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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name ~~MENAMARA, THOMAS E. FILES~~
Counterterrorism and Narcotics

Withdrawer

DLB 12/27/2006

File Folder UNITED KINGDOM (FEBRUARY 1988-OCTOBER 1988)

FOIA

F02-071/3

Box Number 9227 RAC Box 10

COLLINS

9

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
31336	COVER	COVER SHEET PAR 8/4/2008 F02-071/3	1	ND	B1
31337	CABLE	DRAFT CABLE, NO CABLE NUMBER, RE: SECOND US-UK TALKS PAR 8/4/2008 F02-071/3	5	2/2/1988	B1
31338	CABLE	#230005Z FEB 88 R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3	2	2/23/1988	B1
31339	CABLE	#262245Z FEB 88 D 10/26/2011 F2002-071/3	7	2/26/1988	B1 B3
31340	CABLE	#210026Z MAY 88	6	5/21/1988	B1
31341	CABLE	#121815Z SEP 88 R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3	2	9/12/1988	B1
31342	CABLE	NUMBER UNUSED			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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GL: S/CT: MILLER	ARA/CAR: KENNEDY
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CAPTIONS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PREL, PINR, CASC, MARR, UK, MH, TK, AV, CJ

SUBJECT: SECOND US-UK TALKS: COUNTER-TERRORISM CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE UK'S CARIBBEAN DEPENDENT TERRITORIES

REFS: {A} STATE 011958; {B} 87 STATE 330486; {C} HAMILTON 7208

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE SECOND US-UK DISCUSSIONS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR BERMUDA AND THE CARIBBEAN DEPENDENT TERRITORIES WERE HELD IN THE DEPARTMENT ON JANUARY 21. THE UK ORIGINALLY APPROACHED US ON THIS ISSUE BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCERN THAT THE COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPABILITIES OF THE LOCAL ISLAND AUTHORITIES WERE INADEQUATE AND WOULD REQUIRE OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE. THE UK RECOGNIZED THAT BECAUSE OF OUR GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY, WE COULD HAVE FORCES ON SITE 6-12 HOURS BEFORE THEM. HOWEVER, THEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY ARE SOVEREIGN IN THESE TERRITORIES AND WOULD IN MOST CASES BE RESPONSIBLE FOR RESOLVING ANY TERRORIST INCIDENT. HOWEVER, THE US MIGHT BE CALLED UPON TO

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PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT. BERMUDA, WHERE WE HAVE A LEASED NAVAL BASE, IS A SPECIAL CASE REQUIRING FURTHER CLARIFICATION.

IT WAS AGREED THAT A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES SHOULD BE DRAWN UP TO ESTABLISH PARAMETERS OF COOPERATION UNDER VARIOUS TERRORIST SCENARIOS AND AN OUTLINE WAS PREPARED. THE BRITISH PROMISED TO PROVIDE US WITH A DRAFT BEFORE THE NEXT MEETING.

ALSO DISCUSSED WERE WAYS TO COMPLEMENT OUR COUNTER-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN THE CARIBBEAN AND PAKISTAN. END SUMMARY.

3. THE MEETINGS WITH THE UK CONSISTED OF TWO DISTINCT SEGMENTS: (A) PLANNING FOR A TERRORIST INCIDENT IN THE UK-CARIBBEAN TERRITORIES (PARAS. 5-9) AND COUNTER-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE IN PAKISTAN AND THE CARIBBEAN (PARAS. 10-19).

4. THE SECOND US-UK TALKS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR BERMUDA AND THE UK-CARIBBEAN DEPENDENT TERRITORIES TOOK PLACE AT THE DEPARTMENT ON JANUARY 21. HEADING THE UK DELEGATION WAS IVOR ROBERTS (DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM IN THE FCO). THE US DELEGATION WAS LED BY AMBASSADOR CLAYTON E. MC MANAWAY, JR., S/CT.

