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Withdrawer

BCB 5/17/2005

File Folder [NSDD 207 NSC STAFF: CRAIG COY; ROBERT EARL] (4
OF 7)

FOIA

M05-012

Box Number ~~91956~~ RAC Box 10

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STEPANIE

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
10555	TRANSMITTAL	COVER SHEET	1	ND	B1
10557	MEMO	NEAL KOCH TO JAMES HOLLOWAY RE TASK FORCE REPORT: FIRST DRAFT	2	12/10/1985	B1
10558	MEMO	JOHN MOELLERING TO EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE RE COMMENTS	2	12/13/1985	B1
10560	MEMO	JOHN MOELLERING TO EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT, VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE RE COMMENTS	2	12/10/1985	B1
10563	MEMO	TO EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT, VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE RE EDITORIAL COMMENTS	3	ND	B1
10565	MEMO	PARKER BORG TO HOLLOWAY RE TASK FORCE REPORT; FIRST DRAFT PAR 3/27/2006 F97-082/2; R 7/7/2010 M05-012 #10565	8	12/10/1985	B1
10570	PAPER	THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE OFFICE OF COMBATting TERRORISM R 10/12/2006 M05-012	28	ND	B1
10572	PAPER	ATTACHMENT [PAGE 109] R 3/27/2006 F97-082/2	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
10574	LETTER	ROBERT OAKLEY TO JIM HOLLOWAY	3	12/6/1985	B1
		<i>R 3/27/2006 F97-082/2</i>			

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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~~9 LETTER ROBERT OAKLEY TO ADM. HOLLOWAY 3 12/6/1985~~ ^{mvh 3/10/08}

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December 10, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral J.L. Holloway, III,
Executive Director,
Vice President's Task Force on Combatting
Terrorism:

FROM: Parker Borg, Acting S/CT 
Department of State

SUBJECT: Task Force Report: First Draft

We have just finished reviewing the first draft of the Task Force Report. As Bob Oakley has written separately, we believe that the report still needs a lot of work. It is admirable that the Task Force has been able to do so much work in such a short period of time, but the report reflects this hurried approach.

The report reflects a certain bias toward activist military responses to the terrorism problem which is dangerous and overly simplistic. I understand that you would like this report to be a definitive statement about terrorism, a report which will be referred to within the Government for guidance and which will be the basis for a public document. We agree that this is an excellent idea, but the changes required to make the report reflect the government's current or any future approach to combatting terrorism are so extensive that it requires a major rewriting effort. Because so much work needs still to be done, we have not attempted to obtain any clearances outside of the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-terrorism.

There are three major shortcomings to the report.

--Military options are given unwarranted prominence that do not accord with this country's policies or practices.

--The diplomatic activities which form the core of the United States' efforts to combat terrorism seem to be mentioned as afterthoughts or are forgotten entirely. Similarly, the description of the State Department's role in combatting terrorism reflects a fundamental ignorance of the thrust of our diplomacy's most important courses of action.

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

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NLRR MDS-D12 #10565

BY RW NARA DATE 7/7/10

~~SECRET~~

-2-

--The report contains inaccuracies from a policy point of view, statements which should be classified or rewritten, points which are inappropriate for a report signed by the Vice President and could be a source of subsequent embarrassment to him, and ideas which reflect a lack of understanding of the various potential audiences for this report. Finally, the drafting needs to be tightened.

The section dealing with the issues is beginning to look very good, reflecting the long hours of work and the inputs from many sources. If the report is to be equally strong, the Task Force should consider an extension of its work, perhaps for another month until January 20, to complete the task and create a document which will be valuable for the Administration and the base for a public document.

To cite specifics in each of the three problem areas:

Military Emphasis

Page Section and comment

X 26 - 27 Criteria for Responses: This section is essentially about military retaliation. This section should cover the criteria for the whole range of options, not solely the criteria for military retaliation as it presently reads. There is nothing in the section about the role of other governments, intelligence sharing, economic or political actions in response to terrorism.

agree.
2d draft
rewrote
this section
entirely.

71 - 73 Deterrence: This section is concerned with preemptive military strikes, not on diplomatic activity, which is the proper focus. Note should be made of our activities with other governments, sharing intelligence and providing better protection. We also restrict sales of military equipment to states which support terrorism and attempt to restrict commercial sales to them. Efforts to control the movement of terrorists or diplomats from countries supporting terrorism are also important means to control terrorism both unilaterally and in cooperation with other governments.

agree in
part -
diplomacy is
not "the proper
focus" tho it
important
and should
be added.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

73 - 75 Crisis Response: This section is the worst. While the "Do Nothing" response may have been intended for one end of a spectrum of actions, it is used to suggest that anything short of the use of US force will not be effective. This implies that the only useful solutions are military and that the problem is simpler than it is. It will be disastrous for the US if such a concept becomes known publicly. The role of other governments is essential in responding to crises outside the US. We should be talking here about assistance, training, exercises and other forms of cooperation which will ensure more effective responses by them. We must not overlook that our forces are unlikely to be willing to go into an environment where the host government has refused to permit access.

not what was suggested
The Rewrite is clearer (2d time)

No - elsewhere in report; not here (as air)
? bullshit. They'll go "ordered to" (Agree tho we may not want to order)

75 - 78 Retaliation: This section also concentrates in detail on types of military actions -- e.g., airstrikes, large scale military actions, use of Special Operations Forces and surrogate forces -- bringing in non-military actions as a weak afterthought on the last page.

subjective judgment. Stat. is too defensive. (But - add more they want. Move us

Diplomacy

Page Section and Comment

79 International Cooperation: Our primary defense in dealing with terrorism is and will continue to be our efforts with foreign governments. This section should describe the key to more successful efforts against terrorism, but is too far back in the report. It should be placed immediately following the section on organization.

disagree, but this should be non-problem. Move up if it'll help...

