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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Letter	Paul K. Krueger to Ted McNamara, 1 p. <i>D 6/11/82 NLSF 97-082/2 #1</i>	4/9/87	P1/F1 B2
2. Paper	National Assets Protection Program (NAPP): Concept Paper, 22 p. <i>D " " #2</i>	11/10/86	P1/F1 B2
3. Paper	Executive Summaries of the Three Vulnerability Systems, 6 p. <i>D " " #3</i>	n.d.	P1/F1, B2

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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Memorandum

*Bob Penning -
to a memo h
NSC regarding an
this study & stressing
that the work is
not a 25/T
matter -*

Subject

Federal Emergency Management Agency
Summary of the Vulnerability of the
Infrastructure of the United States

Date

4 AUG 1986

VT:LL:WDB:ec

*a separate
mechanism
needs to
be set up*

To

From

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley
Acting Ambassador-at-Large
For Counter-Terrorism
Department of State

Victoria Toensing
Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
Criminal Division

*However, an
unidentified source
is a 25/T matter
who provides
warning to
whom ab.
Houder
inside the
US -
P.*

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has prepared a summary of work done by others regarding the vulnerability of our telecommunications, electric power and electronic banking industries 1/ to deliberate disruption by terrorist organizations. 2/ The FEMA summary was prepared in order to provide information for counter-terrorism planning. As a result of its work, FEMA recommends that additional systems of our infrastructure be analyzed for their vulnerability. The Department of Justice has reviewed FEMA's summary and offers the following observations and recommendations.

1/ These three services or systems represent only a portion of our nation's essential infrastructure. Other parts of our infrastructure which were not addressed include transportation, water supplies, natural gas and oil supplies, all other communications, defense industrial production sites, civilian government, food production and distribution and medical and pharmaceutical production and distribution.

2/ FEMA reviewed and summarized three separate reports. The first report on telecommunications was prepared by Booz-Allen for the National Communications System. The second report on electric power was prepared by the Department of Energy. The third report on electronic banking was prepared by an interagency subgroup of the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board's Economic Stabilization and Public Finance Working Group.

Department Of Justice (DOJ) Observations Regarding System Vulnerability Evaluations

1. A generic approach, which examines the common elements of an entire system, is better than a site-specific approach for identifying system design weaknesses and evaluating vulnerability because it produces better results and is more efficient. A generic approach results in system-wide design improvements which have significant and lasting impacts. It is more efficient because it produces such results more quickly at less cost. In contrast, a site-specific approach, which requires an examination of every site, produces improvements which are only of a short-term benefit because of changes which occur at each individual site over time. In addition, the site-specific approach requires a substantially greater investment of time and resources to yield results which can be applied system-wide.

2. To the extent that it is available, existing research should be relied upon to evaluate system vulnerability. This approach is more efficient, yields results more quickly and is more cost effective than pursuing original research.

3. Technical experts are better suited than counter-terrorism experts to conduct generic vulnerability assessments. Technical experts can best identify potential means of disruption because they understand better than anyone else how their systems are designed and work.

4. If a component of a system is vulnerable to terrorism it is also likely vulnerable to natural and accidental disruptions.

5. A generic approach to evaluating vulnerability does not include an assessment of the resources available to respond to a terrorist incident.

6. Many infrastructure systems are interdependent. Accordingly, the most productive counter-terrorism planning will deal with generic weaknesses which are common to or shared by several infrastructure systems.

7. Vulnerability research would be improved if the efforts of groups working on common or related problems were shared.

DOJ RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A library of infrastructure vulnerability research should be established. This collection of reports should include analyses prepared by or for universities, federal, state and local agencies, private sector consultants and foreign governments. The Intergovernmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) should determine how such a library should be established and operated. |||

NO!
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2. Critical infrastructure systems which have not been examined should be studied.

3. The law enforcement community should study the resources available to respond to an incident.

4. The scope of infrastructure vulnerability studies should be expanded beyond terrorism to include vulnerability to natural and accidental disruptions. A natural or accidental disruption would virtually invite terrorist actions designed to exacerbate the damage already done and to create new disruptions to weaken further the United States.

