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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET

#### **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ

2/28/2007

File Folder

KOREA, SOUTH (10/17/1981-12/31/1981)

FOIA

F06-048

**Box Number** 

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ID Doc Type	Docu	ıment Descriptio	n	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
34767 MEMO	GREG	G TO ALLEN	s	1	10/19/1981	B1
	R	3/27/2008	NLRR06-048			
34768 CABLE	190919	9Z OCT 81		2	10/19/1981	B1
	PAR	8/25/2008	F06-048			
34769 CABLE	270752	2Z OCT 81		2	10/27/1981	B1
	R	3/27/2008	NLRR06-048	8		
34770 CABLE	280523	3Z OCT 81		2	10/28/1981	B1
	R	3/27/2008	NLRR06-048			
34771 CABLE	070313	3Z NOV 81		2	11/7/1981	B1
	D	7/6/2012	F2006-048/1			
34772 CABLE	240813	3Z NOV 81		4	11/24/1981	B1
	R	3/27/2008	NLRR06-048			
34773 CABLE	272146	6Z NOV 81		2	11/27/1981	B1
	D	3/27/2008	NLRR06-048			
34774 CABLE	160619	9Z DEC 81		2	12/16/1981	B1
	R	3/27/2008	NLRR06-048			
34775 CABLE	180743	3Z DEC 81		2	12/18/1981	B1
	R	3/27/2008	NLRR06-048			

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID 8106083

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 19 OCT 81 19

TO

ALLEN

FROM GREGG

DOCDATE 19 OCT 81

KEYWORDS	: KOREA SOUTH	USSR	
SUBJECT:	SOVIET DEMARCHE	TO SOUTH KOREA	
ACTION:	FOR INFORMATION	DUE:	STATUS IX FILES
	FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO

COMMENTS

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# RECEIVED

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#### Comments:

per RVA:

<sup>&</sup>quot;Jeane Kirkpatrick also has an interest in N/S Korean affairs, which are triangulated here."  $\,$ 

**MEMORANDUM** 

## • SEGRET

6083

#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

October 19, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

DONALD GREGG DG

SUBJECT:

Soviet Demarche to South Korea

Using the Finns as a vehicle, the Soviets have sent a message to the South Koreans indicating a desire to improve relations between the two countries. The ROKs have shared this information with us and are asking our advice.

US policy regarding Korea has for the past 6 or 7 years had as an objective cross-recognition of both Koreas by the major powers. The Soviet move, which appears to be motivated by a growing sense of isolation, falls clearly within this policy.

State has asked my views and I intend to support State's recommendation that the ROKs be encouraged to respond cautiously but optimistically to the Soviet move.

COMMENT: I was in Korea when the cross-recognition policy was first developed. The Chinese have already made some moves toward Seoul and had \$400 million worth of trade (through Hong Kong) last year. The Soviets may feel they are getting frozen out and thus are indicating greater flexibility.

I will keep you posted on this development, which, on the face of it, looks quite hopeful. If the Soviets make a move, the Chinese, I think, will be fairly quick to follow.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOB-OUR #34767

N NARADATE 3/37/45

SECRET Review on October 19, 1987

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHUL #2793 2921017

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FM AMEMBASSY SEDUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6527

BT

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NODIS

PLEASE PASS SECDEF

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/19/01 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) OR-M

TAGS: MPOL, MARR, KS

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CHUN -- REACTION TO

REF: (A) SECDEF 190017Z DCT 81, (B) STATE 264978,

(C) STATE 270227

1. TTSA ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SINCE IT WAS PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SEE PRESIDENT CHUN AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 19, AT THE SUGGESTION OF HIS SENIOR PROTOCOL SECRETARY MIKE KIM, I CALLED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND DELIVERED PERSONALLY A LETTER ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT CHUN, THE TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS. I INFORMED MIKE KIM THAT I WOULD BE AVAILABLE AT ANY TIME THROUGH THE NIGHT TO TALK PERSONALLY WITH THE PRESIDENT IF HEHKISHED.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

