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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. list	of attendees (p. 1, partial)	n.d.	<del>BT 57</del> <del>CCB 1/16/00</del> <del>open</del> <del>12/21/2016</del>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].



*El Israel* *Attorney General* *my*

OFFICE OF  
CITY ATTORNEY  
CITY HALL EAST  
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012



OPINION NO. 77-63  
OCT 26 1977

BURT PINES  
CITY ATTORNEY

OPINION RE

ACTIVITIES OF ARMED SECURITY  
AGENTS OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT  
AT LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL  
AIRPORT.

Edward M. Davis  
Chief of Police  
Los Angeles Police Department  
Room 615 - Parker Center

Dear Chief Davis:

You have requested a formal opinion regarding the carrying of weapons by security agents of a foreign government. Specifically, your request centers on the fact that El Al (Israel) Airlines is in the process of operating six round-trip charter flights between Israel and Los Angeles. These flights will utilize Los Angeles International Airport. Further, the government of Israel, through its Consul General, has requested the assistance and cooperation of the Los Angeles Police Department with regard to the security arrangements for the affected El Al passengers, crew and equipment at Los Angeles International Airport.

This office is also in receipt of a letter from Arthur A. Boughton, Acting Director, Office of Israeli and Arab-Israeli Affairs, United States Department of State, dated August 24, 1977, regarding this matter. His letter in pertinent part provides that:

1. The government of Israel has informed the Department of State that it has detailed a number of its official security personnel,



accredited to the government of the United States, to cooperate with local authorities in law enforcement measures as the Los Angeles Police Department may deem appropriate.

2. That the official security agents of the government of Israel are present in the United States with the knowledge and approval of the Department of State, which understands that they may be armed in the course of their duties.

3. That the Department of State would appreciate any reasonable cooperation that may be extended to these official security agents with regard to the specific El Al flights subject to such coordination and conditions that the appropriate Los Angeles authorities may impose.

In order to respond to the thrust of your request, we have taken the liberty of rephrasing the questions posed. With this in mind, the following questions are presented:

**QUESTION:**

Can the Federal Government authorize security agents of foreign countries to enter the United States carrying firearms?

**ANSWER:**

Yes.

**COMMENT:**

Title 27, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 178.115 provides in pertinent part that:

"§178.115 Exempt importation.

"(a) Firearms and ammunition may be brought into the United States or any possession thereof by any person who can



establish to the satisfaction of Customs that such firearm or ammunition was previously taken out of the United States or any possession thereof by such person. Registration on Customs Form 4457 or on any other registration document available for this purpose may be completed before departure from the United States at any U.S. customhouse or any office of an Assistant Regional Commissioner."

\* \* \*

"(d) Firearms and ammunition are not imported into the United States, and the provisions of this subpart shall not apply, when such firearms and ammunition are brought into the United States by:"

\* \* \*

"(5) Foreign law enforcement officers of friendly foreign governments entering the United States on official law enforcement business."

It should also be noted that the Federal Government has exclusive control regarding foreign affairs, and the laws made pursuant to that authority are the supreme law of the land. Article 1, §§1, 8; Article 6, §2, United States Constitution.

**QUESTION:**

In view of California state firearm laws, is a permit required for such foreign government security agents to carry firearms in California?

**ANSWER:**

No.

**COMMENT:**

The California Penal Code is silent with regard to the right of a foreign security officer to be exempt




from the laws pertaining to the prohibition of carrying weapons. Generally, see Sections 12020-12033, California Penal Code. However, in view of the fact that (1) the Federal Government has exclusive control over foreign affairs; (2) there is a specific statute authorizing the importation of a firearm into this country by a foreign law enforcement officer on official law enforcement business; (3) the Federal Government has acknowledged the presence of the subject security guards and affirms that they may be armed in the course of their official duties; and (4) that an official communication has been received from the Department of State requesting the City's cooperation with regard to the subject officers, we conclude that they may lawfully carry out their official security functions while armed at Los Angeles International Airport without obtaining a gun permit or otherwise complying with the possession of firearm requirements of the California Penal Code.

In reaching this conclusion, we have in mind the fact that the Police Department, and other City Departments, have coordinated the subject security activities with the appropriate representatives of the government of Israel consistent with the official request of the Department of State. Additionally, it should be noted that our conclusion in no way affects any other requirements of law pertaining to their conduct while in this jurisdiction.

