designed to rebuild our factories, regain a competitive edge in the world marketplace, and restore the reputation of our country as a place where high-quality products are manufactured.

Specifically, my Administration will accelerate its efforts to pass new investment tax policies in the Congress (such as a refundable investment tax credit), direct expenditures toward innovative research and development, and encourage new avenues of export promotion.

We need a new vision of our industrial future, a new partnership of labor, management, and Government working together to promote U.S. business abroad. We can no longer afford the antagonisms that have plagued industry for so long. Toward this end, industry and labor can do its part to enhance worker morale and the quality of the product; and the Government can help with needed tax provisions, increased R&D expenditures, export promotion, clarification of antitrust policy, and the elimination of unnecessary regulatory burdens.

Trade: Japanese Autos

Q: Does the Carter Administration support a temporary Orderly Marketing Agreement to curb Japanese auto imports?

Response: Trade Adjustment Actions

My Administration has sought to facilitate the retooling of our industry to permit production of small, fuel-efficient, competitive autos. We have also sought to reduce the burdens borne by workers during this transitional period. In cooperation with the Congress, We have provided special financial assistance to the beleaguered Chrysler Corporation and are developing, through tax policy, capital formation incentives.

In July, I announced a number of specific actions including relaxation of some regulatory requirements; new adjustment assistance benefits to aid communities severely affected by the changes in the auto industry; tax relief proposals; and a package of loan programs to aid automobile dealers. I also called for a joint industry, labor, and government Automobile Industry Committee to undertake a continuing dialogue on industry concerns. Members of this committee met in Detroit this September to organize and set their agenda. I have also encouraged Japanese investment in the United States in automotive manufacturing facilities. To date, Honda and Nissan have announced plans to produce cars and trucks in the United States. Nissan has yet to definitively pick a plant site. Toyota, the largest Japanese exporter to this market, continues to study investment possibilities here.

To promote an increase in our exports to Japan, we have reached an agreement with the Japanese Government on a number of measures designed to increase access to the Japanese market for U.S. made automobiles, parts and components. In May, the Japanese Government agreed to eliminate import duties next spring on most automobile parts, ameliorate the impact of certain Japanese standards, and send automobile parts buying and investment missions to the United States. These missions visited our country in September and the tangible results of these visits will be seen in the form of contracts and other arrangements to restore better balance to automobile trade.

Request for Import Relief

In spite of the adjustment actions taken by the Administration, the Congress, and most importantly, the industry itself, many Americans continue to be concerned that the unprecedented Japanese shipments during this transitional period will permanently alter the structure of our automobile market to the disadvantage of American companies and workers.

This situation has led to calls in our country for import restrictions. The United Auto Workers and Ford Motor Company have petitioned the U.S. International Trade Commission for temporary import relief under the provisions of Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. At my request, the ITC has accelerated the schedule for its decision. If the U.S. International Trade Commission finds that imports of automobiles are a substantial cause of injury, or threat thereof, and recommends import

relief, then I will be authorized under our domestic law to restrict auto imports by means of tariffs, quotas, tariff-rate quotas, or orderly marketing agreements.

So the framework created by law to examine claims for import relief is presently engaged. This process should be allowed to operate. While that investigation is in progress, U.S. efforts to obtain restraints on Japanese imports would be inconsistent with the procedures set forth in the Trade Act of 1974.

Decline of the Dollar

Q: What is your response to the GOP charge that "the economic policy of the Carter Administration has led to the most serious decline in the value of the dollar in history"?

Response: When I took office in 1977, we had just experienced a long recession which had put a great strain on the world economy and on the international financial system. The origins of that recession were in a tangle of complicated economic decisions made by both parties over the last two decades. By late 1976, the world economy was in a very precarious situation. To put it bluntly, I had inherited a mess.

My Administration immediately undertook a program of economic expansion to end the recession. I recognized at the time that vigorous economic expansion in this country, without expansion in other countries, could worsen the U.S. trade position. I also understood that the resulting trade imbalance could lead to the depreciation of the dollar relative to some other currencies

It was necessary, however, for the United States to go ahead alone. Not to have done so would have courted far graver dangers for the world economy -- extreme financial difficulties for a number of countries and increasing protectionist actions in most of the industrialized countries.

Today the dollar has regained its strength, despite
Republican exaggerations to the contrary. The dollar
will be the world's leading currency for a long time
to come. The United States current account deficit,
which was \$16 billion in 1978, is near balance this year.
We have achieved a fundamental redirection.

September 18, 1980

Intelligence Reform

Q: The Republican Platform states that "ill-considered restrictions sponsored by the Democrats" have "debilitated US intelligence capabilities..."

Are the CIA and other intelligence agencies hobbled by restrictions imposed by Democrats?

What changes do you recommend to improve our intelligence capabilities?

RESPONSE

The charge made by Governor Reagan that our intelligence agencies no longer function effectively is dead wrong. We have the best intelligence services in the world and I intend to keep them that way.

In addition, over the past four years, I have worked for intelligence reform. It was a part of my campaign for the presidency in 1976, a part of the Democratic Platform that year, and a part of my legislative package each year. In 1978 we achieved the passage of a sensible statute on wire-tap authorization. This year we should have legislation -- long over-due -- to protect the identities of intelligence employees, and an oversight bill for foreign intelligence operations. In each of these measures, great care has been taken to ensure that no restraints are placed on the intelligence agencies that would interfere with their authorized duties.

Gov. Reagan on Intelligence Reform

Foreign Intelligence

Reagan believes the decline of America's intelligence capabilities is due to Congress and the President.

