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[Earl, Robert] (3)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC:
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File Folder: NSDD 207: Responses to Issue Papers [Earl, Robert]
(3 of 4) Page 1 Box 91956 ~~RAI 5010~~

Date: 11/2/00
Wills/F97-082/2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Paper	Issue Paper No. 3 (Post TF Principals Meeting Version) 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
2. Paper	Issue Paper No. 3, (NSC Approved Version), with edits, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
3. Paper	Same as Item #2, with edits, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
4. Paper	Issue Paper No. 3 (NSC Approved Version Incorporating FBI/Justice Suggested Changes...), 1 p.	11/15/85	P1/B1
5. Paper	Issue Paper No. 3 (NSC Approved Version Incorporating FBI/Justice.....) Slight OMB Wordsmithing and State Call-In..., 2 p.	11/19/85	P1/B1
6. Memo	Noel Koch to Director, VPTF, re: Recommendation #3, 1 p.	11/21/85	P1/B1
7. Paper	Alternate Proposal for Issue No. 3, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
8. Paper	Issue Paper No. _____, re: Hostage Family Meetings,	n.d.	P1/B1
9. Draft Paper	Issue Paper #11, 1 p.	11/24/85	P1/B1
10. Draft Paper	Issue Paper #12, 1 p.	11/25/85	P1/B1
11. Draft Paper	Issue Paper #13, 1 p.	11/25/85	P1/B1
12. Draft Paper	Issue Paper #14, 1 p.	11/25/85	P1/B1
13. Draft Paper	Issue Paper #24, 1 p.	11/25/85	P1/B1
14. Draft Paper	Copy of Item #10, with notations, 1 p.	11/25/85	P1/B1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC:
Records

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: NSDD 207: Responses to Issue Papers [Earl, Robert]
(3 of 4) Page 2 Box 91956 RAC Box 10

Date: 11/2/00
Wills/F97-082/2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
15. Memo	██████████ to James Holloway, re: Deployment of Counterterrorist Forces, 1 p. P 5/11/01 NLSF97-082/2 # 73	11/26/85	P1/B1, B3
16. Memo	Noel Koch to Holloway, re: Management of US Efforts Against Terrorism, 3 p.	11/27/85	P1/B1
17. Letter	Noel Koch to Amb. Robert Sayer, 2 p.	5/18/82	P1/B1
18. Paper	Defense Discussion paper on CT Organization, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
19. Memo	Holloway to Senior Review Group, re: Issue papers, 1 p.	11/27/85	P1/B1
20. Paper	R 10/11/02 NLSF97-082/2 # 76 Issue Paper No. _____, re: Deployability..., 1 p. D 3/21/01 NLSF97-082/2 # 78	n.d.	P1/B1
21. Paper	Proposed New Issue Paper, 4 p. PART. 10/11/02 NLSF97-082/2 # 79	n.d.	P1/B1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

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Collection Name COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC:
RECORDS

Withdrawer

LOJ 4/24/2007

File Folder NSDD 207: RESPONSESE TO ISSUE PAPERS [EARL,
ROBERT] (3)

FOIA

F97-082/2

Box Number 91956

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
1	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (POST TF PRINCIPALS MEETING VERSION)	1	ND
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	
2	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (NSC APPROVED VERSION) WITH EDITS	1	ND
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	
3	PAPER	SAME AS #2, WITH EDITS	1	ND
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	
4	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (NSC APPROVED VERSION INCORPORATING FBI/JUSTICE SUGGESTED CHANGES..)	1	11/15/1985
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	
5	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (NSC APPROVED VERSION INCORPORATING FBI/JUSTICE) SLIGHT OMB WORDSMITHING AND STATE CALL IN	2	11/19/1985
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	
8	PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. : RE HOSTAGE FAMILY MEETINGS	1	ND
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	
9	PAPER	DRAFT, ISSUTE PAPER #11	1	11/24/1985
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	
10	PAPER	DRAFT, ISSUE PAPER #12	1	11/25/1985
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	
11	PAPER	DRAFT, ISSUE PAPER #13	1	11/25/1985
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	
12	PAPER	DRAFT, ISSUE PAPER #14	1	11/25/1985
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	
13	PAPER	DRAFT, ISSUE PAPER #24	1	11/25/1985
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	
14	PAPER	COPY OF #10 WITH NOTATIONS	1	11/25/1985
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	
18	PAPER	DEFENSE DISCUSSION PAPER ON CT ORGANIZATION	2	ND
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	
21	PAPER	PROPOSED NEW ISSUE PAPER	4	ND
			<i>MVN 3/6/08</i>	