We trust the foregoing discussion answers the questions you have raised. We would be pleased to respond to any other inquiry you may have.

Very truly yours,

BURT PINES, City Attorney

By   
LAWRENCE M. NAGIN  
Senior Assistant City Attorney



READ

SAIC

HARRISON

# 3/27/84

TORREY

ORTMAN

McCRORY

WAGS

# FIREARMS STUDY GROUP

## SECURITY PLANNING COMMITTEE

COPY TO:

READING

*File Firearms*

On February 28, 1984 a report from the Chairman of the Firearms Study Group was presented to the Security Planning Committee for their consideration. The discussion was postponed until March 13, 1984 meeting to allow SPC members an opportunity to analyze the product.

*Approved by SPC*

On March 13, 1984 the report was again on the agenda for discussion. On that date the discussion was terminated and the Chairman was asked to schedule another meeting of the group to examine new information, redefine and distill the issues and report back to the SPC on March 27, 1984.

All persons shown on the original report were contacted by phone and this was followed up by confirming memorandum, establishing the new meeting date as March 21, 1984.

Following is a list of the persons in attendance at the March 21, 1984 meeting:

Doug Evans  
Lee Wagoner  
Charles Wynne  
George Hisamoto  
Carlos E. Noriega  
Robert C. Schneider  
Arthur L. Gainer  
James D. Pidd  
David O. Finney

LAPD  
U.S. Secret Service  
Ca. Dept. of Justice  
Ca. Dept. of Justice  
Ca. Dept. of Justice  
Ca. Dept. of Justice  
U.S. Customs  
U.S. Customs  
ATF

The meeting consisted of two parts. The first part was an opportunity by the participants to surface issues that were not included in the SPC report. The second part was a discussion of all the issues included in the SPC report.

A through discussion of all issues ensued. Issues were included or deleted based on the opinion of the majority.

Following are the issues and recommendations submitted to the SPC for consideration:

Issue #1

It is suspected, although not confirmed, that certain countries participating in the 1984 Olympic Games will send security officials in an attempt to provide protection for their athletes and possibly their olympic delegation members.

It is assumed that the officials would bring concealable firearms and will carry those firearms concealed.

How will local law enforcement officers identify these officials if they come into contact with them on the street and what effect does the state concealed weapons law have?

\* This issue does not apply to those foreign security officials who are participating with the U. S. Secret Service and/or U.S. State Department on Foreign Dignitary protection details.

Federal Law

The controlling federal statute regarding importation of firearms is Title 18, United States Code, Chapter 44, entitled "The Gun Control Act of 1968". This statute is implemented through 27 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 178.

Following are exemptions which could apply to security officials:

Foreign military personnel on official assignment to the United States who bring such firearms or ammunition into the United States for their exclusive use while on official duty in the United States;

Foreign law enforcement officers of friendly foreign governments entering the United States on official law enforcement business.

There is a provision in the regulations to allow the Secretary of the Treasury to require a permit for the importation or bringing into the United States of any firearms or ammunition.

ATF has officially requested that the Secretary invoke this option and require all security officials to obtain a permit for the importation of firearms or ammunition. This permit would identify them and their firearm(s). This permit would further restrict the imported firearms to be non-automatic and those designed to be fired from the hand. Permit information would be entered into the Treasury Enforcement Communications System.



### State Law

The controlling state statute regarding firearms is Part 4, Title 2, California Penal Code, entitled "Control of Deadly Weapons". It is also known as "The Dangerous Weapons' Control Law."

Section 12025 provides misdemeanor punishment for carrying a concealed pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed without having a license. License requirements under section 12050 indicates that the applicant must be a resident of the county where he/she is applying.

Exemptions for Peace Officers under 12027 does not mention aliens.

### Recommendations

(OLEEC AGENDA)

1. Recommend that the SPC show its support of the ATF request through contact with the U.S. Government representative Ken Hill.

If the Secretary of the Treasury requires importation permits this information would be in the Treasury Enforcement Communications System and would be available to local law enforcement through participation in the OSCC.

2. Recommend that the SPC cause a inquiry to be made of the Attorney General of California regarding possession of concealable firearms by aliens (security officials) who legally imported same under federal law.

### Issue #2

Firearms may be legally possessed by a large number of persons under Part 4, Title 2, California Penal Code. These persons may carry firearms concealed in all locations in the state except in locations where special license prohibits possession.

The firearms could be carried in all Olympic venues where the possessor had accreditation or a ticket unless LAOOC makes it a condition of license.



