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Collection: COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC:

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Wills/F97-082/2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1 Paper	Issue Paper No. 3, (Revision #1), 2 p. <i>R 10/11/02 NLS 97-082/2 #109</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
2. Paper	Issue Paper No. 5, 1 p. <i>R " " #110</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
3. Paper	Issue Paper No. 6, 1 p. <i>R " " #111</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
4. Paper	Issue Paper No. 7, 1 p. <i>R " " #112</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
5. Paper	Issue Paper No. 9, 1 p. <i>D 6/17/02 NLS 97-082/2 #113</i>	n.d.	P1/B1, B2
6. Paper	Issue Paper No. 11, 1 p. <i>Part 3/30/00 " #114</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
7. Paper	Issue Paper No. 13, 2 p. <i>R 10/11/02 " #115</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
8. Paper	Issue Paper No. 14, 2 p. <i>R " " #116</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
9. Paper	Issue Paper No. 16, 1 p. <i>D 6/17/02 NLS 97-082/2 #117</i>	n.d.	P1/B1, B2
10. Paper	Issue Paper No. 17, 1 p. <i>D 3/21/01 " #118</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
11. Paper	Issue Paper No. 19, 1 p. <i>R 10/11/02 " #119</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
12. Paper	Issue Paper No. 20, 1 p. <i>Part 5/11/01 " #120</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
13. Paper	Issue Paper No. 21, 1 p. <i>D 10/11/02 " #121</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
14. Paper	Issue paper no. 22, 1 p. <i>D 6/17/02 NLS 97-082/2 #122</i>	n.d.	P1/B1, B2
15. Paper	Issue Paper no. 23, 2 p. <i>D 6/28/01 " #123</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
16. Paper	Issue Paper No. 24, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
17. Paper	Issue Paper No. 26, 1 p. <i>R 10/11/02 NLS 97-082/2 #125</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
18. Paper	Issue Paper No. 31, 2 p. <i>R " " #126</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
19. Paper	Issue Paper No. 39, 1 p. <i>R " " #127</i>	n.d.	P1/B1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
20. Paper	Issue Paper No. 40, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
21. Paper	Issue Paper No. 42, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
22. Paper	D 3/21/01 NSC 97-082/2 #129 Issue Paper No. 45, 1 p. R 3/13/02 " #130	n.d.	P1/B1

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FOIA

F97-082/2

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
1	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (REVISION #1)	2	ND
2	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 5	1	ND
4	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 7	1	ND
7	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 13	2	ND
8	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 14	2	ND
10	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 17	1	ND
17	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 26	1	ND
18	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 31	2	ND
19	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 39	1	ND
22	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 45	1	ND



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

5 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MR. J. ROBERT MCBRIEN, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
MR. NOEL KOCH, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MR. LOWELL JENSEN, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
MR. MATTHEW Z. SCOCOZZA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
MR. CHARLES ALLEN, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
LTGEN JOHN H. MOELLRING, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MR. OLIVER REVELL, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION X
VADM JOHN POINDEXTER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MR. FRED F. FIELDING, THE WHITE HOUSE
DR. ALTON KEEL, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

SUBJECT: Senior Review Group Meeting

At the November 7th meeting of the Senior Review Group we will be discussing draft recommendations based on the issue papers distributed to you. Attached are draft recommendations and where applicable any dissenting views that surfaced from your responses.

The Vice President intends to join us. In order to insure ample time for complete discussion, the time of the meeting has been extended and will be from 3:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. in Room 208, OEOb.

J. L. Holloway
J. L. Holloway, III
Admiral, USN (Retired)
Executive Director
Vice President's Task Force
on Combatting Terrorism

Attachment
As Stated

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ISSUE PAPER NO.

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Agencies

SUBJECT: National Program for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: ^{Annex} [The attached appendix] should serve as the interim ~~program~~ document of the national program for combatting terrorism. *

(Note: The appendix is currently being prepared by Adm. Staser Holcomb, Terry Arnold, and members of the Working Group, based on the program element information solicited from all agencies in September. The status of this appendix will be briefed to the Task Force Principals on 12 November.)