5. Inter-system dependency should be evaluated.

6. The impact of simultaneous incidents on the ability of our personnel and equipment to respond to such incidents should be studied.

7. The communications systems designed to supply information during terrorist incidents should be better coordinated.

8. The functions assigned to federal agencies should be specific and agencies should not exceed the scope of their assigned duties or authority.

9. The IG/T or an IG/T subgroup should oversee the initiatives proposed above.

NO

ENCLOSURE 1

ENCLOSURE 2

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ENCLOSURE 3

DRAFT

A REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON PASSENGER VESSEL AND PORT SECURITY

PREPARED BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

IN COMPLIANCE WITH
TITLE IX OF U.S. PUBLIC LAW 99-399

☐ ☐ GRC		FEBRUARY, 1987		☐
INFORMATION	☒	Green	☒	Pearson
	☒	Reiman	☒	Cockell
	☐	Carlucci (advance)	☐	Powell (advise)
COMMENTS				

DRAFT

**Report to Congress
On Passenger Vessel and Port Security**

(U) INTRODUCTION

(U) This is a joint report prepared by the Department of Transportation and the Department of State in compliance with the requirements of Public Law 99-399, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986.

(U) The reports required under sections 903, 905, and 907 of Title IX, the International Maritime and Port Security Act, are consolidated herein as proposed in section 913 of that Title.

(U) The report shows the progress being made toward increased security against acts of maritime terrorism both domestically and internationally, particularly for passenger cruise vessels which travel on international voyages.

(U) All information contained in this report is unclassified and is preceded by the letter (U).

(U) As required by Section 913 of Title IX, all classified information has been provided in a separate CONFIDENTIAL Addendum. References to the addendum are noted in the text. All other unclassified material referenced in the report is provided in the appendices.

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

IMO MEASURES AND U.S. INITIATIVES

* (U) Following the hijacking of the ACHILLE LAURO in October 1985, the United States drafted detailed measures for the prevention of maritime terrorism which were adopted unanimously on September 12, 1986 by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). At the same time, the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 99-399, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. This law contains specific provisions in Title IX to combat maritime terrorism.

* (U) The Interagency Working Group on Maritime Security, chaired by the Department of Transportation (DOT), was formed after the ACHILLE LAURO incident to assess worldwide maritime security. The group is coordinating the implementation of the IMO measures and the provisions of Title IX both domestically and with foreign nations through the Coast Guard and the Department of State (DOS).

U.S. PORTS

* (U) The U.S. Coast Guard, with the cooperation of cruise line companies and port authorities, is implementing the IMO security measures and the provisions of P.L. 99-399 at U.S. ports. No additional domestic legislation is needed or recommended at this time.

* (U) To comply with Section 905 of P.L. 99-399, the Coast Guard conducted vulnerability and threat assessments at U.S. ports to determine their overall risk to acts of terrorism (See Addendum, paragraph 1). In addition to implementing the IMO measures, the Coast Guard is developing Local Port Readiness Committees to seek cooperative security efforts among vessel operators and port authorities.

* (U) A number of U.S. ports have instituted new security programs in the wake of the ACHILLE LAURO incident.

* (U) Cruise line companies that serve U.S. and foreign ports have improved their security measures significantly.

FOREIGN PORTS

* (U) In compliance with Section 907 of P.L. 99-399, DOT developed a survey in cooperation with the DOS to assess the effectiveness of security at selected Caribbean ports. The Caribbean was chosen as the first region to survey because of the large number of U.S. citizens who travel there on cruise ships during the winter season. Additional surveys will be conducted in the Mediterranean to coincide with the upcoming summer cruise line travel season (See Addendum, paragraph 2).

1

* (U) No Travel Advisories have been recommended or issued, pursuant to Section 908 of P.L. 99-399. The U.S. Maritime Administration and the Department of State are working with cruise line companies and foreign governments to offer security training and technical assistance to lower overall vulnerability and risk.

OTHER SECURITY TRAINING

* (U) The Coast Guard conducted six regional seminars in November 1986 on maritime terrorism and the IMO security measures. Over 300 members of the maritime industry attended.

