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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

File

TO: John B. Connally

DATE: Wednesday, September 21, 1983

RECOMMENDED BY: EDWARD J. ROLLINS

PURPOSE: To discuss the 1984 Senate race in Texas.

BACKGROUND: A long time Lyndon Johnson protege, Connally served as Secretary of the Navy in the Kennedy Administration. He was elected Governor of Texas in 1962. He did not seek re-election in 1968.

Connally was named by Richard Nixon to be Secretary of the Treasury in 1971. He headed up the Democrats for Nixon effort in the 1972 campaign.

Connally switched to the GOP in 1973, the same year that he was indicted on bribery charges. He was acquitted.

Apart from his abortive run for the presidency in 1979-80, Connally has been with the big Houston law firm of Vinson and Elkins in recent years.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. The President will want to discuss the upcoming senate race in Texas. Who does Connally feel is ahead in the 3-way race for the GOP nomination? The announced candidates are Representative Phil Gramm, Representative Ron Paul and businessman Robert Mosbacher, Jr.

The three candidates for the Democratic nomination are Representative Kent Hance, 1978 Democratic Senatorial nominee Bob Krueger, and State Senator Lloyd Doggett.

2. The President may want to seek Connally's advice on Hispanic concerns. As governor, Connally was widely hailed for his sensitivity to the Hispanic population. Connally was the first Texas governor to appoint Hispanics to a number of top positions.

His office telephone number is 713/651-2222.

DATE OF SUBMISSION: September 21, 1983

ACTION

He thinks it's Phil Gramm. If Dem. nominee is

K. T. K. P. T. could ...

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1983

*Bill
give anyone
a few days
and then follow
to be sure there
some action on
this. Keep me
posted.*

MEMORANDUM FOR OUTREACH STRATEGY GROUP

FROM: MICHAEL K. DEEVER *M*
SUBJECT: Meeting Follow-Up

The follow-up items and action requests from the June 3 meeting are as follows:

1. Contact Governor Deukmejian for some good Hispanic suggestions. (Rollins)
2. Produce a list of 20 most admired Hispanics. (Wirthlin)
3. Set up Personnel meeting to review list of 10 Hispanics worthy of placement -- not later than June 20. (Herrington)
4. Set up a meeting with Administration Hispanics. (Fuller)
5. Check with R. Walker regarding Hispanic business leaders. (McManus)
6. Set up a meeting with RNC regarding general operation and also Hispanic contacts. (Rollins)
7. Look into projects for Mrs. Reagan involvement. (McManus)
8. Produce a list of Hispanic sports celebrities. (McManus)
9. Look into ways to work with Hispanic media. (Gergen)
 - a. Translate RR's radio show for Spanish language edition. (Gergen)

TARGET STATES

The following swing states should be the focus of our attention in the next few months. The number of electoral votes for each state is in parentheses.

<u>WEST</u>	<u>MIDWEST</u>	<u>SOUTH</u>	<u>EAST</u>
California (47)	Illinois (24)	Texas (29)	New Jersey (16)
Washington (10)	Ohio (23)	Florida (21)	Connecticut (8)
Colorado (8)	Missouri (11)	N.Carolina(13)	
Oregon (7)	Wisconsin (11)	Virginia (12)	
New Mexico (5)	Iowa (8)	Tennessee (11)	
		Louisiana (10)	
		Alabama (9)	
		Kentucky (9)	
		S.Carolina(8)	
		Mississippi(7)	

Other states not mentioned are either considered safe or not probable win states at this time.

TARGET GROUPS

1. WOMEN

All regions; Protestants, and middle-aged married Catholics

2. BLUE COLLAR

Southern states and Ohio, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, Connecticut, Iowa, Oregon, New Jersey, Washington, Arizona and New Mexico

3. HISPANICS

Cubans in Florida, Mexican-Americans in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, California and New Jersey

4. SOUTHERN WHITES

Especially lower income/blue collar

5. WHITE NON-UNION PROTESTANTS

Northeast and Midwest; low to moderate incomes

6. SENIOR CITIZENS

Florida, Arizona, Iowa and Missouri

TARGET ISSUES

Economy

The President must continue to position himself to receive full credit for the economic recovery. As the economy comes back, the Democrats will no longer have it as a political issue. The President must remind the public how bad things were when he took over, take credit for recent economic improvement, and continue to be optimistic about the future. He should stick to themes such as "Economic growth means more working Americans," or "We must re-tool and re-train America for the '80's."

The economy will be the paramount issue for 1984. We must be prepared to persuasively answer the question in 1984, "Are you better off now than you were four years ago?" in the affirmative. We will also have to address the fairness issue more effectively.

Leadership

The President is still viewed as a strong leader by most Americans, and this is a theme we need to build upon for re-election.

The image of a strong, steady leader who can continue to guide this country to peace, progress and prosperity will help win the support of not only our base constituencies, but also the non-ideological voters (29 percent of the total) who are attracted by and vote on the basis of their perceptions of performance, charisma, incumbency and leadership.

Foreign Policy/National Security

We are making steady progress in this area. Our own accomplishments coupled with the irresponsible statements coming from the liberal Democrats indicate that we have the opportunity to do well with this issue in 1984. Consistency, caution and concern are key watchwords for 1984. The President can carefully explicate the dangers facing us, demonstrating at the same time that his policy of peace through strength has provided America with both.

Education

Most Americans express deep concern about the quality of education in this country. A majority of parents feel that education has deteriorated in the past decade and that their children are not receiving as good a basic education as they did.

A "back to basics" theme would have widespread appeal among most Americans. Also, the public overwhelmingly supports voluntary prayer in public schools. The President should continue to push this initiative.

Other issues, such as tuition tax credits, should be boosted before targeted audiences.

The recent final report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education lends great intellectual support to the President's efforts to redirect the Department of Education toward an agenda for achievement in our public schools. An important aspect of this effort is competency testing for teachers and students.

Crime

Americans rate crime as the domestic problem they are most concerned with, after the economy.

They believe judges are too soft in issuing sentences to criminals.

A majority expect crime to increase over the next year.

An overwhelming majority feel homeowners should be allowed to use force against burglars breaking into their homes.

A majority of Americans favor the death penalty for those convicted of premeditated murder.

The President need merely advocate the same policies in 1983-84 that he did ten or twenty years ago to establish himself as the candidate who is tough on crime.

The public doesn't necessarily want another LEAA program. Tough speeches before law enforcement groups will go a long way.

The public's concern that judges aren't tough enough gives the President the opportunity to showcase some of his more conservative judicial appointments.

The President's Task Force on Drugs is another example of a vehicle to get the President out front on an issue of major concern to most Americans.

The President should continue to visit law enforcement agencies and express his support for their work. He should seize these opportunities to promote his anti-crime package.

NATIONAL THEMES VS. REGIONAL TARGETED THEMES

In spite of the fact that the major media follows the President wherever he goes and makes a national news story out of most Presidential events, the President from time to time needs to focus his remarks on activities of smaller, but more supportive, audiences. The recent speech to the National Rifle Association was a perfect example of effective "narrowcasting."

While it is true that most Americans support gun control, their support is lukewarm. The 2.8 million members of the NRA, however, are motivated and organized. The gains we make in courting these single-issue voters far exceed any potential losses we could suffer among the rest of the population over this issue.

Several other issues that the President supports are not popular among the public-at-large. He must target the specific constituencies to maximize his gains and minimize his losses when he addresses these issues. Abortion and tuition tax credits are examples of views held by the President that need special, receptive audiences.

The White House must develop the capacity to operate on two tracks at once. The overall message must be general and noncontroversial, while specific communications can be targeted and tailored to single issue supporters.

Optimism

The President is and must continue to be a symbol of hope and optimism to the American public. Ronald Reagan has a unique ability to portray the best side of an issue.

His message should be that America is on the mend, that inflation is down, unemployment is down, the stock market is up, and so is the American spirit. With President Reagan in the White House, we will enjoy peace, prosperity and progress.

An additional benefit of a strong climate of optimism will be better candidate recruitment in 1984 and higher levels of campaign enthusiasm and contributions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are some concrete steps we can take to improve our standing with the populists--in terms of symbolism and issues.