79 - 80 International Efforts: It is untrue that international cooperation cannot eliminate terrorism; it is the best possible tool. This section reflects a fundamental misunderstanding about U.S. diplomatic activity, confusing resolutions and agreements and the relative importance of multilateral and bilateral efforts. The focus is again on military activities: this time the efforts to develop a combined Counterterrorist Strike Force (which is improbable in the foreseeable future).

disagree. T. won't be eliminated by anything!

? give us alternate language.

agree, but VP has an interest.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

80 - 83 U.S. International Efforts: Once again the emphasis is on programs. Nowhere, not even in the section describing what the Department of State or the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-terrorism is, is there the essential balance describing the day-to-day diplomatic activities which are at the heart of the counterterrorism effort. These efforts are bilateral with allies such as the British, Israelis, Greeks, Italians, Jordanians and Canadians as well as with countries where we have not been so close such as Yugoslavia, Syria and the Soviet Union. There are initiatives with like-minded countries through the Summit Seven and the Quad. There are also international initiatives such as the UNGA resolution against terrorism, the Security Council discussions about a hostage-taking resolution, the Milan resolution of September 1985, the long standing work of ICAO and the IMO meetings in London in December where maritime security featured prominently. As a good example of imbalance, there is a page and a half on details of committee work on maritime security and nothing on the real accomplishments in improving aviation security by the FAA and through ICAO.

OK - give us some words (tho we don't want too much, we'll be boring & out of balance other way...

OK - add.

Policy and Other Problems

<u>Page</u>	<u>Section and comment</u>
-------------	----------------------------

12	Understanding Terrorism: The last paragraph clearly states the US interest in avoiding a precise definition of terrorism. This should be dropped or classified. The Soviets will have a field day with it.
----	--

disagree to omit stuff th "might leak" we gotta be up for

13-14	Recent Trends: This does not seem to discuss the subject adequately. The point which should be made in any discussion of this type is that terrorism is likely to be around for a long time and that there are no easy solutions. I attach at Tab A a recent paper which I have prepared on terrorism trends which might be helpful in strengthening this section.
-------	--

} The report does make this point - eg conclusion

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-5-

15-16 Basis of Terrorism: This is an interesting segmentation of the types of terrorism, but it is stated in overly simplistic terms. The report might identify specific groups as examples of each type of terrorism rather than implying that there is a general regional orientation. The Cubans and Nicaraguans directly and the USSR indirectly, as well as the Iranians, Libyans and PLO, have been tied to insurgent groups in Central and South America. Palestinian groups derive support from private sources as well as from Arab states. Tactical terrorism is often associated with communist-led insurgencies around the world, such as those in the Philippines or Burma.

copy

OK -
since it
none
language

18 -23 Historical Perspective: This clearly needs more work. The emphasis is too much on Americans as targets. If Americans are targets of 30-35 % of the international incidents, that means others are the targets of 65 - 70 %. In addition, we only record the international terrorist incidents, which means we exclude from our statistics all the attacks in Germany against Germans, in France against the French, in Colombia against Colombians, etc. To be successful in the fight against terrorism we have got to motivate the world to recognize this as a world problem. Issuing reports which focus only on the American target is not the way to go. The last two sentences on page 23 seem to overstate the situation and ought to be toned down. The Task Force might ask the CIA and State's INR to prepare a more concise statement.

Disagree
That is the
focus of NSD
179 of our

So, State
should do
global report
why didn't
ask INR

23 Vulnerability of America: This unclassified paragraph may be too revealing to be put in a document signed by the Vice President. We should assume that this report will receive wide dissemination and will be read by terrorists. 00

It's in unclas
CSIS etc report
Do we want to
classify it? C? S

28 - 29 Policy: A series of quotes here, but no identification of who is being quoted. NSDDO & Oakley

They don't
read?

30 Policy: The last paragraph on this page contains a prescription for action. Unless the report will do this in each section, this should be avoided.

but, I don't
think report
ought to
cite...

Disagree. We've
got recommendations
throughout the report.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-6-

30 -32 Previous Administration Policy: This section is weak and requires more work. I attach at Tab B a study which a summer intern did for this office about past policy which might be helpful in stating the situation more clearly.

OK - will consider

*an inter history
not a policy " ...
(we used it!)* 37 -47 Resources Committed to Combatting Terrorism: This entire section takes a bricks and mortar approach; the number of offices, the amounts of money and the variety of programs used in the counterterrorism effort. While this is interesting, it is not the key to whether we will succeed in dealing with terrorism. If it is to be a part of the main report, it should be put following the description of lead agency and Department responsibilities, not before it. This entire section might also more usefully become an appendix to the report.

It does follow 3.
on NSDD 1
OK...

50 -52 Department of State: This description of State Department activities is very weak. We are preparing a more accurate statement of responsibilities, but will need to coordinate these statements with other offices.

← accurately reflects reality.
the big stuff

48 - 66 Principal Organizations: Under the Department of Justice, the report might wish to consider the Drug Enforcement Agency. There should probably also be a reference to the Department of Energy which has important responsibilities in the event of nuclear terrorism and the Department of Health and Human Services which works on chemical and biological threats through the Communicable Disease Control Center in Atlanta. — OK — OK — OK...

66 - 68 Principal Organizations: Following the sections on the activities of the various departments, the report lists also as principal organizations the Emergency Support Team and the Hostage Reception and Debriefing Team. These are inter-agency activities coordinated through the IG/P and might be so specified. There are, however, other inter-agency cooperative efforts which deserve equal attention: The Technical Support Working Group which attempts to coordinate interagency anti-terrorism R & D efforts; the Public Diplomacy Working Group which is developing programs to deal

— and RING in incidents...
Goes w/lo...
Issue paper

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-7-

more effectively with the public on terrorism issues; the Rewards Committee which oversees the implementation of the rewards program; the Maritime Security Working Group which is looking at maritime issues in the wake of the Achille Lauro hijacking; and the Exercise Committee which is listed in NSDD 30 as responsible for coordinating counterterrorism exercises. These are all important executive branch resources for dealing with terrorism.

Issue Page

Mentioning a
these labor
risks overload
the narrative

69 Phases of terrorism. Rather than talk about two overlapping planes, this section might more descriptively be called two approaches. One important program which is overlooked is preemption, which would be defined not primarily in the sense of a military preemptive strike, but as security moves in cooperation with host governments to block a known target or move it out of the way of danger.