5. THE US SIDE OPENED WITH A BRIEFING ON OVERALL USG STRUCTURE FOR MANAGING THE RESPONSE TO TERRORIST INCIDENTS. THE BRIEFING INCLUDED DISCUSSION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP, POLICY REVIEW GROUP, INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION AND EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM (EST) AND JSOC. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTIONS THE US HAD POSED TO UK THE WEEK BEFORE. (SEE REFTEL A)

6. THE UK REPRESENTATIVES REITERATED HMG'S POSITION THAT THE BRITISH TERRITORIES IN THE CARIBBEAN ARE AS MUCH A PART OF THE UK AS WALES AND SCOTLAND. THE DIFFERENCE IS THAT THEY ARE SIMPLY A LONG DISTANCE AWAY, THERE IS A LIMITED CIVILIAN LAW AND ORDER INFRASTRUCTURE, AND IN MOST OF THEM THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO MILITARY AND LITTLE POLICE CAPABILITY. HMG RECOGNIZED THAT GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY WOULD ALLOW US COUNTER-TERRORISM FORCES TO ARRIVE ON SITE 6-12 HOURS BEFORE THE BRITISH, AND THAT, THEREFORE, THE US MAY BE ASKED TO PERFORM A "HOLDING OPERATION" UNTIL UK FORCES ARRIVE. WHILE THE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE EVENT OF A TERRORIST INCIDENT LIES

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PAGE 3

WITH HMG, HMG ALSO MIGHT NEED US ASSISTANCE AFTER BRITISH FORCES ARRIVE ON THE SCENE. THE UK ALSO SAW MERIT IN ASKING FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF THE US EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM (EST), ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO CONCLUSION AS TO WHAT THE EST'S ROLE WOULD BE AFTER ITS UK COUNTERPART ARRIVED. THIS WILL HAVE TO BE CLARIFIED IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS.

7. IN THE DISCUSSIONS LAST YEAR (REFTEL B), THE FCO REPRESENTATIVES HAD INTERPRETED LANGUAGE IN THE 1952 BERMUDA BASE AGREEMENT AS GRANTING FULL JURISDICTION TO THE US IN ALL OF BERMUDA SHOULD A TERRORIST INCIDENT ARISE, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE US WOULD NOTIFY HMG IN ADVANCE OF TAKING ACTION. HOWEVER, IN THESE SECOND DISCUSSIONS, THE UK SAID THAT THE AIRPORT WAS ON LAND LEASED TO THE US, THE AIR TERMINAL HAD BEEN LEASED BACK TO THE UK, AND THE US NAVY IS ONLY RESPONSIBLE FOR BASE SECURITY, AN INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING EXISTS WITH THE US BASE COMMANDER IN WHICH HE AGREES TO TURN ANY INCIDENT OVER TO BERMUDA AUTHORITIES (THIS PARALLELS REFTEL C).

8. THERE WAS A DISCUSSION OF CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION, ISSUES OF COMMAND AND CONTROL AND RESPECTIVE ROLES AND RESPONSE TIMES WHICH LEFT SOME UNCERTAINTIES WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREED NEEDED FURTHER CLARIFICATION, POSSIBLY IN A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OR STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT ANY SUCH AGREEMENT MUST BE BROAD ENOUGH TO COVER MOST TERRORIST SCENARIOS AND THAT THE PRIMARY AREA IN WHICH THE US WOULD BE ASKED FOR HELP WOULD BE LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE.

9. HMG SAID IT WOULD LIKE TO WORK WITH THE US ON A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OR STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES TO ESTABLISH PARAMETERS OF COOPERATION UNDER VARIOUS TERRORIST SCENARIOS. A SUB-GROUP COMPOSED OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN REPRESENTATIVES FROM BOTH SIDES DREW UP A TWO-PAGE OUTLINE. HMG PROMISED TO PROVIDE THE US WITH A DRAFT BASED UPON THIS OUTLINE BEFORE THE NEXT FULL BILATERAL MEETING IN MAY.

10. THERE WAS A REVIEW OF UK AND US EFFORTS TO PROVIDE ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN AND IN THE UK DEPENDENT TERRITORIES IN THE CARIBBEAN.

11. PAKISTAN: [REDACTED] OF MIB BRIEFED ON THE TRAINING PROGRAMS BEING OFFERED IN PAKISTAN BY THE BRITISH. HE SAID THAT THE UK OFFERED SUCH AID IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST MADE BY PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO DURING HIS UK TRIP IN APRIL, 1987. FOLLOWING THAT TRIP, [REDACTED]

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PAGE 4

VISITED PAKISTAN AND DEVELOPED A TRAINING PROGRAM. BASED ON THIS PLAN, THE BRITISH PROVIDED A TWO DAY SEMINAR IN NOVEMBER, 1987 FOR SENIOR POLICE/CRISIS MANAGERS. A COURSE FOR 24 AVIATION SECURITY OFFICERS FROM THROUGHOUT PAKISTAN WAS JUST OFFERED IN KARACHI. TWO BRITISH POLICE FROM LONDON MPD ARE NOW IN PAKISTAN OFFERING AN EXPLOSIVE ORDINANCE DISPOSAL COURSE. TRAINING IN KEY POINT SECURITY WILL BE OFFERED THIS APRIL OR MAY.

