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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name ~~MCNAMARA, THOMAS E.: FILES~~

Counterterrorism and Narcotics

Withdrawer

DLB 12/27/2006

File Folder UNITED KINGDOM (AUGUST 1987-JANUARY 1988)

FOIA

F02-071/3

Box Number *9227+ RAC Box 6*

COLLINS

8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
31322	CABLE	DUPLICATE OF #20993; #051022Z AUG 87	4	8/5/1987	B1
31323	CABLE	DUPLICATE OF #20992; #051020Z AUG 87	3	8/5/1987	B1
31324	CABLE	#121040Z SEP 87 R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3	2	9/12/1987	B1
31325	CABLE	#181213Z SEP 87 D 4/10/2012 F2002-071/3	9	9/18/1987	B1
31326	LETTER	REAGAN TO THATCHER, RE: SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3	2	ND	B1
31327	MEMO	FORD COOPER TO CLAYTON MCMANAWAY, RE: UK PAPER AND HANDLING TERRORIST INCIDENTS R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	2	1/8/1988	B1
31328	CABLE	#082017Z JAN 88	1	1/8/1988	B1
31329	PAPER	AGENDA AND LIST OF ATTENDEES - US-UK EXPLORATORY TALKS PAR 8/4/2008 F02-071/3	3	ND	B1 B3 B7(F)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
31330	MEMO	HUGH HUNTER TO THE DIRECTOR FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING, RE: UK PAPER ON HANDLING TERRORIST INCIDENTS	2	1/11/1988	B1
31331	MEMO	CLAYTON MCMANAWAY TO LIST, RE: UK PAPER ON HANDLING OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS <i>R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3</i>	2	1/4/1988	B1
31332	PAPER	HANDLING OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS <i>D 8/4/2008 F02-071/3</i>	4	12/29/1987	B1
31333	PAPER	COMMENTS ON BRITISH PAPER <i>R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3</i>	1	ND	B1
31334	CABLE	#150133Z JAN 88 <i>R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3</i>	1	1/15/1988	B1
31335	CABLE	#151608Z JAN 88 <i>PAR 8/4/2008 F02-071/3</i>	1	1/15/1988	B1

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<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

31324

J. UK
C

<PREC> ROUTINE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUFHLD<DTG> 121040Z SEP 87
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5855
INFO RUEHKK/EC COLLECTIVE
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2378
RUFHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5709
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3807
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 5399
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 3753
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 9582

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: STATUS OF UK-SYRIA RELATIONS

<TEXT>

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LONDON 19790
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: UK, SY, PREL

SUBJECT: STATUS OF UK-SYRIA RELATIONS

REF: (A) DAMASCUS 5036 (B) DAMASCUS 5084

1. CONFIDENTIAL, ENTIRE TEXT.

"BEGIN SUMMARY"

2. SUMMARY: THE FCO TELLS US THAT BRITAIN HAS NO INTENTION OF RESTORING RELATIONS WITH SYRIA BARRING MORE CONCRETE PROGRESS ON THE TERRORIST FRONT, WHICH THEY SEE NO REASON TO EXPECT. WHILE HMG WOULD LIKE SYRIA TO RESTORE OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND AGREE TO A LARGER UK INTEREST SECTION IN DAMASCUS, THE PRICE HMG IS WILLING TO PAY IS STRICTLY LIMITED. END SUMMARY.

"END SUMMARY"

NO CHANGE IN UK SANCTIONS:

3. THE RETURN OF AMBASSADOR EAGLETON TO DAMASCUS HAS LED TO SPECULATION THAT THE UK MIGHT FOLLOW SUIT. THE FCO SAYS THAT HMG'S POSTURE HAS NOT CHANGED, HOWEVER. SYRIA WOULD HAVE TO PUT MUCH MORE PRESSURE ON THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION AND OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS BOTH INSIDE SYRIA AND IN AREAS WHERE SYRIA HAS INFLUENCE (E.G., THE BI'QA), AND REALLY GET RID OF THATCHER'S NEMESIS AL KHOULI. AT THIS POINT OUR FCO COLLEAGUES CAN FORSEE NO LIKELY CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH SYRIA WOULD MEET THESE CONDITIONS.