DISSENTING VIEWS:

OMB - Informal coordination reveals that OMB may be concerned that this would transfer program-budget responsibility from the agencies to the National Coordinator (EOP).

State - Concur that the program document would be a useful, ready reference document, but that it should be maintained by the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, not a National Coordinator.

* compendium of all elements of the national program to combat terrorism
It's not intended as a budget document

both domestic and international

Graphs = illustrative ... Functional & by resource category
the 160 program elements you sent us
"Admin" = top level supervision; Wash folks etc
It's not budgetary data; it's subjective.

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in USG on terrorism

ISSUE PAPER NO.

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Policy for Combatting Terrorism

(NSDD)

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The NSC should promulgate a NSDD¹ (with the policy statements along the lines already expressed in Issue Paper No. 2) as the national policy for combatting terrorism, and NSDDs 30, 138, 179, and 180 should be superseded.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None.

Defense - Declarative policy is frequently a substitute for action.
Would require some changes in our policies -- eg. Iraq is off the list of terrorist-sponsoring nations; May 15 operates here; head of Force 17 is here....
It is no longer clear we should have a declarative policy or concessions.
Recom study in greater depth.

A N-S-D-D (NSDD) should be promulgated to supersede NSDDs 30, 138, 179, and 180 and to serve as guidance in all national matters concerning terrorism. This new NSDD should include policy statements along the following lines:

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (Revision #1)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

ISSUE: The organization for combatting terrorism must be compatible with the overall organizational structure of the U.S. Government, be capable of administering the programmatic aspects of the national program for combatting terrorism, be able to generate a counterterrorist strategy, and provide the operational capability for dealing with terrorist threats and incidents. The existing organization utilizes the interagency approach in the form of the Lead Agency concept. The principal components of this interagency approach are:

- (1) the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, which formulates policy, manages the program, and generally outlines the counterterrorism strategy.
- (2) the Terrorist Incident Working Group, which generally operates in a tactical fashion to resolve threats and incidents in an operational context.
- (3) the assignment of Lead Agency responsibilities to the Department of State for terrorism overseas, the Department of Justice/FBI for terrorism within the United States, and the FAA for aircraft hijackings.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Terrorist Incident Working Group should be retained with the following modification:

There will be established the position of National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism in the National Security Council organization at the level of a Senior Director for National Security (Special Assistant to the President). The Coordinator will:

1. Be supported by a small, full-time, dedicated staff.
2. Serve as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.
3. Serve as Executive Director of the TIWG.
4. Be responsible for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.
5. Provide management coordination of the entire national program for combatting terrorism through the programming documents and the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.
6. Provide a focal point for all matters concerning terrorism other than those clearly the sole responsibility of a single agency

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or department.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

State strongly opposes any shift of foreign policy responsibilities to the NSC, and feels that the appointment of a National Coordinator has this potential. They feel that to take over the functions presently being handled by the office of the Ambassador-at-Large would require a staff of 25-30 persons. They do however agree with the idea of a small interagency policy body in the NSC system, with a small staff for 'liaison purposes'. The directorship of the TIWG could be handled by this body, with State retaining the chair of the IG/T.

CIA, JCS, Justice, FBI and OMB generally concur in principle, but all have some reservations about the amount of authority a National Coordinator should have. OMB wants to ensure that a National Coordinator would not have exclusive program and budget authority, but would coordinate with OMB.

DOD concurs, and feels that the National Coordinator must have directive authority on terrorism issues, taking into account USG institutional realities.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 4

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: Derinition of Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The following working definition of terrorism should be adopted by the US Government and promulgated in the NSDD establishing the national program for combatting terrorism proposed in Recommendation No. 2.

Terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

State - A "universal definition" would create problems without any corresponding benefit. The US could be accused of conducting terrorism, according to the long definition proposed. If a definition is necessary in some situations, it should be a shorter definition.

CIA - Non-concur with long definition proposed; recommend the definition be brief and flexible.

NSC - Non-concur. "Terrorism is already defined in the U.S. Code (Title 50 USC)." It is a political problem, best fought with political tools, and therefore not susceptible to clear, precise definition. "...further definition and statements are a political thicket that we would do well to stay out of."

