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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

LOJ 2/28/2007

File Folder KOREA, SOUTH (09/11/1982-02/28/1983)

FOIA

F06-048

Box Number 9

KYUNG

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
35275	CABLE	120627Z NOV 82 PAR 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	1	11/12/1982	B1
35276	CABLE	160928Z NOV 82 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	1	11/16/1982	B1
35277	CABLE	160941Z NOV 82 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	6	11/16/1982	B1
35278	CABLE	261004Z NOV 82 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	1	11/26/1982	B1
35279	MEMO	WILLIAM P CLARK TO CASPAR W WEINBERGER R 1/22/2010 F06-048	1	1/10/1983	B1
35280	MEMO	LILAC/ROCHE TO CLARK	2	1/5/1983	B1
35281	LETTER	WEINBERGER TO CLARK R 1/22/2010 F06-048	1	11/26/1982	B1
35282	CABLE	200836Z DEC 82 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	2	12/20/1982	B1
35283	CABLE	140957Z JAN 83 R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048	1	1/14/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
35284	CABLE	190844Z JAN 83 <i>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</i>	1	1/19/1983	B1
35285	CABLE	191012Z JAN 83 <i>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</i>	1	1/19/1983	B1
35286	CABLE	270810Z JAN 83 <i>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</i>	1	1/27/1983	B1
35287	MEMO	CLARK TO SHULTZ AND REGAN <i>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</i>	1	1/29/1983	B1
35288	MEMO	GASTON J SIGUR TO CLARK <i>R 7/6/2012 F2006-048/1</i>	1	1/28/1983	B1
35289	CABLE	080315Z FEB 83 <i>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</i>	3	2/8/1983	B1
35290	CABLE	190539Z FEB 83 <i>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</i>	1	2/19/1983	B1

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35275

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SEOUL 2000 DTG: 120627Z NOV 82 PSN: 002975
SITE20 DATE 11/17/82 TOR: 316/1311Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

PRIORITY

DE RUEHUL #2000 3160718

P 120627Z NOV 82

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3301

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SEOUL 12000

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: 11/12/88

TAGS: PEPP KS LY, IR 12

SUBJECT: NSC STAFFER SIGUR'S CALL ON PRESIDENT CHUN

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SENIOR STAFF MEMBER DR. GASTON SIGUR, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR WALKER, CALLED ON PRESIDENT CHUN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) ON NOVEMBER 11. THE CONVERSATION, IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT TOOK THE INITIATIVE, CENTERED ON MIDDLE EAST QUESTIONS.

3. IRAN: PRESIDENT CHUN EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN, WHICH HE SEES FALLING UNDER INCREASING SOVIET INFLUENCE. HE STATED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT HE HAD HEARD THERE ARE SOME TEN THOUSAND SOVIET AGENTS OPERATING IN IRAN, AND WONDERED WHETHER DR. SIGUR HAD HEARD ABOUT THIS. HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IRAN IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. AND THE REST OF THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD, AND CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO FALL TO THE SOVIETS. HE ASKED DR. SIGUR WHAT THE U.S. PLANS TO DO ABOUT THIS SITUATION. DR. SIGUR DEFLECTED THE QUESTION, AND PARTICULARLY THE NOTION THAT IT IS UP TO THE UNITED STATES TO "DO SOMETHING" ABOUT THE IRANIAN SITUATION. HE DID CALL ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THERE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ARE COUNTERFALLING FORCES AT WORK IN IRAN STRIVING TO PREVENT THE COUNTRY FROM FALLING UNDER SOVIET CONTROL.

4. U.S.-IRAQ RELATIONS: THE PRESIDENT ASKED ABOUT THE CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAQ. SIGUR EXPLAINED THAT THE RELATIONSHIP IS STATIC AT A LOW LEVEL OF INTERCHANGE.

5. LIBYA: THE PRESIDENT REPORTED THAT HE HAS BEEN INVITED BY COLONEL QADDAFI TO PAY A STATE VISIT TO LIBYA. HE SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW THE UNITED STATES AND LIBYA ARE TOO IMPORTANT TO BE OUT OF TOUCH WITH EACH OTHER, AND HE WONDERED WHETHER HE COULD SERVE A USEFUL ROLE AS A MEDIATOR. WHILE HE OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT TURN THE LIBYAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AROUND, PERHAPS HE COULD CHANGE QADDAFI'S ATTITUDE "45 DEGREES".

HE ASKED SIGUR'S VIEW. WHILE DECLINING TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE, SIGUR ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT HE WOULD REPORT THE CONVERSATION TO WASHINGTON IN DETAIL.

6. COMMENT: WE KNOW FROM OTHER [REDACTED] CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT THIS WEEK IN WHICH THE AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN INVOLVED, THAT THE QUESTION OF LEBANON IS VERY MUCH ON THE PRESIDENT'S MIND. SIGUR HAD BEEN INFORMED IN ADVANCE THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT RAISE LEBANON WITH HIM. BUT THE PRESIDENT OBVIOUSLY DECIDED TO USE HIS CONVERSATION WITH SIGUR FOR A TOUR D'HORIZON OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAT MIGHT BE OPPOSED TO KOREAN PARTICIPATION IN THE LEBANON MNF. WALKER

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NLRR F06-048 # 35275

BY G1 NARA DATE 3/27/08

~~SECRET~~

35276

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SEOUL 2235 DTG: 160928Z NOV 82 PSN: 008966
SIT472 DATE 11/17/82 TOR: 319/1044Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHUL #2235 3200940
O 160928Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3395

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NODIS

FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ FROM AMBASSADOR WALKER

E.O. 12356: DECL: 11/16/88

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, KS

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ON
MNF FOR LEBANON

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ACCOMPANIED BY POLCONS BLAKEMORE I WENT TO RESIDENCE OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS LEE BUM SUK (M-R: YI POM-SOK) TO MEET WITH HIM, ASSISTANT MINISTER RO-MYUNG GONG (M-R: KONG NO-MYONG) AND MIDDLE EAST DIRECTOR CH'OE KWANG-SIK (M-R).

3. MINISTER LEE DELIVERED A TALKING PAPER IN RESPONSE TO YOUR MESSAGE THE DETAILS OF WHICH ARE BEING SENT VIA A SEPARATE CABLE. I THOUGHT I WOULD SEND ALONG A FEW OF MY PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ON THIS MEETING FROM WHICH I HAVE JUST COME.

4. FIRST, THE MESSAGE WAS VERY WELL THOUGHT OUT AND DELIVERED IN A VERY QUIET AND CONCERNED MANNER. OBVIOUSLY THE KOREANS HAD GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO ALL ASPECTS OF A VERY COMPLICATED PROBLEM. THEY HAD, FOR EXAMPLE, MET WITH US AT THE MINISTER'S RESIDENCE IN ORDER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO AVOID ANY NOTICE BY THE PRESS, WHICH HAS BEEN FOLLOWING (WITH SOME SPECULATION) THE COURSE OF THE LEBANESE REQUEST SINCE IT FIRST SURFACED. THEY HAVE AVOIDED ANY INDICATION IN PUBLIC ONE WAY OR THE OTHER IN ORDER NOT TO PREJUDICE THE ISSUE, AND THEY HAVE CONSULTED WITH A BROAD SPECTRUM OF KOREAN LEADERS.

5. SECOND, THE MINISTER EXPRESSED HIS HOPE, AS I PARTED FROM HIM, THAT YOU PERSONALLY UNDERSTAND THE REASONS (AS SET FORTH IN OUR SEPARATE MESSAGE) THE ROKG RESPONSE HAS TO BE NEGATIVE.

6. THIRD, THE KOREANS, GIVEN THEIR LONG ATTEMPTS TO BUILD THEIR REPUTATION FOR INDEPENDENCE ARE ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE ABOUT THE PROPAGANDA FROM THE NORTH AND ITS EFFECTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. THEY ARE CONSCIOUS OF BEING

THE ONLY THIRD WORLD COUNTRY ASKED TO CONTRIBUTE AND FEAR THAT IT CAN ONLY HAVE THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THEIR BEING PERCEIVED AS 'AMERICA'S GURKHAS'.

7. FOURTH, THE FINANCIAL RISKS FOR KOREA MAKE THIS ESPECIALLY DANGEROUS FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW. LEE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF MIDDLE EAST CONTRACTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH THE RADICAL ARAB STATES (ABOUT DOLS 6 BILLION!).

8. FINALLY, THE BOTTOM LINE, AS FAR AS I CAN SEE AT THIS MOMENT, EVEN THOUGH MINISTER LEE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD NOT MAKE ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL WE HAD HAD CHANCE TO PRESENT TO YOU AND THE DEPARTMENT THE ROKG VIEW, IS THAT THE RISKS SO FAR OUTWEIGH THE ADVANTAGES, THEY WOULD LIKE TO ASK US NOT TO PRESS ANY MORE. THEY WILL NOT MAKE ANY FURTHER STATEMENT UNTIL THE DEPARTMENT HAS HAD CHANCE TO CONSIDER THE POINTS WHICH THEY MADE TO US TODAY.

9. A COUPLE OF OBSERVATION OF MY DWN WOULD BE THAT GIVEN THE DIVIDED NATURE OF THE COUNTRY, WHICH LIKE GERMANY FACES A HOSTILE COMMUNIST PORTION OF ITS OWN TERRITORY, AND GIVEN THE GREAT DISTANCE AWAY AT GREAT RISKS IN AN AREA WITH WHICH THEY ARE NOT FAMILIAR, WE WILL NOT HAVE ALL THAT MUCH SUCCESS WITH THE ROKG ON THIS ISSUE UNLESS: (A) THERE WILL NOT BE A FINANCIAL COST TO AN ALREADY HARD-PRESSED ECONOMY; (B) THEIR PARTICIPATION CAN BE MADE MUCH MORE FREE OF CHANCE OF RETALIATION BY RADICAL ARAB

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

STATES; (C) THE UNDERWRITING OF THE ENTERPRISE CAN BE CLEARLY PRESENTED AS A MULTINATIONAL UNDERTAKING AND NOT JUST AT THE INSTIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES; (D) SPECIFIC GAINS IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER WORLD FORUMS COULD BE ANTICIPATED; AND (E) URGING FOR ROKG PARTICIPATION COULD COME IN MORE POSITIVE TERMS FROM THE HIGHEST USG OFFICIALS INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT AND YOURSELF.

10. AS OF THE MOMENT, THE KOREANS DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD WANT TO EXPEND SOME OF THEIR CLEARLY ESTABLISHED POLITICAL REPUTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY ASKING THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS UNDERTAKING AT THIS TIME.

11. I WISH I HAD A MORE POSITIVE RESPONSE TO RELAY TO YOU, AND HOPE WE SHALL BE ABLE TO CHAT OVER SOME OF THE LOCAL CONCERNS WHEN YOU VISIT HERE IN EARLY FEBRUARY.
DIXIE WALKER

SEOUL 2235

DTG: 160928Z NOV 82 PSN: 008966

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NLRR f06-048 #35276

BY CJ NARA DATE 3/27/98

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35277

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 SEOUL 2238
SIT053 RECALLED

DTG: 160941Z NOV 82 PSN: 010729
TOR: 321/0937Z

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STU4142
DE RUEHUL #2238/01 3200947
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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0002
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0252
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0264
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AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0289
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 0201
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1271
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0297

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 12238

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MILI MOPS KS

SUBJECT: ROKG DECIDES AGAINST PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF

REF: STATE 313769

1. ~~(C-ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. SUMMARY: THE FOREIGN MINISTER OFFICIALLY INFORMED
THE AMBASSADOR NOVEMBER 16 THAT KOREA WILL NOT PARTI-

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NLRR F06-048#35277
BY CN NARADATE 3/27/08

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 160941Z NOV 82 PSN: 010729

EXDIS

CIPATE IN THE LEBANON MNF. HE ADDUCED A NUMBER OF REASONS, BUT THE RISK OF LOSING CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS IN LIBYA AND IRAQ, AND OF GIVING NORTH KOREA A PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE, ARE PARAMOUNT. A USG RECLAMA AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL MIGHT TURN THIS DECISION AROUND, BUT THE COST -- TO US IN MONEY AND FUTURE KOREAN CLAIMS, AND TO KOREA'S IMAGE AS AN INDEPENDENT ACTOR -- WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE. END SUMMARY.

EXDIS

3. ON NOVEMBER 16 FOREIGN MINISTER LEE BUM SUK (M-R: YI POM-SOK) GAVE THE AMBASSADOR KOREA'S RESPONSE TO SECRETARY SHULTZ' LETTER (REFTEL) URGING KOREAN PARTICIPATION IN THE EXPANDED MNF IN LEBANON. LEE EXPLAINED THAT BECAUSE HIS RESPONSE IS NEGATIVE HE MADE IT ORALLY; HE HOPES THE SECRETARY WILL UNDERSTAND.

EXDIS

4. READING FROM A CAREFULLY PREPARED TALKING PAPER, THE MINISTER SAID THAT AFTER CAREFUL AND PRUDENT EXAMINATION OF THE LEBANESE REQUEST, THE ROKG HAS DECIDED IT WOULD BE "TOO DIFFICULT" TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES TO THE MNF. HE TICKED OFF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

EXDIS

A. THE KOREAN PUBLIC, FULLY AWARE OF THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT, WOULD BE CONFUSED IF THE ROKG COULD SPARE TROOPS FOR THE LEBANON MNF. NORTH KOREA WOULD TAKE PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE OF THIS INCONSISTENCY. THE KOREAN PUBLIC STILL REMEMBERS THE DESPATCH OF KOREAN TROOPS TO VIETNAM, WHERE BOTH THE BATTLE AND 5,000 KOREAN LIVES WERE LOST.

B. THE PUBLIC WILL NOT UNDERSTAND WHY KOREA, WHICH IS NOT ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE UN, SHOULD BE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A PEACEKEEPING EFFORT. THIS SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY UN MEMBERS UNDER UN AUSPICES.

C. THE PUBLIC IS CONCERNED THAT ONLY BELGIUM HAS RESPONDED FAVORABLY SO FAR AMONG THE SIX COUNTRIES APPROACHED, AND BELGIUM WILL ONLY PARTICIPATE IF SOMEONE ELSE PROVIDES US DOLS 12 MILLION. WHY IS KOREA BEING

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ASKED, AND IN VIEW OF THE NEGATIVE RESPONSES, IS THIS REALLY A MULTINATIONAL FORCE>

MOVING FROM BEHIND THE CLOAK OF ALLEGED KOREAN PUBLIC REACTION, LEE THEN CAME TO THE ROKG'S OBJECTIONS.

D. IT WOULD BE AWKWARD TO PLACE KOREAN TROOPS UNDER FOREIGN COMMAND. IF IT WERE UN COMMAND THAT WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE.

E. THE ROKG HAS EXPENDED GREAT EFFORT TO BUILD ITS IMAGE IN THE THIRD WORLD. HOW WOULD PARTICIPATION AFFECT THAT IMAGE, PARTICULARLY AMONG ARAB STATES. (IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, LEE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME ARAB STATES FAVOR KOREAN PARTICIPATION.) NORTH KOREA WOULD DISTORT SOUTH KOREAN PARTICIPATION, PARTICULARLY IF THERE WERE AN INCIDENT INVOLVING ROKG TROOPS.

F. THE KOREAN ECONOMY IS IN DIFFICULTY, AND THE DEFENSE BURDEN IS ALREADY HEAVY. KOREA SPENDS US DOLS 6 BILLION ANNUALLY ON ENERGY IMPORTS, SOME OF WHICH IS RECOUPED THROUGH CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AT PRESENT THERE ARE KOREAN FIRMS WORKING UNDER CONTRACTS WITH LIBYA, IRAQ AND IRAN WITH A TOTAL VALUE OF US DOLS 6 BILLION. (IRAN IS A MINOR COMPONENT.) IF THESE CONTRACTS WERE JEOPARDIZED BY MNF PARTICIPATION, IT WOULD BE A SEVERE BLOW. THE ROKG AMBASSADOR COULD NOT REACH HIGH LEVELS OF THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT FOR A READING, BUT A WORKING LEVEL OFFICIAL "RAISED HELL" AT

THE IDEA OF KOREAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF. A HIGHLY
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 SEOUL 2238
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STU5731
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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0003
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0253
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0017
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AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0290
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AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1272
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0298

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 SEOUL 12238

EXDIS

PLACED IRAQI, A MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE
BA'ATH PARTY, WAS LESS EMOTIONAL. BUT HE ASSERTED THAT
ONLY KOREA OF THOSE APPROACHED HAS NO HISTORICAL
CONNECTION WITH THE MIDDLE EAST. IT WOULD APPEAR TO BE
INVOLVED AT THE BIDDING OF THE U.S., AND THEREFORE
ONLY TO HELP ISRAEL. LEE SAID KOREAN BUSINESSMEN ARE VERY
MUCH OPPOSED TO PARTICIPATION.

G. THE DETAILS OF WHAT KOREA IS BEING ASKED TO DO ARE
SKETCHY. THE TIMING, ROLE, DURATION AND DUTIES OF THE MNF

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EXDIS

ARE UNCLEAR, BUT THE RISKS ARE OBVIOUSLY GREAT. THERE IS A MUCH GREATER CHANCE FOR CRITICISM THAN FOR APPRECIATION.

H. FINALLY, LEE SAID THAT EVEN IF THE ROKG FAVORED THE IDEA, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IS UNLIKELY TO APPROVE PARTICIPATION.

IN SUMMARY, LEE ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO PERSUADE WASHINGTON TO "PLEASE EXCUSE KOREA THIS TIME".

EXDIS

5. THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR KOREA'S CONCERNS, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE POINTS IN G. ABOVE. BUT THERE ARE POSITIVE CONSIDERATIONS, SUCH AS A DEMONSTRATED KOREAN WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ITS PLACE AS A RESPONSIBLE MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE HAVE NOW IN LEBANON AN OPPORTUNITY FOR BALANCED RESOLUTION OF ONE OF THE MOST VEXATIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE WORLD. IF OTHERS WILL PARTICIPATE AND HELP. INCREASED PETROLEUM PRICES SINCE 1973 HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY COSTLY TO THE THIRD WORLD NATIONS.

EXDIS

6. THE MINISTER RESPONDED BY FRANKLY ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE RISK OF LOSING CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND OF BEING VULNERABLE TO NORTH KOREAN ATTACKS CONTROL THE KOREAN RESPONSE. HE READILY AGREED, HOWEVER, NOT TO INFORM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OF THE ROKG DECISION UNTIL HE HAS WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO THE FOREGOING IN HAND.

EXDIS

7. COMMENT: THE ROKG HAS THOUGHT THROUGH THIS ISSUE VERY CAREFULLY, AND HAS CALCULATED THAT THE OBVIOUS RISKS OUTWEIGH THE VAGUE POTENTIAL BENEFITS. IN OUR VIEW WE SHOULD NOT CONTEST THIS KOREAN DECISION UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO: (A) MAKE AN APPEAL FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT CHUN; (B) PRESENT A COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF AS MANY OF THE ROKG

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DTG: 160941Z NOV 82 PSN: 010730

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CONCERNS LISTED ABOVE AS POSSIBLE; AND (C) OFFER TO PAY FOR THE ROK EXPEDITION. THE KOREANS REALIZE THAT THEIR PARTICIPATION CANNOT BE MADE RISK FREE, BUT THERE IS AT LEAST A CHANCE THAT THEY WOULD RESPOND TO SUCH AN APPROACH AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. IF WE DECIDE TO MAKE SUCH AN APPROACH, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PAY HEAVILY, NOT ONLY IN MONEY NOW BUT IN A KOREAN SENSE OF U.S. OBLIGATION TO THEM IN THE FUTURE. FINALLY, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT KOREAN AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO THE CHARGE THAT THE KOREANS ARE AMERICAN MERCENARIES, AND THAT VULNERABILITY WOULD CERTAINLY BE EXPLOITED BY NORTH KOREA AND OTHERS. EXPANDED COMMENTS TO THE SECRETARY FOLLOW BY SEPARATE TELEGRAM. END COMMENT.

WALKER

BT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SEOUL 2636 DTG: 261004Z NOV 82 PSN: 024682
SIT909 DATE 11/29/82 TOR: 330/1031Z

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHUL #2636 3301005

O 261004Z NOV 82

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3592

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0006

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0254

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0018

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0822

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0267

BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 12636

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 11/26/88

TAGS: MILI, MOPS, KS, LE,

SUBJECT: KOREA'S CONTRIBUTION TO MNF

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ASSISTANT MINISTER RO MYUNG GONG (M-R: KONG NO-MYONG) CALLED IN CHARGE LATE NOVEMBER 26 TO SHOW HIM A DRAFT LETTER TURNING DOWN OUR REQUEST FOR ROK PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF, WHICH FONMIN LEE BUM SUK (M-R: YI POM-SOK) PLANS TO GIVE AMBASSADOR WALKER TOMORROW, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 27. DRAFT LETTER, WHICH GONG ALLOWED CHARGE TO READ, MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- -- ROKG HAS CONDUCTED A SERIOUS DELIBERATION REGARDING PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF, BOTH WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION AND IN VARIOUS QUARTERS OUTSIDE, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.
- -- THE ROKG HAS CONCLUDED THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO SEND TROOPS ABROAD AT THIS TIME (LETTER INDICATES THAT FURTHER DETAILS WILL BE FURNISHED AMBASSADOR AT TIME HE CALLS ON FONMIN).

- -- KOREA DEEPLY REGRETS IT CANNOT READILY ACCEPT USG REQUEST OWING TO MANIFOLD DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH HAVE COMPELLED US TO REACH SUCH A CONCLUSION.
- -- ROKG EXPRESSES APPRECIATION FOR SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING U.S. SHOWED ON RESPONDING TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE KOREAN SIDE. PRESIDENT CHUN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) HIMSELF IS GREATLY APPRECIATIVE OF AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING AND TRUST.
- -- KOREAN GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO HELP LEBANON IN OTHER WAYS (GONG EXPLAINED THAT THIS MEANT MEDICAL AND OTHER ASSISTANCE) AND HOPES TRADITIONAL FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND KOREA WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP.

3. GONG SAID THAT FOLLOWING DELIVERY OF LETTER TO AMBASSADOR WALKER, KOREANS WOULD WAIT A FEW DAYS, THEN ON WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1, THEY WOULD INFORM OTHERS WITH WHOM THEY HAVE CONSULTED ON THIS MATTER, INCLUDING THE SAUDIS, BRITISH, BELGIANS, AND DUTCH. THEY EXPECT TO INFORM LEBANON OF THEIR DECISION ON THURSDAY, DECEMBER 2.

4. WHEN CHARGE ASKED IF LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN THE LETTER, I.E., "IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO SEND TROOPS ABROAD AT THIS TIME" LEFT ANY ROOM FOR A CHANGE IN KOREA'S POSITION, GONG MADE CLEAR THAT: (A) THIS WAS SIMPLY A POLITE KOREAN WAY OF SAYING "NO"; AND (B) THE ROKG WOULD, OF COURSE, RECEIVE ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS WE HAD ABOUT THIS MATTER.

5. WE HAVE MADE AN APPOINTMENT FOR AMBASSADOR WALKER, CURRENTLY ENROUTE HOME FROM TOKYO, TO SEE FONMIN LEE BUM SUK AT 10:00 A.M., SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 27, SEOUL TIME. CLEVELAND

SEOUL 2636

DTG: 261004Z NOV 82 PSN: 024682

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TO CLARK

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOCDATE 26 NOV 82

LILAC

05 JAN 83

ROCHE

05 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: SECURITY ASSISTANCE

KOREA SOUTH

CM

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO D/R 314 RE FY 1984 FMS CREDIT LEVELS FOR KOREA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 10 JAN 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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SIGUR

HELM

KIMMITT

WHEELER

CHILDRESS

COMMENTS

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LOG 8203451

8203463

NSCIFID DR820314

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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Clark sgt

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12

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Security Assistance for the Republic of
Korea (ROK) (S)

Thank you for your recent memorandum in which you outline an alternative FY 1982 security assistance approach for the Republic of Korea. We look forward to working closely with you, George Shultz and Don Regan to develop the best approach for meeting Korea's security assistance needs. I suggest that our staffs meet with appropriate State, OMB, and Treasury representatives to explore your proposals in greater depth. (S)


William P. Clark

cc: Secretary Shultz
Secretary Regan

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National Security Council
The White House

Package # 8241

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Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>D</u>
Sit Room			

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F06-048

KYUNG

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
35280	MEMO LILAC/ROCHE TO CLARK	2	1/5/1983	B1

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

82 NOV 29 P 2: 49

26 NOV 1982

Honorable William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bill:

(C) I appreciate the support reflected in your memorandum of September 27, 1982 for higher FY 84 FMS credit levels for Korea. After review of the Korean security assistance study, on October 28 Don Regan indicated that in Treasury's view there was no economic need for higher FMS credit for Korea. He also indicated that, while understanding the military and political arguments, from an economic viewpoint he would have great difficulty justifying such an increase since it runs counter to Administration efforts to reduce the budget deficit.

(C) Given this situation, we reexamined our options. We now seek your support in assuring a positive Administration decision to request Congress to authorize extended repayment terms of ten years grace (pay interest only) and twenty years repayment (pay interest and principal) terms for ROK. We would also appreciate your support of our interim efforts to persuade Treasury to support a five-year grace period before Korea starts principal repayments against the loans it takes in FY 83. We also intend to press for priority to Korea for reprogramming of FMS credits that become available in FY 83 and FY 84, circumstances permitting. These steps would be of considerable help in alleviating the ROK's current cash flow problem and should enable the ROK to continue acquisition of critical military hardware and material from overseas sources, primarily the U.S.

Sincerely,

Sey

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/10

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FY 1982 FMS Guaranteed Loans

<u>Country</u>	<u>Amount (M)</u>	<u>Terms 1/</u>
Indonesia	\$ 40.0	2-7-9
Korea	166.0	3-9-12
Malaysia	10.0	1-6-7
Philippinwa	50.0	2-7-9
Thailand	74.7	5-7-12
Egypt	700.0	10-20-30
Israel	850.0	10-20-30
Jordan	54.9	1½-7-8½
Lebanon	10.0	3-5-8
Morocco	30.0	3-9-12
Oman	30.0	1½-7-8½
Tunisia	95.0	3-7-10
Yemen	10.0	3-9-12
Greece	280.0	10-20-30
Portugal	45.0	2-8-10
Spain	125.0	2-8-10
Turkey	343.0	10-20-30
Botswana	.5	1-6-7
Cameroon	1.5	1-5-6
Gabon	2.6	1-4½-5½
Kenya	22.0	3-9-12
Liberia	7.0	5-7-12
Niger	2.0	2-6-8
Somalia	10.0	10-20-30
Sudan	50.0	10-20-30
Zaire	7.5	5-7-12
Colombia	10.0	1-7-8
Dominican Republic	4.0	3-7-10
Ecuador	4.5	2-5-7
El Salvador	16.5	2-7-9
Haiti	.3	5-7-12
Honduras	19.0	5-7-12
Jamaica	1.0	5-7-12
Panama	5.0	2-5-7
Peru	4.5	2-4½-6½
Sri Lanka	2.0	2-9½-11½
	<u>\$3,083.5M</u>	

1/ Terms: Grace period on principal repayment - Total years
to repay principal - Total repayment period

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12/28

Peter Sommer,

We would like an analysis
of possible implications
in other country accounts
if we set this precedent.

✓

John

National Security Council
The White House

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COMMENTS

John - Believe we need to
consider precedential
implications.

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHUL #3490/01 3540852
O 200836Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4074

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1520
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BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 SEUL 13490
E.O. 12356: DECL: 12/20/88
TAGS: SHUM, PINT, KS, US
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH MRS. KIM DAE JUNG
REF: SEUL 13440

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DCM LUNCHED AT EMBOFF'S HOME WITH MRS. KIM DAE JUNG (M-R: KIM TAE-CHUNG) ON DECEMBER 20. GENERAL (RET.) PAK SUNG-CH'OL (M-R), KIM DAE JUNG'S FORMER BODYGUARD, WAS ALSO PRESENT. MRS. KIM AND GENERAL PARK MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
-- KIM'S PRESENT CONDITION: "I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY THAT MY HUSBAND IS UNHAPPY," SAID MRS. KIM. KIM, WHO FOUND OUT THAT HE WOULD BE SENT TO THE U.S. ON DECEMBER 15, ONLY THE NIGHT BEFORE HE WAS ACTUALLY TRANSFERRED TO SEOUL, SEEMS UPSET ABOUT THE PRESSURE AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH HE HAS BEEN TOLD TO LEAVE KOREA. HE IS ESPECIALLY UNHAPPY THAT HE CANNOT SEE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HIS OLD POLITICAL ASSOCIATES "WHO HAVE SUFFERED SO MUCH FOR HIM," AS MRS. KIM PUT IT. MRS. KIM FEELS THAT THE FAMILY SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN MORE TIME TO ARRANGE THEIR FINANCIAL MATTERS AND HOUSEHOLD EFFECTS. STILL, BOTH HUSBAND AND WIFE REALIZE THEY HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO DEPART KOREA ON DECEMBER 23, AND MRS. KIM MADE IT CLEAR THAT IS WHAT THEY WILL DO. TWO OF THE COUPLE'S THREE SONS WILL GO WITH THEM. ONLY THE OLDEST SON REFUSES TO DEPART KOREA.
-- PLANS IN THE U.S.: MRS. KIM SAID THAT THERE IS NO DEFINITE COURSE OF ACTION PLANNED. HER HUSBAND WANTS TO "READ, WRITE, AND TALK TO FRIENDS." IN ADDITION TO SYMPATHETIC SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN, MRS. KIM SAID THAT AT SOME POINT HER HUSBAND WILL SEEK APPOINTMENTS WITH DOS OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE SECRETARY. MRS. KIM AND GENERAL PARK SAID THAT KIM WOULD NOT MAKE ANY POLI-

TICAL STATEMENTS UNTIL HE HAD "REFLECTED" ON THE PROPER COURSE OF ACTION. KIM DEFINITELY WILL NOT JOIN ANY ANTI-ROKG GROUPS FOR AWHILE. ALTHOUGH HER HUSBAND'S HEALTH CONDITION WAS NOT SO BAD AS TO WARRANT IMMEDIATE TREATMENT, MRS. KIM SAID HER HUSBAND HAS BEEN TOLD BY MEDICAL AUTHORITIES HE NEEDS AN OPERATION ON HIS HIP JOINT, ADDING THAT A FRIEND HAD SUGGESTED WALTER REED HOSPITAL (DCM DISCOURAGED THIS, SAYING THAT WALTER REED IS USG HOSPITAL THAT DOES NOT NORMALLY ACCEPT UNOFFICIAL PATIENTS, AND THAT THERE ARE MANY FINE MEDICAL FACILITIES IN WASHINGTON, BOSTON AND ELSEWHERE). ALTHOUGH THE KIM'S WILL ORIGINALLY BE STAYING WITH HER BROTHER, LEE SUNG HO (M-R: YI SUNG-HO) IN THE WASHINGTON AREA, KIM WOULD LIKE AND IS CONSIDERING ACCEPTING A POSITION AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY. MONEY IS A CONCERN, HOWEVER, AND HARVARD ATTENDANCE WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS. MRS. KIM ASKED THE DCM'S ADVICE ON BEST COURSE OF ACTION FOR HER HUSBAND. THE DCM REPLIED THAT KIM MUST DECIDE FOR HIMSELF WHAT HE SHOULD DO. WE THINK THAT KIM'S PLANS AS MRS. KIM OUTLINED THEM MAKE A GREAT DEAL OF SENSE. DCM EMPHASIZED THAT MANY WITHIN THE ROKG ALSO FAVORED POLITICAL PROGRESS BUT HAD TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY AND PRACTICAL MODERATION ON MR. KIM'S PART WOULD HELP THESE FORCES.

-- POLITICAL: MRS. KIM SAID THAT SHE AND HER HUSBAND GIVE MAJOR CREDIT TO THE U.S. FOR KIM'S RELEASE. CLEARLY, AMBASSADOR WALKER AND THE EMBASSY STAFF, PLUS PUSHING FROM WASHINGTON, HAVE BEEN THE MAIN FACTORS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN THE ROKG'S ACTION TOWARD HER HUSBAND. SHE REPEATED THIS ASSERTION EVEN AFTER THE DCM STATED THAT OUR ROLE HAD BEEN TO KEEP THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT AWARE OF OUR WELL KNOWN VIEWS AND QUIETLY CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUCIVE TO THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS; WE HAD CONFIDENTIAL NOT MADE A SPECIFIC EFFORT IMMEDIATELY BEFOREHAND WHICH HAD LED TO THE RELEASE, AS GENERAL PARK AND MRS. KIM SEEMED TO THINK. DCM SAID THAT KIM'S RELEASE, COUPLED WITH THE REMOVAL OF TWO COLONELS FROM THE BLUE HOUSE STAFF AND THE RUMORED FURTHER AMNESTIES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, PLUS THE LIFTING OF THE BAN ON 567 POLITICIANS, MIGHT INDICATE SELF-CONFIDENCE ON THE PRESIDENT'S PART AND A LIBERALIZING TREND. TO GENERAL PARK'S CLAIM THAT THE PRESIDENT IS SURROUNDED WITH HARD-LINERS, THE DCM SAID THAT TWO OF THEM, HER HWA PYUNG (M-R: HO HWA-PYONG) AND HUR SAM SOO (M-R: HO SAM-SU), HAD BEEN RELIEVED OF THEIR

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHUL #3490/02 3540901
O 200836Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4075

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1521
SA CINCUNC KS
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CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 SEOUL 13490
DUTIES THAT MORNING. DCM ADDED THAT CHUN'S DECISION
TO LET KIM DAE JUNG GO TO THE U. S. HAD BEEN A BOLD MOVE
WHICH MANY HARDLINERS OPPOSED. GIVEN THIS OPPOSITION,
THE CHOICE FOR KIM WAS PROBABLY EITHER TO GO TO THE U. S.,
WITHOUT BEING ALLOWED TO CONTACT HIS OLD POLITICAL
SUPPORTERS IN KOREA, OR FREEZE IN A JAIL CELL. MRS.
KIM AND GENERAL PARK SEEMED TO TAKE THE POINT.

3. COMMENT: THE UNCERTAINTY THAT HAS BEEN INTRODUCED
INTO THE DISSIDENT COMMUNITY BY KIM DAE JUNG'S RELEASE
IS CLEARLY REFLECTED IN MRS. KIM'S ATTITUDE. THERE IS
NO QUESTION THAT SHE IS VERY HAPPY OVER HER HUSBAND'S
IMPENDING FREEDOM, BUT ALSO REALIZES THAT IT LAYS KIM
OPEN TO CHARGES THAT HE IS FLEEING KOREA. ESSENTIALLY
UNINTERESTED IN POLITICS, MRS. KIM NEVERTHELESS HAS
A SHREWD UNDERSTANDING OF THE POLITICAL REALITY SURROUN-
DING HER HUSBAND--SHE TRIED, UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO HAVE HER
HUSBAND'S PASSPORT PHOTO TAKEN IN PRISON GARB. SHE
LISTENED WHEN THE DCM MADE ARGUMENTS FOR MODERATION,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BUT CLEARLY IS LEAVING OPTIONS OPEN FOR RENEWED POLI-
TICAL ACTIVITY BY HER HUSBAND, IF THAT IS HIS CHOICE.
WALKER

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SIT: CKLS EOBMP EOB VP EOB SIT KEMP BOSH

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTTT-IST--

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHUL #0473 0141020

O 140957Z JAN 83

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4482

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 1410

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0840

AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1678

BT

~~SECRET~~ SEUL 00473

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 01/14/03

TAGS: PEPR, KS US JS

SUBJECT: CROSS RECOGNITION

REF: (A) SEUL 00061 (B) SEUL 00296 (C) BEIJING 000451

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I HAVE NOW RECEIVED A DEFINITIVE DESCRIPTION OF PRESIDENT CHUN'S AND PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE'S DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT FROM BLUE HOUSE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAHM PYONG-CHOON (M-R: HAM PYONG-CH'UN) AS WELL AS A DEFINITIVE REQUEST FROM HAHM AS TO WHAT THE KOREANS WOULD LIKE US TO DO WHEN NAKASONE COMES TO WASHINGTON. THIS HAS TAKEN SOME DOING. WITHOUT GOING INTO ALL THE DETAILS, I FOUND MYSELF YESTERDAY (JANUARY 13) IN RECEIPT OF TWO CONFLICTING REQUESTS: ONE FROM NSP DIRECTOR SHINYONG LHO (M-R: NO SIN-YONG) AND THE OTHER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER LEE BUM SUK (M-R: YI POM-SOK). LHO TOLD ME THAT PRESIDENT CHUN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) HAD, INDEED, TALKED TO NAKASONE DURING THEIR TETE A TETE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ABOUT CROSS RECOGNITION BY JAPAN AND CHINA OF PYONGYANG AND SEOUL RESPECTIVELY, AND THAT NAKASONE HAD REPLIED POSITIVELY; LHO SAID CHUN WANTED US TO SUPPORT THIS APPROACH WHEN NAKASONE COMES TO WASHINGTON. LEE BUM SUK, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHO ADMITTED HE NEW NOTHING OF THIS EXCHANGE, SAID HE HAD OBTAINED PRESIDENT CHUN'S APPROVAL FOR A DISCUSSION OF JAPANESE/CHINESE CROSS RECOGNITION WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ, WHEN THE LATTER VISITS SEOUL IN FEBRUARY. ONLY LATER WOULD THE SUBJECT BE RAISED WITH THE JAPANESE. CONFUSED, I APPEALED TO BOTH LEE AND LHO TODAY (JAN. 14) FOR A DEFINITIVE DESCRIPTION OF CHUN'S CONVERSATION WITH NAKASONE AND A REQUEST AS TO WHAT WAS WANTED FROM US. HAHM PYONG CHOON CALLED ME TO HIS BLUE HOUSE OFFICE THIS AFTERNOON (JAN. 14) AND GAVE ME THE FOLLOWING.

3. PRESIDENT CHUN HAD ACTUALLY NOT REPEAT NOT INTENDED TO RAISE THIS SUBJECT WITH NAKASONE. HOWEVER, NAKASONE HIMSELF ASKED IN THE COURSE OF THE PRIVATE MEETINGS IF THERE WERE ANYTHING JAPAN COULD DO TO HELP IMPROVE SEOUL'S RELATIONS WITH BEIJING. PRESIDENT CHUN REPLIED THAT ANYTHING NAKASONE WAS PREPARED TO DO WOULD BE WONDERFUL. CHUN THOUGHT JAPAN HAD LITTLE LEVERAGE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION BECAUSE OF EXISTING PROBLEMS BETWEEN TOKYO AND MOSCOW, BUT JAPAN DID HAVE LEVERAGE WITH THE PRC, AND ITS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE BEIJING-SEOUL RELATIONS COULD PROVE EFFECTIVE. NAKASONE APPARENTLY RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THIS, NOTING THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED BETTER PRC-ROK RELATIONS WITH CHO EN LAI 13 YEARS AGO, BUT THAT CHO EN LAI WHILE APPEARING TO BE PERSONALLY SYMPATHETIC, CAME DOWN NEGATIVELY BECAUSE OF KIM IL-SUNG. NAKASONE AND CHUN THEN AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE TWO KOREAS TO ENTER THE U.N.

4. THIS APPARENTLY WAS THE EXTENT OF THE DISCUSSION. ACCORDING TO HAHM PYONG CHOON PRESIDENT CHUN PURPOSELY REFRAINED FROM GOING FURTHER, THAT IS, HE REFRAINED FROM REQUESTING THE JAPANESE TO OFFER CHINA RECOGNITION OF PYONGYANG IN EXCHANGE FOR PRC RECOGNITION OF SEOUL. HAHM SAID PRESIDENT CHUN BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. HAS ACTED IN THE PAST ON BEHALF OF KOREA AND THAT IT WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE FOR US TO BROACH SUCH A SUBJECT TO THE JAPANESE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. SPECIFICALLY, PRESIDENT CHUN HOPES THAT EITHER PRESIDENT REAGAN OR SECRETARY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SHULTZ WILL RAISE THIS PROPOSAL WITH NAKASONE.

5. I THANKED SECRETARY-GENERAL HAHM FOR HIS CLARIFICATION AND SAID I WOULD REPORT PRESIDENT CHUN'S REQUEST TO WASHINGTON.
SECRET

5. OUR CONTACTS AT THE JAPANESE EMBASSY CONFIRM HAHM'S DESCRIPTION OF THE CHUN/NAKASONE EXCHANGE IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

6. COMMENT: IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT CHUN AND NAKASONE SIMPLY DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF JAPAN ENCOURAGING CHINESE MOVES TOWARD SEOUL, NOT JAPANESE RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA. WE REMAIN CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE APPROPRIATENESS OF OUR PRESENTING A KOREAN IDEA TO THE JAPANESE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. IF WE DECIDE TO DO SO HOWEVER, WE WOULD THINK THAT WE SHOULD DETERMINE JAPANESE REACTION AT THE WORKING LEVEL BEFORE RAISING IT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. AND IF BY SOME MIRACLE IT ALL WORKED OUT, IT WOULD BE NO BAD THING FROM THE SEOUL PERSPECTIVE. CLEVELAND

SEUL 0473 0156 DTG: 140957Z JAN 83 PSN: 076936

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NLR 106-048 #35283

BY CI NARADATE 3/27/08

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

35284

22

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SEOUL 0614 8602 DTG: 190844Z JAN 83 PSN: 006421
SIT667 DATE 01/24/83 TOR: 019/1140Z

SEOUL VISIT. CLEVELAND

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB EOBNNORT BOSH

EOB:

SEOUL 0614

8602

DTG: 190844Z JAN 83 PSN: 006421

WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLISTIST-----FORE MTG PRESIDENT

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHUL #0614 0190859

O 190844Z JAN 83

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4565

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 1426

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0849

AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1709

BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 00614

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, KS, KN, JA, CH, US, UR

SUBJECT: NAKASONE-CHUN SUMMIT: CROSS-RECOGNITION

REF: TOKYO 000974

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH BLUE HOUSE SECRETARY GENERAL
HAHM PYONG-CHUN (M-R: HAM PYONG-CH'UN) ON JANUARY 18
FOLLOWING PRESIDENT CHUN'S (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) STATE OF
THE UNION MESSAGE TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, CHARGE
INFORMED HAHM OF THE DEPARTMENT'S VIEW CONTAINED REFTEL
THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER CHUN'S CROSS-RECOGNITION PROPOSAL
WITH GREAT CARE AT WORKING LEVEL BEFORE RAISING IT WITH
NAKASONE. CHARGE SAID THAT, WHILE WE DID NOT PLAN TO
DISCUSS QUESTION WITH NAKASONE, WE UNDERSTOOD IT WOULD
PROBABLY COME UP IN SECRETARY'S MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER ABE. CHARGE DID NOT INDICATE WHO WOULD RAISE
SUBJECT NOR PROVIDE ANY OTHER FURTHER DETAILS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. HAHM AT FIRST RESTATED CHUN'S HOPE THAT PRESIDENT
REAGAN WOULD DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH NAKASONE, BUT
WHEN CHARGE REPEATED OUR VIEW THAT A "GO SLOW" APPROACH
WOULD BE BEST, AND THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING
THIS QUESTION DURING THE SECRETARY'S UPCOMING VISIT,
HAHM DID NOT PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER.

4. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH LEE BUM SUK (M-R:
YI POM-SOK), CHARGE REPEATED THE MESSAGE. LEE, WHO FROM
THE BEGINNING HAS FAVORED CAREFUL DIPLOMATIC CONSIDERATION
OF THIS MATTER BEFORE PLUNGING INTO THE UNKNOWN, WELCOMED
THIS NEWS WITH A SATISFIED SMILE.

5. COMMENT: THIS TAKES CARE OF THE MATTER FOR THE MOMENT,
BUT BELIEVE SECRETARY AND OTHERS IN HIS PARTY SHOULD BE
FULLY PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS INITIATIVE DURING UPCOMING

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NLRR 106-048 #35284

BY CU NARA DATE 3/27/08

~~SECRET~~

35285
~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SEOUL 0618 8602 DTG: 191012Z JAN 83 PSN: 006465
SIT664 DATE 01/24/83 TOR: 019/1217Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOBNNORT BOSH

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTKLISTLIST-----FORE MTG PRESIDENT

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUENUL #0618 0191019

O 191012Z JAN 83

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4568

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 1428

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0850

AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1711

BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 00618

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, KS, KN, JA, CH, US, UR

SUBJECT: CHUN-NAKASONE CONVERSATION: JAPAN'S DIPLOMATIC
- AND SECURITY ROLE IN THE REGION

REF: STATE 013269

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN COURSE OF FAREWELL CALL BY COMBINED FIELD ARMY
COMMANDER LTG JAMES VAUGHT, PRESIDENT CHUN (M-R: CHON
TU-HWAN) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING OUTLINE OF HIS CONVER-
SATION WITH PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE ON JAPAN'S ROLE IN
THE REGION DURING LATTER'S SEOUL VISIT.

3. CHUN SAID HE HAD TOLD NAKASONE THAT THE IMPORTANCE
OF SOLIDARITY AMONG FREE WORLD NATIONS COULD NOT BE OVER-
EMPHASIZED. JAPAN MUST TAKE A LEADERSHIP POSITION AMONG
FREE WORLD NATIONS BECAUSE OF ITS GREAT ECONOMIC STRENGTH.
BOTH KOREA AND JAPAN HAD BILATERAL SECURITY TREATIES WITH
THE U.S., THUS BOTH BENEFITTED GREATLY AND BOTH HAD AN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OBLIGATION TO RALLY AROUND THE U.S. ALTHOUGH KOREA WAS
NOT AS STRONG ECONOMICALLY AS JAPAN, IT HAD DONE AND
WOULD CONTINUE TO DO ITS PART. JAPAN NOT ONLY COULD
HELP ECONOMICALLY, BUT IT COULD HELP BY STRENGTHENING
ITS OWN DEFENSES. THE SHARED U.S./JAPAN/ROK OBJECTIVE
SHOULD BE TO UNITE AND TO RESTRAIN THE USSR AND THE OTHER
CONTINENTAL POWERS (UNSPECIFIED). THAT, SAID CHUN TO
NAKASONE, IS THE BEST WAY TO HELP SHARE THE BURDEN WITH
THE U.S., AND THAT IS THE CONTRIBUTION THAT JAPAN COULD
BEST MAKE TO THE FREE WORLD.

4. CHUN THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT HIS CONVERSATION WITH
NAKASONE HAD GONE SO WELL THAT THE LATTER HAD VOLUNTEERED
JAPAN'S ASSISTANCE IN INCREASING THE LEVEL OF CHINESE
CONTACT WITH AND RECOGNITION OF SOUTH KOREA. "I CAN DO
SOMETHING TO HELP YOU WITH BEIJING", NAKASONE REPORTEDLY

SAID. CHUN IN RETURN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS
OFFER, WHICH HE ACCEPTED. CHUN ALSO ADVISED NAKASONE NOT
TO TRY TO HELP WITH THE ROK/SOVIET CONNECTION; JAPAN
ALREADY HAD TOO MANY PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIETS.

5. CHUN ALSO TOLD NAKASONE THAT REUNITING OF PRC AND USSR
WAS A POTENTIALLY SERIOUS PROBLEM. JAPAN, CHUN ADVISED
HIS JAPANESE VISITOR, SHOULD WORK CLOSELY WITH THE U.S.
TO DEVISE STRATEGY TO FRUSTRATE ANY SUCH REUNIFICATION.
IN SOME CASES, JAPAN WOULD BE IN THE BEST POSITION TO
TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN THIS CAUSE. JAPAN SHOULD USE ITS
INFLUENCE, ENJOINED CHUN, TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN CHINA
AND THE USSR.

6. CHARGE THANKED PRESIDENT CHUN FOR THIS REPORT AND
SAID HE WOULD CONVEY IT TO WASHINGTON.

7. FOLLOWING THE ABOVE CONVERSATION, WHICH TOOK PLACE
MID-AFTERNOON JANUARY 19, FOREIGN MINISTER LEE BUM SUK
(M-R: YI POM-SOK) GAVE ME A FULL READOUT ON THE CHUN-
NAKASONE CONVERSATION, WHICH I WILL REPORT TOMORROW.
SINCE CHUN'S OWN DESCRIPTION OF HIS TALKS WITH NAKASONE
ABOVE SUGGESTS THE NOTION OF A TRIANGULAR DEFENSE ARRANGE-
MENT BETWEEN THE U.S., JAPAN, AND THE ROK, I ASKED LEE
WHETHER CHUN HAD IN FACT MADE SUCH A SUGGESTION. LEE
SAID "ABSOLUTELY NOT". CHUN HAD TALKED ABOUT THE NEED
FOR COORDINATED EFFORTS IN A COMMON CAUSE, BUT HE HAD NOT
SAID ANYTHING ABOUT A TRIANGULAR TREATY RELATIONSHIP.

SEOUL 0618 8602 DTG: 191012Z JAN 83 PSN: 006465
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WHEN I COMMENTED THAT KOREA DID NOT SEEM READY FOR SUCH
A TREATY, LEE AGAIN SAID "ABSOLUTELY NOT". CLEVELAND

SEOUL 0618 8602 DTG: 191012Z JAN 83 PSN: 006465

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NLRR 06-048 #35265

BY 01 NARADATE 3/27/08

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 1 - 368

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATAGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE351
UTS5178
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHUL #0989 0270813
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 270810Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4744
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0190
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SEOUL 00989
E.O. 12356: DECL: 1/27/89
TAGS: PREL EG KS, US
SUBJECT: SOUTH KOREAN EFFORTS TO RAISE RELATIONS WITH
- EGYPT TO DIPLOMATIC LEVEL
- (C) THE BLUE HOUSE HAS PASSED US A REQUEST, THROUGH
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, THAT THE SUBJECT OF UPGRADING
SOUTH KOREAN-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS BE RAISED WITH PRESIDENT
MUBARAK WHILE HE IS VISITING WASHINGTON. BOTH MOFA
AND THE EMBASSY REALIZE THIS REQUEST MAY BE TOO LATE BUT
PASS IT ON IN THE HOPE THAT IT CAN STILL BE ACTED UPON.
WALKER
BT
#0989
NNNN

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NLRR F06-0487 35286

BY CH NARADATE 3/27/08

SENSITIVE

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8300710

RECEIVED 28 JAN 83 20

TO CLARK FROM SIGUR

DOCDATE 28 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: KOREA

FMS

SOUTHEAST ASIA

SUBJECT: FMS TERMS FOR KOREA

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 02 FEB 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(J /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

JAN 29 1983

Clark sgl

mler 15/1/83

DISPATCH

JAN 29 1983

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C)

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

January 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE DONALD T. REGAN
The Secretary of the Treasury

SUBJECT: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) - Terms for Korea (U)

The President is concerned by the serious implications for Korean security and our own security objectives in Northeast Asia of the sharp cuts in FMS levels for Korea. While understanding the need for those reductions, he also recognizes that they will have a significant effect on that country's ability to carry through with its force improvement plan and narrow the dangerous military gap with the North. We have a direct stake in the success of those efforts. Korean forces are on the line with ours facing a formidable threat and would come under our direct command in time of war. (S)

In these circumstances, the President believes that we must take the other steps available to us to help this close ally. He has, therefore, decided that we should provide Korea with extended repayment terms for FY 1983 (5 years grace and 7 years repayment), and include Korea in the list of countries for which we will seek legislation for 10 years grace and 20 years repayment in FY 1984. (S)

During his Seoul visit Secretary Shultz should convey to President Chun both President Reagan's own personal commitment to Korean security and his decision to take the concessional steps outlined above. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


William P. Clark

cc The Secretary of Defense

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

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NLRR 106-048 #35287

BY AW NARADATE 3/27/08

~~SECRET~~

521

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # 710

'83 JAN 28 P6:58

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Jacque Hill	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
John Poindexter	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Staff Secretary	<u>4</u>	<u> </u>	<u>D</u>
Sit Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>JAN 29 1983</u>
<u>LILAC</u>	<u>2</u>	<u> </u>	<u>Comm.</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

~~SECRET~~

35288

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0710

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

January 28, 1983

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *JS*
SUBJECT: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) - Terms for Korea

Because of the absence of an appropriation this year, the government is operating under a continuing resolution at FY 1982 levels in the area of Foreign Military Sales. Moreover, there has been Congressional earmarking for specific programs which effectively leaves us with less money world-wide than last year. We have, therefore, had to reduce the Korean FMS program for FY 1983 from our originally planned level of \$210M to \$140M.

U.S. security assistance is an important incremental factor in the Korean defense budget which absorbs 6% of the Korean GNP and is also seen as an earnest of our commitment. Therefore, this sharp cut will have a major impact on Korean defense planning and would be a serious psychological blow to our Korean allies.

State has informed the Koreans of the reduction from \$210M to \$140M. They are, understandably, discouraged. I agree with State that it is important that we are able to inform the Koreans as soon as possible that we can provide improved repayment terms. Existing terms for Korea are 3 years grace and 9 years repayment. I believe that should be extended to 5 years grace and 7 years repayment for FY 1983 and that Korea should be included in the list of countries for which we provide 10 years grace and 20 years repayment in FY 1984. This action is necessary if we are to maintain our close security relations with a country where U.S. troops occupy front line positions.

I am attaching a letter from you to Secretaries Shultz and Regan at Tab A which outlines for them our position on this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab A Clark ltr to Secretaries Shultz and Regan

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Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR F06-048# 35288
BY RW NARA DATE 7/6/12

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHFAX

710

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JAN 29 1961

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

MESSAGE NO. 270 CLASSIFICATION Secret 101 1
FROM Robert McFarlane
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION FMS

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B</u>	<u>Jerry Bremer</u>		
<u>D</u>	<u>Sec Def</u>		
<u>K-2</u>	<u>Sec Treasury</u>		

REMARKS:

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RECEIVED

3 JAN 29 AM: 07

SITUATION ROOM

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

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JAN 29 AM 10 47

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURESMESSAGE NO. 270 CLASSIFICATION Secret PAGES 1FROM Robert McFarlane
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION FMS

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B</u>	<u>Jerry Bremer</u>		
REMARKS:	<u>SK, SK-S, FA</u>		

63 JAN 29 20: 07

SECRET

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

105
4/17/07

MESSAGE NO. 270 CLASSIFICATION SECRET
FROM Robert M. Felt (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION FMS

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B</u>	<u>Jeffrey Bremer</u>		
<u>D</u>	<u>Sec. 44f</u>		
<u>K-2</u>	<u>Sec. Treasury</u>		

REMARKS:

RECEIVED
JAN 29 1963

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PAGE 1 - 525

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/10/83//222

SITUATION: PRES MSGS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA474

JO RUEADWW

JE RUEHAI #0033 0390315

ZNY SSSSS

J 080315Z FEB 83

FM USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT

TO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 01115

MODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: KOREA VISIT

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MY VISIT TO KOREA SERVED OUR MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF UNDERSCORING OUR COMMITMENT TO KOREAN SECURITY, OUR SUPPORT FOR ITS INITIATIVES TO REDUCE TENSION ON THE PENINSULA AND OUR CONCERN FOR FURTHER POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND GREATER RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

3. IN OUR FIRST MEETING, FOREIGN MINISTER LEE EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR YOUR DETERMINATION TO STRENGTHEN AMERICAN GLOBAL LEADERSHIP, PLEDGING ROK SUPPORT FOR THOSE EFFORTS. I REAFFIRMED YOUR COMMITMENT TO A STRONG DEFENSE AND THE IMPORTANCE YOU ATTACH TO OUR ALLIANCE WITH KOREA. I INVITED LEE TO VISIT US AND LATER NAILED IT DOWN WITH PRESIDENT CHUN WHO AGREED TO A LEE VISIT IN LATE APRIL OR EARLY MAY.

4. LEE SPOKE AT SOME LENGTH ON HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME, EMPHASIZING ITS IMPRESSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE DANGER THAT KIM IL SUNG MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO ATTACK THE SOUTH. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ROK HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO CONTINUE TO IMPROVE ITS DEFENSE. I TOLD LEE WE APPRECIATED THE ROK'S DEFENSE EFFORTS AND THE ECONOMIC BURDEN THEY ENTAILED. I ASSURED HIM THAT BEYOND EASING CREDIT TERMS, WE WOULD WORK HARD TO OBTAIN CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR INCREASED SECURITY ASSISTANCE, BUT CAUTIONED THAT THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT.

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NLRR F06-048 #35289

BY CW NARA DATE 3/27/08

2
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 526

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/10/83//222

SITUATION: PRES MSGS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

5. LEE COMMENTED THAT THE ROK WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED BY THE RECENT IMPROVEMENT IN JAPAN-KOREA RELATIONS. HE EVINced SOME CONCERN, HOWEVER, FOR JAPAN'S POTENTIAL MILITARY ROLE AND ASKED THAT WE KEEP THE ROK INFORMED OF THE NATURE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH JAPAN ON DEFENSE ISSUES. HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE EFFECT ANY SINO-SOVIET RAPPROACHMENT MIGHT HAVE ON NORTH KOREA AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT MILITARY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERRED TO CHINA WOULD FIND ITS WAY TO NORTH KOREA. I ASSURED HIM WE WOULD HAVE THESE CONCERNS IN MIND.

6. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSION, LEE ASSURED ME THAT KOREA IS DETERMINED TO WIND UP THE RICE PROBLEM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I ENCOURAGED HIM IN THAT RESOLVE, EMPHASIZING THAT THE SOONER THE BETTER. WE ALSO HAD A BRIEF DISCUSSION ON PROSPECTS FOR CROSS-RECOGNITION AND AGREED THAT THIS SHOULD BE APPROACHED CAREFULLY AND CAUTIOUSLY. PRESIDENT CHUN LATER TOLD ME THAT THE IDEA OF CHINA RECOGNIZING SOUTH KOREA WHILE JAPAN RECOGNIZED NORTH KOREA HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD FIRST BY NAKASONE. CHUN IS NOT OPPOSED TO IT.

7. IN MY CALL ON PRESIDENT CHUN, HE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL BEST WISHES TO YOU. CHUN SAID HE WAS PLEASED AND ENCOURAGED BY THE INTEREST YOU HAVE SHOWN IN KOREA, AND INVITED YOU TO VISIT. HE PRAISED YOUR DECISION TO CANCEL PLANS TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM KOREA AND YOUR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN OUR SECURITY POSTURE WORLDWIDE. HE ADDED THAT IN HIS TALKS WITH LEADERS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS HE HAD CONSISTENTLY URGED THEM TO WORK WITH THE U.S. TO CONTAIN SOVIET EXPANSIONISM AND MAINTAIN PEACE. I TOLD CHUN THAT IN OUR VIEW THE GROWING STRENGTH OF KOREA AND THE US-KOREAN RELATIONSHIP HAD A SIGNIFICANCE EXTENDING FAR BEYOND THIS PENINSULA. I ALSO TOOK THE OCCASION TO SAY THAT WE WELCOMED THE STEPS CHUN HAS RECENTLY TAKEN TOWARD POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION.

8. IN THE LARGER LUNCHEON MEETING WHICH FOLLOWED, CHUN OUTLINED HIS EFFORTS ALONG WITH PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE TO PUT THE JAPAN-KOREAN RELATIONSHIP ON A BETTER FOOTING. HE GAVE A GREAT DEAL OF CREDIT TO YOU FOR THIS ACCOMPLISHMENT AND PRAISED NAKASONE

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/10/83//222

SITUATION: PRES MSGS
SUBJECT CATEGORY: IN

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FOR HIS POLITICAL COURAGE IN COMING TO KOREA. AT MY REQUEST CHUN THEN ELABORATED ON HIS PROPOSAL FOR A SUMMIT MEETING OF PACIFIC BASIN LEADERS (AN IDEA MOST GOVERNMENTS OF THE AREA HAVE TREATED WITH CONSIDERABLE RESERVE). HE ASSERTED THAT A SUMMIT MEETING OF A MINIMUM OF TEN LEADERS FROM AROUND THE REGION COULD GREATLY FACILITATE RELATIONSHIPS IN THE AREA AND ITS CONTINUED ECONOMIC PROGRESS. CHUN SAID HE HAD PUT FORWARD THE IDEA BECAUSE IT WAS MORE LIKELY TO BE BROADLY ACCEPTED IF PROPOSED BY A SMALLER NATION SUCH AS KOREA. WHILE HE ENVISAGED IT AS A FORUM TO DISCUSS PRIMARILY ECONOMIC ISSUES, HE SAID THAT HIS UNDERLYING MOTIVE WAS TO DRAW SOME OF THE NON-ALIGNED STATES OF THE REGION INTO CLOSER ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNITED STATES. I THANKED HIM FOR HIS THOUGHTS AND AVOIDED COMMITTING OUR SUPPORT. IT IS AN INTERESTING IDEA, BUT NOT SOMETHING WE NEED TO RUSH INTO.

9. IN THE AFTERNOON, I TRAVELED BY HELICOPTER TO THE AREA NEAR THE DMZ, WHERE I VISITED BOTH US AND KOREAN TROOP UNITS. I WAS IMPRESSED BY THE PROFESSIONALISM AND ESPRIT OF BOTH FORCES, AND BY THE IMMEDIACY OF THE MILITARY THREAT WHICH THEY MUST DEFEND AGAINST. JUST PRIOR TO RETURNING TO SEOUL I MET WITH AN ARMY RECONNAISSANCE SQUAD PREPARING TO GO OUT INTO THE DMZ ON A NIGHT PATROL. I TOLD THEM I WAS PROUD OF THEM AND EXPRESSED YOUR APPRECIATION AND FULL SUPPORT FOR THEIR MISSION.

10. PRESIDENT CHUN ASKED TO SEE ME PRIVATELY AFTER THE FAREWELL DINNER AT WHICH TIME I DELIVERED YOUR LETTER. IT IS EVIDENT THAT HE AND THE KOREANS ARE TREMENDOUSLY INTERESTED IN CHINA'S INTENTIONS. THE IDEA OF CHINA AND THE SOVIETS RECREATING THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP THEY ONCE HAD IS DISTURBING TO THE KOREANS. CHUN SEES NO SIGNS AT PRESENT THAT THIS IS THE CASE. IN FACT, THE KOREANS THINK THAT CHINA AND NORTH KOREA ARE DRAWING CLOSER TOGETHER AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SOVIET UNION. CHUN EVEN CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE PLAYING A "SOUTH KOREA CARD;" THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVANCES (E.G. VISITS) TOWARD THE SOUTH KOREANS.

SHULTZ

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Pulled 18 Aug 07

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for Josh Schofen

ALB

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE:

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 3881

~~SECRET~~ STATE 047263

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: SHUM, PREL, KS

SUBJECT: APPEAL FOR CLEMENCY FOR PUSAN ARSON DEFENDANTS

REF: SEOUL 1772

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IF THE KOREAN SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS THE DEATH SENTENCES OF PUSAN ARSONISTS MUN AND KIM, EMBASSY IS AUTHORIZED TO APPROACH THE ROKG, AT ANY LEVEL YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE, TO SEEK COMMUTATION OF THOSE SENTENCES. WE AGREE SUCH AN APPEAL SHOULD BE BASED ON POLITICAL RATHER THAN LEGAL GROUNDS, AND ENDORSE THE APPROACH OUTLINED IN PARA. 9 OF REFTEL. WE ALSO AGREE FULLY THAT ANY REPRESENTATION TO THE ROKG SHOULD BE ENTIRELY PRIVATE. WE WOULD ADD THAT, SHOULD THE KOREANS UNEXPECTEDLY OFFER TO DISCUSS THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE, YOU SHOULD DEMUR.

3. YOU SHOULD ALSO STRESS THAT CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN THIS CASE IS SIGNIFICANT AND INCREASING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

(THANKS LARGELY TO A PETITION CAMPAIGN SPONSORED BY THE NORTH AMERICAN COALITION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN KOREA). WHILE CLEARLY THERE SHOULD BE NO LINK BETWEEN THE ROKG'S HANDLING OF THE PUSAN ARSON CASE AND CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF THE MOST IMPORTANT KOREA-RELATED ISSUE NOW BEFORE IT, THAT OF FMS FUNDING, KOREANS' CONCERN WITH THE LATTER ISSUE MAY NONETHELESS HAVE HEIGHTENED THEIR USUAL SENSITIVITY TO CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES. SHULTZ

DECLASSIFIED

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BY CU NARA DATE 3/27/08

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