* (U) The Coast Guard is providing additional training to its own personnel in the fundamentals of physical security procedures and surveys, and the management of security programs.

IMPLEMENTATION OF IMO MEASURES BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

* (U) The rate of implementation of the IMO measures by other countries will depend on available resources, prevailing expertise, and perceived threat levels. In any event, it will take several years for most IMO nations to implement the measures fully.

I. (U) PROGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION

(U) In response to the October 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship ACHILLE LAURO and the brutal murder of a U.S. citizen onboard, the United States took swift action to improve ship and port security and to reduce the threat of future incidents of terrorism to passengers and crews. The U.S. Government preferred to accomplish this through a world-wide consensus, but was prepared to take unilateral action if necessary to protect U.S. citizens traveling by ship throughout the world.

(U) Against this background, the United States drafted and sponsored with seven other countries a resolution to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in November 1985 calling on all nations to examine current security programs in their ports and onboard ships. (The IMO is a London-based specialized agency of the United Nations whose 127 member governments deal primarily with safety at sea and the threat of marine pollution from ships.) The resolution directed the IMO's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) to develop detailed technical security measures for improving and standardizing security to prevent maritime terrorism. The resolution was adopted nearly unanimously by the IMO Assembly.^{1/}

(U) The U.S. Coast Guard, Department of State (DOS), and Department of Transportation (DOT), along with industry and labor representatives, then developed detailed draft measures for the prevention of maritime terrorism which were accepted by the MSC in January 1986. The draft measures were distributed to member governments for review and comments. The measures were also reviewed and endorsed by the IMO's Facilitation Committee and Legal Committee in March and April 1986, respectively. Utilizing the comments which were submitted by member governments, the measures were revised by a working group at the next session of the MSC in September 1986. The measures were adopted unanimously on September 12 and published in MSC Circular 443. (See Appendix 1).

II. (U) U.S. INITIATIVES

(U) At the same time the IMO measures were being developed, the U.S. Congress took domestic action in the form of H.R. 4151, the "Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986." This bill passed Congress in August 1986 and became Public Law 99-399 (P.L. 99-399). Of particular concern to the maritime industry is Title IX, Maritime Security, titled the "International Maritime and Port Security Act."

^{1/} Iran, which abstained, was the only country that did not approve the resolution.

(U) Title IX gives the Departments of Transportation and State new responsibilities in the area of maritime security and complements the IMO measures. Title IX provides the Coast Guard with expanded security authority under the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, imposes new reporting requirements concerning foreign and U.S. port safety, and provides for the issuance of travel advisories.

(U) The U.S.-sponsored IMO measures were developed by the Coast Guard and DOS under the guidance of the Interagency Working Group on Maritime Security. This group was formed after the ACHILLE LAURO incident and is chaired by DOT. It coordinates the assessment of worldwide port and shipping security, and the implementation of the IMO measures and the provisions of Title IX. Members of the working group include the DOS, Coast Guard, the CIA and FBI, the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. Customs Service.

III. (U) IMPLEMENTATION OF IMO SECURITY MEASURES AT U.S. PORTS

(U) The Coast Guard is moving to implement the IMO security measures and the provisions of P.L. 99-399 at U.S. ports. Since all U.S. maritime security concerns are adequately addressed by the IMO measures, no additional domestic legislation is currently needed or recommended (See Addendum, Section 3).

(U) The local Coast Guard Captains of the Port are utilizing their excellent liaison with local port officials and vessel owners to facilitate voluntary industry compliance with the IMO measures. Security program guidelines and policy are being promulgated from the Port Safety and Security Program Director in U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters (See Addendum, paragraph 4). Current activities designed to increase security at U.S. ports are discussed below.

