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ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO
19TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

2332 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
202-225-3601

ASSISTANT REGIONAL WHIP, PLAINS AND WESTERN STATES

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEES:
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEES:
INSULAR AFFAIRS
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
PUBLIC LANDS AND NATIONAL PARKS

27 April 1983

Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Pat
didn't we
get something
on someone el
from
Berger Bea

Dear Mike:

Enclosed is copy of cover letter and related materials I recently sent to Mac Baldrige urging the appointment of Charlie Fullerton as Regional Director of the Southwest Region, National Marine Fisheries Service.

I'm sure you agree that Charlie is ideally suited for this position. Your help in advising Mac Baldrige of Charlie's compatibility with the Reagan Administration would be appreciated.

Thanks for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,

ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO
Member of Congress

RJL:mw
enc.

E. CHARLES FULLERTON

Residence: 135 Mering Court
Sacramento, California 95822
(916) 482-5021

Business: Department of Fish and Game
1416 9th Street
Sacramento, California 95814
(916) 445-3535

AREAS OF EXPERTISE

Management/Administration

As Director of the California Department of Fish and Game since 1975, I have had sole responsibility for planning, coordinating, managing, directing and controlling ALL department operations including: fish and wildlife resources and habitat maintenance and protection; public information and education; business services, budgeting and fiscal programs; personnel, labor relations and affirmative action; and research programs. The Department has 1500 full time employees and an annual budget of $70 million.

Expertise includes setting goals for the department; planning by predetermining courses of action; organizing and integrating activities of diverse programs; staffing, training and developing a multidisciplinary professional, administrative and support staff; directing activities to bring about purposeful action; controlling to insure progress is made toward objectives; formulating operating policies; making decisions in all areas of department responsibilities.

As Deputy Director for 3 years and Chief of Operations for 4 years for the Department during the Reagan administration, I had major responsibility, accountable only to the Director, for planning, directing, evaluating, controlling and coordinating all staff in the department.

Communications/Negotiations

In over 36 years working for the Department of Fish and Game from the entry to the highest level, I have been intensively involved in communicating departmental policies, procedures and programs to citizens, organizations, news media, legislators, congressmen, various officials of state, federal and local government, as well as representatives of private industry and special interest groups. This has involved speaking engagements with civic groups, sportsmen's organizations and governmental units, radio and TV, presentations and testimony to the Fish and Game Commission, State Legislature and Congress on proposed laws and

regulations affecting fish and wildlife and habitat, budgets and department programs.

Over 10 years were spent coordinating the department's legislative program for both state and federal legislation including testimony at committee hearings.

Extensive involvement in negotiating and resolving conflicts dealing with: legislative issues, fishing activities with foreign governments as a result of the federal 200-mile fishing zone; mitigation of fish and wildlife losses as a result of construction of dams and associated water projects; sport and commercial fishing conflicts, resource user and nonuser conflicts; land and water use problems.

Extensive involvement, knowledge and working relationships with users, both sport and commercial, of the marine resources off the Pacific coast including the offshore tuna industry.

Special Skills and Knowledge

Thorough knowledge of the legislative/congressional process.

Thorough knowledge of total California state government and inter-relationships and inner workings of the federal government and other states' fish and wildlife programs.

Highly developed ability to define group goals and objectives and initiate methods to accomplish goals.

Highly developed ability to develop cooperative working relationships with people at all levels of state, federal and local government, the public, special interest groups, legislative and executive branches of government.

E. C. FULLERTON

Committee Memberships

Chairman, Fisheries/Navigation Committee, Commission of the Californias
Member, U.S. Delegation, Mexican Fishery Treaties
Advisor, InterAmerican Tropical Tuna Commission
Chairman, Trinity River Task Force
Advisor, North Pacific Halibut Commission
Advisor, Atlantic Tuna Committee
Member, State/Federal Interagency Group
Past Member, U.S. NOAA Marine Fisheries Advisory Committee
Past Chairman and Member, U.S. Dept. of Commerce Regional Fishery Management Council
Member, Wildlife Conservation Board
Member, Pacific Marine Fisheries Commission
Chairman, Committee for Sea Grant
Member, Geothermal Board
Member, Colorado River Board
Member, Salton Sea Advisory Committee
Member, Off-Road Vehicle Advisory Council
Member, Advisory Committee on Marine Fisheries
Member, Advisory Committee on Animal Importation
Member, Advisory Committee on Fish Diseases
Member, State/Federal Coordination Program Policy Committee
Member, State Interagency Oil Spill Committee
Member, U.S. Dept. of State Advisory Committee on Ocean Affairs

Past President, Western Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies
Past President, International Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies

NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION
1412 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202—797-6800

- no meetings
- refuse.
- Ruckelshaus 1st step on road to Environmental Recovery

TWELVE ACTIONS FOR INCLUSION IN

THE PRESIDENT'S 1983 ENVIRONMENTAL MESSAGE

- Conservation Foundation

April 1983

- White House Conference on the Economy and the Environment

Executive Summary

- Izaak Walton League

The following is a summary of proposed recommendations for Presidential actions contained in "Twelve Topics for the President's Environmental Message," NWF (April, 1983):

- Environmental Defense Fund.

1. Allow disposal of public lands only on the basis of the following criteria:

   A. BLM Disposals: Sale only after lands are declared excess in the context of a Resource Management Plan adopted in accordance with existing BLM planning regulations.

   B. National Forest Disposals: Proposed sale submitted to Congress only after lands are declared unnecessary to meet multiple-use objectives in the context of a Forest Management Plan adopted in accordance with existing U.S. Forest Service planning regulations.

   C. GSA Disposals: Sale only after consideration of programmatic environmental impacts within the context of a programmatic environmental impact statement. No land sales will occur based on pre-determined monetary targets.

2. Suspend coal leasing through FY 1984. New Leases, including Preference Right Leases, will issue only on the basis of existing demand for production (not for reserves) and only pursuant to duly-promulgated and adopted land use plans.

3. Accord renewable resource management co-equal status--in full-time staff and dollars--with commodity production programs within the Department of Interior.

4. Request sufficient appropriations to acquire all wetlands authorized for acquisition that have been designated by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service as threatened, including all habitat necessary for the protection of threatened or endangered species. All funds authorized under the Wetland Loan Act shall be requested for appropriation. Withdraw Department of Army regulations, promulgated in July, 1982, which exempt a majority of the nation's wetlands from site-by-site permit requirements.

5. Reduce U.S. Forest Service annual timber sale targets from over 13 billion board feet to no more than 10 billion board feet through FY 1986, and prohibit cutting in areas with highly erosive soils or with high fish and wildlife habitat values.

6. Direct that state surface mining regulations conform to strong federal environmental design criteria aimed at minimizing the environmental impacts of coal production.

7. Support legislation requiring a 10-million-ton reduction in annual sulfur dioxide emissions in the eastern 31 states by 1993, prohibit relaxation of existing clean air plans that would increase sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions over existing levels, and support field testing of innovative pollution control technologies to control acid rain.

8. Direct the Department of Interior to assert and quantify federal reserved and non-reserved water rights for multiple-use purposes, including fish and wildlife.

9. Announce a comprehensive ground water contamination policy that includes the following elements:

   A. A policy of non-degradation of existing aquifers.

   B. A commitment to complete, within three years, the requisite remedial investigation/feasibility studies for all 419 high-priority hazardous waste sites, plus all federal facilities that meet EPA's high-priority criteria.

   C. A substantial tightening of existing hazardous waste site regulations, including the elimination of land disposal where treatment is technically feasible.

   D. Drinking water standards for organic as well as inorganic constituents.

   E. An immediate ban on the direct injection of hazardous wastes into all aquifers that are hydrologically connected to drinking water supplies.

10. Announce a comprehensive federal water development policy that includes the following elements:

    A. A commitment to environmental quality and water conservation as key elements of water policy at all levels of government.

    B. Reinstatement of rules to guide federal agencies in their evaluation of water projects.

    C. Non-federal cost-sharing of future resource development projects.

    D. User fees, pricing, and repayment schedules that will repay the costs of federal investments in water resource projects.

11. Direct the Small Watershed Program of the SCS to emphasize soil erosion control and de-emphasize environmentally-damaging flood control and drainage activities, and direct the payment-in-kind (PIK) program to target wetlands, highly-erosive lands, and riparian flood plains as high-priority lands to be taken out of production under the program.

12. Restore the United States to a position of responsible leadership on international environmental issues by taking the following actions:

    A. Support full funding of the United Nations Environment Programme ($10 million), the Man and the Biosphere Program, and the Antarctica Research Program.

    B. Direct immediate implementation of the Western Hemisphere and World Heritage Conventions.

    C. Support UN resolutions calling for controls on hazardous exports and adoption of a World Charter for Nature.

    D. Support controls on overseas sales of toxics and other hazardous substances banned from use in the United States.

    E. Support OECD efforts to harmonize procedures among industrialized countries concerning the testing and control of toxic chemicals.

F. Implement a Congressionally-mandated moratorium on ocean dumping of low-level radioactive wastes.

G. Vigorously support international negotiations which seek protection of the earth's ozone layer.

H. Support the Law of the Sea Treaty as already adopted by over 120 nations.

I. Take immediate steps to implement the recommendations of the Strategy Conference on Biological Diversity (1981) and the Global 2000 Report to the President (1980).

NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION

1412 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202—797-6800

April 14, 1983

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Your recently announced intention to deliver a comprehensive Environmental Message within the next few months is welcome news. In light of recent events at the Environmental Protection Agency and other controversies surrounding the actions of certain Administration officials, the public is anxious to hear your personal views on the role of government in maintaining public health, conserving natural resources, and safeguarding our natural heritage. We hope you will take the opportunity to spell out the policies and principles that guide your Administration's environmental and conservation programs.

Attached to this letter are twelve priority issues that we urge you to address in your message. These are certainly not the only environmental issues facing us, but they are a representative sample of the concerns of our over 4 million members and supporters. To date, we have heard only from your appointed officials on these topics. Our members are very anxious to learn firsthand of your position on these key issues.

We look forward to your Environmental Message and would welcome any opportunity to discuss the issues raised in the attached document with you or with members of your staff in greater detail.

Sincerely,

Jay D. Hair

JAY D. HAIR
Executive Vice President

Attachment

NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION

1412 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202—797-6800

TWELVE TOPICS

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S

1983 ENVIRONMENTAL MESSAGE

April 1983

JAY D. HAIR
Executive Vice President

Patrick A. Parenteau
Vice President
Resources Conservation Department

TWELVE TOPICS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
1983 ENVIRONMENTAL MESSAGE
APRIL, 1983

1. SALE OF PUBLIC LANDS
2. COAL LEASING
3. RENEWABLE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
4. WETLANDS PROTECTION
5. MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL FORESTS
6. STRIP MINING
7. ACID RAIN
8. PUBLIC WATER RIGHTS
9. GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION
10. FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES POLICY
11. SOIL EROSION
12. U.S. LEADERSHIP ON GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

TWELVE TOPICS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
1983 ENVIRONMENTAL MESSAGE
April, 1983

1. SALE OF PUBLIC LANDS

The vast increase in public land sales proposed under this Administration's Asset Management Program is not scientifically based and threatens valuable wildlife habitat. Certainly, some federally-owned property retains little public value and should be sold. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) explicitly sanctions such disposal, but only after the proper development and implementation of Resources Management Plans as provided in the Act.

Unfortunately, vast land disposals are being proposed by your Administration based on political, not resource, considerations. Instead of a "bottoms up" approach to disposal, the Real Property Review Board and OMB have decreed from the top that $1 billion must be raised from land sales in FY 1984, whether or not this means selling off some of our most productive wildlife habitat. The U.S. Forest Service presently plans to seek Congressional authorization to sell over 6 million acres of national forest based on criteria that have nothing to do with the intrinsic value of the resources.[1/]

1/For example, one criteria for sale is whether more than 50 percent of the land within a forest is federally owned. Several national forests in the eastern part of the U.S. are not more than 50 percent federally owned because they were authorized by Congress for acquisition, not withdrawn from public land holdings, and this Administration has attempted to freeze new acquisitions. This is like selling a house solely because construction is only 40 percent complete.

The Bureau of Land Management presently plans to sell an additional 4.2 million acres, much of it outside of the Congressionally-mandated FLPMA planning process. The General Services Administration is also trying to dispose of over 60,000 acres of property without assessing the natural resource value of these holdings.

#1. We request that your environmental message explicitly abandon the present policy of basing public land sales on predetermined monetary targets and reinstitute a disposal program based on the contribution of public lands to multiple-use values and sound management principles.

2. COAL LEASING

The Department of the Interior plans to lease 20 billion tons of coal in the next eighteen months. This plan was established without due regard for the actual demand for coal or the potential adverse environmental effects. The plan threatens valuable public resources, including (1) critical wildlife habitat, (2) rangeland that is very difficult and costly to reclaim, (3) rich archaeological areas, and (4) unique fossil beds. The environmental analysis and land-use planning needed to identify such resources and develop effective measures for their protection has not been conducted. The Department has simply skipped over the planning and analysis stage to meet self-imposed lease sale deadlines.

Yet, there is no need to push billions of tons of new coal onto the current soft market. More than 80% of existing federal coal leases remain out of production and present estimates are that more than half of these existing leases will remain out of production through 1991. Interior's coal leasing plans will simply turn over another million acres of public lands to coal speculators, decades before the coal is needed and for a fraction of its real value.

#2. We request that your environmental message declare an immediate suspension of all coal leasing through Fiscal Year 1984, and direct that future lease sales be conducted only after the Department of Interior has completed the environmental analyses and land-use planning necessary to protect wildlife habitat and other resources in prospective coal lease areas.

3. RENEWABLE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The Department of Interior has the dual responsibility to both conserve and develop our public lands. Historically, the Department has met this dual responsibility by providing almost equal funding and staff for (1) conservation and (2) commercial exploitation of public resources. Under your Administration, however, this delicate balance has been destroyed. Your

proposed FY 84 budget reduces Bureau of Land Management renewable resource programs 47 percent from their Congressionally-approved FY 1981 levels,[2/] while the commodity production programs have received substantial increases over FY 1981 levels.[3/] Similarly, the total U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service budget has been cut 12 percent since FY 1981, although threats to refuges from development have substantially increased.[4/] This imbalance makes it impossible for the Department to sustain an adequate renewable resources program in the face of accelerated public land development. With over 55 percent of our existing public rangeland and grasslands already categorized as overgrazed and overused,[5/] this persistent underfunding and understaffing of resource management activities will unnecessarily destroy millions of acres of habitat.

2/These programs are (1) wildlife habitat management, (2) rangeland improvement, (3) soil, water and air management, and (4) recreation management. Operational funds for these programs fell from $158.9 million in FY 1981 to a proposed $85.2 million in FY 1984.

3/These programs are (1) energy minerals programs and (2) non-energy mineral development. The exact amount of these increases cannot be determined from available information since some activities within this classification have been transferred to the Minerals Management Service.

4/Total U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service appropriated funds in FY 1981 were $300.1 million. The Administration's FY 1984 request was $265.4 million, including no funds for refuge acquisition.

5/"Overgrazed" is defined as rangeland in which the quality of vegetation and soil is 20 percent or less of site potential.

#3: We request that your environmental message direct the Department of Interior to reprogram the Department's budget to assure that total resources devoted to renewable resource management programs--in full time staff and dollars--be no less than total resources devoted to the commodity production programs.

4. WETLANDS PROTECTION

The nation's wetlands are an enormously valuable natural and economic resource. Wetlands improve water quality, reduce flooding, limit shoreline erosion, and provide food and shelter for many species of fish, shellfish and wildlife. The nation's multi-billion dollar recreational and commercial fishing industry depends on the fish and shellfish produced in wetlands. Nevertheless, our wetlands are disappearing at an alarming rate. We have already lost over 50% of our wetlands and continue to lose them at a rate of 450,000 acres per year.6/ In the upper Midwest alone, 50% of the prairie

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6/ Status and Trends of Wetlands and Deepwater Habitats in the Coterminous United States, 1950's and 1970's, U.S. Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of Biological Services (1982).

potholes were lost by 1950, with losses continuing at 48,000 acres per year.[7/]

Much of this destruction is federally subsidized, primarily through agricultural support programs. Although wetlands are protected by law, your Administration has failed to enforce these protections. Secretary Watt has attempted to impose a moratorium on the use of the Land and Water Conservation Fund for wetland acquisition. He has also steadfastly refused to use funds available under the Wetlands Loan Act to purchase wetlands essential to the nation's migratory waterfowl. Meanwhile, officials in the Department of the Army, under the guise of "regulatory reform," are attempting to exempt a majority of the nation's remaining wetlands from site-by-site permit requirements under the Clean Water Act, the only effective federal regulatory program to protect wetlands. While not endorsing legislative action to restrict the program, your Cabinet Council on Energy and Natural Resources has given the Department of the Army the "green light" to seek such action on its own. Secretary Watt's proposed wetland conservation legislation (called Protect Our Wetland and Duck Resources or "POWDR") exempts over 90% of the causes of wetland losses and provides only token financial assistance for acquisition.

7/ Statement of Robert A. Jantzen Before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Subcommittee on Fish and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment, November 20, 1981.

#4. We request that your environmental message (1) support a comprehensive legislative program to protect our remaining wetlands, (2) direct your officials to request funds from Congress to purchase critically threatened wetlands, and (3) direct the Department of the Army to withdraw its regulations, issued in July 1982, emasculating the wetland permit program.

5. MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL FORESTS

Federal law requires that National Forests be managed for multiple uses including outdoor recreation, rangeland, timber, watershed, wildlife and fisheries. Unfortunately, the U.S. Forest Service has adopted a "top-down" management system that keys forest management to predetermined targets for sale of timber. These targets now call for about 11 billion board feet to be sold in FY 1983, rising to over 13 billion board feet in FY 1985. These targets will require that areas critically important to fish and wildlife be cut to meet inflated timber sale goals set in Washington. These high timber sale targets are totally unnecessary since about 35 billion board feet remains sold, but uncut.

One class of areas now facing pressure for cutting is old growth forests, which are of unique importance to many wildlife species as well as to commercial and other fisheries. Cutting will drastically reduce the ability of the land to sustain wildlife, and it is uncertain whether commercial timber can

ever be regrown in some of these areas. These high timber sale targets will also require forest supervisors to shift resources away from forest management to timber sale preparation, further ignoring the multiple-use mandate of the U.S. Forest Service. Your FY 1984 proposed budget reflects this fact, showing increased funds for timber sale preparation activities, while funds for fish, wildlife, and threatened and endangered species habitat improvement all decline.

