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Collection: COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC:
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File Folder: VPTF (Vice President's Task Force) Recommendations/
Status Reports March 1987 Ted McNamara/NSC Staff (5) ~~Box 91956~~

Date: 11/1/00
Wills/F97-082/2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE <i>KAL BOX 10</i>	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Chart	re: Agencies/Action/Status, 4 p.	n.d.	P1/F1
2. Chart	re: Implementation of Recommendations, 7 p.	n.d.	P1/F1
3. Paper	Policy Framework on the Use of Force, 17 p. <i>R 10/11/02 NLSF97-082/2 #16</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
4. Memo	Pat Daly to Rich Porter, re: Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 3 p. <i>Part 3/27/06 " #18</i>	7/13/87	P1/F1
5. Memo	Mary K. Sturtevant to Porter, re: DIA Data Base Briefing, 3 p. <i>Part " " #19</i>	8/13/87	P1/F1 <i>B2, B3, B6</i>
6. Memo	Sturtevant to Porter, re: CIA Briefing on Counterterrorism Data Base, 3 p. <i>Part " " #20</i>	8/21/87	P1/F1
7. Memo	Sturtevant to Porter, re: DOJ Briefings on Counterterrorism Data Base Efforts, 3 p. <i>Part 10/11/02 NLSF97-082/2 #21</i>	8/21/87	P1/F1 <i>S7c B2</i>
8. Memo	Sturtevant to Porter, re: DOJ Briefings -- Part II, the FBI, 2 p. <i>Part 3/27/02 " #22</i>	8/24/87	P1/F1 <i>B2, B6, B7c</i>
9. Memo	L. Paul Bremer to Richard Armitage, Jonathan Howe, et al., re: Counterterrorism Program Review, 2 p.	8/25/87	P1/F1
10. Paper	Additional Personnel Required for CT Public Affairs, 2 p. <i>Part " " #23</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
	<i>Part " " #24</i>		
	<i>Part " " #25</i>		

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

SECRET/SENSITIVE

PROP REC	SUBJECT	AGENCIES	ACTION	STATUS
1	Deployability of JSOC	JCS	Brief in detail to IG/T CSG	Sked 11/12/87, no record brief ever done.
3	Federal Jurisdiction in Terrorist Incidents	DOS DOS	Initiate formal approach to AG to decide whether to pursue further	Justice passed action to State - (IG/T)
4	Private Sector Data Base	DOS	Place on IG/T Agenda w/#28 & 29	

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NLS E97-082/2-#16

BY LOI NARA, DATE 10/11/02

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REC	SUBJECT	AGENCIES	ACTION	STATUS
5	Policy for Active Response to Terrorist Threats & Incidents	DOS	IG/T to submit draft to NSC for review	<i>Rec'd</i>
8	Current Policy Regarding Operational Security of CTJTF Forces	JCS	Place recommendation on OSG Agenda	
9	U.S. Presence Abroad	DOS	Establish procedures to continue monitoring levels of U.S. exposure overseas	
10	Policy on Passports/ Docs for Govt Employees	NSC, DOS	Ensure that inter-agency review is completed, directive approved recommended & disseminated for action	
11	U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerability	DOS NSC DOS	Take lead in defining NBC threats and accelerate work; status report in 30 days	
14	R&D for Combatting Terrorism	DOS	TSWG deserves strong Admin support; Funding to be highlighted as sep. item in DOS budget; emph imp to Congress	

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REC	SUBJECT	AGENCIES	ACTION	STATUS
20	Controlling Cross Border Tvl of Known or Suspected Terrorists	NSC, OMB	Ensure set-up of proper interagency working group to oversee integration of computer systems & data bases; find adequate funding	
24	Expanded HUMINT Capability Against Terrorism	CIA	Establish base line to measure progress	
25	Terrorism Intelligence Analysis	CIA	Further examine issue & report to OSG	
28	Monitoring & Influencing Foreign & Domestic Attitudes & Perceptions Towards Terrorism & U.S. Counterterrorism Policy	DOS	Resources must be committed to effort; more dedicated positions required, especially from IC	
33	International Informant Incentives	DOS	Give work high priority with the goal of earliest implementation; consider authority for AG & require legislation if necessary	
34	Rewards	DOS	Increase publicity; Carry out advertisg	

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REC	SUBJECT	AGENCIES	ACTION	STATUS
39	Prohibition of Training & Support of Counterterrorism/Mercenary Training Camps	DOJ	Discuss status w/DOJ	
40	Foreign Terrorism Activities Within the U.S.	DOJ, DOS	Speedier progress essential	
41	Private Sector Activities that Aid/Abet Terrorism	DOJ, DOS, Treasury	Needs to be more effectively addressed (e.g. make ransom payments illegal eliminate tax deductions, etc.)	
42	Improved Security for Nuclear Reactor Facilities	DOS, NuclrSec Comty <i>DOJ (nukes reactors) 16/T (nukes up site abroad)</i>	Increased & continuing priority attn; explore interagency forum to institutionalize cooperation; complete in-depth study of threat	