...BUT HOPES THAT THE SYRIANS WILL LIFT THEIRS:

4. AT THE SAME TIME, THE BRITISH WOULD LIKE SOME MOVEMENT FROM SYRIA ON TWO ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THEM: OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND THE SIZE OF THE UK INTERESTS SECTION IN DAMASCUS. PRESSURE IS GROWING FROM BRITISH AIRLINES FOR HMG ACQUIESCENCE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SYRIANS ON OVERFLIGHTS, AS REROUTING IS VERY EXPENSIVE FOR THE AIRLINES. THE BRITISH HAVE NO REAL PROBLEM WITH THIS, AS IT WAS A SYRIA-INITIATED MEASURE. THEY REALIZE THAT IN RETURN THEY WILL HAVE TO RESTORE THE SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES LONDON ROUTE.

5. THE BRITISH FROM THE BEGINNING HAVE WANTED SIX BRITONS IN DAMASCUS TO AFFORD SOME WINDOW ON INTERNAL SYRIAN AFFAIRS AND TO LOOK AFTER BRITISH CITIZENS. THE

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NIIPR 102-071/3#31324

DATE 8/4/08

BY 107

SYRIANS, IN BAD HUMOR AT THE TIME, INSISTED ON FEWER, BUT CONTINUE TO WANT COMPREHENSIVE VISA SERVICES IN DAMASCUS. BOTH SIDES SEEM READY TO DEAL ON THIS ISSUE, AND THE BRITISH BELIEVE THEY CAN NEGOTIATE AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE IN LINE WITH THEIR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL.

THE PR PROBLEM:

6. THE BRITISH HAVE NOT RUSHED AHEAD ON THE ABOVE TWO ISSUES BECAUSE THEY FEAR THE MEDIA WILL PLAY ANY SUCH MOVES AS CONCESSIONS TO SYRIA. IN ADDITION TO EXPECTED NEGATIVE REACTION FROM THE BRITISH PUBLIC, THIS COULD GIVE SYRIA, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY THE EUROPEANS, THE WRONG IDEA. WHILE THE BRITISH INSIST THEY ARE NOT ISOLATED, THEY ARE SENSITIVE ABOUT APPEARING ISOLATED. AND THEY DO NOT WANT THE JOB OF RECONVINCING OTHER EC GOVERNMENTS OF THEIR SERIOUSNESS. IN ANY CASE, THE FCO IS NOT CERTAIN THAT MINISTERS WILL AGREE TO ANY EARLY EFFORT TO ENGAGE THE SYRIANS.

EAGLETON'S RETURN AND CHEYSSON'S VISIT:

7. THE FCO IS STRAINING TO APPEAR BLASE ABOUT EAGLETON'S RETURN. WHILE TECHNICALLY THEY NEVER ASKED ALLIES TO WITHDRAW AMBASSADORS, THE BRITISH KNOW IT IS DIFFICULT TO PORTRAY THIS MOVE AS ANYTHING BUT A DISPROPORTIONATE REWARD BY THE TOUGHER STANDARDS THEY HAVE SET FOR THEMSELVES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS A SENSE OF RELIEF AT IMPROVED U.S. ACCESS IN DAMASCUS AGAINST THE DAY THAT SOMETHING IMPORTANT HAPPENS (FOR GOOD OR ILL). THEIR RATIONALE IS THAT THE WALTERS VISIT AND RETURN OF THE AMBASSADOR ARE ALL PART OF A C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 LONDON 19790

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: UK, SY, PREL

SUBJECT: STATUS OF UK-SYRIA RELATIONS

SINGLE PHASE RELATED TO SYRIA'S MOVES AGAINST ABU NIDAL IN SYRIA, AND DO NOT PORTEND FURTHER ACTIONS.

