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30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10112

del

Room 5600

247-3700

April 5, 1984

Dear Mike:

The President's Reception for the Trilateral Commission was a tremendous success. The quality of the participants was excellent and the meetings and discussions we had were first-rate, but the President's willingness to receive us and the quality of his remarks set a tone for the meetings which was extremely important. I heard numerous comments after the reception which were all favorable. In short, I think the reception not only inspired the deliberations of the Trilateral Commission, but I believe it was beneficial in terms of improving the attitudes of our friends in Canada, Europe and Japan toward the United States.

Clearly, the meeting could not have taken place had it not been for your positive intervention on our behalf. Speaking for all the Commissioners who attended, I would like to thank you very warmly for your assistance.

I am also indebted to you for having arranged the meeting a few weeks ago for Archie Roosevelt and myself to talk with the President about our trip to the Middle East. Our meeting was a brief one, but, fortunately, we had organized our thoughts rather carefully and were able to leave some notes with Bud McFarlane. I hope, therefore, it may have been of some value. Thank you for sending the autographed photograph taken during our conversation. It will be a happy memento of the occasion.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



David Rockefeller

Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Assistant to the President
and Deputy Chief of Staff
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/3/84

Bill Sittmann:

Attached is your
Trilateral file. I think the
event went well.

Bob Kinnitt

Med

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

in letter Q
Commission

The Trilateral Commission

345 EAST 46th STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 • (212) 661-1180

25 October 1983

Daniel J. Newman
Program Assistant to the
North American Director

Mr. Mike Deaver
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Mr. Deaver:

Enclosed are some materials on the Trilateral Commission for your meeting at 10:00 am on Thursday 27 October with David Rockefeller.

Included are a brochure and membership list, a question and answer booklet, our two most recent task force reports (Security & Arms Control and Facilitating Development in a Changing Third World) with excerpts and some press coverage, and the three latest issues of our quarterly Dialogue, one on Security and Disarmament, one on the Mideast, and one on our most recent annual meeting in Rome this past April.

I hope these materials help you out, and if you have any further questions concerning the Commission before your meeting on Thursday, don't hesitate to call.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Dan Newman

Daniel Newman

10:00 am

copy

150 April

DB
has
if
you're
interested

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 19, 1983

Dear Mr. Rockefeller:

I am writing on behalf of the President with regard to the Trilateral Commission meeting to take place at the White House on April 1, 1984. I have your December 1st letter to the President with your proposal for the format. As the date draws nearer we will begin to plan a scenario for the event. We will, of course, keep you informed of all plans for the meeting.

Meanwhile if there is anything I can do please call.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'W. F. Sittmann', with a horizontal line extending to the right.

William F. Sittmann
Special Assistant to
the President

Mr. David Rockefeller
The Trilateral Commission
North American Chairman
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017

Personal Friend

Stange 185145

The Trilateral Commission

345 EAST 46th STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 • (212) 661-1180

Cable: TRILACOM NEWYORK • Telex: 424787

David Rockefeller
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Takeshi Watanabe
Japanese Chairman

Georges Berthoin
European Chairman

Mitchell Sharp
North American Deputy Chairman

Nobuhiko Ushiba
Japanese Deputy Chairman

Egidio Ortona
European Deputy Chairman

Charles B. Heck
North American Director

Paul Révay
European Director

Tadashi Yamamoto
Japanese Director

François J. Sauzey
Editor, *Dialogue*

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T. A. Wilson
Otto Wolff von Amerongen
Sir Philip de Zulueta

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I was delighted to receive word that you will receive the Trilateral Commission at the White House on April 1 at 5:30 p.m. This means a great deal to all of us, and will add an irreplaceable dimension to our Washington conference.