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November 1985



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

14 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MR. J. ROBERT MCBRIEN, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
MR. NOEL KOCH, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MR. LOWELL JENSEN, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
MR. MATTHEW Z. SCOCOZZA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
MR. CHARLES ALLEN, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
LTGEN HOHN H. MOELLRING, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MR. OLIVER REVELL, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
VADM JOHN POINDEXTER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MR. FRED F. FIELDING, THE WHITE HOUSE
DR. ALTON KEEL, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

SUBJECT: DRAFT RECOMMENDATION NO. 3

At the 12 November meeting of the Task Force on Combatting Terrorism the Vice President directed that when a version of Recommendation No. 3 was developed that was acceptable to the NSC, it should be circulated to the other agencies for concurrence.

Enclosed is the revised recommendation incorporating the NSC changes. Agency responses are requested by 19 November 1984. The Working Group point of contact for telephonic concurrences or questions is Mr. Burton Hutchings, 395-4950.

J. L. Holloway, III
Admiral, USN (Retired)
Executive Director
Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

Enclosure: Issue Paper No. 3 (NSC-approved version)

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White House Gi
By dh

Nov 23, 1987
Miller

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (Post TF Principals Meeting Version)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: Continuity in the Coordination of Terrorist Incidents

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations set forth in NSDD 30 should be retained with the following modifications:

1. There will be established on the National Security Council staff a position dedicated full-time to the national program for combatting terrorism, which will:

- a. Be supported by a small staff,
- b. Serve as Executive Director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).
- c. Be responsible, in conjunction with OMB and the Department of State, for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.
- d. Provide, on behalf of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, both management coordination and policy recommendations regarding the national program for combatting terrorism through the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T).
- e. Serve as Vice Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

2. The duties of the Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism in the Department of State shall include serving as:

- a. Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.
- b. Vice Chairman of the Terrorist Incident Working Group.
- c. Principal Administration spokesman for national policy dealing with combatting terrorism.

3. The TIWG will remain continually in session during terrorist incidents, utilizing principals and alternates from the various departments and agencies as required.

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E97-082/2#59

LOT

10/11/02

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

14 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MR. J. ROBERT MCBRIEN, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
MR. NOEL KOCH, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MR. LOWELL JENSEN, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
MR. MATTHEW Z. SCOCOZZA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
MR. CHARLES ALLEN, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
LTGEN JOHN H. MOELLERING, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MR. OLIVER REVELL, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
VADM JOHN POINDEXTER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MR. FRED F. FIELDING, THE WHITE HOUSE
DR. ALTON KEEL, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

SUBJECT: Draft Recommendation No. 3

At the 12 November meeting of the Task Force on Combatting Terrorism the Vice President directed that when a version of Recommendation No. 3 was developed that was acceptable to the NSC, it should be circulated to the other agencies for concurrence.

Enclosed is the revised recommendation incorporating the NSC changes. Agency responses are requested by 19 November 1984. The Working Group point of contact for telephonic concurrences or questions is Mr. Burton Hutchings, 395-4950.

J. L. Holloway
J. L. Holloway, III
Admiral, USN (Retired)
Executive Director
Vice President's Task Force
on Combatting Terrorism

Enclosure: Issue Paper No. 3 (NSC-Approved Version)

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dh *11/1/82*

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (NSC-Approved Version)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: Strengthening Coordination in Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations set forth in NSDD 30 should be retained with the following modifications:

1. There will be established on the National Security Council staff a position dedicated full-time to the national program for combatting terrorism, which will:

a. Be supported by a small staff ^{0.}

b. Serve as Executive Director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).

c. Be responsible, in conjunction with OMB and the Department of State, for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.

d. Provide, on behalf of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, both management coordination and policy recommendations regarding the national program for combatting terrorism through the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T).

e. Serve as Vice Chairman of the ^{IG/T.} ~~Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism~~

2. The duties of the Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism in the Department of State should include serving as:

a. Chairman of the ^{IG/T.} ~~Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism~~

b. Vice Chairman of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).

c. Principal Administration spokesman for national policy dealing with combatting terrorism.

3. [Normally] the TIWG will remain in session during terrorist incidents, utilizing principals and alternates from the various departments and agencies as required. THE DURATION OF ITS ACTIVATION WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE CHAIRMAN, TIWG.