#5. We request that your environmental message abandon existing plans for increasing timber sales and reduce annual cuts to less than 10 billion board feet to accommodate responsible environmental and fiscal management of our National Forests.

6. STRIP MINING

The federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 requires the Department of the Interior to protect the nation from the environmental impacts of the strip mining of coal. The heart of this program is a series of so-called "permanent program regulations" that set minimum environmental standards. These standards are established by the Department of Interior and implemented by state surface mining regulators through federally-approved state mining programs. Until recently, these standards consisted of specific environmental

design criteria requiring states to, among other things, (1) protect state-listed threatened or endangered species, (2) fence toxic waste ponds, (3) prohibit the use of most persistent pesticides, (4) protect nationally significant cultural properties, (5) assure safe construction of coal waste piles, (6) control road construction and design, and (7) restore strip-mined land to its approximate original contour. Unfortunately the Department of Interior is now seeking to replace these and other important design criteria with more vague "performance standards" that are difficult to review for effectiveness before they are implemented and difficult to police after they are implemented. In addition, both state implementation and federal supervision are being made more difficult through budget cuts. Indeed, the Department of Interior's own records indicate that the majority of major coal states are not now in full compliance with the federal Surface Mining Act.

#6. We request that your environmental message explicitly support the need for strong federal environmental design criteria aimed at minimizing the environmental impacts of coal production.

7. ACID RAIN

Over 50 million tons of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide

are emitted into the air we breathe in the United States each year--primarily from coal-fired power plants and automobiles--and return to earth as acid rain. Highly respected scientific panels that have studied the effect of these emissions on our environment (including the National Commission on Air Quality, the Committee on the Atmosphere and Biosphere of the National Academy of Sciences, and the United States-Canada Acid Rain Work Group) have concluded that acid deposition is responsible for the acidification of sensitive surface waters in the United States and Canada, and that reductions from present levels would reduce further damage. Evidence is also mounting that sulfur deposition is injuring crops, forests and public health. Yet the United States is unique among industrialized nations in not only ignoring the acid rain/acid deposition problem, but making it worse. Your Administration (1) wants more studies before doing anything to solve the problem, (2) has opposed control legislation, and (3) has granted relaxations in state air quality plans that will increase sulfur dioxide levels 1.5 million tons over formerly projected levels. Last year, your Administration also supported changes in the Clean Air Act that would have allowed a doubling of nitrogen oxide emissions from new cars.

#7. <u>We request that your environmental message (1) support legislation introduced by Senator Stafford requiring a 10-million-ton reduction in annual sulfur dioxide emissions in</u>

the eastern 31 states by 1993, (2) declare a moratorium on State Implementation Plan (SIP) relaxations or other administrative actions or legislative initiatives that would increase sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions over previously projected levels, and (3) support field testing of innovative pollution control technologies to control acid rain.

8. PUBLIC WATER RIGHTS

In our western states, he who owns the water owns the land. Until recently, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) exercised its right to appropriate water for use on public land in the same manner and to the same extent that private landowners appropriate water for use on their own lands. BLM uses water for floodwater and sediment detention, waterfowl habitat, recreation, wildlife and livestock drinking, and other multiple-use purposes. Protection of these rights is crucial to effective multiple-use management of 341 million acres of BLM land, an area twice the size of Texas, most of which is located it in the arid West.

Unfortunately, under a policy adopted by BLM under your Administration, permittees or lessees of public lands are being encouraged to file either as exclusive holders or co-holders (along with BLM) of water rights for improvements on BLM lands used for stockwatering.[8/] By encouraging private owner-

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8/Memorandum from Director, Bureau of Land Management, to Secretary, December 3, 1981. Subject: BLM Water Rights - Stockwatering.

ship of water rights on public land, this policy transfers effective control of public rangelands subject to such water rights to private interests. In addition, the Department of Interior has declared that the federal government has no authority to protect instream flows--flows critical to the health of fish and wildlife on public lands--on non-reserved federal lands.9/ Finally, the Department has recently announced that the federal water rights it has not given away can only be used for human and livestock consumption, not for fish and wildlife.10/ The living resources of our federal lands are being literally squeezed dry to accommodate private energy, grazing, and agricultural interests.

#8. We request that your environmental message repudiate this give-away of federal water, and that an aggressive program of quantification and assertion of federal water rights for multiple purposes (including fish and wildlife protection) be announced.

9/Solicitor Opinion of September 11, 1981. Non-reserved lands are BLM lands that have not been designated for a particular use, such as wilderness or national recreation areas.

10/Solicitor Opinion of February 16, 1983.

9. GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION

Groundwater is an essential but vulnerable national resource. More than 90% of citizens living in rural areas, and 50% of all Americans, depend on groundwater for domestic use. Groundwater is very easily contaminated and, once contaminated, is very often economically or technologically impossible to clean up. Yet a recently released report of the Office of Technology Assessment found that 29% of the groundwater drinking water supplies of 954 U.S. cities with populations over 10,000 is contaminated.[11/] EPA announced last year that organic chemicals, many of which are believed to cause cancer and other diseases in humans, have been detected in 45% of the public water systems that draw on groundwater and serve populations over 10,000. These chemicals have been detected in extremely high concentrations which exceed by several orders of magnitude those found in surface drinking water sources.

Despite the seriousness of the situation, the present Administration has failed to adequately implement existing laws to prevent contamination of groundwater or to develop a comprehensive policy on groundwater contamination. It has (1)

11/ Technologies and Management Strategies for Hazardous Wastes, Office of Technology Assessment (March, 1983), p. 5.

failed to vigorously implement the Superfund program completing clean-up at only four of 419 EPA-identified "high priority" abandoned hazardous waste sites and conducting pre-cleanup remedial investigation/feasibility studies at 32 more sites over the last two years, (2) failed to set uniform national standards for site clean-up, (3) allowed existing landfills to continue operating without taking remedial steps to comply with new standards designed to control groundwater pollution, (4) exempted small surface impoundments, "small" generators that produce 1,000 kilograms of waste per month, and hazardous waste burned in boilers from regulation, (5) failed, as required by law, to establish Underground Injection Control ("UIC") programs in states which do not have them, thus allowing continued direct injection of hazardous waste into aquifers, and (6) failed to test for, or regulate, organic constituents in drinking water,[12/] although organics pose a much more serious threat to public health than inorganic constituents. Moreover, EPA has proposed to grant lifetime permits to many existing hazardous waste facilities, most of which are land disposal facilities, and has failed to take any enforcement action against 70 of the 109 facilities that it has found do not comply with existing regulations.[13/]

12/ The one exception is the existing regulation of trihalomethanes.

13/ "EPA to OMB: Massive Noncompliance Found with Groundwater Monitoring," Inside EPA, April 1, 1983, at 1.

#9. We request that your environmental message announce the adoption of a comprehensive policy on groundwater contamination that includes (1) a policy of non-degradation of existing aquifers (2) a commitment to complete, within three years, the requisite remedial investigation/feasibility studies for all 419 high-priority hazardous waste sites, plus all federal facilities that meet EPA's high priority criteria, (3) a substantial tightening of existing hazardous waste site regulations, including the elimination of land disposal where treatment is technically feasible, (4) drinking water standards for organic as well as inorganic constitutents, and (5) an immediate ban on the direct injection of hazardous wastes into all aquifers that are hydrologically connected to drinking water supplies.

10. FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES POLICY

America is blessed with bountiful water supplies--about 675 billion gallons of usable fresh water from lakes, rivers, and streams per year. In contrast, we use only about 110 billion gallons per year, of which 82 percent is for agricultural irrigation. Domestic and commercial consumption represents only about 8 percent of our water budget. Nevertheless, water shortages exist, primarily because water is not always available when and where it is needed. Public authorities have addressed this problem by building large physical structures to

reduce the risks of droughts and floods, and to bring water and power to distant markets. However, much of our federal water investment has been demonstrated to be (1) economically inefficient, (2) inequitable in its distribution of water costs and benefits, and (3) unnecessarily destructive of the environment. Coordinated action is vitally needed to make sure our federal water investments are efficient, equitable, and compatible with environmental goals. Because most river basins overlap state boundaries federal technical, planning, and management assistance is essential.

Your Administration, to its great credit, has tackled the thorny issue of cost and benefit distribution by supporting the application of "user fees" to federally-supported projects, and by developing a draft policy that would require non-federal interests to pay a significant share of project costs. These measures should reduce political pressure in support of marginal projects that are simply a waste of taxpayers' money. However, your Administration has dismantled efforts to coordinate federal/state water planning by (1) abolishing all federally-funded River Basin Commissions, (2) eliminating the Office of Water Research and Technology in the Department of Interior, (3) stripping the U.S. Water Resources Council of its power to evaluate water projects, (4) rescinding the rules federal agencies use to plan and evaluate water projects, and (5) dropping the promotion of environmental quality as a co-equal objective of water resources planning. These actions

assure that federally-assisted or federally-constructed water projects will continue to be ill-conceived, poorly-planned, inefficient, and politically motivated.

#10. We request that your environmental message announce a coordinated water policy that includes (1) a commitment to environmental quality and water conservation as key elements of water policy at all levels of government, (2) reinstatement of rules to guide federal agencies in their evaluation of water projects, (3) non-federal cost-sharing of future resource development projects, and (4) user fees, pricing, and repayment schedules that will repay the costs of federal investments in water resource projects.

