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Collection: COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC:

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Wills/F97-082/2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Paper	Issue Paper No. 3 1 p. R 10/11/02 NUSF 97-082/2 #131	n.d.	P1/B1
2. Paper	Issue Paper No. 7, 1 p. R " " #132	n.d.	P1/B1
3. Paper	Issue Paper No. 11, 1 p. PART 3/30/06 " #133	n.d.	P1/B1
4. Paper	Issue Paper No. 14, 2 p. R 10/11/02 " #134	n.d.	P1/B1
5. Paper	Issue Paper No. 16, 1 p. D 6/17/02 NUSF 97-082/2 #135	n.d.	P1/B1, B2
6. Paper	Issue Paper No. 17, 1 p. D 3/21/01 " #136	n.d.	P1/B1
7. Paper	Issue Paper No. 21, 1 p. D 10/11/02 " #137	n.d.	P1/B1
8. Paper	Issue Paper No. 22, 1 p. D " " #138	n.d.	P1/B1
9. Paper	Issue Paper No. 24, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
10. Paper	Issue Paper No. 25, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
11. Paper	Issue Paper No. 30, 1 p. PART 3/30/06 " #141	n.d.	P1/B1
12. Paper	Issue Paper No. 45, 1 p. R " " #142	n.d.	P1/B1
13. Paper	Issue Paper No. 5, 1 p. R 10/11/02 " #143	n.d.	P1/B1
14. Paper	Issue paper no. 6, 1 p. R " " #144	n.d.	P1/B1
15. Paper	Issue Paper no. 8, 1 p. R 3/21/06 " #145	n.d.	P1/B1
16. Paper	Issue Paper No. 9, 1 p. D 6/17/02 NUSF 97-082/2 #146	n.d.	P1/B1, B2
17. Paper	Issue Paper No. 10, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
18. Paper	Issue Paper No. 12, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
19. Paper	Issue Paper No. 13, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/B1

R 10/11/02 NUSF 97-082/2 #149

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].

P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].

P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

B-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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Wills/F97-082/2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
20. Paper	Issue Paper No. 15, 1 p. <i>R 12/4/07 NLSF97-082/2 #150</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
21. Paper	Issue Paper No. 18, 1 p. <i>R " " #151</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
22. Paper	Issue Paper No. 20, 1 p. <i>PMT 5/11/01 NLSF97-082/2 #152</i>	n.d.	P1/B1, B3
23. Paper	Issue Paper No. 26, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
24. Paper	Issue Paper No. 28, 1 p. <i>R 12/4/07 NLSF97-082/2 #154</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
25. Paper	Issue Paper No. 29, 1 p. <i>R " " #155</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
26. Paper	Issue Paper No. 31, 2 p. <i>R " 10/11/02 NLSF97-082/2 #156</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
27. Paper	Issue Paper No. 32, 1 p. <i>R 12/4/07 " #157</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
28. Paper	Issue Paper No. 33, 1 p. <i>R 3/27/06 NLSF97-082/2 #158</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
29. Paper	Issue Paper No. 35, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
30. Paper	Issue Paper No. 36, 1 p. <i>R 7/10/02 NLSF97-082/2 #160</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
31. Paper	Issue Paper No. 38, 1 p. <i>R 12/4/07 " #161</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
32. Paper	Issue paper No. 39, 1 p. <i>R 10/11/02 NLSF97-082/2 #162</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
33. Paper	Issue Paper No. 41, 1 p. <i>R 12/4/07 " #163</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
34. Paper	Issue Paper No. 43, 1 p. <i>R 10/11/02 NLSF97-082/2 #164</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
35. Paper	Issue Paper No. 44, 1 p. <i>D 5/27/06 " #165</i>	n.d.	P1/B1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

6 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR

- 1 THE SECRETARY OF STATE
- 2 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
- 3 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
- 4 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
- 5 THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
- 6 THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
- 7 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
- 8 THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
- 9 ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
- 10 THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
- 11 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
- 12 CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE VICE PRESIDENT
- 13 ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Meeting of Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

Enclosed are the draft recommendations and an agenda for the Task Force meeting at 4:00 p.m., November 12, 1985 in the Roosevelt Room at the White House.

The Senior Review Group met on Thursday, November 7. As a result, the draft recommendations are categorized into four sections: Tab 1 issue still in contention; Tab 2 draft recommendations agreed upon in principle but requiring refinement; Tab 3 issues in basic agreement; and, Tab 4 issues initially raised that are being dropped by consensus of the Senior Review Group.