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E97-082/2 #60

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10/11/02

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

14 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MR. J. ROBERT MCBRIEN, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
MR. NOEL KOCH, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MR. LOWELL JENSEN, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
MR. MATTHEW Z. SCOCOZZA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
MR. CHARLES ALLEN, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
LTGEN JOHN H. MOELLERING, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MR. OLIVER REVELL, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
VADM JOHN POINDEXTER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MR. FRED F. FIELDING, THE WHITE HOUSE
DR. ALTON KEEL, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

SUBJECT: Draft Recommendation No. 3

At the 12 November meeting of the Task Force on Combatting Terrorism the Vice President directed that when a version of Recommendation No. 3 was developed that was acceptable to the NSC, it should be circulated to the other agencies for concurrence.

Enclosed is the revised recommendation incorporating the NSC changes. Agency responses are requested by 19 November 1984. The Working Group point of contact for telephonic concurrences or questions is Mr. Burton Hutchings, 395-4950.

J. L. Holloway
J. L. Holloway, III
Admiral, USN (Retired)
Executive Director
Vice President's Task Force
on Combatting Terrorism

Enclosure: Issue Paper No. 3 (NSC-Approved Version)

DEC
White House Gl
By alb f
, August 28, 1997
ate #1100

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (NSC-Approved Version)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: Strengthening Coordination in Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations set forth in NSDD 30 should be retained with the following modifications:

1. There will be established on the National Security Council staff a position dedicated full-time to the national program for combatting terrorism, which will:

a. Be supported by a small staff,

b. Serve as Executive Director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).

c. ^{ann Justice} Be responsible, in conjunction with OMB and the Departments of State, for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.

d. Provide, on behalf of the ^{PROGRAM CODRO} Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, both management coordination and policy recommendations regarding the national program for combatting terrorism through the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) AND PERT. CABINET OFFICERS + AGENCY HEADS

e. Serve as Vice Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

2. The duties of the Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism in the Department of State should include serving as:

a. Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

b. Vice Chairman of the Terrorist Incident Working Group.

c. Principal Administration spokesman for national policy dealing with combatting terrorism.

3. Normally, the TIWG will remain in session during ^{international} terrorist incidents, utilizing principals and alternates from the various departments and agencies as required. ^(with)

in which the U.S. has a substantial interest

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F97-082/2-61

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10/1/02

15 Nov 85

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (NSC-Approved Version incorporating FBI/Justice suggested changes as of 15 Nov. Changes underscored.)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: Strengthening Coordination in Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations set forth in NSDD 30 should be retained with the following modifications:

1. There will be established on the National Security Council staff a position dedicated full-time to the national program for combatting terrorism, which will:

- a. Be supported by a small staff,
- b. Serve as Executive Director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).
- c. Be responsible, in conjunction with OMB and the Departments of State and Justice, for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.
- d. Provide, on behalf of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, both program (not management) coordination and policy recommendations regarding the national program for combatting terrorism working through the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) and coordinating with appropriate Cabinet offices and Agency heads.
- e. Serve as Vice Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

2. The duties of the Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism in the Department of State should include serving as:

- a. Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.
- b. Vice Chairman of the Terrorist Incident Working Group.
- c. Principal Administration spokesman for national policy dealing with combatting international terrorism.

3. Normally, the TIWG will remain in session during terrorist incidents in which the U.S. has a substantial interest, utilizing principals and alternates from the various departments and agencies as required.

F97-189/2 #62

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10/11/02

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F97-082/2 #63

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10/11/02

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19 Nov Version 1700 hrs

ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (NSC-Approved Version incorporating FBI/Justice suggested changes as of 15 Nov. Changes underscored.) Slight OMB wordsmithing and State call-in suggested change set off by *******

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: Strengthening Coordination in Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations set forth in NSDD 30 should be retained with the following modifications:

1. There will be established on the National Security Council staff a position dedicated full-time to the national program for combatting terrorism, ******. this staff officer will receive such additional staff support as may be required. ****** (OMB 19 Nov change) which will:

(****** OMB suggested change would delete this line******) a. Be supported by a small staff,

b. Serve as Executive Director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).

c. Be responsible, in conjunction with OMB and the Departments of State and Justice, for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.

d. Provide, on behalf of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, both program (not management) coordination and policy recommendations regarding the national program for combatting terrorism working through the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) and coordinating with appropriate Cabinet offices and Agency heads..

e. Serve as Vice Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

2. The duties of the Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism

in the Department of State should include serving as:

- a. Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.
- b. Vice Chairman of the Terrorist Incident Working Group.
(**Justice hopes that this does not preempt their present role as VC/IGT but rather adds a co-VC position**)
- c. Principal Administration spokesman for national policy dealing with combatting international terrorism.