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 5

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: ALL

SUBJECT: Coordination of Public Diplomacy/Statements During Terrorists Incidents

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The basic elements of US policy and response guidelines should be delineated at the initial phase of a crisis situation to all US Government policy makers and spokesmen. The process for issuing specific guidance and the rapidity and coordination required to adjust public diplomacy during an ongoing incident is deficient.

1. The TIWG, at its initial meeting in reaction to a terrorist incident, should issue specific guidance to be followed by all US Government spokesmen during the contingency. Legal issues must be carefully considered to ensure that press statements are not made which would jeopardize a criminal investigation or an eventual prosecution.
 - The guidance should be communicated to the President through the White House Press Office.
 - The guidance should be communicated by all members of the TIWG to the applicable responsive activity within each organization. Lead agency responsibility concerning international or domestic terrorist statements should be already delineated.
 - The Deputy White House Press Secretary should be responsible for detailed and timely implementation of the guidance including any restrictions on statements by other agency spokesmen.
 - At each step of the TIWG's deliberations, when further information is received, the situation significantly changes, or new actions are decided upon or planned, the guidance should be reviewed, updated and distributed as outlined above.
2. The Public Diplomacy Working Group of the IG/T should:
 - With NSC approval, provide updated general US policy guidelines for public diplomacy aspects of dealing with terrorism and insure dissemination to all concerned Government press offices.
 - Initiate a system for real time monitoring and analysis of the media during the incident and insure a rapid distribution of this information to US Government press offices and diplomatic posts abroad.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None, comments received have been incorporated into this draft recommendation.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 0

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: Policy for Active Response to Terrorist Threats and Incidents

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: A policy for active response to terrorist threats and incidents -- including a set of criteria similar to that proposed in Issue Paper No. 6 -- should be developed by the National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism [~~Issue Paper No. 3~~] and forwarded to the IG/T for interagency coordination prior to submission to the National Security Council for approval.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

State - Issue is subsumed under Issue Paper No. 9; care should be taken not to break the criteria down too precisely.

Defense - Little is offered by this issue. If a realistic policy framework can be developed, it may be useful. The decisionmaking process could become "too structured", preventing adequate consideration of the varied aspects of a terrorist incident.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 7

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, NSC, CIA, TRANSPORTATION,
JUSTICE

SUBJECT: International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Department of State should pursue a three-track effort regarding international agreements for combatting terrorism.

1. A multilateral treaty against terrorism should be sought with a large number of participants in order to attain a broad international expression of condemnation for international terrorism. The objective should be one of wide participation in a general statement, that can be achieved quickly.
2. A parallel effort should be undertaken to obtain a series of bilateral agreements with our allied and like-minded nations for the purpose of combatting terrorism. The objective in these bilaterals would be to move quickly to achieve agreements in areas where there is already a concurrence of views on both sides. If where only limited concessions can be gained, these should be accepted and agreements rapidly concluded. This way, a network of bilateral agreements concerning terrorism might be achieved in a relatively short period of time.
3. Efforts to ensure compliance with existing treaties should continue to be pursued aggressively with a view to broadening these where appropriate.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

STATE - Does not favor major formal initiatives for either multilateral treaties or for specific bilaterals; prefers to pursue a flexible policy. State feels more systematic, regularized cooperation on an informal basis needed (status reports and agreements on next steps, etc.). Cooperation already taking place without formal treaties. This alternative avoids the need for formal ratifications by Congress and foreign parliaments and avoids attempting to negotiate such tricky questions as intelligence sharing. State counterproposal reads:

"The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Justice, should continue to pursue a flexible policy of international resolutions, agreements, and treaties, bilaterally and multilaterally, as necessary to gain international cooperation in combatting terrorism."

NSC - Generally non-concurred with the draft proposal noting that while there is no doubt we need to do better at developing a broader base of international cooperation, broad agreements are difficult to implement. Because of these constraints, past efforts have been historically based on unwritten "working agreements" on consultation and cooperation (e.g., Summit Seven). No specific counterproposals cited.