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NLS F97-082/2 #17

BY LOI NARA DATE 10/11/02

REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D	ADD		
1	National Program for Combatting Terrorism	X	X			
2	National Policy for Combatting Terrorism	X				Implemented by NSDD-207
3	Strengthening Coordination in Combatting Terrorism	X				
4	Coordination of Public Diplomacy/ Statements During Terrorist Incidents	X	X			See #28
5	Policy for Active Response to Terrorist Threats & Incidents		X	X	IG/T, NSC	IG/T to submit draft to NSC for review
6	Response Options to Terrorism	X	X			
7	Deployment of Counterterrorist Forces	X	X			
8	Current Policy Regarding Operational Security of CTJTF Forces			X	OSG	Place recommendation on OSG Agenda
9	U.S. Presence Abroad	X		X		Establish procedures to continue monitoring levels of U.S. exposure overseas

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REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D	ADD		
10	Policy on Passports/ Docs for Govt Employees			X	NSC	Ensure that inter-agency review is completed, directive approved recommended & disseminated for action
11	U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerability			X	IG/T	Take lead in defining NBC threats and accelerate work; status rpt due in 30 days.
12	Hostage Family Liaison	X	X		DOS	
13	Protection of Foreign Dignitaries in the U.S.	X				
14	R&D for Combatting Terrorism	X	X	X		TSWG deserves strong Admin support; Funding to be highlighted as sep. item in DOS budget; emph imp to Congress
15	Counterterrorism Exercises & Simulation	X	X			At same level of partic. & activ.
16	Country Team Briefings	X	X			
17	International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism		X			Esp. in NATO, where progress to date has been disappointing
18	Extradition Treaties		X	X	DOS	Advise Congress of negative results of revised language

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REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D.	ADD		
19	Int'l RD&A Initiatives		X			Cont. & expand effort; consider re-newing exchanges w/ Israel
20	Controlling Cross Border Tvl of Known or Suspected Terrorists			X	NSC, OMB	Ensure step ^{set} -up of proper interagency working group to oversee integration of computer systems & data bases; find adequate funding
21	Airport & Port Security		X		DOT, DOJ	Cont. high priority for category X pgm. Give higher priority to seeking legislt'n & regulatory changes to ensure adequate employee screening
22	Use of Intelligence Exchange to Promote U.S. Policy	X	X			
23	Intelligence Fusion Center for International Terrorism	X				
24	Expanded HUMINT Capability Against Terrorism		X	X	IC	Establish base line to measure progress
25	Terrorism Intelligence Analysis			X	IICT, OSG	Further examine issue & report to OSG

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REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D	ADD		
26	Increased Coordination w/Law Enforcement Elements Domestically & Overseas	X	X			
27	Chemical & Biological Threat		X		IG/T, thru TSWG	Intensify efforts especially to obtain funding
28	Monitoring & Influencing Foreign & Domestic Attitudes & Perceptions Towards Terrorism & U.S. Counterterrorism Policy		X	X	IG/T NSC	Resources must be committed to effort; more dedicated positions required, especially from I.C.
29	Government-Media Relations during a Terrorism Incident	X		IG/T	NSC, Public Dip.WG of IG/T	Develop & implement strategy to offset terrorist exploitn of U.S. media; quietly consult w/ media as to roles & impact; develop mechanism to brief U.S. officials & media together rapidly at onset of terrorist incidt
30	Psychological Operations to Combat Terrorism		X		IG/T	
31	Adequacy of the International Legal System to Deal with Terrorism	X	X		DOJ	
32	Review of Provisions of Vienna Convention	X	X			

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REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D	ADD		
33	International Informant Incentives			X	S/CT	Give work high priority with the goal of earliest implementation; consider authority for AG & require legislation if necessary
34	Rewards	X	X	X	S/CT	Increase publicity; Carry out advertisg
35	Murder of US Citizens Outside of U.S.	X				
36	Death Penalty for Hostage Taking		X		DOJ	Continue to pursue this legislation
37	Joint Committee on Intelligence	X		X	W/CT	Requires congressional action
38	Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)	X	X		IG/T	Review periodically
39	Prohibition of Training & Support of Counterterrorism/Mercenary Training Camps		X	X	DOJ, Customs, ATF, FBI	

REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D	ADD		
40	Foreign Terrorism Activities Within the U.S.		X	X	DoJ, S/CT	Speedier progress essential
41	Private Sector Activities that Aid/Abet Terrorism		X	X	DoJ, S/CT, Treasury	Needs to be more effectively addressed (e.g. make ransom payments illegal eliminate tax deductions, etc.)
42	Improved Security for Nuclear Reactor Facilities	X	X	X	DoJ S/CT	Increased & continuing priority attn; explore interagency forum to institutionalize cooperation; complete in-depth study of threat

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NLS F97-082/8 #172
LOS 10/11/02

PROP REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D	ADD		
1	Deployability of JSOC	X		X	JSOC	Brief in detail to IG/T
2	New NSC Policy Planning & Operations Coordinating Board	X			IG/T, DOS	Adequately treated in evaluation of Recommendation 3
3	Federal Jurisdiction in Terrorist Incidents		X	X	IG/T S/CT DOJ	Initiate formal approach to AG to decide whether to pursue further
4	Private Sector Data Base				IG/T S/CT	Place on IG/T Agenda w/#28 & 29
5	Anti-Terrorist Assistance Program	X	X			



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 2, 1987

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(UNCLASSIFIED Upon Removal of Attachment)

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

141/00

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel Richard E. Porter, USAF
Office for Counter-Terrorism and
Narcotics
National Security Council

FROM: Colonel Patrick F. Daly, USAF 
Associate Director for Military Affairs
Office of the Ambassador-at-Large
for Counter-Terrorism

SUBJECT: Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

The attached document, "A Policy Framework on the Use of Force," is provided to satisfy Recommendation Five of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism. Due to the realities of terrorist incidents - their highly volatile nature and the rapid occurrence of events - any decision matrix prepared in advance may be of little or no value depending on the situation. In this document, however, we have attempted to list a series of policy questions and criteria which could be reviewed by decision-makers during a fast breaking terrorist incident. An examination of such information could preclude omissions of important considerations which could be caused by the time sensitive nature of the event.

Attachment:
A Policy Framework on the Use of Force.

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DECL: OADR

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POLICY FRAMEWORK ON THE USE OF FORCE

Discussion:

The realities of terrorist incidents - their highly volatile nature and the rapid occurrence of events - by necessity dictate that specific responses to discreet incidents become extremely situation-dependent and in some cases, must be resolved as expeditiously as possible to reduce the potential for loss of life. It should be kept in mind that each terrorist incident is a unique, multidimensional event that may necessitate a different set of responses. At the onset of an incident it would be prudent to review current USG policy for combatting terrorism. Any response should be carefully crafted, keeping adherence to basic policy as a primary objective.

Policy:

- The USG is opposed to terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent and/or respond to terrorist acts.
- States that practice terrorism or actively support it, will not be allowed to do so without consequence.
- State-sponsored terrorist activity or directed threats are considered to be hostile acts and the US will hold sponsors accountable.
- Whenever we have evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against us, we have a responsibility to take measures to protect our citizens, property and interests.
- The USG will make no concessions to terrorists.
- In terrorist incidents abroad affecting US interests we look to the host government to resolve the incident and provide for the safety of our citizens in accordance with international obligations.

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DECL: OADR

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NLS 97-082/2 #18

By CS, NARA, Date 3/27/06

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- 2 -

FOIA(b)(1)

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Goals:

The goals behind any action to counter terrorism are to first prevent the terrorist event from occurring and gain enough advance information to be able to react quickly should the event occur. Once in the condition of reacting to a terrorist incident, courses of action should be developed to control, limit and resolve the event. All actions taken during a terrorist incident should have the long range effect of discouraging such events from happening or re-occurring.

Criteria:

The remainder of this document consists of a series of questions and criteria which should be considered prior to the use of force to resolve a terrorist incident.

LONG RANGE GOAL OF THE US POLICY

- To prevent the loss of innocent lives or resources due to the use of terrorism by individuals, independent groups, or as an instrument of state policy.
- To neutralize terrorism as a means of pursuing national policies.

SHORT TERM GOALS OF USING LETHAL FORCE IN TERRORIST INCIDENTS

- To prevent a terrorist act...
 - Against the continental United States.

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- 3 -

- Against American citizens abroad.
- Against any ally.
- To end a terrorist act in progress...
 - Successfully rescue American citizens held hostage by terrorists.
 - Minimize casualties to American citizens and property.
- To demonstrate US resolve to...
 - Deter and prevent state terrorism.
 - Deter and prevent the spread of terrorist incidents.
- To minimize damage to US and/or allied morale.
- To respond (self-defense) against an individuals, groups, or sponsoring states responsible for terrorist activity against US targets.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE

- What goals does the US intend to accomplish by using force?
 - Have specific goals been established?
 - Can the use of force realistically achieve these goals?
- Is force a proper alternative?
 - What is the potential political down-side resulting from the use of force by the USG regarding friendly governments?