J. L. Holloway III

J. L. Holloway, III

Admiral, USN, (Retired)

Executive Director

Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

Enclosures: Agenda

- Tab 1 Issue In Contention
- Tab 2 Issues Agreed Upon in Principle
- Tab 3 Issues Agreed Upon
- Tab 4 Issues To Be Dropped

(Unclassified when enclosures removed)

CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *only 11/21/00*

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

PRINCIPALS' MEETING
OF
VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM
NOVEMBER 12, 1985
4:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
ROOSEVELT ROOM - WHITE HOUSE

AGENDA

- o Opening Remarks - The Vice President
- o Progress Report - Admiral Holloway
- o Discussion of Draft Recommendations
- o Plans for Final Report

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 3

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Terrorist Incident Working Group should be retained with the following modification:

There will be established the position of National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism in the National Security Council organization at the level of a Senior Director for National Security (Special Assistant to the President). The Coordinator will:

1. Be supported by a small, full-time, dedicated staff.
2. Serve as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.
3. Serve as Executive Director of the TIWG.
4. Be responsible for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.
5. Provide management coordination of the entire national program for combatting terrorism through the programming documents and the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.
6. Provide a focal point for all matters concerning terrorism other than those clearly the sole responsibility of a single agency or department.

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BY 105 NARA DATE 10/11/02

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 1

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Agencies

SUBJECT: National Program for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The attached appendix should serve as the interim programming document of the national program for combatting terrorism.

(Note: The appendix is currently being prepared by Adm. Staser Holcomb, Terry Arnold, and members of the Working Group, based on the program element information solicited from all agencies in September. The status of this appendix will be briefed to the Task Force Principals on 12 November.)

ISSUE PAPER NO. 2

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Policy for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The NSC should promulgate a NSDD (with the policy statements along the lines already expressed in Issue Paper No. 2) as the national policy for combatting terrorism, and NSDDs 30, 138, 179, and 180 should be superseded.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 7

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, NSC, CIA, TRANSPORTATION,
JUSTICE

SUBJECT: International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Department of State should pursue a three-track effort regarding international agreements for combatting terrorism.

1. A multilateral treaty against terrorism should be sought with a large number of participants in order to attain a broad international expression of condemnation for international terrorism. The objective should be one of wide participation in a general statement, that can be achieved quickly.
2. A parallel effort should be undertaken to obtain a series of bilateral agreements with our allied and like-minded nations for the purpose of combatting terrorism. The objective in these bilaterals would be to move quickly to achieve agreements in areas where there is already a concurrence of views on both sides. If where only limited concessions can be gained, these should be accepted and agreements rapidly concluded. This way, a network of bilateral agreements concerning terrorism might be achieved in a relatively short period of time.
3. Efforts to ensure compliance with existing treaties should continue to be pursued aggressively with a view to broadening these where appropriate.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 11

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, TREASURY, CIA, JCS, FBI

SUBJECT: Intelligence Fusion Center for Terrorism



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By CU, NARA, Date 3/30/06

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 14

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: ALL

SUBJECT: Government-Media Relations during a Terrorist Incident

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The US Government should develop and implement a strategy, in consultation with the media, that will limit the capability of terrorists to exploit US press freedom to the advantage of the terrorists. During a fast moving stressful and emotion-laden incident, conflicts often develop between how the media perceives its obligations and how policymakers perceive theirs.

Two viable courses of action are open to the government:

- to organize its public diplomacy efforts better during a terrorist incident;
- to seek voluntary restraints by the media in reporting while a terrorist incident is underway.

US Government officials should systematically meet with media officials to discuss the government's explicit concerns about the role of the media during terrorist incidents. This should be done quietly, but in open consultation with media leaders as a contribution to their process of self-examination and responsible coverage.

The Public Diplomacy Working Group of the IG/T should develop a mechanism to bring representatives of the media and appropriate US Government officials together rapidly at the onset of a terrorist event for discussion of national interests. The US Government considerations could be a factor in the media's determination of how to proceed in fulfilling its responsibilities to the public.

US Government officials responsible for dealing with the media during a terrorist event should bear firmly in mind that efforts to coerce or restrict the media, directly, or indirectly, such as through advertisers, is likely to provoke negative and resentful responses.

