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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 2/28/2007

File Folder

KOREA, SOUTH (04/14/1982-04/30/1982)

**FOIA** 

Box Number 9

F06-048

KYUNG

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ID Doc Type	Docu	ıment Descriptio	on	No of Pages		Restrictions
34790 PROFILE SHEET	NSC 8	202552 (WITH NO	OTATIONS)	1	4/14/1982	B1
	R	1/22/2010	F06-048			
34794 LETTER	CAP V	VEINBERGER TO	WILLIAM P CLARK	2	4/12/1982	B1
	P	1/22/2010	F06-048			
34795 PAPER	ROK N	MND'S VIEWS: TI	HE 14TH ANNUAL	23	4/11/1982	B1
	ROK/U MEET	US SECURITY CO	NSULTATIVE			
	D	6/5/2008				
	<i>D</i>	0/3/2008	NLRRF06-048			
34796 CABLE	241148	8Z APR 82		4	4/24/1982	B1
	PAR	3/27/2008	NLRR06-048			
34797 CABLE	29083	IZ APR 82		4	4/29/1982	B1
	R	3/27/2008	NLRR06-048			
34798 CABLE	290836	6Z APR 82		5	4/29/1982	B1
	R	3/27/2008	NLRR06-048			

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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FROM WEINBERGER, C

ID 8202552

RECEIVED 14 APR 82 11

DOCDATE 12 APR 82

KEYWORDS: FMS

KOREA SOUTH

CHUN DOO HWAN

CM

CLARK

SUBJECT: PRES CHUN REQUEST FOR INCREASED FMS CREDIT

URGENT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 14 APR 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

SHOEMAKER

GREGG

WHEELER

CHILDRESS

COMMENTS \*\*CABINET LEVEL - 3 HR TURNAROUND

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
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TO

CLARK

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOCDATE 12 APR 82



KEYWORDS: FMS

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SUBJECT: PRES CHUN REQUEST FOR INCREASED FMS CREDIT

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ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 14 APR 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

KIMMITT SHOEMAKER GREGG WHEELER

BOB,

CHILDRESS

Rich Armitage called me about this yesterday. He considers it a heads-up memo, alerting us to the fact that SecDef was impressed by the ROK arguments. He suggested that a short acknowledgement from Clark would be all that is necessary. On the substantive issue, I think that the ROKs make a good case

for more FMS, but that with the world as it is, it is hard to make theirs

COMMENTS \*\*CABINET LEVEL — 3 HR TURNAROUND an absolute priority.

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RECEIVED 14 APR 82 11

TO

CLARK

FROM WEINBERGER, C DOCDATE 12 APR 82

DECLASSIFIED White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 2 24 6 7

KEYWORDS: FMS

DISPATCH

KOREA SOUTH

CHUN DOO HWAN

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

CM

SUBJECT: PRES CHUN REQUEST FOR INCREASED FMS CREDIT

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ID 8202552

TO

CLARK

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOCDATE 12 APR 82

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KOREA SOUTH

CHUN DOO HWAN

CM

SUBJECT: PRES CHUN REQUEST FOR INCREASED FMS CREDIT

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ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 14 APR 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

COMMENTS \*\*CABINET LEVEL - 3 HR TURNAROUND

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

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WHEELER

CHILDRESS

I concur.

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# THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

April 29, 1982

Dear Cap:

Thank you for your letter of April 12, which forwarded briefing papers prepared by the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense.

I agree that the Korean security assistance program merits special attention. As you know, however, Korean FMS levels will be very dependent on our ability to secure Congressional approval of an enhanced worldwide security assistance program. I look forward to working with Al and you toward achievement of this important goal.

Sincerely,

Bin

William P. Clark

Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger Secretary of Defense Washington, D. C. 20301

cc: Secretary Haig

#### **MEMORANDUM**

#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH SECRET
ATTACHMENTS

April 16, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT:

South Korean Security Assistance

Secretary Weinberger has forwarded briefing papers on security assistance prepared by the South Korean Defense Ministry (Tab II). The Secretary states his support for enhanced Korean FMS levels and indicates he will propose specific recommendations to achieve this goal.

South Korea is one of the eight countries that consume 85% of our overall security assistance budget. However, since the Korean program is not viewed as an untouchable -- à la Israel, Egypt, and the base rights countries -- it feels the full adverse effect of Congressional cuts and emergency reprogrammings.

Thus, unless we can convince Congress to enhance our worldwide level, there is probably little hope for the major Korean expansion sought by the Secretary. The response at Tab I, then, encourages Secretary Weinberger to join in the effort to secure passage of our pending security assistance requests.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response at Tab I.

Approve\_\_\_\_

Disapprove

Don Gregg, Dick Childress, and Chris Shoemaker concur.

Attachments

Tab I Proposed response Tab II Weinberger letter

UNCLASSIFIED WITH SECRET ATTACHMENTS



MW



## RECEIVE WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

02 APR 14 AID: 59

12 APR 1982

Honorable William P. Clark Assistant to President for National Security Affairs The White House Washington, D.C. Dear Judge\_Clark: \711

(C) During my recent visit to the Republic of Korea (ROK), President Chun, Minister of National Defense Choo, and other officials pressed for increased FMS credit and for assistance to rescue from bankruptcy the over-extended defense industry there. They presented a rather convincing case as evidenced by the attached briefing papers which you and your staff may find of interest. Most telling was the fact that in 1982 they received some \$94 million less in new credit than the \$260 million they were required to pay in that year for past loans. That experience will no doubt be repeated in FY 1983. They argued that despite allocations of 6% of GNP (about 35% of the national budget) to defense, they still will need substantial amounts of FMS credits in the future. They stressed that the credits will be used to support planned acquisitions in the United States over the next few years of about benefits both nations. However, even if they achieve presently projected force modernization goals the military imbalance will not be redressed completely.

