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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC:
Records

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: [NSDD 207 NSC Staff: Craig Coy; Robert Earl] (7)

Date: 11/8/00

Page1 Box 91956 RAC Box 10

Wills/F97-082/2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Note	Lois [REDACTED] re: NSDD responses, 1 p.	3/20/[87]	P3
2. Memo	[REDACTED] re: Regarding Updating Agency Responses, 1 p.	3/20/87	P3
3. Memo	Copy of Item #2, (with different annotations and notes on verso), 2 p.	3/20/87	P3
4. Email	Mary Dix to Ted McNamara, 1 p.	3/16/87	P3
5. Paper	Recommendation 5, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
6. Paper	Recommendation 9, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
7. Paper	Recommendation 10, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
8. Paper	Recommendation 12, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
9. Paper	Recommendation 16, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
10. Paper	Recommendation 17 and 18, 4 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
11. Paper	Recommendation 19, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
12. Paper	Recommendation 20, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
13. Paper	Recommendation 22, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
14. Paper	Recommendation 28, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
15. Paper	Recommendation 29, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
16. Paper	Recommendation 32, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
17. Paper	Recommendation 34, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
18. File List	for Robert Earl, (pages 1 and 3 only), (partial), 2 p.	n.d.	P1/B1

PART 10/11/02

RESTRICTION CODES

#222

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Memo to Don Gregg

December 2, 1986

From: Doug Menarchik

Subject: The NSC Terrorism Office

I know that you and the Vice President need to focus on the immediate problems of the Iran-Contra crisis, but I believe that the NSC terrorism office problem needs to be addressed in the very near term. I also think that, given Poindexter's transfer and Ollie's dismissal, Holloway should return, sooner rather than later.

The VP's Task Force recommended that a full-time terrorism NSC position be created with augmented staff. The NSC under Poindexter defined this as Ollie (who brought along all his other portfolios), and Earl and Coy. When I raised the issue about the lack of a "full-time" commitment to terrorism, I was "informed" that this was NSC business on how to run the terrorism show.

With Ollie's departure, I understand that Rod St. Martin, a Navy Captain who runs the Crisis Management Center, has been placed in charge. This again fails to meet the "full-time" criteria of the Task Force recommendation.

In addition, the NSC position, as I understood it, was a compromise between a "terrorism czar" (a concept that I pushed), or having terrorism run out of the Pol-Mil NSC office, as it had been before the Task Force. That full-time NSC position "should" have been given to a person with clout, one who had received a mandate from the President to fix the ills of the US capability to combat terrorism. That did not happen then, and it is not occurring now.

I'm concerned that if the "St. Martin" temporary fix stays in place during the "interregnum," that the Executive Branch loses ground, and consequently, US policy to combat terrorism suffers.

The NSC Terrorism Office is weakened with the Iran-Contra affair. But State is on the move. Ambassador Bremer is a take charge guy who appears to have breathed new life into the Interagency Group on Terrorism. That's good. The US needs more people like him in the terrorism business. But State is also now drawing power to itself at the expense of the NSC, a natural process given the blood-letting the NSC is undergoing. Shultz has directed Bremer to assume controls in the event of a terrorist crisis. The power play would probably work given the paralysis in the NSC terrorism office. The NSC terrorism office needs to be "stiffened," and soon.

I recommend that you discuss the problem with your counter-parts and consider:

-- bringing Holloway back sooner, rather than later

-- appointing a "heavy-hitter" as the replacement for Ollie, someone like Holloway, Kingston, Brian Jenkins

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DCS

o Bob Bentley 647-8944

(POC FAAT)
--> from Sec

o David Long SCT

DCS

o Steve Burko 647-6493

20 Mar [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] at 4:37, [REDACTED] CIA Exec Secretary office called with following msge on

NSDD 207 responses - being coordinated now in the DDO but has to await his return later this afternoon. It was due yesterday but got bogged down in the bureaucracy.

Re prior responses: the last study was June 86 and if you DO NOT HAVE IT, SHE WILL MAKE A COPY FOR U.

XXX
Reno

Her no. [REDACTED]

Lois

DPOL [REDACTED]
NIS F97-082/2 #205
LOI 6/25/01

20 March 1987

Regarding Updating Agency Responses:

- o Checked files given me this morning. There is the June 5, 1986 summary listing; a detailed July 9, 1986 summary of responses to each recommendation; and a July 30, 1986 assessment of actions on particular items. Only 3 items responding to NSDD 207 are dated after that.
- o Checked through relevant listings for North/Coy/Earl common file. No pay-off after checking promising titles in North's secured documents.
- o Called [redacted] for advice. [redacted]
- o [redacted] O of T. Requested CIA forward memos of relevant responses to tasking. Will call me back. Requested they mail to you.
- o Called Pat Daley. State 5230 secure green. He said he had just dropped off his update. 75% the same as earlier response. Pointed out that the tasking of agencies in the VPs report was different than in NSDD 207.
- o Called Doug Menerhik in Greggs office, 395-4223. O of T. Referred to John Owens in VPs office. Waiting for a call back.
- o Called Arimtage's office. Talked to Secretary. Col. Veany (sp?) will call me back. Brian Flanagan called back. Said Ikle was reviewing new actions right now to send over Monday. Also said that there had not been much new between June and new statement.

It looks like we might have to wait until Monday for feed back. I will have summarized the responses for June 5 and July 30, and then we can add the current feedback.

I will also look through North's old closet files if I get a chance.

*0412 - FBI
FAA - Tony
Brockle*

DECLASSIFIED
F97-0822 #206
4/25/01

20 March 1987

Regarding Updating Agency Responses:

- o Checked files given me this morning. There is the June 5, 1986 summary listing; a detailed July 9, 1986 summary of responses to each recommendation; and a July 30, 1986 assessment of actions on particular items. Only 3 items responding to NSDD 207 are dated after that.
- o Checked through relevant listings for North/Coy/Earl common file. No pay-off after checking promising titles in North's secured documents.
- o Called [REDACTED] for advice. CIA secure [REDACTED]
- o Called [REDACTED] CIA secure [REDACTED] O of T. Requested CIA forward memos of relevant responses to tasking. Will call me back. Requested they mail to you.
- o Called Pat Daley. State 5230 secure green. He said he had just dropped off his update. 75% the same as earlier response. Pointed out that the tasking of agencies in the VPs report was different than in NSDD 207.
- o Called Doug Menerhik in Greggs office, 395-4223. O of T. Referred to John Owens in VPs office. Waiting for a call back. 395-6076
- o Called Arimtage's office. Talked to Secretary. Col. Veany (sp?) will call me back. Brian Flanagan called back. Said Ikle was reviewing new actions right now to send over Monday. Also said that there had not been much new between June and new statement.