(** State would prefer that c. above be changed along the following lines: "Have primary responsibility for contact with Congress on international terrorist issues, and work to develop an effective public affairs policy.** This they believe would avoid apparent conflict with other authorized Administration spokespersons.)

3. Normally, the TIWG will remain in session during terrorist incidents in which the U.S. has a substantial interest, utilizing principals and alternates from the various departments and agencies as required.

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 6-7 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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*JUSTICE need better word
family member?*

ISSUE PAPER NO. _____

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, ~~DOJ~~, NSC

SUBJECT: Hostage Family Meetings with the President and the Vice President

ISSUE: Once the initial shock of a family member being taken hostage wears off, most families become increasingly frustrated at the lack of movement in the return of their loved one. Some families even blame their government for their frustration -- not the terrorists -- believing that the government isn't doing enough to get the hostages back, even if that entails giving in to the terrorists' demands. Pressure from the families builds to see "the highest levels" of the government, including the ~~Vice~~ President and the ^{Vice} President. Meetings between the President (or Vice President) and hostage families place the President in a "no win" situation -- he can only lose in the long run. The best he can hope for is to buy a small amount of time before the hostage families feel even more frustrated that seeing the President hasn't helped return their loved one either. This unresolvable frustration could lead to the hostage families taking advantage of confidences shared by the President in their effort to use the media to further their single, all-consuming purpose.

family member

~~Staff to the President and the National Security Advisor
President and Vice President~~

PROPOSAL: The ~~President and Vice President~~ should state as a matter of policy that ~~they~~ will not meet with families of hostages until after the hostage situation is resolved because they do not want to play into the hands of the terrorists by restricting their freedom of action in resolving the hostage situation. The Government should stress the theme that ~~it is the "patriotic duty"~~ of US citizens whose family members may fall victim to international terrorism ~~to~~ burden the President or restrict his freedom of action by demanding a meeting with him.

STAFF CONTACT: LTCOL R. L. Earl, 395-4950.

must understand ~~as a matter of~~ as responsible citizens that they ~~can~~ should

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E97-082/2 #66

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OK ny

BY LOI NARA DATE 10/11/02

ISSUE PAPER NO. 11

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, TREASURY, CIA, JCS, FBI

SUBJECT: Intelligence Coordination During Terrorist Incidents

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The National Intelligence Officer for Terrorism should be designated as the central reference point for intelligence tasking and analytical production within the community during a terrorism incident. The technical and specialized agencies should be directed to provide support to the departments' and agencies' principal analytical units as needed during an incident.

Draft: 11/24/85

INR feels threatened.

" wants to maintain competing analyses.

State reserves its right to present its own intel analysis to policymakers.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-082/2#67

BY LOI WARA DATE 10/11/02

ISSUE PAPER NO. 12

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Hostage Family Liaison

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The point of contact for day-to-day liaison with the families of American hostages who are not United State Government employees should be the Bureau for Consular Affairs. In exceptional circumstances*, the State Department Hostage Family Working Group, already in existence should take responsibility for contact with hostage families.

11/25/85

primary

NSC-approved documents...?

* (such as when a hostage situation becomes unusually prolonged)

normally

for Combating Terrorism

*the Ambassador at Large
as Chairman of / Working
↓ Group*

*State Department
Hostage Family*

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-082/2#68

BY LOT NARA DATE 10/11/02

ISSUE PAPER NO.13

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: ALL

SUBJECT: Foreign and Domestic Public Awareness

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Interdepartmental Working Group on Public Diplomacy should develop a long-range strategy for improving public understanding of international terrorism at home and abroad and of the policies required to combat it. This strategy should be submitted to the IG/T for approval. Additionally, the State Department should consider specifically designating one or more officers to explain counter-terrorism policies at home and abroad.

11/25/85

F97-082/2#69

LDS

10/11/02

ISSUE PAPER NO. 14

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: ALL

SUBJECT: Government-Media Relations During a Terrorist Incident

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: As a long-term strategy, the U.S. Government should systematically consult with the media on how best to limit the capability of terrorists to exploit U.S. press freedom to their advantage. This should be done quietly but openly with media leaders, not in any way seeking to coerce or restrict the media, but as a contribution to their process of self-examination and responsible coverage.

To improve crisis management, the Public Diplomacy Working Group of the IG/T should develop a mechanism to bring representatives of the media and appropriate U.S. Government officials together rapidly at the onset of a terrorist event for briefings and a discussion of national interests. Ideally, this mechanism should be worked out in advance with media leaders.

