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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

The National War College

ABSTRACTS

**STRATEGIC
STUDIES
PROJECT**




**SELECTED STUDENT REPORTS
1984**

FORWARD

This booklet presents abstracts of selected student reports prepared in the Strategic Studies Program (SSP) of The National War College in Academic Year 1983-84. Individual or small groups of students under the supervision of faculty members carry out research for U.S. Government agencies involved in national security affairs. All reports are unclassified unless otherwise indicated.

A copy of each of the listed SSP reports is available to interested government agencies or their contractors. Copies may be obtained from:

Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)
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84-01

Maritime Theater Nuclear Warfare: Matching Strategy and Capability

Raymond E. Thomas, Commander, USN

Remarks regarding the U.S. Navy's limited capability to successfully conduct maritime theater nuclear warfare against Soviet Naval Forces. Development of current Soviet MTNW capability and expected strategy examined. Historical basis for U.S. Navy's MTNW deficiencies is described. The mismatch between lack of U.S. capability and stated deterrent strategy is discussed. Concluding remarks concern prescriptive measures which can be taken by the U.S. Navy in both weapons systems acquisition and strategy to rectify the strategy/capability disparity.

84-02a

The Bomber's Future in National Security

Harry I. Gillogly, III, Colonel, USAF

Examines current and projected use of the long-range combat aircraft, in terms of its consistency with national policy and military strategy; its role in the planning, employment and organization of Air Force assets; and its effectiveness and utility. Develops the bomber's strengths and weaknesses and, for the latter, suggests possible improvements particularly in conventional warfighting. Provides insights to planners and policy-makers on the utility of the bomber as a force projector and highlights its effect on arms control issues. Suggests that because of cost and perception differences between nuclear and conventional aircraft missions, work must begin now on designing "conventional" long-range combat aircraft. Makes recommendations for changes in Air Force planning and organization to enhance the bomber's role in warfighting.

84-02b (SECRET)

The Future of the Long-Range Bomber in Power Projection

Kenneth V. Smith, Colonel, USA

(U) The United States is involved around the globe in a variety of foreign policy pursuits. Wherever there is involvement, application of force may be necessary. The long-range strategic bomber, with its range and ordnance capacity, is an excellent weapons platform for this role employed unilaterally or in conjunction with other forces. As a conventional weapons delivery system, the long-range strategic bomber is affordable, survivable, and capable of furthering both the diplomatic and military objectives of the United States. Decisions regarding the existence and employment of a strategic bomber force dedicated to conventional missions, as well as ordnance for such a force, must be made in the near term if this potent weapons system is to be effective in power projection activities during the next decade.

84-03

U.S. Security Assistance to Argentina, The Eastern Caribbean Basin, and Kenya: Help or Hindrance?

Paul J. Wenzel, Colonel, USA; Michael B. Prothero, Lieutenant Colonel, USA; Gerald F. Woolever, Commander, USCG

U.S. security assistance to Argentina, the islands of the Eastern Caribbean Basin and Kenya represents a microcosm of U.S. assistance worldwide because of the completely different histories, external threats, cultural differences and varying requirements for security assistance represented in the three countries. A description of each country's history, military assistance background and significant benefits being accrued to the recipients and to the United States allows security assistance planners to judge the effectiveness of past and current assistance programs and assists in on-going planning for future military assistance programs to these countries and, in some instances, to other countries in the same regions. The conclusions resulting from the study of the individual countries indicate that U.S. military assistance to Argentina, the Eastern Caribbean Basin and Kenya is definitely more of a help than it is a hindrance.

84-05

An Alternative Strategy for Employing Special Forces During Peacetime

Richard A. McCoy, Department of State; Warren R. McPherson,
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC

A review of the global environment surrounding Special Forces including Soviet and Cuban influences on insurgencies, political-military realities, and images and perceptions of Special Forces. Current Special Forces employment methods are discussed. The peacetime benefits of the security assistance role are highlighted. Recommendations are presented to gain maximum benefit for U.S. national security objectives from limited and costly assets.

84-06

Continued U.S. Presence/Basing in Latin America

Richard W. Wharton, Colonel, USA; Richard H. Terrell, Lieutenant
Colonel, USA

Ratification of a treaty between the United States and Panama in 1979 provided for the return of the Canal and the Canal Zone to the Panamanians by the year 1999. At that time the Government of Panama would assume responsibility for defense of the Canal and US forces would be withdrawn from the zone.

This paper addresses current economic, political, and military situations in Latin America; examines projections to the year 2000 and investigates plausible future directions. The need for continued US presence is discussed as well as options for future courses of actions. Two feasible courses are suggested.

84-07

Implications for Regional Non-Belligerents of the Iran-Iraq War

Gary K. Erck, Central Intelligence Agency; Michael Austrian,
Department of State

This paper discusses the background to the Iran-Iraq War, highlighting the differences between the current struggle and those which have preceded it in the lengthy history of hostility between these two Persian Gulf states. It next addresses the war's effect on regional non-belligerents, identifying forces for cohesion and disintegration, with particular emphasis on the Gulf Council for Cooperation (GCC). It concludes that the formation of the GCC may have a profound and positive influence on the region's history and on its orientation towards the West. Finally, the paper considers policy options available to the United States to foster this favorable trend and makes a number of specific recommendations with regard to arms transfers and the stationing of U.S. forces in the region.

84-08

U.S. Policy and the Soviet Presence in Syria

J. Kemp Neill, Colonel, USA; John J. O'Donnell, Department of State;
James D. Lehr, National Security Agency

A review of the circumstances leading to the current political situation in the Middle East with special emphasis on the significance of the Soviet presence in Syria. The approach presents the situation from three perspectives: the Syrian, Soviet, and U.S. view. The paper concludes with some recommendations for U.S. foreign policy.

84-09

Use of Nuclear Forces as an Instrument of Strategic Coercion

Rickell D. Knoll, Colonel, USAF

A description and discussion of 28 key factors which should be used to determine if the threat of nuclear force is appropriate for a particular situation, of how to exercise a nuclear threat, of how to communicate the threat, and of how to maximize the probability of successfully applying a nuclear threat. Two actual cases, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973 Arab-Isreali War are analyzed using the 28 factors.

84-10

Deception as a Tactic in Soviet Military Thought

Thomas E. Dixon, Commander, USN; Donald E. Smith, Commander, USN

Highlights the history of the mindset for and inevitable use of deception by the U.S.S.R. at all levels: tactical, operational and strategic. This review and assessment of Soviet deception reveals a need for increased awareness of the problem at all levels of the U.S. defense establishment.

84-11 (SECRET)

Satellite Survivability in a Southwest Asia Scenario

Curtis L. Dickinson, Colonel, USA; Richard A. Platt, Lieutenant Colonel, USA; John L. Seliskar, GM-15, DCA; Thomas R. Skinner, Commander, USN

(U) With the increased emphasis on the security of the oil rich Southwest Asia region, much attention is being given to the ability of the United States to deploy forces from the newly formed U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in defense of vital U.S. interests. Once deployed, communications provided by the military satellite communications system will be critical to command control communications and intelligence support for these forces. At the request of CENTCOM, the vulnerability of these satellites to both electromagnetic and physical enemy threats are examined in this paper.

84-12a

Problems in Joint Operations: Intelligence

Timothy E. Clagg, Defense Intelligence Agency

Remarks on the use of intelligence by planners and commanders focus on the problems that have plagued joint operations. The author has identified six key areas which have historically caused problems between intelligence and operational staffs. Some ways to overcome or reduce those problems are suggested.

84-16

An Information Strategy for Terrorist Incidents

Larry R. Taylor, USIA; John G. Schmidtman, Captain, USCG

Remarks discussing current trends in overseas terrorist activities involving U.S. interests introduce a description and analysis of the existing U.S. organizational structure intended to deal with terrorist incidents. Current U.S. strategies for responding to terrorist incidents are also described and analyzed. Weaknesses in the response organization are identified. Changes to both the organizational structure and U.S. strategies for dealing with overseas terrorist incidents involving U.S. interests are suggested.

84-17

U.S. Overseas Bases

John W. Handy, LTC, USAF; Walter O. McCants, LTC, USAF; Barbara J. Schrage, Dept. of State; Stanley E. Whitmore, LTC, USA; Andrew J. Winter, Dept. of State

This study examines key issues related to current and future U.S. overseas military facilities. It first describes the different types of military facilities, categorizes them into operational functions, and projects which types of facilities will be most needed in the future. A discussion of the impact of technology on military facilities and their operational functions follows. The study then turns to the question of how much the U.S. should pay for overseas facilities. Finally, it discusses the role that negotiating style can play in obtaining access to overseas facilities at a price acceptable both to the U.S. and the host government.

84-18 (SECRET)

A Combined START and INF Negotiation: Can It Work

Richard A. Chilcoat, Lieutenant Colonel, USA

(U) This study begins with an overview of the current status of nuclear negotiations between the US and USSR. It then reviews both the historical and present-day policies of the US Government for conducting strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations along separate tracks. For comparison purposes, an alternative viewpoint is presented; a case for merging the START and INF talks is discussed. Analyses of the opposing cases lead to the conclusion that a merger of START and INF has considerable merit. A detailed concept for merging the negotiations is presented. The study recommends that the US Government seriously consider merging the talks in order to best serve the security interests of the United States.

84-19

World's Apart

Richard A. Virden, USIA

Attempts to determine reasons for the low state of U.S.-Soviet relations at the end of 1983 by examining Soviet perceptions of Reagan Administration actions and policies. Observes that unnecessary misunderstanding contributes to the conflicts between the two countries. Suggests that Soviet perceptions, born of divergent histories, cultures, and ideologies, should be taken into account by U.S. policy-makers. Recommends toning down rhetoric and expanding and improving communications between the two societies.

84-20

The War Powers Resolution: The Balance of War Powers in the Eighties

Robert D. Clark, Colonel, USAF; Andrew M. Egeland, Jr., LTC, USAF;
David B. Sanford, DIA

No single piece of legislation has been as controversial in the debate concerning the war powers of the President and the Congress as has the War Powers Resolution, enacted in 1973 over President Nixon's veto. The 1983 United States Supreme Court's decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha, which held legislative vetoes unconstitutional, is seen to affect the operative provisions of the War Powers Resolution. An analysis of this decision and a review of presidential compliance with the War Powers Resolution has not been a constraining factor on the unilateral deployment of U.S. Armed Forces by Presidents, that the courts will be reluctant to decide the war powers issue and further that the executive and legislative branches will work hard at compromise to prevent a constitutional crisis on the war powers issue.

84-21

What Price Oil?

David R. Dent, Colonel, USAF; Lawrence W. Lavelly, Captain, USN;
Michael J. Connor, Lieutenant Colonel, USA

A current and timely examination of petroleum and its relationship to the national security of the United States. Includes a review of the conditions which led to the first and second "oil shocks" of 1973 and 1979 and compares them to the international oil conditions today. Examines the future with respect to oil. Discusses policy implications for senior U.S. Government officials. Provides recommendations and conclusions.

84-22

Indian Reactions to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

James M. Senner, Department of State

Chronicles and analyzes reactions of the Indian government to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan from December 1979 until the end of 1983. Various motivations and pressures are offered to explain changes in Indian policy statements over the course of four years.

84-23

The Presidential Election Process: Impact on National Security Policy Making

Gorham L. Black, III, LTC, USA; William T. Breer, Department of State; Marilyn Meyers, Department of State

This paper examines the presidential selection process with a view to determining to what extent it affects the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. It is based on extensive interviews with scholars, present and former government and political party officials, media commentators, and our readings of the relevant literature. Although several changes in the system have been proposed to assure a more orderly policy-making process, we have concluded that tinkering with the present system is more likely to create unexpected new problems without bringing about appreciable improvement.

84-24

Congressional Perceptions of Army Programs and Requirements

Ronald H. Bryce, LTC, USA; Alfonso E. Lenhardt, LTC, USA; Burnet R. Quick, LTC, USA; Jarrett J. Robertson, LTC, USA; David E. White, LTC, USA

. . . . " one of the areas in which I felt I had been a failure as Chief of Staff of the Army has been my inability to articulate more clearly the need for resources for the Army."¹

The purpose of this paper is to determine Congressional perceptions regarding Army programs and the Army's ability to adequately inform Congress of its resources requirements. Observations and recommendations for the Department of the Army are provided.

¹ General Meyer, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, DOD Appropriations for 1984, Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives 98th Congress, First Session, Joseph P. Addabbo, New York Chairman, page. 263.

84-25

Congressional Trends and Attitudes on Defense Issues

John J. D'Esopo, GSA; John C. Dewey, CPT, USN; Larry L. Ernst, CDR, USN; Phillip J. Ford, LTC, USAF; David K. Kramer, LTC, USAF; Joanna W. Martin, Dept. of State

As Congress reconvened in 1984, several key defense issues were at the forefront of public consciousness. This study assesses the prevailing attitudes and trends in Congress on significant defense issues and draws conclusions as to their potential impact on the formulation and passage of defense budgets, international defense relationships, and the use of military power as an instrument of foreign policy. Recommendations for actions to improve upon the current Department of Defense/Congressional interface are included.

84-26

China: Blue Water Navy?

William F. Story, CPT, USN; Russell C. Gill, CAPT, USN; James A. Schwab, CPT, USN; Patrick M. Fagan, CDR, USN; Gerald K. Payne, CDR, USN

Remarks on the definition of the term "Blue Water Navy" introduce a discussion on the capability of the Chinese Navy based on this definition. A review of Chinese history follows to show a correlation between growing Chinese internationalism and the need for a Blue Water Navy. This review includes a discussion of Chinese maritime capability in terms of trained manpower, economic base, and political and military objectives. By resolving the Chinese Blue Water Navy question, insight is provided into the appropriate U.S. maritime and global strategy based on the extent of Chinese naval development.

84-27

PRC Civil Defense Programs: Indicators of Evolving Military Doctrine?

John W. Moffat, Captain, USN

This study examines the role of civil defense in the People's Republic of China as a possible source of insight on evolving military doctrine. To that end, the major internal and external events affecting the development of defense policy in China are described. The study then traces the history of civil defense in China to the point where it has become intimately related to defense and economic policy. The study concludes that analysis of civil defense programs in China can provide indications of evolving military doctrine and predicts that a potentially lucrative opportunity for such analysis may occur by 1985.