8. THE BRITISH WILL RESIST EUROPEAN PRESSURE FOR MORE CONCESSIONS, ESPECIALLY FINANCIAL. THEY MADE IT CLEAR TO CHEYSSON BEFORE HE WENT TO DAMASCUS THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO BLOCK THE THIRD FINANCIAL PROTOCOL (REFTELS), AND WILL REITERATE THEIR POSITION AS OFTEN AS NECESSARY. THE BRITISH ADMIT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY CANNOT STOP PROJECTS UNDER PREVIOUSLY NEGOTIATED PROTOCOLS.

PROGNOSIS:

9. OUR FCO INTERLOCUTORS CONTEND THERE IS NO SPECIFIC EVENT WHICH WOULD TRIGGER RESTORATION OF RELATIONS (SHORT OF THE DEATH OF ASSAD OR AL KHOULI). WHILE THE FCO HAS TRIED TO RESIST THE TEMPTATION FROM OTHER QUARTERS TO UP THE ANTE, THEY EXPECT IT WILL BE SOME TIME (EVEN YEARS) BEFORE THERE ARE SUFFICIENT GROUNDS UNDER THE ORIGINAL GROUND RULES TO RESTORE RELATIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, THEY ARE FINDING THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS SURPRISINGLY SATISFACTORY. AS WITH LIBYA, THE BRITISH HAVE REALIZED THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE NOT THE KEY TO POLITICAL INFLUENCE OR ECONOMIC BENEFITS. PRICE

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31325 CABLE		9	9/18/1987	B1
#181213Z SEP 87				

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21

OK
31326

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Margaret:

We have been very mindful of the heightened level of Soviet activity in the Middle East. The Soviets have been using several different approaches, cleverly varying them for different countries and regions. The Soviet effort to sell MIG-29s to Jordan on very favorable terms is worrisome, particularly because the King now seems far more willing to entertain the offer than previously. We hope your efforts to create an alternative by putting together an attractive package on the Tornado bear fruit; we have already urged the Saudis to be supportive, and we will continue to be as helpful as possible.

Another Soviet approach has been to present a reasonable and active image on the issue of peace. As your letter of September 17 pointed out, and we discussed in Washington last July, this calls for continued activity on our part.

But the activity must be reasoned and enhance the prospects for real movement, not compound them. Unreliable or overly vague proposals which are doomed to failure will not help in the long term. The Soviets are likely to discover this. We are not going to give up on the idea of a conference, but we must face certain realities. Yitzhak Shamir, as the Prime Minister and the head of the Likud, has a great deal of political power. This is particularly true on an issue which arouses such strong popular and political feeling as peace and the future of the Occupied Territories. Recent experience has clearly shown that he cannot be ignored. The Hill mission to Israel conveyed clearly and firmly to Shamir our conviction that new momentum toward peace is a necessity. We are continuing our discussions now with all sides of that government and are proceeding quietly with

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BY LOT NARA DATE 8/4/08

King Hussein on the appropriate next step. Progress, though slow and not yet visible, is being made.

We remain interested in the conference and have told Shamir so. However, we are convinced that going to a conference makes little sense if it promises to deadlock immediately. That's why we believe quiet efforts are essential to develop understandings with the parties on what the negotiations will be about and how they will evolve.

It is also essential that we have a better picture of what the Soviets actually intend on the conference. While seeing welcome signs of tactical flexibility on some of its procedures, we also see the Soviets pressing for an ongoing, authoritative role for the conference; we see them saying different things to the Jordanians, Syrians, PLO, and Israelis about how the conference will work and who will represent the Palestinians; and we see them avoiding responses to our questions posed in July on what they would be prepared to accept in a conference. The King told you that we would be surprised by what Shevardnadze had to say on the conference and Middle East peace; unfortunately, Shevardnadze showed no interest in discussing this subject.

We do not exclude the possibility of Soviet flexibility on the conference, but the signs to date are not encouraging. We will maintain a dialogue with the Soviets and continue our efforts to get negotiations started. As our efforts proceed, I will keep you informed and, as always, will value your assessment.