11. SOIL EROSION

Thomas Jefferson once observed that "civilization itself rests upon the soil." Since the Jeffersonian era the United States has moved from an agricultural to an industrial society, but our economic dependence on the soil remains. Our exportable surplus of grain grew from 5 million metric tons in the 1930's to 131 million metric tons in 1980, while the rest of the world (with the exception of Australia and New Zealand) became net grain importers. Yet increased soil erosion threatens the continued productivity of our cropland. Despite federal assistance, soil erosion is estimated to be 25 percent

worse today than in the "dust bowl" days of the 1930's. With farm income currently at the lowest level since the depression, farmers cannot afford to implement expensive soil conservation measures themselves. To the contrary, ever greater concentrations of agricultural chemicals are now applied to our cropland to produce bigger harvests in an attempt to squeeze short-term profits from a fast disappearing resource.

A principle reason for the failure of our federal soil conservation programs is the fact that most federal assistance, administered by the Soil Conservation Science (SCS), is devoted to "structural" solutions such as flood control dams, irrigation systems, and drainage projects.

These "solutions" often inflict extensive damage to wetlands and riparian habitat, natural systems that themselves help to reduce flood damage and soil erosion if protected. Other "non-structural" solutions such as shelter-belts, no-till farming, and the elimination of agricultural subsidies are ignored.

#11. We request that your environmental message (1) direct the Small Watershed Program of the SCS to emphasize soil erosion control and de-emphasize environmentally damaging flood control and drainage activities, and (2) direct the payment-in-kind (PIK) program to target wetlands, highly-erosive lands, and riparian flood plains as high-priority lands to be taken out of production under the program.

12. U.S. LEADERSHIP ON GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS

Until 1981, the United States set the standard for the world on issues relating to the conservation and wise use of natural resources. The force of our example has inspired many other countries, developed and developing alike, to tackle their own problems of pollution and natural resources degradation. Throughout the 1970's, the United States championed efforts to convince other nations to join with us in negotiating international agreements addressing global environmental issues and, through our demonstrated interest, vastly increased global awareness of the connection between environmental and economic progress.

Unfortunately, your Administration has effectively removed the United States from any leadership role on international environmental issues. One of your very first actions in office was to rescind a farsighted Executive Order (E.O. 12264) designed to discourage the sale overseas of toxic and other hazardous substances banned from use in the United States. Instead of working with other industrial nations to address problems posed by toxic chemicals, the United States is now actively opposing (1) an initiative proposed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to harmonize procedures among industrialized countries concerning the testing and control of toxic chemicals, (2) negotiations

which seek protection of the earth's vital ozone layer, and (3) a moratorium on ocean dumping of low-level radioactive wastes, a stand inconsistent even with U.S. law.[14/] The United States was also the only country in the world to vote against UN resolutions calling for (1) controls on hazardous exports, and (2) adoption of a World Charter for Nature.

Collection of data on global environmental and natural resources trends has also stagnated under your Administration and the U.S. has even pressured OECD to drop its work in this area. Important scientific research and conservation programs are being threatened with elimination because your proposed FY 1984 budget zeroes out funds for (1) the Man and the Biosphere program, (2) Antarctica research, and (3) implementation of the Western Hemisphere and World Heritage Conventions. Your Administration is also trying to cut the United States' contribution to the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the environmental conscience of the UN, to $3 million, a 70 percent reduction from the 1980 level. Finally, your Administration has taken no action to carry out the recommendations of its own Strategy Conference on Biological Diversity held in 1981, or the Global 2000 Report to the President issued in 1980.

14/ A 1982 Amendment to the Ocean Dumping Act established such a moratorium.

#12. We request that your environmental message reverse these actions and commit this Administration to restoring the United States to a position of responsible leadership on international environmental issues.

MICHAEL K. DEAVER

Mac

I'd appreciate anything you can do to see if Bob Kaneen can get a spot on the Pacific Fishery Management Council. many thanks.

mike

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The Honorable Malcolm Baldrige
Secretary of Commerce
Department of Commerce
14th and Constitution Ave. N.W.
Washington, DC 20230

3/9

From the desk of

BERGER C. BENSON

2/24/83

Dear Mike:

The enclosed resume for Bob Kaneen is in support of his desire to be appointed to the Pacific Fishery Management Council by the Secretary of Commerce. I worked with Bob for many years and can recommend him highly. Anything you can do will be greatly appreciated.

If you can foresee a two day break in your schedule sometime during the spring turkey season let me know. We have a hunt set up in South Carolina that can't miss. I'll fly out and hunt with you.

Love to all,

Ben

RESUME
ROBERT G. KANEEN

PERSONAL DATA

Born December 30, 1916
Resident of California 65 years
Address: 5230 Appian Way, Long Beach, California 90803
Married 42 years
Graduate of South Gate High School 1936
Attended University of Southern California 1937 and 1938
Retired from California Department of Fish and Game after 40 years of service

SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT TO PACIFIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL

From 11/40 through 12/80, with the exception of 3 years and 3 months during World War II when I served as an Intelligence Agent, U. S. Coast Guard, I was employed by the California Department of Fish and Game, starting as an Assistant Fish and Game Warden and being promoted, respectively, to Fish and Game Warden, Fish and Game Patrol Captain, Fish and Game Patrol Inspector, and for the last 7 years of my career, Regional Manager of the Marine Resources Region, a statewide region from the Mexican border to the Oregon line.

As Patrol Inspector, I supervised 60 law enforcement personnel in the enforcement of laws and regulations pertaining to the conservation and protection of ocean resources, statewide. As Regional Manager, in addition to law enforcement, I was responsible for biological studies, marine catch statistics, and the operation of research vessels.

I have worked on two short-time assignments for the Federal Government. The first was in 1967 when I authored and put into operation the first regulations of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission governing the taking of yellowfin tuna. In 1972 I was employed by the National Marine Fisheries Service as a consultant to review their enforcement program in the northwest region. My recommendations were accepted in their entirety and are currently in effect.

SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

Since the inception of the Fishery Management Councils in 1976 through December 1980 when I retired, I served as Director Charles Fullerton's designee to the Pacific Council and as such I attended and participated in approximately 50% of all Council meetings.

Additionally, I have served as an advisor on numerous international conferences relating to treaties existing between the United States and Mexico, as well as those between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Resume – Robert G. Kaneen (continued)

Special Qualifications (continued)

Since my retirement from the Department of Fish and Game I have continued to be active and interested in the problems of both recreational and commercial fisheries in California. I have appeared before the State Fish and Game Commission, as well as the California State Legislature, representing both sport and commercial fishing organizations. I believe this demonstrates my understanding of both recreational and commercial fishing and my ability to work harmoniously and cooperatively with both groups.

On July 1, 1982 I was employed as a consultant to the California State Lands Commission. The purpose of my assignment was to develop a network throughout California to advise commercial fishing interests of proposed seismic operations (oil exploration) in order to prevent conflict with commercial fishing. In October, 1982, I was appointed as Chairman of a joint State/Federal task force to evaluate the effects of seismic operations on marine mammals and fisheries resources. A report was delivered to the Executive Officer of the State Lands Commission on December 5th and was accepted in its entirety.

ORGANIZATIONS IN SUPPORT OF MY CANDIDACY

United Fishermen's Organization of Southern California, Inc.
P. O. Box 3538
Terminal Island, California 90731

California Gillnetters Association
2200 Signal Place
San Pedro, California

California Seafood Institute
11th and L Building
Sacramento, California 95814
An organization comprised of 200+ whosesale fish dealers and brokers, the only organization of its type in California. Affiliated with the National Fisheries Institute

Sportfishing Association of California (SAC)
555 E. Ocean Boulevard – Suite 700-A
Long Beach, California 90802
An organization of all sport fishing landings and the owners and operators of commercial passenger vessels from Morro Bay to San Diego

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
Washington, D.C. 20235

June 14, 1982

What else can Ray get?

Mike – See attached memo.

Mike:

Ray Nesbit of Sacramento, is among the nominees being considered by Secretary Baldrige for a vacancy on the Marine Fisheries Advisory Committee (MAFAC).

Ray is well qualified and would like the appointment. The Administration could use someone like Ray on MAFAC.

If you have a minute would you put a plug in for Ray with Secretary Baldrige. I am at 634-4232 if you need more information.

Many thanks

Pete

Peter Tweedt

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Michael Deaver

FROM: John Hilboldt

SUBJECT: Raymond Nesbit

Our records show that Mr. Nesbit was appointed to the National Park Service Advisory Board, Department of the Interior, on August 7, 1981. This appointment was for a two-year term and is a Secretarial Appointment.

We show no activity through our offices concerning any other appointments or consideration for other appointments for Mr. Nesbit.

Our entire file on Mr. Nesbit is attached.

Misguided environmental theory threatens the survival of the grizzly

THE LAST BEARS OF YELLOWSTONE

BY ALSTON CHASE

"IN THE YELLOWSTONE," WROTE A VISITOR IN 1909, "bears are as the autumn leaves," and indeed, since Yellowstone Park was founded, in 1872, bears and Yellowstone have seemed inseparable. For three generations of Americans, coming to the Park was nearly synonymous with coming to see bears. For these travelers, it was the black bear—*Ursus americanus*, the impish, appealing, but destructive and sometimes dangerous clown who prowled the campgrounds and begged along the roads, blocking traffic and causing "bearjams"—that provided many a vacation's thrills.