84-29

Congressional Attitudes Concerning the Use of Reserve Components as Units Versus Fillers

Charles R. Bourbonnais, CDR, USNR; James J. Cravens, Jr., LTC, USA; Joseph D. Cunningham, LTC, ANG; Michael J. Quarnaccio, LTC, USAFR; Frank C. Van Fleet, COL, ARNG

In the early history of warfighting in the United States, the militia (National Guard) was called upon and performed its role as an entity alongside the active forces. This continued throughout its evolution into World War I. However, during World War II, and in all United States mobilizations since that time, there has been an elemental change in the use of Guard and Reserve personnel. Although units were mobilized, many were not employed as integral units, but were used to draw qualified personnel for use as individual fillers or replacements for other active and reserve units.

This study was conducted to ascertain if Congress has specified whether reserve components will be used as units or fillers after mobilization. It is based principally on legislative research and interviews with key military leaders and congressional authorities. Discussion moves from a historical review of mobilization through statutes and regulations governing management of the reserve components, to an understanding of attitudes of key military authorities and congressional leaders. Additionally, separate sections are devoted to an analysis of factors that influence employment and to a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of using units versus fillers.

84-31

The Impact of New Conventional Weapons on Joint Army-Air Force
Airland Combat Operations

James W. Holt, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A description of the modern battlefield with emphasis on its ever increasing depth and lethality introduces a discussion of Army, Air Force, and joint efforts to determine what is necessary for success in joint airland combat operations. Mission areas involving surface attack as well as current weapons' capability or shortfalls in those areas is described followed by discussion of new technology weapons that would address the shortfalls identified. Final discussion centers around the wide variety of political and institutional influences which along with cost and weapon effectiveness determine the overall impact of new conventional weapons.

84-32

The Future of International Peacekeeping--the UN/Non-UN Option

Marjorie Ann Browne, Library of Congress

Seven major UN peacekeeping forces and five non-UN peacekeeping operations are discussed in order to identify factors that determine whether a future peacekeeping operation will be authorized under the UN or outside of the UN. The US role and policy in the various operations is discussed. The paper includes two tables--International Peacekeeping Operations: A Selected List of Forces and missions and Cost of International Peacekeeping to the US (Overview)--and two appendixes--Basic Information on International Peacekeeping Operations and Cost of International Peacekeeping to the US.

84-33

The Deng Reforms: Their Impact on the Role of the Chinese PLA

J. Richard Bock, Department of State

Looks at both the PRC military modernization program and the implication for the PLA of the overall Four Modernizations. Analyzes the effects of the military's place in society and the implications for military professionalism. Suggests some implications for US policy.

84-34

Future Involvement of the South Korean Military in the Republic of Korea Government

James N. Carnes, Office of the Secretary of Defense

The study examines the root causes of Korean military intervention in civil politics. It focuses on the evolutionary process of institutional development in "modern" Korea, emphasizing the role of the South Korean Military as the first and preeminent political and social institution. It shows that the military, in the past, has exercised considerable restraint before intervening in civil affairs and done so only after a serious threat to national security manifested itself. The study reaches the conclusion that South Korea is going through a difficult period of modernization in which old political, economic, and social institutions are being replaced by new institutions. There are many problems to be resolved, but over time, South Korea will make the adjustment successfully.

84-36

Two Roads to Power

Robert S. Driscoll, Department of State; Eldon W. Joersz, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Ever since the fall of Somoza's government in Nicaragua in July of 1979, there has been an ever increasing tendency to compare the revolution in that country with the present insurgency in El Salvador. It only seems logical that the situation in one should be quite similar to the situation in the other. Both of these countries are located in Central America, both are Spanish speaking, both have seemingly brutal military establishments and both have had significant social problems. Superficially these countries have much in common; they are, however, the products of distinct histories which profoundly shaped their respective insurgencies and made them different. This research paper will take a look at the two countries, their histories, and the development of their two respective insurgencies. It will draw parallels where they exist and outline differences when evident. The paper will conclude with a short projection of the likely course of the insurgency in El Salvador over the next several months.

84-37 (SECRET)

Burden Sharing in Providing Security Against an Interruption in the Persian Gulf Oil Supply

Carmen A. DiPlacido, Dept of State; James R. Fay, DA; John C. Marshall, COL, USAF; Joseph W. Ralston, COL, USAF; Helen H. Reed, CIA

(U) This paper examines actions the United States might take to lessen the potential for an oil supply crisis. It is an analysis of the worldwide dependency on Gulf petroleum, the situations that could curtail its flow, and the Western response to threats of curtailment. The major portion of the study discusses initiatives to promote broader participation in providing for the region's security--burden sharing. It lays out the pros and cons of multi-lateral and bilateral actions, with specific economic and military recommendations. The authors judge that a credible deterrent force is essential to ensuring a continuing oil supply. The means of achieving this deterrence are detailed with emphasis on training and logistics for both regional and out-of-area forces.

84-38

Economic and Diplomatic Sanctions: Implications for National Strategy

Augustus C. Moran, COL, USAF; Joann C. Neish, LTC, USAF; William E. Runyon, CDR, USN; John C. Shaw, Jr., LTC, USAF

Description of the events that led to the imposition of United States sanctions against Argentina, Russia, Poland, and Iran. Remarks on the effects on the flow of goods and services sanctioned, political effects resulting, individual sanctions imposed, and the objectives of the effort. Conclusions resulting from an evaluation of the four case studies and finally recommendations that should be considered prior to the imposition of sanctions in the future.

84-39a

The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission: A Case Study

William M. Steele, Lieutenant Colonel, USA

The case study provides information on the background planning, and execution of the rescue attempt. Analysis of the critical problems identified subsequent to the operation is also included. This analysis addresses the complexity of the operation, OPSEC emphasis, intelligence requirements, plans review procedures, joint training, joint task force (JTF) organization, command and control, leadership, JTF readiness, and pilot selection. The study concludes that mission failure can be traced to poor decisions made by senior military and civilian leadership.

84-40

Armed Forces Staff for the United States: Why and How

James J. Cain, NSA; James S. Dickey, LTC, USA; Bernard F. Gately, LTC, USA; John C. Graser, LTC, USAF; Charles D. Link, COL, USAF; Michael E. Ryan, COL, USAF; David A. Voigt, LTC, USAF; Arthur J. Willis, COL, USAF

Critics have been questioning the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as principal military advisers to the Secretary of Defense and the President; concurrently doubts have surfaced concerning the role of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some have suggested that military advice to the National Command Authority on substantive issues has been insipid, tardy and routinely nullified through the hierarchy of the Department of Defense; expertise in strategic planning and direction has eroded through lack of Joint Staff authority and competence; and the requirements and resource allocation processes do not benefit from professional joint military consideration due to Service rivalry and political pressures. This paper investigates why these problems exist, examines how other nations attempt to solve similar problems and proposes changes to the current defense structure, to include establishing an Armed Forces Staff, to serve this country's national defense better.

84-41

National Command Authority Options for the Strategic Employment of Forward Deployed Marine Air Ground Task Forces

Arch Ratliff, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC; David P. Martin, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC; Anthony C. Zinni, Lieutenant Colonel USMC

Proposes more effective and efficient methods of employment of forward deployed Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) to provide the National Command Authority with a greater range of options in dealing with worldwide crises that most frequently occur. The report also provides a critical examination of the present and future strategic capabilities, roles, missions, and functions of forward deployed MAGTFs.

84-42

Microorganisms and Nondestructive Warfare

Jacob T. Moll, Colonel, USAF

The concept of nondestructive warfare utilizing microorganisms is contrasted with current weapons of mass destruction. The threat of genetically engineered microorganisms to United States military forces and material is explored. A brief scenario which combines the concept of nondestructive warfare with genetically engineered microorganisms is described. In conclusion a proposal for a program to develop the potential to nullify this threat is presented.

84-43

Strategic Counterintelligence and National Security

Robert B. Wade, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Counterintelligence Community is seen to be too operationally oriented and fragmented to be fully effective. A critique of current recommendations to correct these problems concentrating on the multidisciplinary approach. The suggestion of a matrix management system as an alternative means to enhance the Community's effectiveness by improving interagency coordination and providing better strategic intelligence. In the absence of organizational reform, the paper recommends that a commission be formed to analyze the current situation and institute changes to improve the quality of strategic counterintelligence.

84-44

A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Congressional Budget Control . . .

Edward L. Burchfield, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A research report which presents a practical examination of the day-to-day operation of the Congressional budget process and a review of recent procedural changes. Following a brief discussion of the process, the internal operation of the House and Senate Budget Committee is reviewed to include the formulation of the first concurrent budget resolution, the use of reconciliation, "crosswalk" procedures and the relationship between outlays and budget authority. After an evaluation of how well the process is working, several reform proposals are examined. The paper concludes with an explanation of how the military services interface with the budget committees. Several conclusions about the current status of the process are offered as well as recommendations for improving its efficiency. Suggestions are made throughout the paper for the new Washington arena practitioner regarding ways to better understand the highly complex world of the Congressional budget process.

84-45

Resource Allocation in an Uncertain Environment

James M. Hayes, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC; Alfred H. Moore, Colonel, USMC

Each year the military departments and their respective service components are faced with the programmatic development of five year defense plans, the first year of which leads to eventual budget submission. The programming environment is dynamic and full of uncertainties, and the military services have developed unique organizations, methodologies, and strategies to deal with this environment. This paper will briefly set the programming environment, define an optimal operating mode, examine individual service programming procedures, and make general recommendations relative to constructive change, with more specific recommendations aimed at the United States Marine Corps.

84-46

The Application of Simulation to International Narcotics Control

Laird D. Allshouse, US Customs Service

The history of the last ten years of U.S. activities in pursuing the control of illicit international narcotics is reviewed, with emphasis on the evolution of cooperation among the involved government organizations. This provides an understanding of an environment which could be made more effective through the use of modeling techniques, especially simulations.

A description of the value of simulations is provided, with examples of the application of techniques to business and government problems which have elements similar to those encountered in the narcotics control effort. National applications of simulations to domestic and international aspects of the narcotics problems are discussed. Finally, recommendations on the development of applied simulations are made.

84-47

United States Central Command: A Nontraditional Unified Command

Robert A. Browning, LTC, USMC; Richard K. Farrell, CDR, USN

This paper attempts to codify the various factors leading to the creation of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) for Southwest Asia. The investigation is focused on the historical significance of our political and military commitments in the region since World War II, a discussion of USCENTCOM's mission, the unique and nontraditional aspects of the command, the application of a military strategy and concludes with both near and long term recommendations for pursuing the military aspects of our foreign policy objectives.

The investigation reveals that the US has had a long term relationship with the countries in Southwest Asia and the bedrock of our current policy is found in the Carter Doctrine, which ultimately resulted in the formation of USCENTCOM. Further examination shows that USCENTCOM does not presently possess the wherewithal to effectively deter Soviet designs in the region.

84-48

The Future for Joint Military Coordination

James P. Collins, Commander, USN

Greater Joint Military Coordination is emphasized by many senior military leaders as the necessary ingredient for national defense. The question is how to do this. A review of the problems which inhibit greater joint coordination, from defense policy makers to military operating forces, are presented. Several solutions are suggested, however each solution has positive and negative tradeoffs. The realistic need for greater coordination must be judged in relation to these tradeoffs.

84-49

Military Civic Actions and USAF Bases in the Third World

James F. Schenkel, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Assesses relevance of military civic actions program conducted by Thirteenth Air Force in the Republic of the Philippines to other Air Force bases in the third world. Historical and statutory considerations set framework. Conceptual difficulties associated with USAF policy on MCA lead to operational departures from governing directives by Air Force units in Thailand. Program in the Philippines is contrasted with official policy and related to the Thai experience. Military civic actions as described in official terms promotes activities encouraging indigenous military forces in developing countries to conduct small scale socio-economic projects for the purpose of enhancing their image while contributing to the development of their country. The social and economic programs directed at Clark Air Base are designed to minimize difficulties associated with the presence of USAF facilities in the Philippines. The US Ambassador to the RP states the Thirteenth Air Force program played a positive role in the successful completion of the 1983 Military Bases Review. Concludes USAF policy on military civic actions should be revised and programs based on the Philippine model be introduced to the Republic of Korea, Turkey and other third world countries hosting Air Force facilities.

84-50

A Just War in the Nuclear Age: The Implications of the American Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on War and Peace

Leroy F. Foreman, Colonel, USA

The author analyzes the pastoral letter on war and peace and discusses its implications for U.S. nuclear strategy. Particular attention is given to strategic countervalue warfare, strategic counterforce warfare, limited nuclear war, first use of nuclear weapons, and the strategy of deterrence. The author suggests guidelines for devising a morally acceptable nuclear strategy and emphasizes the need for military professionals to contribute their viewpoints to the debate about the morality of nuclear warfare.

84-52

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Resource Allocation Process

Robert T. Howard, LTC, USA; Clovis LaFond, LTC, USA; Charles T. McManamay, COL, USA; William Rittenhouse, COL, USA; James M. Schroeder, LTC, USA

This study of the CJCS and resource allocation begins with a brief discussion of JCS history including previous proposals for both organizational and role changes. Because certain of these proposals have already been implemented, a basic assumption of this study is that the CJCS should have a role in resource allocation. Following a summary explanation of the current system, an analysis of how the system is actually working is presented. A case study of the multiservice issue, Intertheater Mobility, is used to aid in this discussion. The major thrust of the conclusions is that, although the current CJCS is influential in DOD resource allocation, staffing problems, both organizational and process, exist in JCS, making it difficult for the CJCS to obtain the analysis support he needs. Several alternatives are then proposed which could help solve these problems and further enhance the influence of the CJCS in OOD resource allocation.

84-53

A Strategy Criteria Checklist

Gene L. Juve, Colonel, USAF

Introduction develops the need for, and highlights the apparent lack of a criteria framework for strategy development. Acknowledging the complexity and dynamics of the strategic arena, the author then proposes a criteria checklist to test relative merits of strategic options. The study concludes with a brief description of the framework environment needed to effectively apply strategy criteria testing.