FOIA(b)(I)

I am persuaded by their arguments and was most impressed during my visit by the energy, determination, ambition and accomplishments of the Korean people. The ROK has been a most faithful ally and is likely to continue in that role. I believe that we must do more to assist in the present circumstances. Defense can and will take action to help the ROK defense industry by expanding use of Korean facilities to overhaul and maintain at a savings US equipment on the peninsula and in the region. Defense will also make certain that no sales opportunities are lost due to bureaucratic red tape. Moreover, I intend to support in FY

**DECLASSIFIED IN PART** NLRR FD6-048#34794 BY RW NARA DATE 1-25-10

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

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Classified by: Sec Def Declassify on: 13 April 1988

# SECRET

1984 a larger amount of FMS credit, more favorable repayment terms and some form of concessionary interest. The importance of maintaining stability on the peninsula by deterring North Korean aggression suggests that it would be prudent to use our security assistance resources to make certain that the ROK has the capability to resist successfully a hostile intrusion. My staff is looking at options, and I will be forwarding specific recommendations in due course.

Sincerely,

Attachment

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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FOIA

KOREA, SOUTH (04/14/1982-04/30/1982)

F06-048

**KYUNG** 

Box Number

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ID	Document Type
	<b>Document Description</b>

No of Doc Date pages

Restrictions

**34795 PAPER** 

23 4/1

4/11/1982 B1

ROK MND'S VIEWS: THE 14TH ANNUAL ROK/US SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FAGE 0: OF 02 SECUL 4083 SIT388 DATE 04/28/82 DTG: 241148Z APR 82 PSN: Ø54294

TOR: 114/1357Z

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FOR.

WHSR COMMENT: MSG HAS BEEN RETRANSMITTED TO VP PARTY

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHUL #4083/01 1141151
O 241148Z APR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDO NIACT IMMEDIATE 9645

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 04083
NODIS
DEPT PLEASE PASS TO TOKYO FOR VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S PARTY
E.O. 12065: RDS-4 4/24/02 (WALKER, RICHARD L.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, US, KS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
SHINYONG LHO TO DISCUSS BREAKFAST FOR VICE PRESIDENT BUSH
AT EMBASSY RESIDENCE AND ROKG HANDLING OF STATEMENT BY
KOREAN CHRISTIAN ACTION CRGANIZATION

#### 1. 5 - ENTIRE TEXT.

- 2. UPON RETURN FROM COM MEETING IN HAWAII WHERE I DISCUSSED SUBJECT WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS AND FOLLOWING DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH GENERAL WICKHAM EN ROUTE EACK TO SEOUL, I REQUESTED A MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHINYONG LHO (M-R: NO SIN-YONG) THIS MORNING TO MAKE CLEAR SOME POINTS ON USG POSITION AND MY OWN VIEWS ON THE RECENT HANDLING OF THE MEDIA REGARDING THE STATEMENT ISSUED OSTENSIBLY BY 42 MEMBERS OF THE KOREAN CHRISTIAN ACTION ORGANIZATION (ACTUALLY PROBABLY FEWER THAN TWENTY AGREED TO THE ISSUANCE IN ADVANCE AND SOME HAVE DISASSOCIATED THEMSELVES FROM IT).
- 3. I BEGAN BY STRESSING THAT WE WERE ANXIOUS FOR THE VISIT BY VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH TO BE POSITIVE IN

#### MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

EVERY RESPECT SO AS TO STRESS FOR ALL THE CLOSENESS AND HARMONY IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. I THEN POINTED OUT THAT, IN ALL CANDOR, WE DID NOT BELIEVE THE HANDLING OF THE STATEMENT BY THE 42 CLERICS REFLECTED ADEQUATE ROKG CONSIDERATION EITHER FOR THE LONG RANGE CONSEQUENCES OR FOR THE EFFECT IT COULD HAVE IN THE UNITED STATES.

4. SEVERAL AMERICANS AND SOME KOREANS FROM WHOM WE HAD HEARD FELT THAT THE PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THE INCIDENT, THE ATTEMPT TO SAY THAT THE AUTHORS SUPPORTED THE PUSAN ARSON (WHICH IS NOT ACTUALLY TRUE), AND THE REPEATING OF STATEMENTS WHICH ARE SHEER FABRICATIONS ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL WICKHAM AND MYSELF WOULD ONLY TEND TO AROUSE PASSIONS AND THAT IN THE UNITED STATES THOSE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE CLERICS WOULD USE THE INCIDENT TO KEEP ALIVE A CAMPAIGN DIRECTED AGAINST OUR GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF QUIET





PAGE 02 OF 02 SEOUL 4083

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DIPLOMACY WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS. WERE THE GOVERNMENT TO COME TO THE SUPPORT OF GENERAL WICKHAM AND MYSELF, IT WOULD ONLY PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE ANTI-FOKG ACTIVISTS IN THE UNITED STATES. BY HANDLING THE MATTER THE WAY THEY HAD, THE ROK HAD UNDERCUT TWO OF THEIR LEADING FRIENDS IN KOREA AND BUILT A BASIS FOR FURTHER POLARIZATION. I NOTED THAT SOME AMERICANS AS WELL AS KOREANS HAD EXPRESSED TO EMBASSY PERSONNEL THE BELIEF THAT THE ROK LEADERS HAD BLOWN THIS ISSUE OUT OF PROPORTION PRIMARILY TO INTIMIDATE AND GET A HOLD ON THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY TOWARDS WHICH IT STILL FELT INSECURE.