"...a Democratic Congress, aided and abetted by the Carter Administration, has succeeded in shackling and demoralizing our intelligence services to the point that they no longer function effectively as a part of our defenses."

Speech to Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

The Republic Platform calls for:

"A Republican Administration will seek to improve U.S. intelligence capabilities for technical clandestine collection, cogent analysis, coordinated counterintelligence, and covert action.

"We will reestablish the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board...

"Republicans will undertake an urgent effort to rebuild the intelligence agencies...We will propose legislation to enable intelligence officers and their agents to operate safely and efficiently abroad.

"We will provide our government with the capability to help influence international events vital to our national security interests..."

1980 Republican Platform

Domestic Intelligence

Reagan would appear not to preclude the using of the intelligence agencies to spy on American citizens.

"...in insuring the security of the people and the nation, there may come times you have to spy on your own people.

Los Angeles Times
March 21, 1975

Gov. Reagan on Intelligence Reform

Reagan has also stated:

"I have commented before about what I think is the Justice Department's foolishness in rendering our FBI and CIA impotent, all in the name of privacy."

Reagan Radio Broadcast
February, 1979

September 21, 1980

Refugees

Q: Recently we have witnessed the spectacle of thousands of Cubans pouring into the United States illegally, some of them apparently criminal elements. What have you done to control this situation and, more generally, how can the US aid desperate refugees in the future?

Response

The problem of refugees and displaced persons is serious, widespread, and -- I regret to say -- growing. More than 15 million inhabitants of our planet have fled their homes in recent years because of wars, civil disturbances, persecution, or hostile government policies. The past year alone has witnessed the flight of more than 1.2 million Afghans, 1 million Somalis, and hundreds of thousands of Kampucheans, and others who remain homeless and miserable. Ours is becoming an epoch of refugees.

Since 1975, the United States has welcomed over 600,000 refugees for permanent resettlement. In the past year alone, we have taken in well over 230,000 refugees; and this total does not include the over 150,000 Cubans and Haitians now in the United States, seeking to settle here. We are doing everything we can to assist refugees from around the world who look to us for help. For example, I remain deeply committed to the support of the massive relief program undertaken by the international community through ICRC/UNICEF for relief of the Khmer people inside Kampuchea and along the Thai border. We also fully support the UNHCR program to help the many Khmer in Thai holding centers.

But we need help if we are to help them. The massive burdens that are imposed when thousands of people migrate, as with the chaotic flow of Cubans into our country, require attention that transcends national boundaries. The task of resettlement must be shared on an equitable basis so that no single nation or group of nations is faced with the entire refugee burden. I am encouraging regional associations to work closely with international agencies like the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the Inter-governmental Committee for Refugee Migration to develop procedures for coping with these complex problems.

And, despite the refusal of Cuba to cooperate in devising orderly, legal arrangements for dealing with the migration of Cuban refugees to this country, we are working tirelessly to resettle and accommodate these individuals as quickly and safely as their large numbers will allow.

I recently announced a new three-point plan to improve our response to this challenge. This plan acknowledges the federal responsibility for the refugee burden placed upon state and local government; strengthens law enforcement efforts to bar additional illegal immigrants; and, establishes a new and more efficient resettlement center, allowing the closure of some refugee sites.

Gov. Reagan on Refugees .

Reagan supported a "Berlin airlift--massive and swift" to rescue those Cuban residents seeking political asylum from Castro. (Dallas Times Herald, April 10, 1980)

The United Nations

Q: The United Nations has a league of critics, Governor Reagan among them. There are those who dismiss it as a drain on our resources, an impediment to our bilateral diplomatic relations, a theater of the absurd. More recently a special session of the UN spent several days attacking Israel. Critics say the UN is anti-American and anti-democratic. Many Americans have grown weary of handing out foreign aid to so-called friendly nations around the world only to see them vote against us on the floor of the General Assembly.

To what extent are these conclusions valid, and why should the United States continue to honor its legal obligations to the UN?

Response:

My Administration supports the United Nations and will continue to do so. I strongly oppose the view Governor Reagan once expressed that we should serve notice that we are going home to sit for a while.

Despite the myths surrounding the UN, many of which Governor Reagan seems to have accepted, the fact is the United States is not now, nor has it ever been, the outvoted victim of most United Nations resolutions.

In the area of human rights for example, what for some appeared to have been a lonely American concern, the United Nations today is a major forum for improving the standards of human rights and in promoting actions to protect them.

We don't always get our way, of course. The United Nations has almost a hundred new nations, each free of colonial bondage and fiercely independent. We are no

longer in the position of dictating our will. And,
sometimes we strongly oppose actions taken by the
UN. The 1975 UN condemnation of Zionism as racism was
deplorable. The recent special session on the Middle
East was totally one-sided and inexcusable.

Despite this, those who still think of the
United Nations as an unfriendly and dangerous place
should remember some of its recent acts, such as the
decision of the International Courts of Justice on the
hostages in Iran and the overwhelming condemnation of
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Our country needs
the UN as much as it needs us.

Gov. Reagan on the U.N.

In the past, Reagan has, on special occasions, implied that the United States should withdraw from the United Nations. The first occasion arose in 1971 when the issue of admitting China to the United Nations was being discussed.

"I was also disgusted and very frankly I think that it confirms the moral bankruptcy of that international organization..I don't know whether to withdraw totally from the adjuncts of the United Nations. You know the service organizations surrounding it are doing good work."