12. [REDACTED]

13. [REDACTED]

14. DAVE EPSTEIN OF STATE BRIEFED ON ATA TRAINING AND ITS CURRENT PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY WITH THE BOMB DOG COURSE. HE SUMMARIZED A NEW COURSE IN INTER-DEPARTMENTAL POLICE COORDINATION BEING DEVELOPED FOR THE GOP.

15. THE DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO THE ISSUE OF IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO THE GOP. ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN PAKISTAN INVOLVE THE INTERNAL {DIS}ORGANIZATION OF THE GOP FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM AND THE DIFFICULTY IN IDENTIFYING THE RIGHT OFFICIALS FOR TRAINING. [REDACTED] NOTED THAT THE UK HAS GOOD CONTACTS AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL, BUT NOT AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVELS. A CONSENSUS EMERGED THAT MORE EFFECTIVE TRAINING IN PAKISTAN REQUIRES THAT THE FOCUS OF ASSISTANCE DEVOLVE TO THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE US AND UK AMBASSADORS IN ISLAMABAD WOULD MAKE A DEMARCHE "AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL" TO THE GOP EXPRESSING THE JOINT US/UK BELIEF THAT EFFORTS HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE GOP'S COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORT. DEMARCHE {SUBJECT OF SEPTELS} WILL BE DRAFTED BY US. IT WILL COUPLE OFFERS OF ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE FROM US AND THE UK WITH SUGGESTIONS THAT THE GOP NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS INTERNAL COORDINATION ON COUNTER-TERRORISM AND HELP IDENTIFY TRAINING CANDIDATES AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL FOR OUR ASSISTANCE TO BE EFFECTIVE.

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PAGE 5

LEVEL FOR OUR ASSISTANCE TO BE EFFECTIVE.

16. CARIBBEAN: THE MEETING THEN TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF SIMILAR ASSISTANCE TO THE CARIBBEAN. NEITHER GOVERNMENT OFFERS EXTENSIVE ASSISTANCE IN THAT REGION, ALTHOUGH BOTH RECOGNIZE THAT THE CARIBBEAN OFFERS A POSSIBLE "TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY" TO TERRORISTS WHO WISH TO LAUNCH AN OPERATION TARGETED AT US AND UK INTERESTS.

17. HMG PROVIDES LIMITED POLICE TRAINING TO COMMONWEALTH NATIONS AND DEPENDENT TERRITORIES. US ASSISTANCE INVOLVES POLICE AND MARITIME SECURITY ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE ATA PROGRAM, AS WELL AS OTHER TRAINING PROVIDED BY ~~FAA~~, DEA AND THE COAST GUARD.

18. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE LARGE NUMBERS OF CANADIAN TOURISTS VISITING THE CARIBBEAN ANNUALLY AND THAT CANADA HAS AN AIRPORT SECURITY PROGRAM IN THE CARIBBEAN, IT WAS AGREED THAT TRILATERAL TALKS SHOULD BE HELD WITH THE CANADIANS. THE TALKS WOULD FOLLOW OR PRECEDE A MARCH SCHEDULED SUMMIT-7 EXPERTS MEETING ON TERRORISM IN OTTAWA. THE UK REPRESENTATIVES AGREED THAT THEY WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN WORKING WITH THE CANADIANS TO SET UP THIS MEETING.

19. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT THE US AND HMG REPRESENTATIVES WOULD MEET IN OTTAWA AT THAT TIME TO DISCUSS COUNTER-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE EFFORTS BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS IN AFRICA WHERE THE UK HAS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES. THE US AND UK AGREED TO ESTABLISH FORMAL POINTS OF CONTACT FOR ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE. THE POINTS OF CONTACT ARE ~~UK~~ AND TERRY LAMBACHER {S/CT}.

20. PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD REGARDING THE US PROPOSAL TO JOINTLY ADDRESS COUNTER-TERRORISM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT {R&D} ISSUES IN THE AREAS OF EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL AND TERRORIST USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS. THE UK SIDE AGREED TO BRIEF HIS SUPERIORS ON RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSION WITH A VIEW TOWARD RECOMMENDING CONCURRENCE WITH THE US PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT CONFERENCE OF OUR RESPECTIVE TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVES IN THE MID TO LATE MARCH TIMEFRAME. UK SIDE IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN R&D EFFORTS IN THE CHEMICAL-BIOLOGICAL AREA. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THE BRITISH SIDE HOWEVER ARE NECESSARY FOR THEM TO IDENTIFY AREAS WITHIN THE EOD FIELD IN WHICH THEY WILL BE ABLE TO SHARE DATA WITH THE US. YYY

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<DIST>SIT: VAX

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<TO>TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0000

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PROPOSED JOINT DEMARCHE CONCERNING ANTI-
-- TERRORISM ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

31338

<TEXT>

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 054148
EXDIS FOR AMBASSADOR RAPHEL FROM AMBASSADOR BREMER
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, PK, UK
SUBJECT: PROPOSED JOINT DEMARCHE CONCERNING ANTI-
-- TERRORISM ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I AM SORRY THAT WE WERE UNABLE TO MEET DURING YOUR RECENT VISIT. I HAD PLANNED ON DISCUSSING WITH YOU THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM ASSISTANCE TO THE GOP AS WELL AS THE GOP'S CAPABILITIES IN THIS AREA.

3. I WANTED TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES AS AN OUTGROWTH OF BILATERAL MEETINGS THAT I CHAIRED WITH A UK COUNTERTERRORISM DELEGATION ON 21 JANUARY. THE BRITISH PROPOSED THAT THE MEETING DISCUSS, INTER ALIA, COUNTERTERRORISM ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN. THE BRITISH SUGGESTED, IN LIGHT OF THE DIFFICULTIES (FOR EXAMPLE OUR PROBLEM WITH THE BOMB AND COURSE AND THEIRS WITH IDENTIFYING CANDIDATES FOR ASSISTANCE AT THE PROVINCIAL LEVEL) THAT A JOINT DEMARCHE "AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL" MIGHT BE IN ORDER TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF SENIOR PAKISTANI OFFICIALS OUR SHARED CONCERNS ABOUT COUNTERTERRORISM ASSISTANCE.

4. I AGREED THAT WE WOULD DRAFT SUCH A DEMARCHE AND SEND IT OUT TO LONDON AND ISLAMABAD FOR COMMENTS. WHILE I HAD HOPED TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH YOU BEFORE RELEASING THE DRAFT DEMARCHE, THIS HAS PROVEN IMPOSSIBLE.

5. FOLLOWING IS THE PROPOSED TEXT OF THE DEMARCHE WHICH YOU AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN ISLAMABAD WILL BE REQUESTED TO DELIVER "AT THE HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL." I LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING YOUR COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS.

-- HMG AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT SHARE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN ITS DEEP CONCERN OVER THE TERRORIST CAMPAIGN BEING DIRECTED AT PAKISTAN BY THE KABUL REGIME AND, BY EXTENSION, ITS SOVIET BACKERS. THIS CAMPAIGN TO CHANGE PAKISTAN'S PRINCIPLED SUPPORT OF AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND ITS LONGSTANDING ATTITUDE OF TOLERANCE AND HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO THREE MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES DEMANDS AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE FROM ALL CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS.

-- BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN'S RESOLVE TO CONFRONT THIS TERROR CAMPAIGN. YET, THE TERROR CAMPAIGN CONTINUES AND HAS INCREASED IN INTENSITY IN RECENT MONTHS.

-- BOTH HMG AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ARE

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BY 101 NARA DATE 8/14/88

PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN IN DEALING WITH THIS TERROR CAMPAIGN. WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN EXPANDING OUR TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO ENHANCE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE GOP'S INTELLIGENCE AND POLICE TO DEAL WITH THIS THREAT. -- AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, BOTH OF OUR GOVERNMENTS WANT TO ENSURE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS OF ASSISTANCE ALREADY PROVIDED TO THE GOP THROUGH OUR BILATERAL PROGRAMS. WE BELIEVE THAT FOR OUR ASSISTANCE TO REACH ITS FULL POTENTIAL WILL REQUIRE THE SUPPORT AND ATTENTION OF SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOP. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE TWO SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WE WISH TO MAKE WHICH ARE BASED ON OUR EXPERIENCE IN COORDINATING COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING OUR OWN.