Sincerely,

The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
London



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

January 8, 1988

31327

TO: S/CT - Clayton E. McManaway
FROM: EUR/NE - Ford Cooper *PMJ for*
SUBJECT: UK Paper on Handling of Terrorist Incidents in
Bermuda and the British Caribbean Dependent
Territories

EUR/NE has only a few comments on the British paper dealing with the handling of terrorist incidents in the Caribbean and Bermuda and your memo of January 4. The first is that the British would be very sensitive about another nation attempting to act independently or without prior British authorization in one of their dependent territories. I believe the British paper's lack of mention of what role the UK would expect the US to play if such a terrorist incident were to occur indicates a British desire to solve such problems themselves.

The British would probably be grateful if US assistance were offered, but they might not necessarily accept it. Successes in the Falklands campaign and in the handling of various terrorist incidents in the UK (including Northern Ireland), has reinforced the British desire to solve security problems which could surface in a British territory themselves.

The British were not enamoured with US actions in Grenada. This also could influence their thinking on this particular topic.

Regarding Bermuda, we agree with the British view that the current "gentleman's agreement" between the commander of the US naval air station (NAS) and the British Governor General leaves much to be desired. The current formula apparently leaves open the question of which nation's "higher authority" would have jurisdiction during a crisis at the base/airport. A more formal understanding would be of great use.

The prosecution by German authorities in West Berlin of persons who hijacked aircraft to Templehof in the American sector could have some useful parallels. U.S. military officers were initially responsible for resolving the hijackings, but German police and legal officials immediately took custody of the perpetrators and were responsible for the investigations and trials.

UK told us in London that long-range use of their air forces is a problem in the Canal area. That is why they want these tanks.

utter nonsense!

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8/4/08

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- 2 -

There appears to be some confusion over whether there actually is a gentleman's agreement. The current NAS commander told our Consul General that no such agreement was in force but that he had specific short-term guidance to cover a hijacking. A letter from COMNAVAIRLANT to the NAS commander, dated April 17, 1987, provided interim guidance and gave three possible scenarios. First, in a terrorist act occurring on property not controlled by the USN (i.e., the civilian part of the airport) the NAS should provide perimeter security only if so asked by a senior British official. Second, in a hijacking incident not involving a U.S. military or USG aircraft, NAS assistance should be limited to providing immediate perimeter security "based on a request from UK/Bermuda authorities." Third, in a terrorist act occurring aboard USN/USG-controlled property, NAS "shall continue to exercise law enforcement authority and responsibilities within the context of the 1941 base agreement." The NAS commander is currently waiting for an answer from CINCLANT to a request for further instructions on the handling of terrorist incidents.

Drafted: EUR/NE: CPeacock &
1/8/88 x78027 0120H

Clearance: EUR/NE: RJohnson
EUR/NE: HPerlow

END

57

Re UK paper:
1) are we going to tell them how we intend the Ashville Sands?
2) who is the hostage negotiator on the staff in Bermuda? Is one then all the time?
3) In some ways the partial measures I all in place are on hand as nothing I all because they give a false sense that we have the problem in hand.

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AGENDA

US-UK Exploratory Talks: Terrorism Contingency Planning for Bermuda and the Caribbean Dependent TerritoriesMORNING SESSION---OES Conference Room (7835)*Threats reviews once every 2 years.*

10:00 AM Opening Remarks by both sides

10:10 AM US Briefing (Tieman and Gray)

Cabinet 1 year.

10:40 AM General Discussion

12:00 Lunch

AFTERNOON SESSION---EB Conference Room 6824

2:00 -

3:30 PM 1. Discussion of U.S. Government Counterterrorism Assistance to the Caribbean.