I also looked through North's old closet files. I found the background for the 1985 VP report, but not the responses.

It looks like we might have to wait until Monday for feed back. I will have summarized the responses for June 5 and July 30, and then we can add the current feedback.

Amb. McManaway Sec 5230
647-8485

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F97-082/2 #207

By [REDACTED] 6/25/01

☒ DOS

☒ DoD

JCS

CIA

Justice/FBI

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FOIA(b)(3)

16-Mar-1987 03:02p EST

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MCNAMARA

FROM: jnet%CPUA::NSMAD
(NSMAD@jnet%CPUA@MRGATE)

SUBJECT: Request for Access List

Received: From CPUA(NSMAD) by VAXC with RSCS id 4988
for MCNAMARA@VAXC; Mon, 16-MAR-1987 14:57 EST
MSG:FROM: NSMAD --CPUA TO: VANHORN --VAXC
To: VANHORN --VAXC NSBSR --CPUA

03/16/87 14:59:42

NOTE FROM: Mary Dix
SUBJECT: Request for Access List
Secretarial Support for Admiral Holloway

Bill, please have Arlene put [REDACTED]
Secretarial support for Admiral Holloway on our
access list for the OEOB. [REDACTED]
Ms. [REDACTED] will be able to work full time for us
from March 30-April 6th.
After that, her immediate supervisor will allow her
to come on an as need basis through the end of April.
Admiral Holloway will be working out of Ron St. Martin's
office; and, Ron has indicated that Lois Jago will also
be helping the Admiral. I think that with both ladies on
board the first week, it will help out a lot.
Phyllis from the VP's office coordinated Ms. [REDACTED]
coming to help; [REDACTED] has supported the Admiral before.

cc: MCNAMARA--VAXC
NSJFC --CPUA
LARKINS --VAXC
JAGO --VAXC

NSBEB --CPUA
STMARTIN--VAXC
NSGSG --CPUA

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
REF F97-082/2 #208
by LOI 6/25/01

SECRET

11/6/00

TIME STAMP

RE(S)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

87 MAR 23 7:37

SYSTEM II
90254 Response

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

ACTION OFFICER:

DUE: 25 MAR

☐ Prepare Memo For President

☐ Prepare Memo Green to Chew

☒ Prepare Memo For Carlucci / Powell

☐ Prepare Memo Green to Dolan

☐ Prepare Memo

to

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5066

FYI

☐ ☐ Batjer

☐ ☐ Brooks

☐ ☐ Burns

☐ ☐ Childress

☐ ☐ Cobb

☐ ☐ Cohen

☐ ☐ Collins

☐ ☐ Danzansky

☐ ☐ Dean, B.

☐ ☐ Dobriansky

☐ ☐ Donley

☐ ☐ Douglass

☐ ☐ Ermarth

☐ ☐ Farrar

☐ ☐ Flower

☐ ☐ Grimes

FYI

☐ ☐ Howard

☒ ☐ Kelly, B.

☐ ☐ Kelly, J.

☐ ☐ Kiggell

☐ ☐ Kra

☐ ☐ Law

☐ ☐ Law

☐ ☐ Law

☐ ☐ Lin

☐ ☐ Mah

☐ ☐ Mah

☐ ☐ May

☐ ☐ McN

☐ ☐ Ming

☐ ☐ Oakley

☐ ☐ Paal

FYI

☐ ☐ Platt

☐ ☐ Pugliarasi

☐ ☐ Raymond

Jeff Hughes

"FYI"

Rick Porter

(No Action Required)

INFORMATION

☒ Green

☒ Rodman

☐ Carlucci (advance)

☒ Pearson

☒ Cockell

☐ Powell (advance)

☒ Secretariat

☐

☐

COMMENTS

SECRET

Return to Secretariat



SECRET

SYSTEM II
90254
United States Department of State response

Washington, D.C. 20520 8707621

March 21, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Admiral Holloway's Terrorism Program Review

Attached are the Department of State's status reports on recommendations from the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism.

Melvyn Levitsky
Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

SECRET
DECL: OADR

Department of State
By alb

IFIED

July 21, 1997
11/8/00

SECRET

RECOMMENDATION 5

DESCRIPTION: Submit to the NSC a policy framework prepared by the IG/T for making decisions on the use of force in response to international terrorist threats or attacks.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: IG/T.

STATUS OF ACTION: A document was prepared which, through a questioning process, examined sets of criteria within which the key decisions on the use of force in preemption, reaction, and retaliation could be formulated. A draft working copy of this document was presented to the NSC at the staff officer level in November 1986. Due to changes in the NSC staff, no further action was taken on this recommendation. Copies of this document are available in S/CT.

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OADR

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NLS

EA7-082/2 #709

8.

CIS

NARA, DATE

3/27/06

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RECOMMENDATION 9

DESCRIPTION: Lead a review of all USG official personnel requirements overseas in high threat areas and submit recommendations to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE

STATUS OF ACTIONS: Following the guidelines of this recommendation and the President's request that agencies review and cut where possible staffing levels overseas, the Bureau of Management in the Department of State directed all Chief of Missions abroad to examine staffing and offer suggestions for reductions. Responses were compiled into a report which was submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on April 17, 1986.

The Department considers that this recommendation of the Task Force has been satisfied.

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NLS E97-082/2 #210
8. Cd NARA DATE 3/27/06

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RECOMMENDATION 10

DESCRIPTION: Review government-wide policies on travel documentation for U.S. employees and promulgate consistent guidelines throughout the government.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE.