11/25/85

DECLASSIFIED
NLS E97-082/2 # 70
BY NOI NARA DATE 10/11/02

ISSUE PAPER NO. 24

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, DCI, FBI

SUBJECT: Increased Coordination With Law Enforcement
Elements Domestically and Overseas

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: Ambassadors at critical counter-terrorist posts should be instructed to designate the DCM as counter-terrorism coordinator, with another officer, such as the RSO or other State Department officer, or an FBI, CIA, or military representative, as appropriate, as his or her assistant. Based on a country team assessment of the terrorism situation and on the specific liaison relationships with the host government prevailing in the Mission, the Ambassador should ensure that all counter-terrorist capabilities of the post are properly coordinated internally and that they provide full coverage of host government agencies.

The IG/T should be tasked with (a) developing a list of critical counter-terrorism posts; (b) ensuring that an appropriate inter-agency training program for counter-terrorism specialists to be assigned abroad for this purpose is developed and implemented by the appropriate agencies, particularly the CIA. The objective of the training program is to create a cadre of counter-terrorism specialists to be assigned to the posts where the terrorist threat is most acute.

The FBI, in consultation with the IG/T, should develop a program of briefings and instruction on the national program for combatting terrorism, and make this available to professional law enforcement officers who attend the National Academy at Quantico.

11/25/85

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BY NOT NARA DATE 10/11/02

ISSUE PAPER NO. 12

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Hostage Family Liaison

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The point of contact for day-to-day liaison with the families of American hostages who are not United State Government employees should be the Bureau for Consular Affairs. In exceptional circumstances, the State Department Hostage Family Working Group already in existence should take responsibility for contact with hostage families.

11/25/85

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NLS F95-082/2# 72

BY LOI NARA, DATE 10/11/02

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

FOIA(b) (1)

FOIA(b) (3)

National Intelligence Council

NIC 05857-85
26 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral James L. Holloway, III (Ret.)
Executive Director, Vice President Task Force
on Combatting Terrorism

FROM:

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT:

Deployment Policy of Counterterrorist Forces

1. Issue 42 which deals with JSOC deployment policy has been dropped from the list of active issues.

[REDACTED]

2. JSOC's effectiveness depends on it being able to conduct an assault early in an incident, if such action is required.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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NLS F97-082/2#73

By LOJ, NARA, Date 6/21/01

[REDACTED]

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

SENIOR REVIEW GROUP MEETING
OF
THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1985
9:00 a.m. - 10:00 a.m.
Room 208
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING

AGENDA

1. DRAFT REPORT OUTLINE
2. NEW ISSUES
3. PUBLIC AWARENESS AND ATTITUDES



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

SENIOR REVIEW GROUP MEETING
OF
VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM
27 NOVEMBER 1985
9:00 a. m. - 10:00 a. m.
ROOM 208
Old Executive Office Building

PARTICIPANTS

CHAIRMAN: Vice President George Bush

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Admiral J. L. Holloway, III, USN (Ret.)

SENIOR REVIEW GROUP:

STATE: Ambassador Robert Oakley
TREASURY: J. Robert McBrien
DEFENSE: Noel Koch
JUSTICE: Lowell Jensen
TRANSPORTATION: Matthew Z. Scocozza
CIA: Charles Allen
JCS: LTGEN John H. Moellering
FBI: Oliver Revell
NSC: VADM John Poindexter
LTCOL Oliver North

WHITE HOUSE: Richard Hauser for Fred Fielding
OMB: Robert Howard for Dr. Alton Keel

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

Craig Fuller
Don Gregg
LTCOL Doug Menarchik

WORKING GROUP

Ambassador Edward L. Peck (Deputy Director)
CAPT Louis H. Boink
COL David L. Cole
LCDR Craig P. Coy
LTC Patrick F. Daly
LTC Robert L. Earl
Mr. Burton Hutchings
CAPT David J. McMunn

LIAISON GROUP

FBI: Charles Stapleton
FAA: Billie Vincent
OMB: Arnold Donahue
JUSTICE: David Bouvinger

DRAFT

NOV 27 1985

DRAFT OUTLINE OF TASK FORCE REPORT

- I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- II. INTRODUCTION
 - A. NSDD 179
 - B. Task Force Organization
 - C. Task Force Methodology
 - D. Report Methodology
- III. DISCUSSION
 - A. Definition of Terrorism
 - B. Nature of Terrorism
 - 1. Recent History
 - 2. Basis of Terrorism
 - a. State Sponsored Terrorism
 - b. Ideological Terrorism
 - c. Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare
 - 3. Terrorism as a Crime
 - 4. Tactics of Terrorism
 - a. Conventional Weapons
 - b. Biological/Chemical Weapons
 - c. Nuclear Weapons

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C. Terrorism and the United States

1. Assessment

a. A Brief history of major events.