84-54

Maritime Exclusion Areas: Relevance in Future Naval Strategy

Philip M. Quast, Captain, USN; William R. Schmidt, Commander, USN;
Robert L. Rachor, Jr., Commander, USN

This paper examines the strategic relevance of Maritime Exclusion Areas (MEA's) as an element of maritime strategy. The concept of an MEA is defined and the Soviet threat, which it counters, is discussed. Key issues which are addressed include operational factors, legal considerations, and political implications. Significant emphasis is directed to the potential escalatory nature of MEA's during periods of tension or prehostilities. This factor is central for both political and military decision makers. Whereas an MEA may appear attractive politically, it has both advantages and disadvantages which must be carefully considered. This paper concludes by recommending that MEA's not be used in confrontational situations with the Soviet Union when conflict avoidance is a political objective. On the other hand, if the military objective is essential, and the risk of escalation is politically acceptable, MEA's can play a contributing role in protecting maritime forces.

84-55

The Strategic Importance of the Persian Gulf Oil

John B. Craig, Department of State

A comprehensive review of data on Western economies' oil imports from the Persian Gulf is undertaken. The United States, Western Europe and Japan are examined individually in terms of their continued and projected dependence on Persian Gulf oil. Conclusions regarding the future importance of Persian Gulf oil are drawn and the impact of those conclusions on U.S. policy in the region is discussed.

84-56

U.S. Public Opinion and National Security Decision Making

Dennis J. Egan, Commander, USN

This work examines the role of public opinion in defining the decision environment for those individuals with responsibility in the national security area. Specific public perceptions which influence overall presidential popularity are analyzed for the magnitude of their effect. Using these quantitative results, a framework for conceptualizing the decision environment faced by national security decision makers is developed and discussed. The importance of issues outside a decision maker's specific area of concern is demonstrated using this conceptual framework.

Applicability of Decision Analysis Techniques to AID Strategic Planning

William H. Trayfors, AID

The nature of this paper is exploratory. Its purpose is to examine within specified limits, the potential applicability of selected quantitative methods to critical decision-making processes within the AID environment. In particular, focus is put upon AID decisions which:

"allocate resources among competing programs," and
"set priorities for country, regional, and worldwide programs."

No attempt is made to examine all "quantitative methods" and their applicability to specific situations within AID. Rather, emphasis is given to a relatively new approach known as Decision Analysis, and its potential for strengthening the AID decision-making process. Detailed examples drawn from real-life situations in AID highlight the potential usefulness of Decision Analysis techniques.

Microcomputer programs useful in speeding up the analytical process (thus making the computational part of the analysis almost trivial) are included, as are sample computer-generated reports which document the decision process.

An annotated bibliography and source listing provides pointers to both government and private sector expertise in Decision Analysis techniques, much of which is situated in the D.C. area.

The paper concludes that Decision Analysis techniques appear to have potential for enhancing the quality and consistency of AID decision-making at several levels, and urges that further exploration be done on a pilot basis to determine the viability and net value of employing such methods.

84-58 (SECRET)

Communications for Tactical Signals Intelligence--A Weak Link in the C³I Force Multiplier

Lawrence Castro, National Security Agency

(U) The much cited, but often misunderstood, concept of communications, command, control, and intelligence (C³I) as a force multiplier which contributes to the "offset strategy" to counter Soviet numerical advantage is introduced and described. A model of the C³I process is presented and two quantitative examples are considered which illustrate how C³I can improve combat effectiveness and can reduce war-fighting costs. The paper then investigates whether communications for the assimilation and dissemination of tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) represent a weak link in this force multiplier concept. Service approaches to tactical SIGINT communications are analyzed and found to be deficient in connectivity and transmission capacity. The ability of on-going developments and new technology to correct these deficiencies is investigated. The paper concludes with a framework and guidelines for applying these remedies to correct the problems.

84-59

The Strategic Use of Joint Economic Commissions to Support U.S. Security Interests in Morocco and Algeria

Albert J. Planagan, Department of Commerce

Highlights the development of U.S. Joint Economic Commissions with selected countries in the Middle East. Reviews the operations of these commissions, their achievements and shortcomings. Develops specific policy recommendations for U.S. Government strategy vis-a-vis the continued operations of the U.S.-Moroccan Joint Committee for Economic Relations and the proposed U.S.-Algerian Joint Commission for Economic Relations.

84-60

Expansion of the US-USSR Military Dialogue

Wade J. Williams, Lieutenant Colonel, USA

Following background regarding the current state of overall US-Soviet relations and on the post-World War II history of U/S Soviet military contacts and exchanges, there is discussion concerning the growing interest in increasing military dialogue and role of such dialogue as a component of Confidence Building Measures (CBM). Other areas examined include: status of the present dialogue; components of an expanded dialogue (participants, topics); and, aspects of dealing with the Soviets and possible drawbacks. Finally, conclusions regarding the initiation and conduct of an expanded military-to-military dialogue are presented.

84-62 (SECRET)

The Military Potential of Space-Based Weapons

William E. Dunne, COL, USAF; Peter J. Marchiando, COL, USAF; Alan B. Goldstajn, D/AF; Stephen A. Brower, LTC, USAF; Richard A. Fantauzzo, CDR, USN

(U) This paper explores the potential for space-based weapons (SBW) during the 1990's to the year 2000. A review of current research and development activities is projected into potential weapon systems. This is followed by an analysis of which combat mission areas can be enhanced or accomplished by the use of SBWs and a discussion on their impact on political stability. Organizational implications are considered as well. Paper concludes with the position that SBWs offer a definite benefit for U.S. military strategy and should be pursued.

84-63

The Army Readiness Goal-Perceiving and Meeting Requirements at the Unit Level

Dorsey Edward Rowe, Colonel, USA

The author explores the concept of readiness--its essential relationships to strategy and how readiness requirements are perceived and met at the unit level. Using letters to the Army leadership from former Chief of Staff of the Army General John A. Wickham, Jr., as command guidance, an examination is made of perceptions of how well field units were able to meet that guidance. The study develops a survey to measure perceptions and attitudes on readiness and analyzes selected findings from a field test of the survey. Survey results show that respondents feel units must spend more time on training and maintenance activities to achieve readiness goals.

84-65

Measuring Aircrew Capabilities for PPBS

Joseph E. Hurd, COL, USAF; George M. Moore, CDR, USN; Thomas A. Owens, COL, USAF; Michael C. Press, LTC, USAF

The USAF and USN currently have no viable way of measuring effectiveness of crew training for air-superiority aircrews. From the macro view, this inhibits the ability to effectively use the Air Force Wide Mission Area Analysis (MAA) process to quantify training importance and capability. Also it does not allow for fluctuations in the combat-ready status of individual units based on personal performance. This paper suggests that the USAF and USN have the infrastructure to measure performance. It can be related directly to C-Status. And, it can be used in the MAA computer model to assist programmers in budget prioritization.

84-66

The USN/USAF Memorandum of Agreement: Strategists' Viewpoint of the Maritime Surveillance and Sea Control Mission

Robert T. Fuller, Commander, USN; Thomas W. McCay, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF; Richard L. Thacker, Commander, USN

A plausible scenario is developed that escalates rapidly toward a potential for war. This serves to introduce several strategic and delicate issues that a Commander-in-Chief (CINC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be confronted with in determining the desired mix of available forces to meet a similar, real-world situation. A brief history of the Memorandum of Agreement and the current state of cooperation between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy is then presented. During the course of research the authors formed the opinion (based on "off the record" interviews) that progress, in USN/USAF cooperation since the initial 1971 MOA, has moved up the "one to ten" scale to about "seven." The conclusion drawn is that further cooperation in the areas of joint training, joint development of tactics and doctrine and joint development of some hardware is required. Additionally, the B-52 in its conventional configuration is viewed as a valuable asset in a Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) mission; even more so as it is replaced in the strategic role by the B-1 bomber.

Illegal Migration from Mexico: The Policy Dilemma

Willard T. Carter, Lieutenant Colonel, USA

This study discusses the political, economic, and security aspects of the problem of illegal migration from Mexico into the United States. The problem is defined in terms of forces which tend both to pull Mexican citizens into the United States and to push them out of Mexico. Serious conditions of unemployment and underemployment in Mexico create conditions of extreme hardship which force people to seek alternative ways to support themselves and their families. All they must do is cross an undefended border almost 2,000 miles long, where jobs with much higher pay are waiting. It is explained that the migration of significant numbers of Mexican citizens into the U.S. provides Mexico with an important safety valve to relieve the political and economic pressures of high unemployment and a generally distressed economy. It is also noted that there is an important human dimension in this problem which is frequently overlooked.

The United States is shown to face a serious policy dilemma in attempting to address this problem. The principal difficulty is found in the significant uncertainty associated with all efforts to define the problem. The number of Mexicans who cross into the U.S. illegally each year and the number who reside permanently in the U.S. in an illegal status cannot be established with any accuracy. The number of jobs held by illegal migrants that might otherwise have gone to U.S. citizens is not known, nor can any reasonable estimate be made of the demands placed on social welfare and education systems. It is also observed that the security question implicit in this problem is equally difficult to specify. Further, it is shown that actions taken to resolve the problem in the U.S. could have repercussions in Mexico that might be damaging to the economic and national security interests of the United States.

The various policy responses available to the U.S. are reviewed in detail. These include legal penalties against employers who hire illegal migrants; methods for identifying people eligible to work in the U.S.; amnesty provisions for illegal aliens residing in the U.S.; the potential benefits of a temporary worker program; immigration reform, particularly in regard to modifying the present quota system for legal immigration from Mexico; and U.S. assistance to Mexico to help resolve economic problems in that country. Current U.S. efforts to address the problem are reviewed, with primary attention given to the Simpson-Mazzoli bill pending in Congress. Finally, a specific policy program is proposed that includes variations of the policy responses previously discussed.

84-68

The Joint Duty Preparation of JCS Members and Unified Commanders

Gerald H. Early, Colonel, USA

This paper describes the historical development of today's National Military Command Structure, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified and specified commands, and discusses the Department of Defense requirement that an officer have at least one tour of joint duty to be considered qualified for promotion to one-star grade. It also notes the greater degree of joint qualification that would be reasonably expected of the more senior officers selected as JCS members and unified commanders. Using official biographies, resumes, and transcripts of service careers, it examines the joint duty preparation of all officers who have been JCS members and unified commanders. The data is grouped according to (a) those who have occupied each position, and (b) officers of each service who have held any of the positions. The results are then analyzed to determine the relative degree of joint duty preparation by position and by service.

84-69

USAFE Aggressors for the Future

Robert W. Mendell, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Until a few years ago, the only way a fighter pilot could get realistic, air-to-air, dissimilar fighting experience was in combat. The first time a pilot sees another type airplane should not be in the combat arena, and it definitely should not be in a combat engagement with an enemy MIG at his six o'clock. The wartime classroom allows for only a pass-or-fail grading system, and failure, due to the lack of or improper training, is unforgiving, for there will be no chance for a makeup exam nor another practice flight tomorrow. Fortunately, today's USAF Aggressor Squadrons train U.S. and NATO allied nations, along with many other friendly countries' combat forces, in the skills necessary to counter Soviet and Warsaw Pact air operations in the event of war. Air combat training, consisting of classroom academics, friendly and threat command and control familiarization, and flying operations comprise the major task of the Aggressor mission.

To be highly realistic, this training must be patterned after current, actual Soviet air operations. Therefore, Aggressor capability must be constantly updated to insure accurate, realistic, and sufficient training is produced. In today's combat arena of quality vs. quantity, American fighter pilots will be outnumbered three to one during the first days of the next war in the sky. Therefore, USAF fighter aircrews must train at a high, realistic level that will bring out the maximum in their quality aircraft advantages.

This report investigates the Soviet/Warsaw Pact air threat to see if a change in the USAF Aggressor program is needed and, if so, what kind of a proposal would be most beneficial to both the USAF and to the commercial aircraft industry. It is time to spend nickels to gain dollars in realistic training.

84-71

Conflicting Views on the Use of Economic Leverage Against the Soviets

Thomas F. Barthelemy, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Major trends in post-war U.S. and allied use of economic leverage against the USSR and its client states are identified and analyzed. Sharp disagreements about past and current policies are shown to derive from conflicting value judgements about the nature of the Soviet political system and the sources of the strength of the Western economies. Commercial interests tend to tip the scales toward fewer Government restrictions on trade. The persistence of these conflicting viewpoints, both within the U.S. and allied societies, suggests likely parameters for the future use of economic leverage against the Soviets, namely, no broadbased boycott like that in effect in the 1950's, but no end to the use of leverage. Within these parameters, it is suggested that pressure at about the level currently being exerted by the Reagan Administration (i.e., less confrontation over inevitably different preferences domestically and among allies) can probably yield a reasonably effective use of leverage.

84-72 (SECRET)

The Use of Biologic/Biotoxic Agents by Terrorists for Assassination of Selected National Command Authority Figures

William J. McDaniel, Captain, USN; John P. Flaherty, U.S. Secret Service

(U) Soviet and other Warsaw Pact countries continue to do research in the area of biological/biotoxic agents. There is solid evidence that they have utilized these agents in Southwest and Southeast Asia. Are we assured that terrorists of surrogate nations with terrorist organizations will not be given access to the products of this research? This study will examine this and other questions regarding the feasibility of assassination of National Command Authority figures with biological/biotoxis agents.

84-73

JVX: Is it Worth the Risk?

William R. Gage, Colonel, USMC

Avoidance of force obsolescence through a series of weapons systems modernization programs is a cornerstone of U.S. national security strategy. Such programs are not without risk: technological, satisfaction of operational requirements; timely introduction; affordability; and cost overrun are but a few that must be considered. This research report discusses these inherent risks as applied to the joint advanced multipurpose vertical lift aircraft (JVX) development program. Following a review of the program's initiation and Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps requirements, is an evaluation of current tilt-rotor technology and description of candidate JVX engines, including T64 derivatives and the Modern Technology Engine (MTE). The success or failure of the JVX acquisition program is described as having a particularly significant impact on the operational readiness and tactical lift capability of the Marine Corps in the 1990's. The report concludes that JVX is worth the risks involved, and as such, recommends that key programming and budgeting decisions be made in favor of ensuring that JVX is fully operational in the early 1990's.