The absence of a self-imposed system of restraint raises the potential for government regulation during a terrorist incident. The media, especially television, is much more susceptible to this pressure with the decline in public confidence. Networks may accept a voluntary system of restraint rather than risk a government move to impose regulations during a crisis. Candidate issues to be considered for voluntary restraint include:

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- No interviews with the families of the hostages or victims until after the terrorist incident is resolved.
- No payments to terrorist groups or supporters for interviews or access.
- No live, unedited coverage of actual terrorist events.
- No coverage of military plans or deployments in response to terrorist incidents.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 17

FOIA(b)(1)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, NSC, CIA

SUBJECT: Current Policy Regarding the Operational Security of CTJTF

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The US public, our allies, and our adversaries, including terrorists, are not adequately aware of U.S. competence or resources committed to combatting terrorism. Current policy requires a system of cover, security and classification concerning all aspects of CTJTF/ [REDACTED] A public affairs strategy designed to announce U.S. counterterrorist capabilities while stringently protecting missions, tactics and procedures does not currently exist. Additionally, much of the protected information concerning counterterrorist forces has reached the media and the public domain. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) working in conjunction with the National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism should develop a comprehensive public affairs strategy for counterterrorist forces. Additionally, a perception management program which incorporates OPSEC, PSYOP and deception should be developed by JCS, in coordination with CIA and State, and forwarded to the NCA for review and approval with subsequent distribution to appropriate agencies.

Care must be taken not to imply targeting the US populace in a PSYOP campaign. The focus of the program must be to preserve US CT capabilities and how and when these forces might be used.

Objectives of the perception management program should be:

- To preserve essential secrecy about US military counterterrorist capabilities and how forces might be deployed and employed during training and exercises.
- To provide options to support crisis resolution short of using force, preserve essential secrecy of force preparations, movement and US intentions; gain the initiative, surprise and superiority when forces are used; and, when necessary, support the security and withdrawal of forces.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 25

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE

SUBJECT: Rewards

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Department of State should expedite the authority for payment of rewards authorized under the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, and issue clearly delineated guidance to appropriate U.S. government agencies on how to utilize the provisions of the Act to maximum advantage. Ensure that rewards actually authorized are effectively publicized in both target foreign populations and to the domestic American audience. The full range of aggressive options to include the creative use of rewards for psy-op efforts should be explored so long as the terrorists themselves do not benefit from the payment. Finally recommend consideration be given to obtaining Congressional support for increasing the amount that can be authorized in any one case to \$1 million and to an expanded use of the awards authority, recognizing the practical political constraints that impact on its implementation.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 30

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: DCI, FBI

SUBJECT: Terrorism Intelligence Analysts

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism should establish and oversee an interdepartmental career development program that will encourage a core of intelligence analysts to devote themselves to addressing terrorism as a specialty.

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By C11, NARA, Date 5/30/06

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 45

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, TREASURY

SUBJECT: Protection of Foreign Dignitaries in the United States

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The protection of visiting heads of state and their accompanying party should be retained by the US Secret Service.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 5

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: ALL

SUBJECT: Coordination of Public Diplomacy/Statements During
Terrorists Incidents

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The basic elements of US policy and response guidelines should be delineated at the initial phase of a crisis situation to all US Government policy makers and spokesmen. The process for issuing specific guidance and the rapidity and coordination required to adjust public diplomacy during an ongoing incident is deficient.

1. The TIWG, at its initial meeting in reaction to a terrorist incident, should issue specific guidance to be followed by all US Government spokesmen during the contingency. Legal issues must be carefully considered to ensure that press statements are not made which would jeopardize a criminal investigation or an eventual prosecution.
 - The guidance should be communicated to the President through the White House Press Office.
 - The guidance should be communicated by all members of the TIWG to the applicable responsive activity within each organization. Lead agency responsibility concerning international or domestic terrorist statements should be already delineated.
 - The Deputy White House Press Secretary should be responsible for detailed and timely implementation of the guidance including any restrictions on statements by other agency spokesmen.
 - At each step of the TIWG's deliberations, when further information is received, the situation significantly changes, or new actions are decided upon or planned, the guidance should be reviewed, updated and distributed as outlined above.
2. The Public Diplomacy Working Group of the IG/T should:
 - With NSC approval, provide updated general US policy guidelines for public diplomacy aspects of dealing with terrorism and insure dissemination to all concerned Government press offices.
 - Initiate a system for real time monitoring and analysis of the media during the incident and insure a rapid distribution of this information to US Government press offices and diplomatic posts abroad.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 6

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: Policy for Active Response to Terrorist Threats and Incidents

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: A policy for active response to terrorist threats and incidents -- including a set of criteria similar to that proposed in Issue Paper No. 6 -- should be developed by the National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (Issue Paper No. 3) and forwarded to the IG/T for interagency coordination prior to submission to the National Security Council for approval.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 8