(U) LOCAL PORT READINESS COMMITTEES

(U) The U.S. Coast Guard is fostering cooperative security efforts among Federal agencies, vessel operators, and port authority/terminal operators by establishing local Port Readiness Committees (PRCs) as addressed in Commandant Instruction 16601.6. This Instruction designates Coast Guard Captains of the Port as chairmen of local committees which consist of representatives from the Coast Guard, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Army Military Traffic Management Command, the Maritime Administration, the U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command, and the U.S. Naval Control of Shipping Organization. The local PRCs will foster communication, cooperation and coordination among the signatory agencies to strengthen the capabilities of U.S. commercial seaports to support national defense needs, and are the appropriate forum for the liaison of these agencies to consider port security issues. In particular, the Commandant Instruction recommends the establishment of a subcommittee called the Security Committee. This subcommittee coordinates shoreside and onboard vessel security and

intelligence. The Instruction also recommends that the subcommittee include members of the maritime industry. A number of U.S. ports have already established such subcommittees.

(U) MARITIME COUNTERTERRORISM CONTINGENCY PLANS

(U) Prior to the establishment of local Port Readiness Committees, the U.S. Coast Guard issued its Maritime Counterterrorism Contingency Plan Model in January 1984. This model plan has been used to prepare Coast Guard district and port specific maritime counterterrorism contingency plans. The plan was developed to establish standard responses that were adaptable to each locale and situation. To date, each Coast Guard Captain of the Port office has initiated a plan.

(U) U.S. TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR THE MARITIME INDUSTRY

(U) During November 1986 the Coast Guard conducted six regional seminars on maritime terrorism and the implementation of the IMO measures and P.L. 99-399. The seminars took place in Miami, New Orleans, Atlanta, Philadelphia, San Francisco and Long Beach. There were approximately 300 attendees. About 100 additional requests for information have been filled.

(U) The DOS and the U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD), in cooperation with the Coast Guard, will provide training and technical assistance to foreign nationals. In particular, MARAD is cooperating with the Anti-Terrorism Program of the DOS to:

1. Coordinate the placement of the training classes at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy or equivalent federal and state facilities;
2. Provide arrangements for class access to Ready Reserve Force Ships and port facilities for training exercises; and
3. Contact appropriate port management, police, and administrators to arrange for the utilization of resource personnel in the instructional segment of the maritime security course.

(U) The initial target date for training students representing foreign ports, approved by the DOS, is April 13, 1987. The course will last three weeks and end May 1, 1987. Classroom and living accommodations will be provided at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy. In addition, transportation and other related needs will be furnished in order to operate the course effectively.

(U) The DOS/MARAD training course will be consistent with the IMO security measures. Although foreign nationals would be the immediate beneficiaries, the course is expected to have direct application to U.S. shipping and ports. At the appropriate time and with proper consultation with the U.S. Coast Guard and other federal agencies, the

training material developed for this course may be made available to all U.S. ship and port operators concerned with maritime terrorism activities. Coordination between MARAD, the DOS, and the Coast Guard continues in the development of standardized training courses for both foreign nationals and U.S. industry personnel.

(U) COAST GUARD TRAINING PROGRAMS

(U) In September 1986, the Coast Guard Reserve Training Center in Yorktown, Virginia began the presentation of two Port Physical Security Courses to train Coast Guard personnel in the fundamentals of this mission area. The Port Physical Security Management Course includes management, theory, and practical application of physical security procedures and methods. The Port Physical Security Practical Course includes basic theory and practical application of physical security procedures, methods, and techniques. Upon completion of the courses, Coast Guard personnel will be able to conduct security surveys, make appropriate recommendations for improved security, prepare vulnerability assessments, and develop contingency plans. In March 1987, the Reserve Training Center will begin teaching a course on Readiness Contingency Planning which will include segments on Maritime Counterterrorism Plan development and exercising.

(U) U.S. PORT SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

(U) In compliance with Section 905 of P.L. 99-399, the Coast Guard developed a plan to assess the vulnerability and threat level at U.S. ports. (See Appendix 2). The plan was coordinated with the local Captains of the Port and with the Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) which is the Coast Guard's control point for the analysis and dissemination of Maritime Terrorism/Security threat information. The ICC produces threat assessments on a scheduled and specific request basis. (See Appendix 3). Threat assessments, by nature, are accurate for only the time at which they are produced. The threat can change from day to day or week to week depending on worldwide crisis and intelligence information available.

