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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 1/24/2007

File Folder CANADA (01/01/1983-09/30/1983)

FOIA

F1554

Box Number 12

TAMMY NEMETH

11

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
32803	CABLE	#292048Z JAN 83 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554	2	1/29/1983	B1
32804	CABLE	#042155Z FEB 83 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554	1	2/4/1983	B1
32805	CABLE	#020031Z MAR 83 - LETTER GEORGE SHULTZ TO ALLAN MACEACHEN R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554	1	3/2/1983	B1
32806	CABLE	#241444Z MAR 83 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554	1	3/24/1983	B1
32807	CABLE	#292142Z MAR 83 - CONTAINS LETTER TRUDEAU TO REAGAN R 12/19/2011 F1554/1	2	3/29/1983	B1
32808	CABLE	#302238Z MAR 83 R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554	2	3/30/1983	B1
32809	FORM	RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL - PRESIDENT TO TRUDEAU R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder CANADA (01/01/1983-09/30/1983)

FOIA

F1554

Box Number 12

TAMMY NEMETH

11

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
32810	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO WILLIAM CLARK, RE: RECOMMENDED LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU OF CANADA ON TRUDEAU'S "OPEN LETTER" ON CRUISE MISSILE TESTING <i>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</i>	1	5/12/1983	B1
32811	LETTER	DRAFT LETTER - REAGAN TO TRUDEAU <i>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</i>	1	ND	B1
32812	CABLE	#061612Z JUL 83 <i>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</i>	1	7/6/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

22803

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 270

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE417
OO RUEHC RUEHOT
DE RUEHC #7311 0292048
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 292048Z JAN 83
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 1522
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 027311
EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM PINS
SUBJECT: US-CANADIAN CONSULTATIONS ON SECURITY/ARMS
- CONTROL ISSUES

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1554 #32803

BY GI NARADATE 10/7/07

REF: STATE 20651

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

2. DURING MEETING WITH THE DEPUTY SECRETARY JANUARY 26, LARGELY DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY, CANADIAN AMBASSADOR GOTLIEB PICKED UP POINT CONTAINED IN JANUARY 21 MACEACHEN LETTER TO SECRETARY SHULTZ (REFTEL) ON NEED FOR ENHANCED US-CANADIAN CONSULTATIONS ON SECURITY/ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. GOTLIEB NOTED THAT CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WAS FACING CONSIDERABLE POPULAR OPPOSITION TO WEAPONS TESTING AGREEMENT. WHILE GOC PLANS TO GO AHEAD WITH THE AGREEMENT, GOTLIEB SAID THAT CANADIAN AUTHORITIES HOPE THAT CLOSER AND MORE INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS CAN DEVELOP BETWEEN THE US AND CANADA ON SECURITY/ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. HE NOTED, IN THIS CONNECTION, VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S TRIP TO EUROPE. (COMMENT: CLEAR, THOUGH UNSTATED IMPLICATION OF GOTLIEB'S REFERENCE TO VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP WAS CANADIAN SENSE OF BEING LEFT OUT OF A MAJOR ALLIANCE

EVENT. END COMMENT)

3. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AGREED THAT ENHANCED US-CANADIAN CONSULTATIONS ON THESE ISSUES WOULD BE DESIRABLE. THE ONLY QUESTION, HE SAID, WAS HOW THIS SHOULD BE DONE. EUR DAS NILES POINTED OUT THAT CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN NATO SCG MEANT THAT GOC HAD BEEN INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN ALL PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT OF ALLIED POSITION ON INF. GOTLIEB

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 271

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AGREED, BUT SUGGESTED THAT CLOSER CONSULTATIONS WERE
NEEDED IN ORDER TO SATISFY CANADIAN CONCERNS. THE DEPUTY
SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY-
DESIGNATE BURT WOULD BE POINT OF CONTACT WITH CANADIANS
ON THESE ISSUES; GOTLIEB AGREED. DAM