Press Conference
October 26, 1971

In 1975, when the United Nations condemned Zionism as racism, Reagan suggested that if the U.N. continues its present conduct, the United States should serve notice "we're going to go home and sit a while."

Los Angeles Times
November 17, 1975

Reagan has also attacked various organs of the United Nations including UNESCO. In 1977 when the head of UNESCO, Sean MacBride, attacked the capitalist system, Reagan gave his reply.

"...UNESCO--the United Nationsl Educational, Scientific and cultural organization...May actually be a base for communist espionage."

Jefferson City Post
December 15, 1977

Reagan Themes:
Foreign Policy and National Security

1. The Soviet Union surpasses us in virtually every category of military strength.
2. The only place we search for human rights violations is among our historically friends and allies.
3. We have been dishonored (by Soviet and Cuban adventurism, murdered US diplomats, captive hostages); we have lost our pride.
4. We have been apologetic at best about American capitalism as a model for economic development.
5. Our government taxes industry too heavily and undermines our international competitiveness.
6. Our antitrust laws harm US competitiveness and benefit foreign competitors.
7. The Democrats have neglected our military strength and only after Afghanistan have awakened to the Soviet threat.
8. Even after Afghanistan, Carter's military budget leaves us totally unable to match Soviet buildup (three times ours in strategic arms, nearly twice ours in conventional arms).
9. Our defense posture must be invigorated across the board.
10. We must have a faster remedy to our land-based missile vulnerability than Carter's complex and costly new missile system.
11. We need higher pay and better management of the all-volunteer force, not hundreds of new bureaucrats to administer or draft registration.
12. We have to maintain a superior Navy.
13. We must restore our intelligence agencies, shackled and demoralized by Democrats in Congress and the Carter Administration.
14. Carter meekly accepted a Soviet buildup in Cuba -- after saying it was "unacceptable."

15. We stand by idly as Marxists topple the dominoes in Latin America, one after the other, leading toward Mexico in one direction and Panama in the other.
16. We pay the lion's share of a bloated UN budget only to see its members criticize us while gazing benignly on Soviet colonialism. (The recent UN condemnation of the invasion into Afghanistan failed even to mention the Soviet Union by name.)
17. We apologize, compromise, withdraw, and retreat, fall silent when insulted and pay ransom when we are victimized.
18. We must regain the reputation of reliability toward our allies.
19. We must rid ourselves of the "Vietnam Syndrome."
20. Detente is largely an illusion.
21. We must above all have a grand strategy.*

* These themes come from the March 17, 1980, Chicago speech. The last one, like many others, remains vague but mainly Reagan seems to mean by this that we must stand tough against Soviet and Cuban military ventures.

Most Notable Reagan Quotes

On Foreign Policy

"In the case of foreign policy, I am equally unimpressed with all this talk about our problems being too complex, too intricate, to allow timely decision and action. The fetish of complexity, the trick of making hard decisions harder to make; the art, finally, of rationalizing the non-decision, have made a ruin of American foreign policy."

Reagan Speech
May 21, 1968

On Military Superiority

"Since when has it been wrong for America to aim to be first in military strength? How is American military superiority "dangerous?"

American Legion
August 20, 1980

On SALT II

"I cannot, however, agree to any treaty, including the SALT II treaty, which, in effect, legitimizes the continuation of a one-sided nuclear arms buildup."

Veterans of Foreign Wars
August 18, 1980

On the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

"One option might well be that we surround the island of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out."

New York Times
January 29, 1980

"So when they invaded Afghanistan, maybe that was the time for us to have said, 'Look, don't talk to us about trade. There will be none. Don't talk to us about treaties, like SALT II. We are not going to have any communication with you until (those forces in Afghanistan) are back in the Soviet Union.'"

Time
June 30, 1980

On the Soviet Union

"Let's not delude ourselves, the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in the game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world."

Wall Street Journal
June 3, 1980

"When did the Cold War end?"

Wall Street Journal
June 30, 1980

On CSCE

"Frankly, I have an uneasy feeling that going to Madrid is negating what we thought we could accomplish by boycotting the Olympics. If the athletes can't go, why should the diplomats go?"

Time
June 30, 1980

On Iran

"But some place along the line there had to be an ultimatum. Here again, because we have lost so much influence with freinds and allies, we were not in a position to go to the rest of the world and say, look, this is a violation of international law, and present to them the idea of the world literally quarantining Iran."

Time
June 30, 1980

On US Allies

"I think there is every indication that some of our European friends are beginning to wonder if they shouldn't look more toward -- or have a rapprochment with -- the Soviet Union, because they are not sure whether we are dependable or not."

Time
June 30, 1980

On China and Taiwan

"I would not pretend, as Carter does, that the relationship we now have with Taiwan, enacted by our Congress, is not official."