84-74

Too Joint or Not Too Joint: An Analysis of U.S. Joint Military Operations

Robert J. Wilson, Colonel, USMC

The author believes that although four-Service joint operations are practical where joint control is required because of geographic span of theater and encompassing both naval and continental operations, operational effectiveness and efficiency are marred when jointness is over used. There are many low level conflict situations, he points out, where maximum Service participation is not always the best option. There have been times in the past when mission requirements could have been met and better served without resorting to a four/multi-Service joint operation. Unfortunately, there seems to be a mindset in the unified command structure that maintains that all military operations must have all Services represented. This tendency causes Service component capability to conduct a broad range of missions to be ignored or duplicated for sake of maximum service participation and as a result, operational effectiveness and efficiency suffers.

The author explores the impact that this over jointness has had on operational effectiveness through an analysis of two cases (the Mayaguez operation and the Iranian hostage rescue attempt) and a short review of several other operations. He then outlines conclusions and recommendations for improving the tendency to involve all Services in meeting mission requirements.

84-75

Europe's Economy and U.S. Foreign Policy

Philip McLean, Department of State

Notes allegation that Western Europe is falling even farther behind the United States and Japan in the race to develop "high tech" products. To test this proposition, the paper first examines the U.S. and European commercial aircraft and semiconductor industries in some detail, and then more generally and briefly looks at the robotic, telecommunications and bioengineering sectors. The paper concludes that, while Europe has special problems and has failed to take full commercial advantage of these emerging fields as rapidly as the United States, it will remain an important competitor, if for no other reason than the cross-Atlantic investment exchange which is already taking place. The paper ends with recommendations to help the United States and Europe avoid having the existing gap lead to political damaging tensions between them.

84-80

Understanding and Improving Defense Procurement: An Organizational and Bureaucratic View

Edward H. Conant, Commander, USN

A discussion of organizational complexity introduces a macro analysis of the Defense Procurement Decision Process at the organizational and bureaucratic level. The process is analyzed in terms of three models developed by Dr. Graham Allison in his book Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. One example of numerous recent DOD initiated improvements in the defense procurement process is dissected and characterized as representative of solutions completed and problems remaining. The potential of a threatened bureaucracy to operate counter to organizational goals is presented. The Congress is criticized for assuming a managerial role in the procurement process while using inefficient legislative procedures. Five proposals for improving congressional procedures are presented.

84-81

The Active/Reserve Force Mix: A Congressional Perspective

Michael G. Vergamini, Colonel, USAF; James R. Brown, Colonel, USAF; Kirk R. Brimmer, Lieutenant Colonel, ANG

Determining the mix of active and reserve forces in the military force structure has, until recent years, been left to the various active service components. Recently, however, the Congress has become more involved in the issue. Barely a murmur a few short years ago, the Congressional voice now seems a strident call for action. This research project looks at the force mix issue from the Congressional perspective, from what has been said and officially published, by way of background, to what individual members of Congress and their personal and professional staff members are now saying. Aggregating these perceptions will allow us to assess the possible impact for the Defense Department and the military services as they address the active and reserve forces mix question.

84-82 (SECRET)

Operation Urgent Fury: Intervention in Grenada (A Case Study in Crisis Decision Making and the Political Use of Force)

James H. Holmes. Department of State


(U) With military operations against Grenada on 25 October 1983 as a background, the study makes a chronological examination of the political decision making process which preceeded the use of force. Political interaction among the U.S. crisis management actors and institutions (State, Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NSC Staff, Vice President and President) are emphasized. The influence of Eastern Caribbean State leaders on U.S. decision makers is also highlighted. Public perceptions of both the military operations and their public policy underpinnings are examined, as well as overseas reactions. An effort is made to distinguish between motivations and the legal basis for the invasion, and the apparent blending and confusion of the two by elements of America's media and political elite are reviewed.

84-83

Implications of Legislation Regarding Operational Testing and Evaluation

Richard E. Guild, Colonel, USAF

The Operational Test and Evaluation Amendment to Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 established a Director of Operational Test and Evaluation reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense. Forces of influence during the legislative process, and initial institutionalization of the OT&E Amendment in the Defense Department, are discussed to bring out the intent of Congress, which passed the legislation in spite of formal opposition from the Department of Defense. The legislation is seen as an achievement of the Military Reform Caucus in the Congress. Intellectual and bureaucratic roots of the legislation are traced to the major provisions in the Amendment. Congress is seen to be acting on two levels. The impression of poor operational suitability (reliability and maintainability) of weapon systems is viewed as the cause for Congress taking action. The action Congress took, to bring more attention to the reliability problem, was to establish a Director of Operational Test and Evaluation so that test results would be weighed more heavily in weapon system acquisition decisions. A broader view of test and evaluation than the wording of the OT&E Amendment is used to formulate a number of recommendations for institutionalizing the legislation in the Department of Defense.



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HOW ARE DRUG TRAFFICKING AND TERRORISM RELATED?

By David L. Westrate
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration
U.S. Department Of Justice

What is the nature of the relationship between terrorism and drug trafficking?

The terrorist/insurgent link to drug trafficking and the increasing use of terrorist tactics by drug trafficking organizations are matters of serious concern to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

The mission of the DEA is to combat international drug trafficking and reduce the availability of illegal drugs in the U.S. Terrorism is not the primary focus of DEA operations. However, we are acutely aware of the threat terrorism poses to the U.S. and we aggressively pursue drug-related terrorist information.

Various terrorist and insurgent groups are either directly or indirectly involved in drug trafficking. Beginning in the 1970s, many of these groups began to generate funds through drug-related activities. This trend is especially prevalent in drug-source countries. To the best of our knowledge, however, no U.S.-based terrorist groups are involved in drug trafficking.

To put this drug-related terrorism and violence problem into perspective, I would first like to highlight examples of terrorist/insurgent organizations in various regions that we know are involved in drug-related activities. I will then discuss a situation of

(Continued on page two)

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U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL PROPOSES 1987 DRUG CONFERENCE

United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, comparing drug abuse with the plagues of earlier ages, on May 24 proposed an international conference in 1987 to deal with all aspects of the problem.

"Illicit drugs, wherever they are produced or used, contaminate and corrupt, weakening the very fabric of society," he said in a speech to the U.S. Economic and Social Council. The time has come for the United Nations to undertake a "bold and new offensive" to combat drug trafficking and abuse, he told the 54-nation body concerned with social and economic issues.

An Independent News Summary & Information Exchange

heightened concern to DEA — the issue of the increasing use of terrorist tactics by drug trafficking organizations to achieve their own limited political goals, whether it be the relaxation of enforcement efforts or the prevention of further extraditions.

It has become apparent to DEA that as we become more successful in combatting the drug trade, the level of violence and threats of violence have increased. Moreover, both the terrorists and the traffickers have immeasurably increased the level of anarchy and lethality through the acquisition of automatic weapons such as Uzis and other high firepower armaments. Not only does this endanger DEA and other U.S. employees in these countries, it also contributes to the destabilization of lawful governments.

Latin America

Our most revealing examples, based on DEA investigative activities, of terrorist/insurgent involvement in drug trafficking are in the drug-source countries such as Colombia in Latin America and Burma in the Golden Triangle.

Colombia is a major marijuana producer and a refinement and transshipment point for most of the world's cocaine. Colombia has been victimized by political violence for the last 30 years. Within the last 10 years, DEA has received information on the involvement of several Colombian terrorist/insurgent groups in the drug trade. The two groups most prominently involved with drug trafficking are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, commonly referred to as the FARC, and the terrorist group 19th of April Movement, or M-19.

The FARC is the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party and is the oldest, largest, best armed and best disciplined insurgent group in Colombia. The FARC operates through approximately 25 fronts. Almost half of these fronts are based in coca and cannabis growing areas. The FARC cultivates some coca but derives more profit by collecting protection money from drug growers and traffickers. The traffickers will sometimes also furnish arms and ammunition. In return, FARC units protect drug growing and trafficking areas such as airfields, and provide a warning network for the traffickers.

In March 1984, Colombian authorities raided a group of cocaine laboratories known as Tranquilandia and seized 10 tons of cocaine and cocaine base. While landing at the clandestine airstrip, the authorities engaged in a firefight with approximately 30 people in fatigue type uniforms. These people are believed to be members of the FARC. Follow-up operations in the remote Llanos area of Colombia uncovered a FARC camp within one-half mile of a traffickers' cocaine laboratory site. Whenever drug traffickers and FARC

units operate in the same area, it is likely that a cooperative agreement has been reached between the two groups.

DEA has received various reports of the M-19 extorting money from drug growers and traffickers, along with cultivating drugs. In DEA's most significant investigation of the arms-drugs connection, the M-19 was identified as a recipient of arms from Cuba via the smuggling network of Colombian drug trafficker Jaime Guillot-Lara. Guillot had an arrangement with several high-level officials of the Cuban Government in which the Cubans provided a safe haven for Guillot's drug smuggling vessels from Colombia destined for the U.S. In return, Guillot agreed to pay the Cubans for this facilitation.

Guillot also assisted the Cubans by using his ships to smuggle arms to the M-19 in Colombia. In November 1981, one of Guillot's ships, the *Karina*, offloaded a large quantity of weapons onto another Guillot ship, the *Monarca*. Shortly after this, the *Karina* was sunk during a battle with the Colombian Navy and went down with an estimated 100 tons of weapons on board. Ten days later the *Monarca* was seized by Colombian authorities after it successfully delivered its weapons cargo to the M-19. In November 1982, Guillot, four high-ranking Cuban officials and nine others were indicted in Miami for violations of Federal drug laws. Guillot and the four Cuban officials are still fugitives.

Two other Colombian groups, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) have been the subjects of reports asserting that they "tax" drug growers and traffickers in areas of ELN or EPL operation.

During the last three years Peru has been plagued by violence from members of the Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path. Although DEA currently has no evidence to prove Sendero Luminoso is directly involved in the drug trade, it does appear to be using the drug issue as a critical factor in the formulation of its tactics. During 1984, several anti-coca projects, including a U.S.-supported crop substitution program, were attacked by armed mobs, resulting in serious injury and several deaths. These attacks are likely the result of drug traffickers inciting the local peasants, who stand to lose their livelihood if coca production is halted.

Sendero Luminoso's ideology is to create a rural-based revolution that will rid the predominantly Indian population of the foreign and "imperialistic" influences of the U.S. and of the non-Indian governing classes. Many of the Indian peasants make their living from coca cultivation and the Sendero Luminoso has presented the anti-coca issue as an example of the central government attempting to take away the livelihood of the Indian population. This creates a climate that may be encouraging the attacks on anti-coca projects.

Burma

Halfway around the world in Burma, the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) has been trying to exert its control over the Shan State since Burma gained independence from the British in 1948. The Shan State is the primary opium poppy cultivation area in the Golden Triangle. For years the BCP was involved in the narcotics trade to some degree, such as taxing poppy growing farmers. BCP drug activity expanded greatly in the late '70s. The BCP now produces heroin in its own refineries.

In the 1960s and '70s the Shan United Army (SUA) was an insurgent group, fighting for the independence of the Shan State. The SUA used profits from the heroin trade to finance its insurgency. It now focuses on obtaining profits from the production, smuggling, and sale of heroin and heroin base. The SUA is now primarily engaged in the drug trade for profit. It is the clearest example of an insurgent group that has been corrupted by drug profits and has lost its political zeal.

The Middle East

Another historical example of the relationship between traffickers and terrorists involves Noubar Sofoyan, a documented heroin and hashish trafficker connected with the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, one of several Armenian terrorist groups that are avowed enemies of the Government of Turkey. Sofoyan was arrested in Greece and subsequently released to Lebanese authorities. He remains a fugitive as the subject of a 1980 DEA investigation and his current whereabouts is unknown.

Using Terrorist Tactics

There is another issue I would like to discuss which is related to terrorism and which I mentioned earlier — the increasing use of terrorist tactics by drug traffickers to attain limited political objectives. This new development poses a significant threat to U.S. interests and to the stability of elected governments in drug-source countries.

Drug law enforcement has always been a high risk activity but this escalated violence goes far beyond the normal anticipated danger involved in drug investigations and arrests.

Certain drug traffickers have adopted terrorist tactics to fight anti-drug efforts. While these traffickers are not thought of as terrorists by definition, their use of threats, violence, assassination and kidnapping to dissuade a government from a strong drug law enforcement policy can certainly be characterized as terroristic. These intensified violent acts constitute attempts by drug traffickers to intimidate sovereign governments into weakening or abandoning their drug control policies that have resulted in recent successes against international drug organizations. The intended

aim of these threats is to alter the enforcement environment of our law enforcement presence overseas and render us incapable of performing our foreign mission. Since DEA has a significant presence in foreign countries, we are concerned that drug traffickers are increasingly resorting to violence to achieve their aims.

The use of these terrorist tactics is most evident in Colombia, where just over one year ago Colombian Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla was assassinated on a Bogota street.

In an attempt to halt the extradition of Colombian drug traffickers to the U.S., Colombian traffickers have made many threats against the Government of Colombia, the U.S. presence in Colombia, and the DEA specifically.

Many of these threats have come from major Colombian cocaine violator Carlos Lehder. An outspoken opponent of extradition, Lehder stated in a January 1985 radio interview that if the extradition of Colombians was not stopped, he would have 500 Americans killed. Lehder said he had established contacts with the M-19 as well as elements of the police and army to form a force of 500,000 to defend the national sovereignty. In a January 1985 interview shown on Spanish television, Lehder stated that, although he was not involved in the assassination of Minister Lara, he could justify the killing. Lehder also stated that cocaine is the "atomic bomb" for the revolution of Latin America to use against U.S. imperialism.

Traffickers have not hesitated to follow up their threats with violence. In November 1984, a car bomb exploded outside the fence of the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, killing one Colombian woman. In January, 1985, a bomb exploded at the Meyer Institute, a language school in Bogota owned by a U.S. citizen. Three Colombians were injured. These bombings are believed to be the work of drug traffickers. DEA has recently received information from a number of sources that Colombian traffickers may attempt to attack DEA personnel and facilities in the U.S.