(U) In conducting the threat assessments, the Coast Guard also determined the vulnerability and overall risk of U.S. ports to a terrorist attack. Threat is defined as acts which could result in a compromise of information, a loss of life, or destruction of property. Vulnerability defines how susceptible a port or ship is to attack, given the level of current security measures. Risk is a combination of threat and vulnerability and can be reduced by the Coast Guard's implementation of the IMO measures. (See Addendum, paragraph 5).

(C) Similar surveys and assessments will be conducted on an annual basis to satisfy the reporting requirements of P.L. 99-399 and will allow for an annual comparison of improvements made to port and vessel security.

(U) U.S. PORT SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS

(U) To some degree a number of ports and vessels were already increasing their security procedures prior to the ACHILLE LAURO incident and the issuance of the IMO measures. However, since the hijacking concern about security has heightened. Some marked changes have occurred.

(U) To increase security, the Port of New York has formed the New York Passenger Ship Terminal Security Committee which consists of representatives from the cruise ship industry, the local maritime community, the port authority, and various federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. The Port of Miami formed the Security Committee of the Florida Caribbean Cruise Association which has cruise line industry representatives and keeps various agencies apprised of their accomplishments. Also, the Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach developed the Cruise Terminal Security Committee which consists of various industry representatives and federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. Increased security at these ports is significant because combined they account for approximately 80 percent of all cruise line business from the United States. (See Addendum, paragraph 6).

(U) The formation of these committees demonstrates a concern about the risk from terrorist activities. This cooperative effort to utilize adequate and standardized security measures is a very positive indication of the progress that is possible.

(U) Additional steps are being taken to improve security at U.S. ports. (See Addendum, Item 7). The IMO measures are being adopted by several ports and additional security plans are being considered. In another significant development, some ports are incorporating new security measures when they modernize passenger facilities. (See Addendum, Section 8 for further information).

(U) PASSENGER VESSEL SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

(U) Port security and vessel security are closely linked. In those ports where infrequent cruise ship calls are made it would not be cost effective to expend large amounts of funds or dedicate large amounts of resources to terminal security. The passenger vessel cruise lines have, as a supplement to shore-side measures, taken the initiative to utilize their own shipboard security resources in these types of ports. For example, some cruise lines provide dockside security personnel in ports that can not afford them. This coordination has continued to increase since the ACHILLE LAURO incident and has resulted in a greater degree of vessel-supplemented facility security.

(U) The formation of the security committees in the Ports of New York, Miami, and Los Angeles is significant in that the corporate offices of most of the cruise lines which call at U.S. ports are located in one or

more of these cities. The committees allow the cruise line industry to become self regulating in that they may determine, by a majority consensus, what additional security measures to take and then apply pressure to their members to adopt the agreed upon standards. Information received from these committees indicates that a majority of companies are working to come into compliance with the IMO security measures. Additional time will be needed to bring all cruise line companies into the fold and to judge the results. (See Addendum, paragraph 9 for details).

IV. (U) FOREIGN PORT SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

(U) In keeping with Section 907 of P.L. 99-399, DOT developed a plan (in consultation with the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) of DOS and based on the IMO measures) to assess the effectiveness of security measures maintained at selected foreign ports. (See Appendix 4).

(U) The requirement to conduct foreign port security surveys was forwarded to DSS embassy security officers assigned to major American embassies throughout the world. Embassy security officers in the Caribbean area were asked to survey the ports and report their findings. This region was surveyed first because it attracts a large number of American cruise line passengers during the height of the winter travel season. This is the initial segment of what will be a world-wide requirement for DSS embassy security officers. Mediterranean ports will be surveyed next to coincide with the summer travel season.

(U) Some surveys have not yet been received. Those returned by DSS security officers are reviewed by the DSS Overseas Support Programs unit and forwarded to the Department of Transportation. (See Addendum, paragraph 10 for results).

(U) The level of risk at Caribbean ports should be reduced by Government action and cruise line companies as they implement the IMO measures. The Departments of Transportation and State will be working with foreign governments and cruise line companies to correct identified deficiencies and will offer, where appropriate and feasible, training and technical assistance to accomplish this objective.

(U) The Department of Transportation has, as of this time, not recommended to the Department of State that a Travel Advisory be issued because no condition has been identified that "...threatens the safety or security of passengers, passenger vessels or crew traveling to or from a foreign port...." (Section 908 of P.L. 99-399.)