5. I THEN TURNED TO THE CASE OF PARK HYONG KYU NOTING THAT IT WAS ONLY AFTER AN INVITATION HAD BEEN ISSUED TO HIM FOR . EREAKFAST WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT WE HAD LEARNED THAT HE WAS ONE OF THE ACTIVE FORCES BEHIND THE STATEMENT BY 42 CLERICS. SUBSEQUENTLY, NSP DIRECTOR YU HAK-SUNG HAD HAD A DISCUSSION WITH LATION BE WITHDRAWN. I POINTED OUT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT WE COULD NOT OPEN A PRACTICE WHICH WOULD GIVE THE ROKG SAY-SO OVER MY PRIVATE GUEST LISTS, THAT IF IT WERE TO BECOME KNOWN, THE ROKG SPLIT WITH CHRISTIANS AND ACADEMICS COULD BECOME A CHASM, THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF OTHERS, AND THAT THE CHARGES BY SOME DISSIDENTS THAT THE USG WAS EMBRACING PRESIDENT CHUN DOO HWAN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) TOO UNCRITICALLY COULD SEEM TO BE BORNE OUT.

BI

#### MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

6. I THEN REPEATED THE BACKGROUND OF THE REASON FOR CUR INVITATION FOR INTELLECTUAL, CULTURAL, RELIGIOUS, AND JOURNALISTIC LEADERS TO COME AT MY INVITATION FOR BREAK-FAST. IN DOING SO, I STRESSED THAT WE REGARDED THIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR BOTH THE EMBASSY AND THE ROKG TO DISPLAY SELF-CONFIDENCE IN DEALING WITH A BROAD SPECTRUM OF LEADERS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT. NOTING THAT THE FEW CRITICS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHO HAD BEEN INVITED WOULD BE SURROUNDED BY SOME VERY RESPONSIBLE HEAVYWEIGHTS LIKE THE PRESIDENTS OF YONSEI UNIVERSITY AND OF KOREA UNIVERSITY, FOR EXAMPLE, I STATED MY BELIEF THAT ALLOWING THE BREAK-FAST TO PROCEED WITH UTMOST SMOOTHNESS COULD END UP A POSITIVE PLUS FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, PARK HYONG KYU DID NOT SHOW, HE WOULD BE DISCREDITED AND SINCE HE WILL LIKELY COME, THERE WILL BE A LARGE MAJORITY OF

FAGE 01 OF 02 SECUL 4083 SITSST DATE 04/28/82 DTG: 241148Z APR 82 PSN: Ø54296

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHUL #4083/02 1141159
O 241148Z APR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9646

S F O R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 SEOUL 04083

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO TOKYO FOR VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S PARTY FEOPLE TO REFUTE ANY IRRESPONSIBLE STATEMENTS HE MIGHT MAKE. GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE INFORMAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM IN SEOUL, THE BREAKFAST WILL BE COMMON TALK WITHIN A MATTER OF HOURS.

- 7. I INFORMED THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TALKING POINTS AND ASSURED HIM THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE A REAFFIRMATION OF OUR CONFIDENCE IN THE POLITICAL AND SECURITY FUTURE OF THE ROK. WE VIEW THE BREAKFAST MEETING AS A DECIDED CONTRAST WITH PRESIDENT CARTER'S MEETING WITH THE DISSIDENTS; IT IS A METHOD OF STRESSING THE USG AND ROKG SUPPORT FOR BUILDING RESPONSIBLE CONSENSUS IN DEALING WITH OUR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND COMMON TASKS. I REPEATED MY CONCERN THAT ANY PRESSURES ON ANY OF THE INVITEES COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR FURPOSES WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, BY THIS TIME, INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD AND SHARED.
- 8. FINALLY. I POINTED TO THE FACT THAT APART FROM HIS FORTHRIGHT SUPPORT FOR GENERAL WICKHAM AND MYSELF, I WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT SOME OF THE RESPONSIBLE NON-GOVERNMENT INTELLECTUALS AND CULTURAL LEADERS, WHO HAVE KNOWN MY COMMITMENT TO THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF KOREAN CULTURE AND PEOPLE AND WHO HAVE READ AND NOTED MY STATEMENTS IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

SUPPORT OF HUMAN FREEDOM, HAD NOT VOLUNTARILY COME FORWARD OR BEEN INTERVIEWED TO SET TO REST THE PRESS DISTORTIONS BOTH HERE AND IN THE UNITED STATES. THE FOREIGN MINISTER TOOK THIS ABOARD, BUT I CONCLUDED BY REMINDING HIM THAT I HOPE THE WHOLE AFFAIR WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT.