Associated Press
August 25, 1980

Republican Platform Charges Against the Carter Administration

General

Without a Coherent Strategic Concept
Failure of Leadership, Incompetence
Foreign Policy of Chaos, Confusion, and Failure
Neglect of America's Defense Posture Without Parallel since 1930s
Reduced the Size and Capability of our Nuclear Forces
Defense Programs Cancelled or Delayed
On the Road to a Military Catastrophe
Danger Without Parallel since December 7, 1941
Oblivious to the Scope and Magnitude of the Threat
Lack of Meaningful Response to Use of Soviet Power
Losing the Respect of the World and our Honor
Endangered Energy and Raw Material Lifelines of Western World
Lack of Meaningful Response to Terrorists

National Security

Massive Cuts in U.S. Defense Spending; Reduced Budget by over
\$38 Billion from Ford's last Five-Year Defense Plan
Cut Back Cancelled, or Delayed Every Strategic Initiative Pro-
posed by Ford (Minuteman Missile Production Line, B-1 Bomber,
All Cruise Missiles, M-X, Trident Submarine, Trident II
Missile)
Soviets are Achieving Military Superiority; Moved from Essential
Equivalence to Inferiority in Strategic Nuclear Forces
Failure to Challenge Soviet Use of Surrogate Cuban Forces in
Africa and the Later Soviet Presence in Angola, Ethiopia,
and South Yemen
Mismanagement of Personnel Policy; Shambles of All-volunteer Army
Failure to Maintain Combat Readiness; U.S. Armed Forces at
Lowest State of Preparedness since 1950
Failure to Fund Fully the Space Shuttle Program, As Well As
Advanced Exploration Programs
Ill-informed, Capricious Intrusions of OMB and DOD Office of
Program Analysis and Evaluation have Brought Defense Plan-
ning Full Circle to the Worst Faults of the McNamara Years;
Inefficiency and Paralysis has Led to Huge Cost Overruns
and Protected Delays

Morale of National Intelligence Has Been Eroded; Along with
 Public Confidence; National Intelligence Has Underestimated
 the Size and Purpose of the Soviet Union's Military Efforts
 Fundamentally flawed SALT II Treaty; Cover-up of Soviet Non-
 Compliance, Including BW Convention (Sverdlovsk)
 Misguided Intentions to Deliver Nuclear Material to India

Foreign Policy

US-Soviet Relations

Present Danger is Greater Than Ever Before in the 200-year
 History of the United States
 Carter has Encouraged the Most Extensive Raid on American
 Technology by the Soviet Bloc since World War II
 Partial and Incompetently Managed Grain Embargo
 Human Rights in the USSR Ignored
 Misleading American People About Soviet Policies and Behavior

NATO and Western Europe

Erosion of Alliance Security and Confidence in the US
 Vulnerability of US Increased by Carter's Unilateral Cancellations, Reductions, and Long Delays in the B-1, Trident, M-X, Cruise Missile, and Ship-building Programs, as Has Fundamentally Flawed SALT II
 Alliance Security Decreased by Reversals on Neutron Bomb, Treatment of Future Theater Nuclear Force Modernization, and Manner of Dealing with Terrorist Actions Against Americans Abroad
 Caused Disunity in the Alliance; Lack of Close Coordination Regarding Iran, the Middle East, Afghanistan, the Olympic Boycott, Nuclear Proliferation, East-West Trade, Human Rights, North-South Issues

Middle East, Persian Gulf

Carter Administration Involvement with the PLO

The Americas

Precipitous Decline in US Relations with Virtually Every Country in the Region
 Undifferentiated Charges of Human Rights Violations
 Stands by While Castro Supports Forces of Warfare and Revolution Throughout the Western Hemisphere

Dangerous and Incomprehensible Policies Toward Cuba

Implementing the Panama Canal Treaties will Cost US Taxpayer
\$4.2 Billion

Asia and the Pacific

Balance on the Korean Peninsula has Sifted Dangerously Toward
the North

Africa

Soviet Bases, Tens of Thousands of Cuban Troops, and Soviet-
Bloc Subversion Unacceptable

Foreign Assistance and Regional Security

Carter Administration has Diminished the Role of American
Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales in our
Foreign Policy

International Economic Policy

International Trade and Economic Policy

Largely Ignored the Role of International Economics

Most Serious Decline in the Value of the Dollar in History

Placed Exporting at the Bottom of its Priority List

Passive Approach to Trade

Failure to Pursue Negotiations Designed to Improve the Access
of American Exports to Foreign Markets has Contributed, in
part, to Protectionist Sentiment

Over-burdensome Government Regulations, Excessive Taxation,
Inflationary Monetary Policy, Unstable Economy

The Security of Energy and Raw Materials Access

Too much Concern has been Lavished on Nations Unable to Carry
out Sea-bed Mining, with Insufficient Attention Paid to
Gaining Early American Access to it

Key Proposals in the 1980 Republican Platform

National Security

Will seek military superiority

Earliest possible deployment of the M-X missile

New manned strategic penetrating bomber

Deployment of an air defense system

Accelerate deployment of cruise missiles on
aircraft, land, ships, and submarines

Research and development of an effective anti-
ballistic missile system

Early modernization of our theater nuclear forces

Deployment in Europe of medium-range cruise missiles,
ballistic missiles, enhanced radiation warheads,
and the modernization of nuclear artillery

A permanent fleet in the Indian Ocean

Restoration of tactical aircraft development;
increase in stocks of ammunition, spare parts,
and supplies

Increase airlift capability; increase our aerial
tanker fleet

Restore Navy fleet to 600 ships at a rate equal
to or exceeding that planned by Ford

Improve all-volunteer force; no draft (or draft
registration)

Correct the great inequities in pay and benefits
of career military personnel

Increase funding for R&D

Support a vigorous space research program

Improve U.S. intelligence capabilities for collection,
analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action

Support legislation to invoke criminal sanctions against anyone who discloses the identities of U.S. intelligence officers abroad; support amendment to the FOIA and Privacy Act

Repeal ill-considered restrictions sponsored by Democrats, which have debilitated U.S. intelligence capabilities while easing the subversion efforts of our adversaries

Foreign Policy

U.S.-Soviet Relations

Oppose the transfer of high technology to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites

Call for the immediate lifting of the grain embargo

Insist on full Soviet compliance with the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki agreement

Publicize to the world the fundamental differences in the two systems through RFE/RL

End the cover-up of Soviet violations of SALT I and II

NATO and Western Europe

Categorically reject unilateral moratoria on the deployment by the U.S. and NATO of theater nuclear weapons; oppose arms control agreements that interfere with the transfer of military technology to our Allies

Call for the integration of Spain into the North Atlantic Alliance

Middle East, Persian Gulf

Reject any call for involvement with the PLO

Keep Jerusalem an undivided city

The Americas

Oppose the aid program for Nicaragua

Return to the fundamental principle of treating a friend as a friend and self-proclaimed enemies as enemies, without apology; make it clear to the Soviet Union and Cuba that their subversion and their build-up of

Admit Puerto Rico to the Union

Seek a North America Accord between the U.S., Canada
and Mexico

Asia and the Pacific

Strongly support a substantially increased Japanese
national defense effort

Provide full economic aid and military material to assist
Thailand in repelling Vietnamese aggression

No expanded relations with Vietnam

Press for full accounting of Americans still listed
as missing in action

Regard any attempt to alter Taiwan's status by force
as a threat to peace in the region; give priority
consideration to Taiwan's defense requirements

Africa

Devote major resources to development on a bilateral
basis

Rebuild U.S. military assistance and foreign arms sales

International Economic Policy

Adopt an aggressive export policy

Will not stand idly by as the jobs of millions of Americans
in domestic industries, such as automobiles, textiles,
steel, and electronics are jeopardized and lost

Elimination of disincentives for exporters, including
inhibitive statutes and regulations

Work with trading partners to eliminate subsidies to
exports and dumping

Eliminate excessive taxation of Americans working abroad

Revitalize merchant marine

Domestic economic and regulatory policy must be adjusted
to remove impediments to greater development of our
own energy and raw materials resources

Anderson, Themes:
Foreign Policy and National Security

1. Maintain a stable balance by preserving essential equivalence with the Soviet Union.
2. US must put its economic house in order; rebuilding economy is starting point for international recovery.
3. US must restore historic alliances; rely heavily on collective security arrangements with our principle allies in NATO and Japan.
4. Must modernize and diversify our strategic arsenal.
5. No MX -- "American ingenuity can devise a more flexible and more cost-effective solution."
6. Will take steps to complete SALT II process; invigorate the international quest for arms control.
7. Superpower relationship cannot be allowed to degenerate further; must maintain "active communications" with the Soviets, particularly when tensions are high.
8. Emphasize versatile and usable forces to counter any conventional attack on our vital interests.
9. Establish and maintain peace in the Middle East; oppose Palestinian state; move US Embassy to Jerusalem.
10. Carefully nurture new relationship with China.
11. No more important partner than Mexico.
12. Providing economic aid to Nicaragua promotes an atmosphere of moderation.
13. Open a wider window to India.
14. Cooperate with the developing nations in ways which respect their individuality and independence, and which serve our mutual interests in trade and development.
15. Urges Japan to expand its foreign aid and its security role; encourages Japan to build more plants in US, and remove curbs on US goods (especially in telecommunications, computers, semiconductors).

16. Would continue present informal military and economic relations with Taiwan.

17. Greater IMF help for LDC's energy development.

18. Discourages US investments in South Africa "whenever possible in cooperation with our allies;" encourages compliance with UN arms embargo.

19. Strong human rights stance; urges continued denial of foreign aid to governments violating human rights; criticizes US banks and corporations for underwriting US policy by providing loans and investments to nations ineligible for government aid.

20. Linkage of trade with Soviet bloc to emigration flows.

21. Urges that foreign assistance be channeled through multilateral agencies wherever possible.

22. Claims "benign neglect" has characterized export administration, and proposes various remedies including:

- expanded Eximbank financing;
- reduced taxes on Americans abroad "engaged in export activities;"
- support for export trading companies to help small and medium-sized firms enter export markets.

KEY FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES:

CONTRASTS AMONG THE CANDIDATES

<u>ISSUE</u>	<u>Carter</u>	<u>Reagan</u>	<u>Anderson</u>
M-X	Yes	Yes	No
Aid to Nicaragua	Yes	No	Yes
SALT II	Yes	No	Yes
Comprehensive Test Ban	Yes	No	Yes
Draft Registration	Yes	No	No
Military Superiority	No	Yes	No
Neutron Bomb in Europe	No	Yes	No
Permanent Indian Ocean Fleet	No	Yes	No
600 Ship Navy	No	Yes	No
More Large Aircraft Carriers	No	Yes	No
Lift Grain Embargo	No	Yes	No
Bilateral Over Multilateral Aid	No	Yes	No
Nuclear Materials to India	Yes	No	No

Key Proposals in the Anderson Platform, 1980

National Security

- Essential Equivalence
- Improve Command, Control, and Communications
- Improve Warning Systems
- Trident, Air-launched Cruise Missiles
- R & D on New Bomber
- Reject M-X ("American ingenuity can devise a more flexible and cost-effective solution. . .")
- Redress Grave Personnel Problems
- Pre-position Equipment Overseas
- Increase Air and Sealift Capability
- Allocate More Resources to Naval Forces
- Complete SALT II Process
- R & D on an Anti-satellite Capability
- Greater Defense Role for Japan

Foreign Policy

- Reinforce NATO
- Stabilize US-USSR Relations
- Support Camp David Accords
- Strengthen Ties to Japan
- Nurture Relations with PRC
- Joint American/Mexican Commission
- No Cuban Military Involvement in Hemisphere
- Economic Aid to Nicaragua
- Wider Window to India
- Anti-apartheid Measures Toward South Africa

Economic Policy

- Work Toward a More Equitable International Economic Order

Gov. Reagan on Foreign Policy

"In the case of foreign policy, I am equally unimpressed with all this talk about our problems being too complex, too intricate, to allow timely decision and action. The fetish of complexity, the trick of making hard decisions harder to make; the art, finally, of rationalizing the non-decision, have made a ruin of American foreign policy."

