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Collection: Roberts, John G.: Files
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 1, 1984

John:

I called the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for some information on the attached letter. A woman in the public affairs office told me that the way they normally handle letters like this one is for us to refer it over to a Mr. Joseph Lehman in that office.

You asked me to get information sent here for this letter. Fred's not to you seems to indicate that he wants the letter referred out for a draft response. Let me know whether referring this out to Mr. Lehman is all right, and I will proceed accordingly.

Claudia

O.K.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date 2.28.84

Suspense Date _____

MEMORANDUM FOR: John

FROM: **DIANNA G. HOLLAND**

ACTION

- Approved
- Please handle/review
- For your information
- For your recommendation
- For the files
- Please see me
- Please prepare response for _____ signature
- As we discussed
- Return to me for filing

COMMENT

Sorry, My Memory
is good but not
that good.

MEMORANDUM FOR FRED F. FIELDING

FROM: JOHN G. ROBERTS

SUBJECT: Correspondence Concerning Deployment of Pershing II
and Cruise Missiles

Attached for your review and signature is a memorandum to Joseph Lehman, Director of Public Affairs, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The memorandum requests that Lehman's office draft for your signature a response to a letter from Lloyd Ard of Austin, Texas, who has written to express his opposition to the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Western Europe.

1
Rm. 5840

320 21st St. N.W.

Washington D.C.

20451

(U.S. ACDA - Lehman)

MEMORANDUM FOR JOSEPH LEHMAN
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

FROM: FRED F. FIELDING
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Correspondence Concerning Deployment of Pershing II
and Cruise Missiles

Attached is a letter I have received from Lloyd Ard of Austin,
Texas. Mr. Ard writes to express his opposition to the deployment
of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Western Europe.

I would appreciate your office drafting a response to Mr. Ard
for my signature, and returning the letter and the response at
your earliest convenience.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 28, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JOSEPH LEHMAN
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY

FROM: JOHN G. ROBERTS *JGR*
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Correspondence Concerning Deployment
of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles

I am advised by your office that you might be able to guide us in preparing a response to the attached letter, which was sent to Counsel to the President Fred F. Fielding. We would prefer a draft response for Mr. Fielding's signature rather than a direct response from your office. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 456-7953.

Many thanks.

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

ND018
JE - refer one for direct response I can not


- JV
- O - OUTGOING
 - H - INTERNAL
 - I - INCOMING
- Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1 1

Name of Correspondent: Lloyd S. ARD

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Expresses concern about nuclear war and asks what is being done about it.

ROUTE TO:	ACTION	DISPOSITION
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response Code Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>CW/BOLL</u>	ORIGINATOR <u>84.10.113</u>	<u>1 1</u>
<u>CWAT 18</u>	Referral Note: <u>please call DGH</u> <u>A/D 84.10.113</u>	<u>S 84.10.123</u>
	Referral Note: _____	<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note: _____	<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note: _____	<u>1 1</u>

DGH - 

This is the "please call DGH" item I called you about last week. What does it all mean?

John

Comments: _____

C - Completed
S - Suspended

NDENCE:
als of Signer
e of Outgoing

Keep this worksheet
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 28, 1984


MEMORANDUM FOR JOSEPH LEHMAN
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY

FROM: JOHN G. ROBERTS *JGR*
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Correspondence Concerning Deployment
of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles

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Many thanks.



PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADVISER

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

April 2, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN G. ROBERTS
ASSOCIATE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOSEPH D. LEHMAN *JDL*
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Correspondence Concerning Deployment
of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles

Attached as requested is a draft letter for the signature of Counsel to the President Fred F. Fielding, in response to a letter from a Mr. Floyd Ard. Please advise if there is any more that we can do to be of assistance in this or any other matter.

Attachment:
As stated

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Ard:

This is in response to your ~~January 6~~ letter and the enclosure on thermonuclear war.