} See 2nd draft
rewrite of
D. Strategic
view
consideration

92 Extradition Treaties: The one paragraph which will be read on the Hill, especially by Senators, concerns Extradition Treaties (p.92). That paragraph should be written with the idea of convincing Senators to support Administration efforts to limit the political offense exception. As it is written, it merely shows how desperate the Administration is for Senate consent.

} It uses words
from State
memos.

X 99 -102 Role of Terrorism During an Incident: This whole part would likely be seized upon by the press as an attempt to set government guidelines for it and would probably be embarrassing to the Vice President.

OK, but
are fully aware
to this - See
rewrite

X 106 -09 The Role of Hostage Families: This section is unnecessarily long and detailed. The sections from the top of page 107 through the top of page 109 could easily be omitted. The section on meetings with senior administration officials should be rewritten as listed in Tab C.

disagree -
it's an important
issue - See
2d draft.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-8-

X 110 -16 Conclusions: This entire section still needs work. At the bottom of page 110, Bob Oakley suggested that for balance another sentence be added: "Clearly the Israeli policy of frequent use of force has not solved the terrorist threat, either from within Israel and the occupied territories or without."

— agree. See 2d draft
↑
— agree balance statement
"E two views"

A more logical order for the conclusions might be capabilities, intelligence, cooperation, and then public attitudes. When talking about cooperation, there might be a reference to active measures, including assistance to third countries in counter-terrorist activities and including planning for joint military operations.

— why?
} OK - give in language

The section on Public Attitudes and the effects of a terrorist attack (pp. 112-114) is overdrawn and highly suggestive; it should be dramatically restated.

} See 2d draft.

This report is very important, given the wide dissemination it is destined to have and the uses to which it will be put. Therefore it is very important that this report reflect accurately US policies and their thrust in the future, and take into consideration the various special audiences that will review it carefully--the media, Congress, our allies, enemies and terrorists.

Given this importance, more time needs to be taken in preparing the report. It is difficult to see how a suitable report can be prepared within the narrow time limits currently before the Task Force. I would thus suggest that, at the Senior Review Group meeting December 11, consideration be given to extending the due date of the Task Force's final report to permit the completion of a more finished document, one which will make a stronger contribution to counterterrorism policy.

— disagree

Attachments:

As stated

~~SECRET~~

Trends in Terrorism

Almost every day some new horror committed by terrorists seems to jump at us from the screens of our televisions, the front pages of our newspapers and the covers of our magazines. Twenty-five years ago we did not speak of Palestinian or Shia terrorists, hijackings of planes or ships, car bombs or violent attacks against American citizens around the world.

Terrorism is not a new scourge. It dates back to the First Century A.D. when the Zealots struggled against the Romans in ancient Palestine. Modern international terrorism, however, literally exploded on the world scene in 1970 when radical Palestinians hijacked four airliners to Dawson Field in Jordan where they blew the planes up before the world's television cameras. Over the course of the past fifteen years new groups have joined the scene employing new methods of violence--and always benefitting from prime time television.

Officials and politicians are continuously saying that more must be done to halt terrorism, and many steps have been taken. During 1985, for example, the combination of better intelligence, better security and better cooperation with other governments helped the US preempt or prevent about 90 incidents targetted against Americans. Looking ahead what are the trends which we can expect for the future?

First, terrorism is likely to be a prominent factor on the international political landscape for the rest of this century, despite all efforts to minimize it. All statistics show increases every year. There were 400 - 500 incidents in late 70's and early 80's, 700 incidents in 1984 and perhaps 1,000 for 1985. Terrorism will not disappear for many reasons: frustrated splinter groups recognize that they can more easily make their mark through acts of violence than any other form of opposition; a worldwide system of competitive arms sales makes weapons easily available to terrorist groups; travel is becoming easier between different countries and border controls are diminishing, particularly in Europe; weapons of mass destruction as well as increasingly lethal conventional armaments have made regular warfare potentially too costly; and terrorism is viewed by some countries as a cheap way to strike a blow at their enemies.

Second, the problem for Americans is likely to continue to be external to the U.S., not internal. ~~Less than 1 % of the total terrorist incidents occur in the U.S.~~ Several reasons have been suggested: the effective work of the FBI, the generally tighter control at US points of entry and the absence of radicalized segments of the U.S. population where terrorists can find support. Domestic terrorism could become a more serious problem in the future because of threats from disaffected internal groups such as ethnic separatists, religious fundamentalists and political fanatics or anti-American external groups such as Iranians who find support within immigrant communities, but terrorism for Americans will largely be an external problem. American citizens and US interests have been consistently the target of 30 to 35 % of worldwide terrorist attacks. When considering the terrorism threat, it is important to recognize that citizens of other countries, particularly our European allies, are also victims of such attacks--and they occur in their backyards.

Third, terrorist attacks are likely to be increasingly violent. Looking at recent tactical trends used by terrorist groups, the likelihood for further grotesque developments in the future becomes apparent. The seizing of Embassies and suicidal car bombs are actions which were unknown ten years ago. Look at the firsts from recent incidents: the TWA hijacking of June 1985 allowed us to see hijackers obtain reinforcements for their troops aboard the plane and take passengers from the plane as hostages; the Achille Lauro hijacking presented the first passenger shipjacking in the Middle East and the first murder by terrorists of a passenger aboard a cruise liner. Widespread media coverage gives terrorist acts a demonstration effect for other groups, but continuous repetition of such acts cannot hold the same media attention, leading terrorists to seek more spectacular acts of violence to propagate their messages.

We have this point.

Fourth, a broad spectrum of citizens will be the victims of terrorist attacks. Prominent public figures will undoubtedly remain the primary targets of terrorist attacks, but citizens from all walks of life--businessmen, journalists, tourists and even clergymen--have become increasingly the victims and in some cases the targets of terrorist attacks. In response to the threats against officials, the U.S. government has begun an extensive program to upgrade security at embassies around the world.