Reagan Speech
May 21, 1968

Gov. Reagan on Intervention

Reagan's record is filled with examples of suggestions -- some explicit, some implied -- that U.S. intervention be used to resolve international disturbances.

Angola

In response to Soviet involvement in the Angolan civil war, Reagan said the U.S. should have told the Russians:

"Out. We'll let them (Angola) do the fighting, or you're going to have to deal with us."

New York Times
January 6, 1976

Cuba

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan said:

"One option might well be that we surround the island of Cuba and stop all traffic in and out."

New York Times
January 29, 1980

Cyprus

Reagan has said that, in a manner similar to Eisenhower's deployment of troops to Lebanon, as President he would have favored sending a "token (U.S.) military force" to Cyprus during the 1975 crisis on the island.

New York Times
June 4, 1976

Ecuador

In response to the Ecuadorians' seizure of U.S. tuna boats in 1975, Reagan suggested:

"(T)he U.S. government next winter should send along a destroyer with the tuna boats to cruise, say, 13 miles off the shore of Ecuador in an updated version of Teddy Roosevelt's dictum to "talk softly, but carry a

Gov. Reagan on Intervention

Lebanon

In the same vein as Eisenhower's deployment of troops to Lebanon, Reagan has said that, as President, he would have sent troops to Lebanon during the 1976 civil war.

New York Times
June 4, 1976

Middle East

Responding to a question on whether the U.S. should establish a military presence in the Sinai to counter the Soviets, Reagan said:

"I think this might be a very, very good time for the United States to show a presence in the Middle East. I don't think it would be provocative and I don't think it looks like anyone bullying..."

Boston Globe
January 13, 1980

North Korea

In response to the North Korean seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, Reagan said:

"I cannot for the life of me understand why someone in the United States government, particularly the President, has not said, 'That ship had better come out of that harbor in 24 hours or we are coming in after it.'"

Los Angeles Times
January 25, 1968

Pakistan

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan advocated sending advisers into Pakistan.

"I think the most logical thing is that they (the advisers) would go to the country we have a treaty with, Pakistan, and that training could be provided there, with U.S. and Pakistan where we have a legitimate reason and right to be."

St. Louis Globe-Democrat
January 11, 1980

Gov. Reagan on InterventionPortugal

To prevent a Communist takeover of Portugal in 1975, Reagan said the United States should have acted "in any way to prevent or discourage" the Communists, adding "It was clearly in our interest to do so." But he refused to be more specific.

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Rhodesia

To ensure an orderly transition in Rhodesia between a minority-white to a black-majority rule, Reagan said:

"Whether it will be enough to have simply a show of strength, a promise that we would (supply) troops or whether you'd have to go in with occupation forces or not I don't know."

New York Times
June 4, 1976

North Vietnam

The Los Angeles Times reported that in a speech to the National Headliners Club Reagan stated that the United States should have met North Vietnam's final thrust in South Vietnam with B-52 bombers.

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Foreign Affairs/Defense Issues:

The former permanent representative to the United Nations, envoy to Peking and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency stressed during his recent campaign for the Republican Presidential nomination that because of his background in foreign affairs he is more competent to deal with problems facing the United States around the world than is President Carter.

Despite a reputation as a moderate in foreign affairs, Bush is a "hardliner." His view of the world is focused on the "menace" of Communism -- Russian Communism. It is his often stated opinion that the Soviet Union is "seeking superiority" in the world and the United States must take steps to counteract this aggression. Nearly all of Mr. Bush's foreign policy and military issue positions reflect his overriding preoccupation with the Soviet Union.

As a Presidential candidate Bush castigated the Carter Administration for what he termed the following foreign policy failures:

- Projecting a perception of vacillation and weakness in U.S. foreign policy among our allies and adversaries alike.
- Gutting American defense by slowing the MX and cruise missile programs, and cutting funds for the B-1, a new carrier and naval modernization.
- Initiating a misguided human rights campaign, which overloads our strategic interests and harms our allies.
- Failing to act to release our hostages in Iran.
- Presenting an unverifiable and weak SALT II agreement to the American people.

Defense Spending:

If George Bush's view of the world is clouded by Soviet aggression, his prescription for a stronger, more confident, United States is crystal clear -- increase defense spending and improve our alliances with friendly foreign powers.

Bush is clearly a "hawk" on defense spending, and views the need for additional military hardware as essential. He criticizes the Carter Administration for falling behind the Russians in terms of military strength and calls for the near term funding of the following defense needs:

- a new manned bomber -- the B-1;
- an accelerated MX deployment schedule;
- a long range cruise missile;
- a strengthened three ocean navy;
- improved air defense capabilities;
- expanded and improved strategic airlift capabilities;
- expanded and improved conventional weaponry;
- support for the volunteer army with registration for both men and women;
- an expanded military training program;
- a strong intelligence service, capable of providing accurate information on events abroad;
- increased military R&D funding.

To meet these defense needs Bush has argued for an increase in defense spending of \$5-8 billion per year over the President's latest defense budget figures.