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The Department established a Working Group composed of Consular Affairs, Counter-Terrorism, Security, and Near East/South Asia bureau officers to review present policies, guidance, and training [REDACTED] for official Americans traveling abroad. The Working Group completed several recommendations to be incorporated into a government-wide policy on this issue. The Department forwarded those completed recommendations to the NSC in a memo dated November 26, 1986 and suggested that the NSC circulate them to other agencies for comment/concurrence.

FOIA(b)(1)

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS 197-0824#21
By CL, NARA, Date 3/27/01

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RECOMMENDATION 12

DESCRIPTION: Expand State Department's outreach program to hostage families.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The State Department has enhanced its procedures for maintaining liaison with the families of the hostages held in Lebanon. These procedures should work equally well in any other long-term hostage situation.

A senior officer in the Bureau of Consular Affairs is the Department's primary point of contact with the families. This officer works closely with the Office for Counter-Terrorism, the appropriate geographic bureau, and the Medical Division to ensure that each family is kept fully informed and is contacted at least weekly even when there are no new developments to report. While a hot-line has not been established, families are aware of the officer's home and office telephone numbers, and they have been told to call at any time. Calls are immediately returned so that long distance charges are minimal for the families. In addition to regular telephone contact the officer is available to meet and assist the families whenever they come to Washington.

While the issue of private counseling services has not come up, the Department is prepared to direct families to appropriate organizations or services if they should request such assistance.

Although the established procedures have diminished family pressure for meetings with senior officials, continued demand for occasional meetings can be expected, particularly if the hostage situation continues for an extended period of time.

While efforts to assist hostage families will continue, the Department considers that the recommendation of the task force has been satisfied.

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NLS F97-082/z #212

2: CU NARA, DATE 3/27/06

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RECOMMENDATION 16

DESCRIPTION: Provide coordinated interagency briefings on U.S. policies, resources, and capabilities committed to combatting terrorism for all senior U.S. officials stationed overseas.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The Ambassador-at-Large now meets with all new American Ambassadors before they proceed to post to discuss our counterterrorism policy in general and to review our country-specific objectives. The Foreign Service Institute has augmented its Ambassadorial Seminars with special sections on USG policy and resources committed to combatting terrorism. Similar courses for Deputy Chiefs of Mission are scheduled for the summer, including a full day course on the management of security functions.

FOIA(b)(1)

The State Department offers its Coping with Violence Seminar to all USG employees going overseas. Many senior personnel from other agencies attend these courses.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has been in touch with FSI on how threat analysis information will be factored into FSI's courses for specific target groups, and this role will be reflected in upcoming briefings.

Interagency teams have briefed 26 posts in high threat areas regarding U.S. counter-terrorist response capabilities.

Ambassadors from high threat posts transiting Washington receive personalized briefings from the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism.

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NLS F97-082/2 #213
By CL, NARA, Date 3/27/06

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RECOMMENDATION 17 and 18

DESCRIPTION: Continue efforts to enlist international cooperation in combatting terrorism through both bilateral and multilateral agreements. Particular emphasis should be given to concluding agreements for more effective measures for apprehending, extraditing, and prosecuting known terrorists.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: DOT/FAA

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The Department of State has continued to seek international agreements for combatting terrorism at several levels.

- A. General Resolutions on Agreements. In 1985, the UN General Assembly passed its strongest resolution to date condemning terrorism. In the same month, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution, proposed by the U.S. and supported by the Soviet Union, against hostage taking. In the fall of 1986, the Western members of the Security Council attempted to draft a resolution condemning international terrorism. The Western effort was not successful due to non-aligned insistence on the inclusion in the draft resolution of unacceptable language regarding national liberation struggles and state terrorism. Efforts to draft an acceptable resolution are expected to resume this year. The U.S. proposed measures on maritime security to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in December 1985, which were adopted by the IMO in September 1986. We also introduced a strong resolution against terrorism at the December 1986 meeting of the World Tourism Organization's Executive Council, which was adopted.
- B. International Conventions, Agreements, and Treaties. The IMO is drafting a new convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is developing a new protocol for the suppression of violence at airports serving international civil aviation, which will implement the

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BT CU NARA, DATE 3/27/06

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Montreal Convention. We have successfully urged, with broad support, a new model security article by ICAO for states to use in their bilateral air transport agreements. Such an article has been approved, and the U.S. has initiated a major renegotiation effort to make a binding security article part of its bilateral air transport agreements. Nearly 30 countries have agreed formally or in principle to incorporate acceptable new security measures. Major states include the Soviet Union, U.K., FRG, France, and Canada. The U.S. has also initiated a major effort to renegotiate extradition treaties to limit the political exception clause. The first such treaty, with the U.K., has been completed and ratified, and others are expected.

- C. Informal Cooperation. European fora, such as the EC and the Council of Europe, greatly increased their level of cooperation on counter-terrorism during the course of 1986. U.S. cooperation with those groups, moreover, grew apace, as did U.S.-European cooperation in the Summit Seven context and bilaterally. U.S. efforts to intensify NATO's cooperation and consultation on counter-terrorism at a policy level have been largely frustrated by Allied reluctance to see NATO as an appropriate forum for such cooperation.

EC actions against Libya (April) and Syria (November), although marred by Greece's refusal to take part at various stages, have shown an unprecedented degree of European resolve to work together against state sponsors of terrorism. Helpful statements calling for greater cooperation among states to stop terrorism were issued, as well, at the European Parliament. U.S. cooperation with the EC political directors has been more active than in the past, but better methods for consultation need to be worked out, especially at technical levels. U.S. cooperation with the EC's Trevi Group (Justice/Interior Ministers) and subgroups has been particularly effective and concrete. The Council of Europe (COE) has undertaken useful coordination work, and the U.S. publicly supported the November 1986 COE Declaration on counter-terrorism. We will continue to work closely with the COE when possible.

The Tokyo Summit's strong statement denouncing terrorism and its mandate to make the Bonn Declaration more effective against all forms of terrorism affecting civil

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aviation were followed up during 1986 and early 1987 by a series of experts meetings. Progress was made on expanding the Bonn guidelines and developing new language for the 1987 Summit meeting at Venice in June.