ISSUE PAPER NO. 8

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE

SUBJECT: Extradition Treaties

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The State Department should continue its program of opening negotiations on extradition treaties with countries with democratic regimes and fair judicial systems with a view to limiting the scope of the political offense exception. To achieve this goal, Senate approval of the first such revision (US/UK) to be concluded is a must. The State Department appropriately has the lead in the effort to secure approval. However, assistance from other U.S. Government agencies may be essential to making the Administration's anti-terrorism case.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 10

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, CIA, JCS, FBI, DOT/FAA

SUBJECT: Counterterrorist Exercises and Simulations

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Office of the Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism in the NSC should work with the IG/T and other national elements with exercise programs to coordinate a program of simulating various realistic terrorist problems and conduct interagency exercises that will afford a basis for viable contingency planning. High-level participation should be strongly encouraged, as surrogate role-playing, while useful, does not give either side a true understanding of the likely course of events in a real situation. Post exercise debriefs and lessons learned should be widely circulated and discussed.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

State opposes the idea of a National Coordinator, but agrees that the IG/T should work with the TIWG director at the NSC to develop and run exercises. They feel that after-action reports should avoid individual fault-finding.


NSC feels that the present IG/T exercise program is sufficient.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 11

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, TREASURY, CIA, JCS, FBI

SUBJECT: Intelligence Fusion Center for Terrorism



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By AS, NARA, Date 3/30/06

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 12

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Hostage Family Liaison

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism should be designated as the primary point of contact for liaison with the families of all American hostages who are not USG employees once the hostage situation becomes protracted (e.g. after two weeks).

DISSENTING VIEWS:

State - Retain the Office of Consular Affairs as the point of contact. Evaluate the recent improvements at State -- the creation of a special working group of CA, NE, and M/CTP -- after an appropriate period of time.

NSC - The recently organized hostage family task force at the State Department should be instituted on a permanent basis.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 13

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: ALL

SUBJECT: Foreign and Domestic Public Awareness

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: An important facet of the U.S. ability to deal effectively with terrorism is the extent to which the closely interrelated domestic and foreign publics understand the nature of the threat and support the policies necessary to counter it. Concurrently, there is a national requirement to create a sophisticated public understanding of the essence of the threat to the nation posed by terrorism. The Interdepartmental Working Group on Public Diplomacy in conjunction with the National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism should develop a long-range strategy for approval by the IG/T designed to improve public understanding of international terrorism and the policies required to combat it. Programs to be considered by the Working Group should include:

- The formation of a high level panel, to include representatives from media organizations, religious and ethnic groups, civic groups, national, state and local legislatures, bar associations, law enforcement agencies and other appropriate interested groups to sensitize the American public to the dangers of terrorism and reinforce public preparedness and will to deal with the risks necessary to combat this threat.
- A precise and sophisticated research project designed to explore in depth the public perception, awareness, and understanding of terrorism and its impact. The results of the project would be utilized to generate a "national credo" of US policy towards terrorism in order to educate the public concerning the range of potential responses to terrorism by the government.
- The monitoring by the State Department of US media and public opinion polls to provide insights on how the U.S. public perceives and reacts to various aspects of terrorism and the countermeasures taken against it. USIA should conduct a similar monitoring operation abroad. Government statements on terrorism should be tailored to reflect the results of this analysis.
- A study with USIA, as the lead agency in the international information effort, and working in coordination with the Public Diplomacy Working Group and the IG/T, to complement ongoing efforts to influence foreign opinions concerning terrorism.

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Additionally, the State Department should consider creating a Public Diplomacy Office for Terrorism, similar to the Office of the Coordinator for Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, which would be charged specifically with explaining our counterterrorism policies at home and abroad.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None, comments received have been incorporated into this draft recommendation.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 14

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: ALL

SUBJECT: Government-Media Relations during a Terrorist Incident

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The US Government should develop and implement a strategy, in consultation with the media, that will limit the capability of terrorists to exploit US press freedom to the advantage of the terrorists. During a fast moving stressful and emotion-laden incident, conflicts often develop between how the media perceives its obligations and how policymakers perceive theirs.

Two viable courses of action are open to the government:

- to organize its public diplomacy efforts better during a terrorist incident;
- to seek voluntary restraints by the media in reporting while a terrorist incident is underway.