Despite the fact that President Carter has increased spending on defense every year since the last Ford budget -- an overall increase of \$73 billion -- Bush criticizes Carter for "gutting" American defense by cuts in defense spending, which have resulted in "underpaid military personnel, inadequate personnel to operate equipment and equipment malfunction such as the helicopter malfunction that led to the abortive Iranian hostage rescue attempt." Houston City Hall Speech, Dallas Morning News, 4/29/80.

Bush believes the U.S. can build the military hardware -- the MX, the B-1, a three ocean Navy and implement conventional forces improvements all for \$6-8 billion over several years and still balance the budget by 1982. He would accomplish this feat by "eliminating waste and move away from spending programs such as CETA." Business Week, 2/4/80.

"If it came down to that (more for defense, a tax cut and a balanced budget), I would still have to go with defense increases because we really do have a so-called window of danger. But it is not unrealistic to think you can increase defense spending, have a simply side tax cut and get a (budget) balance. Everybody says that's impossible. The economists advising me don't think it's impossible." Washington Post, 4/20/80.

Intelligence:

The former CIA Director believes the American Intelligence System should be strengthened, but with protections for the rights of U.S. citizens. He is critical of the President's decision to halt SR-71 flights (spy planes) over Cuba, and points this out as an example. His only example of a weakening U.S. intelligence capacity.

Bush also feels the U.S. must "retain the capacity for covert operations in other countries" and refuses to rule out "American participation in the overthrow of foreign governments."

Under his direction at the CIA, new guidelines were adopted. While many critics thought they were not tough enough, there have been no charges of illegal intelligence activity during the past six years.

"I would simply follow the law (concerning covert operations and the CIA)...It excludes assassination, for example. The findings have to be -- and I think this is proper -- in writing by the President, that a sensitive operation is in the national interest and be reported to the Congress. But I think covert operations should be sparingly used ... quiet support for a friend is covert action." Miami Herald, 2/3/80

SALT II:

Bush does not support the SALT II treaty, he believes several amendments should be made to the treaty before it is passed. Specifically:

- the Soviet backfire bomber must be counted as a strategic weapon;
- the size and strength of nuclear warheads and missiles must be addressed to make the treaty more equal;
- obstacles to deploying the MX missile must be removed;
- the treaty must be made verifiable.

Bush does support an arms reduction agreement that is more verifiable and believes the Soviets would be willing to make the changes he has recommended because he believes pressure is mounting in the Soviet Union against increased defense spending.

In 1964, during his unsuccessful race for the U.S. Senate in Texas, Bush vigorously opposed the nuclear test ban treaty.

Nuclear Policy Abroad:

Bush is one of only a few national politicians who has ever stated the view that there is such a thing as a winner in a nuclear exchange. In an interview with Robert Scheer, a writer with the Los Angeles Times, Bush outlined his views on nuclear exchange.

Robert.Scheer: "Don't we reach a point with these strategic weapons where we can wipe each other out so many times and no one wants to use them or is willing to use them, that it really doesn't matter whether we're 10% or 2% lower or higher (than the Soviets)?"

Bush: "Yes, if you believe there is no such thing as a winner in a nuclear exchange, that argument makes a little sense. I don't believe that."

Scheer: "How do you win in a nuclear exchange?"

Bush: "You have a survivability of command in control, survivability of industrial potential, protection of a percentage of your citizens, and you have a capability that inflicts more damage on the opposition than it can inflict upon you. That's the way you can have a winner, and the Soviets' planning is based on the ugly concept of a winner in a nuclear exchange."

Scheer: "Do you mean like 5 percent would survive? Two percent?"

Bush: "More than that -- if everybody fired everything he had, you'd have more than that survive."

Scheer: "So have we made a mistake, then, in not thinking of nuclear war as a possible option that we could survive?"

Bush: "Our strategic forces should be considered as a deterrent, and that is the way I'd do it..."

Los Angeles Times, 1/24/80

Military Draft:

As a member of Congress, Bush supported President Nixon's plan to eliminate the military draft, and remains opposed to a peacetime draft today.

However, he supports registration, for both sexes. He is a strong supporter of the All-Volunteer Army, but believes it must be supplemented, to some degree, if we are to keep our forces at proper levels. He does not explain how he would supplement the all volunteer armed forces without implementing a peace time draft.

Soviet Union:

Bush feels the root cause of all our foreign policy problems is the Soviet Union. Bush believes the Soviets are not satisfied with nuclear parity with the U.S., instead he feels they are seeking nuclear and conventional force superiority. "The Soviets want a first strike capability, and don't think they are above using it." Salinas, California, Californian, 1/28/80.

Afghanistan:

Bush believes the President's failure to spell out our commitments to our allies and other non-alleged nations led to the invasion of Afghanistan and continues to cause foreign policy credibility problems for the U.S. Bush feels that a redefinition of our foreign policy should be made, and include the following:

- keep commitments
- strengthen intelligence operations
- place human rights concerns in proper balance with strategic interests.

In addition, he favors shipping arms to Afghanistan rebels through Pakistan and is critical of the President for not helping "people that are resisting brutal aggression."

Soviet Grain Embargo:

He opposes the U.S. embargo of grain to the Soviets because he feels it hurts us more than it hurts them. However, he would support a total across the board trade embargo against the Soviets. Bush has termed the President's embargo actions as ineffective, and inconsistent. His one example is "we halt grain shipments to the Soviets which lower our farm prices and yet we sell phosphates to the Soviets to improve their crops." Face the Nation, 1/20/80

Olympic Boycott:

Supported the decision to boycott the Moscow games, even proposed withholding athlete's passports to force them to stay home and not participate in the games.