A. WE ENCOURAGE THE GOP TO CONSIDER ESTABLISHING AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL AN OFFICE RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS. THIS OFFICE WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING, AND IF NECESSARY DIRECTING, THE VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE, POLICE AND MILITARY UNITS INVOLVED IN COUNTERTERRORISM TO WORK TOGETHER. IT COULD ALSO TAKE THE LEAD IN ENSURING THAT THERE IS AN EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AMONG THE PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES AND BETWEEN THOSE OFFICIALS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. SUCH AN EXCHANGE WOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT INFORMATION IS SENT TO PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS FROM THE FEDERAL LEVEL. BOTH GOVERNMENTS BELIEVE THAT SUCH AN ORGANIZED EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IS ESSENTIAL IF THIS TERRORIST THREAT IS TO BE DEALT WITH EFFECTIVELY.

B. A SECOND RECOMMENDATION IS THAT THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES WORK WITH OUR GOVERNMENTS AND WITH PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL COUNTERPARTS TO IDENTIFY SUITABLE CANDIDATES FOR COUNTERTERRORISM TRAINING. AS YOU MAY KNOW, SOME OF OUR TRAINING EFFORTS HAVE EXPERIENCED PROBLEMS IN THE APPROPRIATENESS OF CANDIDATES SELECTED FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE. SINCE MUCH OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THWARTING THIS TERROR CAMPAIGN RESTS WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, WE WOULD LIKE TO WORK MORE CLOSELY AT THAT LEVEL IN IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE CANDIDATES FOR SUCH TRAINING. WE RECOGNIZE THAT SETTING UP THIS SYSTEM FOR ALL PROVINCES WILL BE DIFFICULT, AND WOULD SUGGEST THAT THIS PROPOSAL BE TESTED ON A TRIAL BASIS IN THE NWFP. WE WOULD ASK THAT THE GOP APPOINT A LIAISON OFFICIAL IN PESHAWAR WHO CAN WORK WITH OUR EMBASSIES IN IDENTIFYING OFFICIALS WHO WOULD BENEFIT MOST FROM OUR ASSISTANCE. WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN IDENTIFYING SUCH CANDIDATES FROM THOSE AREAS WHICH ARE MOST AT RISK FROM THIS TERROR CAMPAIGN. ON OUR PART, WE WILL ENDEAVOR TO ENSURE THAT THESE CANDIDATES RECEIVE PROMPT AND APPROPRIATE TRAINING FROM PROGRAMS OFFERED BY EITHER OF OUR GOVERNMENTS. WHITEHEAD

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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

MCNAMARA, THOMAS E.: FILES

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DLB 12/27/2006

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UNITED KINGDOM (FEBRUARY 1988-OCTOBER 1988)

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	Document Description			
31339	CABLE	7	2/26/1988	B1
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31340	CABLE #210026Z MAY 88	6	5/21/1988	B1

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RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3427
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1819
RUEHMT/AMCONSUL MONTREAL 1581
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6502
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 9141

ok
31341

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: S/CT AMBASSADOR BREMER DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON
WITH UK COUNTER-TERRORISM OFFICIALS

<TEXT>

S E ~~C~~ R E T LONDON 19386

TERREP

MONTREAL FOR THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE ICAO

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, ICAO, IMO, UK, FR, LY, PK

SUBJECT: S/CT AMBASSADOR BREMER DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON
WITH UK COUNTER-TERRORISM OFFICIALS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR BREMER TOLD UK COUNTER-TERRORISM OFFICIALS THE U.S. WILL REQUIRE THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TAKE CONVINCING STEPS TO DEAL WITH THE NOVEMBER 17 TERRORIST GROUP BEFORE THE U.S. WILL GIVE CT ASSISTANCE TO GREECE. THE TWO SIDES DISCUSSED PROSPECTS FOR CT ACTION BY THE TREVI UNDER GREEK LEADERSHIP; THE UK SIDE SAID THAT GREECE APPEARS TO BE TRYING TO GIVE THE IMAGE IT WANTS TO DO WELL IN THE TREVI. THE NEXT SESSION OF THE U.S./UK BIENNIAL CT TALKS WILL BE EARLY IN THE WEEK OF DECEMBER 5-9. BREMER ASKED THAT WE USE THE OCCASION AS A DEADLINE FOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES, ESPECIALLY BILATERAL MOU'S ON R AND D EXCHANGES AND THE CARIBBEAN.

BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN PROBABLY WILL NOT DECREASE, AND THAT THE GOP NEEDS TO BE PUSHED AGAIN ON THE NEED TO INCREASE ITS CT CAPABILITIES. THEY AGREED TO CONSIDER A FOLLOW-UP TO OUR JOINT APPROACH TO THE PAKISTANIS.

BREMER OUTLINED OUR CONCERNS ABOUT LIBYA, INCLUDING ITS CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, ITS ACQUISITION OF A CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE CW, AND ITS SUCCESSES IN ENDING ITS DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION. THE UK OFFICIALS SAID THAT THEY HAVE ARGUED ABOUT THE LIBYAN THREAT AMONG EUROPEANS. THE UK SIDE SAID THAT HMG HAS NOT CHANGED ITS POLICY OF NO CONCESSIONS FOR THE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES, THAT THERE ARE NO NEGOTIATIONS UNDERWAY BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS CONCERNING THE UK CITIZEN HOSTAGES IN LEBANON, AND THAT HMG DOES NOT EXPECT ANY EARLY RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. THE UK OFFICIALS AGREED WE SHOULD MAKE CERTAIN THAT, UNDER THE FRENCH CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE SUMMIT SEVEN, THERE WILL CONTINUE TO BE REGULAR MEETINGS OF CT EXPERTS.

S/CT STAFF SHOULD NOTE THESE ACTIONS ITEMS: THERE ARE CALENDAR ISSUES FOR DECISION IN PARAS 7 (UK HOME OFFICE OFFICIAL IN WASHINGTON OCTOBER 24) AND 11 (EARLY DECEMBER DATES FOR U.S./UK CT BILATERAL TALKS). PARA 13 REFERS TO A PROPOSAL TO SEND DEPARTMENT LAWYERS TO LONDON TO CONFER WITH UK COUNTERPARTS ON THE CARIBBEAN CT MOU.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 102-071/3#31341

BY ~~AA~~ NARA DATE 8/4/08

END SUMMARY.
~END SUMMARY~

3. S/CT AMBASSADOR L. PAUL BREMER MET IN LONDON ON
SEPTEMBER 8 WITH FCO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY JOHN BOYD
AND FCO SECURITY COORDINATION DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR IVOR
ROBERTS. ROSS RODGERS OF EMBASSY LONDON ACCOMPANIED AND
TOOK NOTES.

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quick

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: WIDESPREAD CRITICISM OF HMG BAN ON TV AND RADIO INTERVIEWS
WITH SINN FEIN AND OTHER TERRORIST SUPPORTERS

<TEXT>

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TERREP

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PTER, ASEC, PHUM, UK, EI

SUBJECT: WIDESPREAD CRITICISM OF HMG BAN ON TV AND RADIO INTERVIEWS
WITH SINN FEIN AND OTHER TERRORIST SUPPORTERS

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

1. SUMMARY

HMG HAS BANNED TELEVISION AND RADIO STATIONS FROM BROADCASTING SPEECHES AND INTERVIEWS OF MEMBERS OF SINN FEIN (SF) AND OTHER GROUPS WHICH SUPPORT TERRORISM. THE BAN IS SIMILAR TO THAT IN FORCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND SINCE THE EARLY 1970'S. SUPPORTERS OF THE BAN INCLUDE UNIONISTS, WHO CALL IT A FIRST SMALL STEP IN COMBATING TERRORISM, AND THE CHURCH OF IRELAND'S PRIMATE. CRITICISM OF THE BAN HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD AND SCATHING. LABOR, DEMOCRAT, SOCIAL DEMOCRAT AND LABOR, AND ALLIANCE PARTY LEADERS HAVE WARNED THAT THE BAN WILL BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. A CONSERVATIVE MP CALLED THE BAN A "VERY GREAT MISTAKE" AND CHARGED THAT "AUTHORITARIAN TRENDS IN BRITAIN TODAY ARE DISTURBING MPS IN ALL PARTS OF THE HOUSE." TO CIRCUMVENT THE BAN, SF WILL LIKELY USE MOBILE RADIO VANS TO BROADCAST ON FREQUENCIES CLOSE TO EXISTING WAVEBANDS.

2. THE GOVERNMENT IS REPORTED TO BE CONSIDERING OTHER ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES SUCH AS CONVICTION OF PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (PIRA) MEMBERSHIP ON EVIDENCE OF A SINGLE POLICEMAN AND EXCLUSION OF ELECTION CANDIDATES WHO REFUSE TO TAKE AN ANTI-VIOLENCE OATH. HMG HAS BEEN UNDER PRESSURE TO "DO SOMETHING" ABOUT TERRORISM, AND THESE MOVES STEM FROM A SECURITY REVIEW ORDERED AFTER THIS SUMMER'S SURGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY. END SUMMARY.