At NATO, U.S. efforts to intensify cooperation and consultation on counter-terrorism met with less success. Most of our Allies believe that existing European fora are more appropriate for such cooperation and feel that existing U.S. consultative mechanisms with those fora are sufficient. Further, we have run up against the argument that existing NATO technical-level fora already address the issue of terrorism. We have argued that a policy level track should also be part of legislatively-mandated proposal to NATO permanent representatives -- with little success.

Private, bilateral consultations and cooperation have continued with a host of governments including our closest allies.

Progress in all of the above fields continues, and work will go forward in the months ahead particularly in the areas of cooperation with EC bodies, effective bilateral cooperation, ad hoc multilateral cooperation, keeping the issue of terrorism before the Alliance, and working for strong and useful language on terrorism for the Venice Summit Declaration.

- D. Extradition Treaties. The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Justice, has developed a two-pronged strategy for negotiating extradition treaties with stable democracies to eliminate, or at least severely restrict, the application of the political offense exception in cases involving violent crimes, typically committed by terrorists. The first approach is followed by those countries that are parties to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism without reservation to that Convention's exclusion of the political offenses exception for specified crimes. The United States has successfully concluded supplementary treaties along these lines with the U.K. and FRG. The U.K. Supplementary Treaty went into force on December 23, 1986. The FRG treaty will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent before ratification by the President. Negotiations continue with Luxembourg, Spain, and Austria following this approach. While not parties to the European Convention, this approach has also been taken with Canada and Australia, with whom negotiations continue.

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A second approach has been developed for those countries that are party to the European Convention subject to a reservation that preserves their options to apply the political offense exception under limited circumstances. The United States successfully concluded and signed on March 17, 1987 a Supplementary Treaty with Belgium following this second approach. The Belgian treaty authorizes waiver of the political offense exception for specified offenses and eliminates the exception altogether for hostage-takings and other crimes committed under particularly serious circumstances. The United States recently pursued this approach with France, which has indicated that it will soon become party to the European Convention subject to a political offense reservation. While an approach along these lines might be acceptable to countries that have similar reservation to the European Convention (Cyprus, Denmark, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland), our strategy is to pursue the first, and preferred, approach with as many countries as possible before pursuing further the second and less desirable alternative.

While we have made speedy progress with countries with whom we are prepared to conclude Supplementary Treaties to cover this issue, negotiations will take longer with others with whom we are negotiating entirely new extradition treaties to replace outdated ones. In these negotiations the political offense exception is only one of a number of issues to be resolved before a treaty is concluded and submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.

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RECOMMENDATION 19

DESCRIPTION: Pursue bilateral arrangements for terrorism related R&D exchanges.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism continues, in conjunction with the IG/T, to pursue bilateral RD&A exchanges with [REDACTED] We are considering the possibilities for expansion to other states.

The IG/T has also initiated technical level investigations with our NATO allies on the acquisition and use by terrorists of explosives and detonation devices. Discussions will take place through the NATO Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Working Party and the NATO EOD Technical Information Center. These preliminary working level contacts are necessary precursors for formalized statements of goals and objectives and funding agreements.

The newly established Practical Measures Working Group of the IG/T will continue efforts in this area.

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F97-0812 # 215
By CU, NARA, Date 5/27/06

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RECOMMENDATION 20

DESCRIPTION: In conjunction with the Departments of Justice and Treasury improve computerized systems for monitoring cross-border travel and visa control of known or suspected terrorists.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: JUSTICE AND TREASURY.

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The State Department is moving ahead to control the cross-border travel of known or suspected terrorists through computerized systems. The present outdated Automated Visa Outlook System (AVLOS) will be replaced by a new, more effective system. [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

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[REDACTED] The contract was awarded in September 1986, and implementation is scheduled to begin January 1988.

State and INS have initiated an information sharing project to exchange computer terminals which permit the electronic transfer of alien lookout data between the two agencies in Washington. We also have a pilot project in Montreal which allows for the transfer of immigrant visa information to INS. Our eventual goal is to share our visa information electronically with all INS ports-of-entry by means of our systems interface in Washington.

The State Department is also working closely with Customs to begin building an interface with their lookout system, TECS II, eventually to share electronically real time lookout information between the two agencies.

In addition, we are cooperating with Customs in their efforts to develop an improved machine to read passports. State has the capability of producing machine-readable passports at nine of our agencies and expects to have all agencies automated in early 1988. Customs has been testing some AIT machine-readable equipment which has produced excellent results and is considering buying these readers to install at their inspection sites.

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NLS 797-682/2 #216
By CU, NARA, Date 3/27/06

FOIA(b) (1) ~~SECRET~~

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We have urged other countries (the U.K., Germany, the Netherlands, India and Japan) to follow our lead in MRPs with some success. (Australia and Canada already produce MRPs.)

The Department of State and DEA have put into effect a drug trafficking information sharing system. [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] and we will receive update records on a monthly basis.

Finally, the State Department is working with CIA, FBI, and Customs to develop a list of known or suspected terrorists to enter in our present visa outlook system. We intend to share the list with other governments and urge them to contribute names of terrorists known to them.

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RECOMMENDATION 22

DESCRIPTION: Through the IG/T and with the concurrence of the DCI provide policy guidance for terrorism intelligence exchanges with local governments.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: IG/T and DCI.

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) continues to work closely with the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism to obtain sanitized reports from CIA and NSA to pass to foreign governments and to encourage exchanges of intelligence with foreign governments. Several papers on Libyan terrorism and Abu Nidal are good examples of this collaboration.

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] Such discussions with senior officials have occurred during visits by the Ambassador-at-Large and other high delegations, but are not yet a part of the ongoing dialogue at the working level.

The Department has attempted to classify threat advisories at the lowest level so that they might receive the widest dissemination. When the advisories must be classified, an unclassified summary is included if at all possible.