V. (U) IMPLEMENTATION OF IMO MEASURES BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES

(U) No formal report has been issued to date by the IMO that indicates which security measures have been implemented by other governments. The IMO measures are very new and some countries will be slower to implement them than others due to inadequate resources or a lack of expertise. Interest in the measures has been expressed to U.S. delegations in bilateral discussions on maritime security with flag states such as Greece, Norway, and the Netherlands. Non-flag states and ports such as Canada and Barbados are also interested. It is expected that, at the minimum, most IMO member countries will implement the measures most applicable to their own security needs. When this is accomplished in the next several years, maritime security will be greatly enhanced worldwide.

(U) In the meantime, the Departments of State and Transportation will continue their mandate under P.L. 99-399 to enhance and encourage improvements in maritime security both at home and abroad. Training and technical assistance will continue to be offered to port operators and vessel owners. Diligent observation of foreign and domestic ports will be maintained to ensure U.S. cruise line passengers the safest journeys possible.

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION

4 ALBERT EMBANKMENT,
LONDON SE1 7SR

Telephone: 01-735 7811

Telegrams: INTERMAR: LONDON SE1

Telex: 23588



IMO

MSC/Circ.443

26 September 1986

Ref.T1/13.01

MEASURES TO PREVENT UNLAWFUL ACTS
AGAINST PASSENGERS AND CREWS ON BOARD SHIPS

At its fifty-third session (MSC 53/24, paragraph 17.3), the Maritime Safety Committee approved the measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships (MSC 53/24, annex 14), the text of which is attached hereto.

These measures are intended to assist Member Governments when reviewing and strengthening, as necessary, port and onboard security in accordance with resolution A.584(14). Member Governments are requested to bring the measures to the attention of concerned organizations and interested parties.

* * *

ANNEX 14

MEASURES TO PREVENT UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST
PASSENGERS AND CREWS ON BOARD SHIPS

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Assembly resolution A.584(14) directed that internationally agreed measures should be developed, on a priority basis, by the Maritime Safety Committee to ensure the security of passengers and crews on board ships and authorized the Maritime Safety Committee to request the Secretary-General to issue a circular containing information on the agreed measures to governments, organizations concerned and interested parties for their consideration and adoption.

1.2 The text of Assembly resolution A.584(14) is attached at appendix 1.

2 Definitions

For the purpose of these measures:

- .1 DESIGNATED AUTHORITY means the organization or organizations or the administration or administrations identified by or within the Government as responsible for ensuring the development, implementation and maintenance of port facility security plans or flag State ship security plans, or both.
- .2 PORT FACILITY means a location within a port at which commercial maritime activities occur affecting ships covered by these measures.
- .3 PASSENGER TERMINAL means any area within the port facility which is used for the assembling, processing, embarking and disembarking of passengers and baggage.

- .4 PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN means a comprehensive written plan for a port facility which identifies, inter alia, regulations, programmes, measures and procedures necessary to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the passengers and crews on board ships.
- .5 PORT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER means the person in a port responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of the port facility security plan and for liaison with the ships' security officers.
- .6 OPERATOR means the company or representative of the company which maintains operational control over the ship while at sea or dockside.
- .7 SHIP SECURITY PLAN means a written plan developed under the authority of the operator to ensure the application of measures on board ship which are designed to prevent unlawful acts which threaten passengers and crews on board ships.
- .8 OPERATOR SECURITY OFFICER^{*} means the person designated by the operator to develop and maintain the ship security plan and liaise with the port facility security officer.
- .9 SHIP SECURITY OFFICER^{*} means the master or the person on board the ship responsible to the master and operator for on-board security, including implementation and maintenance of the ship security plan and for liaison with the port facility security officer.

* The operator security officer functions may be assigned to the ship security officer on board the ship.

3 General provisions

3.1 Governments, port authorities, administrations, shipowners, operators, shipmasters and crews should take all appropriate measures against unlawful acts threatening passengers and crews on board ships. The measures implemented should take into account the current assessment of the likely threat together with local conditions and circumstances.