Few ever saw the grizzly—*Ursus arctos*, or silvertip, as westerners call him. But he remained in Yellowstone as a remnant of a species that once roamed throughout western North America. Much larger than the black, ranging up to 1,200 pounds, wilder and more unpredictable, this bear, easily identified by its humped shoulders, long hind feet, broad muzzle, and long gray guard hairs, usually stayed away from human beings. But his presence was felt. It instilled in the hearts of backcountry hikers the most authentic of wilderness emotions: awe. Knowing the silvertip was there, they knew they were in truly untamed country. The grizzly—with its reputation for ferocity, its intolerance of human beings, its need for great range—had rightly become a symbol of wild America.

As you enter the Park today, you will still be reminded of the bears. At the entrance, a familiar sign reads, "Bears and other large Animals are Dangerous . . . View from a Safe Distance." At the gate, the ranger will give you an information packet that includes a yellow sheet, "About Bears," warning you to "enjoy them at a distance." As you drive through or as you hike in the backcountry, you will most certainly see elk, deer, antelope, bison, mountain sheep, eagles, and ospreys. But you almost certainly will not see any bears. Last summer, I drove more than 5,000 miles in Yellowstone. During each of the past dozen years, I have spent weeks in the Park. During the past decade, I have hiked more than 1,000 miles of the Yellowstone backcountry. Yet I have not seen a bear by a road in Yellowstone since 1972. I have not seen a bear in the backcountry since 1974. Nor have I met anyone, except National Park Service employees, who claims to have seen a bear along a road in years. Larry Roop, a bear biologist for the state of Wyoming and a member of the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team, who flies over the Park several times a week looking for bears in areas best suited for them, has not, he tells me, seen a black bear in two years.

Where have all the bears gone?

If you ask a ranger at one of Yellowstone's visitor centers where the bears are, he will tell you the bears have gone wild: that they are there, but out of sight. The Park, he will say, has for twelve years pursued a policy of weaning bears from human food, to produce free-ranging populations of blacks and grizzlies. This program has been successful, you will be told: now all bears are truly wild, afraid of man, and living in the backcountry.

If you want to study the situation, the ranger will supply you with "fact sheets." From these you will learn that "al our information indicates that about as many black bear inhabit the park now, approximately 650, as when the par was established," and that "an estimated 350 [grizzlies] i habit the Yellowstone ecosystem."

Unfortunately, I'm afraid, there is not a shred of truth what you will have been told. The bears have not g wild. They are simply gone. There never was a scien field study that claimed there were 650 black bears in lowstone, and no scientific study of the black bear has done since 1967. According to Richard Knight, direc the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team, a group t

Alston Chase, the author of Group Memory, *is at work on a book about Yellowstone.*

ILLUSTRATIONS BY MILTON GLASER

nine years has been conducting all Park research on the bears; fewer than 200 grizzlies inhabit the entire Yellowstone area; of these, fewer than seventy are adults and fewer than thirty are adult females. Nineteen cubs are born a year, and grizzly-bear fertility and longevity are declining. About thirty grizzlies, he thinks, are killed each year.

These grizzlies belong to a small population that inhabits parts of Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, and Washington. Currently, not more than 600 to 1,000 live south of Canada, and numbers throughout this area are declining. Although substantial populations still exist in Canada and parts of Alaska, most experts agree that their continued survival is in doubt.

For the Yellowstone grizzly this decline has been dramatic. As late as 1967, according to the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, grizzly-bear populations in Yellowstone were "viable and self-sustaining." Yet by 1975 the grizzly was declared a "threatened" species in the lower forty-eight states. Since 1975, its decline has, if anything, accelerated. No one today in a position to know is optimistic about its future.

The decline of the black bear, although it has drawn less attention, has been even more precipitous. In 1965, according to the only study done on black bears, there were 899 sightings of black bears in one season along the roads of Yellowstone. Yet Knight, Roop, and other researchers confirm that there are today even fewer blacks in the Park than there are grizzlies.

What has happened to the bears?

The answer, as we shall see, is freighted with paradox.

DURING THE WINTER OF 1961–1962, THE PARK SERvice began what was intended to be a quiet hunt. Rangers were assigned the task of systematically culling the northern Yellowstone elk herd. Unfortunately, their work was neither quiet nor systematic. Many thought that the killing was indiscriminate, and word leaked out. Many elk that were to be butchered and sent to orphanages, prisons, and reservations were left to rot. Altogether 4,283 animals were killed. The public outcry was enormous.

This official hunt was part of a longstanding Park policy to contain the numbers of the northern Yellowstone elk. To prevent overgrazing, Park officials reduced the herd by periodic hunts such as this one, and by transfers of elk to zoos and game ranges. By the winter of 1961–1962, the herd had grown to more than 10,000 on a range then believed to have a carrying capacity of 5,000. The reduction of 1962 brought their numbers down to 5,700, but word of the slaughter spread, and so did demands that it never occur again.

The secretary of the interior, Stewart Udall, established a committee to evaluate the Park Service game-management program. This committee, the Advisory Board on Wildlife Management, was chaired by A. Starker Leopold, professor of zoology at the University of California and son of the great naturalist Aldo Leopold.

Leopold saw his charge in broad terms. "We knew," he recently told me, "the world was looking at us. If we were to recommend public hunting of elk, parks in Africa would feel pressed to permit the public hunting of elephant. We decided that we would develop a philosophy of management that could be applied universally."

In March of 1963, the "Leopold Report," as it came to be known, was sent to Udall. This report's recommendations, its authors admitted, were "stupendous."

"As a primary goal," it said, "we would recommend that the biotic associations within each park be maintained, or where necessary re-created, as nearly as possible in the condition that prevailed when the area was first visited by the white man."

Managing parks as original ecosystems, it continued, required that "observable artificiality in any form must be minimized and obscured in every possible way. Wildlife should not be displayed in fenced enclosures; this is the function of a zoo, not a national park. In the same category is artificial feeding of wildlife."

By these means, the report noted, "a reasonable illusion of primitive America could be re-created, using the utmost in skill, judgment and ecological sensitivity." Unfortunately, accomplishing this goal called for "a set of ecologic skills unknown in this country today." To develop these skills, the committee urged that "a greatly expanded research program, oriented to management needs, must be developed within the National Park Service itself. Both research and the application of management methods should be in the hands of skilled park personnel."

The committee, in short, was advocating that natural ecosystems be re-created while admitting that knowledge of how to do this did not exist. And at the same time it was advocating closing the parks to scientific research and putting research under control of the Park Service.

Udall was reluctant to accept the committee's findings. The report, Leopold said, "was so potentially controversial it scared the Secretary to death. But later that spring I presented it as an address to an environmental conference in Detroit. The environmental community received it so enthusiastically that Udall changed his mind. Within three months, it was official Park Service policy."

It is not surprising that the Leopold Report was so appealing, for it presented a credo that coincided with a sentiment shared by a growing number of Ameri-

distrust of human intervention in the natural world. The parks, the report was saying, should no longer be managed as they were at the turn of the century—as game preserves, where hunting was permitted, good animals were protected, and bad animals were exterminated. Nor should parks be run as they were during many decades of this century—as farms, where trees were planted, forest fires fought, pastures plowed and harvested. Nor should they any longer be zoos, where animals were fed for the benefit of tourists. We must play a humbler role, it was telling us, not presuming to make judgments about what species are good and what species are bad; not presuming to decide what lives and what dies. Man must stop meddling with nature.

This was philosophy, not science. It was not science that demanded a return to natural conditions. After all, what is an ecosystem? Few biologists, when they are pinned down, will claim to know. There are different ecosystems for every species. Some, like that of the Devil's Hole pupfish, are no bigger than an average-sized living room; others, like that of elk, encompass hundreds of miles. The range of the grizzly, for instance, is huge. The home range of the average Yellowstone male grizzly is 318 square miles, and some individuals have ranges of more than 600 square miles. Is there any park in the country big enough to be a natural ecosystem for all the species it contains? According to a report of the First World Conference on National Parks, held in Seattle in July of 1962, "few of the world's parks are large enough to be in fact self-regulatory ecological units."

What about Yellowstone? As America's first national park, protected almost from the moment the white man found it, surely it could be a model of natural, primitive America, if any place could. Yet even Yellowstone was not large enough to be "self-regulatory," and, more important, it was no longer in original condition. The white man had changed it in countless ways. He drove off the Indians. He introduced exotic species of trout, many in waters originally barren of all fish, and eliminated several subspecies of arctic grayling and cutthroat trout. He killed all the wolves. He sprayed the forests with DDT and eliminated numerous species of insectivorous birds.

He nearly eliminated the mountain bison (paring its numbers from a historic level of 1,000 to twenty-three by 1902) and then spent fifty years breeding bison like cattle—plowing under the native grasses of the Lamar Valley to plant crested wheatgrass, and feeding the buffalo hay in winter.

The white man also fed the bears. For nearly a hundred years, garbage dumps were maintained in the Park, and there the bears—both grizzlies and blacks—came to feed. The bears, natural scavengers, became the welcome, wild camp followers of the Park.

Restoring Yellowstone to its original condition would have been an impossible task. It would also have been an unpopular one. It would have entailed bringing back the wolf—and that would send shivers down the spines of local citizens. It would have entailed the elimination of many fishes and perhaps the end of fishing in the Park—and fishing groups would not stand for it. And, although this was overlooked, it would require reintroducing the Indian. Instead, the Leopold philosophy was applied selectively.