2. Discussion of HMG Counterterrorism Assistance to the Caribbean.

3. Discussion of U.S. Government Counterterrorism Assistance to Pakistan.

4. Discussion of HMG Counterterrorism Assistance to Pakistan.

3:30 Report on R&D discussions (Jakub)

*- Wants an MOU, - CT help
- Comb Security Agreement sketched*

Wang 0490L

Rager*Mark Cannon Enk**Col. Reg. Hume**Martha Piper*DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS FOI-071/3#31329
By LDI, NARA, Date 8/4/08

- US, UK agree to pursue MOA. -
- concerned - about U.S. Bank
- don't know what support they will need.
 - helos
 - padre
 - black hawk
- want Jroc to set perimeter till they get there -
- communit channel.

UK Attendees

1. Iver Roberts, FCO (your/AA's counterpart)
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]
4. Col Roger Howe, MOD
5. Martin Piper, MOD (will interface with Jakub on R & D)
6. Robert Emble, Pofoff at Emb (Caribbean Specialist) -
Bone & Ricketts will be out of town.

- DES CONF Rm - AM 7835 10-12
- EB " " PM 6824 2-4pm

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31330 MEMO

2 1/11/1988 B1

HUGH HUNTER TO THE DIRECTOR FOR
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, RE: UK PAPER ON
HANDLING TERRORIST INCIDENTS

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Washington, D.C. 20520
January 4, 1938

31331

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MEMORANDUM

TO: CIA/NIO - Mr. Allen
OSD/LIC - Mr. Ropka
CIA/CTC - Ms. Graves
CIA/NESA - Mr. Draper
ARA/CEN - Mr. Zweifel
EUR/WE - Mr. Cooper
INR/TNA - Mr. Sutton

FROM: S/CT - Clayton E. McManaway

SUBJECT: U.K. Paper on Handling of Terrorist Incidents
in Bermuda and the U.K. Caribbean Possessions

Attached is the U.K. paper on handling terrorist incidents in their dependent Caribbean territories and Bermuda. You will recall that this paper was promised to us at our last (October 15) meeting.

The paper addresses the UK role in responding to a terrorist incident, but makes no mention of what - if any - role the UK would envisage for the U.S. After giving us the paper, the British told us that they would hope to see us produce a mirror image of their paper which would deal with the role of U.S. CT forces. Left unsaid is exactly what they would want us to do. The U.K. will have a MOD representative at our next meeting, now scheduled for 1PM Thursday, January 21 in the S/CT Conference Room (Room 2236). Our side should also have a military representative of a sufficiently high level to be able to speak authoritatively about a possible U.S. role. The U.K. side will be led by Ivor Roberts, the deputy director of the FCO's counter-terrorism office. (He led the earlier delegation.)

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DECL: OADR

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NLRR F02-071/3#31331
BY LOI NARA DATE 8/4/08

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I would appreciate your written comments on the attached paper. They should be sent to Tom Miller in my office by COB Friday, January 8. Included in your comments should be any questions/clarifications you may have to the U.K. paper. To plan for the January 21 meeting, Ambassador Al Adams will chair an inter-agency meeting in S/CT at 10am, Tuesday January 12. DOD would be asked to provide a concept paper on the envisaged U.S. role for that meeting.

Please phone Tom Miller to confirm your participation at the January 12 meeting.

. cc: Mr. Lambacher
Colonel Daly
Ambassador Bremer
Ambassador Adams

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31332	PAPER HANDLING OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS	4	12/29/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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31333

COMMENTS ON BRITISH CARIBBEAN PAPER:

This seems to describe the standard British response to a terrorist incident anywhere in the world. There seems to be no difference between the anticipated response regardless of whether the incident occurs in the Caribbean or in Europe.

There appear to be two very different scenarios involved here.

1. In the British Dependent Territories, the British are clearly in charge and the paper makes no mention of any U.S. assistance. The best we can do is to offer up the EST, and perhaps JSOC, on the simple grounds that we can get there much faster than the British can. It is likely that, even if the British accept, we would be viewed as a temporary expedient which would be replaced by the British authorities once they arrive.