US Government officials should systematically meet with media officials to discuss the government's explicit concerns about the role of the media during terrorist incidents. This should be done quietly, but in open consultation with media leaders as a contribution to their process of self-examination and responsible coverage.

The Public Diplomacy Working Group of the IG/T should develop a mechanism to bring representatives of the media and appropriate US Government officials together rapidly at the onset of a terrorist event for discussion of national interests. The US Government considerations could be a factor in the media's determination of how to proceed in fulfilling its responsibilities to the public.

US Government officials responsible for dealing with the media during a terrorist event should bear firmly in mind that efforts to coerce or restrict the media, directly, or indirectly, such as through advertisers, is likely to provoke negative and resentful responses.

The absence of a self-imposed system of restraint raises the potential for government regulation during a terrorist incident. The media, especially television, is much more susceptible to this pressure with the decline in public confidence. Networks may accept a voluntary system of restraint rather than risk a government move to impose regulations during a crisis. Candidate issues to be considered for voluntary restraint include:

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- No interviews with the families of the hostages or victims until after the terrorist incident is resolved.
- No payments to terrorist groups or supporters for interviews or access.
- No live, unedited coverage of actual terrorist events.
- No coverage of military plans or deployments in response to terrorist incidents.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None, comments received have been incorporated into this draft recommendation.

ISSUE PAPER NO. 15

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Murder of U.S. Citizens Outside of U.S.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Departments of State and Justice should continue their efforts in support of legislation which makes the murder of U.S. citizens outside our borders a federal crime under U.S. law.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 17

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, NSC, CIA

SUBJECT: Current Policy Regarding the Operational Security of CTJTF

acknowledge the existence of ...?

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The US public, our allies, and our adversaries, including terrorists, are not adequately aware of U.S. competence or resources committed to combatting terrorism. Current policy requires a system of cover, security and classification concerning all aspects of CTJTF/ [REDACTED]. A public affairs strategy designed to announce U.S. counterterrorist capabilities while stringently protecting missions, tactics and procedures does not currently exist. Additionally, much of the protected information concerning counterterrorist forces has reached the media and the public domain. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) working in conjunction with the National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism should develop a comprehensive public affairs strategy for counterterrorist forces. Additionally, a perception management program which incorporates OPSEC, PSYOP and deception should be developed by JCS, in coordination with CIA and State, and forwarded to the NCA for review and approval with subsequent distribution to appropriate agencies.

Care must be taken not to imply targeting the US populace in a PSYOP campaign. The focus of the program must be to preserve US CT capabilities and how and when these forces might be used.

Objectives of the perception management program should be:

- To preserve essential secrecy about US military counterterrorist capabilities and how forces might be deployed and employed during training and exercises.
- To provide options to support crisis resolution short of using force, preserve essential secrecy of force preparations, movement and US intentions; gain the initiative, surprise and superiority when forces are used; and, when necessary, support the security and withdrawal of forces.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None, comments received have been incorporated into this draft recommendation.

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NLS F97-082/2 #118

By LJS, NARA, Date 10/11/02

ISSUE PAPER NO. 18

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, TREASURY, JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Prohibition of Training and Support/Counterterrorism/
Mercenary Training Camps

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: Appropriate government agencies should continue the effort to employ the expanded ITAR to control the provision of defense services, including training in the use of defense articles such as firearms and explosives, to foreign nationals at mercenary camps in this country. The results of this effort should be assessed after the expanded ITAR has been in effect for one year (1 January 1986). This review should determine whether additional legislation is required to ensure that training and support of terrorists is not permitted under U.S. law.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None

ISSUE PAPER NO. 19

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, JUSTICE, NSC, CIA

SUBJECT: Congressional Oversight of Counterterrorism Operations

DROP AS AN ISSUE

F97-082/2 #119

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 20

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: CIA

SUBJECT: Expanded HUMINT Capability Against Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION:

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b3

DISSENTING VIEWS: None.