AS WE HAVE BOTH AGREED IN OUR DISCUSSIONS, AND AS I HAVE HEARD YOU REASSERT IN DISCUSSIONS WITH UNITED STATES LEADERS WHEN THEY HAVE CALLED UPON YOU, THE SUREST DETERRENCE TO WAR IS OUR STRENGTH AND CREDIBILITY.
IN FORMULATING OUR PROPOSED RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREA'S UNPROVOKED ATTACK ON OUR UNARMED SR-71 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT ON AUGUST 26TH, WE HAVE BEEN MINDFUL OF YOUR VIEW THAT ONLY THROUGH A DETERMINED SHOW OF WILL AND STRENGTH CAN WE SUCCEED IN OUR COMMON GOAL OF DETERRING AGGRESSION AND ENSURING PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. I AM, THEREFORE, GRATIFIED TO BE ABLE TO INFORM YOU THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS APPROVED A PLANNED RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREA'S AUGUST ATTACK. THIS RESPONSE TAKES.INTO ACCOUNT OUR NEED FOR CONTINUED RECONNAISSANCE AND THE NECESSITY TO DEMONSTRATE WITHOUT QUESTION OUR ALLIED RIGHT TO

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION:

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CHECK SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OPERATE FREELY WITH SUCH AIRCRAFT IN INTERNATIONAL AIR-SPACE. THE RESPONSE ALSO DEMONSTRATES, I BELIEVE, THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO REWARD NORTH KOREA'S ILLEGAL ACTION BY STANDING DOWN OUR FLIGHTS DR' OTHERWISE MODIFYING OUR BEHAVIOR IN A MANNER WHICH COULD JEDPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF EITHER KOREAN OR UNITED STATES MILITARY PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT, OR MIGHT INDEED ENCOURAGE FURTHER AGGRESSIVE ACTION ON THEIR PART.

AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND PREPARATION, THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT, WEATHER PERMITTING, WE SHALL RESUME A MISSION BY THE SR-71 AIRCRAFT AT APPROXIMATELY NOON ON UCTOBER 21, ON THE FLIGHT PATH WHICH WAS USED REGULARLY PRIOR TO THE MISSILE FIRING INCIDENT. A SECOND MISSION WILL BE FLOWN ON THE SAME PATH ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 23.

POIA(b) ( )

THE PRESIDENT IS DETERMINED TO RESPOND APPROPRIATELY TO FUTURE NORTH KOREAN ATTACKS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN DUR RIGHTS, INSURE ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE, AND MAINTAIN STABILITY ON THE PENINSULA. GENERAL WICKHAM WILL BE DISCUSSING THE DETAILS OF DUR PLANNED ACTION WITH MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE CHOO. I WANTED PERSONALLY TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU THAT I BELIEVE THE PLANS ARE SUFFICIENTLY WORKED OUT THAT WE CAN HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME AND AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE BEING COMMUNICATED TO THE NORTH KOREAN LEADERS. RESPECTFULLY, RICHARD L. WALKER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR END TEXT. WALKER BT #2793

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81/#309

SITUATION: CHECK SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

**DECLASSIFIED** 

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NERR FOL 048-#34769
BY CN NARADATE 3/27/08

MESSAGE:

HCE024

STU6141

DO RUEHO

DE RUEHUL #3102 3000753

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0 270752Z OCT 81 ZFF-1

FM AMEMBASSY SECUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6663

BT

SECRET SEDUL 13102

EXDIS

E.D. 12065: RDS=1 10/27/01 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR, DVIP, KS