In fact, little happened until Jack Anderson, the superintendent of Grand Teton National Park, was made superintendent of Yellowstone, in 1967. Anderson was the first superintendent in Yellowstone history to have, following the suggestion of the Leopold Report, his own "supervisory research biologist" to help develop and support management policies.

With Anderson's arrival, new policies were quickly put into effect, the most controversial of which were the changes in management of elk and bear.

The Park now decided that the elk could manage itself as a wild population. Reductions would be ended for all time. Park biologists were assuming that even in the absence of the wolf—the greatest elk predator—this herd possessed some biologically determined "population-limiting factors." Over the past fifteen years, however, the elk have not exhibited such traits. The herd has grown from around 4,000 in 1968 to more than 16,000 today.

There was no threat that the bears would overpopulate the Park. But, having grown accustomed to human food, they were seen, following the report, to be unnatural. So the Park Service decided, in 1967, to wean the bears from garbage and transform them into a wild, free-ranging population. Unfortunately, weaning the bears would mean in effect killing many of them. Here, as with the elk, the biological compensatory mechanisms were supposed to help. It was hypothesized that weaning the bears from garbage would improve their diet and increase their fertility.

The major effect of the new eco-philosophy, so far as Yellowstone was concerned, was to end the killing of elk, of which there were too many, and begin the killing of bears, of which there were too few.

LYING BEHIND THE NEW BEAR POLICY, HOWEVER, was something other than ecological concern. As our society became more environmentally enlightened, its tolerance of bears diminished. There was a "bear problem," as Yellowstone officials called it. Bears sometimes damaged property or injured people. Very infrequently, they killed, though the extent of this danger has been greatly exaggerated. In the ninety-five years of Park history preceding the new bear policy, three people had been killed by bears in the national parks (all of them, as it happened, in Yellowstone). The last death had occurred in 1942. Yet, on average, each year around a half-dozen people die in Yellowstone from every conceivable cause: drownings, falls, traffic accidents. People are also gored by buffalo and savaged by moose and occasionally die from these mishaps.

In the 1950s, approximately one out of every 24,000 visitors was injured by a bear, according to my calculations

based on Park Service figures. During the first seven years of the 1960s, this rate went down 50 percent. Yet as the rate went down, concern over it went up.

The first person known to be killed by a bear in the Park was a young man, in 1907, out for a walk with his wife. He chased a grizzly cub up a tree and began poking it with an umbrella. The sow appeared and tore out the man's breastbone and one lung with a single swipe. Although considerable pressure was put on the chief ranger (or scout, as he was then called) to kill the bear, he refused to do so. The bear, he said, had the right to protect her young. That was forest justice.

By the 1960s, the Park was less willing and less able to invoke forest justice. By that time, we had become a litigious people. If, as has happened, Sequoia National Park could be sued by the family of someone who was killed by lightning there, think what a liability the bear must be. He was to Park Service lawyers what icy doorsteps are to homeowners. A bear injury often resulted in a tort claim against the Park. So when a bear hurt someone, the bear was removed, to prevent further liability. The new policy, as described by Starker Leopold and Durward Allen, both of the National Parks System Advisory Board, was to be one that "protects the people from the bears; protects the bears from the people; and protects the National Park Service from tort cases in the event of mishap." In 1968, the Park began to phase out the garbage dumps, to "bear-proof" waste containers, to increase efforts to educate visitors on sanitation and the danger of bears, to remove all "nuisance" bears.

During this time, the noted naturalists John and Frank Craighead, twins, had been conducting the first scientific study of the grizzly ever undertaken in the Park. Their research—independently financed—had begun in 1959. By 1968, employing techniques of tagging and radio tracking individual bears, they had accumulated a data base that even today provides the most complete information available on grizzly population, fertility, and behavior.

But the Craigheads were to run afoul of the new policy. The Park Service, which by this time had its own biologists, felt no need to follow the advice of independent researchers. It was, in fact, anxious to close out independent research on the grizzly. Its decision to change bear policy was made against the Craigheads' advice.

The grizzly population, the Craigheads argued, was fragile, numbering not more than 175 animals. Over the past century they had become dependent on garbage as an important source of food. Maintenance of the dumps in remote locations was the most effective way to keep bears away from human beings. And, the Craigheads argued, it was not necessarily unnatural to do so. Bears naturally eat almost anything, and probably have always eaten human garbage. To the Craigheads the dumps were "eco-centers"—centralized sources of high protein where bears might go at critical times of the year to develop the fat reserves necessary to survive hibernation. The grizzly that visited the dump, they argued, was no different from the Kodiak bear in Alaska that, at certain times of the year, goes to his favorite stream to catch salmon.

So long as the dumps were in remote areas, the bears did not associate garbage with human beings and were not tempted to invade human settlements. But if the dumps were closed, the bears, deprived of a traditional food source, would be forced to wander looking for food. This would bring them into contact with human beings, endangering both people and bears.

The Craigheads suggested a controlled, gradual closing of some dumps with a simultaneous careful study to monitor the effect on the bears. During the transition period, and longer if necessary, supplemental carrion feeding in remote areas, or the continued operation of some dumps, might be used to help the bears.

"We recognize," they said, in a 1967 report to the Park Service,

> the artificiality of this [maintenance of the dumps] as a management technique. However, any purposeful management of wildlife populations or their habitats can be considered "unnatural." Moreover, within Yellowstone some of the natural population regulating processes have been so altered since the establishment of the park that these are not now effective. Since there is no possibility of these being wholly restored and since management must do the job, artificiality becomes inevitable. Maintenance or reestablishment of the natural situation, although a commendable ideal to work towards in national parks, and we fully endorse this concept, does nevertheless have limitations that must be recognized.

The Park Service rejected the Craigheads' advice on the basis of objections voiced by Glen Cole, the supervisory research biologist. The Natural Sciences Advisory Committee of the National Park Service, chaired by Starker Leopold, reviewed the issue in September of 1969 and declined to recommend reversal of the new program.

The underlying issue was, how do you count bears? They are not easily found. If walking through the woods you see five bears, have you really seen five different bears? The only way to avoid duplicate counting is to do what the Craigheads (and only the Craigheads) did: capture a bear and collar it. But when do you know that you have collared them all? You never do. If you somehow managed to put collars on so many bears that after continued search you found none without collars, you might assume that you had found them all, but you could not be certain. And by the time you had reached that point you would have no way of knowing if the first bears you counted were still alive.

Where do you go to find a bear? To collar bears, the Craigheads went to the dumps. Then, by conducting back-country censuses, on the basis of the observed ratio of dump (collared) bears to those without collars, they concluded that the bears that came to the dumps amounted to 75 percent of all Yellowstone grizzlies.

This is where the Interior Department parted company with the Craigheads. There was, it said, a much greater backcountry population. The Craigheads had, it said, fed only garbage-dump data into their computer. "If you put garbage-dump data into the computer," Cole said, "you'll get garbage-dump data out." By killing large numbers of these bears, therefore, the Park Service would not be endangering the population. It would only be making room for the backcountry population of unspoiled bears the Craigheads never found.

Unfortunately, there was no sound evidence that this backcountry population existed. The Park Service claim was based on a study of black bears conducted between 1965 and 1967 by Victor Barnes and Olin Bray, both graduate research assistants at Colorado State University. During this study, researchers observed, but did not tag, twenty-seven grizzlies in the backcountry, only one of which had a Craighead collar. On the strength of this evidence, the Park argued that dump bears were only a small percentage of the population.

The use to which the Barnes and Bray study has been put by the Park Service has produced much misinformation. This study, which was not even concerned with grizzlies, could not rule out duplicate counting. The sample was also too small to have statistical significance. Part of the black-bear study was conducted in some of the best habitat of the Park, where researchers counted an average of one bear every 5.2 square miles. Government biologists took that density figure—among the best density figures researchers could find—and applied it to the entire Park. In this way they extrapolated a black-bear population of 650—a completely unscientific conclusion that is still the basis for official estimates.



BY 1971, ALL THE DUMPS WERE CLOSED. IN THE same year, the Craigheads' research permit came up for renewal. The Park agreed to renew it only if they would sign an agreement not to speak to the public or publish without first obtaining Park Service permission. The Craigheads, seeing this as an infringement of academic freedom, refused. Their twelve-year study came to an end.

As the dumps were closed, the bears began to wander. More came into campgrounds. More people were injured. In response, the Park began to kill more bears. The number of "control actions," according to a report of the National Academy of Sciences, rose from an average of thirteen a year in 1967 and earlier to 63.3 a year between 1968 and 1970. The number of grizzlies reported to have been killed by control actions rose from an average of three a year before 1967 to nine per year in 1968–1970. In all, 189 grizzlies were reported to have been killed between 1968 and 1973.

This was a period that even by official estimates was bloody, but there is good reason to believe that not all bear kills were reported. According to Harry Reynolds, a district ranger in Yellowstone during the late sixties, "Cole, with or without the approbation of Superintendent Anderson, endorsed or initiated a Park practice of not making records of all 'controlled' or otherwise deceased grizzlies." Consequently, according to Reynolds, many bear kills went unrecorded, especially those due to an accidental overdose of tranquilizer. "By this time," he said, in a letter to the National Academy of Sciences, "bears were not infrequently killed in this way by the use of drugs in inexpert hands."