(1). Cite statistics of incidents relating to U. S.

(2). Summary of major world-wide terrorist events over the last ten years.

b. Impact on Nation

(1). Diminishes Prestige

(2). Lowers Public morale

(3). Erodes Confidence of our allies

(4). Contributes to confidence to terrorists

c. Future Threat

a. U. S. as technocracy has especially vulnerable infrastructure.

(1). Power distribution systems

(2). Communication networks

(3). Biological and chemical attacks against urban areas

(4). Assassination of leadership

(5). Nuclear incidents.

d. Threat to Political Institutions

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- D. Considerations
 - 1. Criteria for Responses
- E. United States Reaction to Terrorism
 - 1. Current Policy
 - 2. NSDD's 3, 30, 138, 179, 180
 - 3. Organization
 - a. SSG
 - b. IG/T
 - c. TIWG
 - d. CPPG
- F. Resources committed to terrorism
 - 1. Existing Elements within Executive Branch
 - 2. Graphs showing breakdown and allocation of people and assets.
 - 3. Planned Programs.
 - a. Improvement of Embassy Security
 - b. R & D Programs
- G. Combatting Terrorism
 - 1. Prevention.
 - 2. Preemption.
 - 3. Reaction.
 - 4. Retaliation.
 - 5. Intelligence.
- H. International Cooperation

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- I. Congressional Involvement
 - 1. Intelligence Oversight
 - 2. War Powers Act
 - 3. Legislative Initiatives
- J. Public Awareness and Attitudes
 - 1. Critical Aspect of Public Attitudes
 - 2. Public Perception of Terrorism
 - 3. Media Involvement during Incidents
 - a. The Administration and the Media
 - b. Self Discipline by the Media During Incidents
 - 4. Role of the Hostage Families
 - a. Public Statements
 - b. Meetings with the President and Vice President
 - c. State Department Support

IV. CONCLUSIONS

- A. Paradoxical Nature of Terrorism
 - 1. Dilemmas faced by U. S. Government
- B. Existing Capability is Good
 - 1. Organization
 - 2. Military Response
 - 3. Gaps/Options
- C. Policy Clarification is Needed
 - 1. Coordination of Interagency Efforts
- D. Importance of Public Statements
- E. Importance of Intelligence
- F. Importance of International Cooperation
- G. Need for Specific Legislation

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V. RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. Consolidated List of Issues and Recommendations agreed upon by Task Force
- B. Consolidated List of Issues and Recommendations for subsequent ^{USG} [IG/T] action

VI. Annexes

- A. Membership of the Task Force and Working Staff
- B. Chronology of Task Force Events
- C. List of Field Visits and Capability Demonstrations
- D. Summary of Overseas Visits
- E. List of Consultations
- F. Bibliography of Significant Literature
- G. List of Relevant NSDD's and Department/Agency Instructions
- H. Detail Program Element Data Summary Reports

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DEFENSE DISCUSSION PAPER ON CT ORGANIZATION

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: ALL

SUBJECT: New NSC Policy Planning and Operations Coordinating Boards

BACKGROUND: Under Eisenhower, NSC had a Policy Planning Board and an Operations Coordinating Board. You will know the details of composition and procedure far better than I, so I won't dwell on them beyond noting that Bryce Harlow and Karl Harr recall the evolution of this system as a protracted and bitter struggle lasting about five years. For the last three, State subsided and the system--very formal--worked quite effectively, until President Kennedy scrapped it, and we've been more or less ad hoc-ing ever since.

There is proposed a CT management scheme which retains the essentials of Cabinet government and provides authoritative control of the process by re-creating for combatting terrorism a Terrorism Policy Planning Board (TPPB), and a Terrorism Operations Coordinating Board (TOCB). This is less complicated than it appears at first blush.

DISCUSSION: The present Intergovernmental Group on Terrorism chaired by State would be the correlative of the Terrorism Policy Planning Board (TPPB), but would be subordinate to NSC and obliged to submit on a regular basis the results of its deliberations. Following the original model, differences within the Planning Board would be submitted by NSC for Presidential resolution. As a practical matter, the gravity of such a step would assure that only the most profound and irreconcilable differences would ever go to that level, and the present workings of the IG/T make it difficult to imagine any issue requiring Presidential adjudication. Had the pressure of a Presidential submission existed in the past, we should not have seen decisions taken or not taken without regard for the legitimate concerns of all departments and agencies involved.