There are numerous other examples of drug-related violence. On March 16, the Spanish Embassy Chancery in Bogota was fired on by six men traveling in a jeep. This attack was believed to be in retaliation for continued incarceration in Spain of major Colombia cocaine violators whom the U.S. is seeking to extradite. In late April, an influential Colombian judge involved in the anti-drug fight was gunned down. He was the eighth judge murdered this year. Significantly, judges in Colombia are the primary investigating officials in drug cases. Therefore, the assassination of a judge is a clear attempt to not only intimidate the judicial process but to subvert the entire legal system. Nearly 24 judges have been murdered in the past two years.

Elsewhere in Latin America, DEA became aware of a plot by drug traffickers to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia last November. The traffickers were angered

by the Ambassador's leadership role in drug suppression in Bolivia and Peru. Drug violators in Bolivia pose a threat to the stability of that government. Violators have helped to arm campesinos in the principal coca growing regions, and helped to encourage resistance to central government authority and anti-drug efforts.

Shaping Public Opinion

Violence also is used to shape public opinion. For example, a Colombian public affairs network aired a show in January in which panelists debated extradition. Five of the panelists opposed extradition and only one expressed moderate support. This lack of support for extradition is not surprising since a legal advisor to the Justice Ministry was murdered after making a passionate plea for a treaty on the same TV program a year earlier.

In Mexico, DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena and a Mexican pilot were kidnapped and brutally murdered in an attempt to intimidate DEA into weakening our enforcement pressure there. These tactics did not work, but rather strengthened our resolve. Three major traffickers believed to be involved in the heinous crime have been arrested.

These terrorist tactics are not limited to Latin America. In Sicily, a number of prominent police, judicial and other government officials investigating drug trafficking and traditional organized crime have been assassinated. In the most recent attacks, a car bomb in the Sicilian city of Trapani was targeted against Magistrate Carlo-Palermo, who recently oversaw an investigation into a large drugs and arms smuggling ring in Trento. The bomb injured Judge Palermo and five bodyguards. It killed a 30-year-old woman and her two six-year-old twin boys. On April 20, a powerful bomb destroyed the summer home of the Christian Democratic nominee for mayor of Palermo, who had identified a number of prominent Sicilian politicians as members of Sicilian organized crime. In Southeast Asia, DEA has recently received several threats against personnel in Thailand.

While the above events were not carried out by what we traditionally define as terrorist groups, the violent methods and planned effects of intimidation and fear are the same as those practiced by terrorists and are just as serious a threat to U.S. interests worldwide.

An Even Greater Threat

In summary, DEA believes that the relationship between drug trafficking and terrorism is expanding. While terrorist or insurgent groups are not a threat to established drug smuggling organizations and their operations, it is important to note that terrorist and insurgent groups do not need to compete with the major trafficking organizations to obtain significant drug-related profits.

DEA believes that subversive groups are beginning to acquire such profits which gives them the potential to

greatly increase the frequency and sophistication of their operations. This poses an even greater terrorism threat worldwide.

In the last several years DEA has received drug-related information on rural insurgents, urban terrorists, liberation movements, arms traffickers, left and right wing political groups and high-level officials acting on behalf of their governments. This emerging trend of using drug trafficking to support political ends represents a major change in the historical pattern of drug trafficking in which drug traffickers were only interested in profits. During the 1980s, political activists, subversives and even some high-level government officials have become involved in drug trafficking to finance political objectives. This expanding use of drug trafficking for political purposes has already had an effect on, and could have far-reaching implications for, drug law enforcement worldwide and U.S. foreign policy.

The rapidly expanded use of terrorist tactics by drug traffickers also indicates a significant change in tactics by some drug traffickers. Previously, traffickers viewed law enforcement successes as part of the cost of doing business and did not react violently to avoid provoking governments into more serious action. Now, in the wake of continued drug control and law enforcement success, especially in Latin America, the trafficking organizations have been disrupted and the traffickers are on the defensive. They have reacted not only with threats but with the commission of terrorist acts.

This violence is an attempt by traffickers to intimidate DEA, the U.S. and foreign governments and force a change in drug control policy and inhibit effective law enforcement action. Drug traffickers, with their vast financial resources and power, pose a significant threat to drug law enforcement efforts. DEA considers this to be the most significant issue facing drug law enforcement today. ■

MILITARY ROLE IN DRUG WAR NEEDS TO BE EXPANDED, BUT CAUTIOUSLY, REP. RANGEL SAYS

The chairman of a key House drug panel said on May 15 there is "no question" the military role in drug enforcement needs to be expanded but said he wants to "avoid a confrontation" with the Pentagon over the issue.

Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) made the comments after a two-hour, closed meeting with members of his Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control and Defense Department representatives — including Lt. Gen. R. Dean Tice, director of the Defense Department's Drug Enforcement Task Force.

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Insurgents, Terrorists and the Drug Trade

Mark S. Steinitz

ALTHOUGH TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL organizations continue to dominate the international narcotics trade, a growing number of insurgent and terrorist groups from all parts of the political spectrum and globe have obtained money and other benefits from illegal drug-related activities in recent years.¹ These activities range widely from providing protection to drug dealers to retail trafficking to outright control over drug-producing regions. The list of insurgents and terrorists heavily involved in the drug trade remains relatively small compared to the total number of militant subnational groups, but it includes several major organizations, especially in South America and Southeast Asia. Given the lucrative nature of the drug business, even limited participation can yield sizable profits to help finance armed struggle.

In a broad sense, the increased insurgent and terrorist connections to this illicit activity are a result of a world-wide expansion in the demand for drugs, which has opened up new opportunities for what might be

termed non-traditional suppliers—to include political parties and even some sovereign governments.² A recent UN report noted that drug use has become so pervasive as to threaten the very security of some countries.³

Another key factor, however, has been the tendency for insurgency, terrorism, and the drug trade to be located in roughly the same areas. In several important instances, shifts in the pattern of the global drug trade have brought large-scale narcotics production into areas where insurgents or terrorists were already active. Conversely, in several other cases, political changes have brought insurgency and terrorism into regions where the cultivation and processing of substantial amounts of narcotics were well-established.

Despite conflicting long-range aims and initial antipathy or suspicions, insurgent-terrorist groups and those involved in the drug business share many short-term goals and can be of mutual value. This frequently—though not always—facilitates cooperation especially when co-location of insurgency, terrorism, and the drug trade occurs over any extended period. Most co-location has occurred in remote regions, explaining why the narcotics-related activity of larger rural-based insurgents tends to be more systematic and extensive than that of smaller urban terrorist groups. The latter are subject to greater police harass-

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ment and generally have no "liberated zones" in which to carry out various drug-related activities.⁴ Rural insurgency and drug production (especially cultivation and processing) both thrive in rugged areas where the central government is weak and where a nationally-integrated economic infrastructure is lacking.

Paradoxically, increased insurgent-terrorist activity in the drug market could in some ways work to the advantage of anti-narcotics efforts as well as counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism programs. Overall, however, the involvement of these groups in the drug trade will serve to complicate government measures against narcotics trafficking and subnational political violence.

Evidence of Involvement

Latin America. Until the late 1970s there were few insurgent or terrorist ties to the drug business in this region. Typical of the violence that plagues many Latin American societies, feuding between these groups and the criminal underworld still erupts.⁵ Nevertheless, insurgent and terrorist connections to the area's thriving drug business have become stronger in recent years. Most of these links occur in Colombia, which has been the principal supplier of cocaine and marijuana to the United States.⁶ The group most active in Colombia's extensive narcotics industry is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), long identified as the militant arm of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC). A largely rural-based organization, FARC has roughly 5,000 active members and supporters, divided into 23-28 guerrilla fronts, approximately half of which operate in coca leaf or marijuana growing areas.

FARC's involvement in the drug

trade began slowly but now encompasses a wide scope of activities. The group regularly collects protection money from coca and marijuana growers in its operating territory, sometimes receiving as much as 10 percent of the profit. One front is believed to have obtained \$3.8 million per month in taxing the coca industry. The 13th Front, located in the south of Huila Department, and the 4th Front, located in Putumayo Department, have been dealing with coca traffickers to obtain arms and ammunition. FARC leaders ordered one of their chief operatives in Caqueta Department to maintain direct control over narcotics trafficking activities and to collect set quotas from drug dealers.

FARC also guarantees access to a number of clandestine airfields vital to drug traffickers. Moreover, the group also appears to engage in some limited coca cultivation and perhaps cocaine refining. In November 1983 the Colombian Army discovered 90 hectares of coca and a processing laboratory next to an abandoned FARC camp in southern Colombia. According to the U. S. Embassy in Bogota, FARC's overall cooperative relationship with Colombia's drug barons appears to have been sanctioned by the PCC at its Seventh National Conference in 1982. Citing an informed source, a leading Colombian newspaper recently reported that Carlos Lehder, one of the country's leading traffickers, has offered to pay FARC for protection services.⁷

Several other militant organizations in Colombia have benefited in one fashion or another from the drug trade. The leftist 19th of April Movement (M-19), which has about 900 activists divided into both urban and rural cells, cooperated with leading Colombian drug trafficker Jaime Guillot-Lara. He supplied the group with weapons in

the early 1980s and assistance in his derterprise from high-r officials. In January 1 Lehder claimed th lished friendly con This is in sharp con lier antagonistic rel traffickers, a result chant for kidnappi wealthy drug smug left-wing Colombia tional Liberation A Popular Liberation believed to levy p coca and marijuar areas of control. In lombian press rep guerrillas were arr of 150 metric tons

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 This is in sharp contrast to M-19's ear-
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 left-wing Colombian groups, the Na-
 tional Liberation Army (ELN) and the
 Popular Liberation Army (EPL), are
 believed to levy protection taxes on
 coca and marijuana growers in their
 areas of control. In May 1984 the Co-
 lombian press reported that 24 ELN
 guerrillas were arrested in possession
 of 150 metric tons of marijuana.⁸

Elsewhere in Latin America, there
 has been considerable speculation
 about the relationship between Peru's
 mystic and Maoist Sendero Luminoso
 (Shining Path or SL) and that coun-
 try's coca cartels. Available evidence
 suggests that some local SL command-
 ers probably extort money from coca
 growers. The Peruvian government
 recently reported that it had broken
 up a major cocaine trafficking ring that
 financed terrorists, presumably SL.⁹
 Nevertheless, despite the potential for
 expanded links, the group's connec-
 tion to the drug trade presently ap-
 pears less structured and extensive
 than FARC's.

SL's recent operations in the coca-
 growing upper Huallaga valley appear
 to have less to do with gaining drug
 money than with taking political ad-
 vantage of anti-government and anti-
 U.S. sentiment in an area where a
 joint Peruvian-U.S. drug control proj-
 ect was underway.¹⁰ Sendero's
 avowedly Maoist ideology may also be
 slowing its involvement in the drug
 trade, given the Chinese leader's fe-
 rocious crackdown on narcotics abuse

in China after 1949. Whatever the ac-
 tual evidence, however, most Peruvi-
 ans seem convinced that SL is tied up
 in the drug trade. Over 75 percent of
 respondents in a recent opinion poll
 believed a close relationship exists be-
 tween traffickers and terrorists.¹¹

A number of right-wing European
 terrorists and neo-Nazis have been
 employed as "enforcers" by Bolivia's
 cocaine barons. One of these neo-fa-
 cists, Pierluigi Pagliai, shot by Bolivi-
 an police in 1982, was wanted by Ital-
 ian authorities for his alleged role in
 the 1980 Bologna railway station
 bombing that claimed over 80 lives.¹²
 In late 1984 the Bolivian government
 announced it was searching for an Ar-
 gentine terrorist who had been hired
 by Bolivian drug traffickers to kill the
 U.S. ambassador in La Paz.¹³

There is considerable evidence that
 the anti-Castro Cuban exile terrorist
 group Omega 7 has links to the drug
 business. In 1981 a top member of the
 group was arrested in possession of a
 large quantity of marijuana. During
 the 1984 trial of Eduardo Arocena, the
 alleged leader of Omega 7, numerous
 details emerged showing that Arocena
 had agreed to allow drug dealers in
 Florida to use group members as "hit-
 men."¹⁴

Southeast Asia. In 1984 Burma pro-
 duced an estimated 630 metric tons of
 opium, making the "hermit kingdom"
 the world's largest single source of il-
 legal opium. Between one-half and
 two-thirds of this harvest occurred in
 areas controlled by leftist and ethnic
 separatist insurgents, mainly the Bur-
 mese Communist Party (BCP) and, to
 a lesser extent, the Kachin Indepen-
 dence Organization (KIO).¹⁵

The BCP oversees the level of op-
 ium production in areas under its con-
 trol, especially in the Shan State, and
 collects protection taxes and some-
 times exacts forced deliveries from

farmers. BCP units traveling in caravans transport raw opium to heroin refineries near the Thai-Burmese border.

Since late 1983 the BCP has begun to establish refineries to convert opium into heroin and engage in direct sales of refined opiates to middlemen. BCP's limited moves into the refining stage have brought the group into increased conflict with the Shan United Army (SUA), a "warlord" organization that has dominated the border refining area in recent years. Although once a viable insurgency, SUA now concentrates its resources on the drug trade and is a good example of the long-term corrupting influence of narcotics money on a political movement.¹⁶

Insurgent-terrorist links to the trade elsewhere in Southeast Asia are weaker than in Burma. The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) has given some indications of willingness to engage in trafficking, but has been badly battered by Thai security forces over the last several years.¹⁷ Heroin production laboratories are located on either side of the rugged Thai-Malaysian border where leftist Malaysian insurgents are based. In the mid-1970s there were unconfirmed reports of Malaysian Communist ties to heroin refining, but no hard evidence of linkage has emerged. In Laos, some resistance groups operate near poppy-growing areas. Although hard evidence is lacking, press reports on the location of drug seizures from Lao refugees offer some circumstantial evidence that the groups may be profiting from the drug trade.¹⁸ A recent Philippine government "white paper" charged that the New People's Army derives revenue from marijuana cultivation.¹⁹

South Asia. Between 1980 and 1983 opium production increased from an estimated 200 metric tons to 400-575

metric tons in wartorn Afghanistan where *mujahedin* guerrillas are waging a bloody struggle against Soviet invaders and their Afghan clients.²⁰ Much of the opium cultivation takes place in eastern Afghanistan where insurgent activity is greatest. The international press has frequently contained stories that the rebels derive funding from the drug trade and use narcotics sales to undermine Soviet fighting ability. In late 1983 a spokesman for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was reported as stating that the *mujahedin* were financing their struggle against the Soviets at least partly through the sale of opium. The official, however, provided no specific details of the insurgents' involvement.²¹

Since roughly 1983, Sri Lankan nationals have become active in smuggling Pakistani-produced heroin to Western Europe and Canada. Arrests for heroin trafficking in Sri Lanka rose astronomically from four in 1981 to over 500 in the first half of 1984, according to the chairman of the country's National Dangerous Drugs Control Board.²² In July 1984 Colombo's Minister of National Security publicly denounced Tamil separatists for involvement in international drug smuggling. In March 1985, Italian authorities issued 100 arrest warrants for Tamil drug traffickers, some of whom were connected with the separatist struggle, according to the Italian public prosecutor in the case.²³

The Middle East. Lebanon is the world's leading producer of hashish and much of the 1984 yield of an estimated 700 metric tons was grown in the fertile Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley primarily by Shiite Muslim farmers. Heroin laboratories also are believed to operate in the area. From the Bekaa, the hashish is shipped to various regional and Western markets through Lebanon's system of illegal

ports. A portion of the hashish is smuggled via Damascus and Beirut.