Perhaps it would be useful for Commission members to arrive at the White House gate a few minutes past 5:00, and be assembled near the East Room no later than 5:20. Perhaps I could very briefly say a few words of appreciation to you for the group in the East Room as we begin, rather like the Americas Society reception earlier this year. Perhaps you could then give us your thoughts on a few key current issues. I wonder if I could ask Commission members to submit written questions to me, which we would bring to the White House much earlier in the day and from which you might choose a few for answering. Alternatively, perhaps you could respond to a few spoken questions on an impromptu basis. Whatever format you prefer would be fine with us. Do you imagine a closing time of about 6:00?

Mike Deaver's office has told us of your desire to have the White House rather than the Trilateral Commission announce this meeting with you first, which is certainly fine with us. I will check with him about when I can tell Commission members about this. They will be eager to know.

With warmest appreciation,

December 7, 1983

Sincerely,



David

David Rockefeller

:rbf

PRESERVATION COPY

THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION
345 EAST 46TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017



The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

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INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE DATE 831207 RECEIVED DATE 831212
(PREFIX) (FIRST) (LAST) (SUFFIX)

MR. DAVID ROCKEFELLER
TITLE: NORTH AMERICAN CHAIRMAN

ORGANIZATION: THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION

STREET: 345 EAST 46TH STREET

CITY: NEW YORK

STATE: NY ZIP: 10017

COUNTRY:

SUBJECT: WRITES CONCERNING THE MEETING WITH THE
TRILATERAL COMMISSION AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON
APR 1 84

AGY/OFF ACTION CODE TRACKING DATE
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STAFF NAME: PRESIDENT REAGAN
COMMENTS: PERSONAL FRIEND

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The Trilateral Commission

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Niels Thygesen
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António Vasco de Mello
J. H. Warren
T. A. Wilson
Otto Wolff von Amerongen
Sir Philip de Zulueta

December 29, 1983

Mr. William F. Sittmann
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Sittmann:

Thank you for your note of December 19 relating to the President's reception at the White House for members of the Trilateral Commission on April 1. I also have Mr. Frederick Ryan's note of December 9 confirming the date and time.

I look forward to staying in touch as the date draws nearer and the details of the event are planned. I understand Charles Heck spoke with you last week about when we might be able to tell our members about the event. We shall make a non-committal reference in a letter going to members this week, and will await your announcement so that we can then proceed to officially inform our members as well.

I and my colleagues on the Commission greatly appreciate the President receiving us. It will be the high point of our three-day meeting.

With thanks and best wishes for the New Year,

Sincerely,



David Rockefeller

:rbf

EUROPEAN OFFICE: 35, avenue de Friedland, 75008 Paris, France

JAPANESE OFFICE: Japan Center for International Exchange, 4-9-17 Minami-Azabu, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan

Room 5600
30 Rockefeller Plaza

12/1

1983

To: Donna Blum

From: MEG KRAUSE

As discussed, attached is
Mr. Rockefeller's letter of
November 2nd to Mr. Deaver.
Please let me know if there
is anything else I can do.

Meg.

10:00 a.m.
Rockefeller
meeting

10/27
jul

cc: M Krause ✓
check

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10112

Room 5600

247-3700

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November 2, 1983

(via Federal Express)

Dear Mike:

I was very glad to have a chance to talk with you briefly last Thursday, both about the present status of Westway and the forthcoming meeting in Washington of the Trilateral Commission. I should like in this letter to refer particularly to the possibility of a Presidential Reception for the Trilateral Commission at the White House on Sunday afternoon, April 1.

As you know, the Trilateral Commission, which is made up of opinion makers from Western Europe, North America and Japan, meets annually in plenary session. The meetings are rotated among the three regions. Last year, the meeting was in Tokyo; this year, it was in Rome; and next year, it will be back again in Washington. I believe you have already received materials which list the membership in the Commission as well as samples of some of the reports which have been prepared for the Commission. Clearly, the group is a distinguished one; and I believe that, over the decade since it was formed, it has performed a useful role in shedding light on major issues of the day and in bringing the Japanese into closer contact and, hence, a better understanding of their North American and European allies.