BT
#7311
NNNN

SENSITIVE

32804

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE846
STU1081
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHOT #0940 0352156
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 042155Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0048
INFO RUHNA/USMISSION USNATO 2253
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OTTAWA 00940
EXDIS
GENEVA FOR USINF PLEASE PASS TO BURT
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, NATO, INF
SUBJECT: INF: REVISION OF SOVIET TREATY
REF: STATE 032730
1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. REFTEL MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED TO CANADIAN SCG REP
BOB CAMERON ON FEBRUARY 4. HE EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION
FOR THE INFORMATION CONVEYED. CAMERON ALSO TOOK THE
OPPORTUNITY TO MENTION THAT THE GOC AND OTHER ALLIES
WERE SPECULATING THAT VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S RECENT
PUBLIC REMARKS, AND ESPECIALLY US MEDIA INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE LATTER, SUGGESTED THE US MAY HAVE PREPARED AN
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO THE ZERO-ZERO OPTION. WE REPLIED,
OF COURSE, THAT WE HAD NO INFORMATION THAT WOULD SUPPORT
SUCH SPECULATION.
ROBINSON
BT
#0940
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

NLRR F1554 #32804

BY CW NARA DATE 12/7/07

~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

32805

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 6094607 DTG: 020031Z MAR 83 PSN: 068666
SIT708 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 061/0420Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR VP BOV SIT EOB EOB SH NORT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: -----CHECKLIST-----

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #6094 0610048

O 020031Z MAR 83 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 1949

~~SECRET~~ STATE 056094

MODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: US, CA, WA, PNAT, PSDC

SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS SECRETARY MACEACHEN

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT).

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE
SECRETARY TO CANADIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SECRETARY MACEACHEN
(THERE WILL BE NO RPT NO SIGNED ORIGINAL).

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR ALLAN:

CHET CROCKER HAS BRIEFED ME ON THE VERY USEFUL MEETING OF
CONTACT GROUP AFRICA DIRECTORS JUST HELD IN OTTAWA UNDER
CANADIAN CHAIRMANSHIP.

I AM PLEASED THAT YOU WERE ABLE TO MEET WITH THE GROUP
AND TO LEAD A PROBING DISCUSSION OF A PROBLEM WE FACE IN
COMMON: HOW TO MAINTAIN OUR CREDIBILITY IN AFRICA ON THE
NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE PROCESS AT A TIME OF FRUSTRATION OVER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE LACK OF PUBLIC AND VISIBLE PROGRESS. WHILE WE ARE
TAKING MUCH OF THE HEAT ON THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ISSUE,
YOU AND OUR OTHER CONTACT GROUP PARTNERS ARE INEVITABLY
AFFECTED AS WELL. WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THAT. IN THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES, YOUR EXPRESSION OF PURPOSE AND READINESS
TO SEE THIS THING THROUGH IS GREATLY APPRECIATED.

AS YOU WILL HAVE HEARD FROM YOUR REPRESENTATIVES, DIS-
CUSSION ALSO FOCUSED ON HOW WE MIGHT COLLECTIVELY AND
INDIVIDUALLY CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE ALL PARTIES TO KEEP
THE NEGOTIATIONS MOVING FORWARD. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT,
FOR OUR PART, WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO PRESS FOR
REASONABLE SOUTH AFRICAN BEHAVIOR AND RESTRAINT ON ANGOLA
WHILE OTHER PRESSURES MOUNT ON THE ANGOLANS TO NEGOTIATE
SERIOUSLY.

IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, WE WILL BE INVOLVED ON BOTH FRONTS,
AS WE EXPECT TO RESUME DIRECT TALKS WITH THE ANGOLANS IN
EARLY MARCH, WHICH WILL PARALLEL TALKS AT SENIOR LEVEL
WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. IN THE COMING MONTHS, IT IS
LIKELY THAT WE WILL COLLECTIVELY BE FACING A COMPLEX SITUA-
TION: A POSITIVE BUT PROBABLY GRADUAL EVOLUTION OF THE
ANGOLAN PICTURE AT THE SAME TIME AS PUBLIC DIPLOMATIC
CRITICISM MOUNTS AT THE UN AND NON-ALIGNED MEETINGS. WE
WILL KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU AND WILL VALUE YOUR
SUPPORT.

SINCERELY YOURS,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

THE HONORABLE
ALLAN MACEACHEN, P.C., M.P.,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF CANADA,
OTTAWA.