A. Symbolism

As we plan our populist strategy, we should remember that populists appreciate honesty, candor, and straight-forwardness. They loathe hypocrisy, condescension, and pretense. Our strategy must be carefully planned and be consistent to avoid these pitfalls. Below are some specific suggestions:

1. The President could do the play-by-play for a pro baseball or football game. How many people know that the President is a former sportscaster? The President's image would be boosted immeasurably if he were to show off his microphone expertise alongside populist heroes such as Curt Gowdy or Frank Gifford.
2. Many presidents (though not lately) have thrown out the first ball at the beginning of the baseball season. This is a tradition which could easily enough be revived. Perhaps the President could be with Jim Brady if the Bear throws out the first ball for a Chicago Cubs game again.
3. The President could go to a stock car race. Although stock car racing is neglected by the media, it is one of the nation's biggest spectator sports. And those spectators are almost 100% populists.
4. The President could host a group of football or baseball stars--former and current--over to the White House. It is just as important to invite retired stars, as populists are old as well as young. We cannot over-emphasize the importance of sports to the populists. Sports like baseball and football are literally as American as apple pie. Sports--team and individual--epitomize valuable characteristics such as discipline, hard work, and perseverance. The President's connection with sports has been neglected. The public should be reminded that the President is a former athlete and sportscaster, and that he still enjoys watching a game on TV as much as the next guy.
5. The President could ask the 50 Reagan-Bush State Chairmen to each designate one blue collar worker to come to the White House and tell President Reagan what he or she thinks he ought to know.
6. If this program worked well, it could be repeated indefinitely. For example, the Reagan-Bush Chairmen could each choose an entrepreneur from their state who has recently started a small business that provides jobs. Additionally, the Chairmen could each select a farmer, working mother, Social Security recipient, outstanding student, star athlete, etc.

7. Populists like to see the chasm between themselves and the elite narrowed. We could narrow that gap overnight by inviting some of the hundreds of thousands of Americans who write to the President each year to actually come visit the White House and talk to him in person.
8. Also in the interest of narrowing the gap between the government and the governed, we should give some serious thought to accepting some of the myriad invitations to conventions, parties, weddings, baptisms, etc. that the President gets each year.
9. The President is personally the greatest conservationist since Teddy Roosevelt. Not since TR has there been a president who spent so much time in the great outdoors. Not only does the President spend as much time as he can on his ranch, but he actually works with his hands when he's out there. Perhaps the President could invite others to come along. They could be rodeo champions, working cowboys, or perhaps "dudes" who would like to try "roughing it" for a few days. Our one "in house" rodeo champion is Malcolm Baldrige. Perhaps the President could do the announcing at an event where the Secretary performs.
10. No other president, no matter how beloved by the Sierra Club, can claim the same level of genuine familiarity and affinity with outdoor life. The President may want to stop at a national park some time to make this point in person. He might say that people can honestly differ over the nuances of environmental policy, but that people who say that Ronald Reagan is out to damage the environment are not being honest.
11. An event could be arranged at the White House for "blue collar environmentalists," those non-granola eating working class Americans who drive their pickups and RV's into the country to hunt, fish, boat, etc. Perhaps they could all drive to the White House in their pickups and campers to discuss issues of common concern with the President.
12. The President could stress "blue collar environmentalism" in a speech to the National Rifle Association. Its members have a great interest in pragmatic environmental policy. Also, their political clout is much greater than most people realize, viz. the defeat of the California gun control initiative. Recall that Ronald Reagan was the first candidate the NRA ever endorsed. However, the current pro-Reagan leadership of the NRA is being seriously challenged by forces allied with Michigan Democrat John Dingell. An appearance by the President at an NRA fundraiser would greatly strengthen the pro-Reagan incumbents.
13. The President could greatly advance his education agenda and help himself with the populists if he spoke to a conservative education group, such as the PTA or the National Association of School Boards.

The President might also consider speaking at a high school or grammar school commencement. There is no reason why the school has to be large. Surely we can find a traditionally-minded public school which never lost sight of the three R's and still graduates achievers without huge expenditures or frills.

14. Since nationalistic themes appeal to the populists' patriotism, the President might consider an event marking the anniversary of some great battle or treaty, preferably dating from the Revolutionary War. Another important date on the horizon is the 40th anniversary of D-Day, which comes up on June 6, 1984.
15. The President should seize the opportunity to emphasize his continuing commitment to human rights in the captive nations of Eastern Europe. He could meet with Cardinal Cooke of New York, and participate in a candlelight vigil for Solidarity, Soviet Jews, imprisoned Pentecostals, etc.
16. The President has great communication skills. He could utilize them to the fullest to a sympathetic audience if he were to do a question-and-answer show over a nationwide hookup of FM country music radio stations. The advantage of radio is that the market is so segmented that we can seek out and find the precise populist audience we want.
17. The President could also lend his stature to a charity telethon, such as the Jerry Lewis telethon for muscular dystrophy. A Presidential appearance would certainly generate record contributions.
18. The President's philosophy and that of voluntarist groups like the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts are very much in tune. We should keep this in mind as we weigh the numerous invitations that pour into the White House every day.
19. The family has a special place in American life. The President is a son, husband, brother, father, and grandfather. All Americans enjoy celebrating holidays, birthdays, and reunions. They are showing increasing interest in their "roots." The President is uniquely qualified to explain to his fellow citizens how his vision for America speaks to their concerns and aspirations and how his policies address those concerns and aspirations. By word and deed, the President can help the families of America celebrate their unity and their diversity.
20. After the family, the greatest American social institution is the neighborhood, or community. From the Mayflower Compact, through quilting bees, all the way to Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Americans have seen the necessity, and the desirability, of uniting to achieve common goals. As the President draws attention to the diversity of American neighborhoods, he should devote careful attention to the unique sounds, sights, words, and foods of each.

Particular attention should be given to ethnic foods. The President eating pizza or munching on a gyros is always worth a spot on TV or a picture in the newspaper.

21. Work is what built this country. Incentives and rewards for productive work are central to the President's Economic Recovery Program. The President can visit high schools where the workers of the future are being trained, and he can visit the high tech factories where the products of the future are being produced. Just as importantly, the President can visit the older workplaces of smokestack America, where he can offer his assurances that the heavy industries that built this country will not be left behind.
22. To have peace, we must have strength. This is the essential message of the Administration's national security policies. The President must cut through the noisy rhetoric of our opponents and remind the American people of the bottom line: America is at peace. Populists in particular feel strongly that we must not only have peace; we must have peace with honor. Populists don't want any more Irans. They are less worried about America being loved than they are about America being respected. The President can "humanize" our national defense policies and bring the issue down to "human scale" by visiting with ordinary soldiers and sailors. After meeting with those who are bearing the burden of our freedom today, he can meet with those who have borne it in the past: veterans and their dependents.

B. Issues

We have to remember that populists are in sympathy with us mostly on cultural and nationalistic issues, i.e. social and foreign policy. On economic issues the populists tend to side more with the Democrats. The economic issues we should stress with the populists are:

1. Jobs. Populists are still loyal to the WPA/CCC-type programs that gave jobs to their fathers and grandfathers. They would rather be working in the private sector, but they consider public works employment to be better than nothing--and much better than welfare.

The gas tax legislation and now the jobs bill will both put blue collar, hard hat Americans back to work. We should not hesitate to take credit for these bills.

In the future, we should continue to emphasize the job creation aspects of all our economic policies. Populists want to hear "jobs, jobs, jobs" over and over again.

2. Housing. Closely related to the jobs issue is housing. Construction workers tend to be populists, but they are pro-Republican. The key to making them happy is putting them back to work, and the key to putting them back to work is lowering interest rates. We should always mention how many Americans will be able to afford new

homes--and how many jobs will be created in the construction of those homes--thanks to our success in lowering interest rates.

The foreign policy issue we should emphasize with the populists is:

1. National Defense. Populists are hawks. Long after much of the elite had abandoned our cause in Vietnam, the populists continued to stand up for America's national honor. Populists still wear American flag decals on their hardhats. They still say: America-love it or leave it.