Since the beginning, the Chiefs of State of the countries where we have held our plenary sessions have greeted the Commission. You will recall that in 1981, when the Commission last met in Washington, the President had agreed to receive the Co-Chairmen of the Commission, but was unable to do so because of the dastardly assassination attempt. This year in Rome, the Commission was received in the Vatican by the Pope, in the Quirinale by President Pertini and was addressed by Prime Minister Fanfani at the Palazzo Barberini.

Naturally the Commission would be greatly honored if the President were willing to receive the entire group in the East Room of the White House. The number involved could be somewhere between 250 and 300, including staff.


We would, of course, have a more accurate figure a little bit later on. In any event, it was our thought that perhaps the President would be willing to say a few words to the group in much the same way he addressed the members of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas last June. In my discussion with you, it appeared that sometime around 5:30 in the afternoon on Sunday is likely to be the most convenient from the President's point of view. If so, it would be ideal for us but the meetings continue through the afternoon of Tuesday, April 3; and I am sure that the Commission could adjust its program to accommodate the President if another time proved to be more convenient.

During the course of our session, we hope to hear from other members of the U.S. Government, including, most especially, Secretary Shultz. Among other outside speakers we are inviting to participate are Prime Minister Trudeau and IMF Managing Director de Larosiere. It was our hope to have, as a representative of the Third World, President de la Madrid, but as I indicated to you we have heard from him that he could not participate unless, at the same time, he were paying an official visit to the United States. You kindly indicated you would inquire of the State Department whether it seemed possible that President Reagan might be inviting him to visit Washington at approximately that time.

Please let me know if there is more information you would like. I need hardly tell you how important it would be for the success of our Conference to be able to meet with the President. I am hopeful that he would also find it a rewarding and pleasurable exchange.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



David Rockefeller

Mr. Michael K. Deaver, Jr.
Assistant to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Trilateral group urges more security cooperation among allies

By Brad Knickerbocker
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

"The trilateral countries and the Soviet Union stand at a crossroads. They can either reach accommodations which will make possible a reduction of their military competition or face an increasingly unstable world in which the economic burdens of defense will grow and the security of all nations will diminish."

This warning, in a report published this week by the Trilateral Commission, comes as East and West stand poised to deploy new, more threatening and destabilizing weapons.

Looking at the state of the world today, this group of world authorities says that the security of Western Europe, Japan, and North America "will be much less divisible than in the past," that cooperation among them "will be more important to their security in the 1980s than in previous decades."

Like the problems it describes, the report's recommendations are complex and in some cases at least superficially paradoxical.

For example, it opposes deployment of the MX intercontinental missile. But it says the nuclear freeze could be dangerous and concludes that the NATO decision to deploy new intermediate-range missiles in Europe beginning in December must not be reversed or delayed.

It urges NATO to reduce its arsenal of battlefield nuclear weapons, but says the Western alliance (at least for now) should not renounce the first use of nuclear weapons to halt a conventional attack from the Warsaw Pact. And the commission report calls for substantial increases in alliance spending for conventional forces.

Recognizing that economic revitalization is essential to national security as well, one of the report's authors, former US arms control negotiator and Ambassador Ge-



Smith, pleased with Reagan's new flexibility on arms talks
But the alternative to a strengthened conventional deterrent, Mr. Smith told reporters in Washington, is a further slide toward superpower confrontation and possible nuclear war.

Founded 10 years ago, the Trilateral Commission is a

5 private group of political leaders, bankers, business executives, and academics from the three regions.

Prominent Americans affiliated with the organization include former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, former chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers Alan Greenspan, former Defense secretaries Robert S. McNamara and Harold Brown, and former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union George F. Kennan.

Members of the Reagan administration previously associated with the commission include Vice-President

Commitment to NATO and the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty 'must be reaffirmed to our populations.'

George Bush, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, and Ambassadors William E. Brock III and Arthur F. Burns.

Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul A. Volcker also has been a member.

While the report's authors take exception to some Reagan administration positions and policies, the differences are not fundamental.

For example, the report states: "The heart of trilateral security will continue to rest indefinitely on strong survivable nuclear forces. This fact must not be underestimated or deprecated."

But Mr. Smith, who held key positions in Republican and Democratic administrations and is now president of the Arms Control Association, also noted a recent shift in Reagan administration action and rhetoric. He cited a more moderate position on integrating arms control and strategic modernization, and said, "We're pleased to see that."

The lengthy report is the commission's first in-depth effort in the areas of national and collective security. Most of its earlier commentary and recommendations — which, although unofficial in status, are closely read in Japan and the Western democracies — have dealt with world economic issues.

The report, citing "the dangers that the Soviet Union presents," foresees "a greater need for consultation and action on a trilateral basis," and says commitment to NATO and the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty "must be reaffirmed to our populations."

It urges the US, Japan, West Germany, Britain, Italy, Canada, and France — the seven summit nations — to broaden their collective concerns to include security improvements.

The report, titled "Defense & Arms Control Policies in the 1980s," was written by Gerard Smith, Paolo Vittorelli (Chairman of the Italian Institute for Defense Studies and Research), and Kiichi Sekki (Chairman of the Nomura Research Institute).

EXCERPTS FROM
SMITH-VITTORELLI-SAEKI REPORT
TO TRILATERAL COMMISSION

Nuclear Weapons Issues

"Inevitable Parity"

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has yet learned to live with a situation in which, as long as both sides continue the competition, the only possible strategic nuclear relationship is one of approximate parity. While one side may obtain an edge in one or more components of nuclear forces, offensive or defensive, this edge is unlikely to be either enduring or, given the vast uncertainties associated with nuclear war and the massive arsenals of both sides, exploitable in either political or military terms. (p. 37)

Progressively Shifting the Onus of a First-Use Decision to the Soviet Union

At present, U.S. strategy retains this option first use of nuclear weapons explicitly in the defense of Europe and Korea and implicitly in the defense of Japan. It has also been discussed in connection with the Gulf region. (p. 39)....The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) has called for the acquisition of non-nuclear forces of sufficient strength to shift onto the Soviets the war time onus for any decision to use nuclear weapons....The authors of this report believe...that the trilateral countries should work towards force postures that in time will permit them to avoid being the first to use nuclear weapons. SACEUR has estimated that in Europe such a posture could be had at a cost higher by only one percent than current NATO targets (i.e., a four percent real increase in defense spending over six years, as compared with the current three percent target agreed in NATO).... The governments should consider whether the political will needed for such an effort could be more readily galvanized if the aim of shifting onto the Soviets the onus of a nuclear first-use decision, as proposed by SACEUR, were adopted. (p. 40)

This policy would retain the option of first use as a deterrent to conventional attack and would not require a change in NATO doctrine, while initiating an allied study of the circumstances in which the Alliance could avoid having to face an early decision to use nuclear weapons and in which the onus of a first-use decision could progressively be shifted to the Soviet Union. (pp. 40-41)

At the same time, the United States should make plain its determination to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent to any use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union. (p. 41)

New Single-Warhead ICBM instead of MX

The goals of strong deterrence and crisis/wartime stability--and to some degree that of alliance cohesion--require that the United States retain for the time being survivable land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and bomber forces, since both have distinctive characteristics as compared with other systems. Such forces should be designed with the aim of reducing Soviet incentives to threaten to strike them preemptively and so of increasing crisis and wartime stability.... Some changes in current U.S. programs and plans could help to achieve this. For example, the planned deployment of 100 MX missiles with 10 warheads apiece would concentrate