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- Will it affect military cooperation (including the use of bases in foreign countries) with friendly countries?
- What will the effect be on diplomatic, political or economic relations with friendly countries?
- What will the effect be on hostile governments?
- Will it encourage more support for the terrorists?
- Will the hostile government actively intervene on behalf of the terrorist?
- Have other alternatives been exhausted?
- Have diplomatic measures been taken?
- Have economic efforts been made?
- Have psychological operations been attempted?
- Is there adequate intelligence information to permit the effective employment of force?
 - Is there enough intelligence information?
 - Is the existing intelligence information of high enough quality to support the use of force?
 - Are the benefits gained from an action enough to possibly outweigh the loss of an intelligence source?

SITUATIONAL CONSTRAINTS AND CHARACTERISTICS

- What are the characteristics of the incident?
 - Was the attack part of a pattern?

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- Was the attack an act of random violence?
- Where did the attack take place?
 - Was it in the continental United States?
 - Is the host country allied with the US?
 - Is the host country hostile to the US?
- Who was targeted?
 - Were specific personnel the target of the attack?
 - US citizens, US military/diplomatic, foreign nationals.
- If a hostage situation...
 - Is the carrier of US flag?
 - How many hostages are US citizens?
 - What are the nationalities of the other hostages?
 - Are US citizens being singled out for execution?
 - Was the act aimed at random or discreet targets?
- Who is responsible?
 - Does US intelligence know who the responsible party is?
 - Do our allies, or other sources, have confirming intelligence information?
 - Did any individual or group claim responsibility?

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- 6 -

- What are the identifying characteristics of the group claiming responsibility?
 - Same modus operandi?
 - Is the group trying to blame another?
 - Is the group trying to take credit for another's acts?
- Is the group acting independently?
 - Did they have a sponsor?
 - Did they act in concert with another group or individual?
- What are the motivations of the group?
 - Are they personal (grudge/feud)?
 - Does the group seek money (from ransom, etc.)?
 - Is the group operating on religious or ideological principles?
 - Was the attack motivated by a desire to win a tactical or military victory?
 - Was the group seeking publicity?
- What are the goals of the terrorists?
 - Do they want social/political reforms?
 - Do they wish to end foreign presence somewhere?
 - Are they attempting to achieve "liberty"?
 - Is there someone in prison they wish to see released?

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- 7 -

- Is their goal to advance a little known cause?
- What is the most recent profile of the terrorist group?
 - How long has the existence of the group been known?
 - Are there any confirmed members of the group?
 - Has the group struck before?
 - Is it likely that the group will strike again?
 - How committed are the members of the group to their cause?
- Is there a specific hierarchy of leadership within the group?
- Are the members of the group willing to die?

DOMESTIC POLITICAL CLIMATE

- What is the level of support for such action within the United States?
 - Is there support in Congress for action?
- If something goes wrong, what is the worst that can happen on the domestic political scene?
 - Is it serious enough to turn public opinion against the US?
 - Will the action generate sympathy for the terrorists?
 - Could the action encourage support for the terrorists?
- What are the dangers of losing someone involved in the operation?
 - Has the United States consulted with its allies?
 - Would the American people forgive a POW/MIA situation?

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- 8 -

- If there are American casualties, what will the public reaction be?
 - To US civilians casualties?
 - Toward US military personnel involved in the response?
- If covert or surrogate force is used, what will be the possible aftermath if such action becomes public?
 - Will the government lose credibility after first denying an incident?

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE

- Does the US have the support of its allies?
 - To what extent will the allies assist the US?
 - Will the allies provide forces and supplies?
 - Can an allied country be used to stage the action?
 - Will the allies provide moral and political support?
 - How will the action affect our allies' view of the US?
 - Will they become openly antagonistic or hostile?
 - Can our allies maintain a posture of neutrality in the face of world opinion?
 - Will the allies openly attack the US in an open political forum?
 - What will the private views and opinions of our allies be in the wake of any action?
- What is the current US situation in the world?
 - What is the status of relations...

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- With the Soviets?
- With our allies?
- With countries in the region of the world where force is to be used?
- What affect will the action have on the rest of the world?

HOST COUNTRY ATTITUDE AND SITUATION

- Is the host country contemplating action against the terrorists?
- If the host country supports the terrorists, is its support active or passive?
- What is the current status of relations between the US and the host country?
 - Does the US provide essential or subsidiary aid to the host government?
 - Economic?
 - Political?
 - Military?
 - How important is it to the US that we maintain present relations with the host government?
 - Does the host government desire better relations with the US in the future?
 - If the host country is hostile toward the US, are there any US citizens in that country who may be put at risk?
- What are the CT capabilities of the host government?
 - Does it have an organic CT capacity?