Recommendation

1. Request LA00C consider adding to the rules of accreditation and the ticket license the following rule:

Firearms are not allowed in any location at any venue site. This would not apply to or affect law enforcement officers who are carrying out official duties.

The effect of this rule change would allow LA00C Security to enforce the rules at the venue site. This is similar to rules at rock concerts where the organization holding the concert searches for weapons/drugs etc.



Date: March 23, 1984

To: Security Planning Committee

From: Bombs/EOD Subcommittee

Subject: Recommendations for Munitions Countermeasures -  
Sanitizing Venues and Buses

One element of this Subcommittee's precept is to develop plans and procedures and the determination of resources for sanitizing the interior of Olympic locations, modes of transportation for athletes, officials, etc. The purpose of this memorandum is to present the Subcommittee's general recommendations for sanitizing the interior of Olympic locations and buses. It is emphasized that these are general recommendations. Recommendations for each specific site can be made only after completion of detailed site surveys. It is our intention to state both the benefits and potential risks associated with the recommendations.

#### Recommendations

- (1) It is recommended that each area to be sanitized be secured immediately before, during, and after any searches in order to maintain the integrity of the searches.
- (2) It is recommended that local law enforcement explosive detecting dog teams not be used to conduct scheduled routine searches to sanitize venues.
- (3) It is recommended that if explosive detecting dogs are needed to conduct scheduled routine searches, military dogs and handlers should be used.
- (4) It is recommended that local civilian bomb technicians not be used to conduct scheduled routine searches to sanitize venues.
- (5) It is recommended that private security personnel, civilian police officers, or military police officers be trained and used to conduct scheduled routine



searches to sanitize venues.

(6) It is recommended that there should be one military EOD team or one civilian bomb squad team on site during the scheduled routine searches, not to be involved in searches but to assist in resolving suspicious items, and if necessary to safely deal with actual hazardous devices or components found.

(7) It is recommended that once the venues have been sanitized, the integrity of the searches must be maintained by subjecting all entering persons and items to a search.

(8) It is recommended that a work order procedure be established for tradesmen entering with deliveries or to do work.

(9) It is recommended that suitable barriers be built at vehicular entry points to prevent vehicles from building up enough speed to crash through a checkpoint.

(10) It is recommended that buses used to transport athletes be physically searched.

These recommendations will be discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.

#### Discussion

For purposes of this paper, "sanitizing" an area means detecting and safely neutralizing any hazardous devices or their components already in place at the time of the search, and preventing the introduction of assembled hazardous devices and the components from which devices can be assembled into the area after the search. Sanitizing is accomplished in three stages. First, the area to be sanitized is secured, and once established, this security must be maintained. Second, the area is searched. Third, any items and persons entering the area are inspected or searched to assure that hazardous devices



or components are not carried into the area.

For purposes of conducting munitions countermeasures searches, an area will be considered secured when a reasonably impenetrable and defensible perimeter has been established with controlled access points at which persons and items entering after the searches will be subjected to (1) positive verification of identification, (2) positive verification of "need to go", the need to be inside the area, and (3) reasonable inspection of their persons and items in their possession.

Prior to the search, anyone other than searchers in the area must be removed to outside the perimeter, and they will not be readmitted until after the searches have been completed. It is essential that the area be cleared of all non-searchers so that searchers can do their job quickly and without concern that a hazardous device will be emplaced behind their search by a "straggler". Failure to evacuate an area prior to its being searched results in confusion among searchers and will most certainly result in areas being overlooked during the search. A "straggler" could intentionally distract a searcher and divert his attention from an area concealing a hazardous device.

Once an area has been properly secured, it can be searched. Searches are done to find assembled hazardous devices and the components from which hazardous devices can be assembled. The confidence that other security elements have in the search is directly related to the quality of the search performed. It is absolutely essential that the searches be systematically planned and executed. When done properly, searches will not only find emplaced devices, they will also establish a level of security which can be preserved throughout the Olympics with reasonable security measures. Good searches and good security play another very important role: if one has confidence in the searches and confidence in the security established during and after the searches, one can



be free to respond to these incidents and not be scheduled for routine searches. Scheduling bomb technicians to do routine searches then pulling them out to respond to incidents will result in an incomplete search of an area.

(5) The most effective use of bomb dogs during the Olympics will be not in the routine search of areas but in the conduct of special circumstances searches.