The U.S. corporate world can be expected to make similar investments if it wishes to remain active in high threat areas. The sorts of security procedures which we have come to accept before boarding a plane are likely to become more common for entrance aboard ships and into public buildings.

Fifth, open societies will remain the principal targets of terrorists, but no societies will be immune. Open and ~~democratic societies are vulnerable to terrorism~~ because on the one hand the terrorists might succeed more easily in bringing the democratic state to its knees, and on the other the overreactions by democratic states to the threat could more easily destroy the open nature of the society. In designing policies to halt terrorism, we must be careful to protect our basic liberties. We should also recognize that the means which are available to the opponents of democratic states are increasingly available also to the opponents of dictatorships. In Bulgaria there were several terrorist attacks during 1985, probably committed by its repressed minority Turkish population. During 1984 the Soviet Union ranked number seven on the terrorist victim list and during 1985 witnessed four of its diplomats in Beirut fall victim to the same style of kidnapping which has plagued Western governments.

we make this point

Sixth, ~~State sponsorship has become an increasingly dangerous factor in global terrorism.~~ There has been an unmistakable rise in state terrorism in the past few years with Iran, Libya, Syria, Cuba and Nicaragua as the most active, determined and systematic supporters of terrorist groups. The growing direct government assistance in arms explosives, communications, travel documents, and training of fanatics goes a long way to explaining the shift in tactics toward bombings and armed attacks. Iran remains the major proponent of state terrorism. Its goal appears to be the establishment of fundamentalist Shiite regimes patterned after its own elsewhere in the Muslim World, reducing at the same time all traces of Western influence. In 1983 there were 50 attacks and in 1984 about 60 attacks directly indirectly tied to Iran. Libya, which directs most of its attacks against its own citizens abroad, but has also been active against neighboring countries, appears to have been involved in about 25 incidents last year.

Seventh, the responses from governments to terrorist attacks will tend to ebb and flow with events. Shortly after the bombing of our Embassy in Beirut in September

1984, there was a great outcry for action in the US which fostered the passage of the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism and other important related provisions. Some of the segments of this legislation had been proposed to several previous sessions of Congress; the entire package appeared likely to die in committee prior to the bombing. In London, following the shooting of a British policewoman from a window in the Libyan Embassy, there was a cry of outrage against Libyan terrorism. Similarly, in Europe after the discovery of collaboration among leftist terrorist groups and assassinations of prominent figures in France and Germany in early 1985, there was a rash of cooperative measures among the European states. A few months later when we have tried to talk with the British about stronger joint actions against the Libyans or with the Europeans about strengthening cooperation, the normal bureaucratic reasons for inaction have again dominated the dialogues. When Russians were being held hostage in Beirut, there were signs the Soviet Union might want to talk about terrorism, but when their hostages were released, this interest waned. ✓

Terrorism will be a fact of life for Americans for the rest of this century, although it will affect us overseas more than at home. It will be increasingly violent and affect a broad range of victims. The root causes of terrorism must be studied and underlying conditions analysed, but it is unrealistic to expect that terrorism will disappear simply, either through bold military responses to one or two threats or by resolving fundamental political conflicts such as the Palestinian homeland question. There are no easy solutions. There are too many groups--and deranged individuals--who have learned from the demonstration effect of other fanatics that random violence gets the sort of attention and prestige that would be otherwise unavailable. Better intelligence, enhanced personal and building security, improved international cooperation and a wider realization by the media of their contributing role are essential, if we hope to live in a world where the violence of terrorism does not dominate world events.

Good
Summary-

We
agree &
think
our
report
says
this!

~~SECRET~~

What's this?

TAB C

Given this situation, and the obligation of the government to keep the families informed, there needs to be an effective "outreach" program to maintain personal contact with the families and share information with them as extensively as possible. Responsibility for this outreach program must be clearly fixed within the Executive Branch, so that an effective program is developed. The decision has been taken that in exceptional circumstances (such as an unusually prolonged hostage situation) primary responsibility for dealing with hostage families is assigned to a special committee within the Department of State. Improvements over the previous system include: assignment of individuals to maintain frequent personal contact with each family; the use of hot-lines or toll-free numbers, and more extensive information on the availability of professional counselling services. (U)

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NLS 97-082/2-177

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37. CS, NARA, DATE 3/27/06

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NLS MO5-012 #10570

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 10/12/06

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The Historical Development of
the Office for Combatting Terrorism

The phenomenon of political terrorism has beset members of the international community arena since 1968; however, the matter was not of bureaucratic concern to the United States Government until 1972 when President ~~Nixon~~ established the ~~Cabinet Committee~~ to Combat Terrorism. The Committee was established after the terrorist incidents at ~~Lod Airport~~ in Tel Aviv in May ~~1972~~, and later that year in September at the Munich Olympic Games. Although neither of these incidents directly involved American citizens or diplomatic installations abroad, the United States Government took the imminent threat of worldwide terrorism seriously and began the necessary steps toward designing a policy structure. On September 25, 1972 a Presidential directive (~~Presidential Review Memorandum No. 30~~) established the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. The first meeting of its Working Group was convened on October 2 by Secretary of State William Rogers.

The ~~relatively inactive~~ status of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism over the ensuing five years, coupled with President Carter's decision to create a stronger policy response to terrorism, led to the CCCT's formal abolition in

~~SECRET~~

September of 1977. Reorganized by the Carter Administration as the Interagency Working Group to Combat Terrorism, it was chaired by the Acting Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, John Karkashian. The Office for Combatting Terrorism was initially established on August 1, 1976 under the aegis of the Deputy Undersecretary for Management (M/CT). Ambassador L. Douglas Heck was appointed as Director on August 11. It should be noted that the official designation for the Office for Combatting Terrorism has changed from the original M/CT code, to D/CT temporarily, and back to M/CT. These changes will be elaborated upon in the chronological discussion of this Office.