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE

SUBJECT: Extradition Treaties

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The State Department should continue its program of opening negotiations on extradition treaties with countries with democratic regimes and fair judicial systems with a view to limiting the scope of the political offense exception. To achieve this goal, Senate approval of the first such revision (US/UK) to be concluded is a must. The State Department appropriately has the lead in the effort to secure approval. However, assistance from other U.S. Government agencies may be essential to making the Administration's anti-terrorism case.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 13

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: ALL

SUBJECT: Foreign and Domestic Public Awareness

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: An important facet of the U.S. ability to deal effectively with terrorism is the extent to which the closely interrelated domestic and foreign publics understand the nature of the threat and support the policies necessary to counter it. Concurrently, there is a national requirement to create a sophisticated public understanding of the essence of the threat to the nation posed by terrorism. The Interdepartmental Working Group on Public Diplomacy in conjunction with the National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism should develop a long-range strategy for approval by the IG/T designed to improve public understanding of international terrorism and the policies required to combat it. Programs to be considered by the Working Group should include:

- The formation of a high level panel, to include representatives from media organizations, religious and ethnic groups, civic groups, national, state and local legislatures, bar associations, law enforcement agencies and other appropriate interested groups to sensitize the American public to the dangers of terrorism and reinforce public preparedness and will to deal with the risks necessary to combat this threat.
- A precise and sophisticated research project designed to explore in depth the public perception, awareness, and understanding of terrorism and its impact. The results of the project would be utilized to generate a "national credo" of US policy towards terrorism in order to educate the public concerning the range of potential responses to terrorism by the government.
- The monitoring by the State Department of US media and public opinion polls to provide insights on how the U.S. public perceives and reacts to various aspects of terrorism and the countermeasures taken against it. USIA should conduct a similar monitoring operation abroad. Government statements on terrorism should be tailored to reflect the results of this analysis.
- A study with USIA, as the lead agency in the international information effort, and working in coordination with the Public Diplomacy Working Group and the IG/T, to complement ongoing efforts to influence foreign opinions concerning terrorism.

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Additionally, the State Department should consider creating a Public Diplomacy Office for Terrorism, similar to the Office of the Coordinator for Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, which would be charged specifically with explaining our counterterrorism policies at home and abroad.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 15

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Murder of U.S. Citizens Outside of U.S.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Departments of State and Justice should continue their efforts in support of legislation which makes the murder of U.S. citizens outside our borders a federal crime under U.S. law.

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BY CW NARA DATE 12/4/07

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 18

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, TREASURY, JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Prohibition of Training and Support/Counterterrorism/
Mercenary Training Camps

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: Appropriate government agencies should continue the effort to employ the expanded ITAR to control the provision of defense services, including training in the use of defense articles such as firearms and explosives, to foreign nationals at mercenary camps in this country. The results of this effort should be assessed after the expanded ITAR has been in effect for one year (1 January 1986). This review should determine whether additional legislation is required to ensure that training and support of terrorists is not permitted under U.S. law.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 20

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: CIA

SUBJECT: Expanded HUMINT Capability Against Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION:

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 28

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Death Penalty for Hostage Taking

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Justice Department should pursue legislation which provides that individuals who murder U.S. citizens during a hostage taking would be subject to the death penalty. It is suggested that this be included as part of Senate Bill 239, which calls for imposition of the death penalty for certain Federal crimes: treason, espionage, crimes involving the death of a person and an attempt to assassinate the President.

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BY OU NARA DATE 12/4/07

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 29

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Department of Justice should take the lead in an interagency review of the provisions of the FOIA to include determining the validity of reported abuses of the intent of the Act. If the review does in fact conclude that there are abuses, the Justice Department should develop legislation to close the loophole in the law. Counterterrorism is only one small part of this major issue.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 31

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, NSC, CIA

SUBJECT: Psychological Operations to Combat Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Psychological Operations Working Group of the IG/T's Public Diplomacy Committee should insure that Psychological Operations to combat terrorism are closely integrated into the overall counterterrorism effort. Additionally, the Working Group should be tasked to prepare a PSYOP campaign designed to meet the following objectives during specified contingencies.