Cuba:

He believes Cuba presents this country with one of its major foreign policy challenges. Specifically, he cites the basing of Soviet troops in Cuba as an outrageous affront to our security and insists they must be removed.

Agrees that the Administration has appeared "important" by not dealing directly with the issue of Cuban troops in Africa. Bush has stated, "the Cubans are surrogates for the Soviets...they are being used as pawns by the Soviets to gain political advantages and seek hegemony everywhere." Political Profiles, Inc., 12/79

Bush ridiculed Ronald Reagan's suggestion that we should blockade Cuba in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by saying "the idea of blockading Cuba, which Ronald Reagan has proposed, risks nuclear war and would require the entire Atlantic fleet. It wasn't Cuba that invaded Afghanistan, it was Russia. The way to peace is to keep this country strong, not through reckless foreign policy." Washington Star, 3/22/80

Europe:

Bush strongly favors European unity . . . supports the admission of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the EEC.

During the recent campaign he was highly critical of the President's handling of the issue of deploying the neutron bomb in Western Europe. Bush said, "Carter backed off after convincing West Germany to deploy the neutron bomb, in the face of a massive propoganda campaign launched by the Soviets, and left Chancellor Schmidt out on a political limb." Face the Nation, 1/20/80

Human Rights:

Bush believes the U.S. human rights policy, under the Carter Administration is misguided and harmful to our allies.

He argues that we should decide foreign policy on the basis of strategic interests and not solely on a particular country's human rights record. He uses Iran as an example by saying: "our failure to defend our ally, the Shah, created a situation where one form of tyranny is replaced with an even worse form and one that is not in our strategic interest." Dallas Morning News, 5/1/80

Bush supports efforts to improve human rights, but only in concert with U.S. strategic interests.

Iran:

Bush leveled his harshest criticism of the President during his recent campaign over the issue of Iran and the hostages being held there. In an interview with Robert Shogan of the NY Times in March, Bush said, "Carter has manipulated the news media, for the benefit of his own reelection, it is time the American people recognize our Iranian policy for what it is...one of failure, inaction and even calculated deception."

He also charged the President with full responsibility for the hostage crisis by saying, "the weakness and inexperience of the President have both led to this crisis and managed to isolate us in our tragedy." Dallas Morning News, 4/29/80

Without offering his own suggestions to resolve this hostage crisis, Bush demanded we close the Iranian embassy in Washington and expell all Iranian diplomats.

He completely rejects the notion that the U.S. should apologize for any past actions in Iran. For all the criticism of the Shah's regime American support for Iran was the aim of our policy for nearly three decades, and the wisdom of that policy has been reinforced by recent events." LA Times, 5/15/80. Bush considered the Shah "a friend who was less then perfect in human rights." The Flint Journal, 5/11/80

Bush differed with Ronald Reagan's "live in the dust" position on Iran, which would set a firm date for the release of the hostages or risk American action to release the, by saying "Reagan owes the American people a better explanation of his proposal. In the decade of the 80's a foreign policy based on bluffs is as ineffectual as it is dangerous." LA Times, 5/15/80

Panama:

Bush opposed the canal treaties primarily because of "the appearance that we are retreating and pulling back on commitments." LA Times, 1/24/80

Middle East:

He strongly supports the State of Israel, believes we need to strengthen our ties with moderate Arab states and feels the Palestinian people should have a role to play in negotiations that will determine their future.

Bush is generally supportive of the Camp David accords but argues that Jordan and other Arab countries must be brought in to the peace making process. He is opposed to allowing the PLO to participate in any negotiations until they renounce their pledge to destroy the state of Israel and cease terrorist attacks. He has likened the PLO to an international KKK.

On the issue of settlements he is opposed to the construction of additional settlements on the West Bank, but supports "the legitimate construction for national security purposes" of those settlements that currently exist.

He believes Ronald Reagan's suggestion that Sinai troops should be based in the Sinai would be a mistake and would draw the Soviets back into the middle east.

China:

Bush views himself as an expert on China which stems from his term of duty as U.S. envoy to China in 1974. He sees China as a backward country with a large standing conventional army. He also believes the Chinese are not expansionistic, but rather they seek to be self reliant by the year 2000.

He is opposed to selling arms to the Chinese until he is certain they have "no foreign ambitions."

Bush is highly critical of the way the Carter Administration ended diplomatic relations with Taiwan. "For the first time in our history, a peacetime American government has renounced a treaty with an ally (Taiwan) with cause or benefit." Washington Post, 12/78.

Bush's assignment in the U.N. was highlighted by the failure of the United States to retain a seat in the General Assembly for Taiwan. The U.S. position had been to support a "two China policy" with both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China being represented.

As Ronald Reagan's emissary, George Bush recently visited China and Japan to outline what many foreign policy advisors believe in Reagan's version of a "two-China policy" for U.S. foreign relations in the 1980s. The Chinese are clearly not enthusiastic over Mr. Bush's return to China, where he is viewed as a supporter of Taiwan and an adversary of arms sales to the People's Republic.

East Asia:

Bush would push for stronger ties and security arrangements with East Asian countries and isolate (economically) disruptive nations ... North Korea, Vietnam.

He would also encourage Japan to assume greater responsibility in regional defense and security matters. In addition, he supports an increase in air and naval forces in the Pacific as well as the establishment of an Indian Ocean fleet.