SUBJECT: COMMERCE SECRETARY BALDRIDGE'S CALL ON

PRESIDENT CHUN, OCTOBER 27, 1981

1. AST ENTIRE TEXT.

2. COMMERCE SECRETARY BALDRIDGE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR AND UNDERSECRETARY OLMER, HAD A VERY CONGENIAL HOUR WITH PRESIDENT CHUN DOO HWAN (M-R; CHON TU-HWAN) THIS MORNING. THE PRESIDENT WAS VERY FORTHCOMING IN EXTENDING WELCOME AND IN REPEATING FOR THE SECRETARY HIS ADMIRATION FOR AND WARMTH TOWARD PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE STRESSED KOREA'S POTENTIAL ROLE AS A MIDDLE LEVEL PROCESSOR IN JOINT ENTERPRISES DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE TRADE AND COMMERCE. HE PARTICULARLY COMMENTED ON THE POTENTIAL OF THE CHINA MARKET, NOT IMMEDIATELY BUT SOME YEARS DOWN THE ROAD, AND NOTED THIS COULD BE AN AREA WHERE JOINT ENTERPRISES LOCATED IN KOREA COULD FIND A PROFITABLE FUTURE.

3. THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS USUAL PITCH TO THE SECRETARY ASKING FOR AMERICAN ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING THE LOANS FROM JAPAN, STRESSING THE PRESSURES PUT ON THE KOREAN ECONOMY BECAUSE OF THE NECESSITY FOR HIGH DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. HE NOTED THAT, IF THE GOAL OF THEIR FIVE-YEAR PLAN TO ACHIEVE A GNP OF 100 BILLION IS ACHIEVED, PERHAPS KOREA COULD REDUCE ITS PERCENTAGE OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES TO FIVE PERCENT AND STILL MAINTAIN NECESSARY SECURITY WHILE MAKING A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICA'S

PURPOSES IN LEADING THE FREE WORLD.

4. SECRETARY BALDRIDGE EXPRESSED WARM APPRECIATION FOR KOREA'S ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS, NOTING THAT KOREA EXPORTS MORE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS TO THE U.S. THAN THE U.S. EXPORTS TO KOREA, CALLING PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO AMERICAN INTERESTS IN TURBO GENERATORS FOR NUCLEAR PLANTS 9 AND 10 AND SUBWAY SYSTEMS 3 AND 4.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

5. THE PRESIDENT SEEMED INTERESTED IN THESE QUESTIONS AND QUICKLY AND INTENSIVELY QUERIED MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY SUK JOON SUH (M-R: SO SOK-CHUN) AND KIM JAE IK (M-R: KIM CHAE-IK), WHO WERE PRESENT, ABOUT THE STATUS. I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS SOMEWHAT SURPRISED A DE-CISION HAD NOT BEEN MADE ON THE TURBO GENERATORS. HE RE-FERRED TO MY EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH HIM, ASSURING SECRETARY BALDRIDGE THAT "OTHER FACTORS BEING EQUAL" HE FAVORED GIVING THE CONTRACTS TO THE U.S. HE SMILED, BURST INTO ENGLISH, AND SAID "BUY AMERICAN". 6. COMMENT: THE PRESIDENT WAS ESPECIALLY WARM TODAY AND COMMENTED THAT THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN HIMSELF AND ME OR BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. THIS SEEMED TO BE A MESSAGE HE WAS ESPECIALLY ANXIOUS TO MAKE, PERHAPS IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT I HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM TO DELIVER PERSONALLY THE DETAILS ON OUR RESPONSE TO THE SR-71 INCIDENT. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY SECRETARY BALDRIDGE. WALKER BT #3102 NNNN

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOB-048 #34770

BY CN NARADATE 3/27/68

MESSAGE:

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STU8942

DE RUEHUL #3138 3010531 (CCY TEXT AD340650)

ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZY

U 280523Z UCT 81 ZFF-1

FM AMEMBASSY SECUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6700

BT

SECRET SEDUL 13138

NODIS

CORRECTED COPY (TEXT - PARA 5)

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/28/01 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR UR KS