Scope

It will be the purpose of this paper to trace the historical development of the Office for Combatting Terrorism. Pursuant to this objective, the paper will provide a brief overview of how the Office is integrated into the United States Government anti-terrorism policy formulation process. The initial stage of the paper will commence with a discussion on how the office was able to justify its existence in terms of the policy matters it considered. A brief discussion of its past leadership will also be woven into the section addressing historical development. The second section of the paper will examine

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

(u) the structural organization of the office with regard to its staff members and their responsibilities. Thirdly, in keeping with a general systems approach of examining complementarity of structure and function, the paper will probe into the functional dynamics of the office. Particular areas of discussion will be how the office interfaces with other agencies who also share a mutual interest in combatting terrorism. This will be elaborated upon by a description of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) and the Advisory Group on Terrorism with respect to their goals, objectives, and agency membership. Finally, this will be followed by a similar description of the Special Situation Group and the Terrorist Incident Working Group whose functions are outlined in the National Security Decision Directive No. 30.

Early Years 1972-1975

As indicated, a considerable length of time passed between the initial point when the U.S. Government was confronted with the threat of terrorism until the government made its first formal bureaucratic response. President Nixon's Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism was the first such attempt at responding to terrorism. It was during this time under the Nixon Administration that the lead agency concept was implemented, delineating the bureaucratic responsibility for management of a terrorist situation.

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Convened for the first time on Monday, October 2, 1972, the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee was chaired by Ambassador Armin H. Meyer, the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism. Key areas of discussion during this first meeting were intelligence collection and preventive measures since the Munich Olympic incident occurred one month prior. Other matters considered were contingency planning and international actions. By November 15, 1972, the Working Group of the CCCT focused its attention on preventive measures in the Federal Aviation Administration's anti-hijacking program with the implementation of a program in January 1973 of assigning "Skymarshals" on board commercial airliners.

The year 1973 saw the appointment of Ambassador Lewis Hoffacker as Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (S/CCT). In March of 1973, the Working Group of the CCCT attempted to reinforce the importance of publicizing punishment of the Black September Organization terrorists who during this month kidnapped and murdered Ambassador Noel and DCM Moore at the American Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan. Later in 1973, the issues of terrorism reappearing in Latin America and terrorists' use of biological and chemical agents became of increasing concern.

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In 1974, one year after the implementation of domestic airport screening measures, the FAA began to assist in improving the security of foreign airports. Also under consideration was the Atomic Energy Commission program for the protection of special nuclear materials in transit and on location and reinforcing the potential dangers of sales on the black market for use in sabotage and terrorism. The potential for future domestic political kidnappings was discussed since the Hearst kidnapping could have incited similar incidents. The collaboration between the FBI and Secret Service helped shed light on the case of manic-depressive hijacker Samuel Byck who planned to hijack a Delta airliner and crash it into the White House.

The next major area of concern appeared to be the activity of exiled anti-Castro Cubans. By and large, their attacks involved book bombs, and were directed against the Cuban Embassies in Mexico City, Lima, and Jamaica. The FBI later apprehended three members of the FLNC group. According to Mr. Philip Johnson of the State Department, the anti-Cuban activity during that time could perhaps be traced to the militant exiles being under the impression that the United States was going to alter its policy toward Cuba. Another incident that occurred on April 13, involved the ambush killing of three U.S. Naval officers

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in Subic Bay, Philippines. In November, U.S. Customs Service announced plans to expand its enhanced airport security program to 28 major domestic airports. The program was evaluated experimentally at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago and consists of x-raying hold baggage prior to passengers claiming it and closed circuit television monitor of all areas where passengers could be prior to going through Customs. Finally, the December 14 hijacking of a private plane from Tampa to Cuba provided an opportunity to evaluate the strength of the February 1973 agreement between the United States and Cuba of either prosecuting or extraditing hijackers.

Ambassador Hoffacker announced his plans to retire effective January 31, 1975. His position as Chairman of the Working Group/CCCT was filled temporarily by Mr. John N. Gatch, Jr., Acting Chairman of the Working Group. In April of 1975, Ambassador Robert A. Fearey was designated as the new Chairman of the Working Group and Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism.

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The first major incident directed against an American target under Ambassador Fearey's chairmanship was the conspiracy to kidnap Vice Consul John Patterson in Mexico in 1975.

Another major area of concern to Fearey's Working Group was the future of Palestinian terrorism by numerous Palestinian groups such as Al Fatah ("The Conqueror"), Al Sa'iqah ("The Lightning Bolt"), the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/General Command (PFLP/GC). Additionally, there were several kidnapping cases that were brought to the attention of the Working Group, such as the Sears & Roebuck executive Donald Cooper in Bogota, Colombia, Col. Ernest Morgan in Beirut, Charles Gallagher and William Dykes also in Lebanon, and the abduction of two American military personnel in Ethiopia by the Eritrean Liberation Front. Finally, 1975 ended with the locker bomb explosion at La Guardia Airport by Puerto Rican nationalists, and the Vienna OPEC incident in which "Carlos" was suspected to have been involved.

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Middle Years 1976-1980

The year 1976 was special for several reasons. In July there were the Bicentennial events and the Canadian Olympics which called for special security attention. At the same time on July 4, 1976, there was the Palestinian hijacking of an Air France airliner which was taken to Entebbe by the hijackers. Several American citizens were involved.

Organizationally important was the establishment of the Office for Combatting Terrorism on August 1, 1976 and the simultaneous abolition of S/CCT. At this time, the Office was assigned the official designation M/CT, and its administrative parent office within the Department was the Undersecretary for Management. On August 11, 1976, Ambassador L. Douglas Heck was appointed as chairman of the Working Group/CCCT and the Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism (M/CT). The former title of Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (S/CCT), held by previous ambassadors chairing this position, was abolished.

The year 1977 began with a review of two unresolved American kidnapping cases; Curtis and Niehous. Mr. Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation was present for one of the first Working Group meetings of the year. He made an

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interesting point that no single policy toward political kidnappings will deter terrorism. Having a fixed and rigid policy would only inhibit creative thinking. For this reason, Mr. Jenkins was of the opinion that it would be more important to emphasize tactical flexibility.