We should continually stress nationalistic themes in our communications. We should emphasize that America is once again respected around the world, thanks to President Reagan's defense buildup. We can point out that there have been no more Irans and Afghanistans since President Reagan's inauguration.

We believe that the social issues listed below serve to reinforce our strength with the populists while not jeopardizing our overall coalition:

1. Education. Americans are deeply concerned about deteriorating standards and discipline in our schools. President Reagan has already addressed these concerns, with programs and proposals to improve computer literacy, to direct special aid to science and math instruction, to eliminate counterproductive school busing, promote tuition tax credits, and so on.

The President can continue to press for educational reforms. He can push for higher teacher competency standards, for more job-oriented instruction, and further advances in high technology training. At the same time, he can continue to stress the importance of basic instruction, school prayer, and morality.

2. Immigration. Just about everyone agrees that the current situation is out of hand. Populists are not racists because they want to regain control of our borders. They worry about their jobs and that traditional American values and institutions are being eroded.
3. Crime. In terms of politics, the issue comes and goes. But in terms of victims, the problem gets worse and worse. Populists lean toward no-nonsense justice that puts cops on the streets and crooks in jail.

ACTION ITEMS

Efforts must be made to identify the President with the working man and his interests.

- The President must stress, in every speech that he makes and at every meeting, that the Economic Recovery Program is working and that the Administration's Number One goal is getting Americans working again.

JOBBS! JOBBS! JOBBS!!

- The President should make appearances at key ethnic events, and speak to family values and jobs. This will show a sensitivity to the blue collar ethnics.
- The President should appear with small groups of workers at a union hall or factory as a forum to explain key Administration programs.
- Whenever traveling, the President should try to meet local Catholic Bishops or church leaders.
- The President should increase the frequency with which he attends Sunday services. Consideration should be given to having visiting church leaders hold services at Camp David. (Religion and fear of its decline are important to blue collar ethnics.
- The President should go to retirement homes in blue collar neighborhoods and discuss Social Security and family-related issues.
- Get the President meeting with working people!

Harley-Davidson Factory -- tariff decision saved
their jobs

Shipyard workers -- The Navy's 600 fleet program is
creating thousands of jobs. Attend a
keel-laying ceremony

Textile Mill -- Administration has saved jobs

Meet with Teamsters

Meet with Working Women

- Consult with labor on labor-sensitive appointments
- Invite local and friendly international Labor leaders to White House functions -- State Dinners, briefings, etc.
- The President, when on the road, should invite five or six local Labor leaders for breakfast, lunch or short meeting.

*won about like
all GOP have won.*

- * A successful strategy for the reelection of President Reagan in 1984 will require three things:
 1. A clear analysis of what happened in 1980,
 2. A map of the political groups and states that can be assembled into a majority coalition in 1984,
 3. A course of action that will actually bring them together in November, 1984.
- * When analyzing the various groups in the electorate that might be assembled to provide the President with a majority in 1984, it is best to look at them by demographic group, geographic region or ideological group and not by their current attitude toward the President. By using relatively stable demographic or ideological groups, it will enable us to track our success or failure at bringing these voters into a Reagan coalition. Whereas, segmenting and analyzing the electorate in terms of the Reagan's performance rating or thermometer rating would yield groups of approvers or disapprovers whose composition would change over time. Because of changing attitudes toward Reagan, we would be looking at very different groups and not able to track our success or failure with our target groups.

There are various ways to look at coalitions:

- * Simply look at that group of states that can be assembled to produce 270 electoral votes.
- * Look at the electorate in terms of popular vote by demographic group, by ideological group, and by the special, and often important, constituent groups within it, i.e., women, Blacks, farmers, blue collar workers, etc.
- * In the last six Presidential elections (1960-1980), the Republican share of the popular vote has ranged from a low of 39% to a high of 61%, averaging approximately 48%. President Reagan captured 51.7% of the popular vote; a figure which does not strikingly distinguish Reagan from the average. Restated, 48.3% of the vote was non-Reagan. Indeed, Reagan achieves an absolute majority in 25 states and fell below 50.5% in the remaining 25 states and the District of Columbia.
- * In terms of states, there are twenty states, all within President Reagan's 1980 coalition, that virtually always vote Republican and yield 157 electoral votes. He also won ten additional states that have always voted Republican, except for either religious (Kennedy) or regional (Carter) reasons. These states yield 134 electoral votes and when combined with the twenty base Republican states, produce 291 electoral votes, or enough to win.
- * The important point to make at the beginning of this exercise is that 1984, in its most basic elements, will be very similar to the Republican strategy of winning Republican Presidential campaigns since 1952 including Reagan's 1980 coalition. Regardless of whether we are dealing with a coalition of states or a coalition of voters within the national electorate, winning Republican coalitions have been very similar. They have been largely assembled by maximizing the Republican and

conservative base vote, which 36%-38%, and then adding the 12%-14% it takes to reach a majority. That 12%-14% can be divided about equally, half of which are almost always available to a Republican candidate and the remaining half who are critical to reaching a majority but who do not have any particular ideological or party tie to the President and are extremely candidate-oriented.

The Demographic Character of the 1980 Reagan Coalition

- * The most efficient demographic analysis of the patterns and trends to partisan voting is based on a discrete categorization of the electorate in terms of region, religion, union membership and race. This yields for six basic groups and multiple subgroups within the basic six.

	<u>Group Size*</u>	<u>1980 Percent Voting Reagan</u>
1. Northern Protestant	24.5%	68%
2. Northern Union	17.4	44
3. Catholics	16.5	54
4. Jewish	2.5	35
5. Blacks	10.3	7
6. Southern White	25.9	59

36 38% conservative
base
6-7% candidate
oriented

*Group size as of 1980.

- * The regional and social character of the Reagan '80 coalition closely parallels previous post New Deal GOP coalitions, particularly since 1952.
- * Reagan was weak with many traditional Democratic support groups -- Black voters, Jewish voters, lower class border Southerners.
- * The most distinctive features of the Reagan vote was a noticeable improvement over President Ford's performance among Northern Protestants, particularly middle-to-lower class voters. Catholics, also provide President Reagan with a unique level of support. Indeed, Nixon '72 is the only other Republican who ran better with Catholics than Reagan did in 1980.
- * While Reagan also surpassed previous levels of Republican support among voters from Northern union households, his appeal with the union vote in '80 has been somewhat overstated. It was Reagan's weakest Northern group in 1980. The increase for Reagan reflects more of a weakness in the 1976 coalition than a truly unique 1980 Reagan appeal.
- * The major deficiency or departure from past GOP coalitions occurred with upper-end "silk stocking" Protestants across the North. Every Republican candidate since 1960 equalled or surpassed Reagan's 1980 performance. Anderson captures a sizeable 18% of these voters.
- * One cannot reflect on 1980 without mentioning the "gender gap," which represents the most global deficiency for Reagan. A weakness with women operated across all socio-economic groups.

Table 1: Percent Voting Republican

	Size of Group**	Presidential Election of:					
		1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980
Total	100%	50	39	43	61	48	51
Northern White Protestants							
"Silk-Stocking"	7%	92	65	82	73	69	65
Middle Class	14	81	54	71	76	64	72
Working Class	6	72	39	58	69	49	62
White South							
Border South							
Upper End	3	50	49	67	71	65	75
Lower End	2	57	24	42	74	51	45
Deep South							
Immigrants	5	82	62	67	84	60	62
Natives-Upper End	8	41	54	50	74	61	61
Natives-Lower End	5	41	31	30	83	46	52
Catholics							
Polish and Irish	5	9	24	33	60	46	54
Other Catholics							
Upper End	7	18	37	51	66	56	63
Lower End	5	23	22	34	68	37	46
Jews	3	11	11	6	31	27	36
Blacks	11	29	(1)	3	13	5	7
Northern Farmers	1	73	31	61	80	63	73
Northern Union*	19	37	18	45	58	38	44

*Northern White Protestants and Catholics from union households.

**Group size as of 1980.

Note: This is an exclusive categorization of the electorate. Voters are in only one group. A one in parentheses, e.g., (1), indicates less than 1 percent.