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- 10 -

- Will it use this force in this situation?
- Will using organic CT forces jeopardize the lives of the US citizens involved?
- Is the use of CT forces likely to lead to greater or lesser friendly casualties?
- Does the host government desire assistance from the US?
 - Is the host government cognizant of the CT capabilities of the US?
 - Can the EST be utilized to assist local CT forces?
 - Does the host desire, or will they accept the use of JSOC forces?
 - As observers?
 - As advisors?
 - As a rescue force, or a part thereof?
 - In support of a rescue effort, or directly involved?

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

- What is the potential impact of media coverage of US force?
 - Is the media on the scene?
 - What form of media is present?
 - Are they in contact with the terrorists?
 - By what means?
- To what extent, if any, does the media's presence increase the risk of a hostage rescue effort?

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- 11 -

- What will the media portray to the outside world?
 - Will the US be presented as the aggressor?
 - Will the media portray the US as simply reacting to a challenge?
 - Will the action look like self-defense to the media?
- When will the media know about such an action?
 - Will a press pool be organized?
 - Will the action be completely covert?
 - Have plans been made to sanitize the area from members of the media?
 - Has a public diplomacy plan been implemented?

MORAL AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON CT

- What is the moral aspect of any action?
 - Is the action consistent with USG policy?
- Can any use of force be explained so as to make it legal?
 - To the general public?
 - To the rest of the world?
- What are the possible courses of action if a terrorist is captured during a military intervention?
 - Turn over to host government for prosecution under applicable local laws...
 - Bring the terrorist forcibly back to the US for trial...
 - Use existing extradition treaties to legally bring the terrorist to trial in the US...

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MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE

- Is there a viable target to strike?
 - Is the target accessible?
 - Can force be brought to bear on the target quickly?
 - Does the target meet all political constraints?
 - Are the assets readily available to complete the mission?
- What are the characteristics of the incident?
 - What are the capabilities/characteristics of the target?
 - Are they military or non military?
 - What is their level of training?
 - What type of equipment/weapons do they use?
 - How many terrorists are there?
- What is the risk to US civilians held hostage?
- What is the risk of collateral civilian casualties?
- What is the risk to US rescue force personnel?
- Are actions contemplated proportionate to the threat, but adequate to resolve the situation?
- Do political constraints intended to minimize collateral civilian casualties place mission accomplishment or US rescue personnel at undue risk?

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FOIA(b) (1)

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FOIA(b) (1)

POSSIBLE FORCE OPTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

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FOIA(b) (1)

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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July 13, 1987

MEMORANDUM

TO: RICH PORTER - NSC STAFF
FROM: PAT DALY - S/CT (P)
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING
TERRORISM

The following comments are provided as a result of discussions between the office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism and members of the NSC staff on June 25, 1987. These discussions are offered for inclusion in the NSC tasking document being prepared as a result of the program review of the Vice President's Task force on Combatting Terrorism. Comments are provided only for those recommendations that the Department or the IG/T are responsible for resolving.

Recommendation 1 - Counterterrorism programming document.

Comments: The OMB should provide this document to the IG/T for distribution and review.

Recommendation 4 - Public diplomacy statements.

Comments: The Department of State should install an unclassified telefax machine dedicated to public affairs use in the State Task Force area.

The White House Communications Agency should install a telephone hot line in the State Task Force which connects the White House Press Office. This drop will be used for conference calls to coordinate press guidance during terrorist incidents.

Recommendation 5 - Policy framework on the use of force.

Comments: This document was submitted to the NSC staff on June 26, 1987.

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NLS 197-0822 #19
By CU NARA Date 3/27/06

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Recommendation 9 - Review of US presence abroad.

FOIA(b) (1) Comments: Changes in status of high threat areas
(additions/deletions) and security of US personnel in these
areas should be briefed to the IG/T as it becomes necessary.

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Recommendation 12 - Hostage family liaison.

FOIA(b) (1) Comments: Department of State, Consular Affairs, Citizen's
Emergency Center should provide hostage family status review
to the IG/T on a periodic basis (every six months).

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FOIA(b) (1)

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Recommendation 28 - Public diplomacy

Comments: As recommended the IG/T should review and determine the appropriate agencies that should provide resources to support this effort and report to the NSC within 60 days. Applicable agencies should provide the personnel necessary to complete the staffing of the interagency public diplomacy element located in the office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism. A minimum of four additional officers and a secretary are required.

The Department of State should supply the office space, equipment and printing capacity for the increases in personnel and production.

1045

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Aug-1987 03:29p EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard E. Porter

(PORTER)

FROM:

Mary K. Sturtevant
(STURTEVANT)

SUBJECT:

DIA Data Base Briefing

August 13, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DIA Briefing on Counterterrorism Data Base

On Friday, August 7, 1987, Rich Porter and Mary Sturtevant of the NSC staff, and Arnie Donahue and Doug Horner of the OMB, were briefed by DIA representatives [REDACTED]

on the status of their counterterrorism data base development efforts.