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NLS 197-0842 #217
By CH NARA, Date 3/27/06

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NLS F97-0812 #218

CU NARA, DATE 3/27/01

RECOMMENDATION 28

DESCRIPTION: Develop a long-range strategy to improve public understanding of international terrorism and the policies required to combat it.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism now has a USIA Senior Foreign Service officer aboard as Deputy Director for Public Diplomacy. The new deputy is writing a comprehensive work plan which will be completed by the end of March 1987. While the plan is still in draft form, the following are likely to emerge as priority areas:

- o An incident management handbook devoted solely to the press/public diplomacy. The hand book will include pre-drafted cables of instruction to affected embassies, suggested standard guidances for State, White House, and DOD spokesmen, action requests for USIA, and duty rosters (designated by position) to be activated as soon as a task force is formed.
- o There is no timely, comprehensive and official source for unclassified information about terrorism. State, CIA, and DOD all prepare or are preparing unclassified documents about terrorism and counterterrorism policy, but conceptual differences and varying priorities lessen the value of work already being done. The strategy paper will request that the resources used to prepare these documents be consolidated at State so an annual white paper on terrorism can be issued.
- o State PA is monitoring U.S. public opinion polls on terrorism and works closely with the Office for Counter-Terrorism (S/CT) to make speakers available to the U.S. public. From March 15 through August 31, S/CT is booked for 27 speaking engagements and has another six tentative dates.
- o USIA Office of Policy Guidance is monitoring FY 88 Country Plan submissions to make sure that USIS posts in key countries world wide, but especially in Europe, will present programs on terrorism during FY 88. USIA's Program Development Office is working with S/CT to fill requests for speakers on terrorism during the current fiscal year.
- o USIA's Office of Research has been requested to conduct opinion polls in the U.K., France, Italy and the FRG to assist in opinion analysis in those countries.

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Finally, the Public Diplomacy Working Group of the IG/T is presently developing a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy and action plan. In the course of formulating this plan, we are considering various means for bringing media representatives and appropriate USG officials together quickly at the outset of any terrorist event for the discussion of the national interest in the case, so that USG considerations could be a factor in the media's own determination of how it should proceed in fulfilling its own responsibilities to the public. Final approval of the strategy and action plan is essential to the definitive preparation of actions by responsible offices and agencies.

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RECOMMENDATION 29

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

STATUS OF ACTIONS: Extensive discussions with journalists at the working level (State and Pentagon correspondents of the major networks, weekly news magazines and wire services) and at the management level (the principal stockholder of one of the country's largest news outlets, the vice president of a major network) make it clear that important news organizations will not agree to even voluntary guidelines.

Discussions with journalists also made it clear that government officials have been responsible for giving some of the material which had the most potential to damage counterterrorist operations. Reporters with no desire to mislead made it clear that multiple sources within the government had discussed [REDACTED]

leaks can be established disciplinary action should be taken.

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NLS F97-082/2 #C/9

By DU, NARA, Date 5/21/02

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S/CT's incident management press book will contain specific suggestions for statements to be made at the beginning of any terrorist incident. These statements will specifically mention areas which spokesmen will not address and cite the reasons why we believe that discussion of such items poses a potential hazard for specific individuals.

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RECOMMENDATION 32

DESCRIPTION: Monitor abuses of diplomatic immunities in support of terrorists for possible sanctions against violators of the Vienna Convention.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE.

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The State Department has continued efforts previously underway to discuss this matter with other governments in both bilateral and multilateral (e.g., Summit Seven) frameworks. Very recently there has been a major intensification of these efforts with selected countries in response to specific threats and incidents of Libyan-supported terrorism. Last year the EC adopted strong language condemning terrorism and announced a series of steps to tighten visa restrictions and invoke other measures against Libyan diplomats. EC states have since expelled more than 100 Libyan diplomats and businessmen.

Every year since 1980, the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the UN General Assembly has taken up, at the initiative of the five Nordic countries, an agenda item on "Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security, and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives." This item focuses on the need to safeguard the maintenance and normal development of diplomatic and consular relations as the cornerstone of cooperation between states and peoples irrespective of their political and social systems. The emphasis in the past has been that diplomatic and consular missions and representatives were increasingly the subject of attacks and acts of violence, which seriously compromised cooperation between states. However, this same item could be used by us for further exploration of ways of dealing with abuse of privileges and immunities by diplomatic and consular missions and representatives.

Since the Nordic countries took the lead on the item, we consulted closely with them during our 1986 pre-UNGA consultations about the feasibility of using the debate on last year's resolution to stress the importance of full compliance with treaty obligations. During the debate under Item 128--Protection of Diplomats--at the 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly, the U.S. Delegation stressed that abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities and misuse of the diplomatic bag for terrorist purposes were absolutely unacceptable. Several other delegations also condemned the abuse of diplomatic privileges.

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at CU NARA, DATE 3/27/06

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The General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution marking the 25th anniversary of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which addressed the matter of abuse of diplomatic privileges. The pertinent paragraphs of that resolution are the following:

Preambular: "Recalling that, in accordance with the Convention, without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State" and

Operative: "Urges all states to take effective action at national and international levels with a view to suppressing terrorist and other acts of violence against diplomatic missions and representatives, and to timely prosecuting the perpetrators of such acts and with a view, in accordance with the Convention, to avoiding abuses of diplomatic privileges and immunities."

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RECOMMENDATION 34

DESCRIPTION: Provide, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, more extensive publicity regarding the terrorist reward program in order to more effectively integrate it into the overall counter-terrorist effort.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

STATUS OF ACTIONS: Section 502 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, passed by the House of Representatives on March 18, 1986, amends Section 36(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 by increasing the amount of the reward for information about most-wanted international terrorists from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000. This legislation was the result of intense consultations between the State Department and congressional members and their staff assistants.

Rewards for information have been established for five terrorist incidents: Kuwaiti Airlines 221 (12/4/84), TWA 847 (6/14/85), Zona Rosa massacre, El Salvador (6/19/85), Achille Lauro (10/85), and TWA 840 (4/2/86).

Last year, the State Department tasked our facilities here and abroad to publicize our rewards program. Virtually all of our posts overseas responded that the publicity envisioned would not be accepted by the host government or media, or would have a negative effect. We continue to work on efforts to publicize the program through other channels, such as posters to be used at embassies. In addition, plans are underway for the program to be advertised through Voice of America and Interpol.

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NLS F97-0821#221

87 CU NARA, DATE 3/27/06

THE VICE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

For Immediate Release
June 2, 1987

Contact (202)-456-6772

OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

On March 4, 1987 the President asked the Vice President to reconvene the Task Force on Combatting Terrorism to review our policy for combatting terrorism and to evaluate the effectiveness of our current program. That review has been completed and was delivered to the President today.