SUBJECT: SOVIET INITIATIVE TOWARD THE ROKG

REF: (A) SEDUL 12513

(B) CLEVELAND/BLAKEMORE TELECON 10/27

LC) CLEVELAND/BLAKEMORE TELECON 10/28

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

- 2. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHINYONG LHO (M-R: NO SIN-YONG) LATE OCTOBER 27 TO CONVEY THE USG REACTION TO THE SOVIET FEELER PASSED THROUGH THE FINNISH PRIME MINISTER (REF A). IN SO DOING I FOLLOWED CAREFULLY THE TALKING POINTS PROVIDED IN REF B. I REVIEWED FOR LHO OUR ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE SOVIET MOTIVES, AND LISTED POSSIBLE BENEFITS AND RISKS AS WE SEE THEM. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WE HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET APPROACH, AND URGING THAT AMBASSADOR HAHM (M-R: HAM PYON-CHUN) FOLLOW A TACTIC IN MOSCOW OF MERELY LISTENING TO WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE TO SAY. UPON HIS RETURN WE COULD CONSULT ON POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS.
- 3. LHO WAS APPRECIATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES POSITION. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD LIVED IN CHINA UNDER RUSSIAN CONTROL, AND EXPRESSED HIS OWN GRAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT DOING BUSINESS WITH THE SOVIETS AT ALL. BOTH HE AND PRESIDENT CHUN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) HAD GIVEN AMBASSADOR HAHM EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO RESPOND TO ANY SOVIET INITIATIVE, BUT TO INQUIRE WHAT MOSCOW AUTHORITIES HAVE IN MIND. BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER STRESSED TO HAHM THAT THEY DO NOT WANT TO ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WITHOUT CLEAR COORDINATION WITH THE UNITED STATES.
- 4. LHO CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION BY ASKING WHEN HE MIGHT EXPECT A RESPONSE TO HIS INQUIRY ON HOW THE ROKG SHOULD

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3

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SITUATION LISTING

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SITUATION: CHECK SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RESPOND TO THE FINNISH PRIME MINISTER. APPARENTLY HELSINKI HAS BEEN INQUIRING BECAUSE PM KOLVISTO IS BEING TAXED BY THE SOVIETS. (LHO REGARDS THE HAHM MISSION AS A SEPARATE, THOUGH OF COURSE RELATED, ISSUE FROM THE FINNISH CHANNEL.) I WILL BE SEEING THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO CONVEY TO HIM THE TALKING POINTS PROVIDED IN REF C. 5. COMMENT: I BELIEVE THAT IT IS NECESSARY THAT WE BE PROMPTLY FORTHCOMING AND RESPONSIVE ON ISSUES LIKE THIS IN ORDER TO INSURE THAT THE ROKG CONTINUES TO CONSULT AND COORDINATE WITH US. LHO EXPRESSED SOME DISAPPOINTMENT THAT MATERIAL SUCH AS I NOW HAVE IN REF C HAD NOT YET REACHED HIM. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ALSO CONCERNED WHEN I CHATTED WITH HIM. WALKER BT #3138 NNNN

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F06-048

**KYUNG** 

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34771 CABLE

11/7/1981

B<sub>1</sub>

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PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2 SEOUL 4Ø72 SIT588 DATE 11/25/81 DTG: 24Ø813Z NOV 81 PSN: Ø23484

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHUL #4072/01 3280818
O 240813Z NOV 81 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE\_WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7147

SECRET SECTION Ø1 OF Ø2 SEOUL 14072

EXDIS

PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF, JCS AND CINCPAC

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 11/24/01 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, KS, US

SUBJECT: ADMIRAL LONG'S CALL ON PRESIDENT CHUN,

NOVEMBER 23

1. 18 ENTIRE TEXT.