[REDACTED] first discussed the procedures followed when DOS gets a "hit" through its AVLOS system.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DIA representatives outlined the problems with implementing a true community system, as tasked by recommendation 20 of the Vice President's Task Force report.

FOIA(b)(1) --Everyone in the community recognizes the value of information sharing to allow preemptive as well as reactive measures. There is not a lot of agreement on how much and how information should be shared.

--Currently, there is no central data base on terrorism. The only significant data base of this kind up and running today is CIA's DESIST. The USG needs a central data base into which all agencies can deposit data, but DESIST is not it.

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NLS 197-082/2728

CU CIA Date 3/27/06

FOIA(b)(1)

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--The real problem is at the political, not technical, level. Traditional rules--e.g. the third agency rule--have to be looked at; we need new rules for new types of problems.

--The current way of doing things is time-consuming; [REDACTED]

(1) --Although work on transnational terrorism may well best be done in the US, the field is better equipped to handle other terrorist groups (e.g. RAF members do not get visas). But they do not receive much of the available information.

--There are "nontraditional players" who need to be involved in this process (e.g. FAA for hijackings, FBI for hostage debriefings).

--The recommendation goes beyond just terrorism to include narcotics, perhaps even counterintelligence. This also complicates the task. Currently, DOD has not computerized its narcotics files.

(1) [REDACTED] thinks the community needs an honest broker at the top to sort out the turf fights. The IC staff has done this-- [REDACTED] But this task goes beyond the IC.

[REDACTED] then discussed DOD efforts to develop a terrorism computerized data base. FOIA(b) (1)

(1) --DOD is developing a system, for which DIA is the data base manager. DIA calls it the Defense Intelligence Terrorism Data Base System (DITDS). It is used by some of the service intelligence organizations under slightly modified names and helps them to develop threat assessments for their forces. The system also will be used by several unified commands.

--The system currently taps into DIALS and COINS; DIA hopes CIA will allow them to tap into DESIST (problematic). Secret Service has a line to DITDS, and INR wants to be hooked up as well.

--The IG/T's Technical Support Working Group has given DIA two million dollars to develop the system.

--DIA provides a "full-service" operation, by maintaining all the contractual relations necessary to set-up and operate the system.

--The data base is all-source, including unclassified information. What makes it unique is the software, which is based on inferential models of specific groups. This means the system can not only flag data on words, but also perform automatic link analysis to relate words and concepts. DIA wants to develop this capability -- which can be used predictively. In 1987, \$800,000 was dedicated to this effort, with roughly the same amount set aside for next year.

--DITDS tracks incidents and groups (divided between names and biographic profiles). Profiles include such issues as grey arms and financial networking.

--DIA sees its system as a complement, not replacement, to DESIST.

Efforts also need to be made to coordinate terrorist information available worldwide.

--Israel has a data base with the names of 60,000 alleged terrorists. DIA offered to exchange names for software; no answer yet.

--In Berlin a list of terrorists in Germany has been developed.

The DIA representatives also provided the names of several contractors who have been working with DOD on these issues.

--[REDACTED] a consulting firm) is involved in developing a PC-based system for use by foreign governments who issue passports to record and pass to a central automated data base. We should check into this.

--One of DIA's important contractors in these efforts is [REDACTED] can provide information.

--Another contractor, [REDACTED], is especially known for behavior science; [REDACTED] is a good POC.

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NLS F97-082/2 #21

By LOT, NARA, Date 10/11/02

FOIA(b)(1)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

21-Aug-1987 03:22p EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard E. Porter

(PORTER)

FROM:

Mary K. Sturtevant
(STURTEVANT)

SUBJECT:

~~SECRET~~

August 3, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ~~CIA~~ Briefing on Counterterrorism Data Base-

On Wednesday, July 29, 1987, Rich Porter and Mary Sturtevant of the NSC staff, and Doug Horner of OMB were briefed by CIA representatives ~~_____~~ on the status of their counterterrorism data base development efforts.

~~_____~~ opened the meeting by stating that the IICT has been looking into the problem addressed by Recommendation 20 of the Vice President's Task Force report. He outlined current procedures for identifying possible terrorists at the border or in US consulates.



[REDACTED] acknowledged the problem with releasing information [REDACTED] but believes the process -- although slow -- works.

[REDACTED] opinion, what really is missing is a lead agency to take responsibility for pushing this initiative forward; he thinks the likely candidate for lead agency is DOS.

--One test bed for moving information out to the borders has been set up [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] described the DESIST system (see attachment).



[REDACTED] DESIST is a much more capable system.