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NLS F97-082/2 #120

By LOI, NARA, Date 6/21/01

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 25

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE

SUBJECT: Rewards

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Department of State should expedite the authority for payment of rewards authorized under the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, and issue clearly delineated guidance to appropriate U.S. government agencies on how to utilize the provisions of the Act to maximum advantage. Ensure that rewards actually authorized are effectively publicized in both target foreign populations and to the domestic American audience. The full range of aggressive options to include the creative use of rewards for psy-op efforts should be explored so long as the terrorists themselves do not benefit from the payment. Finally recommend consideration be given to obtaining Congressional support for increasing the amount that can be authorized in any one case to \$1 million and to an expanded use of the awards authority, recognizing the practical political constraints that impact on its implementation.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

CIA - Concurs, so long as the terrorists themselves do not benefit from the payment.

STATE - Non-concurs: This issue paper should be eliminated since its recommendations have been adopted independently. Detailed policy guidance on offering rewards has been promulgated in the Foreign Affairs Manual, with interagency coordination. Rewards have been offered in the TWA 847 and Kuwaiti 221 cases, and are under consideration, according to current policy, for the Achille Lauro and Rhein-Main incidents.

FBI - Non-concur. Rewards already offered for TWA 847 and four Marines in El Salvador.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 26

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, JUSTICE, CIA

SUBJECT: International Informant Incentives

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The State Department, in concert with the Department of Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency, should take the lead in an interdepartmental effort to develop a unilateral and/or bilateral program of informant incentives and, initiate requisite legislative action to support such a program. Examples of incentives which might be offered (in addition to monetary rewards) are: immunity from prosecution for previous offenses; and, granting of U.S. (or other) citizenship to the informant and immediate family.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

NSC - Non-concurred with draft proposal, noting that it is inappropriate for State Department to utilize existing authority for intelligence collection. Further, CIA already has authority and resources to pay for information; additional authorities are unnecessary.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 27

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, JUSTICE, FBI

SUBJECT: Terrorism as a Crime

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The USG should not refer to terrorism as war but rather as crime.

DISSENTING VIEWS: It was the overwhelming opinion that the USG should not seek legislation which makes terrorism itself a crime. There was support for referring to terrorism as criminal activity.

ISSUE PAPER NO. 28

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Death Penalty for Hostage Taking

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Justice Department should pursue legislation which provides that individuals who murder U.S. citizens during a hostage taking would be subject to the death penalty. It is suggested that this be included as part of Senate Bill 239, which calls for imposition of the death penalty for certain Federal crimes: treason, espionage, crimes involving the death of a person and an attempt to assassinate the President.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None

ISSUE PAPER NO. 29

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Department of Justice should take the lead in an interagency review of the provisions of the FOIA to include determining the validity of reported abuses of the intent of the Act. If the review does in fact conclude that there are abuses, the Justice Department should develop legislation to close the loophole in the law. Counterterrorism is only one small part of this major issue.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

STATE - FOIA contains provisions to withhold records that are classified or relate to law enforcement. Requests to State Department are largely from the media.

CIA - Do not address.

OMB - If pursued, should be addressed as a broader FOIA reform, only indirectly related to terrorism.

ISSUE PAPER NO. 30

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: DCI, FBI

SUBJECT: Terrorism Intelligence Analysts

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism should establish and oversee an interdepartmental career development program that will encourage a core of intelligence analysts to devote themselves to addressing terrorism as a specialty. Training, plans and resources, interagency rotations, exchanges with friendly governments, and participation in various agency and CINC gaming evolutions should be included in the program.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

CIA - Worthy objective; difficult to achieve.

JCS - Doubtful CT specialists would be useful.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 31

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, NSC, CIA

SUBJECT: Psychological Operations to Combat Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Psychological Operations Working Group of the IG/T's Public Diplomacy Committee should insure that Psychological Operations to combat terrorism are closely integrated into the overall counterterrorism effort. Additionally, the Working Group should be tasked to prepare a PSYOP campaign designed to meet the following objectives during specified contingencies.