The Terrorism Operations Coordinating Board (TOCB) would be a new entity in the proposed scheme. Its predecessor consisted of people at the Under or Deputy Secretary-level addressing operational plans prepared by intergovernmental groups pursuant to policy established by the TPPB. Such a Board would be chaired by Defense, with Justice as Vice-Chairman. This Board, too, would be subordinate to NSC on the same terms as the TPPB. It would formalize and streamline the presently unwieldy and unresponsive system for addressing other than a reactive response to terrorism. As to the latter, the Terrorist Incident Working Group would remain as established.

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10/14/22

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The suggestion that DoD Chair and Justice Vice-Chair the TOCB gives rise to a number of questions:

- (a) How is CIA designed into the process? This might be answered by having them co-chair or Vice-Chair the TOCB, but this gives the impression of looking for a heavy title for everyone.
- (b) What is Justice's role? Its constant institutional concern has been that it may acquire oversight that it does not now have, need, or want. As you recall, this was solved in the past by noting that any national level coordination was directed only to contingencies requiring National Command Authority decisions. But,
- (c) Is past and present thinking adequate to the future?

Justice's role in combatting terrorism, being largely compartmented, has not been considered as fully as it might have been. It is very substantial, and will grow further. We should anticipate the increased importation of extra-national terrorism. Justice's role, internationally, will expand. Justice's legatts, now relatively few in number, may well increase. Their access to police intelligence is unique. They deal frequently with people who do not want to deal with CIA or DIA. Terrorism is preeminently a police problem which fact further defines the importance of Justice. As our thinking has refined over time, it has focused more sharply on bringing terrorists to justice, rather than simply protecting people and property, and rescuing people from them. Justice's dealings with foreign counter-terrorist forces is growing through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program.

In short, we are moving, almost willy-nilly, past the artificial distinction which divides domestic from international terrorism and the pat delineation of departmental roles defined legalistically, to a more realistic amalgamation of responsibilities and capabilities, and this can occur--as it must--without doing violence to the legal constraints which assign Justice responsibility for certain activities and State, Defense and CIA other responsibilities for other activities.

In light of all this, the wiser course might be to create the TOCB, as proposed, and have it chaired by CIA rather than DOD, with DOD and DOJ as Vice-Chairman. To put this in clearer perspective, Clair George would Chair the TOCB, with Will Taft and probably Bill Webster as Vice-Chairmen. The supporting structures would be pretty well self-defining.

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

27 November 1985

To: Senior Review Group
Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

From: Admiral J. L. Holloway, III *M*
Executive Director

Subject: Issue Papers

Enclosed is another increment of Issue Papers developed by the Staff Working Group as the result of the further review and refinement of the issue.

As we agreed from the beginning of our effort, issues can and will be raised as they are identified. The final report will allow for those issues not agreed upon or circulated in time for complete staffing to be referred to the IG/T for resolution after the Task Force is disestablished.

Just as before, the cognizant department or agency responsible for reviewing each issue is shown on the issue sheet form. However, any member of the Senior Review Group is invited to comment on any issue.

Responses to the attached issue papers should be made to the Executive Director of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism not later than 4 December 1985. Substantive comments only are desired at this point. A staff contact has been assigned to each issue to coordinate the responses as they are received.

From these responses, draft recommendations representing the consensus of the Senior Review Group will be prepared and recirculated to the SRG for further review.

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PROPOSED NEW ISSUE PAPER

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: NSC, STATE, CIA, DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Composition And Timely Deployment Of Emergency Support Teams

ISSUES:

The formal Emergency Support Team (EST) concept was established in a November 1984 memorandum among State, JCS, JSOC and the CIA. The EST represented an interagency effort to pre-coordinate and integrate the existing incident response capabilities of the participating agencies. The team's primary mission is to provide policy guidance, counterterrorism expertise and specialized intelligence to senior embassy officials, host government decisionmakers and incident managers. Its secondary mission is to collect intelligence and make other arrangements for possible direct USG intervention.