When asked about the feasibility of a central data base, with minimum number of fields (e.g. names, agency of information), the CIA representatives made the following points:

- The technology and hardware already exists, but the architecture would have to be developed.
- Would have to overcome pressure to include more information, rather than less in a single, community data base.
- Would need a lead agency, backed up by agreements to provide information signed by agency heads.
- Need to consider quality control question; responsibility for set-up, management and quality control should reside with one agency.
- This effort should dovetail well with the work of the ISWG.

██████████ also asked whether the NSC staff still wanted to be hooked up to DESIST. The money has already been appropriated; all that is needed is the verbal "okay." The CIA needs to know by the end of August, or the money will be reallocated.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

21-Aug-1987 11:05 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard E. Porter

(PORTER)

FROM:

Mary K. Sturtevant
(STURTEVANT)

SUBJECT:

DOJ Briefings on Counterterrorism Data Base Efforts

On Tuesday, August 18, Rich Porter and Mary Sturtevant of the NSC staff, and Arnie Donahue of OMB, were briefed by representatives of DOJ, INS and DEA (list attached) on their efforts to develop counterterrorism data base systems.

Cliff Landsman from INS began the discussion. He is from the intelligence division of INS and outlined two serious problems INS has encountered in the course of their efforts to get information on terrorists to the ports of entry (POEs) into the United States.

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INS claims they have to have this type of information available to their inspectors at the border for two reasons:

- Once a foreigner gets past INS, in order to turn him or her away the US has to undertake a deportation hearing, rather than an exclusion hearing. The burden of proof is on the USG in the former case; on the foreigner in the latter.
- Although Customs has a data base at the border -- TECS -- with terrorists names in it, the agency does not check 100% of the people coming through, as INS does. INS cited the case of JFK Airport, where they claim less than 10% are checked by TECS, versus 100% checked by INS (in NAILS or SLOB, described below).

INS handles close to 10 million documented non-immigrants a year (not counting Canadian or Mexican border crossers. There are 33 grounds for excluding aliens from the US, including terrorism (which is not a separate category, but

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NLS 97-082/2 # 42

NARA, Date 3/27/05

is handled under the "intent to overthrow the government" section).

The most common visa type is the 60-month, multiple-entry type. At this time, Syria, Iran and Libya are the only three countries with single application visas. US citizens currently bypass INS.

Peggy Wong from INS discussed INS' two border look-out systems.

FOIA(b) (2) --The first is the National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS). Only about [REDACTED] of the approximately [REDACTED] are hooked up to NAILS; of the [REDACTED] ports which do have NAILS terminals, only [REDACTED] have terminal coverage in primary as well as secondary.

[REDACTED]

--Both NAILS and SLOB are unclassified.

--INS currently makes [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (7) [REDACTED] These standards are becoming less and less meaningful.

--Other agencies can place look-outs in the systems which INS retains [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (2) [REDACTED]

Customs uses and displays only a portion of the INS records dumped via tape into its TECS terminals every month. This is because TECS is geared to the Customs mission of keeping contraband, not people, out; Customs therefore is interested in only some of the information INS needs to perform its mission of admitting people into the US. Even if a TECS search were to get a hit on a

potential terrorist name, unless the individual were carrying something illegal, Customs could do nothing to stop his entry into the US. INS would then have to institute deportation -- rather than the easier exclusion -- procedures, if it had adequate information.

INS also has the lead in a multiagency committee which was put in place a couple of years ago as a result of task force directives. The Alien Border Control (ABC) Committee staff has drafted a document as a result of its work which is pending with the Commissioner (as chairman). The committee has four working groups.

- Means and Methods of Preventing Known Terrorists from Entering the United States.
- Ways to Streamline and Expedite Removal of Known/Suspected Terrorists from the US. (This is the major problem for INS.)
- Visa Restrictions. (Looking at the current system which allows transit without a visa in some cases, e.g. on flights from Europe to Canada which stop in the US.)
- Contingency Plans for Sealing the Border.

Henry Erde from DEA provided a quick read-out on his agency's rôle.

- DEA has no counterterrorism mission.
- The agency relies on the intelligence community for its threat information, except as in the case of Columbian drug trafficking.
- DEA does not have Flashboard or DESIST.
- In December, a law was passed requiring DEA to provide information on known traffickers to State. This resulted in passing about 90,000 records into AVLOS.
- DEA's computer system contains only DEA-originated information. Its records are unclassified or LOU/DEA Sensitive.