Although some of the Lebanese factions vying for power in Lebanon resemble the private militias more common in insurgencies, nearly all the Lebanese, Phalangists, Maronites, Shiites—obtain revenue from the industry, either directly through the contraband trade or through the existence of this huge market. It is estimated at \$1 billion annually and remains one of the mainstays of the Lebanese economy. The restoration of full fiscal authority in Lebanon is a major goal.

Armenian terrorist groups in numerous countries, including Lebanon, are based in Lebanon. Many are based in Beirut where members of the community figure prominently in drug traffic. As recently asserted, it is likely that at least some of the Lebanese are on their way into terrorism.

In 1980 Noubanian drug smuggler and Lebanese citizenship was indicted for heroin smuggling and arrested in Switzerland. He allegedly helped Armenian terrorists in their fight for a Jewish installation in Lebanon. He was arrested in Beirut on charges, but extended his release where he was released because of pressure from the Minister of Justice.²⁷

Also in 1981, a group of Lebanese smugglers who were arrested and handed over documents and other items to a leftist group, the Armenian Liberation Front. The smugglers were arrested in Lebanon and Armenian traffickers in the United States. Although

war-torn Afghanistan guerrillas are waging against Soviet invading clients.²⁰ Much cultivation takes place in Afghanistan where insurgents exist. The international community contained stories derive funding from the use of narcotics sales to augment fighting ability. In a spokesman for the U.S. government Administration stated as stating that the financing their struggle derives at least partly from opium. The official provided no specific details of the insurgents' involvement.²¹

In 1983, Sri Lankan narcotics become active in smuggling-produced heroin to the United States and Canada. Arrests in Sri Lanka rose from four in 1981 to 15 in the first half of 1984, according to the chairman of the counternarcotics Dangerous Drugs Commission.

In July 1984 Colombo's International Security publicly indicted Tamil separatists for international drug smuggling. In 1985, Italian authorities issued 10 arrest warrants for traffickers, some of whom were linked with the separatist group linked to the Italian publication of the case.²³

East. Lebanon is the largest producer of hashish. The 1984 yield of an estimated 100 tons was grown in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley by Shiite Muslim laboratories also are active in the area. From the Bekaa Valley hashish is shipped to the United States and Western markets through the United States' system of illegal

ports. A portion of the heroin is smuggled via Damascus airport.²⁴

Although some of the armed factions vying for power in fragmented Lebanon resemble warlord groups or private militias more than standard insurgencies, nearly all of them—Palestinians, Phalangists, Druze, and Shiites—obtain revenue from the drug industry, either directly or by protecting the contraband as it is transported through their areas of influence. The existence of this huge drug economy, estimated at \$1 billion in 1981, remains one of the major obstacles to the restoration of central government fiscal authority in Lebanon.²⁵

Armenian terrorists operate in numerous countries, but they frequently are based in Lebanon, especially Beirut where members of the Armenian community figure prominently in the drug traffic. As the French press recently asserted, it seems likely that at least some of these drug profits find their way into terrorist coffers.²⁶

In 1980 Noubar Sofoyan, an Armenian drug smuggler with Lebanese citizenship, was indicted in the U.S. for heroin smuggling. Sofoyan had been arrested in Switzerland in 1976 for allegedly helping fund right-wing Armenian terrorists who bombed a Turkish installation in Zurich. In 1981 he was arrested in Greece on drug charges, but extradited to Lebanon where he was released, most likely because of pressure exerted on the Minister of Justice.²⁷

Also in 1981, Swedish police arrested a group of Armenian narcotics smugglers who were also in possession of documents and publications linking them to a leftist Armenian terrorist group, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). The smugglers were also linked to Armenian traffickers in the United States. Although the Swedes were

never able to prove that the arrested traffickers had passed money to terrorists, ASALA issued several threats against Swedish interests on behalf of the jailed drug dealers and may have been behind an unsuccessful attempt to help one of them escape custody.²⁸

In early 1983 the Turkish press, citing Interpol sources, claimed that nine kilograms of heroin seized on Cyprus belonged to a Greek smuggling ring that helped fund ASALA. The Turkish press also claimed that one of the ASALA terrorists who participated in the June 1983 attack on the Istanbul covered bazaar later hid at the home of a drug smuggler.²⁹

Europe. In the late 1970s and early 1980s Turkey became the scene of a booming heroin industry geared toward supplying European addicts. Fueled by opium and morphine base from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, most of the Turkish heroin refining is carried out in rugged southeastern Turkey by Kurds. Although criminal organizations and families dominate this trade, Turkish officials report a degree of overlap between the traffickers and Kurdish separatists in the region. The separatists have been particularly eager to trade drugs for weapons, according to Turkish authorities. In January 1985 the Turkish press reported that Kurdish insurgents had received funding from a known drug smuggler. In May 1985 Behet Canturk, a convicted major drugs and arms smuggler, went on trial in Turkey on charges of separatism and belonging to an outlawed Kurdish organization.³⁰

Urban terrorists in Turkey have also derived income from the heroin trade. In 1981 an extensive investigation by Istanbul police into the activities of the left-wing Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left) revealed that the group engaged in heroin sales and used the proceeds

to purchase arms.³¹ Right-wing terrorists, especially the Grey Wolves, also obtained money for weapons through heroin sales.³² The widely publicized investigations into the activities of convicted papal assailant Mehmet Ali Agca have revealed the close links between the Grey Wolves and the Turkish drug-and-gun-running Mafia—the latter aided and abetted by Bulgarian intelligence services.³³ The activities of urban terrorists in Turkey—presumably including those related to the drug business—have declined over the last few years as Turkish enforcement efforts have increased.

Italian judicial authorities believe that Maurizio Folini, a left-wing Italian terrorist, was a key member of a smuggling network that procured arms for the Red Brigades (BR) from Middle Eastern sources in the early 1980s. The network also reportedly engaged in heroin sales and sometimes bartered narcotics for guns.³⁴ Although further evidence of outright drug dealing is scarce, left-wing Italian terrorists have apparently sought to forge working relations with the country's various organized crime groups, all of whom are involved in drug trafficking. According to one repentant terrorist who belonged to *Potere Operaio* (Workers' Power), his organization had an informal agreement with the underworld in the late 1970s to kidnap for ransom, rob banks, and commit other thefts. The spoils were to be split evenly.³⁵

The BR column in Naples has made several overtures to that city's criminal band, the Camorra. In July 1982, after assassinating a Naples police chief and his driver, the BR issued a communique describing the Camorra as an "extra-legal proletariat"—a flattering term in terrorist parlance.³⁶ Several months later the BR failed in an attempt to stage a massive escape from a Naples prison that housed many Ca-

morra prisoners.³⁷

For its part Italian organized crime seems somewhat ambivalent about the terrorists. BR activity in Naples always seems to increase police patrols that invariably disrupt Camorra rackets. The Sicilian Mafia has not permitted BR activity on the island. Nevertheless, many Italians believe criminals and terrorists can and have worked together. In late 1984 an Italian parliamentary committee stated its belief that the BR and Camorra had agreed to collaborate in the killing of particularly energetic magistrates and police officials.³⁸ As the BR, decimated by extensive personnel losses, increases its recruiting among convicts and less educated youths, its cooperation with criminal groups may likewise increase.

Drug abuse in the Basque region of northern Spain has grown and so have accusations that the separatist Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA) is facilitating the flow of narcotics into the region. One specialist in international terrorism has charged that the influx of hard drugs into Spain is almost entirely the work of ETA, which obtains the narcotics in Colombia, ships them through Brussels and Paris, and then into Spain.³⁹

Although unwilling to go quite so far, sources knowledgeable in Basque affairs contend that ETA does play an important role in the drug scene in the Basque area.⁴⁰ In November 1984 Catholic bishops in northern Spain, who are not particularly known for their pro-Madrid views, issued a pastoral letter criticizing ETA for involvement in the drug traffic, adding that Spanish security services also used drugs as payment for information.⁴¹

Involvement in the drug traffic would entail risks for ETA given the conservative social attitudes in the Basque region. Nevertheless, ETA is reported to be short of money partly

because more Basque are refusing to pay "reparations." Additionally, ETA has found it difficult to collect taxes from the wealthy to pay. The group has also taken delivery of arms from southern France. Increased French police activity has made it more difficult to operate there.

ETA for its part has been active in drug trafficking. A group warned that it was fighting alleged narcotics traffickers in the Basque region and that it was a threat at least several years.⁴²

Factors Behind

Changes in the international drug scene, national drug scene, political changes, terrorism, and closer geographic proximity, in many cases this has led to the involvement of international groups in the drug trade.

One such shift occurred in the late 1970s when Mexico began a drug control program against narcotics. Although the government was concerned about the drug trade which was then a major part of the economy, the government was also concerned about the more widely known drug trade in the country. Some of the reasons that Mexico was spraying programs against the government were the increasing drug economy and anti-state elements which give rise to narcotics.

Whatever the reasons, the Mexican eradication effort has been a devastating effort.

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because more Basque businessmen are refusing to pay "revolutionary taxes." Additionally, ETA finds it more difficult to collect taxes from those willing to pay. The group had traditionally taken delivery of payments in its southern France sanctuary, but increased French police pressure has made it more difficult for ETA to operate there.

ETA for its part, denies involvement in drug trafficking. In 1982 the group warned that it would begin killing alleged narcotics dealers in the Basque region and has carried out that threat at least several times in recent years.⁴²

Factors Behind the Linkages

Changes in the pattern of the international drug scene as well as several political changes have brought insurgency, terrorism, and the drug trade into closer geographical proximity. In many cases this has greatly facilitated the involvement of militant subnational groups in the drug-related activity.

One such shift in the drug business occurred in the mid-and late 1970s when Mexico began an aerial eradication program against opium and cannabis. Although the U.S. government was concerned chiefly with the opium, which was then fueling the U.S. heroin market, the Mexicans were more concerned about cannabis, a much more widely abused drug in their country. Some observers also believe that Mexico undertook its herbicide spraying program because the central government feared that the burgeoning drug economy might begin to fund anti-state elements and perhaps even give rise to nascent insurgencies.⁴³

Whatever the mix of motives, the Mexican eradication program had a devastating effect on opium and mar-

ijuana cultivation, greatly reducing both. The decline in Mexican opium prompted an increase in cultivation in Asia. The decline of Mexican marijuana provided a tremendous boost to the cannabis industry in Colombia. Cultivation rose dramatically, including in some areas controlled by FARC, increasing the group's exposure to the drug trade.

Bolstered by a rapid rise to ascendency over the U.S. marijuana market, Colombian traffickers quickly began to move into the cocaine trade. In the early 1980s they began to establish their own cocaine laboratories and coca fields in southern Colombia, with the ultimate aim of eventually decreasing their dependence on Bolivian and Peruvian coca. Much of this refining and cultivation occurred in or near areas influenced by FARC, giving the group even more exposure to tempting drug profits.

The rise of Pakistan as a major heroin producer over the past several years has also been conducive to Tamil separatist involvement in trafficking. Although opium had been a traditional crop in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the country never developed a major heroin industry until the early 1980s. Two general factors contributed to that change. First, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at least temporarily disrupted westward opium smuggling routes out of the NWFP. As huge stockpiles of perishable opium began to develop, Pakistani traffickers decided to begin converting the opium into heroin which they could market in the United States, Western Europe, and Canada.⁴⁴ Second, in 1979 Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq abruptly terminated the country's Vend system, which provided legal opium maintenance to registered addicts. As happened in the shah's Iran and several East Asian states that

enacted opium bans in the postwar era, the change in the legal status of opium in Pakistan, without any serious attempt to reduce the demand for drugs, contributed to the onset of a black market and the introduction of heroin. Compared to opium, which has a strong odor and is difficult to transport illegally into urban areas, heroin is almost odorless. Since it takes 10 units of opium to make one unit of heroin, the latter is more concentrated and easier to conceal and smuggle.⁴⁵

As large quantities of heroin began to flow out of Pakistan, police in Western countries began to focus their interdiction efforts on air flights out of Karachi, Islamabad, and Lahore. This prompted traffickers to begin making greater use of India as a departure point where Sri Lankans, including Tamil Separatists, came into increased contact with the heroin trade.

Burma, Lebanon, and Afghanistan offer three examples where political change brought insurgency or terrorism into a region where an extensive drug industry already existed.

In Burma, Communist insurgencies have been struggling against the Rangoon government in one form or another since 1948. Nevertheless, in the Shan State, where opium cultivation is the most intense, Communist insurgency was not a major factor until the late 1960s, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) markedly increased its political and material support for the BCP. As a result of this PRC support, a new insurgent front, the Northeast Command, was created in the northern Shan State.⁴⁶

In addition to this co-location, the BCP's systematic involvement in the drug trade was propelled by two other factors. In the late 1970s Peng Chia Sheng became senior officer and vice-commander of the Northeast Com-

mand. Peng was a long-time protégé of Lo Hsing-han, one of the most notorious traffickers in the Burma-Thailand-Laos tri-border area known as the Golden Triangle. In 1978 the PRC began to reduce its aid to the BCP, providing the group with increased incentive for involvement in the opium trade.⁴⁷

Long before the current round of anarchy, Lebanon had a thriving drug business. In the 1960s the UN unsuccessfully tried to substitute food crops for cannabis production in the Bekaa Valley.⁴⁸ Central government control over the valley was never very strong, but in the years following the outbreak of civil war in 1975, it nearly disappeared. As authority receded, drug cultivation increased. One U.S. journalist in Lebanon noted that hashish cultivation, once limited to a rugged northern part of the Bekaa, had spread to the Beirut-Damascus road by the early 1980s, replacing potatoes and wheat.⁴⁹ As the hashish crop grew so did the number of factions and militias needing funding.

As in Burma and Lebanon, drug production was a large-scale and centuries-old activity in Afghanistan.⁵⁰ The tribesmen who were most active in the cultivation of opium, the Pathans, have always been fiercely independent and willing to fight for what they regard as their tribal prerogatives. At times they have sought union with their Pathan kinsmen in the neighboring NWFP, their objective being the creation of a separate state, Pushtunistan. Following the April 1978 coup in which Marxist Nur Mohammad Turaki overthrew General Mohammad Daoud, the tribesmen began to oppose the new regime. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 in support of another Marxist, Babrak Karmal, this opposition grew into a full-fledged rebellion.

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Once again insurgency had come to a major drug-producing area.

The Turkish experience provides an example in which political developments and a shift in the drug trade both played a role—albeit at different times—in forging insurgent and terrorist links to the drug trade.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Turkey was the major source of illicit opium for most of the heroin destined for the U.S. market. The opium, which was diverted from licit cultivation, was grown mainly in the western part of the country, free from any major insurgent activity. Converted into morphine base in Turkey, Lebanon, and Syria, it was shipped via boat or overland to Marseille. There the morphine base was refined into high-grade heroin by the French-Corsican underworld—the so-called French Connection—and smuggled to the United States.⁵¹

Contact between terrorists and this well-established narcotics network occurred during the late 1960s and early 1970s, when Turkey experienced a wave of urban political violence. Turkish officials charged that urban terrorists frequently obtained weapons from smugglers, who returned from drug runs in Europe laden with guns.⁵² The life of this drugs-guns-terrorism nexus, however, was relatively shortlived.

In 1971 the Turkish military took control of the government. Not only did it crack down on terrorism, but, under prodding from Washington, it agreed to ban all opium cultivation and arrested numerous traffickers. Combined with French and U.S. enforcement measures, Turkey's actions helped break the French Connection.⁵³

In 1974 a new civilian government declared a general amnesty and released many of the drug traffickers arrested since 1971. Despite the fact

that most of their former French partners were still in jail, these Turkish traffickers were eager to return to the narcotics business to take advantage of the growing European heroin market. However, they lacked a ready source of opium. Although Turkey had resumed opium production in 1974, the government had mandated a new form of harvesting—the poppy straw method—that greatly reduced diversion of licit opium for pharmaceutical use into black market channels.⁵⁴

The solution to the traffickers' problem—the development of new sources of opium in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan—resulted in the establishment of heroin laboratories in southeastern Turkey, close to the source of supply. This development served to bring the Turkish drug trade into closer contact with Kurdish separatists in the area. The movement of large quantities of heroin from Turkey to Western Europe, coupled with a resurgence of Turkish urban terrorism in the late 1970s, rejuvenated and expanded the earlier drugs-arms nexus. The result was even greater terrorist-trafficker cooperation. The unprecedented widespread availability in Turkey of the more easily smuggled heroin in the late 1970s also facilitated urban terrorist links to trafficking.

Although co-location greatly enhances the probability that some forms of cooperation will develop between insurgents or terrorists on the one hand and traffickers on the other, it is not an absolute guarantee. The long-range aims of these groups are frequently in opposition. Insurgents and terrorists—particularly leftists—often want to remake society and may have strong ideological misgivings about cooperating with criminals. Traffickers generally champion the political status quo and presumably realize that there would be little place for them in the

kind of society envisioned by most revolutionaries. Basic operating styles also differ. Those engaged in the drug trade generally prefer to maintain a low profile to avoid the attention of law enforcement. Insurgents, and especially terrorists, however, seek to publicize their exploits in an effort to gain public support.

Nevertheless, it appears that these longer term differences can be and often are overridden by more pressing short-term concerns. For insurgents and terrorists, the drug trade offers sums of money that would tempt the most ardent Marxist-Leninist. For traffickers, who live in a world where the threat of violence is constant, insurgents and terrorists offer much needed sources of protection and an enforcement capability. Aside from this there are several other items that insurgents, terrorists, and traffickers are constantly searching for: arms, clandestine transportation and methods of communication, corrupt officials, false documentation, and information on the activities of police and security forces.

Implications for Government Policy

Much of the world's drug cultivation and processing occurs in less developed countries where narcotics enforcement has traditionally held a low priority. Lack of resources partly explains this, but for many years the drug trade was viewed as an American problem. Growing abuse of harder drugs in the Third World in recent years has slowly begun to alter this attitude and brought a new awareness of the dangers of drug use.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, Third World governments still attach a much higher priority to the more immediate problem of defeating domestic insurgents or terrorists who

seek to overthrow the state. Military leaders, who often exert strong influence on decision-making, remain wary of involvement in narcotics control. Not only do they view drug enforcement as outside their mission, but they fear the corrupting influence of the drug trade on their forces, especially the officer corps.

Yet, as more governments come to believe that insurgents or terrorists are being funded by the drug trade, they may give a higher priority to combating narcotics as part of and not separate from their counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism measures. Cognizant of the corrupting influence of drug money, more efforts may be made to establish special, elite paramilitary units designed solely to fighting trafficking. Colombia already has such units and the ties between FARC and the drug market appear to have been at least partly responsible for the Betancur government's tougher stance against drugs over the past 18 months.⁵⁶ Burma has begun to consider an aerial herbicide spray program against opium poppy cultivation.⁵⁷

Despite this potential residual benefit, however, the involvement of insurgents and terrorists in the drug trade must be viewed on balance as an impediment to narcotics control. Even with the assistance of the army or special units, drug enforcement is always a difficult undertaking. The presence of well-armed irregular military organizations with a stake in the survival of the trade makes that task harder. Moreover, involvement of the army or specially-created units in drug control will heighten inter-agency rivalries with regular police forces who view enforcement as their primary mission.

Insurgent and terrorist activity in the drug market may result in several unexpected windfalls for government counter-insurgency and counter-ter-

rorism programs. In Colombia, the government's SUA department in the drug trade has had a debilitating effect. In the absence of an organized police force in urban areas, terrorists and traffickers can take advantage of the situation. An American-style counter-terrorism program with good government support has the potential to rescue U.S. interests from the Red Army's information program.⁵⁸

As in the case of the Philippines, however, insurgent activity in the drug business may have an overall counter-insurgency effect on terrorist programs. The market open up a new avenue of financing to cover the costs of and improve fighting capabilities, though precise estimates are difficult to obtain, running counter to the generally held view that an expensive urban terrorist group like the Red Brigade is estimated to have needed \$1 million for the group's heyday. The \$4 million in drug proceeds in 1978 from barely a dozen drug deals.⁶⁰ A lack of access to drug proceeds may lead to dependence on other sources of income, thus closing off an avenue of leveling the playing field in drug game fighting in

Notes

1. The terms terrorist and insurgent are used to describe low-level political violence between the two groups. The hope of inflicting a defeat on an opponent is the most exclusive

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potential residual ben- e involvement of in- rorists in the drug wed on balance as an rcotics control. Even e of the army or spe- nforcement is always king. The presence egular military orga- stake in the survival es that task harder. ment of the army or nits in drug control ter-agency rivalries ce forces who view eir primary mission. terrorist activity in ay result in several alls for government y and counter-ter-

rorism programs. As the case of Thai- land's SUA demonstrates, involve- ment in the drug trade can have a debilitating effect on the revolutionary élan of an organization. At least in ur- ban areas, terrorist contact with drug traffickers can lead to police penetra- tion. An American specialist on terror- ism with good sources in the Italian government has reported that the 1982 rescue of U.S. General James Dozier from the Red Brigade was based on information provided by drug traffick- ers.⁵⁸

As in the case of anti-narcotics, how- ever, insurgent-terrorist involvement in the drug business will probably have an overall negative impact on counter-insurgency and counter-ter- rorist programs. Links to the drug mar- ket open up a lucrative avenue of fin- ancing to cover operating expenses and improve fighting capabilities. Al- though precise figures are difficult to obtain, running an insurgency is usu- ally an expensive proposition. An ur- ban terrorist group such as the Red Brigade is estimated by one source to have needed \$10 million a year during the group's heyday in the late 1970s.⁵⁹ The \$4 million Basque ETA collected in 1978 from bank robberies could eas- ily be earned in a relatively few major drug deals.⁶⁰ Additionally, a group's access to drug profits would reduce its dependence on any patron state sup- porter, thus closing off one possible avenue of leverage available to a re- gime fighting insurgents or terrorists.

Notes

1. The terms terrorism and insurgency are used to describe two forms of systematic, low-level political violence conducted by militant subnational groups. The difference between the two is difficult to define precisely. The terrorist, however, has little hope of inflicting a significant military defeat on an opponent regime and relies almost exclusively on the psychological im-

pect of violence. His targets are chosen for their symbolic value and are often civilians. The terrorist avoids set battles with security forces, has no standing force in the field, rarely wears distinguishing insignia during operations, and shows little interest or ability in occupying a significant portion of territory. Although relying at times on the psy- chological impact of violence, the insurgent seeks primarily to affect political behavior through the material impact of violence and selects targets for their instrumental value. The insurgent is willing to engage security forces at least on the small unit level, wears some type of uniform, has a permanent force in the field and generally controls ter- ritory, at least in the latter stages of struggle.

2. Colombian drug trafficker Carlos Lehder set up his own neo-fascist party, the Latin National Movement. See, *Latin America Weekly Report*, October 28, 1983, p. 8. In February 1985 a leading supporter of El Salvador's rightist ARENA party was arrested in Texas in possession of nearly \$6 million, which U.S. Customs agents alleged had come from drug sales. Some U.S. officials close to the case believe at least part of the money was to be used for political purposes. See, Craig Pyes and Laurie Becklund, "Inside Dope in El Salvador," *New Republic*, (April 15, 1985), pp. 15-20. For charges that govern- ments in Bolivia (1980-81), Bulgaria, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Vietnam have engaged in or condoned trafficking as a matter of policy see, U.S. Department of State, Narcotics Profile Paper: Bolivia (1983); Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Clyde D. Taylor, Bureau of International Narcotics Mat- ters, Department of State to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on the Judiciary, Joint Hearing, May 14, 1985; "Vietnam Turns to Narcotics to Pay its Bills," *Wall Street Journal*, March 8, 1984.
3. *Washington Post*, January 18, 1985.
4. The dilemmas of operating in an urban area are described in, Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla* (Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1976), pp. 350, 404; Richard Gillespie, *Soldiers of Peron: Argentina's Montoneros* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 270.
5. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *RCMP National Drug Intelligence Estimate, 1983* (Ot- tawa: Public Relations Branch, RCMP, 1984), p. 38.
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- sumers Committee (NNICC), *Narcotics Intelligence Estimate, 1983: The Supply of Drugs to the U.S. Illicit Market from Foreign and Domestic Sources in 1983 (with Projections through 1984)* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984), pp. 9, 18.
7. Taylor statement; unclassified cable of March 19, 1984, from U.S. Embassy Bogota reported in *New York Times*, March 21, 1984; *El Espectador* (Bogota), May 5, 1985.
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 9. Cynthia McClintock, "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Sendero Luminoso," *World Politics*, p. 37, no. 1 (October 1984), p. 81; Agence France Presse, July 13, 1985.
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 16. Taylor Statement.
 17. *Ibid.*
 18. *Nao Na* (Bangkok), August 29, 1984; *Ma-nichon* (Bangkok), February 2, 1985.
 19. UPI, May 13, 1985.
 20. NNICC, 38.
 21. *Washington Post*, December 17, 1983.
 22. *New York Times*, October 4, 1984.
 23. British Broadcasting Corporation, July 13, 1984; UPI, March 18, 1985.
 24. NNICC, 3, 41.
 25. Adam Zagorin, "A House Divided," *Foreign Policy*, no. 48 (Fall 1982), p. 116.
 26. *Le Matin* (Paris), cited in *Armenian Reporter*, February 7, 1985.
 27. Westrate statement.
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 30. *Milliyet* (Istanbul), January 15, 1985; *ibid.*, May 14, 1985.
 31. *Hurriyet*, February 19, 1981.
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 40. *El Alcazar* (Madrid), April 27, 1984.
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Tutorial

From: NEWS Posted: Fri 18-Apr-86 10:17 EST Sys 97
(50) Subject: TERRORISM :terrorism we face a direct and explicit
military and polit * UPI REGIONAL Wire (New York Area)

(text of reagan's speech; previous Washington) adv 12:15 pm est By
NORMAN D. SANDLER

NEW YORK (UPI) President Reagan, asserting the defense of democracy "means protecting those who fight for it," sounded an urgent new call for his endangered aid program for Nicaraguan rebels today in offering a political boost for Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, R-N.Y.

Preoccupied for days by his confrontation with Libya, Reagan left the White House for four hours to enrich D'Amato's campaign coffers and press his effort to keep the Senate in Republican hands this fall.

Reagan, the keynote speaker at a million-dollar fund-raising luncheon, heaped praise on D'Amato as a crime-fighting crusader against drugs and ally in his fight against "Soviet expansionism, imperialism and terrorism."

"We face a direct and explicit military and political challenge in Central America a challenge involving communism and its ambitions," Reagan said in his prepared remarks. "Al D'Amato agrees that to protect the peace, you have to protect democracy. And that means protecting those who fight for it."

Reagan said D'Amato, in supporting his request for \$100 million in aid to the rebel Contras a proposal mired in partisan bickering in the House proved the first-term senator "can face the hard choice and make the hard votes."

"I know it isn't easy," Reagan said, "but it's better than easy. It's right."

The presidential appearance on behalf of one of the Republican Party's most comfortable incumbents underscored Reagan's determination to keep the Senate in GOP hands and to improve GOP fortunes across the board in advance of the November elections.

The brief trip Reagan planned to be at the Waldorf-Astoria for just an hour marked only the second time he had emerged from the White House since the U.S. attack on Libya.

And while his prepared remarks contained no mention of Libya, the consequences of the U.S. strike against military targets in Tripoli and Benghazi were evident.

Heavy security was in place for the visit, reflecting concern accentuated in recent days by terrorist incidents abroad the latest in Costa Rica against U.S. Embassy property that were being studied as possible Libyan-backed reprisals for the U.S. raid Monday.

A homemade bomb exploded outside a U.S. Embassy building in San Jose Thursday night, wounding three Costa Ricans on the street and damaging several buildings.

Despite heightened security concerns, however, Reagan and his aides made clear Thursday he was satisfied Monday's air raids sent a message to Moammar Khadafy and instilled a very real fear in the radical Libyan leader that continued support for terrorism will be met with additional use of American force.

pickup6thgraf: With Khadafy _____ upi 04-18-86 10:20 aes

From: NEWS Posted: Wed 26-Mar-86 18:27 Sys 97
(27) Subject: SMUGGLING :smuggling terrorism and other international
crimes upi 03 * UPI NATIONAL Wire

Meese meets Afghan refugees

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (UPI) _ Attorney General Edwin Meese told Afghan refugees at a village near the Pakistani border Wednesday that President Reagan supports the struggle of Afghani people.

Addressing Afghan refugees at Katcha Gari Tentage village, Meese quoted Reagan as saying, "Time has come for America to resume its historical role as a leader of the free world and therefore, we must stand by all our democratic allies."

Meese said, "We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua, to defy Soviet-supported aggression and to secure rights which should be the rights of all peoples since birth."

To cheers from the Afghan refugees, Meese said, "We have demonstrated this commitment through recent events in such places as Grenada, Haiti, and the Philippines, and we stand with freedom-loving men and women around the world in Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, and particularly in Afghanistan" .

"Today we are here in Pakistan only because we cannot go to Afghanistan _ because obviously the Soviets would not receive us. But we don't need to travel to Afghanistan to see the signs of the scars and the tragic consequences of Soviet domination."

Meese is leading a U.S. delegation on a four-nation Asian tour ordered by Reagan to promote cooperation with the United States in fighting drug smuggling, terrorism and other international crimes.

_____ upi 03-26-86 06:28 pes

From: NEWS Posted: Tue 25-Mar-86 3:24 EST Sys 97
(43) Subject: NARCOTICS :narcotics dealers plant explosives on someone
who owes the * UPI STATE Wire (CALIFORNIA)

Bombs are back and officials are worried

SAN JOSE, Calif. (UPI) — Bombs are back, and law enforcement officials in Santa Clara County are worried about it.

Police Sgt. Larry Weir says the bomb squad, which he heads, has responded to 16 exploded or unexploded bomb incidents this year and has investigated many more bomb threats. Last year his unit investigated 54 bombings and 187 threats.

The sheriff's department bomb squad is headed by Sgt. Leonard Anderson, who says there were 13 bombing incidents and more than 30 threats in his jurisdiction in the first two months of this year. He said the 1985 figure was 60 bombs plus many threats.

"Since the political unrest faded in the mid-1970s, the bombings went down," Weir said. "But recently, for some unknown reason, they've been creeping up again."

Anderson said the people who planted bombs during the Vietnam War "were spouting causes. Now it's grudges and a lot of experimentation."

Also, the materials are easier to get. Weir noted some students steal small amounts of the materials over a long period of time from school laboratories so the thefts won't be noticed.

He noted low explosives can be purchased legally whereas a decade ago bombings usually were preceded by the theft of high explosives.

Last week, a 10-year-old San Jose boy was hospitalized with facial injuries after a pipe bomb he was trying to make exploded prematurely. Police said the device included a casing from a bomb a man failed to explode several days earlier.

Hospital officials said the boy could be partially blinded for life.

"We've had boyfriends try to blow up girlfriends, husbands booby-trap their wives' lovers, narcotics dealers plant explosives on someone who owes them money, high school vandalism, abortion clinic bombings, motorcycle gangs planting explosives on motorcycles and extortionists sending exploding packages to banks," Weir said.

Officials also noted there has been a rash of mailbox bombings in nearby Los Altos Hills.

"These are daylight bombings, real pipe bombs, dangerous ones," Weir said. "The mailboxes were completely blown apart. One of these days someone is going to get hurt."

Each bomb squad has special robots to handle the bombs, trucks to transport them and a demolition range. The squads also have trained dogs, which were loaned for use at the 1985 Super Bowl at Stanford University, to protect politicians and to search electronics firms.

_____ upi 03-25-86 12:24 aps

Terror

From: NEWS Posted: Tue 1-Apr-86 8:15 EST Sys 97
(44) Subject: NARCOTICS :narcotics related shooting in four days near a
san pedro p * UPI STATE Wire (CALIFORNIA)

By DANELIA WILD

LOS ANGELES (UPI) — A passenger in a car was killed Monday in the third narcotics-related shooting in four days near a San Pedro public housing project and a 17-year-old youth suspected of firing the fatal shot was arrested early Tuesday, police said.

Daniel Eberhardt, 23, was wounded about 10:50 p.m. Monday as he sat in a parked car adjacent to the Rancho San Pedro housing project, Detective Larry Kallestad said.

"Eberhardt was shot once in the chest as he was sitting in a parked car on First Street near Mesa Street in an area frequented in an ever-increasing volume by narcotics sellers and their customers," Kallestad said.

The victim and the driver apparently had negotiated a purchase with narcotics sellers when a gun was thrust through the window and Eberhardt was shot in the chest at point-blank range, Kallestad said.

"His companion (the driver) pleaded with the others around the car to let him go and drive his friend to San Pedro Peninsula Hospital," Kallestad said.

The four potential sellers and the gunman allowed the driver to leave, he said.

Eberhardt, who lived in San Pedro, died at 11:49 p.m. at San Pedro Peninsula Hospital from a single gunshot wound to the chest, Kallestad said.

A 17-year-old suspected of being the gunman was arrested at his apartment in the Rancho San Pedro housing project at about 12:30 a.m. Tuesday, Kallestad said. A .22-caliber rifle believed to be the murder weapon was confiscated.

The teenager, whose name was withheld because of his age, was booked at a juvenile facility and detectives said they would seek a petition in juvenile court charging him with murder.

Kallestad said the killing was the third shooting near the housing projects in four days, all apparently unrelated. Detectives, however, believe the three shootings share a common motive — narcotics sales gone awry, Kallestad said.

Neither of the other shooting victims has died. One is in critical condition with a gunshot wound to the chest and a second was in satisfactory condition with a leg wound.

Detectives said most of the narcotics sales in the area involve marijuana and rock cocaine, a form of the drug commonly smoked.

"It's (narcotics sales and accompanying violence) just getting out of hand all of a sudden," Kallestad said.

_____ upi 04-01-86 05:16 aps

TERROR

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san pedro p * UPI STATE Wire (CALIFORNIA)

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_____ upi 04-01-86 05:16 aps

From: NEWS Posted: Tue 1-Apr-86 16:48 EST Sys 97
(51) Subject: NARCOTICS :narcotics and weapons trafficking extortion
robbery and mu * UPI NATIONAL Wire

Report cites crime groups nationwide

WASHINGTON (UPI) _ The President's Commission on Organized Crime cited the following groups Tuesday as affiliated with organized crime:

Mafia

The report cited 1,700 members of the Mafia, also known as La Cosa Nostra, in 24 families nationwide _ one half of them in New York's five families _ plus an additional 17,000 people affiliated with the mob. It said the number of La Cosa Nostra members is unclear but are believed concentrated in the Northeast, particularly in New York and Cherry Hill and Sayerville, New Jersey. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs

It estimated there are between 800 and 900 outlaw motorcycle gangs in the United States, with at least four _ the Hell's Angel's, the Outlaws, the Bandidos and the Pagans, about 3,100 members _ said to be full organized crime groups. In addition, the report named several others as particularly active: the Sons of Silence (Midwest and Great Lakes region); the Vagos (Los Angeles and Mexico); the Peacemakers (Southeast) and the Dirty Dozen (Arizona and the Southwest). Prison Gangs

The report said several such groups operate in and out of prison and have taken on the characteristics of true organized crime associations, engaging in narcotics and weapons trafficking, extortion, robbery and murder. The Justice Department has identified 114 different gangs, five of which reach mob levels:

_The Mexican Mafia: Gang consists of about 600 members who are required to kill without question.

_La Nuestra Familia: Initially formed as a Latin cultural group in Soledad prison in 1967, it has established "regiments" of about 750 members outside, using Fresno, Calif., as a base.

_The Aryan Brotherhood: First originated in San Quentin prison in California, is now about 500 strong, a white, Nazi-oriented gang dominated by members of motorcycle gangs. Most active in state prisons in California, Arizona, Wisconsin and Idaho.

_The Black Guerrilla Family: The most politically oriented, following a Maoist philosophy, seeks to protect black prison inmates. Many members formerly of the Black Liberation Army, the underground group responsible for the October 1981 Brinks robbery.

_The Texas Syndicate: Third major Mexican-American prison gang, formed in California's Folsom prison in 1974. Now has 175 members, mostly in Texas, and is the largest gang in that state's prison system. Known to be exceptionally violent. Chinese Organized Crime

Secret societies known as Triads exist in major American cities and are active in drug trafficking, illegal gambling and loan sharking. Initiation rituals include beheading a chicken, representing what happens to a member who betrays the group, and reciting 36 loyalty oaths. Frequently cross-affiliated with Tongs, especially active in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Monterey Park, Calif., and Boston.

Vietnamese Gangs

The report said the groups, which traffick in drugs, extortion and prostitution, are active in seven cities in California, with four gangs in Texas, three in Louisiana, two in Alabama, and one each in Washington, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Virginia and Hawaii. Officials say there are at least informal connections between gangs in different parts of the country. Japanese Organized Crime: The Yakuza

Believed to be the largest organized criminal group in the world, with membership as high as 110,000 in as many as 2,500 gangs. Have invested in U.S. businesses for 20 years, mainly in Hawaii and Los Angeles. Other groups reported in San Francisco, Las Vegas and Denver. Cuban organized crime, The Marielitos

Drawn from the more than 1 million Cuban refugees into the United States, the report identified two organized crime groups, one known as La Compania, a considerable force in drug trafficking, and a second, The Corporation, primarily active in gambling and headed by Jose Miguel Battle. That groups annual net profit was estimated to be between \$45 million and \$100 million in 1984. The Marielitos, including criminals that came to the United States, formed loose crime gangs, most often involved in cocaine trafficking, along with murders and assaults. They have appeared in Connecticut, Nevada, Florida, Indiana, Texas and California.

Colombian Cocaine Rings

Almost 75 percent of the cocaine consumer in the United States is supplied by at least 20 self-contained, sophisticated gangs, the report said. They use Swiss bank accounts and tax havens in the Bahamas, Panams and Cyman Islands and have political influence in Colombia and other South American countries.

Irish Organized Crime

In Philadelphia, the dominant Irish group has about 100 members and is tied to the La Cosa Nostra family there. The Irish also are affiliated with the mob in Boston, including the Winter Gang and the Anguilo group. In New York, the dominant Irish gang, is known as the Westies and consists of about 15 members, with another 50-100 associates, which have considerable influence in the entertainment industry.

Russian Organized Crime

The American Express co. estimated it lost \$2.7 million to Russian organized crime groups during the first nine months of 1984. There are about 12 groups in New York, totaling about 500 members. Russian gangs have also been reported in Los Angeles, Cleveland, Chicago, Dallas, Portland, Boston, Miami and San Francisco. The report cited some speculation that agents of the KGB are connected to the gangs here and are linked to the Genovese La Cosa Nostra family. Canadian Organized Crime

The report cited frequent ties between Canadian groups and La Cosa Nostra, as well as increasing criminal activity in Florida, where their presence is clearly evident. Since 1982, officials have arrested five of Canada's 10 most wanted criminals there, all members of associates of Canadian crime families.

From: NEWS Posted: Tue 31-Dec-85 19:05 EST Sys 97 (46)
Subject: NARCOTICS :narcotics sales block said he will introduce a mobile entr
* UPI STATE Wire (CALIFORNIA)

By ALICE CRANE

LOS ANGELES (UPI) _ Terrorist acts could take place on American soil, but law enforcement authorities have few options available to guard against them, Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block said Tuesday.

"I believe there are people here in this country who have sympathies, allegiances and alliances with terrorist groups throughout the world and ... when they receive word they will carry out what they are capable of," Block told reporters at a yearend news conference to review his agency.

"It's a difficult thing for the American psyche to accept," the sheriff added, "that we can never secure all people and places safely from terrorists acts. I don't know that there is anything in particular that can be done."

Block said, however, that U.S. airport security is superior to European facilities such as those in Rome and Vienna, where Palestinian terrorists last week opened fire on passengers, killing 20.

The sheriff also said officers receive constant training to upgrade their response to emergencies involving explosives and automatic weapons favored by terrorists.

"We have terrorism on the domestic level every day," Block said, referring to crimes levels on American streets. "It's not so far removed that someone would do the same thing under the banner of some foreign cause."

In his review of Los Angeles crime-fighting efforts, Block released statistics showing a slight decrease in violent crime last year, offsetting a rise in crimes against property.

In 1986, as part of the battle against narcotics sales, Block said he will introduce a "mobile, entry device" to be used in raids on fortified "rock houses," where cocaine dealers barricade themselves against police intrusion.

The sheriff would give few details about the new tool, except to say it will "neutralize bars or barricaded doors very quickly."

Block blamed court procedures for jail overcrowding, which he described as the biggest problem facing the sheriff's department as the new year approaches.

Legislature going into effect New Years Day will limit the number of court date postponements granted defendants awaiting trial. Those inmates account for the large majority of the 17,000 prisoners now crowding county facilities designed to 11,000, he said.

Construction of a new 500-bed jail for women in Mira Loma along with an expansion of 1,700 beds at the Pinchess Honor Ranch should also help ease overcrowding, Block added.

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Disposition: d