3. HMG BANS SINN FEIN TV AND RADIO INTERVIEWS

HOME SECRETARY DOUGLAS HURD ANNOUNCED ON OCTOBER 19 A BAN ON RADIO AND TELEVISION INTERVIEWS WITH MEMBERS OF SF, REPUBLICAN SINN FEIN, PIRA, IRISH NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY, ULSTER VOLUNTEER FORCE, ULSTER FREEDOM FIGHTERS, AND ULSTER DEFENCE ASSOCIATION. STATEMENTS BY ANY PERSON SUPPORTING OR INVITING SUPPORT FOR THOSE ORGANIZATIONS ARE ALSO BANNED FROM BROADCAST. HMG THUS HOPES TO CUT OFF "THE OXYGEN OF PUBLICITY FOR TERRORISM." THE GOVERNMENT ACTION, TAKEN UNDER THE TERMS OF THE BBC LICENSE AND THE BROADCASTING ACT, BECOMES EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY. THE BAN WILL BAR SF'S 56 ELECTED COUNCILLORS AND ONE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FROM SPEAKING ON RADIO AND TELEVISION. IT IS THE FIRST TIME IN BRITAIN THAT INTERVIEWS WITH ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN BANNED. THE BAN, HOWEVER, WILL HAVE ONLY LIMITED OPERATION DURING ELECTION CAMPAIGNS. WHILE MEMBERS OF THE ABOVE GROUPS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SPEAK ON TV OR RADIO, BROADCASTERS WILL BE ABLE TO QUOTE FROM THEIR STATEMENTS. THE BAN RUNS CONTRARY TO THE ADVICE OF THE STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OF LORD COLVILLE, WHO RECOMMENDED IN THE 1987 REVIEW OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT THAT POWERS TO CURB BROADCASTS BE ABOLISHED.

4. CHURCH OF IRELAND SUPPORTS BAN

CHURCH OF IRELAND PRIMATE ROBIN EAMES, CLAIMING TERRORISTS USED THE AIRWAVES AS A PROPAGANDA MACHINE, RECENTLY CALLED FOR SUCH A BAN ON INTERVIEWS WITH TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS.

5. UNIONISTS: BAN SHOULD BE JUST FIRST STEP

WHILE SUPPORTING THE BAN, DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY (DUP) LEADER IAN PAISLEY CALLED THE PROPOSAL A "FUDGE" AND SAID SF ITSELF SHOULD BE BANNED COMPLETELY. DUP DEPUTY LEADER PETER ROBINSON CALLED THE GOVERNMENT MOVE MORALLY RIGHT "REGARDLESS OF WHAT DEGREE OF ASSISTANCE IT WILL BE TO THE AUTHORITIES IN DEFEATING THE (P)IRA." HE ADDED, "IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO STOP GERRY ADAMS SHOOTING OFF HIS MOUTH. WE WANT TO STOP THEM SHOOTING." OFFICIAL UNIONIST PARTY (OUP) MP KEN MAGINNIS SAID THE BAN WILL PREVENT YOUNG PEOPLE FROM BEING INFLUENCED BY THE LIKES OF GERRY ADAMS ON TELEVISION.

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6. ALLIANCE CONCERNED OVER BAN

ALLIANCE PARTY LEADER JOHN ALDERDICE FEARED THE BAN "COULD END UP WITH THE WORST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS. THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE SEEN INTERNATIONALLY AS HAVING EMBARKED ON DRACONIAN AND REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION, BUT SF WILL STILL BE FREE TO USE THE NEWSPAPERS TO MAKE PROPAGANDA." ALDERDICE SAID "SF SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM ALL BROADCASTING AND PRINTED MEDIA BY A VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT."

7. LABOR AND DEMOCRAT OPPOSITION

LABOR SHADOW HOME SECRETARY ROY HATTERSLEY TERMED THE BAN TRIVIAL AND COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IN THE REAL FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, AND HE CLAIMED IT WAS DESIGNATED TO CREATE AN ILLUSION OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY AGAINST TERRORISM. HE WARNED THE BAN WILL BE USED PARTICULARLY IN THE U.S. TO PORTRAY THE GOVERNMENT AS THE ENEMY OF FREE EXPRESSION. LABOR PARTY SPOKESMAN FOR NORTHERN IRELAND KEVIN MCNAMARA AND DEMOCRAT LEADER PADDY ASHDOWN AGREED THE BAN WOULD GIVE SF A PROPAGANDA BOOST.