- Psychological perceptions to foster during a terrorist incident
 - Promote international condemnation of the terrorist act.
 - Foster resolution of the incident short of the use of military forces.
 - Support the gathering of intelligence information to support CT operations planning.
 - Reduce the willingness of target audiences, foreign countries, and special interest groups to aid and inform terrorist organizations concerning US military movements and preparations.
 - Establish international support for the use of military force to resolve the incident if necessary.
- Short-term objectives designed to influence the objective reasoning of foreign target audiences include:
 - Emphasize the random threat of terrorist actions and adverse consequences from nationally sponsored terrorism so that foreign individuals and groups demand official action by their governments and police forces to suppress terrorists and deny them support.
 - Emphasize that terrorists are considered criminal undertakings for base motives and are described in terms relating to criminal behavior.
 - Emphasize that terrorism is an act that may achieve short-term goals but over the long term is counterproductive.

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- Long-term objectives designed to influence the emotional and objective reasoning of foreign target audiences so that the use of terror to gain political ends is widely condemned include:
 - Discouraging the use of terror to gain political ends.
 - Encouraging individuals and groups to provide information to police and intelligence agencies concerning terrorists and their plans.
 - Encouraging individuals and groups to refuse safe havens and support for terrorists.
 - Encouraging individuals and groups to agree with and support the suppression of terrorist organizations by force when appropriate.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 32

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, TREASURY, JUSTICE, CIA

SUBJECT: Controlling Cross-Border Travel of Known or Suspected Terrorists

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The State Department should take the lead in an interagency effort to upgrade existing systems or recommend development of a new computerized system to monitor cross-border people movements. Upgrading of the State Department's Automated Visa Outlook System (AVLOS) may have application in this area.

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State should pursue the development of its improved visa lookout system CLASS (Consular Lookout and Support System), which will be able to interact with other countries' lookout systems.

State should also continue to urge other countries to establish visa lookout systems and to share the results with us. Efforts such as those already being undertaken by State and CIA with selected friendly governments, inter alia to associate the United States with European Community systems for controlling cross-border movements of terrorists, should be emphasized.

State should consider including this issue in the ATA Program, that an R&D effort be directed to developing a uniform system that could inter-link friendly countries, and that resources be provided to assist friendly countries in acquiring hardware presently unavailable to them.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 33

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE

SUBJECT: Review of Provisions of Vienna Convention

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The State Department should continue efforts with selected other governments to tighten the interpretation and application of the Convention. A resolution for presentation to the U.N. General Assembly condemning use of the facilities, privileges and immunities provided to diplomats pursuant to the Vienna Convention or customary international law to support or protect terrorist action could help to provide political and moral impetus to our efforts to counter this abuse.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 36

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: NSC, FBI, TREASURY, STATE

SUBJECT: U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (proposed in Issue Paper No. 3) in his capacity as Chairman, IG/T, should prepare an action plan to identify the extent to which these infrastructure assets are vulnerable and propose near- and long-term programs to rectify what appears to be a potentially serious national security problem.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 38

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Improved Security for Nuclear Reactor Facilities

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Justice Department should pursue legislation to permit nuclear reactor licensees access to FBI criminal history files.

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ISSUE NO. 39

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, DOT, CIA, NSC, OMB

SUBJECT: Research and Development for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism should be assigned coordination authority and responsibility for R&D related to terrorism through existing interagency terrorism R&D committees. His coordination function would reduce the incidence of duplication in the funding of terrorism R&D projects and the likelihood that worthwhile R&D projects to combat terrorism go unfunded because of interagency bickering over funding responsibility.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 41

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Adequacy of the International Legal System to Deal with
Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Departments of State and Justice should continue government-to-government contacts and stimulate appropriate private and academic initiatives that address the relationship between terrorism and the domestic and international legal system. State and Justice should seek every opportunity to improve the international consensus for governments to act in counter-terrorist events to the full extent of the authority available to them.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 43

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: U.S. Presence Abroad

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Department of State should direct Ambassadors in all designated high-threat areas to institute a thorough review of the personnel requirements of all Agencies represented in-country, in order to reduce the exposure of personnel and facilities to terrorist attacks to the minimum consistent with effectiveness. The review should carefully examine the question of hardening all Embassy-related facilities, or including them within a security perimeter, regardless of practices prevailing elsewhere. The Department of Defense should direct the appropriate CINCS to undertake similar reviews for their commands.

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ISSUES TO BE DROPPED

ISSUE PAPER NO. 4	Definition of Terrorism
ISSUE PAPER NO. 19	Congressional Oversight of Counterterrorism Operations
ISSUE PAPER NO. 27	Terrorism as a Crime - <i>believe a point will be issue</i>
ISSUE PAPER NO. 34	Preventing Flyaway of Hijacked Aircraft
↑ ISSUE PAPER NO. 37	Interference with the Movement of Nuclear Material
↓ ISSUE PAPER NO. 42	Deployment Policy for JSOC