1,000 warheads in only 100 aimpoints for Soviet missiles.... By contrast, the deployment of an equal number of warheads (1,000) on a new, single-warhead ICBM would create 1,000 aimpoints against which the Soviets would have to target at least 2,000 warheads in order to have high confidence of destroying them. Thus, even if the missiles were deployed in fixed silos which could easily be targeted, the Soviets would have to use up a substantial fraction of their present force to destroy them. Such a new ICBM would provide a more flexible system than the MX to ensure adequate ICBM survivability. (p. 42)

We doubt whether the deterrent effect on the Soviets of the MX would significantly add to that already created by existing U.S. nuclear forces, enhanced, as they will be, by the ongoing U.S. Trident and cruise missile programs and by the B-1 and advanced technology (or 'stealth') bombers. It also seems unlikely, based on past experience, that the commitment to deploy MX would lead to a significantly greater Soviet willingness to accept a U.S. arms control initiative which would involve changing the nature of their ICBM force. Indeed, the Soviets might well see an initial deployment of 100 MX as merely the first step in an attempt by the United States to achieve a first-strike capability against them.... Last, but not least, the cost of the MX program...is a high price to pay to indicate resolve and acquire negotiating leverage at a time at which so many important non-nuclear defense programs are in jeopardy because of pressures on defense expenditures. On balance, therefore, the case for pursuing only a new, single-warhead ICBM is persuasive. (pp. 43-44)

Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe

We recommend that:

- * Negotiations about intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) be merged at an appropriate time with the START negotiation. If, in the interim, a separate INF agreement becomes negotiable in the current INF negotiations, even on a compromise basis between the zero level and the current levels of Soviet systems, and would contribute to intra-Alliance cohesion, it should be accepted. It is essential that such an agreement protect Japanese interests in not seeing a shift of Soviet systems from Europe to Asia.
- * Pending agreed limitations on such systems and assuming continued European support for their deployment, deployment of Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles should proceed. Failure to deploy them in these circumstances would be a sign of weakness that would sharpen trans-Atlantic tensions. Requests by any of the host nations for 'two-key' arrangements for the release of these systems should be accepted in principle and subject to satisfactory negotiations between the governments concerned.
- * NATO should move towards a gradual thinning-out of shorter-range 'tactical' nuclear weapons in central Europe, in combination with the conventional force improvements and arms control proposals set out below. (p. 82)

'Freeze' Proposals

We recognize the importance of the strong public support for proposals for a freeze on the production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons as a signal to governments, and especially the U.S. government, to get on with arms control. However, we do not favor such proposals for a freeze, which would inhibit a U.S. move away from the weakness of its present posture. (p. 82)

Conventional Forces Issues

The advent of nuclear parity makes conventional forces critical for trilateral security, as a source of reassurance and political stability for friends in peace and in crisis and as a means of meeting aggression if it occurs....Although the United States has in theory consistently based the size of its conventional forces on a strategic concept which involved fighting at least one 'major' war against the Soviet Union, budgetary pressures to have combined with skepticism about the likelihood of such a war to relegate deterrence of Soviet aggression principally to nuclear weapons....Deterrence of general war through reliance on nuclear weapons has also been embraced in Western Europe, Japan, and Canada. In these countries, decisions about the size of conventional forces have rested more on the basis of what was needed to ensure continuation of U.S. defense commitment, and especially the U.S. nuclear guarantee, than on a realistic assessment of what would be needed in a major war. (pp. 57-58)

Economic and budgetary stringency in Western Europe, Japan and Canada and constitutional and political constraints in Japan impose severe limitations on what can be done to respond to Soviet conventional force developments and have made it easier to retain previous assumptions about Soviet actions than to adopt new and more challenging ones. (p. 60)

The authors of this report believe that the trilateral countries should adopt a lower-risk approach which involves having sufficient forces for deterrence and reassurance and that they should not run the higher risks of division and weakness inherent in an approach which would be satisfied with less capable conventional forces. They believe that a sustained effort to this end over several years is not beyond the political and economic resources of the trilateral countries. Such an effort would require additional defense expenditures. It should be accompanied by a renewed effort to reach agreements with the Soviet Union which could at least place a ceiling on, and hopefully reduce, the levels of forces needed. While this approach would not be without difficulty for the trilateral countries, we believe that it is within the reach of carefully formulated and consistently implemented policy. (pp. 61-62)

We recommend that:

- * Negotiations on the limitation of conventional force manpower in Europe be pursued.
- * Consideration be given to proposals for broadening these negotiations to include, once again, the most threatening battlefield weapons systems. These include short-range nuclear weapons and tanks. The goal of such proposals should be to achieve reductions in the levels of systems deployed near the front line.
- * Efforts be made to expand the confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) which were agreed at the Conference on Security and Disarmament in Europe, during the first phase of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe covering a larger geographical area, including the Western Soviet Union.
- * An examination be made of the applicability of the CSBM approach in the Far East (especially reducing the risk of conflict in Korea). (pp. 85-86)

Japan

Japanese tend to be more concerned about threats to their material well-being than military threats.... The growth of economic protectionism appears to be regarded as a more serious threat to Japan than the much-debated Soviet military threat. Given this general background, there is a tendency in Japan to discount any direct Soviet military threat to Japan in the absence of a broader conflagration involving the United States. Yet the Soviet Union has consistently been the least-liked foreign country in Japan and the recent arms buildup in the Soviet Far East and a series of annoying incidents have created more public consciousness of a Soviet threat. (pp. 16-17)

U.S. defense policies themselves can be sources of great insecurity for many Japanese who fear that U.S. miscalculation or irrationality may ignite a conflict into which Japan will inevitably be drawn. From this perspective, the apparent preoccupation of the Reagan Administration with meeting the Soviet challenge through a military buildup has increased the problems which Japan has in reaching a public consensus about its own appropriate security posture....If Japan fears dangers from the U.S. buildup, dangers also lie in the reduction of U.S. forces....Significant U.S. withdrawals could have a serious polarizing effect on Japan's defense debate, simultaneously encouraging pacifists and those Japanese who would support an expanded but autonomous defense, while undermining the position of 'mainstream' policymakers who advocate a closer alliance relationship with the United States based on the present mutual security arrangements. (pp. 19-20)

Asked whether the United States would really defend Japan in the event of a war, a March 1981 poll found only 22 percent responding affirmatively and 59 percent negatively. (p. 20)

As many informed Japanese recognize, the comprehensive national security concept at this stage of its development is not yet convincing in the eyes of Japan's allies, given the failure to clarify, qualitatively and quantitatively, what it should mean in terms of Japan's military and non-military contributions to the international community. In such a situation, there may be some suspicions that 'comprehensive national security' is an excuse for Japan not to make a greater contribution in trilateral security efforts. In determining Japan's fair share of trilateral security efforts, several factors should be taken into consideration. They include 1) the trend in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, 2) the Soviets' external behavior in the face of mounting domestic socio-economic problems, 3) political instability in the Third World, particularly in the Middle East, 4) the Soviet arms buildup in the Asia Pacific region, and 5) the narrowing gap of economic strength between the United States and Japan. All these considerations, however, must remain within a basic policy framework: The degree of Japan's commitment to its 'peace' constitution, to the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, to the exclusively defensive posture of its military forces, and to the so-called 'three non-nuclear principles' (not to produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons into Japan). If Japan were to depart from this basic policy framework, either voluntarily or under external pressure, it would face major domestic political turmoil in which its positive security contributions would become impossibly or greatly constrained. To be more specific, Japan should focus its efforts on improving the quality, readiness, and sustainability of existing and planned forces rather than expanding the scope of defense power beyond that which already has been planned. (p. 24)

The level of Japan's military spending will have to go beyond one percent of GNP, but should be kept under the two percent level in order to adhere to the commitment to the basic policy framework mentioned above. (pp. 24-25)

Western Europe

A nightmare is today confronting all NATO partners, a nightmare fed almost equally from each side of the Atlantic partnership. The nightmare is that, long before the dispelling of the post-war threats that caused the Alliance to be negotiated and agreed upon in 1949, and despite the later adherence of new members and acceptance by many people who were originally hostile (such as the Italian Communist Party after 1975), NATO faces a centrifugal crisis. More and more Europeans fear a return to some form of isolationism by the United States, to some extent in reaction against allied resentment of military policies which they criticize, justly or not, as overly adventurous. More and more nations in Europe are taking -- partially or globally -- a stand corresponding to the same trend, by attempting to ensure their own security by their own means. (pp. 15-16)

North America

Part of the anxiety reflected in current U.S. attitudes derives from the psychological difficulty for the United States of adjusting to the unavoidable diminution of the strength of its military and economic position vis-a-vis allies and adversaries during recent years. That source of insecurity is of considerable importance. Among other things, it helped to create much of the recent polarization in U.S. informed opinion. This polarization has been between those who nostalgically yearned for a return to nuclear superiority and those who hoped that Soviet attainment of strategic parity and the increased economic strength of the major allies of the United States would lead both the Soviets and the allies to changes of attitude and policy which would result in a more stable international system. In such a system, they believed, the United States would be able to lay down some of its burden as a guarantor of the security of others. Whether this psychological insecurity is alleviated or intensified during the 1980s will depend in part on developments in the world beyond the trilateral countries. But it will also be strongly influenced by the security policies adopted by the trilateral countries in their attempts to deal with other, more tangible dangers to their security. (pp. 27-28)

General Perspectives

A major theme running through the report is that the security of the trilateral regions is indivisible -- that there is in fact a trilateral community of security interests and that a trilateral approach to meet the dangers of the 1980s offers the best chance of success. (p. ix)

Cooperation between the trilateral countries will be more important to their security in the 1980s than in previous decades. Faced with the challenges of the future, the security of the trilateral countries will be much less divisible than in the past. There will be a greater need for consultation and action on a trilateral basis. The existing alliances among the trilateral countries are security assets of high value and instruments of great flexibility. The mutual commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty to regard an attack on one member as an attack on all and the very different undertakings in the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (under which Japan may not exercise the right of collective self-defense) are political engagements of profound significance, the vitality of which must be constantly reaffirmed to our populations. The confidence of allied governments is a key element of security and its erosion in the recent past has heightened the general sense of insecurity. (pp. 79-80)

[The regional discussions have] highlighted the familiar distinction between the position of the United States as the Western superpower, for which security problems are seen largely as a function of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and the positions of Western Europe, Japan, and Canada, where security is often perceived more in terms of the policies and attitudes of the United States, which are variously seen as the primary source of reassurance, a frequent source of anxiety and, on occasion, a source of danger and insecurity for other trilateral countries. On this diverse canvas, however, one impression of central relevance to this report stands out. In all the trilateral regions, recent events have created an unusual combination of security-related tensions and problems....-- all the trilateral regions are anxious about the future of their security relationships. (p. 34)

We recommend a progressive broadening of the agenda of the seven nation summits to include the elaboration of a broad strategy for improving security and to cover several security-related subjects.... We recommend that the senior officials in foreign ministries responsible for political-military affairs or other appropriate senior officials meet regularly in advance of the summits to prepare a report and recommendations to their heads of state and government on these and other security-related subjects.... We recommend meetings between appropriate trilateral officials responsible for defense affairs and military staff officers, to be arranged on a regular basis to assess the global military balance and to highlight for the summit participants areas of agreement and disagreement. (pp. 87-88)

Revitalization of the world economy is a fundamental precondition of an improvement in our security position. Without it, sustained defense efforts will become harder, parochial attitudes will grow stronger, and confidence in the ability of our democratic societies to sustain the economic and social values which, among other things, security policies are designed to protect will be weakened. (p. 79)