3.2 It is desirable that there be appropriate legislation or regulations which, inter alia, could provide penalties for persons gaining or attempting to gain unauthorized access to the port facility and persons committing unlawful acts against passengers or crews on board ships. Governments should review their national legislation, regulations and guidance to determine their adequacy to maintain security on board ships.

3.3 The measures contained in this document are intended for application to passenger ships engaged on international voyages^{*} of 24 hours or more and the port facilities which serve them. Certain of these measures may, however, also be appropriate for application to other ships or port facilities if the circumstances so warrant.

3.4 Governments should identify a designated authority responsible to ensure the development, implementation and maintenance of ship and port facility security plans. The designated authority should co-ordinate with other relevant domestic agencies to ensure that specific roles and functions of other agencies and departments are agreed and implemented.

* Voyages include all segmented voyages.

3.5 Governments should notify the Secretary-General of progress made in the implementation of security measures. Any useful information, which might assist other governments in their implementation of measures, on any difficulties and problems which arose and were overcome during implementation of the security measures, should be forwarded with the notification. The designated authority should co-operate with similar authorities of other governments in the exchange of appropriate information.

3.6 Governments concerned with an act of unlawful interference should provide the Organization with all pertinent information concerning the security aspects of the act of unlawful interference as soon as practicable after the act is resolved. Further information and a reporting format is given in appendix 2.

3.7 In the process of implementing these measures, all efforts should be made to avoid undue interference with passenger services and take into account applicable international conventions.

3.8 Governments and port authorities should ensure the application of these measures to ships in a fair manner.

4 Port facility security plan

4.1 Each port facility should develop and maintain an appropriate port facility security plan adequate for local circumstances and conditions and adequate for the anticipated maritime traffic and the number of passengers likely to be involved.

4.2 The port facility security plan should provide for measures and equipment as necessary to prevent weapons or any other dangerous devices, the carriage of which is not authorized, from being introduced by any means whatsoever on board ships.

4.3 The port facility security plan should establish measures for the prevention of unauthorized access to the ship and to restricted areas of the passenger terminal.

4.4 The port facility security plan should provide for the evaluation, before they are employed, of all persons responsible for any aspect of security.

4.5 A port facility security officer should be appointed for each port facility. The port facility security plan should identify the security officer for that port facility.

4.6 The responsibilities of the port facility security officer should include, but not be limited to:

- .1 conducting an initial comprehensive security survey in order to prepare a port facility security plan, and thereafter regular subsequent security inspections of the port facility to ensure continuation of appropriate security measures;
- .2 implementing the port facility security plan;
- .3 recommending modifications to the port facility security plan to correct deficiencies and satisfy the security requirements of the individual port facility;
- .4 encouraging security awareness and vigilance;
- .5 ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for security;
- .6 maintaining records of occurrences of unlawful acts which affect the operations of the port facility;
- .7 co-ordinating implementation of the port facility security plan with the competent operator security officers; and
- .8 co-ordinating with other national and international security services, as appropriate.

4.7 Security measures and procedures should be applied at passenger terminals in such a manner as to cause a minimum of interference with, or delay to, passenger services, taking into account the ship security plan.

5 Ship security plan

5.1 A ship security plan should be developed for each ship. The plan should be sufficiently flexible to take into account the level of security reflected in the port facility security plan for each port at which the ship intends to call.

5.2 The ship security plan should include measures and equipment as necessary to prevent weapons or any other dangerous devices, the carriage of which is not authorized, from being introduced by any means whatsoever on board a ship.

5.3 The ship security plan should establish measures for the prevention of unauthorized access to the ship and to restricted areas on board.

5.4 A ship security officer should be appointed on each ship. The ship security plan should identify the ship security officer.

5.5 The operator security officer should be responsible for, but not be limited to:

- .1 conducting an initial comprehensive security survey and thereafter regular subsequent inspections of the ship;
- .2 developing and maintaining the ship security plan;
- .3 modifying the ship security plan to correct deficiencies and satisfy the security requirements of the individual ship;
- .4 encouraging security awareness and vigilance;
- .5 ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for security;
and
- .6 co-ordinating implementation of the ship security plan with the competent port facility security officer.