Reynolds's story has been confirmed by many working with the Park at this time. Others tell of finding burial pits filled with bear carcasses in the backcountry. James June, a biologist for the state of Wyoming, has told me of finding piles of bear carcasses near Turbid Lake on two separate occasions during the late sixties, when he was doing field research on geese.

According to Ben Morris, one of the helicopter pilots who transported bears during this period, grizzlies would be hauled to the backcountry three times. "If they came back a fourth time, they were killed. But so far as I could tell, if a black bear caused trouble they just killed it. The Park VIPs felt they couldn't waste helicopter time and money hauling black bears."

Usually, Morris says, they would take a grizzly to a steep divide on the Park border that sloped out of the Park. After the bear was revived from the tranquilizer, they would chase it downhill, out of the Park. "Many of the bears," he adds, "were killed by accidental overdoses of tranquilizer." The problem, he thinks, was inexperienced Park personnel. "But the people working with the drug called it a bad batch of tranquilizer." Morris recalls a time in 1971 when three grizzlies died in two days from tranquilizers, and he suspected there were more. He remembers also another pilot accidentally dropping a grizzly, killing it.

The Park has, or makes available, little information about this period. Superintendent Anderson, according to Park archivist Tim Manns, discontinued in 1967 the long-established practice of requiring monthly reports from district rangers. To this day, the Yellowstone archives have no records on bears after 1967. Whatever materials exist, according to Manns, are said to be in the research biologists' office. When he requested them, he was told they were still in use.

The lack of data from this period reflects the Park's declining interest in science. Immediately after the Craig-



heads' research terminated, the Park Service began to remove the collars from bears the Craigheads had studied. This was done, it was said, in preparation for the Park's centennial. Collars were considered unsightly and every effort was being made to spruce up bears for the celebration.

With the collars gone, there was no way to settle the numbers dispute between the Park and the Craigheads; there was no way to gather fertility or longevity figures; no further information on the bears' movements and population dynamics was available.

Three years into the new era of official government biology, science was moving relentlessly in the wrong direction. Now all population statistics were kept by Cole. These consisted of reported sightings by "qualified observers." This was a system that invited double counting; thus, not surprisingly, the Park came up with numbers that, if believed, were reassuring to those concerned about the bears.

The Craigheads, meanwhile, continued to sound the alarm. The grizzly-bear dispute became a public controversy. To settle it, the Interior Department created in 1973 the Committee on the Yellowstone Grizzlies, a division of the National Academy of Sciences.

The committee's report was nearly a complete confirmation of the Craigheads' conclusions. It described Cole's population estimates as possessing "little if any meaning." It suggested that he exaggerated the number of backcountry bears, agreeing with the Craigheads that the dump bears were between 65 and 75 percent of the population. It criticized lax record-keeping by the Park Service of both control actions and injury rates. It suggested that both black-bear and grizzly kills may have been higher than reported. It suggested that "uncontrolled sources of bias" in the figures on bear-caused human injuries "make any comparison of injury rates valueless." It asserted that man-caused mortality rates of grizzlies were too high; that by 1974 they were averaging more than thirty a year, and that the population could not, over the long run, endure a man-caused mortality rate greater than ten.

Included in the committee's recommendations were these: First, "we urge the creation of a nongovernmental coordinating body . . . directed toward the well-being of Yellowstone grizzlies. It must be chaired by a respected neutral individual." Second, "the National Park Service and the U.S. Forest Service [should] pursue a policy of supporting and encouraging independent research on Yellowstone grizzlies. The freedom of scientists to conduct research throughout the Yellowstone ecosystem is imperative if the data essential to successful management of Yellowstone grizzlies are to be obtained."

These recommendations of course conflicted with the policy of government control of scientific work in the Park, as laid down in the Leopold Report, and the Park Service rejected them both. It continued to make inflated population estimates on the basis of unscientific sightings by "qualified observers." It continued to prohibit radio collaring or tagging of bears, even by its own scientists, until 1976.

Meanwhile, in place of an independent research effort, the Interior Department had created, in 1973, the Interagency Grizzly Bear Study Team, composed of personnel from the Park Service, the Forest Service, the Fish and Game departments of Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and directed by a Park Service employee, Richard Knight. This team in turn is supervised by a Grizzly Bear Steering Committee, coordinated through Interior Department offices in Washington.

In 1975, seven years into the new bear-management program, the grizzly was declared a threatened species by the Fish and Wildlife Service. The Park Service objected to the classification, seeing it rightly as official acknowledgment that its bear program had failed. But bear policy did not change.

The plight of the bears worsened. Their hunger made many of them mean, and less afraid of man. Often invading human settlements in the Park, they became the victims of control actions and removals. More wandered out of the Park, to be killed by shepherds, ranchers, hunters, and poachers. More maulings occurred outside the Park. Bears wandered into border communities such as West Yellowstone and Cooke City, attracted by garbage dumps, where they were sometimes shot.

"Grizzly bears," Roop told me recently, "are wandering farther each year. We are finding them in the northern part of the Beartooth Mountains, also near Bozeman—seventy-five air miles from the Park. These are places where grizzlies haven't been seen in a hundred years."

As more moved out, the number killed outside the Park rose dramatically. John Craighead, using Park Service estimates of man-caused mortalities (excluding deaths due to legal hunting, which ended when the grizzly was declared a threatened species in 1975), recently calculated that the number of grizzlies killed outside the Park in the decade since the closing of the dumps is two and a half times what it was during the decade prior to the closing of the dumps.

Shortly after the study team began its real research, in 1976, disturbing trends began to surface. The life expectancy of bears was dropping, possibly due to poor nutrition as well as to human predation. The average life expectancy of bears studied by the Craigheads was more than twenty-five years. But the team was finding no bears over sixteen. "Few bears," the 1980 report noted, "are reaching the older age classes."

Contrary to the sanguine assumptions of Park biologists that biological compensatory mechanisms would lead to an increase in bear fertility, the team found that fewer cubs were being born, apparently because the quality of the bears' diet had declined.

There was a growing imbalance in the sex ratio, a dangerously low number of sows relative to boars. "It is evident," the team noted, "that females are being produced

and recruited into the population at a lower rate than males and that they are dying at a higher rate than males." This, Roop told me, was probably a result of control actions. Sows, protective of their cubs, were often seen as nuisance bears, and were therefore more likely to be removed from the population.

Even Leopold and Allen began to sense that things were not working out as they had hoped. In 1977, as members of the National Parks Advisory Board, they wrote, "It would appear that progress in bear management is far from satisfactory. We seem to have grossly underestimated the problem. In the past 10 years grizzlies have killed more people in the parks than in the previous century . . . The task ahead is still enormous."

MEANWHILE, AS THE STUDY TEAM AND THE ADVISORY board were becoming more pessimistic, the Park Service—particularly the staff biologists (and naturalists trained by these biologists)—was displaying fresh optimism.

A 1980 paper by Mary Meagher (a former pupil of Starker Leopold's who by then had succeeded Cole as supervisory research biologist at Yellowstone) and Jerry Phillips, a Yellowstone resource-management specialist, concluded that "the bear management program within Yellowstone National Park during the 1970s had achieved the goal of restoring populations of grizzly and black bears to natural foraging conditions. Concurrently the management program reduced bear-caused injuries to humans in developed areas." Likewise, the bear fact sheet used to train naturalists in 1982 states, "The results [of Yellowstone's bear management] thus far have been encouraging—for the first time in almost a century these truly magnificent creatures are living relatively wild and undisturbed lives."

Clearly, to Park Service officials, the operation is a success even as the patient is dying. How have they managed to persist in this delusion? In part by the way they measure success. Bureaucratic boundaries serve to limit responsibility. Park policy is to protect the bear *in the Park*—and to reduce human injuries caused by bears *in the Park*. There are fewer bear mortalities and maulings in the Park because there are fewer bears in the Park. Their bear program will be a total success when they have eliminated all bears: zero bears, zero bear mortality; zero bears, zero maulings.

Over the past few months, Knight has been stating in increasingly forceful terms that the number of grizzlies has reached critically low levels. But Interior Department officials have been reluctant to accept his conclusions. From Knight's point of view, this is merely because he is "coming up with the wrong numbers."

"They want me to continue with research," he told me recently, "until I find more grizzlies. They want to do this because as long as they can say 'We don't know enough' they can postpone making any management decisions. But I can't find any more grizzlies, because there aren't any more. Between the Craigheads and me, twenty-one years of research have been done on the grizzly. We have both, independently, come up with the same figures. But people in management still won't believe them. So they want more research. But enough research has been done. Now is the time for management to make some policy decisions that will end the killing of bears."

The Grizzly Bear Steering Committee has been pressing Knight to conduct a "saturation trapping" or "grid trapping" program on the grizzly. The idea is to trap every bear so as to settle the numbers dispute once and for all. Knight refuses to do it.

"I don't want to do the trapping," he has told me. "There is no way to remove all doubt about grizzly numbers. To put traps every place in the Park they want me to I'd have to use snares—because culvert traps can't be lifted by helicopter. But snares injure bears. Besides, every time you tranquilize a bear you risk killing it with an overdose."

Other bear experts agree with Knight. "Our studies have not shown that tranquilizers hurt the bear," John Craighead told me a few months ago, "but you cannot rule it out. The fact that few bears seem to be living past fifteen years suggests that they have been severely stressed by research and transfers. I agree with Dick Knight—we knew enough about the bear to save it fifteen years ago. Now the question is: Are we going to count bears until we have counted the last one?"