9. THE FOREIGN MINISTER WAS ENTIRELY SUPPORTIVE OF THE POSITIONS I EXPRESSED AND OBVIOUSLY SHOWED LITTLE ANXIETY ABOUT RELAYING THE EMBASSY'S POSITION TO PRESIDENT CHUN AND OTHER BLUE HOUSE STAFFERS. HE EXPRESSED HIS OWN HOPE THAT, OUT OF THIS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT MOMENT, WE WOULD ALL EMERGE WITH BETTER UNDERSTANDING, AND HE REPEATED THAT THE PRIVATE BREAKFAST WAS A GOOD IDEA. HE EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH WE HAD INCLUDED SOME CRITICS AND SURROUNDED THEM WITH RESPONSIBLE OPINION LEADERS



F4GE 02 OF 02 SEOUL 4083

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IN THE ROK. IN THE COURSE OF A VERY CONGENIAL DISCUSSION, HE EVEN REVEALED THAT ON RETURN FROM A BLUE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON TUESDAY WHICH INCLUDED HER HWA PYUNG (M-R: HO HWA PYONG). HUH SAM SOO, YI POM-SOK (M-R), THE PRESIDENT AND TWO OTHERS, HE HAD FELT SOMEWHAT WORRIED ABOUT THE IMPACT THE WHOLE PRESS HANDLING WAS HAVING ON ME, AND HE SUMMONED A PRESS CONFERENCE WITHOUT EVEN CONSULTING THE FRESIDENT. THIS HAD, AS HAS BEEN REPORTED, RESULTED IN HIS OWN EXPRESSIONS OF FAITH IN THE SUPPORT FOR THE KOREAN PEOPLE AND THEIR DIGNITY BY BOTH GENERAL WICKHAM AND MYSELF.

10. COMMENT: THE FOREIGN MINISTER SEEMS TO BE FULLY UNDERSTANDING OF OUR INTENTIONS AND THE PATTERN WE HAVE LAID OUT FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. THIS AUGURS WELL FOR THE INTENSE FORTY-EIGHT HOURS BEGINNING TOMORROW MORNING. HE IS ALSO EXUDING SOME CONFIDENCE ABOUT THE UPCOMING MEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN AND TOOK THE OCCASION TO THANK ME FOR THE INDIRECT AMERICAN SUPPORT HANDLED IN JUST THE RIGHT MANNER. END COMMENT. WALKER

SEOUL 4083

DTG: 241148Z APR 82 PSN: Ø54296

PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2 SEOUL 4296 SIT197 DATE Ø5/Ø3/82 DTG: 290831Z APR 82 PSN: 005009

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NARADATE 3/27/08

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DE RUEHUL #4296/Ø1 1190841
O 290831Z APR 82
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9729

INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1164
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0070
SA CINCUNC KS PRIORITY
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS PRIORITY
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//CJ-CC/BJ-PL-H/SJS// PRIORITY
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 04296 CANBERRA FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY E.O. 12065: GDS 04/29/88 (CLEVELAND, PAUL M.) OR-M TAGS: PINT SHUM EIND ELAB KS US OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE) SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S BREAKFAST MEETING WITH KOREAN OPINION LEADERS

### 1. (C ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: AT AN OFF-THE-RECORD BREAKFAST MEETING APRIL 26 WITH LEADERS OF ACADEMIC, LABOR, AND CHRISTIAN CIRCLES, THE VICE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO JUSTICE, FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXPLAINED THESE GOALS CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMACY. IN RESPONSE TO THE VICE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION FOR "FRANK, HONEST CRITICISM," TWO LEADING CHRISTIANS COMMENTED ON THE CHUN ADMINISTRATION'S TIGHT CONTROL OVER KOREA AND CLAIMED THE ROKG MANIPULATES EVENTS FOR ITS OWN INTERESTS. ONE SAID THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SEEMS TO GIVE HUMAN RIGHTS SECOND PRIORITY, AN ASSERTION WHICH THE VICE PRESIDENT VIGOROUSLY AND EFFECTIVELY REBUTTED. IN PERHAPS THE MOST NOTABLE REMARK AT THE BREAKFAST, HOWEVER, THE REV. PARK YOUNG KYU CONCEDED THAT REPORTS OF AMBASSADOR WALKER'S REMARKS ABOUT "SPOILED BRATS" TURNED OUT TO BE WRONG. A LABOR EXPERT SAID CONTINUED ACCESS TO THE U.S. MARKET IS NECESSARY NOT ONLY FOR KOREA'S ECONOMIC RECOVERY, BUT FOR DEMOCRACY. REACTION AMONG THE KOREAN GUESTS TO THE VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE THEIR CONCERNS WITH HIM WAS VERY POSITIVE. END SUMMARY.

3. THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD A 90-MINUTE BREAKFAST MEETING APRIL 26 WITH 18 KOREAN LEADERS FROM ACADEMIC, LABOR AND RELIGIOUS CIRCLES, AND THREE AMERICAN MISSIONARIES. IN OPENING REMARKS THE VICE PRESIDENT COMMENTED ON KOREA'S

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GROWING INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE, THEN SAID HIS VISIT TO U. S. AND KOREAN SOLDIERS AT THE DMZ THE PREVIOUS DAY HAD BROUGHT HOME FOR HIM THE NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES NOT TO PULL BACK FROM WORLD RESPONSIBILITIES. HE PRAISED THE CLOSE SECURITY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. BUT THE U.S. HAS OTHER INTERESTS BESIDES SECURITY, OUR COUNTRY IS FOUNDED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, PRINCIPLES WHICH MUST BE REFLECTED IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRA-UNLIKE ITS PREDECESSOR, WILL HONOR THESE PRINCIPLES THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMACY RATHER THAN PUBLIC EXHORTATION. PRESUMABLY WE HAVE THE GREATEST LEVERAGE IN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES, BUT IF WE UNDERMINE AND ESTRANGE FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS WE WILL LOSE OUR LEVERAGE. THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED A GROWING SENSE OF NATIONAL SELF-CONFIDENCE AND PRIDE IN KOREA. STRONG NATIONAL PRIDE WAS SOMETHING AMERICANS UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED IN OTHERS. WE DID NOT INTERPRET THIS AS ANTI-AMERICANISM. THERE MAY BE POCKETS OF ANTI-KOREAN FEELING IN THE U.S. OR POCKETS OF ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS IN KOREA, BUT THE OVERWHELMING IMPRESSION IS ONE OF SHARED PURPOSE. HE SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THE VAST MAJORITY OF KOREANS WERE NOT ANTI-AMERICAN. THE VICE PRESIDENT INVITED FRANK, HONEST HE MIGHT DISAGREE WITH IT, BUT THE RELATION-CRITICISM. SHIP IS STRONG ENOUGH TO TAKE CRITICISM.

4. THE FIRST RESPONDENT WAS REV. HYUNG KYU PARK (M-R: PAK -- HYONG-KYU), ONE OF THE SIGNERS OF AN APRIL 15 KOREAN

#### MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CHRISTIAN ACTION ORGANIZATION (KCAO) STATEMENT CRITICAL OF THE ROKG AND U.S. POLICY IN KOREA. REV. PARK SAID HE WAS HONORED TO BE PRESENT AND THANKED THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE AMBASSADOR FOR THE CHANCE TO EXPRESS HIS VIEWS. SAID HE AGREED WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT THE VICE PRESI-HE WAS NEITHER PRO- OR ANTI-AMERICAN, NOR DENT HAD SAID. HAD ANY OF HIS PUBLIC REMARKS BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST INDIVIDUALS. HE THEN APOLOGIZED FOR A SERMON IN WHICH HE ATTACKED THE AMBASSADOR FOR CALLING KOREAN DISSIDENTS "SPOILED BRATS." "I QUOTED THE AMBASSADOR AND FOUND OUT LATER THAT I WAS WRONG. " REV. PARK WENT ON TO SAY THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT REPRESENT ALL KOREANS. ALT AL THOUGH MOST KOREANS FEEL THE COUNTRY IS FULLY READY FOR DEMOCRACY, THE GOVERNMENT DISAGREES, AND LEADS KOREA AS IT SEES FIT. THE GOVERNMENT USES PRO-AMERICAN FEELING AND THE THREAT FROM THE NORTH FOR ITS OWN POLITICAL PURPOSES. GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS ARE IMPORTANT, BUT SO ARE THOSE BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF KOREA AND THE U.S.

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- 5. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD KNOWN AMBASSADOR WALKER FOR A LONG TIME; HE IS A DECENT, HONORABLE MAN AND REV. PARK HAD SHOWN BY HIS APOLOGY AND CORRECTION OF HIS MISQUOTATION OF AMBASSADOR WALKER THAT HE WAS A BIG MAN. PARK'S CONVICTIONS HAD COME THROUGH LOUD AND CLEAR.
- 6. PROFESSOR PARK YOUNG KI (M-R: PAK YONG-KI), DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF LABOR AND MANAGEMENT, SOGANG UNIVERSITY, SPOKE NEXT, SAYING THAT KOREA IS IN A RECESSION, UNEMPLOY-MENT IS UP, AND UNION MEMBERSHIP HAS DECLINED FROM 1.2 MILLION TO .8 MILLION. KOREA'S ECONOMY IS EXPORT-ORIENTED, AND RESTRICTIONS ON FREE TRADE IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE ARE HARMFUL. THESE RESTRICTIONS CAUSE DOMESTIC TENSION AND HINDER DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT.
- 7. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT DESPITE RISING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROTECTIONIST SENTIMENT IN THE U.S., ESPECIALLY AGAINST JAPAN, AND THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FACING THE U.S. ECONOMY, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS SENSITIVE TO THE KOREAN SITUATION AND REMAINS COMMITTED TO FREE AND FAIR TRADE.