DOJ attendees:

Steve Weglian, DOJ (786-4805)

Cliff Landsman, INS [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (2)

Peggy Wong, INS [REDACTED]

Henry Erde, DEA (633-1023)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-Aug-1987 10:54 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard E. Porter

(PORTER)

FROM:

Mary K. Sturtevant
(STURTEVANT)

SUBJECT:

DOJ Briefings--Part II, the FBI

On Wednesday, August 19, Mary Sturtevant of the NSC staff and Arnie Donahue of OMB were briefed by [REDACTED] of the FBI [REDACTED]. He first discussed the Bureau's counterterrorism data base developments. FOIA(b)(2)(6)(7c)

--Automation of the FBI's counterterrorism efforts began in the late 1970s with the development of ISIS--a case management system used to track investigative leads. A simple, full-text retrieval system, ISIS is for internal use with no outside dissemination. This is because FBI is a law enforcement, not an intelligence, agency. ISIS is in the process of being phased out.

--The second round of automation efforts began around 1980, on the intelligence side of the house, with the goal of information management. [REDACTED]

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--The FBI relies on information from other agencies in developing its internal files. The Bureau has access to DESIST (all levels), TECS, AVLOS, and will get NAILS.

The FBI also works with other government agencies to share information on terrorism in a non-automated fashion.

--Any informational reports the FBI generates on terrorism are passed in hard copy through regular dissemination channels. [REDACTED] does not know if other agencies input these reports into their respective data base systems.) FOIA(b)(6) 7c

--The FBI also passes information on terrorists that it develops in the course of its investigations to INS and Customs, but [REDACTED] didn't know what those agencies did with this information. The Bureau also is required to inform other agencies of information of possible violations of laws not under their charter.

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NARA, Date 3/27/06

FOIA(b)(6) 7c

FOIA(b) (1)

--In addition, the FBI will do name checks when asked by DOS; if a visa applicant meets certain criteria (e.g., [REDACTED], these checks, or Security Advisory Opinions (SAO), are mandatory.

[REDACTED] also discussed evolving FBI counterterrorism strategy and plans.

FOIA(b) (1)

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--In the late 1970s, the FBI began to change its strategy in dealing with terrorism in response to an increasing number of incidents. Terrorism was moved from the intelligence to the criminal side of FBI in accordance with the Attorney General's guidelines on domestic security (not statutory).

--Because of this criminal focus, computerization was considered to be an investigative aid, with a strong emphasis on criminality and a new focus on preemptive action.

--Until recently, the FBI's extranational charter was very limited. One result of the 1983 Beirut bombings, however, included new legislation, granting the Bureau jurisdiction for the murder of US citizens abroad, attacks on diplomats, and Americans held hostage overseas.

--FBI has a number of Legal Attaches overseas who exchange information with their counterparts in foreign governments on international terrorism. (FBI defines international terrorism as involving groups whose acts transcend international borders; domestic terrorism means there is no foreign influence. By this definition, there have been no international terrorist incidents in the US for the past three years.)

FOIA(b) (1)

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[REDACTED] however, [REDACTED] did not know if the [REDACTED] the RSO were obligated to put this information into their agencies' respective data bases [REDACTED]

--The FBI also is trying to adapt their successful task force concept -- bringing together FBI agents, local law enforcement officials and other interested parties to work a problem -- to the international arena. They are hoping they will be able to collect evidence in exchange for sharing their expertise.

--One such area of proposed international cooperation is "Ridge Count;" the FBI would share its expertise in fingerprint identification. This proposal has cleared legal counsel and awaits implementation.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 25, 1987

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE IG/T EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

TO Mr. Richard Armitage,
Office of the Secretary of Defense

VADM Jonathan Howe
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. Oliver Revell
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mr. Clair George
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, Chairman
Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism

SUBJECT: Counterterrorism Program Review

As you know, in March, the President directed the Vice President reconvene the Task Force on Combatting Terrorism to review the effectiveness of our current program. The review was completed and sent to the President in June.

The review found that overall progress had been excellent. It did however, identify several issues of a continuing nature that should be formally addressed. The memorandum from the National Security Council which you received on July 27, 1987, outlined actions to be taken to fully implement the Task Forces' original recommendations.

Recommendation twenty eight, "Monitoring and Influencing Foreign and Domestic Attitudes Towards Terrorism and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy" recommends devoting additional interagency resources to this effort, including more dedicated positions. In the July memorandum, the NSC tasked the Department of State to identify agencies to provide the required personnel by September 30, 1987. The attached draft requirements statement is our first cut at identifying these positions. The Department currently has three personnel assigned to this effort and USIA has detailed a senior officer to act as Office Director.

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- 2 -

Request you review the attached staffing document and provide any comments to me by September 15 so we can satisfy our suspense of the end of the month. The S/CT point of contact who can provide the details is Donald Hamilton at 647-7633.

Attachment:
As Stated.

CC: Mr. Barry Kelly
Mr. Ted McNamara ✓

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

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[illegible]

o From USIA:

A research assistant/secretary to provide clerical support and general assistance to the officers described above.

GS-7 or FS equivalent. This could be an upward mobility position. TS clearance required.