We fully share your concern about the risk of nuclear war and are committed to doing everything possible to reduce that risk. Since the invention of nuclear weapons every American President has sought to prevent conflict, reduce the risk of war and ensure a lasting peace with freedom. But keeping the peace and preventing war require more than good intentions. They require a concerted effort to maintain our own strength and to seek, wherever possible, to reduce nuclear and conventional arsenals and resolve international differences peacefully. This dual policy of deterrence and dialogue has helped to prevent major war for almost forty years.

In addition to maintaining our military strength, the US has proposed a number of new initiatives to substantially reduce nuclear and conventional arsenals and to reduce the risk of war ~~accruing~~ by accident or miscalculation.

For example, in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, the US proposed substantial reductions in ballistic missile warheads, deployed missiles, and in other measures of strategic capability. These proposals would reduce the number of deployed warheads by more than one-third; ~~of their current levels~~; the bulk of reductions would be in the most dangerous and destabilizing type of warheads. In October 1983, President Reagan outlined a new US initiative for a mutual guaranteed build-down of nuclear forces whereby a larger number of old nuclear weapons would be removed for each new weapon introduced in a manner that would encourage movement to smaller and more stabilizing nuclear forces.

Ambassador Nitze, our Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiator, and his team worked very long and hard at Geneva in an effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on either global elimination or deep reductions of land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missiles of the US and Soviet Union. The delivery/deployment of the Pershing II and Ground-launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) to Europe is designed to counterbalance a Soviet monopoly in this missile class. (Since 1976, the Soviets have deployed over 370 new SS-20 missiles -- each with three separate nuclear warheads -- for a total of over 1000 new warheads in this class alone.) However, we are prepared to resume the Geneva Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations with the Soviets at any time and to halt, reduce or reverse our deployments in accordance with an eventual agreement.

In addition, the US has also proposed a series of confidence-building measures -- such as advance notification of ballistic missile tests, expanded exchange of information and improvements in communication -- to stimulate greater mutual understanding and thus reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.

We recognize that the nuclear freeze proposal represents a desire to achieve rapid progress in arms control, and we share that goal. However, a freeze at current levels is not an effective or sound approach to arms control. Such a freeze would seriously handicap our efforts to negotiate major arms reductions because it would perpetuate existing Soviet military advantages, while preventing us from carrying out necessary modernization of our nuclear forces. It would thus reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously on the proposals for substantial cuts in nuclear arsenals that we have offered in the START and INF negotiations.

Although a freeze appears simple, it would require extensive and lengthy negotiations to agree on the terms and guarantees, particularly verification measures, thus detracting from the more important and immediate task of seeking reductions. In addition, important aspects of a freeze would be virtually impossible to verify.

We can and must do better than a freeze, and in some ways we have already gone beyond the concept of a freeze in persuading the Soviet Union of the merits of negotiating for actual reductions in nuclear arsenals. In the START negotiations, for example, the Soviets publicly indicated a willingness to consider reductions of 25 percent in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles below the SALT II levels. Although this is still not as far as we believe both sides can go, it is nevertheless a step in the right direction.

We are determined to spare no effort to reach equitable, stabilizing and effectively verifiable agreements with the Soviet Union to reduce nuclear arsenals and the risk of war. However, it takes two to reach an agreement, and the Soviet Union has so far not shown comparable flexibility at the negotiating table. In fact, the Soviets have chosen to interrupt the arms reduction negotiations in Geneva and have so far been unwilling to agree to a date for their resumption. We remain ready to resume the negotiations at any time, and we hope the Soviet Union will reconsider its actions and decide to return to the negotiating table as soon as possible. (on

Our far-reaching arms reduction proposals, coupled with a firm resolve to maintain America's deterrent strength, have provided incentives for the Soviet Union to negotiate for arms reductions. Achieving agreements on such reductions will not be easy. It requires patience and determination. It also requires the understanding and unity of the US and our Allies behind the goals we all share -- to reduce the risk of war, and the growth in nuclear arsenals.

Thank you for sharing your views with us.

Sincerely,

Fred F. Fielding
Counsel to the President