8. THE LAST KOREAN RESPONDENT WAS KOREAN NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (KNCC) PRESIDENT CHO YONG SUL (M-R: CHO YONG-SOK), WHO ALSO SIGNED THE KCAO STATEMENT. CHO SAID THE KCAO STATEMENT IS PORTRAYED BY THE GOVERNMENT AS ANTI-AMERICAN, AND IN THE EYES OF THE GOVERNMENT MOST OF THE CHRISTIANS AT THE BREAKFAST ARE ANTI-AMERICAN. AFTER THE BREAKFAST, HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT MAY CALL US ALL "FOLLOWERS OF BIG POWERS." IF THE GOVERNMENT KEEPS FORCING DISSIDENTS INTO A CORNER, PEOPLE WHO WERE NOT ORIGINALLY ANTI-AMERICAN MAY END UP HATING THE U.S. UNDER PRESIDENT CARTER, HUMAN RIGHTS GOT A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION, BUT

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UNDER PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT CONCERN SEEMS TO HAVE SECOND PRIORITY. AFTER PRESIDENT PARK (M-R: PAK CHONG-HUI) WAS ASSASSINATED KOREANS HAD GREAT HOPES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA, BUT THERE HAS BEEN ONLY SUPERFICIAL IMPROVEMENT. IN FACT, THE SITUATION IS MORE CONTROLLED TODAY THAN IT WAS IN THE 1970'S, AND PART OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT LIES WITH THE U.S. DECISION TO GIVE HUMAN RIGHTS A LOWER PRIORITY.

9. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID REV. CHO'S VIEWS REMINDED HIM OF MANY VIGOROUS DISCUSSIONS AND DISAGREEMENTS HE HAS HAD WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE UNITED STATES. THE NCC HAS BEEN LARGELY SILENT ABOUT THE SAD STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN VIETNAM AFTER THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. THE NCC WAS VERY CRITICAL OF THE SHAH BUT IS LESS CRITICAL OF THE AYATULLAH KHOMEINI, OF IRAN. EVEN THOUGH HUMAN RIGHTS ARE MORE RESTRICTED NOW THAN UNDER THE SHAH. THE NCC CRITICIZED THE PREVIOUS REGIME IN NICARAGUA, BUT CRITICISM OF OBVIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF THE PRESENT MARXIST GOVERNMENT IS NOT HEARD. THE VICE PRESIDENT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS ABANDONED BREAST-BEATING HUMAN RIGHTS RHETORIC. BUT "IN ITS HEARTBEAT" IT IS COMMITTED TO THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN CALLED ON NSC STAFFER DON GREGG TO COMPARE HUMAN RIGHTS IN TODAY'S KOREA WITH THE SITUATION IN THE 1970'S WHEN GREGG SERVED IN EMBASSY SEOUL. GREGG SAID THAT WHEN HE FIRST CAME TO KOREA THE KCIA WAS HEADED BY AN INFAMOUS INDIVIDUAL, KIM DAE JUNG (M-R: KIM TAE-CHUNG) HAD

#### MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

JUST BEEN KIDNAPPED FROM HIS HOTEL IN JAPAN, AND A PROFESSOR CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT HAD DIED IN SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. WHILE THE CURRENT SITUATION IS NOT PERFECT, IT COMPARES FAVORABLY WITH THE EARLY 1970'S.

- 10. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THIS BREAKFAST MEETING WAS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PRESENTATION WAS ARTICULATE AND SENSITIVE TO THE CONCERNS OF HIS AUDIENCE. THEY REACTED VERY POSITIVELY TO IT, AND TO THE HEARING THEY RECEIVED. THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE OF THE BREAKFAST AND, AFTER SOME INITIAL RESERVATIONS, POSED NO OBJECTION TO IT.
- 11. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY. WALKER

## SECRET

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SECRET SECTION Ø1 OF Ø3 SEOUL Ø4297 CANBERRA FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY E.O. 12065: RDS-4 Ø4/29/Ø2 (BLAKEMORE, DAVID) OR-P TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE) KS US SUBJECT: THE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CHUN

## 1. S- ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: DURING THE FIRST OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TWO APRIL 26 CALLS AT THE BLUE HOUSE, PRESIDENT CHUN DOO HWAN EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR THE VISIT AND FOR STRONG U.S. SUPPORT. IN THE PAST, UNCERTAINTY ABOUT U.S. POLICY HAD CAUSED SOME COUNTRIES TO FALL TO THE COMMUNISTS. CHUN FORESEES NO MOVEMENT ON NORTH/SOUTH ISSUES, BUT IN FIVE OR SIX YEARS THE NORTH WILL BE COMPELLED BY THE SOUTH'S ECONOMIC SUCCESSES TO RESPOND POSITIVELY. THE PRESIDENT MADE A PLEA FOR UNSPECIFIED, SPECIAL ECONOMIC TREATMENT. IF KOREA COULD SUSTAIN A SIX OR SEVEN PERCENT ANNUAL GNP GROWTH, IT COULD OFFER AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND

#### MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

ALSO SUSTAIN A 5 BILLION MILITARY BUDGET WITH LITTLE STRAIN. CHUN ASKED FOR AN INCREASE IN FMS CREDIT IN FY 1983 FROM 210 MILLION DOLLARS TO 500 MILLION DOLLARS, AND URGED THAT THE INTEREST RATE BE DROPPED FROM 14 PERCENT TO 7 PERCENT. WITHOUT MORE FMS CREDIT, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR KOREA TO PURCHASE NEW FACILITIES AND WEAPONS AND PAY BACK ITS DEBTS. THE VICE PRESIDENT PROMISED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER. DURING AN AFTER DINNER PRIVATE MEETING, PRESIDENT CHUN SPOKE POSITIVELY OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S BREAKFAST WITH KOREAN OPINION MAKERS EARLIER IN THE DAY. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING THE FIRST OF VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S TWO APRIL 26 CALLS AT THE BLUE HOUSE (ONLY THE VICE PRESIDENT, CHUN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN), AND AN INTERPRETER FROM EACH SIDE WERE PRESENT) PRESIDENT CHUN SAID HE HAD BEEN HONORED TO BE THE

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FIRST HEAD OF STATE TO VISIT THE REAGAN WHITE HOUSE, AND IT IS AN HONOR TO HAVE VICE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH VISIT KOREA DURING THE CENTENNIAL OF U.S.—KOREAN RELATIONS. CHUN NOTED HE HAS BEEN IN OFFICE LITTLE MORE THAN A YEAR. THANKS IN PART TO STRONG U.S. SUPPORT, KOREA HAS BEEN ABLE IN THAT SHORT PERIOD TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY.