- Psychological perceptions to foster during a terrorist incident
 - Promote international condemnation of the terrorist act.
 - Foster resolution of the incident short of the use of military forces.
 - Support the gathering of intelligence information to support CT operations planning.
 - Reduce the willingness of target audiences, foreign countries, and special interest groups to aid and inform terrorist organizations concerning US military movements and preparations.
 - Establish international support for the use of military force to resolve the incident if necessary.
- Short-term objectives designed to influence the objective reasoning of foreign target audiences include:
 - Emphasize the random threat of terrorist actions and adverse consequences from nationally sponsored terrorism so that foreign individuals and groups demand official action by their governments and police forces to suppress terrorists and deny them support.
 - Emphasize that terrorists are considered criminal undertakings for base motives and are described in terms relating to criminal behavior.
 - Emphasize that terrorism is an act that may achieve short-term goals but over the long term is counterproductive.

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- Long-term objectives designed to influence the emotional and objective reasoning of foreign target audiences so that the use of terror to gain political ends is widely condemned include:
 - Discouraging the use of terror to gain political ends.
 - Encouraging individuals and groups to provide information to police and intelligence agencies concerning terrorists and their plans.
 - Encouraging individuals and groups to refuse safe havens and support for terrorists.
 - Encouraging individuals and groups to agree with and support the suppression of terrorist organizations by force when appropriate.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None, comments received have been incorporated into this draft recommendation.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 32

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, TREASURY, JUSTICE, CIA

SUBJECT: Controlling Cross-Border Travel of Known or Suspected Terrorists

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The State Department should take the lead in an interagency effort to upgrade existing systems or recommend development of a new computerized system to monitor cross-border people movements. Upgrading of the State Department's Automated Visa Outlook System (AVLOS) may have application in this area.

Treasury (Customs), State and Justice (INS) should look at the possible expansion of the Treasury Enforcement Computer Systems (TECS), particularly the terrorist category (TECS-T), used by Customs and INS officials at ports of entry.

State should pursue the development of its improved visa lookout system CLASS (Consular Lookout and Support System), which will be able to interact with other countries' lookout systems.

State should also continue to urge other countries to establish visa lookout systems and to share the results with us. Efforts such as those already being undertaken by State and CIA with selected friendly governments, inter alia to associate the United States with European Community systems for controlling cross-border movements of terrorists, should be emphasized.

State should consider including this issue in the ATA Program, that an R&D effort be directed to developing a uniform system that could inter-link friendly countries, and that resources be provided to assist friendly countries in acquiring hardware presently unavailable to them.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

STATE - Generally agreed with the draft proposal but considerably expanded the scope of the recommendations. (Comments incorporated).

OSD - Generally concurred but expanded the recommendation to include other initiatives. (Comments incorporated).

ISSUE PAPER NO. 33

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE

SUBJECT: Review of Provisions of Vienna Convention

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The State Department should continue efforts with selected other governments to tighten the interpretation and application of the Convention. A resolution for presentation to the U.N. General Assembly condemning use of the facilities, privileges and immunities provided to diplomats pursuant to the Vienna Convention or customary international law to support or protect terrorist action could help to provide political and moral impetus to our efforts to counter this abuse.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None

ISSUE PAPER NO. 34

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: TRANSPORTATION

SUBJECT: Preventing Flyaway of Hijacked Aircraft

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: Issue withdrawn based on consensus of inputs received.

DISSENTING VIEWS: N/A

ISSUE PAPER NO. 35

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, CIA, JCS

SUBJECT: Country Team Briefings

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Department of State should arrange for and require all Ambassadors, DCMs, Chiefs of Station, and Military Attaches to be briefed on USG policies, resources and capabilities committed to combatting terrorism. This briefing should be provided in conjunction with a risk assessment of the particular country and region.

COMMENTS:

State agrees, but would expand the proposal, increase FSI courses, and make the course/s mandatory for all USG employees whose parent agencies do not have equivalent courses.

ISSUE PAPER NO. 37

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Interference with the Movement of Nuclear Material

DROP AS AN ISSUE

ISSUE PAPER NO. 36

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: NSC, FBI, TREASURY, STATE

SUBJECT: U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (proposed in Issue Paper No. 3) in his capacity as Chairman, IG/T, should prepare an action plan to identify the extent to which these infrastructure assets are vulnerable and propose near- and long-term programs to rectify what appears to be a potentially serious national security problem.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

NSC - The IG/T was directed by the NSC in 1983 to review this problem; the Congress requested similar action in 1984. The IG/T should prepare an action plan addressing these issues. (Comment incorporated.)