The Partisan and Ideological Character of the 1980 Reagan Coalition(a)

- * The 1980 Reagan coalition had a much more pronounced ideological component than the more recent GOP presidential coalitions. Conservatives gravitated to Reagan and liberals to Carter. Partisanship and ideology were the primary motivating factor for a full 72% of the Reagan voters. Restated, 37 points of his total 51 points were contributed by voters with either a partisan loyalty or ideological proximity to Reagan.
- * However, a significant number of Reagan voters were neither motivated by party or ideology. Twenty-eight percent (28%) of the Reagan voters or 14 points of his total 51 points were contributed by non-Republicans and non-conservatives who were more concerned with the issues of performance and candidate perceptions than the ideological or programmatic differences between Reagan and Carter.

Table 2: Summary of the Partisan-Ideological Character of the Reagan Vote: 1980

	Contribution To Reagan Vote	Motivation
Conservative Republicans	14%]	PARTISAN MOTIVATED VOTING
Mod./Lib. Republicans	10]	
Conservative Ind./Dem.	13]	NON-PARTISAN/IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATED VOTING
Mod./Lib. Ind./Dem.	14]	

- * The non-ideological voter was a critical vote. The cutting issue for these voters revolved around the inability of the Carter Presidency to govern the country. The perceived failure of Carter to handle foreign policy and the deterioration of the economy were the central elements behind their support for Reagan.
- * Labeling the non-ideological voters simply as an anti-Carter vote does not fully capture the motivation of these voters. Reagan won these voters not only because they were casting a negative vote against Carter's Presidency, but also because they trusted the confidence exhibited by Reagan in what he wanted to achieve as President.

(a) Throughout this section the classification of voters into liberals and conservatives was done by their belief consistency as measured across several survey questions covering economic, racial and foreign policy issues. This is in contrast to a typology which relies on the voters' self-reports of their ideology.

- * These voters were not unique to 1980, but represent a vote which operates in virtually every presidential contest. Obviously, these voters have no partisan or ideological linkage to Reagan and they as likely to punish Reagan as they are to reward him.
- * While non-ideological vote was a critical element, the importance of the ideological base in assembling Reagan's 1980 coalition cannot be overlooked or taken for granted. Reagan attracted a complex of distinct and separate ideological voters under the general banner of "conservative."
- * It is important to recognize that the ideological orientation of the electorate is not a simple liberal-conservative dichotomy.
- * An ideological segmentation of the electorate which relies solely on a voter's self report grossly misrepresents the ideological divisions within the electorate. The true ideological profile is multi-dimensional embodying issue preferences across economic, social, and foreign policy issues. Consequently, a multi-dimensional issue strategy is required to solidify the ideological base of the Reagan vote.
- * The following table displays an ideological segmentation base on the attitude and belief across a number of economic, racial, and foreign policy issues. The key point is that the "conservative" vote has three major components each of which must be appealed to in separate and unique ways.

Ideological Segmentation of The Electorate

CONSERVATIVE	18%
LIBERTARIAN	13
POPULIST	24
LIBERAL	16
NON-IDEOLOGICAL	<u>29</u>
	100%

Reagan Popular Vote Coalition at Mid-Term

- * The non-ideological voter of 1980 was influenced by four negative issues in 1982 -- (1) unemployment-economic recession, (2) perceived fairness of the Reagan economic program, (3) the leadership style of the administration, and (4) defense spending. Together these issues have rekindled the concerns which led to Carter's dismissal from office and have brought Reagan's performance and leadership into question.
- * The importance of the "fairness" issue cannot be overemphasized. Throughout the 1982 campaign, the perceived fairness of Reagan's policies was strongly related to the voters' overall assessment of his job performance.
- * The interaction of these issues and perceptions within the context of the 1982 elections had three key manifestations. First, it exacerbated the inherent hostility among many traditional Democratic sectors and mobilized them against Republicans in 1982 -- union members, liberals, environmentalists, blacks, and Hispanics. Second, it invited skepticism and increased hostility from women. Third, it pushed the ticket-splitter, who is essential to a majority Republican coalition, into the Democratic column.
- * The full negative impact of these issues and perceptions were blunted in the short-term by the widespread perception that the Democrats were responsible for the recession and by the inability of the Democrats to persuade many voters that Reagan's approach was a total failure and that they had a better alternative. These perceptions may not last through 1984.
- * Who has Reagan lost? Although Reagan has lost some support across all major sectors of the electorate, there has been a disproportionately large loss among northern white Protestants.
- * There is a fundamental strategic question that this Northern-Protestant erosion brings forth. Have these voters been permanently scared or alienated from Reagan and, therefore, must be replaced in 1984? (OR) Can they be pulled back into the coalition in 1984?

Table 4. Comparison of 1980 Reagan Vote and Mid-Term Reagan Vote by Regional and Social Groups

<u>Social Grouping</u>	<u>Group Size</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent Voting Reagan</u>		<u>Dif- ference</u>
			<u>(a)</u>		
			<u>1980</u>	<u>1983</u>	
Northern Protestant	(24.5%)	100%	68%	57%	-11%
Northern Union	(17.4)	100%	44	44	- 0
Catholics	(16.5)	100%	54	49	- 5
Jewish	(2.5)	100%	35	23	-12(b)
Blacks	(10.3)	100%	7	4	- 3
Southern White	(25.9)	100%	59	54	- 5
Total		100%	51	47	- 4

(a) Reagan vs. Mondale

(b) Not statistically reliable because of small sample size.

1984 Target Groups

Currently, there are four groups of voters who are not supporting Reagan at the rates needed to build a safe, majority coalition. In most cases they are voting no different than their traditional partisan profiles would predict which works to the disadvantage of any Republican presidential candidate. Those groups are:

- ° Northern white Protestants, particularly those in the Northeast and those with college educations but low-to-moderate incomes (the "intelligentsia").
- ° Catholics, particularly those who are middle class or live in the industrial Midwest.
- ° Women - both Protestants and Catholics.
- ° Lower end Southern whites.

Who Reagan has and doesn't have can be summarized as follows for each of four major groupings of the electorate.

Among Northern White Protestants Reagan is currently strong with the affluent and the middle class but not with the college educated, moderate income segment. In addition, lower end Protestants are now moderately anti-Reagan. The gender gap is a significant 10 points among Northern Protestants. Regionally, Reagan has good ballot strength with white Protestants in the Midwest and West, but he does no better than a straight party vote in the Northeast.

Among Catholics Reagan is currently strong with the well educated as well as the upper income voters, and he is strong with the under 40 year old Catholics. He is weak with middle class Catholics. The gender gap is a large 17 points among Catholics -- 8 points of which is due to the greater Democratic partisanship of Catholic women and 9 points of which is due to current political perceptions. Regionally, Reagan is strong with Catholics in the Northeast and in the West, but he does no better than a straight party vote in the East North Central states.

Among Northern union voters Reagan has the support of one significant subgroup -- upper income (over \$30,000) union families. Educated, middle class, and lower end union families are all anti-Reagan. The gender gap is almost non-existent among Northern union members mainly because there is no pro-Reagan vote from union men. Age and region produce little variation in union support for Reagan.

Among Southern whites Reagan is strong with the educated and the middle class. Lower end Southern whites are just mildly pro-Reagan. His weakest group in the South are senior citizens who are most wedded to their Democratic voting tradition. Younger voters in the South are strongly pro-Reagan. The gender gap in the South is relatively mild -- a five point difference between men and women.

In summary, the subgroups Reagan has now; the subgroups which are voting against him; and the subgroups which are presently neither pro or anti-Reagan beyond party, are:

* Reagan Has Now:

- High income voters across all groups including union families and Catholics.
- Educated Catholics and educated Southern whites with low-to-moderate incomes.
- Middle class Northern Protestants and middle class Southern whites.
- Younger, non-union voters (18-39 year old) in the North and South and among Catholics. (This support is probably soft.)
- Non-union men -- North, South, and Catholic.

* No Clear Trend Beyond Party Vote

- Educated Northern Protestants with low-to-moderate incomes.
- Catholics who are middle class, middle aged, or in the industrial Midwest.
- Northeastern WASPS.
- Northern women - WASP, Catholic, and union.
- Lower-end, Southern whites.

* Voting Against Reagan

- Northern union voters with low-to-moderate incomes, including those with college degrees.
- Lower-end, non-union, northern WASPS.
- Blacks

Reagan's Current Vote and Non-Party Margin Among Key Demographic Groups

	<u>Major Demographic Target Groups</u>				
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Northern Protestant</u>	<u>Northern Union</u>	<u>Catholic</u>	<u>Southern White</u>
<u>Total</u>	50 (+ 4)*	62 (+ 7)	48 (+ 1)	52 (+ 7)	58 (+11)
<u>Status</u>					
High income	66 (+11)	78 (+15)	62 (+12)	59 (+ 9)	62 (+ 8)
College	58 (+ 7)	57 (0)	35 (- 9)	66 (+19)	66 (+17)
Middle class	56 (+ 8)	68 (+13)	40 (- 6)	46 (+ 1)	60 (+17)
Lower end	44 (0)	42 (- 6)	41 (- 3)	46 (+ 6)	48 (+ 4)
Dem. Groups	17 (-11)	X	X	X	X
<u>Age</u>					
Under 40	53 (+ 6)	65 (+11)	51 (+ 1)	57 (+11)	61 (+14)
41-64	48 (+ 2)	59 (+ 2)	45 (+ 1)	48 (0)	58 (+10)
65+	46 (+ 3)	59 (+ 8)	46 (- 2)	41 (+ 6)	44 (0)
<u>Sex</u>					
Men	55 (+ 7)	67 (+13)	49 (+ 2)	61 (+11)	60 (+13)
Women	46 (+ 1)	57 (+ 3)	47 (- 1)	44 (+ 2)	55 (+ 8)
<u>Region</u>					
Northeast	49 (0)	60 (+ 1)	47 (- 2)	55 (+ 7)	X
E.N.C.	49 (+ 4)	65 (+10)	47 (+ 3)	42 (+ 1)	X
West/W.N.C.	54 (+ 5)	61 (+ 8)	48 (+ 2)	58 (+12)	X
South	49 (+ 6)	X	X	X	58 (+11)

*Reagan's percentage differs from previous tables because the undecided vote has been removed in order to perform this particular analysis. The number enclosed in the parentheses is the difference between Reagan's vote and the expected vote for each group based on their reported party identifications.

Ideological Segmentation of the Electorate

Type of Issue:

<u>Economic Regulation</u>	<u>Civic Liberties/ Social Issues</u>	<u>Foreign Policy</u>	<u>Ideological Type*</u>
1. Opposes extensive government activity	Supports traditional attitudes	Anti-Communist, opposes US con- cern with other countries' prob- lems	"CONSERVATIVE" 18%
Opposes extensive government activity	Supports traditional attitudes	Mixed	

2. Opposes extensive government activity	Permissive attitudes	Mixed	"LIBERTARIANS" 13%


3. Supports extensive government activity	Supports traditional attitudes	Mixed	"POPULIST" 24%

4. Supports extensive government activity	Permissive attitudes	Mixed	
Supports extensive	Permissive attitudes	"international- alist" & not anti-Communist	"LIBERAL" 16%

5. MIXED	MIXED	MIXED	NON- IDEOLOGICAL 29%

			100%

A REAGAN-REPUBLICAN PROFILE OF THE ELECTORATE



Age

18-39	50%	49%	37%	51%	50%
40-64	36	38	47	38	36
65 and over	13	13	15	11	15

Sex


Male	50%	47%	47%	42%	39%
Female	50	53	53	58	61

Status*

Lower End	20	22	28	22	33
Middle Class	38	36	21	36	17
Intelligentsia	10	11	3	12	9
High Income	27	20	21	18	23
Democratic Groups	<u>1</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>17</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Blacks, Jews, and Hispanics are included in the "Democratic Groups" category.

A REAGAN-REPUBLICAN PROFILE OF THE ELECTORATE



Social Groups

Northern Whites					
Protestants	30%	19%	23%	31%	26%
Catholics	19	14	16	12	14
Union Members*	14	17	21	17	19
Southern Whites	30	42	19	29	17
Jews	1	3	3	2	2
Blacks	--	3	16	6	13
Other	<u>7</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

*Northern whites who are Protestant or Catholic, but in a family with someone who is a union member are treated as union members.

CORE REAGAN REPUBLICANS 31%	MARGINALS 33%	ANTI-REAGAN DEMOCRATS 36%
--	------------------------------------	--



PRO-REAGAN INDEPENDENTS 6%	PRO-REAGAN DEMOCRATS 10%	OTHER 7%	ANTI-REAGAN REPUBLICANS 6%	ANTI- REAGAN INDEPEN- DENTS 4%
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1980
Presidential
Vote

Reagan	62%	43%	39%	55%	22%
Carter	9	38	36	18	25
Anderson	4	5	2	12	18
Other	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

1983
Trial Heat
Results

Reagan	75%	60%	37%	49%	16%
Mondale	8	34	46	39	51
Undecided	<u>16</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>32</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Reagan	67%	57%	40%	32%	9%
Glenn	18	36	43	57	66
Undecided	<u>15</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>24</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Presidential State Patterns From Eisenhower Thru Reagan

Initial Points

- * Only Delaware has been in all the winning coalitions since 1952. All other states have been on the losing side at least once.
- * Only Arizona has always voted Republican. No state has always voted Democrat; Washington, D.C. has an unblemished Democratic record although it begins after Eisenhower.
- * Because of Republican electoral landslides in four of the past eight presidential elections (1952, 1956, 1972, 1980), almost all the states have some Republican history and none can be classified as steadfastly Democratic. Forty-six of the states have gone Republican at least three times. Three states have gone Republican twice (Arkansas, Georgia and West Virginia). Hawaii, not eligible for the Eisenhower electoral landslides, was part of the Nixon landslide.
- * There have been three close elections in the past eight. These three elections -- 1960, 1968, 1976 -- act as the most important test of what are the Republican and Democratic presidential states.

Classification of States by Presidential Pluralities

- * There are 30 states, totaling 291 electoral votes -- enough for a majority, which usually vote Republican and can be labeled, presidential Republican states
 - Twenty of these states (157 electoral votes) remained Republican in all three close elections since Eisenhower. (Maine broke pattern in 1968 which can be viewed as a Muskie home-state aberration.) In fact, the only year they didn't vote Republican was 1964 (except Arizona, which did). These 20 states have been the Party's Consistent Core. (Listing of these states follows.)
 - Four of the presidential Republican states went for Carter in 1976 as their only exception -- other than 1964. Carter's regional appeal explains the behavior of Florida and Tennessee. It was also the reason for Ohio (southeast portion of the state). Wisconsin is the other Carter aberration state, and the reason for its deviation in 1976 stems from its rural populism.
 - Four of the presidential Republican states went for Kennedy in 1960 as their only exception -- other than 1964. Kennedy's Catholicism explains the behavior of at least New Jersey and perhaps the other three as well -- Illinois, Nevada, and New Mexico. An unusually high "machine vote" in Cook County also contributed to the 1960 result in Illinois.

- The next to last Republican Presidential state is Washington. Its single, significant blemish is 1968. Washington is by itself with this Republican/Humphrey pattern.
- Kentucky completes the presidential Republican states. Its pattern is most like the four states that defected to Carter in 1976. It has one other blemish on its record - a slim 700 vote plurality for Stevenson in 1952; otherwise, it would perfectly fit the Carter aberration pattern noted for Florida and Tennessee.
- * The remaining twenty states plus Washington, D.C. present a variety of patterns. Seven of these states have singular patterns, unmatched by any other state and lacking much sense other than D.C.'s straight Democratic pattern. The other fourteen states fall into two groupings:
 - The Redneck Conservative states (52 electoral votes) -- Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Their most distinctive feature is that they voted for Goldwater in 1964 or Wallace in 1968 or both. Nixon carried them all in 1972, Ford lost them all in 1976, and Reagan carried them all except, understandably, Georgia in 1980. Other than Louisiana in 1956, these states remained Democratic during the two Eisenhower landslides.
 - The Democratic states (138 electoral votes) -- Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Texas. They joined the two Eisenhower landslides (except Hawaii) and the Nixon 1972 landslide, but voted Democratic in the close elections in 1960, 1968, and 1976. (Michigan voted for its home state candidate, Ford, in 1976; nevertheless, it belongs in this group.) In 1980, the Reagan electoral landslide was great enough to peel away half of these states -- Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. The other four -- Maryland, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Hawaii -- fell short of joining the sweep.
- * The last seven states cut their own individual patterns.
 - Delaware votes for the winner.
 - Connecticut, a Catholic state, voted against Carter in 1976 as well as 1980. It voted for Kennedy in 1960. 1968 was its key test, and it voted Democratic.
 - District of Columbia -- solid Democrat.
 - Massachusetts voted for Eisenhower twice and Reagan in 1980 but was all Democratic, in between, refusing even the Nixon 1972 sweep.
 - Missouri voted for Nixon in 1968 as well as in 1972 but failed to help in the 1960 and 1976 elections. It went for Eisenhower in 1952 but not in 1956. Its history is the most erratic of any state.

- ° North Carolina may be a new Republican state. It went Democratic from 1952 thru 1964, but has voted Republican three of the last four times. It is unlike the Redneck Conservative states in that it eschewed both Goldwater and Wallace.
- ° West Virginia probably could be grouped with the eight Democratic states which only join Republican landslides. It is even more resistant than those eight, however -- it turned down Eisenhower in 1952.

Classification of States by Presidential Pluralities

<u>Presidential Republican - States the Consistent Core</u>	<u>Presidential Elections</u>									
	<u>Electoral Vote</u>		<u>Ike</u>		<u>Dem. Years</u>		<u>New Majority</u>			
	'84	'72	'52	'56	'60	'64	'68	'72	'76	'80
1. Alaska	(3)	(3)	--	--	X	0	X	X	X	X
2. Arizona (except 64: Goldwater effect)	(7)	(6)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
3. California	(47)	(45)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
4. Colorado	(8)	(7)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
5. Idaho	(4)	(4)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
6. Indiana	(12)	(13)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
7. Iowa	(8)	(8)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
8. Kansas	(7)	(7)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
9. Maine (except 68: Muskie effect)	(4)	(4)	X	X	X	0	0	X	X	X
10. Montana	(4)	(4)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
11. Nebraska	(5)	(5)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
12. New Hampshire	(4)	(4)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
13. North Dakota	(3)	(3)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
14. Oklahoma	(8)	(8)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
15. Oregon	(7)	(6)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
16. South Dakota	(3)	(4)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
17. Utah	(5)	(4)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
18. Vermont	(3)	(3)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
19. Virginia	(12)	(12)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
20. Wyoming	(3)	(3)	X	X	X	0	X	X	X	X
TOTAL	(157)	(153)								
<u>Presidential Republican States-Carter Aberration</u>										
1. Florida	(21)	(17)	X	X	X	0	X	X	0	X
2. Ohio	(23)	(25)	X	X	X	0	X	X	0	X
3. Tennessee	(11)	(10)	X	X	X	0	X	X	0	X
4. Wisconsin	(11)	(11)	X	X	X	0	X	X	0	X
TOTAL	(66)	(63)								

Presidential Republican - States-Kennedy Aberration	Presidential Elections									
	Electoral Vote		Ike		Dem. Years		New Majority			
	'84	'72	'52	'56	'60	'64	'68	'72	'76	'80
1. Illinois	(24)	(26)	X	X	0	0	X	X	X	X
2. Nevada	(4)	(3)	X	X	0	0	X	X	X	X
3. New Jersey	(16)	(17)	X	X	0	0	X	X	X	X
4. New Mexico	(5)	(4)	X	X	0	0	X	X	X	X
TOTAL	(49)	(50)								

The Lone Bellweather

1. Delaware	(3)	(3)	X	X	0	0	X	X	0	X
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The Fearsome Foursome

1. Michigan (except 76: Ford effect)	(20)	(21)	X	X	0	0	0	X	X	X
2. New York	(36)	(41)	X	X	0	0	0	X	0	X
3. Pennsylvania	(25)	(27)	X	X	0	0	0	X	0	X
4. Texas	(29)	(26)	X	X	0	0	0	X	0	X
TOTAL	(110)	(115)								

Ike and '72 Landslide States

1. Maryland	(10)	(10)	X	X	0	0	0	X	0	0
2. Minnesota	(10)	(10)	X	X	0	0	0	X	0	0
3. Rhode Island	(4)	(4)	X	X	0	0	0	X	0	0
4. Hawaii	(4)	(4)	--	--	0	0	0	X	0	0
TOTAL	(28)	(28)								

Redneck Conservative States

1. Alabama	(9)	(9)	0	0	B	X	W	X	0	X
2. Arkansas	(6)	(6)	0	0	0	0	W	X	0	X
3. Georgia (except 80: Carter effect)	(12)	(12)	0	0	0	X	W	X	0	0
4. Louisiana	(10)	(10)	0	X	0	X	W	X	0	X
5. Mississippi	(7)	(7)	0	0	B	X	W	X	0	X
6. South Carolina	(8)	(8)	0	0	0	X	X	X	0	X
TOTAL	(52)	(52)								

		Presidential Elections									
		Electoral Vote		Ike		Dem. Years		New Majority			
<u>Mixed Pattern States</u>		<u>'84</u>	<u>'72</u>	<u>'52</u>	<u>'56</u>	<u>'60</u>	<u>'64</u>	<u>'68</u>	<u>'72</u>	<u>'76</u>	<u>'80</u>
1.	Connecticut	(8)	(8)	X	X	0	0	0	X	X	X
D-2.	District of Columbia	(3)	(3)	--	--	--	0	0	0	0	0
R-3.	Kentucky	(9)	(9)	0	X	X	0	X	X	0	X
4.	Massachusetts	(13)	(14)	X	X	0	0	0	0	0	X
5.	Missouri	(11)	(12)	X	0	0	0	X	X	0	X
6.	North Carolina	(13)	(13)	0	0	0	0	X	X	0	X
R-7.	Washington	(10)	(9)	X	X	X	0	0	X	X	X
D-8.	West Virginia	(6)	(6)	0	X	0	0	0	X	0	0
TOTAL		(73)	(74)								

Key:

X Republican win
 0 Democratic win
 W Wallace win
 B Byrd win

D Democratic pattern
 R Republican pattern

Rank-order of 1980 State Results, 1952-1980 Pattern, and 1984 Assignment

State (elect. vote)	1980 Total Vote		Rep. Major Vote	Historical Pattern	1984
	Rep	Other			
Utah (5)	73	7	78	Rep.	Reagan
Idaho (4)	67	8	73	Rep.	Reagan
Nebraska (5)	66	9	72	Rep.	Reagan
North Dakota (3)	64	10	71	Rep.	Reagan
Nevada (4)	63	11	70	Rep.JFK	Reagan
Wyoming (3)	63	9	69	Rep.	Reagan
Arizona (7)	61	11	68	Rep.	Reagan
South Dakota (3)	61	8	66	Rep.	Reagan
Oklahoma (8)	61	5	63	Rep.	Reagan
New Hampshire (4)	58	14	67	Rep.	Reagan
Kansas (7)	58	9	64	Rep.	Reagan
Montana (4)	57	11	64	Rep.	Reagan
Indiana (12)	56	6	60	Rep.	Reagan
Florida (21)	56	6	59	Rep.Carter	Reagan
Colorado (8)	55	14	64	Rep.	Reagan
Texas (29)	55	3	57	Dem.	Marginal
New Mexico (5)	55	8	60	Rep.JFK	Reagan
Alaska (3)	54	19	67	Rep.	Reagan
California (47)	53	11	60	Rep.	Marginal
Virginia (12)	53	7	57	Rep.	Reagan
New Jersey (16)	52	9	57	Rep.JFK	Marginal
Ohio (23)	52	8	56	Rep.Carter	Marginal
Iowa (8)	51	10	57	Rep.	Reagan
Missouri (11)	51	5	54	Singular	Marginal
Louisiana (10)	51	3	53	RC	Marginal
Washington (10)	50	13	57	Rep.HHH	Reagan
Illinois (24)	50	9	54	Rep.JFK	Marginal
Pennsylvania (25)	50	8	54	Dem.	Dem.
Michigan (20)	49	9	54	Dem.	Dem.
Alabama (9)	49	4	51	RC	Marginal
Kentucky (9)	49	3	51	Rep.Carter	Reagan
Mississippi (7)	49	3	51	RC	Marginal
North Carolina (13)	49	4	51	Singular	Reagan
South Carolina (8)	49	3	51	RC	Marginal
Tennessee (11)	49	3	50	Rep.Carter	Reagan
Connecticut (8)	48	13	56	Singular	Marginal
Oregon (7)	48	13	56	Rep.	Reagan
Wisconsin (11)	48	9	53	Rep.Carter	Marginal
Arkansas (6)	48	4	50	RC	Marginal
New York (36)	47	9	52	Dem.	Dem.
Delaware (3)	47	8	51	Bellweather	Marginal
Maine (4)	46	12	52	Rep.	Marginal

(continued on next page)

Rank-order of 1980 State Results, 1952-1980 Pattern, and 1984 Assignment

(cont'd.)

State (elect. vote)	<u>1980 Total Vote</u>		Rep. Major Vote	Historical Pattern	1984
	<u>Rep</u>	<u>Other</u>			
West Virginia (6)	45	5	48	Dem.	Dem.
Vermont (3)	44	17	54	Rep.	Marginal
Maryland (10)	44	9	48	Dem.	Dem.
Hawaii (4)	43	12	49	Dem.	Dem.
Minnesota (10)	43	11	48	Dem.	Dem.
Massachusetts (13)	42	16	50	Dem.	Dem.
Georgia (12)	41	3	42	RC	Marginal
Rhode Island (4)	37	15	44	Dem.	Dem.
D.C. (3)	13	12	15	Dem.	Dem.
Total	51	8	55		

Largest Black Populations by State

	(a) Total Population	(b) Blacks as % of Voting Age Population	(c) Blacks as % of Registered Voters
1. District of Columbia	70.3%	66.5%	NA
2. Mississippi	35.3	31.2	NA
3. South Carolina	30.4	27.7	27.8
4. Louisiana	29.4	27.3	NA
5. Georgia	26.8	23.9	NA
6. Alabama	25.6	22.5	NA
7. Maryland	22.7	20.1	NA
8. North Carolina	22.4	19.6	NA
9. Virginia	18.9	17.4	NA
10. Arkansas	16.3	13.9	NA
11. Delaware	16.1	13.7	NA
12. Tennessee	15.6	14.0	NA
13. Illinois	14.7	12.8	NA
14. Florida	13.8	11.6	11.0*
15. New York	13.7	12.8	NA
16. Michigan	12.9	11.8	NA
17. New Jersey	12.6	11.4	NA
18. Texas	12.0	11.7	
19. Missouri	10.5	10.8	

(a) Bureau of the Census PC80-S1-1 (May, 1981).

(b) Bureau of the Census P-25 No. 879 (March, 1980).

(c) Latest state reports.

*% of registered Republicans & Democrats only.

1984 Electoral Vote Coalition

1980 State Coalition and Past State Patterns

In 1980 President Reagan received one of the five electoral landslides that have become the rule rather than the exception over the past eight presidential elections. His 1980 state coalition is far larger than what would occur in a close election. However, within his 44 state coalition were 20 states, totaling 157 electoral votes, which have almost always voted Republican with the major exception of the 1964 debacle. An additional 10 states in Reagan's coalition, totaling 134 electoral votes, have voted Republican in presidential elections except when deflected by a strong religious appeal (Kennedy) or a strong southern appeal (Carter-1976). The 30 presidential Republican states, together, represent 291 electoral votes -- more than the 270 majority needed. All thirty of these presidential Republican states cannot be automatically counted as safe for 1984. They include states in the industrial Midwest and the Northeast which were as much anti-Carter as pro-Reagan and, since 1980, they have been scarred by the recession. More generally, there have been exceptions to the Republican voting among these states in the past, and exceptions will occur again.

Reagan's landslide was strong enough to include four large Democratic states which appeared in previous Republican landslide victories in 1952, 1956, and 1972: Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Except for home-state candidate Ford in Michigan, these four states have never voted Republican when the elections were close (1960, 1968, 1976). Reagan's landslide was not strong enough to capture four Democratic states which had joined the other Republican landslides: Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota, and Rhode Island.

More important for 1984 was Reagan's near-sweep of the South. Florida, Tennessee, and Kentucky returned to their, now, long-standing Republican presidential support, and North Carolina restarted its developing Republican pattern. In addition, the cotton states, except Georgia, went to Reagan. This strongly suggests that 1976 was an interruption in their recent voting history and that the Republican potential seen during the 1964-1972 period can be taken seriously again. While Reagan's margins in the cotton states were very small, it should be kept in mind that Carter still had regional appeal in 1980 even if he was not the draw that he was in 1976.

The groupings of states with similar presidential voting patterns, just referred to, can be found in the appendix. In order to follow the analysis of marginal states for the 1984 election, the reader may want to consult the appendix for a more detailed discussion of state historical patterns plus a rank-ordering of the 1980 Reagan vote by state.

Republican, Marginal, and Democratic States in 1984

There is no certain way to identify safe and marginal states over a year before the election. At this point the two most important pieces of information are retrospective: the sizes of Reagan's state margins in 1980 and the general voting history of each state. Consequently, these initial assignments place a fairly large weight on historical consistency.

We can still overlay a few assumptions and assertions about 1984 on the historical state patterns. The key ones are:

- Absent in 1984 will be the anti-Carter voting in the North and the residue of pro-Carter voting in the South that was part of the 1980 election.
- Unemployment in the industrial Midwest and Northeast will be a significant negative, either in fact or in memory.
- There will be extreme racial polarization in 1984.
- The Democratic opponent will be a non-Catholic, northerner.

Beginning with the twenty core Republican states, worth 157 electoral votes, Reagan did very well in almost all of them and he should repeat in 1984. His vote was lowest in Maine (46%) and Vermont (44%) with Anderson receiving over 10%. These two New England states should be placed in the marginal column for 1984. (New Hampshire gave Reagan a much higher 58%). California, for no reason other than its sheer size, must be given priority over the designated Reagan states for 1984. It has an almost perfect Republican voting history, and Reagan took it by a large margin in 1980. Even so, California will be designated "marginal." Oregon (48% Reagan) had the next lowest Reagan vote in 1980 in this group, but its major party ratio for Reagan was a fairly strong 56%. The tally to this point is:

	<u>Reagan</u>	<u>Marginal</u>	<u>Democrat</u>
◦ Republican Core	103	54	--

The remaining ten Republican Presidential states, worth 134 electoral votes, have left the Republican coalition in one of the past three close elections. Five of them broke ranks for the first time in 1976 but returned to Reagan in 1980. Of the five, Ohio and Wisconsin should be considered marginal -- Ohio because of recession scars and Wisconsin because of a progressive streak similar to Minnesota. Florida, Kentucky, and Tennessee are presidential Republican states when the Democrats nominate northerners. Florida is the strongest of the three, but all three are placed in Reagan's column for 1984.

Four Republican presidential states deviated to Kennedy in 1960. Reagan did well enough in New Mexico and Nevada to place them in his column for 1984. New Jersey and Illinois, the other two Kennedy states, are placed in the marginal list because of the pockets of high unemployment in downstate Illinois and because New Jersey is simply too big and too heterogeneous to consider safe.

The last presidential Republican state is Washington which went for Humphrey in 1968 as its major aberration. Reagan's margin over Carter was +13% and it is placed in the Reagan column for 1984. The tally:

	<u>Reagan</u>	<u>Marginal</u>	<u>Democrat</u>
° Republican core	103	54	--
° Other Republican	<u>60</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>--</u>
	163	128	0

The six cotton or redneck conservative states, worth 52 electoral votes, are all placed in the marginal column for 1984. This includes Georgia. While Reagan received only 41% in Georgia, the home state effect in past presidential elections is so strong that Georgia's support for Carter is no surprise, e.g. Maine for Muskie (1968), Arizona for Goldwater (1964), and Michigan for Ford (1976). Moreover, there are fewer blacks in Georgia than in Mississippi, South Carolina, or Louisiana. The battle for these six states may be decided more by the black and white registration drives in each state than any other factor. The tally:

	<u>Reagan</u>	<u>Marginal</u>	<u>Democrat</u>
° Republican core	103	54	--
° Other Republican	60	74	--
° Redneck conservative	<u>--</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>--</u>
	163	180	0

Because of five Republican electoral landslides in the last eight presidential elections, there are only ten states plus the District of Columbia left with discernible Democratic voting patterns. None of these states has voted Republican in a close election, except Michigan for Ford, so picking any of them as even marginal for 1984 should be done with great caution. Only Texas warrants such a designation at this time. The tally:

	<u>Reagan</u>	<u>Marginal</u>	<u>Democrat</u>
° Republican core	103	54	--
° Other Republican	60	74	--
° Redneck conservative	--	52	--
° Democratic states	<u>--</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>131</u>
	163	209	131

Four states remain -- Delaware, Connecticut, Missouri, and North Carolina. Delaware is the only state left which has a perfect winning record; Missouri has the most erratic voting pattern of any state in the Union; Connecticut voted for the Catholic candidate in 1960, against the southern Baptist candidate in 1976, but failed to vote Republican in 1968; and North

Carolina did not like Ike but has recently gone for Nixon (twice) and Reagan. Give North Carolina to Reagan, and consider Delaware, Connecticut, and Missouri marginal for 1984. The final tally:

	<u>Reagan</u>	<u>Marginal</u>	<u>Democrat</u>
° Republican core	103	54	--
° Other Republican	60	74	--
° Redneck conservative	--	52	--
° Democratic states	--	29	131
° Mixed pattern states	<u>13</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>--</u>
	176	231	131

In the Reagan column are 176 electoral votes from 24 states that are almost sure Republican wins unless there was a Democratic landslide. They include all the western states, except California, plus Alaska, Florida, Kentucky, Indiana, Tennessee, North Carolina, Virginia and New Hampshire.

In the Democratic column are 131 electoral votes from nine states and the District of Columbia that are almost sure Democratic wins unless there was another Republican landslide. They include the states Reagan lost in 1980 (except Georgia) plus four that he did win: Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts.

Reagan needs 94 out of the 231 designated marginal electoral votes to reach a majority. The marginal electoral votes are in:

<u>Northeast</u>	(34)
Connecticut	(8)
Delaware	(3)
Maine	(4)
New Jersey	(16)
Vermont	(3)
<u>Midwest</u>	(69)
Illinois	(24)
Missouri	(11)
Ohio	(23)
Wisconsin	(11)
<u>South</u>	(81)
Alabama	(9)
Arkansas	(6)
Georgia	(12)
Louisiana	(10)
Mississippi	(7)
South Carolina	(8)
Texas	(29)
<u>West</u>	(47)
California	(47)

Out of these seventeen states, California and Texas were two of Reagan's strongest states in 1980, and they will be less susceptible to the Democratic jobs rhetoric in 1984. Of course, if Texas votes Republican in 1984 in the absence of a Republican landslide, it will be for the first time. The last 18 electoral votes will be tough, and setting priorities becomes very difficult.

The assignments for all 50 states plus the District of Columbia are:

<u>Reagan</u>	(176)	<u>Marginal</u>	(231)	<u>Democrat</u>	(131)
<u>Northeast</u>	(4)	<u>Northeast</u>	(34)	<u>Northeast</u>	
New Hampshire	(4)	Connecticut	(8)	Massachusetts	(13)
		Delaware	(3)	New York	(36)
		Maine	(4)	Pennsylvania	(25)
		New Jersey	(16)	Rhode Island	(4)
		Vermont	(3)		
<u>Midwest</u>	(38)	<u>Midwest</u>	(69)	<u>Midwest</u>	(30)
Indiana	(12)	Illinois	(24)	Michigan	(20)
Iowa	(8)	Missouri	(11)	Minnesota	(10)
Kansas	(7)	Ohio	(23)		
Nebraska	(5)	Wisconsin	(11)		
North Dakota	(3)				
South Dakota	(3)				
<u>South</u>	(74)	<u>South</u>	(81)	<u>South</u>	(19)
Florida	(21)	Alabama	(9)	Maryland	(10)
Kentucky	(9)	Arkansas	(6)	West Virginia	(6)
North Carolina	(13)	Georgia	(12)	District of	
Oklahoma	(8)	Louisiana	(10)	Columbia	(3)
Tennessee	(11)	Mississippi	(7)		
Virginia	(12)	South Carolina	(8)		
		Texas	(29)		
<u>West</u>	(60)	<u>West</u>	(47)	<u>West</u>	(4)
Alaska	(3)	California	(47)	Hawaii	(4)
Arizona	(7)				
Colorado	(8)				
Idaho	(4)				
Montana	(4)				
Nevada	(4)				
New Mexico	(5)				
Oregon	(7)				
Utah	(5)				
Washington	(10)				
Wyoming	(3)				

Assignments of States for 1984 by a Classification of State Presidential
Voting Patterns

	<u>Electoral Vote</u>	<u>1984 Status</u>
I. Republican States		
A. Consistent core (20 states)		
◦ Seventeen states (see appendix)	103	Reagan
◦ California: too big not to treat as if marginal	47	Marginal
◦ Maine: small 1980 Reagan vote (46%)	4	Marginal
◦ Vermont: small 1980 Reagan vote (44%)	3	Marginal
B. Republican With Single Aberration		
1. JFK states (Religious vote for Kennedy in 1960)		
◦ Illinois: too big not to treat as if marginal and recession scars	24	Marginal
◦ New Jersey: too big not to treat as if marginal and in the Northeast	16	Marginal
◦ New Mexico: should be OK	5	Reagan
◦ Nevada: should be OK	4	Reagan
2. Carter States (Regional vote for Carter in 1976)		
◦ Florida: should be OK	21	Reagan
◦ Kentucky: should be OK	9	Reagan
◦ Ohio: recession scars	23	Marginal
◦ Tennessee: should be OK	11	Reagan
◦ Wisconsin: vote for Carter in 1976 is troublesome	11	Marginal
3. Humphrey State		
◦ Washington: should be OK	10	Reagan
II. Democratic States		
A. Redneck Conservative States		
◦ Arkansas (14% black)	6	Marginal
◦ Alabama (23% black)	9	Marginal
◦ Georgia (24% black)	12	Marginal
◦ Louisiana (27% black)	10	Marginal
◦ South Carolina (28% black)	8	Marginal
◦ Mississippi (31% black)	7	Marginal

(continued on next page)

Assignments of States for 1984 by a Classification of State Presidential
Voting Patterns

(cont'd.)

	<u>Electoral Vote</u>	<u>1984 Status</u>
B. Join Republican Landslides Including Reagan's		
◦ Michigan: recession scars-auto	20	Democrat
◦ New York: recession scars	36	Democrat
◦ Pennsylvania: recession scars-steel	25	Democrat
◦ Texas: above average Reagan vote in 1980	29	Marginal
C. Join Republican Landslides Except Reagan's		
◦ Hawaii: Japanese are Democrats	4	Democrat
◦ Maryland: 20% black plus large Catholic vote	10	Democrat
◦ Minnesota: too liberal	10	Democrat
◦ Rhode Island: 65%+ Catholics	4	Democrat
D. Solid Democrat		
◦ District of Columbia: 67% black	3	Democrat
◦ West Virginia: voted Republican just twice	6	Democrat
III. Mixed Pattern States		
◦ Delaware: only state with a perfect winning record	3	Marginal
◦ Connecticut: Catholic state, hard to figure	8	Marginal
◦ Massachusetts: too liberal*	13	Democrat
◦ Missouri: spotty support, hard to figure	11	Marginal
◦ North Carolina: recent Republican pattern	13	Reagan

*Included among the "eleven Democratic states" in the narrative.