During the Olympics, special circumstances searches will be handled by a special team of 16 military explosive detecting dogs and handlers if the Department of Defense provides these assets. Should a particular need

develop for a dog search at a venue or location, the 16 military dogs and handlers could be deployed for this purpose. Since the military dogs are certified by the Federal Aviation Administration, they could also search commercial airplanes at airports, with four dog teams dedicated for this purpose. The remaining 12 dog teams could be deployed as follows: two teams at each Olympic village and eight teams deployed on emergency response. The emergency response teams could be prepositioned geographically to facilitate rapid response.

The most effective use of local dogs during the Olympics will be to assess suspected bombs or suspicious packages. Using the local bomb dogs in this way will result in a rapid determination of the threat and the timely resumption of the affected Olympic activity. It is expected that there will be an increase in the number of suspicious packages reported, and it will be desirable to resolve these as safely, quickly, and discretely as possible. The dog's sensitive smell coupled with the bomb technician/handler's judgement will best accomplish these objectives. Local bomb squad dogs should not be used for routine searches of areas and items which can be searched adequately by trained human searchers. The dogs have a limited operating time and must then

X IMPORTANT

X IMPORTANT



more reliably resolve bomb threats without resorting to extremely disruptive measures such as evacuation and re-search.

One question that needs to be resolved is who will do the routine searches. It is widely assumed that military explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians and civilian public safety bomb technicians and dogs will be used to do the searches. This assumption is incorrect, because:

\* (1) Military regulations forbid the use of military EOD technicians to do routine searches for any civilian agency except the U.S. Secret Service. The Secret Service will be using a limited number of dedicated EOD teams to conduct searches of selected areas within sites. These dedicated military EOD teams cannot be scheduled to conduct routine searches for other agencies because of the military regulation and because these teams must be able to relocate with the Secret Service.

(2) Most public safety bomb squads' departmentally approved standard operating procedures state that the bomb squads will not be used for routine searches in response to threats or to sanitize areas.

(3) Persons other than military EOD or civilian bomb technicians can be taught to do adequate searches in response to threats or to sanitize areas.

(4) EOD or bomb technicians are the only persons qualified to make a final evaluation of a hazardous device and render it safe. They must be alert and able to concentrate. An EOD or bomb technician fatigued from hours of routine searches is more likely to make a fatal mistake in evaluating a device and safely dealing with it. It is expected that there will be a substantial increase in the numbers of suspicious items which require the bomb and EOD technicians' expertise to evaluate during the Olympics. These technicians must



be rested. The dogs should be saved for resolving suspicious items and selective searches in response to specific threats or incidents. A dog which has been "beat to death" doing routine searches will be of no value in resolving suspicious items and may, in fact, fail to alert properly, thus resulting in a false sense of security which may endanger bomb technicians and the public. This Subcommittee aggressively discourages any plan to use civilian explosive detecting dog teams for routine searches.

Venue and village munitions countermeasures searches will best be accomplished by a visual or physical search. It is recommended that these routine scheduled searches be done by private security personnel in conjunction with civilian law enforcement officers (not bomb technicians) and military security police personnel. The major advantages of using the private security personnel are:

- (1) They can be provided in sufficient numbers at each site to be able to complete adequate searches systematically in a reasonable time.
- (2) If given the proper training in explosives procedures and bomb scene procedures, these people can conduct an adequate search. They need not be trained bomb technicians to effectively perform searches.
- (3) They are, or should be, familiar with their area of operations. They should know what belongs and what does not belong in their area.

\* The major disadvantages of using private security personnel for routine searches are:

- \* (1) If not properly motivated, their dedication factor will be lower than that of military and civilian police officers.
- (2) If not properly instructed in planning and executing searches, they may be too aggressive if they find a suspicious item.



(3) They may not be able to resist pressure to, "Hurry up and get this search done so we can get these people in here!". The quality of their searches may be controlled and therefore degraded by outside pressures from non-security elements at the Olympics.

The major advantages of involving military and civilian police in searches are:

EXPLORE  
THIS  
OPTION  
(1) They already do this type of search in response to threats, so they have some level of training and experience. On military installations in particular, it is the security police, not EOD technicians, who do searches.

(2) These people are a known entity. They have been screened, tested, and evaluated for their present positions.

(3) The dedication factor of these people will probably be higher than for private security.

(4) Because they are commissioned law enforcement officers, they have more authority than private security. They will be better able to resist civilian pressures to sacrifice quality for speed.