Hank Fabich, a Montana game warden and a veteran of eight years of trapping bears, believes trapping is the single greatest source of man-caused bear mortality. "Every time you catch a bear," he told me recently, "in a snare or culvert trap, you risk killing it. Sometimes you overdose it. Other times the bear goes berserk and breaks a leg or tears out its claws or teeth in the cage. I have found a couple with useless limbs because they had been hobbled and released with the hobbles on. How do you think bears without teeth or claws or good legs can make it? They can't hunt well. So they go into human settlements looking for easy food. They are hungry and mean—they have a reason not to like us. Then they are killed by administrative removals because they are nuisance bears. Others are never listed as being killed by humans. They just die of starvation. I've seen bears—young bears that should have been perfectly healthy—dying in their sleep, in hibernation. Why did they die? Well, some were missing teeth, others

claws. One we found with a broken foot. I love the bear and I hate to see this happening. But you can't convince me that we are not doing this to the bear."

Nevertheless, saturation trapping is still on the steering committee's agenda.

THE PLIGHT OF THE BLACK BEAR HAS BEEN ALL BUT forgotten, except by those Yellowstone visitors who look for the bears in vain. But today there is renewed interest in the grizzly. Last summer, a memorandum from the steering committee, reflecting Knight's view that the number of grizzlies had fallen below critical levels, was leaked to the press. For the first time in seven years, there are renewed public demands to do something to save the bears. Government agencies and environmental groups have rediscovered the problem and are jumping on the bandwagon.

Unfortunately, the bandwagon is heading in the wrong direction.

The grizzly's problems are now perceived to lie outside the Park. Black-bear hunters in Wyoming bait bears to their blinds and sometimes kill grizzlies "by mistake." The Forest Service continues its practice of leasing land for sheep-grazing around the edges of the Park, where shepherds shoot grizzlies. People who live in border communities shoot hungry bears visiting town dumps in search of food. Poachers continue to kill bears that wander out of the Park, so long as a carcass can bring $15,000 when sold in parts. (The pancreas, for instance, is prized in the Orient as an aphrodisiac.) Grizzly habitat around the Park is being nibbled to death by geothermal development, oil and gas exploration, construction of new ski resorts and summer homes, grazing, and increased backcountry use by hikers and sportsmen.

Indeed, all this activity now threatens bears, and every effort must be made to stop it, not only to protect the grizzly but to protect other wildlife and the Park as well. But the obstacles to success in halting these killings and this loss of habitat are enormous. Betting the future of the grizzly on our ability to control human behavior in this region is not fair to the animal.

Since bears have no respect for administrative boundaries, pursuing a coherent policy means achieving agreement among the states of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, five national forests, two national parks, and the Fish and Wildlife Service. No one knows how decisions on the bears are to be reached, much less how a coherent change of policy might be achieved.

It is no wonder, therefore, that the architects of present policy sound despairing.

"I wish I knew what the solution was," Leopold says. "If I knew, I'd be out there, banging on doors."

"The grizzly's decline," Mary Meagher says, "is part of a long-term trend, and there is little reason to believe it will be reversed."

"It may be too late to save the grizzly," Nathaniel Reed says, though he urges a last-ditch effort to end illegal hunting. (Reed, an assistant secretary of the interior under Presidents Ford and Nixon, was instrumental in the decision to implement the new bear policy, and is now on the board of directors of the National Audubon Society.)

Although various agencies are considering piecemeal measures, no one is optimistic. The Fish and Wildlife Service continues to lobby without success for stiffer legal penalties for poachers and better sanitation in border communities. The Audubon Society is offering a $10,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of poachers. The Wilderness Society and other environmental groups are lobbying for legislation that would protect the greater Yellowstone ecosystem—an area about twice as large as the Park. Wyoming is considering the prohibition of black-bear hunting in its Jackson district and of bearbaiting in the Cody district.

As important as efforts to reduce human predation and to protect wildlife habitat along Park boundaries may be, these actions alone will not save the bears. For the source of the bears' decline lies not outside the Park but inside it. Park policy is killing the bears, because it is driving them into human settlements. And no matter how strong the efforts to protect the bears outside the Park, if policy remains unchanged and they continue to wander, they will continue to be killed.

For these reasons, nearly all biologists working with Yellowstone grizzlies believe that saving the bears will almost certainly require, among other things, a program of supplemental feeding to re-establish the Park as an ecocenter. This need not mean reopening the dumps. It might entail, as first suggested by the Craigheads in the sixties, killing a few surplus elk and leaving their remains in a central, remote area of the Park, to encourage grizzlies to stay there and to give them the essential protein necessary to raise their reproductive rate and to endure hibernation.

The concern of these men is not only that past Park policy has been mistaken; they also note that the present grizzly habitat in the Park is deteriorating. There may simply not be enough food to keep a fragile population from perishing. The Park is now constructing a new settlement (Grant Village) on the site of five prime grizzly fishing streams. In a few years, Knight says, the pine bark beetle, which is already widespread throughout the Park, will begin to infest the whitebark pine, whose nut is the principal fall grizzly food. When that happens, he says, the effect on the grizzly will be "devastating."

Yet supplemental feeding, although it is sometimes mentioned, is not likely to be made policy unless there is a public outcry. To introduce supplemental feeding is to admit that a system of official government biology has produced fifteen years of deception; that hundreds of bears died in vain; that a beautiful environmental ideal does not work, and worse, is responsible for the near elimination of

a species; that prominent individuals, still influential in the Park Service and the environmental movement, were dreadfully mistaken.

In 1981, the late John Townsley, then superintendent of Yellowstone, an outspoken and powerful voice in the Park Service, tried unsuccessfully to introduce supplemental feeding of the grizzly. Although both Interior Department and independent biologists with whom I have talked reacted favorably when they heard of Townsley's plan, I cannot find anyone in management or in the environmental movement in favor of it. Many, confusing the symptoms with the cause, put all the blame on what is happening outside of the Park. Many still do not accept, or do not want to accept, Knight's numbers. Some are simply timid, not wanting to be the first to favor a radical departure from existing policy. Others suggest that supplemental feeding would not keep bears in the Park a significant length of time, or they note, perhaps rightly, that it may be too late to reverse the migration. Still others argue that favoring one animal group over another—killing elk to save bears—could destabilize both populations.

Yet the most common objection to supplemental feeding raised by those to whom I have talked is a philosophical one. They do not want to interfere with nature. "If we are not going to have wild bear," Durward Allen (who serves on both the National Parks System Advisory Board and the board of directors of the National Audubon Society) told me, "we are going to have no bear at all!"

To Mary Meagher, feeding the bears is unthinkable: "We cannot play God," she told me.

To Roland Wauer, chairman of the Grizzly Bear Steering Committee, and Christopher Servheen, grizzly-bear-recovery-plan coordinator for the Fish and Wildlife Service, the prospect of supplemental feeding poses a problem of classification. "We don't want to make Yellowstone a zoo," they said.

These people, and others working within Yellowstone wildlife management, are well intentioned and dedicated to the preservation of our wilderness species. It is both paradoxical and sad, therefore, that they are, in the case of the bear, pursuing an illusion. "Not playing God," "keeping the bears wild," and not "turning Yellowstone into a zoo" are the catchphrases of a philosophy that, slowly but surely, is killing black bears and destroying the grizzly as a species. It is based on a distorted environmental logic that claims it is natural to kill a bear but not natural to feed it, that it is not hubris to re-create an ecosystem but that killing an elk is playing God.

This philosophy is tripping over its own semantic distinctions because it is based on myth, yet myth so attractive that few want to be disillusioned. The vision of the pristine wilderness and the self-regulating ecosystem still holds many environmentalists in thrall. That is why we hear so little from those who might help the bear.

The story of the bears ought to tell us that pristine wilderness is gone forever. There is no place on earth that man has not touched, not changed. The grizzly, whose intolerance of man so aptly symbolizes true wilderness, is dying because we have driven him from his home.

There are many reasons why the death of wilderness is difficult to accept. The environmental ethic rejects the Judeo-Christian view that nature was created for our use, to be subdued or consumed. But having removed man from the center of the universe, environmentalists all too often do not know where to place him. Presumably human beings, too, are part of the great web of life, but all too often the environmentalist perspective excludes them. The Leopold Report excluded them when it implied that man was not part of the primitive scene. The Park Service excludes them when it rules that human garbage is an unnatural food for bears. This philosophy generates dichotomies, in which man and nature are kept apart. The world is divided into the wild and the tame, the natural and the unnatural.

This kind of thinking has theoretically given the bears but two options: to live in a zoo or to live in a natural ecosystem. Our national parks, however, are neither zoos nor natural ecosystems. They are, as John Townsley once suggested to me, social institutions. They are laboratories where we learn how we might coexist with other creatures. Yellowstone demonstrates for the rest of the country how a community that is visited by more than 2 million people a year can remain beautiful, so nearly unchanging; how a settlement that can generate 5 million gallons of sewage a day can still have pure water; how streams that receive hundreds of thousands of fishermen a year can still be natural fisheries. It is in this way, as a model society side by side with nature, that Yellowstone serves as hope for the future. It shows that what people touch need not be made ugly by the touching, and that there is still a place where we might live in peace with other creatures. I think it would be nice, too, if, once again, the bears were included in this scene. □