5.6 The ship security officer should be responsible for, but not limited to:

- .1 regular inspections of the ship;
- .2 implementing and maintaining the ship security plan;
- .3 proposing modifications to the ship security plan to correct deficiencies and satisfy the security requirements of the ship;
- .4 encouraging security awareness and vigilance on board;
- .5 ensuring that adequate training has been provided for personnel responsible for security;
- .6 reporting all occurrences or suspected occurrences of unlawful acts to the port facility security officer and ensuring that the report is forwarded, through the master, to the operator for submission to the ship's flag State's designated authority; and
- .7 co-ordinating implementation of the ship security plan with the competent port facility security officer.

6 Annexes

The annexes attached hereto contain information which may be useful when developing or improving security measures.

APPENDIX 1

RESOLUTION A.584(14)
adopted on 20 November 1985

MEASURES TO PREVENT UNLAWFUL ACTS WHICH THREATEN
THE SAFETY OF SHIPS AND THE SECURITY
OF THEIR PASSENGERS AND CREWS

THE ASSEMBLY,

RECALLING Article 1 and Article 15(j) of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization concerning the purposes of the Organization and the functions of the Assembly in relation to regulations and guidelines concerning maritime safety,

NOTING with great concern the danger to passengers and crews resulting from the increasing number of incidents involving piracy, armed robbery and other unlawful acts against or on board ships, including small craft, both at anchor and under way,

RECALLING resolution A.545(13) which urged action to initiate a series of measures to combat acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships and small craft at sea,

RECOGNIZING the need for the Organization to assist in the formulation of internationally agreed technical measures to improve security and reduce the risk to the lives of passengers and crews on board ships,

1. CALLS UPON all Governments, port authorities and administrations, shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters and crews to take, as soon as possible, steps to review and, as necessary, strengthen port and on-board security;

2. DIRECTS the Maritime Safety Committee, in co-operation with other committees, as required, to develop, on a priority basis, detailed and practical technical measures, including both shoreside and shipboard measures, which may be employed by Governments, port authorities and administrations, shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters and crews to ensure the security of passengers and crews on board ships;

3. INVITES the Maritime Safety Committee to take note of the work of the International Civil Aviation Organization in the development of standards and recommended practices for airport and aircraft security;

4. AUTHORIZES the Maritime Safety Committee to request the Secretary-General to issue a circular containing information on the measures developed by the Committee to Governments, organizations concerned and interested parties for their consideration and adoption.

APPENDIX 2

REPORTS OF UNLAWFUL ACTS

1 To safeguard maritime interests against unlawful acts which threaten the security of passengers and crews on board ships, reports on incidents and the measures taken to prevent their recurrence should be provided to the Organization as soon as possible by the flag and port state, as appropriate. This information will be utilized in updating or revising these agreed measures, as necessary.

2 Use of the following report format is recommended for conveying information for such purposes:

REPORT ON AN UNLAWFUL ACT

Date: _____

1 SHIP OR PORT AREA DESCRIPTION;

NAME OF SHIP _____

FLAG _____

MASTER _____

PORT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER _____

2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT OR THREAT

DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF INCIDENT OR THREAT _____

3 NUMBER OF ALLEGED OFFENDERS:

PASSENGER _____ CREW _____ OTHER _____

4 METHOD UTILIZED TO INTRODUCE DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES OR DEVICES INTO THE
PORT FACILITY OR SHIP

PERSONS _____;

BAGGAGE: _____ CARGO: _____ SHIP STORES: _____ OTHER: _____

5 TYPE OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES OR DEVICES USED, WITH FULL DESCRIPTION:

WEAPON -

EXPLOSIVES -

OTHER -

6 a) WHERE WERE THE ITEMS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 5 ABOVE CONCEALED, IF KNOWN?

b) HOW WERE THE ITEMS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 5 ABOVE USED AND WHERE?

c) HOW WERE THE SECURITY MEASURES CIRCUMVENTED?

7 WHAT MEASURES AND PROCEDURES ARE RECOMMENDED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF A SIMILAR EVENT?

8 OTHER PERTINENT DETAILS:
