

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Counterterrorism and Narcotics, Office
of, NSC: Records
Folder Title: Colombia (1)
Box: RAC Box 5

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Counterterror and Narcotics

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

McNamara Thomas C. Files

Collection: COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS

Archivist: smf

NSC OFFICE OF RECORDS

File Folder: Columbia (1)

Date: 10/3/96

Ted McNamara NSC Staff Box 92258 RAC Box 5

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. summary	re: Colombia; ELN Threat (1 p., partial)	10/14/88	P1 BZ
2. cable	cable #292344Z (1 p.)	8/29/88	P1
3. cable	cable #232229Z (1 p.)	8/23/88	P1
4. cable	cable #232309Z (2 pp.) D 6/15/88 NLSF94-091 #72	5/23/88	P1
5. cable	cable #231806Z (2 pp.) D 6/15/88 #77	5/23/88	P1
6. cable	cable #202011Z (5 pp.)	5/23/88	P1
7. cable	cable #140004Z (7 pp.)	5/20/88	P1
8. cable	cable #191513Z (3 pp.)	5/20/88	P1
9. cable	cable #2021072Z (4 pp.) D 6/15/88 #77	5/20/88	P1
10. cable	cable #070033Z (1 p., partial; 2 pp. closed in full) P 4/22/99 NLSF94-091	5/7/88	P1
11. cable	cable #070122Z (2 pp.) P 4/22/99 NLSF94-091	5/7/88	P1 F9
12. cable	cable #062143Z (2 pp.) D 6/15/88 #80	5/6/88	P1
13. cable	Page 2, cable #032318Z (1 p., partial)	5/3/88	P1
14. cable	cable #021020Z (1 p.) P 4/22/99 NLSF94-091	5/2/88	P1
15. cable	cable #291934Z (1 p.) D 6/15/88 #83	4/29/88	P1
16. cable	cable (1 p.) D 6/15/88 #84	4/28/88	P1
17. cable	cable #260041Z (4 pp.)	4/26/88	P1
18. cable	cable #251912Z (2 pp.) R 4/22/99 NLSF94-091	4/25/88	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS,
NSC OFFICE OF: RECORDS

Archivist: smf

File Folder: Columbia (1)

Date: 9/27/96

Ted McNamara NSC Staff Box 92258 RAC BOX 5

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
49. cable	cable #210917Z (3 pp.)	4/25/88	P1
	A 4/22/99 NLSA 94-091		
20. cable	cable #251831Z (2 pp.)	4/25/88	P1
	A 4/22/99 NLSA 94-091		

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~Secret~~

B2

~~ICTED~~

~~ICTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~ICTED~~

B1

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~ICTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~ICTED~~

DIADIT 199-1 as of 1500 EDT 13 Oct 88

B2

14 Oct 88

Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary

Page 1

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS #94-091#69

By CIS DATE, Date 1/6/06

~~Secret~~

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING

Department of State

PAGE 01 BOGOTA 13078 292343Z 9975 SSO4890
29/2353Z

INFO SSO-01 MR-01 /002 A4 DTD

ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W

-----150112 292347Z /70

O 292344Z AUG 88

FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9240

~~SECRET~~ BOGOTA 13078

~~EXDTS SECRET SPECAT EXDTS~~

POISON PROMISE MESSAGE

DELIVER TO POISON PROMISE FOCAL POINT OFFICER ONLY;
SECSTATE FOR S/CT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, CO

SUBJECT: FUNDAMENTAL LIGHTNING IV: PLANNING MEETINGS

REF: A) BOGOTA 12984, B) BOGOTA 12039

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. COUNTRY CLEARANCE APPROVED FOR IAWG TEAM MEMBERS
GARY CHAFIN S/CT AND COL. TOM KUSTER DOD/SO/LIC.

3. HOTEL RESERVATIONS FOR LOS URAPANES CONFIRMED FOR
ONE NIGHT, 6 SEPTEMBER.

4. FLIGHT AND HOTEL RESERVATIONS TO COMMAND POST
EXERCISE SITE WILL BE MADE AS SOON AS GOC REACHES FINAL
AGREEMENT ON EXERCISE SITE. (SEE REFTEL B).

5. GOC CONCERNS REGARDING SECURITY IN THE BUCARAMANGA
AREA ARE NOT NEW. THIS AREA HAS ALWAYS SUFFERED A HIGH
DEGREE OF GUERRILLA RELATED VIOLENCE, BUT THIS HAS BEEN
EXACERBATED IN THE LAST MONTH. AS WE REPORTED IN REFTEL
A, THE SITUATION IN BUCARAMANGA HAS DETERIORATED TO A
STATE IN WHICH GUERRILLAS OPENLY WAR AGAINST THE POLICE,
ARMY AND PARAMILITARY GROUPS, WHILE POLICE AND ARMY
ATTACK AN ASSORTMENT OF GUERRILLA UNITS AND PARAMILITARY
GROUPS. THE PARAMILITARY GROUPS IN TURN ATTACK THE
GUERRILLAS, THE UNIONS AND LEFTIST GROUPS. BY MID
AUGUST, VIOLENCE HAD REACHED THE LEVEL WHERE STREETS
WERE VIRTUALLY DESERTED, LOCAL TRANSPORTATION UNIONS
WERE THREATENING STRIKE, AND MOURNERS WERE OBLIGED TO
ATTEND FUNERALS IN ARMORED CARS. NEVERTHELESS, IT
SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS GENERALIZED VIOLENCE HAS NOT
SO FAR BEEN DIRECTED AT US INTERESTS OR PERSONNEL.
NEVERTHELESS, IT IS ONLY A REASONABLE PRECAUTION TO
LIMIT HIGHLY VISIBLE US PRESENCE, PARTICULARLY IN
CONNECTION WITH AN ANTI-TERRORIST EXERCISE, TO A SECURE,
GUARDED MILITARY RESERVE. THIS RECOMMENDATION WOULD
APPLY TO ALMOST ANY DEPARTMENT LEVEL EXERCISE SITE, AND
WAS STRONGLY RECOMMENDED BY RSO WHEN POST EVALUATED GOC
SITE PROPOSALS INITIALLY. THIS IS JUST COMMON SENSE
RISK REDUCTION, ESPECIALLY AS THE VALUE OF THE EXERCISE
IS IN NO WAY ENHANCED BY PUTTING CONTROLLERS AND
PARTICIPANTS IN UNNECESSARY DANGER.

6. IN ADDITION, GENERAL BARRIOS HAS FURTHER SUGGESTED
THAT THE SITE BE MOVED ENTIRELY TO THE MORE SECURE CALI
AREA. WHILE WE BELIEVE, AS POINTED OUT IN REFTEL A,
THAT BARRIOS IS PRIMARILY MOTIVATED BY INTER AGENCY
RIVALRY AND EGO ENHANCEMENT, HE NEVERTHELESS JUSTIFIED

PAGE 01 BOGOTA 13078 292343Z 9975 SSO4890

HIS RECOMMENDED SITE CHANGE ON SECURITY GROUNDS.
BARRIOS DID NOT, HOWEVER, STATE THAT THE BUCARAMANGA
MILITARY SITE WOULD BE UNSAFE FOR PARTICIPANTS AND
CONTROLLERS, BUT RATHER THAT THE FIFTH BRIGADE
HEADQUARTERS IN BUCARAMANGA IS TOO OCCUPIED IN ACTUAL
ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS TO EITHER PARTICIPATE IN OR
HOST THE EXERCISE. MILITARY FACILITIES, AT THE BRIGADE
HEADQUARTERS LEVEL, ARE ROUGHLY EQUAL AT BOTH SITES.
GILLESPIE

BK

RB

SA

Phi
Columbia

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F94-091 #70

BY any NARA, DATE 4/22/99

21 CT
PM/ISP
ARC/AND
6 CHAFIN

ALERT COPY

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE
AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

S/S-U
INCOMING

Department of State

PAGE 01 BOGOTA 12728 232235Z 0372 SS09888
-----23/2254Z
INFO MR-01 SSOA-01 /002 A4 PRS

ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SSO-00 /000 W
-----171025 232244Z /60

O 232229Z AUG 88
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9080
INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM IMMEDIATE
COMSOUTH QUARRY HEIGHTS PM IMMEDIATE
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC PRIORITY
CDR3DBN7THSFGP FORT DAVIS PM PRIORITY
USARSO FT CLAYTON PM PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~ BOGOTA 12728

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~EXDIS~~
POTENT EAGLE MESSAGE

DELIVER TO POTENT EAGLE FOCAL POINT OFFICER ONLY;
SECSTATE FOR S/CT; CIA FOR CTC/TRG, LA/VCEP/C; SECDEF
FOR SO/LIC, ISA/IA; USCINCSO FOR SOCSE; COMSOUTH
FOR SOCSO-CO; COMJSOC FOR J5; JCS FOR J3-SOD;

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, CO

SUBJECT: PLANNING MEETING WITH COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS FOR FUNDAMENTAL LIGHTNING IV

L. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY FOCAL POINT OFFICER AND SOUTHCOM ADVANCE
PARTY MET WITH COLOMBIAN VICE MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT
DR. FERNANDO BRITTO AND SUB-SECRETARY OF THE
PRESIDENCY DR. RODOLFO URIBE ON AUGUST 18, 1988 TO
PLAN PRELIMINARY PHASES OF FUNDAMENTAL LIGHTNING IV
EXERCISE.

3. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE DISCUSSED AND AGREED UPON:

A. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS TO FORMULATE COMMAND POST
EXERCISE WILL TAKE PLACE SEPTEMBER 8-10 IN
BUCARAMANGA. SIMULTANEOUSLY, ORIENTATION IN CRISIS
MANAGEMENT THEORY WILL BE OFFERED TO COLOMBIAN
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS AT THE DEPARTMENT
LEVEL WHO WILL BE PARTICIPATING IN THE EXERCISE BUT
HAVE HAD NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN THE FIELD.

B. ACTUAL COMMAND POST EXERCISE WILL BE HELD
SEPTEMBER 23-25, IN BUCARAMANGA. BECAUSE OF THE HIGH
LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN BUCARAMANGA RECENTLY, THE GOC
RECOMMENDS THAT THE ENTIRE EXERCISE TAKE PLACE ON A
CONTROLLED MILITARY INSTALLATION.

C. COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT WILL PROVIDE SECURITY AND
GROUND TRANSPORTATION IN BUCARAMANGA DURING BOTH THE
SEPTEMBER 8-10 PRELIMINARY SESSIONS AND THE SEPTEMBER
23-25 COMMAND POST EXERCISE.

D. USG OFFICIALS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR
TRANSPORTATION FROM BOGOTA-BUCARAMANGA-BOGOTA.

E. COLOMBIAN CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT WILL NOTIFY MILITARY
OF THE PROPOSED DATES.

4. IF THE ABOVE PROPOSED DATES ARE AGREEABLE TO ALL
AGENCIES INVOLVED, THE EXERCISE SCHEDULE WILL BE AS
FOLLOWS:

--SEPT 6 - INTER-AGENCY PLANNING MEETING
--SEPT 7 - DEPART FOR BUCARAMANGA
--SEPT 8/9 - EXERCISE PLANNING MEETING
--SEPT 10 - RETURN BOGOTA.
GILLESPIE

BK ✓
RB ✓
SA *

Φ Columbia

2.

S/CT
PM/ISP
ARA/AND

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F94-091 #71

BY amf NARA, DATE 4/22/99

ALERT COPY

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE
AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

<DIST>SIT: TAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED<OSRI> RUEHBO<DTG> 271408Z JUN 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
<TO>TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7517

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: RECENT KIDNAPPING OF US CITIZENS IN COLOMBIA

<TEXT>

UNCLAS BOGOTA 09670

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: CASC, PTER, PREL, ASEC, CO

SUBJECT: RECENT KIDNAPPING OF US CITIZENS IN COLOMBIA

REF: MCLEAN/LEMAY TEL CON JUNE 27, 1988

1. EMBASSY RECALLS 15 US CITIZENS BEING KIDNAPPED OR HELD HOSTAGE IN 10 INCIDENTS IN RECENT YEARS. THE FOLLOWING LIST WAS COMPILED FROM CONSULAR FILES AND EMPLOYEES' MEMORIES. THE LIST MAY BE INCOMPLETE BECAUSE FILES ARE REGULARLY DESTROYED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS. THE CITIZENS EMERGENCY CENTER IN BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS MAY HAVE RECORD OF OTHER INCIDENTS.

(A) FEBRUARY 1980- US AMBASSADOR DIEGO ASECIO HELD HOSTAGE WITH GROUP OF OTHER AMBASSADORS FOR ABOUT 3 MONTHS.

(B) SPRING 1980- RICHARD STAR - PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER KIDNAPPED IN BOGOTA- RETURNED ALIVE, DETAILS UNKNOWN.

(C) FALL 1980- SUMMER INSTITUTE OF LINGUISTICS MISSIONARY KIDNAPPED--KILLED IN MARCH 1981 IN BOGOTA: KIDNAPPERS SAID TO HAVE BELIEVED HE WAS CIA.

(D) MARCH 1982- JOYCE HOLMES AND TIMOTHY WELCH DISAPPEARED IN GUERRILLA TERRITORY, POSSIBLY KIDNAPPED, PRESUMED DEAD.

(E) APRIL 1983- CATHERINE KIRBY - KIDNAPPED AT HER RANCH IN META (A RURAL DEPARTMENT OF COLOMBIA)- KIDNAPPERS WERE A GUERRILLA GROUP. RELEASED UNARMED NOVEMBER 1983.

(F) FALL 1983- RUSSELL MARTIN STENDAL ALSO KIDNAPPED IN META, PROBABLY BY SAME GROUP THAT TOOK MRS. KIRBY - RELEASED UNHARMED AFTER TWO OR THREE MONTHS.

(G) FALL 1985- THREE NEW TRIBES MISSIONARIES KIDNAPPED BY PERSONS NEVER IDENTIFIED: HELD AT LEAST TWO MONTHS AND THEN RELEASED.

(H) DECEMBER 1985- EDWARD SOHL AND JOSH GEDDES (BECHTEL AND FLUOR EMPLOYEES) TAKEN BY EPL. IN JUNE 1986 MR. SOHL DIED PRESUMABLY FROM DISSENTERY AND COMPLICATIONS. GEDDES WAS RELEASED JUNE 1986 AFTER PAYMENT OF RANSOM.

(I) OCTOBER 1987- STEPHEN KONEMAN AND JASON MCLACHLAN DISAPPEARED IN RIVER PUTUMAYO REGION- BELIEVED KIDNAPPED BY UNIDENTIFIED GROUP OF GUERRILLAS, STILL IN CAPTIVITY.

(J) 24 JUNE 1988- IACOPO GAMBINI, EMPLOYEE OF

Φ Colombia

GENERAL PIPE SERVICES, KIDNAPPED IN SAVANNA DE
TORRESBY BY GROUP OF GUERRILLAS CLAIMING TO BE
ELN- STILL IN CAPTIVITY.
GILLESPIE

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 9670<STOR> 880628103445 MSG000204806085
<TOR>880628105933



'88 JUN -4 912 14

8813137 - NSC-

United States Department of Defense

Washington, D.C. 20315

June 04, 1988

Randy

AS
EX

DIST:
D
P
C
S/S
S/S-S
PM
TMA
TMB
IA
RF:rw

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Non-Reimbursable Detail of Mr. Rand Beers

The Executive Resources Board has approved the non-reimbursable detail of SES member Mr. Rand Beers for a period of one year to the National Security Council. The effective date will be June 6, 1988.

Melvyn Levitsky
Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

PER/CCA:PBurton:pry
X76972 Doc#0380A 06/03/88

Clearance: PER/CCA:SDeane

<DIST>SIT: VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL<OSRI> RUEHC #<DTG> 240154Z MAY 88
<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC
<TO>TO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 0000
RUMJRC/AMEMBASSY RANGOON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBH/AMEMBASSY NASSAU IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA CITY IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUDKST/AMEMBASSY SOFIA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION IMMEDIATE 0000
RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BELIZE IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN IMMEDIATE 0000

<SUBJ>SUBJECT:NARCOTICS UPDATE TO AMBASSADORS

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *sub 7/29/86*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 165759

VIENNA FOR UNVIE PASS TO PAOS

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SNAR

SUBJECT:NARCOTICS UPDATE TO AMBASSADORS

1. THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMMITTEE (NNICC) REPORT WAS RECENTLY RELEASED. THIS REPORT REPRESENTS A COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO COLLECT, ANALYSE, DISSEMINATE AND EVALUATE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC STRATEGIC DRUG-RELATED INTELLIGENCE. THE 1987 NNICC REPORT WAS PREPARED AND APPROVED BY THE COAST GUARD, CUSTOMS SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, FBI, INS, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, WHITE HOUSE DRUG ABUSE OFFICE AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
2. THE FOLLOWING ARE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS PERTAINING TO THE 1987 NNICC REPORT, PROVIDED TO YOU AS BACKGROUND.
3. Q. WHAT COUNTRIES WERE THE LEADING PRODUCERS OF MARIJUANA AVAILABLE IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1987? A: MEXICO (3100-4200 METRIC TONS); COLOMBIA (2300-6600 METRIC TONS) AND THE UNITED STATES (3000-3500 METRIC TONS).
4. Q. A NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE (NIDA) SPONSORED

SURVEY FOUND A CONTINUATION OF THE DOWNWARD TREND OF MARIJUANA USE AMONG HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS. WHAT WERE SOME OF THE FINDINGS? A. THE PROPORTION OF SENIORS WHO USED MARIJUANA DAILY DECLINED FROM 10.7 PERCENT AT ITS PEAK IN 1978 TO 3.3 PERCENT IN 1987. THE PROPORTION OF SENIORS PERCEIVING QUOTE GREAT RISK UNQUOTE IN REGULARLY SMOKING MARIJUANA INCREASED FROM 34.9 PERCENT IN 1978 TO 73.5 PERCENT IN 1987.

5. Q. COCAINE WAS READILY AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES IN 1987. WAS THERE AN INCREASE FROM 1986 TO 1987 IN THE NUMBER OF COCAINE RELATED HOSPITAL EMERGENCIES REPORTED BY DAWN? A. THE PROJECTED INCREASE (BASED ON FIGURES FOR NINE MONTHS OF 1987) WAS MORE THAN SIXTY PERCENT.

6. Q. THE NIDA SPONSORED SURVEY ALSO FOUND A DOWNWARD TREND OF COCAINE USE AMONG HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS. WHAT WERE SOME OF THE FINDINGS? A. A DECREASE OF ABOUT ONE THIRD (FROM 6.2 PERCENT TO 4.3 PERCENT) IN THE PROPORTION OF HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS WHO HAD USED COCAINE AT LEAST ONCE IN THE PAST MONTH. THE PERCENTAGE OF HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS WHO PERCEIVED GREAT RISK ASSOCIATED WITH INGESTING COCAINE EVEN ONCE OR TWICE INCREASED FROM 34 PERCENT TO 48 PERCENT IN 1987.

7. Q. LABORATORIES IN COLOMBIA PRODUCED MOST OF THE COCAINE HCL THAT WAS EXPORTED TO THE UNITED STATES. WHAT COUNTRIES WERE THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCERS OF COCA LEAVES AND COCAINE PASTE AND BASE USED FOR CONVERSION TO COCAINE HCL? A. PERU AND BOLIVIA.

8. Q. INDICATORS OF THE AVAILABILITY AND USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS WERE MIXED IN 1987. DESCRIBE THE TRENDS. A. TRAFFICKING AND AVAILABILITY OF METHAMPHETAMINE CONTINUED AT LEVELS ABOVE THOSE IN PREVIOUS YEARS. THE NUMBER OF AMPHETAMINE-RELATED HOSPITAL EMERGENCIES REMAINED RELATIVELY STABLE. THE USE OF DEPRESSANTS DECLINED. HOSPITAL EMERGENCIES INVOLVING PCP AND LSD ROSE IN 1987.

9. Q. CLANDESTINE LABORATORY REMOVALS IN THE UNITED STATES ROSE TO AN ALL-TIME HIGH OF 509 IN FISCAL YEAR 1986. WHAT WAS THE FY 87 FIGURE? A. 682.

10. Q. WHAT DANGEROUS DRUG ACCOUNTED FOR MOST OF THE HOSPITAL EMERGENCIES AND DRUG-RELATED DEATHS IN 1987? A. PCP.

11. Q. WHAT WAS THE RETAIL PURITY OF HEROIN IN 1987? A. STREET-LEVEL PURITY WAS ALMOST 6 PERCENT.

12. Q. HOW SERIOUS WAS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN AIDS AND INTRAVENOUS HEROIN USE? A. IT WAS THE MOST SERIOUS HEALTH ISSUE ASSOCIATED WITH HEROIN. IN 1987, ALMOST ONE-FOURTH OF ALL AIDS CASES INVOLVED INTRAVENOUS DRUG USERS WHO TRANSMITTED THE DISEASE THROUGH BLOOD BY THE SHARING OF NEEDLES/SYRINGES.

13. Q. HEROIN IN THE UNITED STATES WAS MADE FROM OPIUM PRODUCED IN THREE AREAS OF THE WORLD--SOUTHEAST ASIA, SOUTHWEST ASIA AND MEXICO. HOW MUCH OPIUM WAS PRODUCED IN EACH AREA IN 1987? A. SOUTHEAST ASIA: 1095-1575 METRIC TONS; SOUTHWEST ASIA: 735-1360 METRIC TONS; MEXICO: 45-55 METRIC TONS.

14. Q. THE RETAIL PRICE OF HEROIN (PER MG PURE) DURING THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF 1987 WAS ABOUT DOLS 2.00. HOW DOES THIS COMPARE WITH OTHER YEARS? A. 1985: DOLS 2.30; 1986: DOLS 2.12.

15. Q. WHAT AREA IN THE UNITED STATES CONTINUED TO BE THE

CENTER OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACTIVITIES? A. SOUTH FLORIDA;
MIAMI IN PARTICULAR.

16. Q. WHICH FOREIGN FINANCIAL CENTERS WERE PRIMARY
RECIPIENTS OF DRUG PROCEEDS? A. CARIBBEAN: ANTIGUA,
ANGUILLA, MONTSERAT, CAYMAN ISLANDS; CENTRAL AMERICA:
PANAMA; EUROPE: SWITZERLAND, LUXEMBOURG; MIDDLE EAST:
DUBAI; FAR EAST: HONG KONG. SHULTZ

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 5759<STOR> 880523221519 MSG000201737719
<TOR>880523222516

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4-5 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

23-May-1988 12:28 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

PORTER
MCNAMARA

FROM: VMS MAIL user ADDIS
(ADDIS@VAXC@MRGATE)

SUBJECT: FYI

<PREC> ROUTINE<CLAS>\CONFIDENTIAL<DTG> 202011Z MAY 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU
<SUBJ>SUBJECT: GCOB PRESENTS PLAN FOR JOINT INTERDICTION
STRATEGY

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 03 NASSAU 03051
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: SNAR, PREL, BF, US
SUBJECT: GCOB PRESENTS PLAN FOR JOINT INTERDICTION
STRATEGY
~BEGIN SUMMARY~

1. SUMMARY: THE GCOB HAS SENT US A THREE-STAGE VERY
AMBITIOUS, WELL-RESEARCHED PLAN FOR STEMMING THE FLOW OF
DRUGS THROUGH THE BAHAMAS INTO SOUTH FLORIDA. PHASE ONE
TO BEGIN JULY 1 WOULD INVOLVE USE OF SIX US NAVY FRIGATES
EQUIPPED WITH AIR SEARCH RADAR AND HELICOPTERS TO PATROL
BAHAMIAN AND INTERNATIONAL WATERS FOR 120-180 DAYS WITH
OPBAT TEAMS ABOARD. THE SECOND PHASE, COMMENCING
OCTOBER 1, INVOLVES STATIONING SEVERAL OUT-OF-SERVICE OR
SOON TO BE OUT-OF-SERVICE COAST GUARD VESSELS. THE FINAL
PHASE WOULD HAVE US ESTABLISH ELEVEN PERMANENT BASES
AROUND THE COUNTRY WITH U.S. RESOURCES AND EQUIPMENT AND
JOINT U.S. AND BAHAMIAN PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION, THE GCOB
PROPOSES: A) JOINT BAHAMIAN-DEA CONSPIRACY GROUP AT
~END SUMMARY~

2. NASSAU TO DEVELOP CASES FOR PROSECUTION IN BOTH COUNTRIES
B) OFFERS EVIDENCE, WITNESSES, ETC., FOR A STEPPED-UP
MAJOR CONSPIRACY PROSECUTION PROGRAM IN MIAMI, C) POINTS
TO THE NEED TO BETTER CONTROL SOUTH FLORIDA WATERWAYS,
D) REITERATES THE NEED FOR A PRISONER EXCHANGE AGREEMENT,
E) OFFERS FACILITIES FOR ANOTHER QUOTE CITATION UNQUOTE
TYPE AIRCRAFT BASED IN BAHAMAS, F) RECOMMENDS U.S.

NLS F94-09L #24

BY smf NARA, DIT. 4/22/99

STRUCTURED AERIAL PATROLS USING CONFISCATED AIRCRAFT AND G) INVITES FAA TO COME INSPECT U.S. REGISTERED AIRCRAFT ILLEGALLY MODIFIED FOR SMUGGLING PURPOSES WITH A VIEW TO THEIR SEIZURE BY THE GCOB. THE PLAN IS VERY HEAVY ON NEW U.S. MATERIEL AND PERSONNEL COMMITMENTS AND LIGHT ON GCOB ADDITIONAL RESOURCES (BEYOND SOME ADDED MANPOWER). EMBASSY WILL HAVE FURTHER COMMENT ON THE PROPOSALS, BUT WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE INPUT FROM ADDRESSEE AND COORDINATED GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON. END SUMMARY.

2. ON WEDNESDAY EVENING WE RECEIVED FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL ADDERLEY A QUOTE PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL UNQUOTE ADVANCE COPY FOR THE QUOTE AMBASSADOR'S PERSONAL INFORMATION ONLY QUOTE OF THE GCOB'S JOINT STRATEGY PLAN FOR STEMMING FLOW OF DRUGS THROUGH THE BAHAMAS. THE OFFICIAL VERSION IS TO BE SENT TO US VIA THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. ON THURSDAY IN A PUBLIC ADDRESS, PRIME MINISTER PINDLING ANNOUNCED THAT THE BAHAMIAN PLAN HAD BEEN DELIVERED TO THE U.S. THE FIFTEEN PAGE WELL-RESEARCHED AND WELL-PREPARED DOCUMENT IS OBVIOUSLY THE PRODUCT OF ADDERLEY'S AMERICAN ADVISER (OBVIOUS BY NOT ONLY ITS CONTENT BUT ITS AMERICAN VS. BAHAMIAN/BRITISH ENGLISH). THE FIRST SEVEN PAGES SET THE SCENE BY DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND ANALYZING THE SEIZURES IN 1987 AS LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE STRATEGY. THE PRODUCT SHOWS VERY DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF U.S. RESOURCES. COPIES OF THE DOCUMENT ARE BEING SENT TO DEPARTMENT (ARA/CAR AND INM). IMMEDIATE RESPONSE (PHASE 1)

3. THE IMMEDIATE RESPONSE PHASE OF THE PROPOSED PLAN CALLS FOR A JULY 1 START-UP DATE FOR A 120 TO 180 DAY OPERATION. IT CALLS FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF SIX U.S. NAVY OLIVER HAZARD PERRY FFG7 CLASS FRIGATES TO PATROL IN INTERNATIONAL AND BAHAMIAN WATERS. THESE SPECIFIC VESSELS WERE CHOSEN BECAUSE THEY QUOTE HAVE THE BEST AIR SEARCH RADAR SYSTEM AND BEST HELICOPTER PLATFORM, ETC. THE PAPER NOTES THAT THERE ARE 54 OHP/FFG7 CLASS SHIPS, SEVERAL OF WHICH HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO NAVAL RESERVE TRAINING AND THUS COULD BE PHASED INTO THIS ASSIGNMENT. THE PAPER FURTHER SPECIFIES THE AREAS OF THE BAHAMAS WHERE IT WOULD BE BEST TO PATROL. EACH SHIP WOULD COME WITH TWO HELICOPTERS WHICH WOULD CARRY THE NORMAL OPBAT TEAM (TWO STRIKE FORCE AND ONE DEA AGENT).

4. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE VESSELS IS QUOTE TO IMMEDIATE AND DRAMATICALLY INCREASE THE INTERCEPTION OF COCAINE LADDED AIRCRAFT. UNQUOTE. THE PAPER FURTHER SUGGESTS THAT COAST GUARD BEAR AND RELIANCE CLASS CUTTERS, WHICH ARE LESS WELL EQUIPPED THAN THE OHP/FFG7S, COULD OPERATE WITH THE LATTER VESSELS BY FEEDING OFF THEIR RADAR FOR TARGETS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 03 NASSAU 03051
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: SNAR, PREL, BF, US
SUBJECT: GCOB PRESENTS PLAN FOR JOINT INTERDICTION

SMALLER USCG PATROL BOATS OF THE ISLAND, CAPE AND POINT CLASS COULD ALSO OPERATE WITH THE OHP/FFG7S AND FEED OFF THEIR RADAR IN INTERCEPTING AIR DROPS. THE RBDF (BAHAMAS DEFENCE FORCE) 103 AND 109 FOOT CLASS COULD ALSO OPERATE IN THE SAME WAY.

5. THE 46 KNOX FF1052 CLASS AND SIX OF THE TEN GARCIA FF1040 CLASS WHICH ARE EQUIPPED TO CARRY HELICOPTERS AND THE SIX BROOKS FFG1 CLASS ARE ALL SUGGESTED AS ALTERNATIVES IF ALL SIX VESSELS REQUIRED CANNOT COME FROM THE OHP/FFG7 CLASS.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE (PHASE 2)

6. THIS PHASE IS SUGGESTED TO COMMENCE BY OCTOBER 1, 1988. IT WOULD USE FOUR USCG VESSELS WHICH HAVE BEEN LAID UP OR ARE ABOUT TO BE LAID UP, TO SERVE AS STATION SHIPS OR QUOTE TENDERS UNQUOTE TO SUPPORT HELICOPTERS, RBDF AND USCG PATROL BOATS. THE SPECIFIC VESSELS ARE ONE OR BOTH OF THE ICEBREAKERS WESTWIND AND NORTHWIND AND THE CUTTER UTE WMEC 76 AND LIPAN WMEC 85. THE BAHAMIANS ARE ALSO INTERESTED IN THE UNIMAC, INGRAHAM, CHEROKEE AND TAMAROA WHICH THEY UNDERSTAND ARE ALSO ABOUT TO BE PUT OUT OF SERVICE. THE UNIMAC IS IDEAL BECAUSE IT WAS BUILT AS A SEAPLANE AND PT BOAT TENDER. THE GCOB RECOMMENDS EIGHT LOCATIONS WHERE THESE STATION SHIP/TENDERS SHOULD BE LOCATED. THERE ARE U.S. NAVY VESSELS, THE REPORT SAYS THAT COULD ALSO SERVE IN THIS PROGRAM. THEY WOULD SEE THEM MANNED BY U.S. PERSONNEL. AN AIR SEARCH RADAR SHOULD BE INSTALLED ON EACH VESSEL. IN ADDITION TO THE U.S. PERSONNEL MANNING THEM, EACH WOULD HAVE OPBAT TEAMS ABOARD TO RESPOND TO TARGETS. A TWO TO FOUR MEMBER BAHAMIAN POLICE NARCOTICS UNIT TEAM WOULD ALSO BE ASSIGNED TO SUPPORT INTERCEPT OPERATIONS AND DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE AND CONDUCT FOLLOW-UP INVESTIGATIONS.

PERMANENT RESPONSE (PHASE 3)

8. THIS PHASE THE GCOB WOULD LIKE INITIATED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND EVENTUALLY REPLACE THE TWO EARLIER PHASES. IT WOULD INVOLVE ESTABLISHING ELEVEN (VICE THE THREE THAT NOW EXIST) JOINT BASES FOR OPBAT HELICOPTERS, STRIKE FORCE, DEA, COAST GUARD AND RBDF PERSONNEL WITH A COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS CENTER FOR THE OPBAT, PATROL BOAT AND FAST BOAT OPERATIONS. EACH BASE WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH AN AIR SEARCH RADAR MOUNTED ON A TOWER. IT WOULD CONTAIN ALL THE NEEDED SERVICES AND ACCOMMODATION FOR TWO TO THREE WEEKS TDY FOR PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION TO STRIKE FORCE PERSONNEL, FOUR TO SIX CONSTABLES FROM THE BAHAMIAN DRUG ENFORCEMENT UNIT WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO DEVELOP NARCOTIC INTELLIGENCE AND CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS. THE BASES WOULD BE AT: NASSAU, FREEPORT, GEORGE TOWN, MATTHEW TOWN (INAGUA), CLARENCE TOWN (LONG ISLAND), COLONEL HILL (CROKED ISLAND), HAWKS NEST (CAT ISLAND), SPANISH WELLS (ELEUTHERA) R MARSH HARBOUR (ABACO), GUN CAY (BIMINI) AND CAY SAL (A STATION SHIP).

ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES

9. FORMATION OF A JOINT BAHAMIAN POLICE DRUG

ENFORCEMENT UNIT - DEA CONSPIRACY GROUP AT NASSAU TO DEVELOP CASES FOR PROSECUTION OF BOTH MAJOR BAHAMIAN AND SOUTH FLORIDA PARTICIPANTS IN BOTH JURISDICTIONS.

10. THE PAPER RECOMMENDS QUOTE AS URGENT THE NEED TO DEVELOP A STEADY PROGRESSION OF MAJOR NARCOTIC CONSPIRACY PROSECUTIONS AT MIAMI UNQUOTE...OF TRAFFICKERS RESPONSIBLE FOR ORGANIZING THE TRAFFIC THROUGH THE BAHAMAS. THE GCOB STANDS READY TO MAKE ANY EVIDENCE, INFORMATION AND WITNESSES AVAILABLE.

11. THE BAHAMIAN PLAN ALSO NOTES THE NEED FOR BETTER CONTROL OF THE WATERWAYS INTO SOUTH FLORIDA. IT ALSO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 03 OF 03 NASSAU 03051

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SNAR, PREL, BF, US

SUBJECT: GCOB PRESENTS PLAN FOR JOINT INTERDICTION REITERATES THE NEED FOR A PRISONER EXCHANGE AGREEMENT (DUE TO OVERCROWDING HERE). IT OFFERS FACILITIES TO BASE AN AIRCRAFT SUCH AS THE QUOTE CITATION UNQUOTE USED BY U.S. CUSTOMS OUT OF HOMESTEAD AFB IN THE BAHAMAS. IT OFFERS BASES IN THE BAHAMAS FOR QUOTE STRUCTURED AERIAL PATROLS UNQUOTE USING DEA AND U.S. CUSTOMS CONFISCATED AIRCRAFT. (COMMENT: NO MENTION IS MADE OF USE OF BAHAMIAN CONFISCATED AIRCRAFT OR BAHAMIAN RESOURCES.)

12. THE GCOB PAPER NOTES THAT A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT USED IN COCAINE SMUGGLING FROM COLOMBIA ARE BASED IN THE BAHAMAS, JJALLY AT ITS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS. THEY ARE MOSTLY U.S. REGISTERED AND HAVE BEEN ILLEGALLY MODIFIED. MODIFICATIONS ARE NOT YET ILLEGAL UNDER BAHAMIAN LAW, THOUGH A CHANGE IN THE LAW WILL BE PROPOSED. IN THE INTERIM, THEY INVITE FAA INSPECTORS TO COME HERE TO INSPECT FOR AND DECERTIFY ILLEGALLY MODIFIED U.S. REGISTERED AIRCRAFT PARKED AT BAHAMIAN AIRPORTS. THE GCOB WOULD HOLD THE AIRCRAFT UNTIL THE ILLEGAL MODIFICATIONS WERE CORRECTED. IF STEPS WERE NOT TAKEN TO CORRECT THE ILLEGAL MODIFICATIONS WITHIN A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME, THE AIRCRAFT COULD BE CONSIDERED ABANDONED AND BE FORFEITED TO THE GOVERNMENT.

13. THE NEXT SECTION OF THE STRATEGY PLAN POINTS TO WEAKNESS IN OUR COVERAGE OF SPECIFIC AREAS SUCH AS ANDROS, INAGUA AND MAYAGUANA. IT ALSO FAULTS COAST GUARD FOR CONTINUING TO USE QUOTE VENERABLE HH3F PELICAN UNQUOTE IN THE OPBAT PROGRAM. IT SUGGESTS PREFERABLE COAST GUARD HELICOPTERS SUCH AS THE HH65A QUOTE DOLPHIN. UNQUOTE. IT ALSO LAMENTED THE POSSIBLE PULLOUT BY DOD OF THE ARMY BLACK HAWKS AND HOPES THIS WILL NOT BE DONE BECAUSE THE BLACK HAWK HAS PROVEN TO BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE HELICOPTER.

14. THE PAPER CONCLUDES BY STATING THAT THE APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BAHAMAS GOVERNMENT ARE PREPARED TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RELEVANT OFFICIALS OF THE APPROPRIATE U.S. FORCES FOR ANY FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THESE PROPOSALS AND ALSO TO DISCUSS ANY VARIATIONS WHICH

MAY ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPOSED PROGRAM.

15. COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY THE AUTHOR HAS DONE HIS HOMEWORK AND KNOWS WHAT IS AVAILABLE FROM WHERE. THE PLAN IS HEAVY ON INCREASED U.S. RESOURCES AND LIGHT ON NEW BAHAMIAN INPUTS. THERE ARE CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE PROGRAM -- LIKE THE FAA INSPECTORS OR THE JOINT CONSPIRACY UNIT -- WHICH WILL NOT REQUIRE ANY GREAT NEW OUTLAYS AND SHOULD BE INSTITUTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

16. ONCE WE HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO STUDY THE PROGRAM PROPOSALS MORE CLOSELY WE WILL BE OFFERING FURTHER COMMENT. OBVIOUSLY WE WILL WELCOME THE VIEWS OF ALL ADDRESSEES AND WILL NEED COORDINATED GUIDANCE FROM WASHINGTON ON HOW TO RESPOND TO THE GCOB.

CHESHES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-May-1988 14:47 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ADDIS
~~FORAMARA~~

FROM:

VMS MAIL user ADDIS
(ADDIS@VAXC@MRGATE)

SUBJECT:

FYI

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<DTG> 140004Z MAY 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
<SUBJ>SUBJECT: HELICOPTERS: INTELLIGENT USE AND USE OF
- INTELLIGENCE
-

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 LIMA 06464
2ND C O R R E C T E D C O P Y ADDING ADDEES

STATE FOR INM

DEA FOR OC, OF

E.O: 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SNAR, PREL, PE

SUBJECT: HELICOPTERS: INTELLIGENT USE AND USE OF
- INTELLIGENCE
-

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY:

DURING HIS VISIT TO PERU, MARCH 16-21, INM SENIOR
AVIATION ADVISOR JOHN MCLAUGHLIN, REVIEWED ANTI-
NARCOTICS AIR RESOURCES AND THEIR USE AND STATED
THAT INM DECISIONS ON "ADDITIONAL HELICOPTER
REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE MADE WITHIN 45 DAYS -
BASED ON AN EVALUATION OF AIRCRAFT USE, TARGET
IDENTIFICATION AND AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS."
(LIMA 3902). IN THAT CONTEXT, MR. MCLAUGHLIN
AND DEA AIR DIVISION CHIEF DAVE ASHTON ALSO
DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF USING THE HELICOPTERS
FOR AN OPERATION AGAINST A LIMITED NUMBER OF PRIME
LABORATORY TARGETS IN THE NORTHEAST TRAPEZOID -
COLOMBIAN BORDER AREA. INM'S REVIEW OF THE POST'S
REVISED OPERATING PLAN (STATE 106731) SUGGESTED
THAT WE DEVELOP A DETAILED OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT

DECLASSIFIED

NLS E94-091 #75

BY inf NARA, DATE 4/22/99

CONCEPT, QUANTITY, TIMING, SUPPORTING INTELLIGENCE AND TARGETS OF PERFORMANCE TASKS THAT WOULD ALLOW INM TO MEASURE PERU'S NEED AGAINST THE DEMAND FROM THE EXISTING PROGRAM. THIS MESSAGE PRESENTS AN UPDATED DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT AIRCRAFT USE AND TARGET IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUES TO CLARIFY HOW WE USE THESE COSTLY ASSETS IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE FASHION. NAU'S AVIATION ADVISOR IS PREPARING A MORE DETAILED OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT PLAN, AS REQUESTED (STATE 106731), TO INCORPORATE INTO THE POST OPERATIONS PLAN. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

-

2. GENERAL:

- -----

THE PRINCIPAL AREAS FOR COCA CULTIVATION, COCAINE PASTE AND BASE PRODUCTION AND NARCOTICS TRANSHIPMENT IN PERU ARE LOCATED IN REMOTE JUNGLE TERRAIN WITH FEW ROADWAYS, NONE FULLY SECURE. MOST OF THESE NARCOTICS TARGETS CAN EFFECTIVELY BE REACHED ONLY WITH THE AID OF ROTOR WING AIRCRAFT. THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH CURRENT OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED IS EXTREMELY VOLATILE WITH AN EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH LEVEL OF BOTH NARCOTICS AND TERRORIST RELATED VIOLENCE, WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THE DEATHS OF 32 POLICE OFFICERS SINCE JANUARY 1987 IN THE UPPER HUALLAGA VALLEY (UHV) ALONE. THE TRAFFICKERS/TERRORISTS HAVE KNOCKED OUT COMMUNICATIONS RELAYS, AMBUSHED VEHICLES AND POLICE CONVOYS ALONG THE UHV'S ONLY ROADWAY, DESTROYED BRIDGES, CRATERED ROADWAYS AND OTHERWISE IMPEDED THE FLOW OF TRAFFIC. THIS HIGH INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE INHIBITS OPERATIONAL PLANNING, AS POLICE TROOPS AND AIR ASSETS ARE OFTEN DIVERTED FROM INTERDICTION AND ERADICATION ACTIVITY TO REINFORCE AREAS UNDER ATTACK OR WHERE ATTACKS ARE BELIEVED IMMINENT. MOREOVER, THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE REQUIRES THAT VIRTUALLY ALL PERSONNEL, FUEL, FOOD, AND SUPPLIES TO SUSTAIN A COMBINED POLICE/CORAH CONTINGENT (AVERAGING MORE THAN 450 AND 250 PERSONS RESPECTIVELY) MUST BE MOVED BY AIR FROM TINGO MARIA TO FORWARD BASES AT STA. LUCIA AND TOCACHE AS WELL AS AT SEVERAL SMALLER OUTPOSTS. SINCE LAST NOVEMBER, MOST OF THE LOGISTICS LIFT HAS BEEN PERFORMED BY HELICOPTERS, SINCE THE C-123 HAS BEEN LARGELY INOPERATIVE AND OTHER AIRLIFT UNAVAILABLE. WE RECENTLY ENTERED INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CIVIL GUARD FOR RENTAL OF ITS ISLANDER IN THE UHV, WHICH COULD REDUCE THE LOGISTICS LOADS CARRIED BY THE HELICOPTERS. A SINGLE ROUND TRIP LOGISTICS/SUPPLY FLIGHT

BY HELICOPTER FROM TINGO MARIA TO STA. LUCIA,
INCLUDING MINIMAL GROUND TIME, TAKES
APPROXIMATELY 2-1/2 HOURS. FURTHER, WHEN
SLINGLOADING HELICOPTER FUEL TO STA. LUCIA
A HELICOPTER MUST BE COMPLETELY EMPTY OF
OTHER PASSENGERS OR CARGO DUE TO WEIGHT
RESTRICTIONS. ABOUT 50 PERCENT OF HELICOPTER
OPERATING TIME HAS BEEN DEDICATED TO LOGISTICS/
SUPPLY OPERATIONS - A POOR USE OF HELICOPTERS
- ALTHOUGH SOME LOADS MUST BE CARRIED BY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 LIMA 06464
2ND C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDING ADDEES
STATE FOR INM
DEA FOR OC, OF
E.O: 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SNAR, PREL, PE
SUBJECT: HELICOPTERS: INTELLIGENT USE AND USE OF
- INTELLIGENCE
HELICOPTER, INCLUDING FUEL FROM TINGO MARIA
TO SANTA LUCIA AND SOME CORAH PERSONNEL FROM
SANTA LUCIA TO COCA FIELDS.
-

3. OPERATIONS PLANNING:

WHILE SELECTION OF TARGETS SUCH AS SUSPECTED
PASTE OR BASE LABORATORIES REMAINS LARGELY
A FUNCTION OF DEA, OPERATIONS PLANNING IS
CONDUCTED JOINTLY WITH PERUVIAN POLICE COUNTERPARTS.
CIVIL GUARD BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS COMPLICATE
THIS TASK; THERE HAS BEEN NO DISCERNIBLE
GC COMMAND HIERARCHY TO DECIDE DAY TO DAY
OPERATIONAL PLANNING IN THE UHV. AS A RESULT,
PLANNING SESSIONS ARE SOMETIMES LENGTHY,
LABORIOUS AND INCONCLUSIVE. WHEN
AGREEMENT IS REACHED, HIGHER LEVEL POLICE
OFFICIALS HAVE AT TIMES COUNTERMANDED PLANS
ALREADY AGREED UPON. ACCORDINGLY, WE HAVE
PROPOSED THAT GENERAL ZARATE DESIGNATE ONE
OFFICIAL AS THE ONLY PERUVIAN POLICE FIELD
REPRESENTATIVE EMPOWERED TO DISCUSS OPERATIONS
PLANNING. ZARATE HAS AGREED TO ASSIGN OTHER
OFFICERS TO COMMAND POSITIONS IN SQUAD SIZED
UNITS. THIS WILL ASSIST IN MORE EFFICIENT
OPERATIONS PLANNING, AND -- BY REMOVING
UNNECESSARY STAFF FROM HEADQUARTERS PLANNING
FUNCTIONS -- CREATE A HEALTHY COMPETITIVE
SPIRIT AMONG SQUADS, WHICH SHOULD ENHANCE
ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS.
-

4. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE:

WITH REGARD TO TARGET SELECTION AND
ARGETING PROCEDURES, DEA IS ENGAGED IN
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAMS, INCLUDING:

HUMAN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNICATIONS
MONITORING INTELLIGENCE, AND AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
AND IMAGERY. GOOD HUMAN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE IS
PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO ACQUIRE. CORRUPTION
IN THE PERUVIAN JUSTICE SYSTEM VIRTUALLY
PRECLUDES THE USE OF "MOTIVATED" DEFENDENT
INFORMANTS. THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF TRAFFICKER/
TERRORIST VIOLENCE AND THREATS OF REPRISAL
FURTHER INHIBITS THE COLLECTION OF HUMAN
SOURCE INTELLIGENCE. MOREOVER, THIS
INFORMATION CAN OFTEN BE CORROBORATED ONLY
BY CONDUCTING A STRIKE AGAINST THE SUSPECT
TARGET AS DOUBLE AND TRIPLE CANOPY JUNGLE
OFTEN PRECLUDES SUCCESSFUL RECONNAISSANCE.
DEA IS EXPANDING ITS NETWORK OF HUMAN SOURCE
INTELLIGENCE WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON
THE RECRUITMENT OF KEY RESIDENTS OF THE UHV.

6. BETTER PLANNING:

IN AN ATTEMPT TO BECOME MORE EFFICIENT WITH
AVAILABLE ASSETS, DEA LIMA HAS FORMALIZED THE
TARGET SELECTION/OPERATIONS PLANNING PROCESS.
FIRST, ALL SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE ARE
SCRUTINIZED FOR INFORMATION REGARDING
POINTS OF RECURRING NARCOTICS RELATED
ACTIVITY. (I.E. COCAINE BASE AND HCL LABS,
CLANDESTINE AIRSTRIPS, AND COLLECTION SITES).
NEXT, A DETAILED QUESTIONNAIRE IS COMPLETED
WHICH IS DESIGNED TO PERMIT READY IDENTIFICATION
OF THE "SUSPECT SITE" BY PERSONS NOT INVOLVED
IN THE ORIGINAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OR
SOURCE DEBRIEFING. THIS SUSPECT SITE IS
THEN SURVEILLED (GENERALLY WITH DEA FIXED
WING AIR SUPPORT), PHOTOGRAPHED, AND A STANDARD
TARGET RECON REPORT WHICH INCLUDES GEOGRAPHIC
COORDINATES IS COMPLETED. IF IT IS EVALUATED
THAT THIS SUSPECT SITE IS A WORTHY TARGET,
A NUMBER IS ASSIGNED AND INTERDICTION ACTIVITY
IS PLANNED. FIELD OPERATIONS PLANNING INCLUDES
A PLANNING/STRATEGY SESSION ATTENDED BY AT
LEAST THE SENIOR DEA FIELD REPRESENTATIVES,
THE SENIOR HELICOPTER PILOT, AND A GC
REPRESENTATIVE. SUBSEQUENTLY, A PRE-OPERATIONS
BRIEFING IS CONDUCTED ON THE FLIGHT LINE
IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. A DAILY
SITUATION REPORT IS THEN TRANSMITTED FROM THE
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 LIMA 6464
2ND C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDING ADDEES
STATE FOR INM
DEA FOR OC, OF
E.O: 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SNAR, PREL, PE
SUBJECT: HELICOPTERS: INTELLIGENT USE AND USE OF

- INTELLIGENCE

FIELD TO DEA LIMA TO ASSESS FUTURE INTERDICTION ACTIVITY.

-

7. AIRSTRIPS:

- -----

TAKING CONTROL OF NARCOTICS RELATED AIR TRAFFIC IN THE UHV IS A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE. UNLIKE NEIGHBORING BOLIVIA, IN PERU THE VAST MAJORITY OF AIRSTRIPS IN THE COCA CULTIVATION/TRANSHIPMENT AREAS ARE NOT FORMAL AIRPORTS AND THEREFORE MAY BE RENDERED AT LEAST TEMPORARILY INOPERATIVE BY CRATERING; BY SCATTERING SHARP METAL FRAGMENTS TO BLOW THE TIRES OF TRAFFICKER AIRCRAFT; OR BY LAYING AMBUSHES FOR AIRCRAFT. WHILE SOME GROUND AND RIVER TRANSPORT IS USED TO MOVE COCA DERIVATIVES WITHIN PERU (GENERALLY TO OTHER CLANDESTINE AIRSTRIPS), VIRTUALLY ALL COCA DERIVATIVES ARE EVENTUALLY MOVED BY SMALL AIRCRAFT TO INTERMEDIATE OR FINAL PURCHASERS FOR CONVERSION TO COCAINE BASE AND/OR HCL. (NOTE: ROAD AND RIVERINE INTERDICTION PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN PROPOSED TO ADDRESS BOTH INTRA-PERUVIAN AND INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF ESSENTIAL PRECURSOR CHEMICALS AND COCA DERIVATIVES.)

-

8. LABS AND PITS:

- -----

ALONG WITH THE INTERDICTION OF TRAFFICKER AIRCRAFT, INTERDICTION OF COCAINE BASE HCL LABORATORIES, AND DRUG COLLECTION SITES WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE HIGHEST PRIORITY. COCAINE PASTE PRODUCTION SITES (MACERATION/DECANTATION PITS) DO NOT HAVE HIGH PRIORITY FOR INTERDICTION, AS THE PITS AND PRECURSOR CHEMICALS NEEDED TO PRODUCE COCAINE PASTE ARE EASILY REPLACED. THE DESTRUCTION OF THOUSANDS OF ESTIMATED SITES IS AN INEFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES. INTERDICTION EFFORTS CANNOT COMPLETELY IGNORE THESE COCAINE PASTE PRODUCTION SITES

HOWEVER. PATROLLING ACTIVITY IN THE AREA OF THESE PITS OFTEN RESULTS IN THE DISCOVERY OF PASTE AND BASE. THE INM HELICOPTERS' GLOBAL LAND NAVIGATION SYSTEMS (WHICH WERE NOT AVAILABLE ON THE LEASED HELICOPTERS) MIGHT HELP IDENTIFY LARGER NUMBERS OF COCAINE PASTE PRODUCTION SITES, WHICH COULD BE PLOTTED OUT, AND GROUPED TOGETHER FOR MORE EFFICIENT INTERDICTION ACTIVITY AS AIR ASSETS BECOME AVAILABLE.

-

9. TRAPEZOID OPERATIONS:

WITH REGARD TO THE PROPOSED OPERATION IN THE
NORTHEAST TRAPEZOID AREA NEAR THE COLOMBIAN
BORDER, DEA AND GC COUNTERPARTS HAVE IDENTIFIED
27 CLANDESTINE AIRSTRIPS AND 15 SUSPECTED
COCAINE BASE/HCL LABORATORY LOCATIONS.
TARGET SELECTION AND OPERATIONS PLANNING IS
BEING CONDUCTED AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 6,
AND SOME RECONNAISSANCE OF THESE SUSPECT
SITES HAS ALREADY OCCURRED. WE ANTICIPATE
THAT MANY OF THESE SUSPECT SITES WILL BE
DEEMED ACTIONABLE INTERDICTION TARGETS. THE
TARGETS WILL BE PRIORITIZED TO MAXIMIZE THE
ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, ALLOWING SEIZURE OF
LABORATORIES AND COLLECTION SITES FIRST AND
DESTRUCTION OF AIRSTRIPS LATER. MEETING IN
LIMA, APRIL 18-21, PERUVIAN, BRAZILIAN,
COLOMBIAN, BOLIVIAN, ECUADORIAN AND VENEZUELAN
NARCOTICS REPRESENTATIVES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
DEA COUNTERPARTS, DISCUSSED SIMULTANEOUS
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY AND PLANNED STRATEGY
AND LOGISTICS. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THESE
SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS WILL BE APPROXIMATELY
2-3 WEEKS IN DURATION AND COMMENCE IN AUGUST.
(SEE LIMA FOR GREATER DETAIL.) "
(SEE LIMA 5745 FOR GREATER DETAIL.)

10. CONCLUSION:

THE THREE INM HELICOPTERS HAVE GIVEN A TREMENDOUS
BOOST TO ANTI-NARCOTICS OPERATIONS IN THE UHV,
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 LIMA 06464
2ND C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDING ADDEES
STATE FOR INM
DEA FOR OC, OF
E.O: 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SNAR, PREL, PE
SUBJECT: HELICOPTERS: INTELLIGENT USE AND USE OF
- INTELLIGENCE
AS REFLECTED IN AIRSTRIPS CRATERED, PASTE LABS
DESTROYED, AND THE 6.4 TONS OF COCA PRODUCTS
SEIZED IN 1987. THESE HELICOPTERS, HOWEVER,
HAVE BEEN STRAINED BY LOGISTICS DEMANDS AND
MAINTENANCE NEEDS, WHICH HAS GREATLY REDUCED
THEIR AVAILABILITY FOR STRAIGHT OPERATIONS.
INTELLIGENT USE OF THE HELICOPTERS DEMANDS
NOT ONLY BETTER TARGETTING BUT ALSO A
CONTINUOUS, RELIABLE FIXED WING STOL
CAPABILITY. THE ISLANDER OPTION MAY OFFER
SOME RELIEF; DEA'S CASA WOULD HELP; RENTING
PERUVIAN AIR FORCE PLANES MIGHT MEET NEEDS
IN SOME EMERGENCIES (THOUGH ONE CANNOT DEPEND
ON THEIR AVAILABILITY). BUT, WE CONTINUE TO
NEED THE CAPABILITY TO HAUL GOODS OVER THE MOUN-

TAINS FROM LIMA TO THE UHV, AND TO CARRY MID-SIZE LOADS REGULARLY UP AND DOWN THE VALLEY. FURTHER, THE PROPOSED TRAPEZOID OPERATION WILL REQUIRE AT LEAST TWO ADDITIONAL FIXED WING AIRCRAFT: THE CASA AND THE C-123, OR TWO CASAS. MOREOVER, WE NEED AN ADDITIONAL HELICOPTER FOR TWO BASIC REASONS:

-- OPTIMALLY, OPERATIONS AGAINST LABS OR OTHER TARGETS WHERE THE POLICE COULD ENCOUNTER ARMED RESISTANCE SHOULD BE CONDUCTED WITH THREE HELICOPTERS -- TWO TO CARRY PERSONNEL TO THE SITE AND THE THIRD FOR OVERHEAD SURVEILLANCE. SINCE ONE HELICOPTER IS USUALLY UNDERGOING MAINTENANCE, WE NOW SELDOM OR NEVER HAVE THIS OPTIMAL DEPLOYMENT.

-- SECOND, OPERATING IN A REMOTE AREA WITH MINIMAL PARTS INVENTORY, WE HAVE EXPERIENCED EXTENDED PERIODS WITH TWO HELICOPTERS IN MAINTENANCE. RECALL, FOR INSTANCE, THAT ONE EVERGREEN CONTRACTED HELICOPTER WAS GROUNDED FROM SEPTEMBER 1987 TO FEBRUARY 1988. THAT MEANT THAT OPERATIONS CEASED ENTIRELY WHEN A SECOND HELICOPTER UNDERWENT ROUTINE MAINTENANCE. A FOURTH HELICOPTER WOULD PREVENT SUCH DISRUPTIONS AND PERMIT GREATER OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY.

PLANNING IS NOW ADVANCED FOR AN OPERATION IN THE NORTHEAST TRAPEZOID AREA, WHERE JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT MAJOR HCL LABS ARE OPERATING. THE GOP SAYS IT IS PREPARED TO DO AS MUCH AS AVAILABLE AIR RESOURCES WILL PERMIT THEM TO DO. WE PLAN TO EXPLOIT TO THE FULLEST THIS WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE. FOR THAT REASON, WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO THE EARLY ASSIGNMENT OF A FOURTH HELICOPTER TO PERMIT EXPANSION OF THIS EFFORT. FURTHER EXPANSION SHOULD BE KEYED TO PERFORMANCE WHICH CAN BE MEASURED AGAINST COMPETING DEMANDS. WATSON

20-May-1988 14:32 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

PORTER
MCNAMARAFROM: VMS MAIL user ADDIS
(ADDIS@VAXC@MRGATE)

SUBJECT: FYI

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<DTG> 191513Z MAY 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
<SUBJ>SUBJECT: NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR VISIT OF REP MURTHA,
SECRETARY MARSH AND PARTY TO COLOMBIA

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 07639

SECDEF FOR ASD:SO-LIC

STATE FOR ARA/AND

USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP, OTRA, PINS, SNAR, CO

SUBJECT: NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR VISIT OF REP MURTHA,
SECRETARY MARSH AND PARTY TO COLOMBIA

REF: (A) BOGOTA 7627; (B) SECDEF 172302Z MAY 88

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY IS EXTREMELY PLEASED THAT REPRESENTATIVE
JOHN P. MURTHA AND SECRETARY JOHN O. MARSH AND PARTY ARE
ABLE TO VISIT BOGOTA ON MAY 22 AND 23. THE FOLLOWING
NOTIONAL SCHEDULE HAS BEEN PUT TOGETHER IN HOPES OF
HIGHLIGHTING FOR THE VISITORS THE SERIOUS INSURGENCY AND
NARCOTICS PROBLEMS COLOMBIA FACES, AND THE EFFORTS THE
GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY ARE MAKING TO CONFRONT THESE
CHALLENGES. MEETING TIMES AND PARTICIPANTS HAVE NOT YET
BEEN FIRMED UP.

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE

3. THE PARTY WILL BE MET ON ARRIVAL AT THE CATAM AIR
FORCE BASE BY THE AMBASSADOR, POLITICAL OFFICER DAVID
NOBLE, DAO AND MILGROUP REPRESENTATIVES, AND POSSIBLY BY
A MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE GOC. THE PARTY WILL
DIVIDE INTO TWO GROUPS AND PROCEED TO THEIR LODGINGS.
GROUP ONE WILL BE COMPRISED OF CONGRESSMAN MURTHA,
SECRETARY MARSH, BOB PASTORINO AND JOHN PLASHAL. THEY

NLS F94-091 #26BY Amf4/22/99

WILL GO WITH THE AMBASSADOR DIRECTLY TO HIS RESIDENCE.
MR. NOBLE WILL TAKE GROUP TWO, WILLIAM OLSON, LTCOL
CLOSE AND MAJOR NEUMAN, TO THEIR HOTEL.

4. AFTER CHECKING IN, THE VISITORS WILL ASSEMBLE AT THE
AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE FOR A MINI COUNTRY TEAM MEETING
AND BRIEFING. WE HOPE THIS CAN BE FOLLOWED BY AN
INFORMAL BUFFET DINNER WITH SENIOR GOC OFFICIALS AND
PROMINENT BUSINESS LEADERS, ALL OF WHOM WOULD SPEAK
ENGLISH. ON MONDAY, MAY 23, WE ARE ARRANGING A MEETING
WITH THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND THE ARMED SERVICE
CHIEFS. THERE WILL ALSO BE A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
BARCO AND, POSSIBLY, SOME OF HIS KEY ADVISORS. WE ALSO
HOPE TO ARRANGE A SMALL LUNCH AT THE INFANTRY SCHOOL, TO
INCLUDE COLOMBIAN COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS WITH RECENT
COMBAT EXPERIENCE. FOLLOWING THE LUNCH THE VISITORS
WOULD RETURN TO CATAM AFB FOR A 3:00 PM DEPARTURE.
INTERPRETERS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR ALL THE MONDAY
MEETINGS.

OBJECTIVES OF THE VISIT

5. THE PURPOSE OF THE SCHEDULE IS TO EXPOSE THE
VISITORS TO COLOMBIA'S COMPLEX SECURITY PROBLEMS. THESE
INCLUDE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKER INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE,
VIRILE GUERRILLA GROUPS, AND COMMON CRIMINAL ACTIVITY,
SOME OF WHICH ARE COMBINED IN VARIOUS WAYS. THE
PROBLEMS THESE PRESENT ARE COMPLICATED BY A JUDICIAL
SYSTEM THAT HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY WEAKENED BY THE NARCOS
AND GUERRILLAS. THEREFORE, FOLLOWING THE INITIAL
COUNTRY TEAM BRIEFING, AND IN ORDER TO EXPLORE THESE
ISSUES, THE AMBASSADOR HOPES TO GATHER SEVERAL PROMINENT
COLOMBIANS WITH WELL-FORMED VIEWS ON THE COUNTRY'S
SECURITY SITUATION. WE ARE AIMING FOR A REPRESENTATIVE
GROUP FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR WHICH MIGHT ALSO INCLUDE
SOME GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. BECAUSE IT IS A SUNDAY
EVENING, WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO ATTRACT ALL THOSE WE
WANT, BUT WE WILL DO OUR BEST.

6. THE MEETING WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE ARMY GENERAL
SAMUDIO AND THE SERVICE CHIEFS IS INTENDED TO PROVIDE A
VIEW OF THE MILITARY LEADERS TASKED WITH MEETING THE
NARCO AND GUERRILLA THREAT. WE DO NOT YET KNOW WHO
PRESIDENT BARCO WILL INCLUDE IN HIS MEETINGS. (YOU
SHOULD NOTE THAT HE IS PREPARING FOR OFFICIAL VISITS TO
PORTUGAL, SPAIN, ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES ON WHICH HE
IS SCHEDULED TO DEPART EARLY ON WEDNESDAY, MAY 25.) ON
OTHER OCCASIONS HE HAS HAD THE DIRECTOR OF THE ANTI
NARCOTICS POLICE AND THE DAS (FBI EQUIVALENT), MILITARY
OFFICERS INVOLVED IN CURRENT OPERATIONS AND KEY CABINET
OFFICIALS. HE MAY DO LIKEWISE FOR THIS MEETING. LUNCH
AT THE INFANTRY SCHOOL WILL GIVE REP. MURTHA AND
SECRETARY MARSH A CHANCE TO HEAR FIRST HAND SOME OF THE
PROBLEMS AND FRUSTRATIONS OF JUNIOR OFFICERS WITH
IMMEDIATE FIELD EXPERIENCE. THE US SIDE WILL BE KEPT TO
A MINIMUM FOR THIS MEETING IN AN ATTEMPT TO KEEP THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BOGOTA 07639

SECDEF FOR ASD:SO-LIC

STATE FOR ARA/AND
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP, OTRA, PINS, SNAR, CO

SUBJECT: NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR VISIT OF REP MURTHA,
ATMOSPHERE INFORMAL AND TO ENCOURAGE THESE YOUNGER
OFFICERS TO SPEAK CANDIDLY.

THE PRESS

7. SINCE THE PARTY ARRIVES ON A SUNDAY AFTERNOON, THE
PRESS WILL LIKELY VIEW THE VISIT AS LESS THAN A ONE
WORKING DAY STOP. TO AVOID THE ONLY DOWN SIDE OF THE
APRIL VISIT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE'S VISIT, I.E.,
CRITICISM OF ITS BREVITY, EMBASSY DOES NOT BELIEVE IT IS
IN US OR THE VISITORS' INTEREST TO TRY TO DEVELOP A
PRESS SCENARIO. RATHER, WE INTEND TO PREPARE PRESS
GUIDANCE FOR USE HERE (WITH WASHINGTON'S CLEARANCE) IN
THE EVENT THE VISITORS (OR EMBOFFS) ARE ASKED ABOUT THE
VISIT. WE HOPE TO INCLUDE A PUBLISHER/EDITOR AT THE
BUFFET DINNER. EMBASSY SEES NO NEED FOR ARRIVAL OR
DEPARTURE STATEMENTS. OUR BASIC LINE IS THAT THIS IS AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR TWO PROMINENT AMERICANS OPERATING UNDER
SEVERE TIME CONSTRAINTS TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THE
REALITIES OF THE COLOMBIAN SITUATION.

GILLESPIE

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 9 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

<DIST>SIT: VAX

<PREC> PRIORITY<CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL<OSRI> RUEHPE<DTG> 181428Z MAY 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8705
RUEABND/DEAHQS WASHDC PRIORITY

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: ORGANIZING ANTI-NARCOTICS FIELD OPERATIONS

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *inf 7/29/96*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 LIMA 06597
STATE FOR INM
DEA FOR OF, OC
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: SNAR: PREL, ASEC, PE
SUBJECT: ORGANIZING ANTI-NARCOTICS FIELD OPERATIONS

1. (LOU) IN ORDER TO PROVIDE MORE EFFECTIVE AND COORDINATED USE OF U.S. AIR ASSETS AND PERSONNEL IN ANTI-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES IN THE HUALLAGA VALLEY, WE HAVE CREATED A FIELD ORGANIZATION UNDER THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF A HUALLAGA COORDINATOR WHO REPORTS TO THE MISSION'S NARCOTICS COORDINATOR. WE HAVE ALSO DEVELOPED GUIDELINES FOR THE COORDINATOR, AND, MORE GENERALLY, FOR U.S. PERSONNEL AND U.S.-PROVIDED AIRCRAFT. THIS ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN IN PLACE ON AN INTERIM BASIS SINCE EARLY MARCH WITH A SENIOR DEA TDY AGENT SERVING AS UHV COORDINATOR. THE ARRANGEMENT HAS PROVED ITS WORTH IN CLARIFYING LINES OF RESPONSIBILITY AND IN PROMOTING MORE EFFICIENT EMPLOYMENT OF INCREASING ASSETS, WHICH MAY SOON INCLUDE TWO MEDICAL CORPSMEN. SUCH AN ORGANIZATION IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR OPERATIONS IN THE HIGH THREAT CONDITIONS WHICH OCCUR IN THE HUALLAGA VALLEY. IT HAS BENEFITED GREATLY FROM THE PRESENCE AND ADVICE OF THE AVIATION ADVISOR. HAVING COMPLETED THIS "TEST" PHASE, WE NOW PLAN TO ISSUE THE GUIDELINES MORE FORMALLY AS A DIRECTIVE FROM THE AMBASSADOR. THE ARRANGEMENT IS CLEARLY SUBJECT TO REVISION AS EXPERIENCE INDICATES. MEANWHILE, ANOTHER TDY DEA AGENT HAS ASSUMED THE HUALLAGA COORDINATOR ROLE FOR THE 90 DAYS BEGINNING MAY 5. WE PLAN TO ASSIGN A NAU FIELD ADVISOR TO THIS COORDINATOR ROLE AS SOON AS HE CAN BE BROUGHT ON BOARD. FOR ADDRESSEES' INFORMATION, THE CURRENT GUIDELINES ARE PROVIDED BELOW.

2. (U) GUIDELINES FOR HUALLAGA COORDINATOR

THE HUALLAGA COORDINATOR REPORTS TO THE MISSION'S CHIEF NARCOTICS COORDINATOR THROUGH THE DEPUTY NARCOTICS COORDINATOR.

AS THE OVERALL COORDINATOR OF U.S. SUPPORT TO PERUVIAN ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS IN THE HUALLAGA VALLEY, THE COORDINATOR WILL:

-
-- IN COOPERATION WITH THE AIR ADVISOR, INSURE EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF ALL U.S. ASSETS INCLUDING FIXED WING AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT.

-
-- INSURE ADEQUATE AIRLIFT TO SUPPORT ERADICATION EFFORTS IN VICINITY OF SANTA LUCIA, INCLUDING DAILY TRANSPORT OF WORKERS TO AND FROM THE FIELDS BEING ERADICATED AND PERIODIC OVERFLIGHTS OF ERADICATION SITES.

-
-- INSURE ADEQUATE PROVISION FOR THE HEALTH AND SECURITY OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND FOR SECURITY OF EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING MAKING DECISIONS AS TO MOVEMENTS OF U.S. PERSONNEL INTO AND WITHIN THE HUALLAGA VALLEY.

-
-- IN COOPERATION WITH MEDICAL PERSONNEL DETAILED TO THE HUALLAGA VALLEY, IDENTIFY ADEQUATE MEDICAL FACILITIES TO DEAL WITH POSSIBLE EMERGENCIES INVOLVING USG DIRECT-HIRE AND CONTRACT PERSONNEL.

-
-- INSURE ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS BOTH FOR FIELD OPERATIONS AND BETWEEN THE FIELD AND EMBASSY LIMA.

-
-- COORDINATE WITH DEA AND GOP COUNTERPARTS REGARDING LAND, RIVERINE AND AIR INTERDICTION OPERATIONS.

-
-- PROVIDE SUPPORT AS APPROPRIATE TO THE USAID-SPONSORED UPPER HUALLAGA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (PEAH).

-
-- ASSIST IN DRAFTING AN EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN TO BE ADDED TO THE MISSION'S EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN.

-
-- ADVISE THE EMBASSY NARCOTICS COORDINATOR OF REQUIREMENTS TO FULFILL THE FOREGOING RESPONSIBILITIES.

-
3. (U) OPERATING GUIDELINES FOR U.S. PERSONNEL AND U.S.-PROVIDED AIRCRAFT IN THE HUALLAGA VALLEY

ALL MISSIONS OF U.S. AIRCRAFT ARE TO BE AUTHORIZED BY THE COORDINATOR OR HIS DESIGNEE.

-
U.S. AIRCRAFT ARE PROVIDED TO SUPPORT THE GOP
C O N F I D E N T I A L
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 LIMA 06597
STATE FOR INM

DEA FOR OF, OC
E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SNAR: PREL, ASEC, PE

SUBJECT: ORGANIZING ANTI-NARCOTICS FIELD OPERATIONS
ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORT. FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE FOLLOWING
RULES ARE ESTABLISHED RESPECTING THEIR OPERATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT.

-
GENERAL

-- ALL AIRCRAFT MISSIONS ARE TO BE RELATED TO ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS AND CONSEQUENTLY WILL NORMALLY BE UNDERTAKEN ONLY IN AREAS OF ONGOING ANTI-NARCOTICS OPERATIONS.
-

-- , AIRCRAFT MAY BE USED TO TRANSPORT UNIFORMED PERSONNEL
BUT ARE NOT TO BE EMPLOYED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF
ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIONS.

-- A PERUVIAN PILOT WILL NORMALLY BE ABOARD ALL MISSIONS
OF U.S. PROVIDED HELICOPTERS.

-- U.S. AIRCRAFT PILOTS ARE AUTHORIZED TO DISCONTINUE ANY
MISSION ENDANGERING AIRCRAFT OR ITS PERSONNEL.

-- U.S. PERSONNEL ARE AUTHORIZED TO USE FORCE ONLY IN
SELF DEFENSE OR IN DEFENSE OF OTHER U.S. OR PERUVIAN
PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS.

SPECIFIC

AUTHORIZED AIRCRAFT MISSIONS INCLUDE:

A. INTERDICTION:

ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

RECONNAISSANCE FOR OPERATIONS

TRANSPORTATION OF OFFICIAL OR AUTHORIZED
PERSONNEL

B. ERADICATION:

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

SECURITY SUPPORT FOR CORAH PERSONNEL

TRANSPORTATION OF OFFICIAL OR AUTHORIZED
PERSONNEL

C. DEVELOPMENT:

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

TRANSPORTATION OF OFFICIAL AND OTHER
AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL

SPECIAL STUDY SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT
ACTIVITIES

D. GENERAL SUPPORT:

EMERGENCY VEHICLE PLATFORM INCLUDING
MEDICAL EVACUATIONS

COMMUNICATION VEHICLE PLATFORM

NON-AUTHORIZED MISSIONS INCLUDE:

ANY TYPE OF ENGAGEMENT WITH ANTI-SUBVERSIVE
OPERATIONS WHERE U.S. PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN
ALERTED THAT SUCH AN OPERATION IS EXPECTED
TO TAKE PLACE. THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE THOSE
INSTANCES WHERE THE MISSION ORIGINATES AS AN
ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORT AND DUE TO AN EMERGENCY
OR OPERATIONAL NECESSITY, I.E. LIFE
THREATENING SITUATION INVOLVING USG
OR GOP ANTI-NARCOTICS POLICE, THE MISSION
CHANGES TO INDIRECT SUPPORT OF AN ANTI-

SUBVERSIVE OPERATION.

ANY EXCEPTIONS TO THE FOREGOING MUST BE MADE BY THE
COORDINATOR OR HIS DESIGNEE. WATSON

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 6597<STOR> 880518105626 MSG000201264985
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 6597<STOR> 880518105820 MSG000201265100
<TOR>880518111034

<DIST>SIT: VAX

<PREC> ROUTINE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUEHBO<DTG> 070033Z MAY 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6282
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN COLOMBIA: DAS REPORT HINTS
AT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN URABA; MORE ON
CORDOBA

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 07075
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, PTER, PHUM, PGOV, SNAR, CO
SUBJECT: VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN COLOMBIA: DAS REPORT HINTS
AT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN URABA; MORE ON
CORDOBA

REF: BOGOTA 6711 AND BOGOTA 5442

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

1. (C) SUMMARY: MILITARY OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN IMPLICATED IN THE MARCH 4 KILLINGS IN URABA. A RECENTLY COMPLETED STUDY BY THE DAS (FBI EQUIVALENT), OF WHICH THE PRESS HAS OBTAINED A COPY, HAS CONCLUDED THAT MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE B-2 (INTELLIGENCE) IN URABA IDENTIFIED PEOPLE BELONGING TO THE SUPPORT NETWORK FOR THE EPL (ARMY OF POPULAR LIBERATION). THESE SAME PEOPLE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY MURDERED ON MARCH 4. A MILITARY SPOKESMAN DENIED THAT THE REPORT INCRIMINATED THE MILITARY, CONTENDING THAT IT MERELY RELATED UNPROVEN TESTIMONY ACCUSING THE MILITARY OF INVOLVEMENT. MINISTER OF DEFENSE SAMUDIO DENIED ANY MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN REMARKS TO THE PRESS ON MAY 5. HE SAID "SINISTER FORCES" WERE TRYING TO DEFAME THE MILITARY. POLOFF'S VISIT TO MONTERIA, THE CAPITAL OF CORDOBA DEPARTMENT, REINFORCED THE VIEW THAT THE SITUATION IN NORTHERN COLOMBIA REMAINS COMPLEX AND RESISTS EASY SOLUTIONS.
END SUMMARY

~END SUMMARY~

2. (C) THE URABA REPORT: THE WEEKLY NEWS MAGAZINE SEMANA PUBLISHED MAY 3 A REPORT ON THE MURDERS IN URABA IN EARLY MARCH. THE REPORT DRAWN FROM A CONFIDENTIAL DAS REPORT CONCLUDED THAT IN THE KILLINGS AT THE "LA HONDURAS" AND "LA NEGRA" FARMS IN URABA ON MARCH 4, THE VICTIMS WERE PART OF THE EPL GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION'S SUPPORT GROUP; THAT IN THE WEEKS PRECEDING THE KILLINGS, MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY CARRIED OUT OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO IDENTIFY MEMBERS OF THE GUERRILLA GROUP; THAT DESERTERS FROM THE EPL COLLABORATED WITH THE MILITARY IN MAKING THE IDENTIFICATIONS; AND THAT THE DESERTERS MAY HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY PARTICIPATED IN THE KILLINGS. THE REPORT DID NOT RULE OUT THE FACT THAT MILITARY PERSONNEL MIGHT ALSO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE KILLINGS. IT CONCLUDED THAT THIS TYPE OF "CLEAN-UP OPERATION" ("OPERACION LIMPIEZA") WAS BEING FINANCED BY LOCAL LANDOWNERS WHO WERE FED UP (DESESPERADOS) WITH THE GUERRILLAS. SOME OF THE EPL DESERTERS SAID THAT

DECLASSIFI P RT

NLS E94-091 #78

By amf, NARA, Date 4/22/99

SECURITY FORCES FORCED THEM TO IDENTIFY WORKERS INVOLVED IN EPL EXTORTION (BOLETEO) OR OTHER SUPPORT ACTIVITIES.

3. (U) REACTION: THE MAY 4 EDITION OF BOGOTA CONSERVATIVE DAILY "EL SIGLO" QUOTES EX-PRESIDENT LLERAS RESTREPO AS SAYING THAT ANY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND SELF DEFENSE GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE MASSACRE SHOULD BE BROUGHT BEFORE MILITARY COURTS. MINISTER OF JUSTICE LOW MURTRA AND ATTORNEY GENERAL HORACIO SERPA AGREED WITH THE SENTIMENT, BUT SAID CIVILIAN COURTS WOULD TRY THE OFFENDERS. SERPA, IN A MAY 4 PRESS CONFERENCE, ALSO SAID THAT MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, BUT HE DENIED THAT THEY ACTED IN THE NAME OF THE STATE. HE ALSO SAID THAT "WITHOUT A DOUBT THE BEST RESPONSE TO OFFER THE CITIZENRY AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION IS TO DISCOVER AND PUNISH THE MATERIAL AND INTELLECTUAL AUTHORS OF THESE CRIMES..."

4. (U) THE LEFTIST PATRIOTIC UNION (UP) HAS USED THE REPORT TO CONTINUE ITS ATTACK AGAINST THE NEWLY NAMED MILITARY CHIEF IN URABA, CLAIMING THE APPOINTMENT GIVES SECURITY FORCES A "GREEN LIGHT" FOR FURTHER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.

5. (U) NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CORDOBA KILLINGS: MEANWHILE, BOGOTA DAILY "EL TIEMPO" ON MAY 6 REPORTED THAT AUTHORITIES HAVE ARRESTED NINE PEOPLE SUSPECTED OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE MEJOR ESQUINA, BUENA VISTA, "EASTER" MASSACRE IN CORDOBA (BOGOTA 5442). THE NEWSPAPER REPORT CLAIMS THAT THE NINE ARRESTED WERE PLANNING ADDITIONAL ATTACKS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE UP AND OTHERS THEY VIEWED AS SUPPORTERS OF THE GUERRILLAS.

6. (C) CORDOBA -- NO EASY ANSWERS: ON APRIL 22, POLOFF TRAVELED TO MONTERIA, CORDOBA DEPARTMENT. TO DISCUSS THE SECURITY SITUATION WITH [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE CONVERSATION FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON THE EPL THREAT IN CORDOBA. [REDACTED] ESTIMATED THAT TOTAL GUERRILLA STRENGTH IN THE DEPARTMENT WAS LESS THAN 300 FIGHTERS, BUT THAT THAT NUMBER IS BOLSTERED BY AN INTELLIGENCE AND SUPPORT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BOGOTA 07075

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINS, PTER, PHUM, PGOV, SNAR, CO

SUBJECT: VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN COLOMBIA: DAS REPORT HINTS NETWORK (MOSCA--FLIES) THAT SUPPLIES THE GUERRILLAS WITH INFORMATION ON TROOP MOVEMENTS. SINCE THE BRIGADE HAS NO HELICOPTERS OR SUFFICIENT TRANSPORT FOR ITS 4000 TROOPS, THEY MUST MOVE ON FOOT.

7. (C) TO MAKE UP FOR MATERIAL SHORTAGES, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE BRIGADE RELIES ON UNORTHODOX TACTICS AND INTELLIGENCE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THEN ADDRESSED THE KILLING OF 40 PEOPLE NEAR BUENA VISTA (BOGOTA 5442), WHICH HAS BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO NARCOTRAFFICKER RETALIATION AGAINST EPL EXTORTION. [REDACTED] SAID THAT SOME RANCHERS, DRIVEN TO EXTREMES BY GUERRILLA DEMANDS, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MASSACRE. PLACING THE REAL BLAME ON THE EPL, [REDACTED] ASKED HOW LONG CAN ANYONE PUT UP WITH INSURGENTS WHO REPEATEDLY HARRASS, BURN, AND MURDER WITH VIRTUAL IMPUNITY. THIS IS THE REAL SOURCE OF RURAL VIOLENCE, HE SAID, NOT THE TRAFFICKERS. (NOTE: [REDACTED] AVOIDED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER SOME LANDOWNERS WERE NARCOS, AS OTHERS HAVE TOLD US.)

10. (C) COMMENT: NORTHERN COLOMBIA CONTAINS ELEMENTS OF ALL THE CAUSES OF VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRY. EVEN HENRY VELASCO, THE CIVILIAN HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH DOG FOR THE MILITARY, HAS TOLD POLCOUNS THAT THE MILITARY IS INVOLVED. HE WAS CAREFUL TO POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE MILITARY IS INVOLVED AS INDIVIDUALS. THERE IS NO INSTITUTIONAL SANCTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND THOSE WHO ARE INVOLVED IN BREAKING THE LAW WILL BE PUNISHED, HE SAID. WHAT EMERGES FROM THE ABOVE IS THAT COMMANDERS IN RURAL AREAS ARE OFTEN LEFT ON THEIR OWN WITH FEW RESOURCES IN AREAS WITH HIGH RATES OF VIOLENCE. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY ARE PRONE TO USE THE RESOURCES AT HAND, WHICH MAY BE LOCAL RANCHERS (INCLUDING NARCOS) WHO, IN THE ABSENCE OF LEGALLY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITY, PAY "SELF DEFENSE" GROUPS TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS. COMMANDERS FACED WITH MAINTAINING SOCIAL ORDER, BUT WITH LITTLE MATERIAL SUPPORT, MAY VIEW COOPERATION WITH LOCAL GROUPS AS THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM.

GILLESPIE

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 7075<STOR> 880508075347 MSG000200390027
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 7075<STOR> 880508075418 MSG000200390058
<TOR>880508080117

<DIST>PRT: SIT
SIT: MORRISON VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUEHBO<DTG> 070122Z MAY 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6286
INFO RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
RUEABND/DEA WASHDC
RUEHFB/DIRFBI WASHDC
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 5693
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEGMI/USOFFICE ATO MIAMI 0315
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 1844

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PLAN TO KIDNAP AMBASSADOR GILLESPIE

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BOGOTA 07079

TERREP EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: ASEC, PTER, CASC, CO

SUBJECT: PLAN TO KIDNAP AMBASSADOR GILLESPIE

1. ~~Q~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE RSO WAS ADVISED ON MAY 5, 1988, BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THERE WAS A PLAN TO KIDNAP AMBASSADOR GILLESPIE.

[REDACTED] IT WAS STATED THAT A PLAN TO KIDNAP THE AMBASSADOR EXISTED. DETAILS OF THE DATE, TIME, PLACE, AND METHOD OF ATTACK WERE NOT DISCUSSED. ALTHOUGH WILLING TO KILL THE AMBASSADOR, THEY PREFERRED TO KIDNAP HIM. THEIR ASSUMPTION IS THAT KIDNAPPING THE AMBASSADOR WILL PROVIDE A MEANS TO REDUCE THE PRESSURE AGAINST THE NARCOTRAFFICKERS.

3. [REDACTED]

4. A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REVEALED THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE INVESTIGATION CONTINUES.

5. WE CONCLUDE THAT AS A MINIMUM ONE OF THE THREE SOURCES IS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF NARCOTRAFFICKERS AND ONE OF THEIR LOCATIONS NOT COMMONLY KNOWN TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. WE CANNOT OTHERWISE TEST THE CHAIN OF SOURCES, ALTHOUGH WE ARE ASSUMING THE INFORMATION IS CREDIBLE AT THIS TIME.

DECLASSI

NLS F94-091 #79

Amf, NARA, Date 4/22/99

/Released

6. CONSIDERING THIS THREAT IN LIGHT OF OTHERS AGAINST
THE AMBASSADOR, THE COM-R, AND THE EMBASSY, THE RSO IS
REVIEWING THE AMBASSADOR'S SCHEDULE TO MODIFY
REPETITIVE PATTERNS AND DANGEROUS MOVES. GILLESPIE

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 7079<STOR> 880506212548 MSG000200265948
<TOR>880506214324

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 12 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

<DIST>SIT: MCNAMARA PORTER VAX

encl 7/17/96

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUEHBO<DTG> 032318Z MAY 88

<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA

<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6137

INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 4130

RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS

RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 5680

RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0613

RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0465

RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1213

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: WAVE OF KIDNAPPINGS OF FOREIGN CITIZEN HONORARY
CONSULS

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BOGOTA 06775

TERREP

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PINS, PTER, CO

SUBJECT: WAVE OF KIDNAPPINGS OF FOREIGN CITIZEN HONORARY
CONSULS

1. (U) SUBVERSIVE GROUPS HAVE UNLEASHED A NATIONWIDE WAVE OF KIDNAPPING ATTEMPTS TARGETTING FOREIGNERS, MOST OF WHOM ARE HONORARY CONSULS, ACCORDING TO MEDIA AND OTHER SOURCES. THE SELF STYLED ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (ELN) HAS TAKEN CREDIT FOR THE KIDNAPPING OF A GERMAN HONORARY CONSUL AND THREE JOURNALISTS IN BUCARAMANGA, SANTANDER DEPARTMENT, ON MAY 3. ANONYMOUS CALLERS CLAIMED THAT THE HOSTAGES WOULD BE RELEASED IN THREE DAYS WITH A MESSAGE FOR THE GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN MILITARY ATTACHE IN BOGOTA, A SECOND GERMAN HONORARY CONSUL WAS KIDNAPPED IN MEDELLIN, ANTIOQUIA DEPARTMENT. IN ANOTHER ATTACK, POLICE IN CALI, VALLE DE CAUCA DEPARTMENT, THWARTED AN ATTEMPT TO KIDNAP A FRENCH CITIZEN HONORARY VICE CONSUL. A POLICE OFFICER, HOWEVER, WAS KILLED BY THE UNIDENTIFIED ASSAILANTS. MISSION HAS RECEIVED REPORTS, ALSO AIRED OVER LOCAL RADIO, OF OTHER ELN ATTEMPTS AGAINST BELGIAN CONSULAR OFFICERS IN CALI.

2. (U) PANAMANIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD POLOFF THAT THE PANAMANIAN CONSUL GENERAL IN CARTAGENA ALSO WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN UNSUCCESSFUL KIDNAPPING ATTEMPT. THE ATTACK WAS CARRIED OUT BY ELN MEMBERS POSING AS STUDENTS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT GUERRILLAS ENTERED THE CONSULATE AND SEIZED THE PRINCIPAL CONSULAR OFFICER. THE PANAMANIAN OFFICER, HOWEVER, BROKE FREE OF THE ASSAILANTS AND RECEIVED POLICE ASSISTANCE. THE POLICE CAPTURED THE KIDNAPPERS, WHO REMAIN IN CUSTODY.

3. (U) LATE RADIO REPORTS INDICATE TWO SWISS CITIZENS HAVE BEEN KIDNAPPED BY A GROUP CLAIMING TO BE FROM THE ARMY OF POPULAR LIBERATION (EPL). TEN EPL MEMBERS REPORTEDLY ENTERED THE SWISS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN BOGOTA (CALLE 42, CARRERA 21), TIED UP 15 EMPLOYEES, WROTE EPL SLOGANS ON THE WALLS, AND DEPARTED WITH TWO SWISS CITIZENS. SWISS POLITICAL COUNSELOR CONFIRMED ABOVE TO POLOFF AND SAID THAT AN EMPLOYEE OVERHEARD

NLS F94-091 # 81

BY *encl*

4/22/99

KIDNAPPERS SAY THAT THE TWO WOULD BE RELEASED WITH A COMMUNIQUE FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION. BOTH VICTIMS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE FOUNDATION FOR PEACE ON EARTH, A SWISS/COLOMBIAN PHILANTHROPIC ORGANIZATION.

4. (C) COMMENT: INFORMATION AT THIS POINT IS STILL VERY SKETCHY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE. FRENCH POLCOUNS TOLD POLOFF THAT GERMANS AND FRENCH ARE MEETING TO DISCUSS COMMON ACTIONS TO TAKE IN FACE OF KIDNAPPINGS. HE SAID THE GOC HAS PROMISED TO INCREASE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, WHICH EMBASSY RSO HAS CONFIRMED. THIS WAVE OF KIDNAPPING ATTEMPTS IS REMINISCENT OF SIMILAR SUCH INCIDENTS BY THE ELN AGAINST MAYORS AND JOURNALISTS PRIOR TO THE MARCH 13 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. THE VICTIMS WERE HARANGUED AND SET FREE WITHIN A FEW DAYS WITH MESSAGES FOR THE PUBLIC. WE SUSPECT THE SWISS KIDNAPPING WAS ALSO AN ELN OPERATION SINCE IT FOLLOWED THE SAME PATTERN USED BY THAT GROUP.

5. EMBASSY IS ALERTING AND CAUTIONING ALL US PERSONNEL AND THE US CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. AT OUR REQUEST, LOCAL POLICE ARE PROVIDING SECURITY TO CHAMBER. GILLESPIE

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 6775<STOR> 880503192912 MSG000199999752
<TOR>880503225713

<DIST>SIT: VAX

<PREC> PRIORITY<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUEHCR<DTG> 021020Z MAY 88
<ORIG>FM AMCONSUL MARSEILLE
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5758
INFO RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1395
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0004
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0008

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MARSEILLE 0483

TERREP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, FR

SUB: NEW-CALEDONIA GENDARME HOSTAGE-TAKING

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2.

AUTHORITATIVE DETAILS AS TO THE MODUS OPERANDI OF THE FLNKS
TERRORISTS RESPONSIBLE FOR TAKING THE ORIGININAL GROUP OF
GENDARMES HOSTAGE ON THE ISOLATED NEW CALEDONIAN ISLAND OF
OUVEA APRIL 22.

OF THE 27 WHO WERE INITIALLY SEIZED, 15 REMAIN IN THE HANDS
OF THE TERRORISTS.

3. OUVEA IS A TINY ATOLL POPULATED BY APPROXIMATELY 3000
MELANESIANS WITH NO MORE THAN 30 EUROPEANS, INCLUDING
THE GENDARMERIE DETACHMENT. WHILE FLNKS SYMPATHY HAS TRADITIONALLY
BEEN STRONG AMONG THE INHABITANTS, THE ISLAND HAD BEEN CALM
FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS AND THE GENDARMERIE ACCORDING TO OUR
SOURCE POST WAS NOT OPERATING UNDER ANY STATE OF ALERT. BEYOND THE
SENTRY AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE POST, THE THREE GENDARMES ON DUTY
AT THE TIME WERE CARRYING OUT THEIR OFFICE CHORES IN A ROUTINE
MANNER ("LIKE WE WOULD DO IN THE METROPOLE") WHEN THEY RECEIVED
A VISIT FROM A LOCALLY-ELECTED MELANESIAN REGIONAL COUNSELOR A
FREQUENT CALLER, WELL KNOWN TO THE PERMANENT STAFF OF THE POST.
4. AS THE REGIONAL COUNSELOR WAS CASUALLY CONVERSING WITH THE
GENDARMES, FOUR OTHER MELANESIANS FILTERED IN THE OFFICE, ONE BY ONE,
OSTENSIBLY TO JOIN THE CONVERSATION. UPON A SIGNAL THE FIVE
MELANESIANS (WHO HAD CONCEALED WEAPONS) ATTACKED THE THREE GENDARMES.
IN THE ENSUING STRUGGLE, THE OFFICER IN CHARGE WAS KILLED QUICKLY
WITH A HATCHET BLOW TO THE FOREHEAD AFTER HE DREW AND BEGAN FIRING
HIS SIDEARM. THE OTHER GENDARMES RECEIVED FATAL BULLET WOUNDS.
THE TERRORISTS NEUTRALIZED THE SENTRY BY THREATENING THE FAMILIES
OF THE GENDARMES ON PERMANENT STATION IN OUVEA (IN GENDARMERIE POSTS,
DEPENDENTS ARE ALWAYS HOUSED IN AN ADJOINING BARRACKS). WITH THE
LIVES OF THE WIVES AND CHILDREN OF THE GENDARMES AS NEGOTIATING
POINTS, IT WAS A SIMPLE MATTER TO DISARM THE REMAINING GENDARMES
WHEN THEY RETURNED FROM THEIR PATROLS.

5. REPORTING OFFICER WAS TOLD THAT THE AREA WERE THE HOSTAGES WERE
CURRENTLY BEING HELD DOES NOT LEND ITSELF TO AND ASSAULT AND THAT
THEIR RELEASE WILL HAVE TO BE SOUGHT THROUGH OTHER MEANS.
THIS INCIDENT HAS STIRRED MORE THAN PROFESSIONAL INTEREST IN
GENDARMERIE CIRCLES HERE AS SEVEN OF THE CASUALTIES AND ORIGINAL
HOSTAGES WERE IN OUVEA ON TEMPORARY DETAIL FROM THE GENDARMERIE IN
NEARBY ANTIBES.

6. DEPT MAY WISH TO RESEND THIS CABLE TO OTHER TERREP ADDEES.

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 0483<STOR> 880502185443 MSG000199911283
<TOR>880503111527

DE JARVIS ! RT

NLS F94-091 #82

By am, NARA, Date 4/22/99

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 15-16 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

<DIST>SIT: MCNAMARA PORTER VAX

<PREC> PRIORITY<CLAS>~~SECRET~~<OSRI> RUEHBO<DTG> 260041Z APR 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5852
INFO RUEOEHA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4092
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: THE MILITARY RESPONDS: SOME THOUGHTS ON WHY

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 06223

SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

STATE PLS ALSO PASS EXIM FOR JULIE PENARO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PTER, MCAP, SNAR, EFIN, CO

SUBJECT: THE MILITARY RESPONDS: SOME THOUGHTS ON WHY

REF: (A) BOGOTA 4884 (B) BOGOTA 2556 (C) IIR 6 819
0120 88

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY IS BEGINNING TO SHOW SIGNS OF LIFE; OF A DETERMINATION TO FIGHT BACK AGAINST BOTH NARCOTIC TRAFFICKER AND GUERRILLA VIOLENCE. THERE ARE MANY POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THIS NEW FOUND WILLINGNESS AND CAPABILITY, AS REFLECTED IN ACTIONS BY GENERAL RUIZ IN MEDELLIN, GENERAL NIEBLES IN CALI, AND GENERAL BEDOYA IN GUARVIARE (THE FOURTH, THIRD AND SEVENTH BRIGADE COMMANDERS RESPECTIVELY), INCLUDING ONGOING US ASSISTANCE. ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY STILL LACKS THE STRATEGY AND WHEREWITHAL TO MAKE MAJOR GAINS, THERE IS ROOM FOR HOPE. MILITARY DECAY TOOK PLACE UNDER THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION'S "PEACE PLAN" AND CONTINUED INTO THE FIRST YEAR OF THE BARCO ADMINISTRATION. RISING TRAFFICKER AND GUERRILLA SPONSORED VIOLENCE APPEARS TO BE THE INITIAL INCENTIVE LEADING TO THE THUS FAR LIMITED MILITARY RESPONSE. END SUMMARY

~END SUMMARY~

3. THE BACKGROUND: THE "PEACE PROCESS" WAS A MAJOR CONSTRAINT ON MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE GUERRILLAS, PRIMARILY THE FARC, DURING THE BETANCUR ADMINISTRATION. ALTHOUGH THE BARCO GOVERNMENT CONTINUED THE PEACE PLAN, IT CHANGED THE RHETORIC, PLACING THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE GUERRILLAS (BY THEN ONLY THE FARC) TO COMMIT TO A NEGOTIATING PROCESS THAT WOULD LEAD TO THEIR EVENTUAL REINCORPORATION INTO THE COLOMBIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. BY THE FALL OF 1987 NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE FARC AND PRESIDENTIAL PEACE ADVISOR, CARLOS OSSA ESCOBAR, HAD ALL BUT ENDED. NEVERTHELESS, WITH THE MARCH 13, 1988, MAYORAL ELECTIONS ON THE HORIZON, NEITHER THE GOVERNMENT NOR THE FARC BELIEVED IT WAS IN THEIR INTEREST TO FORMALLY DENOUNCE THE PEACE PROCESS.

4. MEANWHILE, BEGINNING IN LATE DECEMBER, LEVELS OF VIOLENCE ROSE DRAMATICALLY. THE MILITARY RECORDED NINETY ARMED CLASHES WITH GUERRILLAS IN THE FIRST TWO MONTHS OF 1988, ALL INITIATED BY THE GUERRILLAS. THE

NLS F94-091 #85

BY smf R

4/22/99

ELN, BEGAN DYNAMITING WITH OMINOUS REGULARITY THE COVENAS-CANO LIMON OIL PIPELINE; AND THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS, IN THE WAKE OF JORGE LUIS OCHOA'S NOVEMBER 21 ARREST AND RELEASE SIX WEEKS LATER, APPEARED INTENT ON COWING THE GOVERNMENT INTO FORESWEARING ANY SUCH FUTURE ACTIONS. THEY TRIED TO KIDNAP THE CONSERVATIVE CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR OF MEDELLIN ON NOVEMBER 22, SUCCEEDED IN KIDNAPPING BOGOTA'S CONSERVATIVE CANDIDATE ON JANUARY 18, AND BUNGLED A KIDNAPPING OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON JANUARY 25, KILLING HIM IN THE PROCESS.

5. WHEN HE TOOK OFFICE IN AUGUST 1986, PRESIDENT BARCO DID NOT EXPECT NARCOTICS RELATED VIOLENCE TO BE A MAJOR PROBLEM, AND HE HAD HIS OWN WELL-THOUGHT-OUT PEACE PLAN TO DEAL WITH THE GUERRILLAS. REALITIES SOON INTRUDED ON THE EARLY OPTIMISM. ON JUNE 25, 1987, A SUPREME COURT DECISION TOOK AWAY EXTRADITION AS A MAJOR TOOL AGAINST THE TRAFFICKERS. WHEN OCHOA WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ARRESTED, BARCO LEARNED HOW IMPORTANT WAS THE LOSS OF THE 1979 EXTRADITION TREATY. THE RELEASE OF OCHOA EMBARRASSED THE GOVERNMENT AND ENCOURAGED THE TRAFFICKERS TO EVEN BOLDER THREATS AGAINST THOSE WHO DARED STAND IN THEIR WAY. BARCO'S PROGRAM FOR NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION IS LONG-RANGE IN SCOPE, BRINGING NO EARLY SUCCESSES IN PACIFYING THE GUERRILLAS. IN FACT, THE FARC AMBUSHED A MILITARY CONVOY IN JUNE OF 1987, KILLING 27 SOLDIERS. IN ADDITION, IN ALL OF 1987 GUERRILLA ACTIONS RESULTED IN OVER 700 MILITARY DEAD AND WOUNDED.

6. BEGINNINGS OF GOVERNMENT REACTION: ON JANUARY 27, 1988, TWO DAYS AFTER THE MURDER OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, PRESIDENT BARCO ISSUED THE FIRST OF HIS STATE OF SIEGE DECREES AIMED AT CREATING A LEGAL STRUCTURE WITH WHICH TO PURSUE BOTH THE TRAFFICKERS AND THE GUERRILLAS. BUT THE VIOLENCE CONTINUED UNABATED -- OFTEN WITH LITTLE CLUE AS TO WHETHER THE NARCOS, THE GUERRILLAS, OR COMMON CRIMINALS WERE BEHIND THE ATROCITIES. ON MARCH 2, 1988,

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BOGOTA 06223

SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

STATE PLS ALSO PASS EXIM FOR JULIE PENARO

E.O. 12356: BACL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PTER, MCAP, SNAR, EFIN, CO

SUBJECT: THE MILITARY RESPONDS: SOME THOUGHTS ON WHY THE NARCOS STOLE BACK FROM UNDER THE NOSE OF THE AIR FORCE A SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT PREVIOUSLY CONFISCATED BY THE AUTHORITIES. EMBARRASSMENT WAS TEMPERED BY A NEW FEELING OF CONFIDENCE WHEN THE AIR FORCE EMPLOYED IT AC-47 TO FIND AND DESTROY THE STOLEN PLANE.

7. MORE RESPONSES FOLLOWED. ON MARCH 22 THE NEWLY APPOINTED COMMANDER OF THE FOURTH BRIGADE IN MEDELLIN MOUNTED A DAWN RAID ON A KEY PROPERTY OF NARCO BOSS PABLO ESCOBAR, JUST MISSING CAPTURING HIM IN THE PROCESS (BOGOTA 4884). OTHER RAIDS FOLLOWED, NETTING VALUABLE PROPERTIES AND INFORMATION. THE THIRD BRIGADE MADE SIMILAR, LESS PUBLICIZED RAIDS ON HOLDINGS OF THE CALI CARTEL. MEANWHILE, IN EARLY APRIL THE SEVENTH BRIGADE INTENSIFIED ITS ONGOING OPERATIONS, BEGUN DECEMBER 19, 1987, IN META AND GUAVIARE DEPARTMENTS, ROUSTING SEVERAL FARC FRONTS (THE I, VII, XXVII AND XXVIII FRONTS) IN ORDER TO REESTABLISH THE GOVERNMENT'S PRESENCE IN THOSE AREAS. THE PURVEYORS OF VIOLENCE CONTINUED TO CAPTURE THE HEADLINES, BUT THE AUTHORITIES WERE STIRRING.

8. . WHY IS THE MILITARY FIGHTING BACK NOW? NO ONE KNOWS WITH ANY GREAT DEGREE OF CERTAINTY WHY THE MILITARY HAS BEGUN TAKING SOME STEPS TO FIGHT BACK. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PLAUSIBLE EXPLANATIONS, NONE OF WHICH COMPLETELY EXPLAIN THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO ACT AT THIS TIME, BUT WHICH DO ISOLATE SOME OF THE VARIABLES. THE MOTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION APPEAR TO HAVE COME TOGETHER AND REACHED CRITICALITY OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS LEADING TO THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT RESPONSE. THE FOLLOWING CONSTITUTES A LIST OF LIKELY VARIABLES THAT HAVE GONE IN TO GENERATING THAT RESPONSE.

-- PRESIDENT BARCO WAS BEING MADE TO LOOK INEFFECTUAL IN THE FACE OF OCHOA'S RELEASE AND THE RISING VIOLENCE. WE KNOW HE WAS UPSET WITH GENERAL SAMUDIO'S SEEMING INABILITY TO RESPOND TO GUERRILLA AND TRAFFICKER VIOLENCE AND HAD STRONG MOTIVES TO ORDER GENERAL RUIZ INTO ACTION IN MEDELLIN. HIS OWN DETERMINATION WAS REFLECTED IN THE STATE OF SIEGE DECREES, CREATING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH ACTION COULD BEGIN.

-- THE MILITARY'S INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY WAS AT STAKE. IT WAS COMING UNDER INCREASING CRITICISM AND EMBARRASSMENT OVER ITS APPARENT LACK OF WILL TO FIGHT, EVIDENCE OF COLLABORATION WITH THE NARCOS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FIRING OF THE FOURTH BRIGADE'S INTELLIGENCE CHIEF, AND THE NARCO THEFT OF THE PLANE FROM CATAM AIR FORCE BASE.

-- SOME (VERY BASIC) US EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING PROGRAMS, IN THE NARCOTICS AND ANTI-TERRORIST FIELDS, WERE COMING INTO PLACE. THE DELIVERY OF THESE PROGRAMS BOTH GAVE A SENSE OF CAPABILITY AT HAND AND STIRRED FAITH THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE THE ASSISTANCE. THIS LIKELY ADDED TO CONFIDENCE AND MORALE.

-- SOME OF THIS MATERIEL WAS ALREADY PRODUCING RESULTS. TWO EXAMPLES: THE AC-47 HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, AND AN ASSAULT TEAM, CREATED TWO YEARS AGO FOR HOSTAGE RESCUE, IS NOW GETTING SOME USE AGAINST NARCOTICS TARGETS (AND WAS USED IN THE MEDELLIN RAID).

-- US PRESSURE AND INTEQNATIONAL EMBARRASSMENT IN THE FACE A LONG STRING OF GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY FAILURES TO SHOW PROGRESS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE TRAFFICKERS REACHED A PEAK IN JANUARY.

-- THE MARCH MAYORAL ELECTIONS, WITH ITS CONSEQUENT DRAIN ON TROOP STRENGTH, WAS OVER. THE POLICE, FOR EXAMPLE, SAID FOR MORE THAN SIX MONTHS THAT THERE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT ANTI-LAB RAIDS AFTER THE ELECTIONS. THEY ARE KEEPING TO THAT SCHEDULE.

-- HIGHLY MOTIVATED MILITARY LEADERS ARE IN PLACE IN MEDELLIN, CALI AND VILLAVICENCIO (I.E. GENERAL RUIZ, GENERAL NIEBLES, AND GENERAL BEDOYA). WHERE BARCO'S DESIRE FOR ACTION SEEMED FOR A LONG WHILE TO FALL ON

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BOGOTA 06223
SOUTHCOR FOR POLAD

STATE PLS ALSO PASS EXIM FOR JULIE PENARO
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PTER, MCAP, SNAR, EFIN, CO
SUBJECT: THE MILITARY RESPONDS: SOME THOUGHTS ON WHY DEAF EARS, THESE THREE HIGHLY MOTIVATED GENERALS APPEAR TO BE USING THEIR AUTHORITY IN AGRESSIVE, IMAGINATIVE

WAYS. (IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT BOTH RUIZ AND BEDOYA DISCOVERED THAT THEIR INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS WERE HELPING THE NARCOS, AND BOTH GENERALS CASHIERED THEM.) WHERE THE MILITARY HAS SHOWN NO FIRE FOR OVER A YEAR, MISSION SOURCES INDICATE THAT THE WILL TO FIGHT IS RETURNING FOLLOWING THE LONG HIATUS DURING THE BETANCUR YEARS.

-- RECENT FINDS OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY IN THE HANDS OF THE NARCOS AND THE GUERRILLAS MAY HAVE LED MILITARY LEADERS TO BELIEVE THAT UNLESS PREEMPTED THE TWO GROUPS COULD BECOME MORE THAN A PERIPHERAL THREAT, UNDERMINING THE MILITARY'S VERY CLAIM OF PROVIDING MINIMUM SECURITY.

-- UNTIL RECENTLY, THE NATIONAL POLICE HAD AN UNWRITTEN RULE WITH SOME LOCAL MILITARY COMMANDERS THAT IT WOULD NOT OPERATE IN FARC AREAS. THE POLICE ARE NOW SWEEPING IN BEHIND THE SEVENTH BRIGADE TO HIT FARC-RUN LABS IN THE GUAVIARE/META REGION, MANY MUCH MORE SUBSTANTIAL THAN THE LABS ENCOUNTERED LAST YEAR. NEVERTHELESS, THE POLICE HAVE NOT YET HIT A CURRENTLY OPERATING "HOT" HCL LAB.

9. CONCLUSION: RECENT MILITARY ACTION IN MEDELLIN, CALI AND THE EASTERN PLAINS IS LIKELY THE RESULT OF THE COMING TOGETHER OF MANY DIVERSE FACTORS, AS OUTLINED ABOVE. TRAFFICKER AND GUERRILLA SUCCESSES HAVE PROVIDED THE MOTIVATION FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY TO DEFEND ITS INTEGRITY. MORE THAN MOTIVATION IS NEEDED, HOWEVER. SUSTAINED OPERATIONS WILL DEPEND ON GREATLY INCREASED TRAINING AND MATERIEL IMPROVEMENTS. HOPES FOR FUTURE MAJOR USG ASSISTANCE HAVE PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN THE LIMITED ACTIONS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE THUS FAR. CONTINUED AND INCREASED US INTERACTION WITH THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY AND POLICE WILL BE CRUCIAL TO MOVING THE GOC TOWARDS ADOPTING A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNAL SECURITY STRATEGY.

GILLESPIE

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03<SSN> 6223<STOR> 880425213638 MSG000199316198
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03<SSN> 6223<STOR> 880425213719 MSG000199316239
<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03<SSN> 6223<STOR> 880425213736 MSG000199316256
<TOR>880425215220

<DIST>SIT: VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS>~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUEHBO<DTG> 251912Z APR 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
<TO>TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5838

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PRE-IG MUSINGS

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BOGOTA 06198

EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SNAR, PGOV, CO

SUBJECT: PRE-IG MUSINGS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I CAME AWAY FROM BUENOS AIRES CONCERNED THAT THE COLOMBIA IG WILL FOCUS ON A COUNTRY ABOUT TO CAVE IN TO THE NARCOS AND GUERRILLAS. THAT IS NOT THE CASE. BARCO'S LOW KEY APPROACH HAS MASKED DETERMINED COLOMBIAN EFFORTS TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE NARCOS AND THE GUERRILLAS. HE MAY NOT HAVE FULLY APPRECIATED THE SCOPE OF THEIR POWER UNTIL OCHOA WALKED, BUT SUBSEQUENT TRAFFICKER THREATS, KIDNAPPINGS AND MURDERS CHANGED THAT. WITH LITTLE FANFARE, IT APPEARS THAT EARLIER INERTIA HAS BEEN OVERCOME AND THE COLOMBIANS HAVE MOUNTED A COUNTERATTACK THAT WE ARE JUST BEGINNING TO SEE. TO WIT:

-- TALENTED, AGGRESSIVE GENERALS WHO TOOK OVER KEY COMMANDS IN MEDELLIN, CALI AND VILLAVICENCIO IN JANUARY ARE TAKING THE WAR TO TRAFFICKER AND GUERRILLA-RUN COCA OPERATIONS, AND DIRECTLY TO THE FARC IN THE LLANOS. WE EXPECT A RESHUFFLING OF THE MILITARY HIGH TO COMMAND TO MOVE MEN DETERMINED TO TAKE ON THE NARCO THREAT INTO POWER (AND THEY WILL LIKELY FOCUS MORE SHARPLY ON THE INTERNAL THREAT -- NOT VENEZUELA).

-- THE MILITARY IS PRESSURING THE TRAFFICKERS, IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE. LAST WEEKEND THE THIRTEENTH BRIGADE HIT SIX OF EL MEJICANO'S FINCAS. THEY GOT 20 VEHICLES, WEAPONS AND MORE INTELLIGENCE ON NARCO OPERATIONS. THAT MAKES MORE THAN A MONTH'S WORTH OF HARD HITS BY THE ARMY, AND WE BELIEVE THEY WILL CONTINUE.

-- BARCO'S STATE OF SIEGE DECREES IN JANUARY STRENGTHENED LEGAL POWERS TO DISRUPT NARCO OPERATIONS.

-- THE BELEAGUERED LEGAL SYSTEM, DESPITE ALMOST DAILY DEATH THREATS TO KEY OFFICIALS, HAS NOT COLLAPSED: IT ISSUED TWO PRO-EXTRADITION RULINGS JUST LAST WEEK. IN ONE, THE SUPREME COURT TOOK AWAY THE RIGHT OF HABEUS CORPUS FOR THOSE BEING HELD FOR EXTRADITION (REMEMBER, THAT'S HOW OCHOA WAS SPRUNG).

-- JUSTICE MINISTER LOW RESTATED ON APRIL 20 HIS DETERMINATION TO USE THE MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION TO EXTRADITE THE NEXT CARTEL MEMBER ARRESTED. BARCO SIGNED AN AGREEMENT WITH ALAN GARCIA APRIL 25 TO USE THE MONTEVIDEO CONVENTION FOR EXTRADITIONS BETWEEN THOSE TWO COUNTRIES. AND WE ARE EXPECT TO SEE MORE JOINT PERUVIAN-COLOMBIAN ANTI-NARC OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS SOME WITH THE VENEZUELAN IN THE GUAJIRA.

NLS F94-091 #86

BY Amj

4/22/92

-- NEW ATTORNEY GENERAL SERPA TOLD US AND, MORE IMPORTANT, THE PRESS THAT HE WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WITH NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS, THAT EXTRADITION IS A FUNDAMENTAL JUDICIAL INSTRUMENT DIRECTED AT REDUCING NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, AND THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT HE WILL SUPPORT IT.

-- CONCLUSION: THE GOC KNOWS THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS HAVE MOVED TO A MUCH MORE AGGRESSIVE STRATEGY, TAKING ON THE GUERRILLAS AND THE NARCO TRAFFICKER SIMULTANEOUSLY.

3. BARCO IS LOW KEY, PUBLICITY SHY, BUT DETERMINED. HE LACKS POLITICAL TALENT, WHICH COSTS HIM DEARLY IN PUBLIC IMAGE. BUT HE IS STUBBORNLY FIGHTING TO PROTECT THE GOVERNMENT'S INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY FROM THE TRAFFICKERS. HE IS STILL OUR STRONGEST ANTI-NARCOTICS ALLY IN THE GOVERNMENT AND, WITHIN THE MEANS AVAILABLE TO HIM, HE IS TRYING. US INTERESTS DICTATE THAT WE SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS HOWEVER WE CAN.
GILLESPIE

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 6198<STOR> 880426010313 MSG000199328593
<TOR>880426011601

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

25-Apr-1988 09:36 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

PORTER
MCNAMARA

FROM: VMS MAIL user ADDIS
(ADDIS@VAXC@MRGATE)

SUBJECT: FYI

<PREC> PRIORITY<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<DTG> 210917Z APR 88
<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC
<SUBJ>SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR POST COMPREHENSIVE NARCOTICS
CONTROL PLAN FOR MEXICO FOR REMAINDER OF 1988

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 125963
FROM INM A/SEC WROBLESKI AND ARA A/SEC ABRAMS TO AMB. PILLIO
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: SNAR, MX
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR POST COMPREHENSIVE NARCOTICS
CONTROL PLAN FOR MEXICO FOR REMAINDER OF 1988
REFS: (A) MEXICO 8577; (B) STATE 111459; (C) MEXICO
4634; (D) MEXICO 4270

1. RECENT EVENTS SUCH AS THE PROBLEMS WITH THE MEXICO
CERTIFICATION, THE PUBLICATION OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE (GAO) REPORT ON THE MEXICAN ERADICATION PROGRAM,
AND THE MARCH VISIT OF MEXICAN DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
PORTE PETIT'S TO A NUMBER OF USG DEPARTMENTS/AGENCIES AND
TO THE CONGRESS, HAVE FOCUSED CONGRESSIONAL, MEDIA AND
PUBLIC ATTENTION ON MEXICO AND ON THE U.S. ANTI-NARCOTICS
ROLE IN MEXICO. MEXICO IS BEING PRESSED STRONGLY TO
IMPROVE PERFORMANCE IN REDUCING THE FLOW OF DRUGS TO THE
UNITED STATES, AND THOSE WASHINGTON OPERATING AGENCIES
MOST INVOLVED IN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WITH THE GOM WILL BE
HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE SUCCESS OF THOSE EFFORTS.

2. THE CONCERNED AGENCIES HAVE AGREED THAT FOR MEXICO WE
NEED TO FLESH OUT AND EXPAND THE FY 88-89 INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY/IMPLEMENTATION PLAN DRAWN UP
BY THE INTERNATIONAL STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL
DRUG POLICY BOARD (NDPB) LAST YEAR AND APPROVED BY THE
NDPB IN JANUARY 1988. BECAUSE THE EMBASSY WILL BE THE
PRINCIPAL IMPLEMENTER OF A COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-NARCOTICS
PLAN FOR MEXICO, WE NEED THE BEST THINKING OF YOU AND

NLS E94-091 #87

BY smf N

4/22/88

YOUR STAFF ON THE MOST APPROPRIATE ACTION PLAN TO FOLLOW OVER THE NEXT NINE MONTHS. A COMPREHENSIVE COUNTRY PLAN COVERING THE REST OF THE CALENDAR YEAR AND PROVIDING A ROAD MAP TO THE FUTURE WILL PERMIT THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY TO PLAN MORE EFFICIENTLY SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS FOR 1988 AND BEYOND. IT WILL ALSO PERMIT EFFECTIVE EVALUATION OF OUR COOPERATIVE NARCOTICS CONTROL ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO AND IMPROVE OUR READINESS FOR RIGOROUS OVERSIGHT BY THE CONGRESS, THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE AND STATE'S INSPECTOR GENERAL.

3. THE MAY 1987 EMBASSY NARCOTICS CONTROL OPERATIONS PLAN REPRESENTED AN EXCELLENT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. HOWEVER, BECAUSE THE NDPB STRATEGY REPRESENTS THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE RECENT ARTICULATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS STRATEGY AND HAS BEEN USED AS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FORMULATION OF FY 1988-89 POLICY PLANS AND BUDGET RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT, WE ARE REQUESTING THAT YOU AND YOUR STAFF USE THE NDPB PLAN AS A GUIDE FOR FORMULATING AN INTEGRATED MEXICO PLAN, COVERING ALL JOINT U.S.-MEXICO ANTI-NARCOTICS INITIATIVES. IN EFFECT, THE POST PLAN SHOULD COVER IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL OF THE STRATEGY'S ELEMENTS. IT SHOULD ALSO BE CLASSIFIED, AS IT IS INTENDED FOR INTERNAL USG USE.

4. WE REQUEST THAT YOU OVERSEE THE EFFORT TO DEVELOP THIS PLAN, IN COORDINATION WITH ALL MISSION AGENCIES INVOLVED IN ANTI-DRUG EFFORTS, USING THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES:

(A) GIVEN THE WIDELY DIFFERING COUNTRIES AND ACTIVITIES COVERED, THE NDPB STRATEGY WAS ORGANIZED PRIMARILY BY NARCOTIC SUBSTANCE FOR THE SAKE OF SIMPLIFICATION. THE POST PLAN, HOWEVER, SHOULD REFLECT THE VARIOUS FUNCTIONS WHICH REPRESENT THE U.S./MEXICO COOPERATIVE EFFORT. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE YOU MAY WANT TO BREAK THESE CATEGORIES DOWN EVEN MORE OR RESTRUCTURE THEM, THE PLAN SHOULD, AT A MINIMUM, COVER THE FOLLOWING:

- ENFORCEMENT AND INTERDICTION (INCLUDING, E.G., OPERATION ALLIANCE)
- INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS (INCLUDING, E.G., THE CAMARENA AND CORTEZ CASES)
- ERADICATION AND VERIFICATION
- PUBLIC AWARENESS AND DEMAND REDUCTION

(B) IN THE CASE OF EACH ACTIVITY OR GROUP OF ACTIVITIES, POST SHOULD DESCRIBE THE ACTIVITY AND CURRENT STATUS, STATE OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF THE ACTIVITY, AND LIST TARGETS OF PERFORMANCE, MILESTONES OF ACTIVITY AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AS HAS BEEN DONE IN THE NDPB STRATEGY.

(C) REFTELS . REPRESENT PLAN DRAWN UP BY THE EMBASSY NAU FOR ERADICATION AND INM-FUNDED PUBLIC AWARENESS AND CAN SERVE AS GUIDES FOR THE LEVEL OF DETAIL DESIRED IN THE POST PLAN FOR OTHER NARCOTICS CONTROL ACTIVITIES. POST PLAN WILL NOT PROVIDE SPENDING LEVELS, HOWEVER.

(D) IN DEVELOPING THE PLAN, THE FOLLOWING DEFINITIONS SHOULD BE HELPFUL.

--THE OBJECTIVE INDICATES WHAT THE ACTIVITY OR GROUP OF ACTIVITIES IS EXPECTED TO ACCOMPLISH, E. G., REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF HEROIN ENTERING THE U.S. FROM MEXICO.

--TARGETS OF PERFORMANCE REPRESENT OPTIMAL EXPECTATIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL BILATERAL EFFORTS; THEY REPRESENT WHAT YOU BELIEVE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED. (I.E., AN EVENT THAT WILL HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN 1988 TO ACCOMPLISH THE OBJECTIVE.)

--MILESTONES REPRESENT ACTIVITIES WHICH MARK SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A BILATERAL NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM AND FACILITATE MONITORING BY POLICY OFFICIALS (I.E., A DISCRETE ACTION OR ACTIVITY COMPLETED DURING THE YEAR THAT HELPS ACHIEVE THE TARGET OF PERFORMANCE). MILESTONES ANSWER THE QUOTE HOW MUCH BY WHEN UNQUOTE DIMENSION OF A TARGET OF PERFORMANCE.

--MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS ARE REASONABLE CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING PROGRESS TOWARDS OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS OF PERFORMANCE. THEY MUST BE RELEVANT, SIGNIFICANT AND VERIFIABLE.

5. WE APPRECIATE YOUR ASSISTANCE IN THIS EFFORT WHICH CAN PROVIDE US ALL WITH A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE DIRECTION WHICH WE SHOULD FOLLOW IN OUR BILATERAL NARCOTICS EFFORTS. IF POSSIBLE, WE WOULD LIKE THE POST PLAN SUBMITTED FOR WASHINGTON COMMUNITY COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS BY MAY 16.

6. THIS CABLE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE FOLLOWING ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: ADMINISTRATOR JACK LAWN, DEA; DOTREAS ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRANK KEATING; DREW ARENA, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DOJ; AND ADMIRAL PAUL YOST, COAST GUARD. WHITEHEAD

<DIST>SIT: VAX

<PREC> ROUTINE<CLAS>~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUEHBO<DTG> 251831Z APR 88
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5834
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 4087

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: VIOLENCE UPDATE: FARC ATTACKS, ELN AND M-19
TERRORISM, VII BRIGADE PUSHES ON

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 06196

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINS, PTER, SNAR, ASEC, PGOV, CO

SUBJECT: VIOLENCE UPDATE: FARC ATTACKS, ELN AND M-19
TERRORISM, VII BRIGADE PUSHES ON

REF: BOGOTA 5447

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

1. (U) SUMMARY: APPROXIMATELY 100 GUERRILLAS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC) ATTACKED THE EASTERN PLAINS TOWN OF MITU IN THE VAUPES INTENDANCY WEAIRLY APRIL 20. THE INCIDENT, WHICH MISSION SOURCES SAY IS THE FIRST GUERRILLA ACTION EVER IN VAUPES, LASTED FOR SIX HOURS, DURING WHICH THE INSURGENTS CLASHED WITH A NATIONAL POLICE FORCE OF 30-50 OFFICERS. IN OTHER AREAS, THE ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (ELN) HAS STEPPED UP REPRISALS AGAINST RECALCITRANT FARMERS IN SANTANDER DEPARTMENT, KILLING AT LEAST SEVEN PEOPLE DURING THE WEEK OF APRIL 18. MEANWHILE, THE NINETEENTH OF APRIL MOVEMENT (M-19) CELEBRATED ITS 14TH ANNIVERSARY BY BLOWING UP TOLL BOOTHS IN CAUCA DEPARTMENT AND SETTING UP A NEW RADIO STATION. NOT EVERYTHING, HOWEVER, HAS GONE WELL FOR THE GUERRILLAS. IN PARTICULAR, MILITARY OPERATIONS BY THE SEVENTH BRIGADE IN META, VICHADA, AND GUAVIARE HAVE MADE HEADWAY AGAINST FARC UNITS. END SUMMARY
2. (C) FARC UNITS SWARMED OVER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CENTER OF THE VAUPES INTENDANCY IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20. ACCORDING TO BOGOTA DAILY "EL ESPECTADOR", THE GUERRILLAS CAUSED SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE TO THE TOWN AND MAY HAVE DESTROYED THE POLICE STATION, LEAVING EIGHT WOUNDED POLICEMEN AND HOLDING SEVERAL PEOPLE HOSTAGE FOR A SHORT TIME. IN ADDITION, TELECOM INSTALLATIONS, THE AGRARIAN BANK, AND ELECTRIC TOWERS WERE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED, EFFECTIVELY CUTTING OFF THE TOWN FROM THE REST OF THE COUNTRY. WHILE GOC OFFICIALS HAVE PUBLICLY STATED THAT THE ATTACK WAS FOILED WITHOUT THE GUERRILLAS HAVING TAKEN CONTROL OF THE TOWN, SOME MISSION SOURCES SAY THAT MITU MAY HAVE BEEN BRIEFLY HELD BY THE GUERRILLAS. THE PRESS HAS REPORTED THAT FROM TWO TO TWELVE INSURGENTS DIED AND OTHERS WERE CAPTURED, BUT CONFIRMATION OF REPORTS IS DIFFICULT DUE TO THE OUTLYING LOCATION OF THE ATTACK SITE.
3. (U) AUTHORITIES HAVE CHARGED THE ELN WITH THE MURDER OF AT LEAST SEVEN PEOPLE IN SANTANDER. OVER THE PAST WEEK, SECURITY FORCES HAVE DISCOVERED SEVERAL CORPSES IN

NLS E94-091 #88

BY anf 11

4/22/99

SPARSELY POPULATED AREAS OF THE DEPARTMENT. MOST WERE IDENTIFIED AS FARMERS AND WERE FOUND WITH GUERRILLA PROPAGANDA LITTERED AROUND THE KILLING GROUND. THE COUNT INCREASED TO AT LEAST SEVEN ON APRIL 20, WHEN POLICE ANNOUNCED THAT THREE MORE FARMERS HAD BEEN KILLED IN SAN VICENTE DE CUCHURI, AN AREA WHERE THE ELN HAS ACTED WITH VIRTUAL IMPUNITY.

4. (U) ATTACKS BY UNIDENTIFIED GUERRILLAS AGAINST VENEZUELAN BORDER FORCES WERE REGISTERED ON APRIL 20. CASUALTIES AND FURTHER REPORTS ARE VAGUE, ALTHOUGH THE BOGOTA PRESS SAYS THAT THE ATTACK TOOK PLACE IN THE SIERRA DE PERIJA. NINE VENEZUELAN NATIONAL GUARDSMEN WERE SLAIN IN AN ATTACK LAST YEAR WHILE ON MARIJUANA ERADICATION SWEEPS IN THE SAME AREA.

5. (U) IN CAUCA, GUERRILLAS OF THE NINETEENTH OF APRIL MOVEMENT CELEBRATED THEIR 14TH YEAR OF OPERATIONS BY BLOWING UP TOLL BOOTHS 36 KILOMETERS FROM POPAYAN. THE SUBVERSIVES STOLE THE MONIES COLLECTED THEN FORCED THE ATTENDANTS TO LEAVE THE BOOTHS BEFORE DYNAMITING THEM. THIS IS THE SECOND SUCH ATTACK ON THESE SAME BOOTHS BY THE M-19, ACCORDING TO NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS. THE INCIDENT, WHICH TOOK PLACE ON APRIL 19, LEFT NO CASUALTIES. AT THE SAME TIME, THE M-19 ANNOUNCED THE INAUGURATION OF A NEW RADIO STATION TO SERVE CAUCA AND VALLE DEPARTMENTS. THE STATION, CALLED "RADIO MACONDO" AFTER GABRIEL GARCIA MARQUEZ' FICTIONAL TOWN IN "ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF SOLITUDE", BEGAN BROADCASTING LAST TUESDAY.

6. (C) SEVENTH BRIGADE MAKES SOME HEADWAY: THE SEVENTH BRIGADE OF THE COLOMBIAN ARMY, UNDER GENERAL HAROLD BEDOYA, HAS STEPPED UP OPERATIONS AGAINST THE FARC IN META, GUAVIARE, AND VICHADA. ACCORDING TO MISSION SOURCES, THESE SWEEPS HAVE BEEN AGGRESSIVE AND REFLECT THE BRIGADE'S ABILITY TO SEIZE THE LOCAL INITIATIVE. ACCORDING TO BOGOTA DAILY "EL TIEMPO", THE LAST CLASH TOOK PLACE NEAR CUMARIBO IN VICHADA, LEAVING THREE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BOGOTA 06196

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINS, PTER, SNAR, ASEC, PGOV, CO

SUBJECT: VIOLENCE UPDATE: FARC ATTACKS, ELN AND M-19 GUERRILLAS DEAD AND THE ARMY WITH SEVERAL CAPTURED WEAPONS. THE SEVENTH BRIGADE REPORTEDLY HAS DISLODGED FARC UNITS AS BEDOYA CONTINUES TO PRESS THE LOCAL OFFENSIVE. THE PRESS APRIL 25 SAID THE SEVENTH BRIGADE, WITH ANIT-NARCOTICS POLICE HELP, HAS DESTROYED 87 (SMALL) LABS, CONCLUDING THAT SECURITY FORCES HAD DISRUPTED THE FARC'S SOURCE OF FINANCES.

GILLESPIE

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 6196<STOR> 880425214817 MSG000199316897
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 6196<STOR> 880425214823 MSG000199316903
<TOR>880425215325