The attached is the text of the Vice President's letter to the President introducing the review report and summarizing the findings of the review. The actual report is classified. It examines in detail the U.S. counterterrorism capabilities and evaluates the progress made in our capabilities since the original report of the Task Force was completed on December 20, 1985.

Dear Mr. President:

On March 4, 1987 you directed me to reconvene the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism to review our policy for combatting terrorism and to evaluate the effectiveness of our current program. That review has now been completed.

I am pleased to report that the Task Force has reaffirmed that our current policy as articulated in the Task Force report is sound, effective, and fully in accord with our democratic principles and national ideals of freedom, justice, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. That policy, however, needs re-emphasis and its provisions and purposes need careful explanation to the American people.

Americans must understand that our actions in preventing and responding to terrorism are part of a conscious policy and an integrated national program that was spelled out in detail in the report to you a year and a half ago. In following the policy and the program we have been effective in countering terrorism. Hence, our commitment to that policy has been, and will continue to be, beneficial. The mistakes involved in our contacts with Iran caused a temporary reduction in credibility which has been regained as our resolve has become apparent. Indeed, our programs of practical cooperation with friendly states -- intelligence sharing, training and assistance -- have expanded and grown stronger in recent months.

In this program review the Task Force has focused primarily on an item-by-item review of the effectiveness with which each of the Task Force recommendations have been implemented. Where any new concerns or issues emerged, they were examined in the review process.

Overall we have found progress has been excellent and the improvement in our counterterrorism capability has been evident in the results. Most of the taskings have been completed. Others of a continuing nature are being effectively managed. In a few cases -- usually requiring the cooperation of foreign governments -- our final objectives have not yet been attained, but the efforts of the Administration have been vigorous and sustained. These situations were not unanticipated.

A detailed evaluation of the effectiveness with which the original recommendations have been implemented is forwarded as a classified enclosure to this letter-report. When the remaining work noted in these evaluations is completed, our program will, in a technical sense, fulfill the resource requirements of our national policy.

Although this remarkable progress is praiseworthy, I must emphasize that our vulnerability to terrorism, though reduced, has not been eliminated. This is a critical point which must be conveyed to the American people. Democratic

societies are by their nature more vulnerable to terrorism than others. As a practical matter, in the face of extensive worldwide international terrorist activity, the United States will certainly continue to be a principal target of terrorists. Because of the growing experience of the terrorists and the sophistication of their methods, human casualties and property losses to American citizens and US interests regrettably will continue to occur. When we suffer these losses at the hands of terrorists, we must be prepared to minimize the impact.

Except in the case of a catastrophe resulting from biological, chemical or nuclear terrorism, the gravest threat is the potential political impact: a short term crisis, reduced American credibility in the eyes of others, and an upsurge in activity by terrorists who believe they have succeeded.

We can minimize the political effects of a successful act of terrorism against the United States so that it will not upset or cast doubt on our process of government or our leadership. To do this we must emphasize at all levels of government that adherence to our policy, our program, and our procedures is most important. Only in this way, by demonstrating resolve and consistency in dealing with the threat, can the political impact be blunted.

Evidence has demonstrated that our policy for combatting terrorism has been effective when carried out with consistency and supported by the expanded resources we are devoting to it. According to the latest statistics for 1986, the year following the issuance of the Task Force Report, the number of Americans who died worldwide as the result of terrorist incidents declined to 12 from 38 in 1985. Also, working unilaterally or with friendly nations we took preemptive action in several hundred instances to stop possible terrorist acts against Americans and American interests. Finally, of special note is that only one American was killed in the United States by terrorists in 1986 and that a dozen intended terrorist acts in the U.S. were avoided due to the efforts of our counterterrorist agencies.

- We should also highlight our effective efforts to deal with state-sponsored terrorism. Although terrorist incidents had been increasing for several years, there was a noticeable drop in Mideast-related, state-sponsored, terrorism in Europe in the second half of last year. This resulted from our strike on Libya last April, the expulsion from Western Europe of Libyan "diplomats" and "businessmen", and increased surveillance and intelligence. These actions produced good effects, thus showing that carefully chosen military action combined with cooperation with our Allies can be beneficial. In concert with other nations we have also selectively applied diplomatic pressure to good effect. Tightened airport and travel security has also contributed to fewer hijackings and incidents.

The best approach to a terrorist incident is to prevent its occurrence. Hence, we and our friends and allies have devoted increased attention and resources to identifying, tracking, and apprehending terrorists, and through courageous judicial actions to effectively prosecuting, convicting and punishing the terrorists as the criminals they are. This quiet, unspectacular, but very effective, police and intelligence work combined with a determined judicial process has resulted in a significant decline in international terrorist incidents and an increase in the numbers of terrorists in custody around the world. These successes have been the direct result of a step-by-step application of our policy.

I am convinced that we are doing a better job in combatting the terrorism now than we were seventeen months ago when the Task Force submitted its report. I am equally convinced that we must do better. As we increase our efforts we as a nation should not exaggerate either the threat, or the limited damage that terrorists can do to us and to our society. To do so only plays into the terrorists' hands by increasing their political impact. We must, therefore, emphasize good intelligence, careful police work, international cooperation, judicial process, and a controlled approach to public handling of terrorist incidents. Only in this way can we stop and then extinguish this criminal menace to all civilized societies.