An ongoing specific topic of interest was the development of new technical advances in letter bomb detection.

With regard to administrative changes, in June, Mr. John E. Karkashian was appointed as Acting Chairman of the Working Group/CCCT. He served in this capacity until October when Heyward Isham was appointed as Director. At this point the future status of the Working Group was reevaluated, and it was determined that the new National Security Council/Special Coordination Committee Working Group would replace the existing Working Group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, which was abolished on September 16, 1977. The new Working Group would consist of 28 federal agencies within whose jurisdiction it is to combat terrorism. Aside from the Working Group, there would also be an Executive Committee on Terrorism (ECT), whose membership would be selected by the NSC. The primary function of the Executive Committee and the Working Group

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was for "policy formulation and information exchange." For a more detailed explanation of the organization for antiterrorism planning, coordination, and policy formulation under the Carter Administration, see Figure 1, Appendix.

There was a strong emphasis in 1978 on anti-hijacking measures. Part of the Ribicoff Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Bill (S.2236) called for establishing a List of Dangerous Airports; however, this was later rejected in the belief that it could inhibit the FAA's efforts to enhance overseas airport security. A multi-national anti-hijacking agreement, the Bonn Declaration was signed into effect in July 1978 by the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The Declaration calls for those member countries agreeing to terminate civilian airline service to any country who fails to either "prosecute or extradite" a hijacker. The first time the Bonn Declaration was invoked was in March 1981 when air service to Afghanistan was terminated because of Afghanistan's failure to impose sanctions against the Pakistan Liberation Army hijackers of a Pakistani International airliner in Afghanistan.

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The subject of terrorism in Latin America was of concern to the Working Group of the NSC/SCC. The ideological foundation behind this kind of terrorism was cited as being nationalistic in orientation which is characteristic of national liberation movements.

Ambassador Anthony C.E. Quainton was appointed Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism in July of 1978. Due to the size of the Working Group, Ambassador Quainton was of the opinion that it was too large to operate effectively. In an attempt to make the Working Group function more effectively, Ambassador Quainton divided the agency members into committees. Therefore, another administrative concern to the NSC/SCC Working Group on Terrorism was the clarification of responsibilities in each of the Working Group committees.

--The Research and Development Committee is intended to coordinate federal anti-terrorism research and respond to research proposals. The committee is also responsible for updating and identifying deficient areas of extant research.

--The Public Information Committee evaluates guidelines for media coverage of terrorist incidents, and identifies ways of dealing with the press during an incident.

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--The International Initiatives Committee functions as a liaison with the United Nations. It concluded that the United Nations General Assembly support for the Bonn Declaration would not be in the Declaration's best interest as it could decrease its authority.

--The Foreign Security Policy Committee aims to reinforce security at U.S. diplomatic installations abroad, implement programs to train USG employees, programs of assistance to American businessmen abroad, evaluate the effectiveness of the Security Watch Committee concept, and ways of streamlining inter-agency relationships.

--The Domestic Security Policy Committee (now defunct) was intended to focus on border management, interagency exchange of operational information, and evaluating the susceptibility of U.S. targets.

--The Domestic Crisis Management Committee (also defunct), was composed of four subcommittees: (a) Plans and Procedures; (b) Coordination and Communication; (c) Training and Evaluation; and (d) Intelligence Requirements and Access.

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--The Foreign Crisis Management Committee (also defunct), focused mostly on interagency communication links.

On October 17, 1979, the Office for Combatting Terrorism was placed under the purview of the Office of the Deputy Secretary and was to be known as D/CT until January 15, 1982 when it was once again designated as M/CT. A summary report of the Executive Committee on Terrorism activities from May to October of 1979 reveals that there was a considerable amount of attention devoted to security planning for the Pan American Games in San Juan and the Lake Placid Winter Olympic Games. Due to the location of the Olympic Games, there was extensive coordination with the Canadian government. The Research and Development Committee of the Working Group approved several research projects on various aspects of terrorism. The Domestic Security Policy Committee collaborated with the Contingency Planning and Crisis Management Committee in an effort to resolve security issues of intelligence and security information regarding terrorist threats and improved the exchange of training material such as films and security equipment.

Unfortunately, there was no information available on the involvement of D/CT in the American hostage situation in Tehran.

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1981 to Present

The year 1981 ended with the kidnapping of Brig. Gen. James L. Dozier by the Red Brigades in Italy. 1982 began with his dramatic rescue by Italian counter-terrorist police. During his captivity, an interagency task force was convened at the State Department. Due to General Dozier's military position, there were representatives of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The trend in the geographic distribution of terrorist incidents has shown that in 1981, there were 91 countries that reported terrorist acts. Also in 1981, the citizens of 71 countries were victimized by terrorist attacks which was more than in any prior year since 1968, when statistical records on the incidence of terrorism were first kept. With regard to the type of victim most likely to be targetted, about half (40%) of the victims worldwide are Americans and almost half of this proportion are diplomats. Thus, American diplomats travelling abroad are highly susceptible to being victims of terrorist attack.

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A major activity of 1981 was the development of a counter-terrorism training and assistance program that would be made available to friendly foreign governments. Many countries are also beset with the threat of terrorism. However, the U.S. is able to render such law enforcement assistance to friendly countries. Police forces would entail modifying Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 to permit foreign countries to receive counter-terrorist training by the U.S. Government. Domestic law enforcement agencies that provide the training include the FBI, FAA, Treasury, and U.S. Customs.

There are five objectives behind the Antiterrorism Assistance Program. The first objective is to enhance the law enforcement antiterrorism skills of those countries threatened by political terrorism, and to provide them with appropriate equipment to prevent terrorism. The second program aims to reinforce bilateral relations with friendly governments by offering assistance. This promotes cooperation between foreign police forces and the U.S. Government. Fourthly, the program through its modern police techniques will raise the level of law enforcement human rights. Finally, the program assists foreign governments in protecting American installations and interests from acts of international terrorism.

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On May 12, Ambassador Robert M. Sayre was appointed as Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, where he presently serves. He also chairs the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Advisory Group on Terrorism, and is the Coordinator for Security Policy and Planning.