- 4. THE VICE PRESIDENT ASSURED PRESIDENT CHUN THERE IS NO CHANGE IN U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF KIM IL SONG'S BRUTAL AND TOTALITARIAN RULE. THE U.S. WILL NOT WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM KOREA. U.S.-KOREAN RELATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN BETTER, AND THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO IMPROVE. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS ALWAYS READY TO HEAR ABOUT POSSIBLE PROBLEMS.
- 5. PRESIDENT CHUN SAID HE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT REAGAN THAT THE FREE WORLD MUST RALLY AROUND THE U.S. TO PUT A STOP TO COMMUNIST EXPANSION. YET, MANY NATIONS PURSUE THEIR OWN NARROWLY-DEFINED NATIONAL INTERESTS. EARLIER U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS LACKED SENSITIVITY TO ALLIES' PROBLEMS AND TRIED TO FORCE A COMPLETELY U.S. MODEL ON OTHERS. PARTLY AS A RESULT, SEVERAL COUNTRIES FELL TO THE COMMUNISTS AND NOW THE U.S. SUFFERS A LACK OF CREDIBILITY WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM DURING HIS TOUR OF FIVE ASEAN COUNTRIES LAST YEAR, ASSURING THOSE NATIONS' LEADERS THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN KNOWS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FRIENDS AND ENEMIES. HE HAD ENCOURAGED ASEAN LEADERS TO DEVELOP CLOSER TIES WITH THE U.S., AND THEY SEEMED TO AGREE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THIS IS DESIRABLE.

- 6. THE VICE PRESIDENT, NOTING THAT HIS NEXT STOP AFTER SEOUL IS SINGAPORE, SAID THE U.S. GETS FAIRLY SOLID SUPPORT FROM ASEAN. OUR MAIN CONCERN NOW IS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, ESPECIALLY IN NICARAGUA, HONDURAS, AND EL SALVADOR. THERE IS A LACK OF SUPPORT FROM EUROPEAN ALLIES AS WE ATTEMPT TO COUNTER SOVIET-BACKED CUBAN EXPANSIONISM.
- 7. PRESIDENT CHUN SAID THE EIGHTIES WILL BE VERY DANGEROUS IF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S. DO NOT COOPERATE, A POINT HE STRESSES WHEN WESTERN LEADERS VISIT KOREA. KOREA HAS RECEIVED MUCH FROM THE U.S. DURING THE PAST 100 YEARS; IT EXPECTS TO REPAY THAT DEBT BY BEING A STEADY U.S. ALLY IN THE NEXT CENTURY. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT KOREA'S SACRIFICES DURING THE VIETNAM WAR WERE A SIGNIFICANT REPAYMENT.

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- 8. PRESIDENT CHUN EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE YOUNG AMERICAN MEN AND WOMEN RISKING THEIR LIVES TO DEFEND KOREA. THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS THE BEST PLACE IN THE WORLD TO COMPARE THE MERITS OF THE COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST SYSTEMS. HISTORICALLY, IT HAS BEEN THE BATTLEGROUND OF CONTINENTAL AND NAVAL POWERS WHICH RECOGNIZE ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE CHINESE AND SOVIETS, BOTH OF WHOM WOULD LIKE IT IN THEIR SPHERE OF INFLUENCE. THE U.S. ROLE HERE CONTRIBUTES NOT ONLY TO PEACE IN THIS AREA BUT TO WORLD PEACE AS WELL.
- 9. WHEN THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED ABOUT PROGRESS IN THE NORTH/SOUTH PROBLEM, CHUN SAID THERE IS NO HOPE AT PRESENT. TO ANY OBJECTIVE OBSERVER, HIS PROPOSALS ARE LOGICAL AND REALISTIC, BUT THEY HAVE PUT KIM IL SONG IN AN EMBARRASSING POSITION. THE NORTH CANNOT ACCEPT PRESIDENT CHUN'S

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

PROPOSALS NOW BECAUSE THE SUCCESSION ISSUE HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED. HOWEVER, IN FIVE OR SIX YEARS THE SOUTH WILL HAVE SO CLEARLY OUTSTRIPPED THE NORTH ECONOMICALLY THAT THE NORTH WILL HAVE TO MAKE A POSITIVE RESPONSE. IN THE MEANTIME, PRESIDENT CHUN WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE. IN RESPONSE TO THE VICE PRESIDENT'S QUESTION, PRESIDENT CHUN SAID THAT KIM CHONG-IL IS WORSE THAN HIS FATHER KIM IL SUNG, AND IS A VERY DANGEROUS MAN.