Sincerely,

George Bush

1. ORIGINAL DATE OF RETIREMENT	2. OLD JOB #
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Robert Earl Fells

(Entire contents reviewed
by FBI first)

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RE's office
upstairs
vertical file
cabinet

Personal Items were returned
OFFICE FILES

UP TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING Terrorism

Formation of NSC STAFF on Terrorism

Terrorism: Presidential MSG; Long Rpt - Terrorism

PAN AM #73 Hijacking - Sept 5, 1986

Libya [REDACTED] FOIA(b)(1)

Libyan Terrorist Threats

Libyan Terrorism - Other

Libya: Trevi: EC C/T GP (hubbers)

Libya: Berlin ~~Exp~~ Bombing U.S.-Response

Walters Trip

Berlin, GE Disco Bombing - Apr 4-5, 1986

TWA flight #840 - April 1, 1986

Kidnapping of 4 Sov Diplomats 10-1-85

Marked OLA	
1 folder	

Marked OLA
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16. COMPONENT RMO

17. REVIEWING OFFICER _____
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18. INPUT OPERATOR

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NLS E97-082/2#222

By LOT, N. 10/11/02

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CRAIG Coy office		23		1		1		1		1		Personal items returned 12/8/86		file retained - marked as OCN folder	
		4						1		1		IN BASKET ON DESK (FOLDER) (not rel)			
		4						1		1		TOP OF DESK (FOLDER) (not rel)			
		1						1		1		SYRIA			
		1						1		1		French Meeting R.G. Terrorism			
		1						1		1		FOLDER (IICT, Mig-IG/T-11/9/86, SSCI Briefing by Holloway, Border Control, World Communications year)			
		1						1		1		Terrorism mty with the British (1 folder US/UK/FR)			
		1						1		1		Public Diplomacy - Libya ***			
		1						1		1		Terrorism Infor - General			
		1						1		1		Hostage Families			
		1						1		1		WSDDS			
		1						1		1		Libya Non-Military Action			
		1						1		1		Libya Strike Follow-up			

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Craig, Coy	1			1		Terrorism - Public Diplomacy ***				file retained marked as O&V folder	
	2			1		* Profs Notes *				file retained COYS BSR 11/087	
	2			1		Misc Notes					
	2			1		Terrorism - Speeches					
	2			1		NSDD 207 Folder - Barb Rose					
	2		1	2		1985 Appointment Book *				COYS both kept when retained BSR	
	2			1		R & D Counterterrorism					
	2			1		Combating Terrorism					
	2			1		Review of Overseas Staffing ***				file retained marked as O&V folder	
1	2			1		Binder: SYST 90001				VP orig Copy - returned to Sec State BSR	
	3			1		Maritime Policy					
	3			1		Shipyards Mobilization Base Study					
	3			1		Navy Merchant Marine Manpower Study					
	3			1		Misc (Maritime Policy)					

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Craig Coy	3			1	-	Binder on Congress Mandated Mobility Study					
	3			1	-	Drug Air Interdiction					
	3			2	-	Misc Binders: Drug Enforcement during Reagan Admin					
	3			1	-	Blair Ltr Head & Envelope					
	4			1	•	Misc Folder (WH Fellows Foundation)					
	4			1	•	NNBIS (drug interdiction)					
	4			1	•	JP Task Force					
	5			1	•	Misc Folder					
	5			1	•	Reinson: Physical Security					
	5			1	•	Civil Aviation + Tokyo Follow Up					
	5			1		Desist					
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Craig Coy	5			1		Maritime / Iceland							
	5			1	*	Tech Support Working Group							
	5			1	x	Maritime: US / USSR							
	5			1	*	Maritime							
	5			1	*	Libya - Financial (ref. - to US activities to stop financing of terrorism) file retained - marked as own file.							
	6			1		Misc Folder (not rel.)							
	6			1		Misc Folder *			file retained Coy's BSR				
	6			1		Maritime File							
	6			1		Maritime File - CDS							
	6			1		Bum - Bag *			file retained Coy's BSR				
	6			1		Kranian Terrison *			file retained Coy's BSR				
add ons	6			1		1986 Appt BK (Rept by R. Browne) *			retained Coy's BSR				
	6					pkg of Cassette Tapes (received by FBI - not taken) (records returned to Coy - tapes retained) *			Coy's BSR				

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RE's office upstairs vertical file cabinet	1					Personal Items were returned OFFICE FILES				Marked OLN folder	
	1					UP TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING Terrorism					
	1					Formation of NSC STAFF on Terrorism					
	1					Terrorism: Presidential MSG; Long Rpt - Terrorism					
	1					PAN AM #73 Hijacking - Sept 5, 1986					
	1					Libya: [REDACTED]					
	1					Libyan Terrorist Threats					
	1					Libyan Terrorism - Other					
	1					Libya: Trevi; EC C/T GP (hubbers)				Marked OLN folder	
	2					Libya: Berlin Bomb Bombing U.S. - Response					
	2					Walters Trip					
	2					Berlin, DE Disco Bombing - Apr 4-5, 1986					
	2					TWA Flight #840 - April 1, 1986					
	2					Kidnapping of 4 Sov Diplomats 10-1-85					

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By LDI, NAL, Date 10/11/02

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KE	(cont'd) 2					Egypt Air #737 Hijacking - Nov 23, '85					
	2				✓	Terrorism: Achille Lauro Hijack 10/7/85 II					
	3					Terrorism: Duarte Kidnapping 9-10-85					
	3					Terrorism: Rhein Main Bombing 8/8/85					
	3					? Legislative Strat					
	3					Terrorism: Kuwait Hijacking 12/3/84					
	3					Hijacking of TWA #847 June 14, 1985					
	3					Beirut Bombing of Sep 20 1984 / 5:55 am					
	4					Misc Maps/Pictures					
	4					Misc Folder (part retained)					
	4					Misc Binder					
R.E. OFFICE UPstairs CREVEZIN	5					Libya				N/R	
						Syrian Connection to Terrorism - May 86				N/R	
						2 July Hostage Developments				N/A	

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RE	(Cont'd) 5					[REDACTED] [Exercise]	N/R
						Fema: Vulnerability Study	N/R
						R & D	N/R
						US - French Talks	N/R
						US - Japan Discussions	N/R
						US - UK Extradition Treaty	N/R
						US - Israel Cooperation	retained as pos. rel.
						US - Soviet CT Talks	N/R
						US - Italy Cooperation	N/R
						Probs Notes (July 1986 - Nov 1986)	retained as pos. rel.
						[REDACTED]	N/R
						Public Diplomacy	N/R
						Public Diplomacy Working Group	N/R
						Defense Reorganization	

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SECTION

7. DISPOSITION DATE (MMYY)

8. ITEM NO.	9. BOX NO.	10. RES.	11.	FILE NO.	12. FLD.	13. MEDIA	14. FILE TITLE	15. INC DATES DDMMYY DDMMYY
RE	6						Working Folder	retained as pos. rel.
							Legislation	rel.
							Statistics	N/R
							IICT [INTERAGENCY ACMT E ON TERRORISM]	N/R
							IGIT [INTERDEPT'L GAP ON TERRORISM]	N/R
							Hostage Rescue	retain as pos. rel.
							Interviews/Experts/Personnel Public Report	N/R
							Evacuation Procedures	N/R
							Misc Reports	N/R
							Misc	N/R
							TWA 840	N/R
							NSDD-32 Reviews	N/R
							Hostage Families	retain as pos. rel.
							Jenco Release 26 July 1986	retain as pos. rel.