(5) Most important, military or civilian police officers finding a suspicious item are much less likely to take some unauthorized dangerous action regarding the device. They will be less likely to panic and more likely to respond appropriately.

The major disadvantages of using military and civilian law enforcement officers to do routine searches are:

2  
(1) They may not be available in the numbers required to complete thorough searches in a reasonable amount of time.

(2) They may not be as familiar as private security with the site to be searched



in terms of what does and does not belong in the area.

7 (3) Posse comitatus may preclude the use of military forces to conduct routine searches outside military reservations.

SPC  
DECIDE  
Based on a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages listed above, it is this Subcommittee's recommendation that routine munitions countermeasures searches be done by private security or by civilian and military police personnel, and that military EOD technicians, public safety bomb technicians, and civilian explosive detecting dogs not be used to conduct routine scheduled searches. It is also recommended that regardless of who does the searches, there should be one military EOD team or one civilian bomb squad team on site during the search to assist in resolving suspicious items, and if necessary to safely deal with actual hazardous devices or components found.

Once the searches of the area have been completed, normal entry and exit traffic can resume. It is essential that the integrity of the search be maintained by subjecting all entering persons to reasonable personal inspection as well as an inspection of all entering items. Assembled hazardous devices as well as well as components can be hidden under clothing. While magnetometers are useful for detecting metallic weapons, they will not detect non-metallic explosives or components. It is recommended that security personnel be instructed to carefully observe all persons entering through checkpoints and that security persons challenge and search persons who behave suspiciously. It is essential that all handcarried items be inspected by security personnel. Any items which cannot be satisfactorily inspected (such as wrapped packages, briefcases, and sealed containers) must not be admitted until the carrier opens the item, and its contents are inspected.

It is recommended that a work order procedure be established for tradesmen entering with deliveries or to do work. Their employer should be required to



call the site security office the day before the work or delivery is scheduled and provide the name and personal descriptions of all persons desiring entry the next day. The employer should also provide a description of the vehicle to be driven, and the employer should be instructed to ensure that the contents of all vehicles are shipped uncrated and available for easy inspection upon arrival. Needless to say, there must also be some suitable procedure for positively determining the authenticity of persons calling to set up appointments for tradesmen. A tradesman's entrance should be established at each venue, and all tradesmen and deliveries should be given access only through the tradesman's checkpoint. Upon arriving at that point, security must verify that the person and vehicle are expected, and then security must inspect the person, vehicle, and its contents. The reason for the work order procedure is to reduce the chances of a Harvey's Casino device or a truck bomb from being introduced surreptitiously into the venues.

It is also recommended that suitable barriers be built at vehicular entry points to prevent vehicles from building up enough speed to crash through a checkpoint. Recognizing the need for emergency vehicles to enter rapidly and unimpeded, the Subcommittee recommends that structurally reinforced gates be used at designated emergency vehicle entry points. These gates must be able to withstand a vehicular crash. These gates should be closed and locked but manned by security so the gates can be quickly opened to admit emergency vehicles.

A recent assessment of search requirements of the transportation buses for athletes revealed that the most effective way to accomplish bus searches is by physical means. The buses could be driven up an elevated ramp and the underside visually checked. The interior could also be similarly checked by search-

#1  
TRADESMAN  
ENTRANCE

#2  
BARRICADES

#3  
BUSES



trained security guards. This would take from 5 to 7 minutes per bus using 2 persons, 1 inside and 1 outside. Should an elevated ramp be impractical, a mechanic's creeper could be used, but the time required to do the search would increase to 8 to 10 minutes per bus.

As stated before, these are general recommendations. Members of the Subcommittee would welcome the opportunity to meet with you or any appropriate subcommittee to discuss these recommendations further.

*Arleigh E. McCree*  
WLM

Arleigh McCree  
Chairman  
Bombs/EOD Subcommittee

AEM:wlm

RECOMMEND : 1) ALL VENUE PLANNERS  
GET THIS PAPER.

2) WAOOC DISCUSS PRIVATE  
SECURITY ROLE @ Venues

3) MILITARY STATUS

3) SPC DICTATE LAW ENFORCEMENT  
DIRECT SWEEPS / PUT SECURITY  
DO THEM

\*4) TRAINING SUBCOMMITTEE  
GET WITH BOMBS/EOD  
& WAOOC RE: EFFECTIVE  
TRAINING.