ESTs currently consist of a team leader from State, [redacted] and a JSOC planning element. State's leadership role includes advising host country and embassy officials, coordinating overall team support of host government and embassy, facilitating team acceptance and encouraging the host government to allow JSOC operations (if decided upon). [redacted]

The USG is rich in assets capable of countering a terrorist incident. The EST must identify, integrate and employ the "right mix" of assets for the specific mission. Experience is now sufficient to look at expanding the capabilities of the EST beyond that provided by the current participants. [redacted]

[redacted] To ensure internal compatibility of components, the integration of new participants should be worked

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By LDT, NARA, Date 10/11/02

out prior to employment as to appropriate roles, responsibilities, responsiveness and support requirements. This is particularly true if the EST is expanded. Automatic participation of every agency in every incident (which is the general rule now) could easily balloon the EST's size, severely hindering its effectiveness.

Another key issue is timely deployment of ESTs during a fast moving terrorist incident. Until EST expertise and special equipment arrive on the scene, the USG's ability to influence the host government's management of the incident is limited. In previous deployments, several factors have combined to delay the dispatch of ESTs. One has been the tendency in the initial stages to treat the deployment of the EST and [REDACTED] Senior decisionmakers need to recognize the differences. Since the EST is only advisory, it should be dispatched almost immediately by the TIWG or similar authority once it is clear that U.S. interests are involved. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It should be approved and dispatched separately. This should simplify the approval and scheduling processes for each and save valuable time.

There has been a reluctance on the part of EST participants to agree to a quick dispatch of an advance element (4-5 persons) to the incident site to get over the "acceptance threshold" and persuade the host government to accept the remainder of the team. Such an advance contingent offers a number of advantages. Since individuals carry little more than personal luggage, they can deploy quickly in a variety of commercial and military aircraft. To a country dealing with a highly visible and politically sensitive crisis, the acceptance of a small US contingent with a few suitcases is much more palatable to assist a host government or the embassy than a 16-20 man team with 5,000 pounds of equipment. Once on the ground, the advance element can better explain the expertise and capabilities offered by the remainder of the team.

No one has seriously attempted to pre-configure EST teams into deployable "packages" (personnel and equipment) which would permit the TIWG to quickly tailor response teams according to political constraints and incident requirements. Instead, team configuration is individually determined by each agency according to how it interprets the TIWG guidance and in consonance with its own interests. The British use pre-configured deployment packages in their terrorist responses and are quite pleased with the results.

A pre-designated forward base in each theater

would permit pre-positioning of some EST equipment and provide an initial destination for the team until diplomatic efforts can win access to the country handling the incident. Should clearance be granted while the team is airborne, it could be quickly diverted to the incident area. A designated forward base would also support staging of the team in addition to providing planners an opportunity to pre-coordinate clandestine arrival and use of the base during the incident.

Another major concern in structuring and deploying ESTs is that no permanent, interagency pre-planning group exists to define roles, clarify responsibilities, develop procedures and, upon direction of the TIWG, oversee the marshaling, dispatch and continued support of the ESTs. Consequently ESTs are literally born on the aircraft parking stand and exist more as a collection of experts and equipment than a real operational team. If they are not physically collocated in the field, they tend to function autonomously, since each agency reports back to its parent agency rather than a central point.

Such fragmentation of command and control is a severe handicap to secure, effective dispatch and employment of ESTs. It stands in stark contrast to the security and close supervision exercised by the NMCC over similar military teams. The permanent working group responsible for pre-planning should also oversee the deployment and continued support of the team during an incident. This should be done from a single location, at the NSC or State.

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PROPOSAL #1:

Pre-coordination and structuring of ESTs to ensure a variety of deployable "packages" for the TIWG to consider and dispatch is critical to future mission accomplishment. The NSC ~~or the~~ IG/T should establish a permanent, interagency planning group to

←
working through the

thoroughly review and identify:

- Mission and organization.
- Proper roles and responsibilities.
- Potential new participants.
- Alternative deployment packages.
- Operational and deployment procedures.

~~PROPOSAL #2~~

discuss A ↓

Should not be a proposal

U.S interests are best served when its counterterrorism expertise and special resources are on the scene to assist host governments and/or embassies handle terrorist incidents. The urgent deployment of ESTs deserves serious attention by an appropriate NSC or IG/T study group. Special consideration should be given to:

- De-coupling EST and [REDACTED]
- Dispatching, when warranted, EST advance elements vice the entire team.
- Establishing pre-configured "packages" of personnel and equipment to streamline and speed up EST deployments.
- Designating a forward base in each theater to permit pre-positioning of equipment, staging into the incident site, and pre-coordination of operational security measures.
- Identifying and/or designating suitable airlift to support EST deployments.

discuss as final P in issue discuss

See above