ADMIRAL LONG, ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSADOR, GENERAL WICKHAM, AND POLAD CONNORS, HAD AN HOUR AND A HALF WITH PRESIDENT CHUN DOO HWAN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) IN THE OFFICE AND OVER LUNCH NOVEMBER 23. MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE CHOO YOUNG BOCK (M-R: CHU YONG-POK), CNO ADMIRAL LEE EUN SOO (M-R: YI UN-SU), AND SECRETARY GENERAL KIM KYUNG WON (M-R: KIM KYONG-WON) WERE ALSO PRESENT. HIGH POINTS OF THE CONVERSATION WERE AS FOLLOWS: NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS. PRESIDENT CHUN REFERRED TO THE ANTI-NUCLEAR PROTESTS IN EUROPE AND SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD DEPLOY ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN FRIENDLY COUN-TRIES WITH AN OBJECTIVE OF ENCIRCLING THE SOVIET UNION. CHUN SAID HE CANNOT UNDERSTAND THE EUROPEAN BEHAVIOR, ASKING "DO THEY WANT THE SOVIETS TO COME IN?" CHUN IN-DICATED THAT HE BELIEVES PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND PEACEKEEPING IS CORRECT AND ADDED THAT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS TO KOREA WOULD BE A

#### MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

USEFUL SIGNAL TO THE SOVIET UNION AND TO KIM IL-SUNG. HE FEELS THAT THIS COULD BE THE KEY FOR PREVENTING WAR IN NORTHEAST ASIA. ADMIRAL LONG SAID THAT HE WAS AWARE OF MINISTER CHOO'S EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL WICKHAM ON THE SUBJECT OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS AND WANTED THE PRESIDENT TO KNOW THAT THE ISSUE IS OF SUCH POLITICAL IMPORTANCE IT WILL REQUIRE CAREFUL REVIEW AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL. LONG NOTED THAT A STUDY IS NOW UNDERWAY ON THE GENERAL QUESTION OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE PACIFIC. RESULTS OF THAT STUDY WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE BEFORE NEXT SUMMER. HE STRESSED THAT THE IMPORTANT POINT ON THIS ISSUE IS THAT IT IS BEING FULLY REPORTED TO WASHINGTON FOR REVIEW AND THAT NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA.

-- OPERATIONS UPDATE. ADMIRAL LONG PROVIDED AN UPDATE ON

PAGE Ø2 OF Ø2 SEOUL 4Ø72

DTG: 24Ø813Z NOV 81 PSN: Ø23484

CVBG ACTIVITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN (DOWN FROM 2 TO 1-1/2 CVBG) AND SEA OF JAPAN (A CVBG GOING THERE AFTER LONG ABSENCE), NOTING THE POSITIVE IMPACT ON SECURITY IN NORTHEAST ASIA.

-- ASEAN. ADMIRAL LONG ALSO DESCRIBED HIS RECENT VISIT TO MANILA DURING WHICH MARCOS POINTED UP THE NEED FOR GREATER ALLIED EFFORTS AGAINST THE SOVIETS, STRESSING IN PARTICULAR THE NEED FOR JAPAN TO DO MORE ON DEFENSE. MARCOS SAID HE BELIEVES ASEAN STATES ARE PREPARED ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS TO ENCOURAGE JAPAN. CHUN SAID HE HAD URGED ASEAN LEADERS TO WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH THE U.S. AND TO ACCEPT A GREATER JAPANESE MILITARY ROLE, ESPECIALLY IN AIR AND NAVAL DEFENSE.

-- JAPAN. PRESIDENT CHUN SAID THAT PART OF THE PROBLEM IN GETTING JAPAN TO DO MORE IS THE FACT THAT THE U.S. HAD BEEN SO PROTECTIVE IN THE PAST. HE NOTED HIS BELIEF THAT THE U.S. LACKS LEVERAGE BECAUSE OF THE STRONG JAPANESE ECONOMY. ADMIRAL LONG EMPHASIZED THAT U.S. PRESSURE NOW IS VERY REAL AND WILL CONTINUE. HE REFERRED TO GROWING U.S. CONGRESSIONAL IMPATIENCE WITH THE DEFENSE ISSUE AND THE TRADE IMBALANCE.

-- COALITION STRATEGY. ADMIRAL LONG REFERRED TO SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S NEW DEFENSE GUIDANCE POINTING UP THE NEED TO MAXIMIZE THE SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS OF ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN THE FACE OF THE GROWING SOVIET THREAT. HE POINTED OUT THERE ARE IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC REASONS WHY THIS CONCEPT MUST BE PURSUED WITH SPECIAL CARE, BUT WE NEED TO BE LOOKING AT WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR

#### MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

COMMON EFFORTS; FOR EXAMPLE, IN SUCH THINGS AS AIR AND SEA LIFT, AIR DEFENSE AND SEA SURVEILLANCE. THERE ARE GOOD THINGS WE ARE DOING TOGETHER IN THESE AREAS WHICH MIGHT BE USEFULLY EXPANDED, AS POLITICAL FACTORS PERMIT. HE EMPHASIZED THE SUCCESSFUL SOVIET EFFORT TO DEVELOP MILITARY CAPABILITY TO FIGHT SIMULTANEOUSLY IN EUROPE AND IN THE PACIFIC. THIS HAS OCCURRED OVER THE PAST DECADE WHILE OUR FORCES HAVE BEEN DRAWN DOWN. THE U.S. IS MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT TO MEET THE NEW THREAT. OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN THE REGION SHOULD ALSO DO MORE TO CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSES WHICH CAN HELP PRESERVE PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION AND BEYOND.

SEOUL 4072

DTG: 24Ø813Z NOV 81 PSN: Ø23484

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2 SEOUL 4Ø72 SIT587 DATE 11/25/81 DTG: 24Ø813Z NOV 81 PSN: Ø23485

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NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHUL #4072/02 3280827
O 240813Z NOV 81 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7148

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 SEOUL 14072

-- CHINA. ADMIRAL LONG ASKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS VIEWS ON U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. CHUN SAID HE HOPES RELATIONS WILL GRADUALLY EXPAND TO PRECLUDE ANY POSSIBILITY OF CHINA AND THE USSR GETTING TOGETHER AGAIN. BUT CHUN SAID THE U.S. SHOULD NOT PROVIDE CHINA "LETHAL, OFFENSIVE WEAPONS RIGHT AWAY", BECAUSE CHINA HAS NOT REALLY CHANGED THAT MUCH.

- 3. COMMENT: THE ABOVE SUMMARY OF THE LONG-CHUN MEETING WAS DRAFTED BY POLAD CONNORS AND SHOWN TO ADMIRAL LONG AND GENERAL WICKHAM WHO, ALONG WITH MYSELF, REGARD IT AS CLEAR AND ACCURATE.
- 4. I BELIEVE THE PUSH BY THE CHUN GOVERNMENT--ON WHICH THE PRESIDENT WAS BOTH FORCEFUL AND INTENSE--TO SEE NEW STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENTS HERE IN THE ROK REPRESENTS A CLEARLY THOUGHT-OUT MOVE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CURRENT DOUBTS AMONG AMERICAN ALLIES BOTH IN EUROPE AND ASIA ABOUT OUR STRATEGIC POSTURE. IT REPRESENTS TO THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE UP CLOSE TO THE RANKS OF MIDDLE POWER U.S. ALLIES LIKE, SAY, JAPAN OR BRITAIN, AND THEY MAY PERCEIVE THIS AS YET ANOTHER LEVER TO USE IN THEIR RUNNING DEBATE WITH JAPAN ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. CHUN HAS GIVEN CLEAR EVIDENCE IN RECENT TALKS WITH VISITORS IN WHICH I HAVE PARTICIPATED OF ENVISAGING A MUCH MORE ACTIVE AND PARTICI-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

PATORY ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND ESPECIALLY IN THE SECURITY ACTIVITIES IN THE REGION. THIS IS AN ITEM ON WHICH WE ARE LIKELY TO BE PRESENTED ISSUES FOR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE IN FUTURE MONTHS, AND WE SHALL LIKELY NEED TO THINK THROUGH JUST WHAT SORT OF REGIONAL ROLE WE OURSELVES ENVISAGE FOR THE ROKG IN OUR CLOSE ALLIED RELATIONSHIP WITH IT. END COMMENT. WALKER

# SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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E. O. 12065: RDS-1 12/16/01 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) OR-M

TAGS: MASS, MILI, JO, KS, IZ

SYBJECT: JORDANIAN PURCHASE OF KOREAN MANUFACTURED ARMS

REF: (A) STATE 329072 (B) AMMAN 09075

(C) SEOUL 11872 (D) SEOUL 12816

- 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. CHIEF, JUSMAG-K TODAY INFORMED FIRST ASSISTANT MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MG HAN (M-R: HAN SANG-KWON) OF THE INABILITY OF THE USG TO APPROVE THE TRANSFER OF 105MM AND 155 MM HOWITZERS AND 155MM AND 8-INCH AMMUNITION TO JORDAN BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE FINAL DESTINATION OF THESE ITEMS.
- 3. MG HAN INDICATED HE WOULD PROPOSE THAT THE JORDANIANS BE REQUESTED TO EXECUTE NEW RETRANSFER ASSURANCES AND DELIVER THEM TO THE ROK AND US EMBASSIES IN AMMAN. HE ASSERTED THAT REGARDLESS OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE LOSS OF THESE SALES, THE ROKG SUPPORTS US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WILL WITHDRAW ITS OFFER TO JORDAN, IF NECESSARY. MG HAN, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER WRITTEN NOTIFICATION OF THE U.S. DECISION WAS REQUIRED, REPLIED THAT HE HAD ALL HE NEEDED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTION.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- 4. COMMENT: MG HAN'S COMMENTS ABOUT REAPPLYING FOR RETRANSFER AGREEMENTS MAY BE WHISTLING IN THE DARK. WE WILL FOLLOW UP WITH MOFA ON DECEMBER 17. END COMMENT.
- 5. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS OTHER ADDRESSEES AS APPROPRIATE. WALKER

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## SECRET

### WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/18/01 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) OR-M TAGS: MASS, MILI, JO, KS, IZ

SUBJECT: JORDANIAN PURCHASE OF KOREAN MANUFACTURED ARMS SEOUL 14893 B) STATE 329072 C) AMMAN 09075 REF: A)

(SY ENTIRE TEXT.

EA/K DIRECTOR DESIGNATE LAMBERTSON AND EMBOFF CALLED ON MOFA ASSISTANT MINISTER FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS RO MYUNG GONG (M-R: KONG NO-MYONG) DECEMBER 17. AFTER GONG HAD COMMENTED ON VERY SATISFACTORY STATE OF US/ROK RELATIONS, LAMBERTSON TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE SUBJECT OF POTENTIAL SALE OF KOREAN MADE U.S. - ORIGIN DEFENSE EQUIPMENT TO JORDAN. ALTHOUGH CHIEF JUSMAG-K HAD SPOKEN TO VICE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, LAMBERTSON NOTED WE WANT TO REEMPHASIZE THAT THE SALE IS DISAPPROVED, AND THAT KOREAN REAPPLICATION FOR RETRANSFER ASSURANCES WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT CHANGE THIS DISAPPROVAL. GONG MUSED THAT POONGSAN METALS IS IN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND THAT BUSINESSMEN FRIENDS OFTEN TELL HIM THAT IF KOREANS DO NOT SELL ARMAMENTS TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES, SOMEONE ELSE WILL. EMBOFF SAID THAT SALES WHICH VIOLATE THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF AGREEMENTS WITH THE U.S. A) RUN THE RISK OF RETALIATION IN MATTERS THAT AFFECT THE ENTIRE ROK DEFENSE POSTURE, SUCH AS CUTS IN FMS LEVELS, AND B) DAMAGE THE CONFIDENCE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

WHICH IS SO NECESSARY TO A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KOREA AND THE U.S.

- GONG LISTENED CAREFULLY TO THE POINTS RAISED. WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE ISSUE AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT.
- 4. DEPT PLEASE PASS OTHER ADDRESSEES AS APPROPRIATE. WALKER

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