Organizational Structure of M/CT

The current organizational structure of the Office for Combatting Terrorism consists of a "front office", two sections and one training program (see Figure 3, Appendix). Staff responsibilities are divided along functional and geographic lines. Ambassador Robert M. Sayre is presently the Director of the Office and pursuant to this role is also the Chairman of both the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Advisory Group on Terrorism, and Coordinator for Security Policy and Planning. The Director of the Office holds the administrative rank equivalent to Assistant Secretary. The senior Deputy Director is charged with the responsibility for overseeing the contingency planning and crisis management function, which is the reactive arm of the U.S. Government anti-terrorism response policy. Six Foreign Service Officers and three clerical staff comprise this section.

The second function is that of overall security policy and coordination which is the responsibility of an Assistant Coordinator of Security Policy.

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At this point it would be appropriate to discuss how the Office for Combatting Terrorism interfaces with other agencies who also share a mutual interest in combatting terrorism. As indicated, in addition to Ambassador Sayre's duty as Director of this Office, he is also the Chairman of the Department of State's Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Advisory Group on Terrorism. Until recently, the Advisory Group was formerly known as the Working Group.

The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) consists of delegates from various federal agencies who bear a direct responsibility for responding to terrorism. The twelve agencies serving on the Interdepartmental Group are the Office of the Vice President, the National Security Council (Special Coordination Committee), Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Energy, Transportation, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of State chairs this group, seconded by the Department of Justice as the Deputy Chairman. The IG/T was established at the beginning of the Reagan Administration, pursuant to the abolition of the Executive Committee on Terrorism which was established under the Carter

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NSDD 30

By proclamation of National Security Decision Directive No. 30 (April 10, 1982), the United States Government organization for managing terrorist incidents is composed of the Special Situation Group (SSG), the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG), and the participating agencies Task Forces.

Special Situation Group

The role of the Special Situation Group is to monitor crises and generate response options for evaluation either by the NSC or by the President. The membership of the SSG is composed of the Vice President (Chairman), Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence, Attorney General/Director of the FBI, Director of the Federal Aviation Administration, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Security Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counselor to the President, Chief

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t of Staff to the President, Deputy Chief of Staff to the
s President, and any others as deemed necessary by the Vice
c President.

d
t The specific responsibilities of the SSG are to: (a)
I initiate contingency planning for a crisis; (b) monitor the
d crisis, utilizing available government resource agencies;
d (c) submit options for evaluation to the NSC or the
n President; (d) ensure that Presidential decisions are
s relayed to agencies for execution; (e) monitor the
c implementatioj of the Presidential decisions and directives
i and (f) provide communications and press guidance for use b
p the White House and State Department. There are several
t other provisions to NSDD 30 which will be discussed as
follows: TIWG, IG/T, White House Operations Group,
Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, and the
o Exercise Committee.

T
a Terrorist Incident Working Group

a The purpose of the Terrorist Incident Working Group
t (TIWG) is to aid the decision-making authorities in the
f White House in the resolution of on-going terrorist
C incidents. Its primary role is to provide operational
T assistance to the SSG. When the SSG is monitoring a
S terrorist incident, the TIWG will be directly accountable

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Chiefs of Staff, FBI, and FEMA. It should be noted that the Chairman reserves the right to alter the TIWG composition to suit the needs of each individual incident. As the nature of the incident changes, so may the agency personnel at the discretion of the Chairman.

Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism

The next provision of NSDD 30 is the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. The Interdepartmental Group convenes at least once per month to discuss matters pertaining to counter-terrorism policy, contingency planning and protective security. Those matters of higher priority are referred by the Senior Interdepartmental Group to the National Security Council. By mandate of President Carter in 1977, the NSC was reorganized to oversee the Policy Review Committee and the Special Coordination Committee.

The White House Operations Group, which is chaired by the Director of the White House Military Office is another provision of NSDD 30. This Group is activated when terrorist threats or acts are perpetrated against the President, Vice President, or senior U.S. official. The NSC staff will act as a liaison between this group, the IG/T, and TIWG.

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The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. Its function is to provide interagency intelligence support to the SSG and the TIWG specifically in the area of counter-terrorism threat analysis.

The Exercise Committee is appointed by the Chairman of the IG/T and its purpose is to conduct exercise programs to ensure that U.S. counter-terrorist response capabilities are ready for deployment. It should be noted that no interagency exercise may be carried out at the national level without IG/T recommendation and approval of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

"Lead Agency" Concept

With regard to which agency will assume the command over managing a terrorist incident, the "lead agency" concept is used. The organization of federal response will be delegated to that agency with the most direct operational role in dealing with that type of incident. For example, since acts of terrorism occurring outside the United States but perpetrated against target symbolizing American interests become a diplomatic matter, the Department of State becomes the lead agency. In response to acts of domestic terrorism occurring within the United States, the FBI within the Department of Justice will become the lead agency. Each FBI field office has developed contingency

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use of assault teams. In the event of a hijacking within U.S. air space, the lead agency will be the Federal Aviation Administration, or the FBI depending on the circumstances.

Summary

It has been the purpose of this paper to review the historical development of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, the Department of State's office for implementing the Department's lead agency responsibility for responding to acts of international terrorism. As indicated, the Office is directed by an Assistant Secretary level official, staffed by Foreign Service Officers, and is divided into three branches: crisis management, security policy, and a training program.