16. COMPONENT RMO

DATE

17. REVIEWING OFFICER

DATE

(PLEASE PRINT)

18. INPUT OPERATOR

DATE

1. ORIGINAL DATE OF RETIREMENT		2. LD JOB #		Robert Earl Files									
3. JOB NO.		4. RECORDS SCHEDULE		5. OPI		6. DIVISION		BRANCH		SECTION		7. DISPOSITION DATE (MM/YY)	
8. ITEM NO.	9. BOX NO.	10. RES.	11.	FILE NO.	12. FLD.	13. MEDIA	14. FILE TITLE					15. INC DATES DDMMYY DDMMYY	
RE	(Cont'd) 6						Admin (Consultant)					N/R	
							Central America 10 Aug 86 [contains material dated July-Nov 86]					return to pos. rel	
							Trip: Latin America [Oct 1985] [contains material Oct 85 - July 86]					return to pos. rel.	
							Central America [March - Apr 1986] [contains material March - April 1986]					return to pos. rel.	
						✓	OSG I (OSG + TWG Dec 1985 - Oct 86)					ret as pos. rel	
							Building Plans					N/R	
??							Security - Classified [VP Task Force]					N/R	
							Misc (not rel)					N/R	
✓	7						Misc [repts to VP Task Force] (Barb has)					N/R	
??							Security [VP Task Force]					N/R	
							Rome / Vienna Attacks, 27 Dec 85 (drafts thru to families + files)					N/R	
??							Report Format (VP Task Force)					N/R	
							Program Elements					N/R	
							Media					N/R	

16. COMPONENT RMO _____

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TOP SECRET		SECRET		CONFIDENTIAL		UNCLASSIFIED		19. CL. BY:		PAGE 6 OF 8					
1. ORIGINAL DATE OF RETIREMENT				2. OLD JOB #											
ROBERT EARL FILES															
3. JOB NO.		4. RECORDS SCHEDULE		5. OPI		6. DIVISION		BRANCH		SECTION		7. DISPOSITION DATE (MMYY)			
8. ITEM NO.		9. BOX NO.		10. RES.		11. FILE NO.		12. FLD.		13. MEDIA		14. FILE TITLE		15. INC DATES DDMMYY DDMMYY	
RE		(Cont'd) 7										Low Intensity Conflict Conference		N/A	
												Issues		N/A	
												Congress (w/ VP Task Force + Terrorism - SSCI/HPSCI War Powers etc.)		retain as pos. ref.	
												Framework Proposal		N/A	
												Travel (VP Task Force)		N/A	
												Task A - Definition (VP Task Force)		N/A	
												Task Force (includes MFR of SRG meeting 27 Nov '85)		N/A	
												Misc (jtrns repo. VP Task Force staff)		N/A	
												Consultants (request for consulting only)		N/A	
												Biographies		N/A	
												Berrut Hostages		retain as pos. ref.	
												Exercises - Gaming		N/A	
												Drugs / Narco - Terrorism [Insurgent/Terrorist invol. in Drug Trade]		N/A	
												Bob Earl Correspondence [VP Task Force]		N/A	

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1. ORIGINAL DATE OF RETIREMENT

2. OLD JOB #

Robert Earl Files

3. JOB NO.

4. RECORDS SCHEDULE

5. OPI

6. DIVISION

BRANCH

SECTION

7. DISPOSITION DATE (MM/YY)

8. ITEM NO.	9. BOX NO.	10. RES.	11. FILE NO.	12. FLD.	13. MEDIA	14. FILE TITLE	15. INC DATES DDMMYY DDMMYY
RE	(Cont'd) 7					Misc	Part retained in dup folder ?
						Misc bottom shelf credenza	Part retained in dup folder ?
	8					3 binders from Credenza: 2 binders from vertical file [see Taronato / Taronin gen]	N/A
	9					Misc bottom shelf credenza (Cont'd)	Part retained in dup folder ?
						Misc middle shelf Credenza	N/A
						Binder (VP's Task force on Combatting Terr.)	N/A (dup)
						Misc pubs middle shelf Credenza	N/A (dup)
	10					Responses to Issues Paper (VP Task Force) (Bipartite)	N/A
						Bob Earl	N/A
						TIWG	N/A
						Task Force Hold (Empty)	N/A
						Final Report (VP Task Force member on Final Rpt)	N/A
						Misc Top shelf Credenza	(part) 1 spiral notebook retained as per rel. ?
						Misc Pubs Top shelf Credenza	N/A

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Robert Earl Files

3. JOB NO.		4. RECORDS SCHEDULE		5. OPI		6. DIVISION		7. DISPOSITION DATE (MM/YY)	
8. ITEM NO.	9. BOX NO.	10. RES.	11. FILE NO.	12. FLD.	13. MEDIA	14. FILE TITLE		15. INC DATES DDMMYY DDMMYY	
KE	(Cont'd) 10					2 Binders		N/A	
	11					Misc Basket on Desk I		part pos. rel. no retained part both in 1 folder	
						Misc Basket on Desk II			
						NSDD 207		N/A	
						Post Jacobson Release		Retain on pos rel	
						Current Threats		N/A	
					✓	OSG II		Retained on pos rel	
						EST		Retain on pos rel, 2 ite.	
						Libya - Economic Sanctions		N/A	
						Earl II "honor"		N/A	
	12					BURN Bag & all copies FBI took 1-30 (FBI copied 85-253)		Retained pos rel	
	13					EQUIPMENT from EARL'S OFFICE		✓	

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