2. In Bermuda there seems to be a potential for a very different situation. It seems that in any incident which occurs in the U.S. portion of the airport (how large is that?), we would end up with U.S. Marines manning the inner perimeter and a U.S. military negotiator on the phone with the terrorists. We know nothing about the qualifications of that negotiator but, whether good or bad, he would place the U.S. Government in the position of dealing directly with the terrorists. In such a case, it should be mandatory to get the EST on scene as quickly as possible and JSOC as well. As the British paper points out, it would be useful to have some sort of agreement on this in advance.

Tom Miller

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NLRB FO2-071/3#31333

BY NOT NARA DATE 8/4/08

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OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

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APPROVED BY: IHR/C:JWANT

S/CT:CMCHANAWAY

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ROGER CHANNEL

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS ROOC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PINR, PFEL, CASC, MARR, UK, MII, TK, AV,
CJ

SUBJECT: US-UK EXPLORATORY TALKS: TERRORISM
CONTINGENCY PLANNING

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE SECOND JOINT DISCUSSION ON TERRORISM CONTINGENCY
PLANNING FOR BERMUDA AND THE CARIBBEAN DEPENDENT
TERRITORIES WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE DEPARTMENT JANUARY

21. WE ENVISION A TWO SESSION MEETING WITH THE MORNING
(10AM-NOON) DEVOTED TO HOW TERRORIST INCIDENTS MIGHT BE
HANDLED AND A 1 1/2 HOUR (2-3:30 PM) AFTERNOON SESSION TO
A DISCUSSION OF TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS THE
DEPENDENT CARIBBEAN TERRITORIES AND PAKISTAN. AS AGREED
AT THE LAST DISCUSSION, OCTOBER 15, THE UK HAS PROVIDED A
PAPER WHICH ADDRESSES THE UK PROCEDURES IN RESPONDING TO
A TERRORIST INCIDENT. AT THE MEETING, WE WILL BE
PREPARED TO MAKE A PRESENTATION ON HOW THE US RESPONDS TO
INCIDENTS, IF THAT IS DESIRED.

3. UNFORTUNATELY, THE UK PAPER MAKES NO MENTION OF WHAT -
IF ANY - ROLE THE UK WOULD SEE FOR THE US IN A TERRORIST

INCIDENT. WE HAD ANTICIPATED THAT THE UK PAPER WOULD
ADDRESS THIS QUESTION AS WELL AS WHAT ASSISTANCE THE UK
WOULD DESIRE FROM THE US, E.G., LOGISTICAL SUPPORT. FOR
THE NEXT MEETING TO BE PRODUCTIVE, WE WILL NEED TO GET AT
THESE QUESTIONS. OUR APPROACH TO ACHIEVING THIS WILL BE
TO POSE A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ORGANIZED BY THE POSSIBLE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF AN INCIDENT. FOR STARTERS, WE FORESEE
THREE DIFFERENT CONTEXTS IN WHICH THE US MIGHT GET
INVOLVED IN A TERRORIST INCIDENT.

(1) AN INCIDENT IN A US CONTROLLED FACILITY SUCH
AS THE NAVAL AIR STATION IN BERMUDA WHICH WOULD LEAD TO
DIRECT US INVOLVEMENT.

(2) AN INCIDENT INVOLVING US CITIZENS OR ABOARD A
US FLAG CARRIER AT OTHER LOCATIONS IN BERMUDA OR THE
DEPENDENT TERRITORIES WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO DIRECT US
INVOLVEMENT.

(3) AN INCIDENT NOT AFFECTING US CITIZENS IN
WHICH THE UK MIGHT REQUEST US INVOLVEMENT.

(4) AN INCIDENT NOT AFFECTING US CITIZENS OR
DIRECT US INVOLVEMENT IN WHICH THE UK MIGHT DESIRE US
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

4. WE UNDERSTAND THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF TERRORIST EVENTS
AND THE NUMEROUS SCENARIOS WHICH WOULD COME INTO PLAY,
HOWEVER IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ABOVE AND TO ASCERTAIN
THEIR THINKING REGARDING THE US ROLE, WE HAVE DRAWN UP A
SET OF QUESTIONS WHICH WE WOULD LIKE THE BRITISH TO BE
READY TO ADDRESS AT OUR JOINT DISCUSSION:

3. A. DOES HMG WISH TO HAVE A FORMAL MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE HANDLING OF TERRORIST
INCIDENTS?