10. CHUN SAID THAT LAST YEAR THE KOREAN GNP WAS ABOUT SIXTY BILLION DOLLARS, COMPARED TO ONE TRILLION DOLLARS FOR JAPAN. KOREA IS THE U.S.' NINTH LARGEST TRADING PARTNER, PERHAPS SIX OR SEVENTH IF MILITARY SALES ARE INCLUDED. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH, KOREA NEEDS MORE FAVORABLE ECONOMIC TREATMENT FROM THE U.S. THAN JAPAN RECEIVES. WITH SIX OR SEVEN PERCENT ANNUAL GROWTH IN GNP,

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KOREA'S GNP WILL BE ABOUT 100 BILLION DOLLARS IN SIX YEARS.
MILITARY EXPENDITURES ARE NOW ABOUT SIX PERCENT OF GNP, OR
3.7 BILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR. THIS PLACES A GREAT STRAIN
ON THE ECONOMY, BUT WITH A 100 BILLION DOLLAR GNP, THE
MILITARY BUDGET CAN BE RAISED TO FIVE BILLION DOLLARS PER
YEAR WITH NO GREAT DIFFICULTY. IN ORDER TO REACH THIS
GOAL, HOWEVER, THERE NEEDS TO BE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN
U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARDS KOREA, INCLUDING IN THE AREAS
OF TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. WITH A 100 BILLION
DOLLAR ECONOMY, KOREA COULD UNDERTAKE DIPLOMATIC INITIA—
TIVES OF INDIRECT BENEFIT TO THE U.S. THAT MIGHT MEET
RESISTANCE IF DONE DIRECTLY BY THE U.S. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE
KOREA IS ALREADY GIVING SOME AID TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES, A
100 BILLION DOLLAR GNP WOULD ALLOW GRANTS IN AID OF ABOUT
FIFTY MILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY.

- 11. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT PRESIDENT CHUN'S POINT DESERVES AND IS RECEIVING CONSIDERATION. THE U.S. HAS ASKED JAPAN TO RAISE ITS DEFENSE BUDGET ABOVE THE CURRENT LEVEL OF ONE PERCENT OF GNP. THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS KOREA'S PROBLEMS AND WILL BE AS FORTHCOMING AS POSSIBLE.
- 12. PRESIDENT CHUN MADE A PLEA CONCERNING FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDIT ISSUES THAT WERE DISCUSSED WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER IN SEOUL LAST MONTH. ALTHOUGH KOREA WILL RECEIVE 160 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS CREDITS AT 14 PERCENT INTEREST IN FY 82, FMS DEBT SERVICE THIS YEAR AMOUNTS TO 260 MILLION DOLLARS. THIS GAP HINDERS KOREA'S SEGOND FORCE

#### MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

IMPROVEMENT PLAN. THE 14 PERCENT INTEREST RATE SHOULD PROPERLY BE ABOUT SEVEN PERCENT. FY '83 FMS CREDITS WILL BE 210 MILLION DOLLARS, BUT THE COUNTRY NEEDS 400-500 MILLION DOLLARS IN FMS CREDITS IN FY '83 TO BUY NEW FACILITIES AND WEAPONS AND REPAY EXISTING DEBTS. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE WILL TALK ABOUT THE PROBLEM WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER. THE U.S. ECONOMY IS WEAK NOW AND THERE IS GREAT PRESSURE ON INTEREST RATES, BUT THE U.S. WILL TRY TO BE HELPFUL.

13. THE VICE PRESIDENT PAID A SECOND, LATE EVENING PRIVATE CALL, REQUESTED BY PRESIDENT CHUN, PURSUANT TO A SUGGESTION MADE BY FOREIGN MINISTER SHINYONG LHO (M-R: NO SIN-YONG). A BREAKFAST WHICH THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD HAD WITH A VARIETY OF NON-GOVERNMENT LEADERS AT THE AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE THAT MORNING WAS DISCUSSED (SEE SEPTEL). THE PRESIDENT CLEARLY HAD BEEN FILLED IN ON WHAT TRANSPIRED AT THE BREAKFAST AND HE WAS VERY POSITIVE AND FORTHCOMING. HE TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE EMBASSY'S APPROACH HAD BEEN CORRECT. HE EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S STATEMENTS AT THE BREAKFAST THAT THE ROKG HAD NOT INTERFERED, AND THAT THE U.S. APPROACH COINCIDES WITH THE ROKG POLICY

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# SECRET WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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S E CR E T SECTION Ø3 OF Ø3 SEOUL Ø4297

CANBERRA FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY
OF OPENING COMMUNICATIONS TO THE BROAD RANGE OF RESPONSIBLE KOREAN OPINION LEADERS.

- 14. THE PRESIDENT WAS APPARENTLY UNAWARE THAT REVEREND PARK HYONG KYU HAD EXPRESSED HIS REGRET OPENLY AT THE BREAKFAST FOR HIS MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE AMBASSADOR'S POSITION. THE PRESIDENT WAS DOUBLY PLEASED AT THIS. HE EXPRESSED OPENLY TO THE AMBASSADOR HIS THANKS FOR OUR HAVING WORKED SOMETHING SO EFFECTIVELY WHICH RESULTED IN ASSISTANCE TO HIS GOVERNMENT.
- 15. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY. WALKER BT