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SUMMARY OF LEADERSHIP
OF THE
OFFICE FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM

<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Period of Leadership</u>
Armin H. Meyer	October 1972 - June 1973
Lewis Hoffacker	July 1973 - February 1975
John N. Gatch, Jr. (Acting)	February 1975 - April 1975
Robert A. Fearey	April 1975 - July 1976
L. Douglas Heck	August 1976 - June 1977
John Karkashian (Acting)	June 1977 - October 1977
Heyward Isham	October 1977 - July 1978
Anthony C.E. Quainton	July 1978 - June 1981
Frank H. Perez (Acting)	June 1981 - May 1982
Robert M. Sayre	May 1982 - Present

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Appendix

Figure 1

Organization for Antiterrorism Planning, Coordination, and
Policy Formulation, Carter Administration

NSC Advisor	Secretary Defense	Director of
	Vice President	Chairman JCS
		CIA
	Secretary State	other concerned agencies

Executive Committee on Terrorism

State	Treasury	Energy
Justice/FBI	Transportation	NSC Staff
Defense/JCS	CIA	

Working Group on Terrorism

State	Army	ICA
Justice	Defense	LEAA
ACDA	DIA	D.C. Police
AID	Energy	NSA
CIA	FBI	NRC
Coast Guard	Fed. Prepared. Agy.	OMB
Commerce	Customs	FAA
Postal Service	Treasury	AT&F
Immig. & Natur. Svc	U.S. U.N.	HEW
Secret Service	Federal Prot. Svc	JCS

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Comittees of the Working Group

Research & Development

Security Policy

Contingency Planning & Crisis Management

Public Relations

International Initiatives

Source: Farrell, William R. The U.S. Government
Response to Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Strategy
Strategy. p. 60.

Federal Protective Service
Immigration and Naturalization Service
International Communications Agency
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Metropolitan Police Department
National Security Agency
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Undersecretary of Defense
United States Coast Guard
United States Customs Service
United States Postal Service
United States Secret Service

References:

1. Farrell, William R. The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Strategy. Westview Press, Inc.; Boulder, Colo. 1982, p. 98.
2. "Heck Leads New Effort to Combat Terrorism," Department of State Newsletter, August-September 1976, p. 13.
3. U.S. Department of State Bulletin Reprint. "Combatting Terrorism." September 1982, p. 4.
4. (Ibid), p.10.
5. Farrell, William R. (Ibid).

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CONFIDENTIAL

December 6, 1985

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Dear Jim:

With all of the day-to-day work plus preparing for our trip, I have had time for only a quick once-over of the first draft of the report and the latest draft of those issues papers on which consensus is still being developed. Parker will provide more detailed comments, but my general observations are for you personally and, if you agree, to be shared with Don Gregg.

First, the issues papers look very good, with two or three exceptions where more information on what is occurring should produce acceptable fixes. The Hegelian process has worked well in producing realistic, useful agreed papers. More importantly, in many areas the process plus the catalytic effect of the existence of a dynamic, probing Task Force led by the Vice President has produced substantial progress by single agencies and on interagency issues which had long been dead in the water. Obviously, recent terrorist incidents have contributed to the positive reaction but the input of the Working Group has greatly facilitated the emergence of agreed programs and courses of action.

Second, the report needs a lot of work; primarily because it has not been through the same sort of vetting process as the issues papers, but also because there seems not be much awareness of how the report is likely to be used. Once approved by the President, it will become something close to gospel or dogma--to be followed almost blindly by many and to be attacked by others. This means

Admiral James L. Holloway, III,
Executive Director,
Vice President's Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism,
730 Jackson Place,
Washington, D.C.

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thinking about the dangers of being too detailed or constraining or too frank, particularly since the secret report will certainly leak and be compared with the public report as well as scrutinized by potential political critics of the Administration and by foreign governments. The fact that a number of recommendations and ideas dropped from the issues papers or made less binding have crept back into the report as observations makes this consideration all the more important. The exogesis which will inevitably take place later needs to be taken carefully into account now. I imagine that the Packwood Commission has encountered a similar problem.

Third, the report and issues papers, taken as a whole, convey a very clear impression that there is a solution to international terrorism and that it lies primarily in the better use of active measures by the United States Government. In my judgment, this is as erroneous a conclusion as it is dangerous. Over the past year, there has been a substantial increase in terrorism abroad, beyond our power to affect directly since it originates, develops and acts in countries controlled by other governments. Our knowledge as well as our capability to stop or stunt the growth of these movements and to attack them militarily or legally or psychologically is severely constrained. As CNO you constantly ran up against the problem of needing the cooperation of foreign governments to conduct certain operations. With terrorism it is much more important, and the politics of getting others to cooperate with us are even trickier. Even in the active measures area, there should be a lot of emphasis upon getting others conditioned, trained, equipped, politically willing to do the job themselves and to seek our assistance. We can never do the job alone and current trends foresee a lot more terrorism abroad for a long time, no matter how effective we are unilaterally or in getting other governments to cooperate. Given the power of the gospel, if the Task Force report is open to the interpretation that a lot of progress can be made unilaterally by better organization, and more resources, or that it can be made in the near term even with others, the public and Congress will justifiably ask in a couple of years why the failure and who is responsible. As the Working Group says with respect to the past conduct of public diplomacy, do not promise or imply a promise unless you can make it good.


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Finally, I believe that the report very badly overstates the political impact of terrorism--on this country and upon other countries' perception of the strength and will of the USG. The fact that there are so few casualties combined with the fact that terrorism takes place abroad reduces what could be a major problem, and does so by minimizing the direct responsibility of the USG to prevent or resolve or retaliate for terrorist incidents. The three Beirut bombings were different and had a major impact because USG security seemed so faulty. We should not overdramatize the importance of the problem, lest we play the terrorists' game and needlessly arouse the Congress and public opinion. The polls do not show, at least not yet, that terrorism is an issue of overwhelming political concern such as nuclear armament, inflation, etc.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Robert B. Oakley". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial "R" and a cursive "Oakley".

Robert B. Oakley
Acting Ambassador-at-Large
for Counter-Terrorism

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Burt
10 Dec

1. The source of this report should be considered:

- it is from M/CT, the office that has from the beginning seen the existence of this Task Force as a threat.

it has not been coordinated anywhere else in the Department of State

insofar as it has legitimate points (eg. classification mismatches, misstatements of fact) we should consider it a positive contribution.

if we have time we can draft a measured response, taking a positive tack. What we should avoid at all costs is a tit-for-tat response

such a response might well take issue with the question of where the 'solution' to terrorism is most likely to come

we might legitimately request specific rewrites from the Department, as we have from other departments and agencies. They tend to stand off and fire at the report without making other than self-serving inputs.