8. CONSERVATIVE BACKBENCHER CRITICAL OF BAN

CONSERVATIVE MP HUGH DYKES CALLED THE BAN A "VERY GREAT MISTAKE." HE ADDED, "IT WOULD LOOK AS IF THE GOVERNMENT FEARS THE (P)IRA CAN PERSUADE PEOPLE OF THEIR SICK CAUSE. IN REALITY THE MORE THEY APPEAR THE MORE THEY ALIENATE THE DECENT MODERATE MAJORITY." HE CHARGED THAT "AUTHORITARIAN TRENDS IN BRITAIN TODAY ARE DISTURBING MPS IN ALL PARTS OF THE HOUSE."

9. SDLP OPPOSITION

SDLP MP EDDIE MCGRADY SAID HIS PARTY OPPOSED THE BAN AND SF "SHOULD BE KEPT FULLY IN THE PUBLIC EYE WHERE THEIR HYPOCRISY CAN BE EXPOSED IN THE FULL GLARE OF THE SPOTLIGHT." DR. JOE HENDRON BELIEVED THE MOVE COULD PROVE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE BY MAKING SOME PEOPLE MORE SYMPATHETIC TO SF. SDLP DEPUTY LEADER SEAMUS MALLON SAID THE BAN GAVE SF AN ISSUE FOR NEXT YEAR'S EURO-PARLIAMENT AND DISTRICT COUNCIL ELECTIONS.

10. BROADCASTERS PROTEST

THE BBC SAID THE BAN SET A DAMAGING PRECEDENT AND COMPLAINED IT WOULD RENDER REPORTING IN NORTHERN IRELAND INCOMPLETE. THE NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS CHARGED THE MOVE UNDERMINED BRITAIN'S CLAIM TO HAVE A FREE DEMOCRATIC MEDIA.

11. SINN FEIN REACTION

SF SPOKESMAN DANNY MORRISON SAID THE BAN UNDERLINES "THE DOUBLE STANDARDS AND HYPOCRISY OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND WILL LEAD TO CONSIDERABLE INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS DOMESTIC CRITICISM." SF PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS CALLED THE BAN PART OF THE "HIDDEN AGENDA" OF THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT AIMED AT SMASHING SINN FEIN AND PROMOTING SDLP. HE VOWED SF WOULD "DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF

INFORMATION." IT IS BELIEVED SF WILL SET UP PIRATE RADIO STATIONS BROADCASTING FROM MOBILE VANS ON FREQUENCIES CLOSE TO EXISTING WAVEBANDS.

12. SIMILJR BAN IN REPUBLIC

THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND HAS BANNED MEDIA INTERVIEWS WITH SINN FEIN AND PIRA SINCE THE EARLY 1970'S. SUPPORTERS OF A BAN IN NORTHERN IRELAND POINT TO SINN FEIN'S WEAK SHOWING IN THE REPUBLIC'S ELECTIONS AS PROOF THE BAN IS EFFECTIVE.

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13. OTHER ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES UNDER CONSIDERATION

THE PRESS REPORTED HMG IS CONSIDERING OTHER ANTI-TERRORIST MEASURES SUCH AS:

- REMOVAL OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS' RIGHT OF SILENCE;
- CONVICTION ON A CHARGE OF PIRA MEMBERSHIP ON THE EVIDENCE OF A SINGLE POLICEMAN;
- EXCLUSION OF ELECTION CANDIDATES WHO REFUSE TO TAKE, OR ABIDE BY, AN ANTI-VIOLENCE OATH; AND,
- POWERS TO TRACE AND CONFISCATE FUNDS AND MONEY "LAUNDERED" BY TERROR ORGANIZATIONS.

UNLIKE THE BAN, NEW LEGISLATION WOULD HAVE TO BE PASSED TO ENACT THE ABOVE MEASURES. SINCE THIS SUMMER'S INCREASE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY, THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO "DO SOMETHING" ABOUT TERRORISM. THE MEDIA BAN STEMS FROM A SECURITY REVIEW ORDERED AFTER THAT UPSURGE, AND MORE MEASURES ARE EXPECTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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