B. WHAT TYPE OF CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS WOULD HMG
ENVISION TO ASSURE IMMEDIATE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
BETWEEN OFFICIALS OF BOTH SIDES ONCE AN INCIDENT HAS
OCCURRED? WHAT KIND OF SPECIALIZED COMMUNICATION
REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE NEEDED?

C. HAS HMG ANY SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR LOGISTICAL
ASSISTANCE FROM THE US? UNDER WHICH SPECIFIC SCENARIOS
WOULD ASSISTANCE (AND WHAT KIND) BE REQUESTED?

D. WOULD HMG ANTICIPATE THE NEED FOR SPECIALIZED US
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT?

E. WE CAN ENVISION SITUATIONS IN WHICH THERE WOULD BE A
TIME LAPSE BETWEEN THE ONSET OF INCIDENTS AND THE ARRIVAL
OF UK CT FORCES. THE GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY OF US CT
FORCES WOULD ENABLE THEM TO REACH THE INCIDENT IN ADVANCE
OF THE UK FORCES. IF IT WERE DECIDED THAT US FORCES WERE
NEEDED, WHAT ROLE WOULD HMG EXPECT THEM TO HAVE AND FOR
WHAT TIME PERIOD? WHAT WOULD BE THE COMMAND AND CONTROL
ARRANGEMENTS?

F. WHAT SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS NEED TO BE PLANNED FOR A
POSSIBLE INCIDENT IN BERMUDA GIVEN THE 1952 US-UK
AGREEMENT? WHAT IF ANY OTHER AGREEMENTS EXIST IN THE
DEPENDENT TERRITORIES THAT WOULD REQUIRE SPECIAL
ARRANGEMENTS?

G. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE PROVIDE FCO WITH OUR SET OF
QUESTIONS, IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO
ADDRESS THEM AT OUR MEETING. SHULTZ

S/CT

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BY LOI NARA DATE 8/4/08

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INCOMING
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MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS RODCA

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PINR, PREL, CASC, MARR, UK, MH, TK, AV, CJ
SUBJECT: U.S.-UK EXPLORATORY TALKS: TERRORISM
CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

REF: STATE 11958

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE DISCUSSED THE TERRORISM CONTINGENCY PLANNING
ISSUES RAISED IN REFTEL WITH IVOR ROBERTS, DIRECTOR OF
THE FCO'S SECURITY COORDINATION DEPARTMENT, WHO WILL BE
WITH THE UK TEAM IN WASHINGTON FOR THE JANUARY 21
TALKS. WE ALSO PASSED TO ROBERTS A PAPER WITH THE
QUESTIONS PROVIDED IN REFTEL, AND SAID WE HOPE THE UK
SIDE WILL BE ABLE TO ADDRESS THESE QUESTIONS IN THE
WASHINGTON MEETING.

3. ROBERTS SAID HE COULD NOT GIVE ANY IMMEDIATE
RESPONSE, BUT THAT HE WOULD BE CHAIRING A MEETING ON THE
AFTERNOON OF JANUARY 19 TO PREPARE THE UK TEAM MEMBERS
FOR THE DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON AND WOULD USE OUR
QUESTIONS AS PART OF HIS MEETING AGENDA.

4. WE WILL SPEAK WITH ROBERTS AGAIN AFTER HIS MEETING
ON JANUARY 19 TO LEARN WHETHER HE HAS ANY RESPONSE TO
OUR QUESTIONS AND, IF SO, WE WILL REPORT. PRICE

S/CT

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NLS FOI-071/3#31335

By LOT, NARA, Date 8/4/08

~~SECRET~~