JUSTICE - Agreed that FEMA should have a role, but non-concurred that FEMA take the lead in the effort. (Comment incorporated.)

ISSUE PAPER NO. 38

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Improved Security for Nuclear Reactor Facilities

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Justice Department should pursue legislation to permit nuclear reactor licensees access to FBI criminal history files.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None

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ISSUE NO. 39

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, CIA, NSC, OMB

SUBJECT: Research and Development for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism should be assigned coordination authority and responsibility for R&D related to terrorism through existing interagency terrorism R&D committees. His coordination function would reduce the incidence of duplication in the funding of terrorism R&D projects and the likelihood that worthwhile R&D projects to combat terrorism go unfunded because of interagency bickering over funding responsibility.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

State - The real problem is lack of formal funding. State forwarded on 31 Dec 1984 a five-year program for \$23 million/year. The NSC should weigh in with OMB.

JCS - Concur in principle. The source of supplemental funding should be identified by the NSC.

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BY 105 NARA DATE 10/11/02

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 41

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Adequacy of the International Legal System to Deal with
Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Departments of State and Justice should continue government-to-government contacts and stimulate appropriate private and academic initiatives that address the relationship between terrorism and the domestic and international legal system. State and Justice should seek every opportunity to improve the international consensus for governments to act in counter-terrorist events to the full extent of the authority available to them.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

JUSTICE - Questions the appropriateness as well as the need for governmental support to private sector initiative.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 43

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: U.S. Presence Abroad

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Department of State should direct Ambassadors in all designated high-threat areas to institute a thorough review of the personnel requirements of all Agencies represented in-country, in order to reduce the exposure of personnel and facilities to terrorist attacks to the minimum consistent with effectiveness. The review should carefully examine the question of hardening all Embassy-related facilities, or including them within a security perimeter, regardless of practices prevailing elsewhere. The Department of Defense should direct the appropriate CINCS to undertake similar reviews for their commands.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

State - NSC should create an interagency committee of all agencies with representation abroad to report to the NSC the results of each agency review, so that appropriate reductions or personnel abroad can be ordered.

ISSUE PAPER NO. 44

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, CIA, DEFENSE

SUBJECT: International Research, Development and Acquisition (RD&A) Initiatives

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The State Department, through the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), should continue to pursue bilateral arrangements for RD&A exchanges with selected foreign counterparts such as are now ongoing with the British and Israelis. Each arrangement should ultimately be based on a formalized statement of goals and objectives, funding agreements where appropriate and a general understanding of what's expected of each party. Above all, these combatting terrorism programs should be highly compartmented and structured on a quid pro quo basis in order to protect and enhance US political, military, and technological interests.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

STATE - Generally agrees with the draft proposal but prefers a less formalized approach, i.e., "We recognize how difficult it is to structure formally bilateral relationships on a matter as sensitive as counterterrorism defensive capabilities and technologies. We need to keep pressing for greater cooperation, while understanding that progress, which will be based on mutual trust, will develop slowly."

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 45

F97-082/2 #130

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, TREASURY

HOS

3/13/02

SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Dignitaries in the United States

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: ^{extension of} The protection of visiting heads of state ~~and~~ to their accompanying ~~party~~ ^{spouse} should be ~~retained~~ ^{considered} by the US Secret Service.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

State - Suggested some modifications to the statement of the issue, but retained the proposal as written.

Treasury - Non-concur. It was not the intent of Congress that the Secret Service (Title 18, USC, Sect 3056) protect any of the "accompanying party". "We strongly disagree that there exists fragmentation or egregious duplication in the protection of a visiting Head of State's "accompanying party." Our "overlapping responsibilities" have been managed effectively in the past.

Agency responsibilities for
the protection of For Dignitaries and Facilities should be reviewed by an interagency study group, chaired by the Department of State.

McBrien proposal:

the US Secret Service should consider further protective responsibility in the form of "accompanying spouses" of heads of state when on ^{state} official, ^{or private} visits to the United States.

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