END TEXT. SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 6094607 DTG: 020031Z MAR 83 PSN: 068666

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FISSY # 32805

BY CW NARA DATE 12/7/07

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 881

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

32806

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE996
STU4564
PP RUEHC
DE RUEHOT #2271 0831445
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 241444Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0881
BT
~~SECRET~~ OTTAWA 02271
EXDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, CA, US
SUBJECT: TESTING OF US CRUISE MISSILES IN CANADA
1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. BOB CAMERON, EXTAFF'S ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL AFFAIRS
TOLD US MARCH 23 THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER HOPES THAT THE
US WILL NOT/NOT LONG DELAY ITS REQUEST FOR THE START OF
THE CRUISE MISSILES IN CANADA. CAMERON EXPLAINED THAT
THE MINISTER WANTED TO COMPLETE BOTH THE PROJECT AGREEMENT
AND THE ACTUAL TESTING BEFORE THE NEXT CANADIAN FEDERAL
ELECTION. HE BELIEVES THAT THOSE ELECTIONS ARE LIKELY
TO BE CALLED IN THE SPRING OF 1984.
ROBINSON
BT
#2271
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF 1554 432806

BY CL NARADATE 12/7/07

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE734
STU6191
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHOT #2427 0882144
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZY
O 292142Z MAR 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1012
BT

~~SECRET~~ OTTAWA 02427

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, CA

SUBJECT: CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER'S RESPONSE TO PRESI-
- DENT'S LETTER ON US NEGOTIATING POSITION IN
- INF TALKS

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE REPEAT BELOW THE TEXT, GIVEN US IN STRICTEST
CONFIDENCE BY EXTAFF (PROTECT) ON MARCH 29, OF PRIME
MINISTER TRUDEAU'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF
MARCH 29 REGARDING THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION IN THE
INF TALKS. THE ORIGINAL WAS TO BE DELIVERED BY THE
CANADIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON ON MARCH 29. WE UNDER-
STAND A CLOSELY SIMILAR LETTER FROM TRUDEAU WAS ABOUT
TO BE SENT TO THE PRESIDENT IN FAVORABLE REACTION TO
THE VICE PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING OF TRUDEAU HERE ON MARCH
23 ON THE SAME ISSUE.

3. BEGIN TEXT (OF LETTER DATED MARCH 28, 1983)

DEAR RON,

- I SUPPORT YOUR PROPOSAL TO HAVE AMBASSADOR NITZE
PROPOSE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IN THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE
NUCLEAR FORCE TALKS. AS I TOLD VICE PRESIDENT BUSH
DURING HIS WELCOME VISIT ON WEDNESDAY, WE IN CANADA
WOULD AGREE THAT THE ZERO OPTION IS IDEAL, IN THE SENSE
THAT IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE BETTER IF THERE WERE NO
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE. HOWEVER, THIS
DOES NOT SEEM TO BE A REALIZABLE GOAL, AND I AGREE THAT
WE SHOULD LOOK AT A POSSIBLE INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION. THUS
I CONCUR WITH THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE PROPOSAL
CONCERNING THE INF TALKS THAT YOU OUTLINED IN YOUR
MESSAGE.

ON FRIDAY OUR REPRESENTATIVES ON THE NATO
SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP DISCUSSED THE MERITS OF
PROPOSING FIGURES FOR THE NUMBERS OF WARHEADS WHICH

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1554 #32807

BY RW NARA DATE 12/19/11

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WOULD BE DEPLOYED UNDER AN INTERIM AGREEMENT, AT LEAST FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES. I UNDERSTAND YOUR REASONS FOR JUDGING THAT IT WOULD BE BEST NOT TO DEAL IN SPECIFIC NUMBERS AT THIS TIME. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT A DETAILED PROPOSAL, INCLUDING NUMBERS OF WAR-HEADS, SHOULD NOT BE LONG DELAYED IF WE ARE TO ENSURE MAXIMUM PUBLIC SUPPORT. I AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE RECESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE SHORTENED IN ORDER TO STEP UP THE MOMENTUM OF NEGOTIATIONS. OF THE POSSIBLE DATES YOU SUGGESTED, I THINK MAY 10 WOULD BE THE BEST.

- I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING OUR CONSULTATIONS ON THESE AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS IN THE FUTURE.

- YOURS SINCERELY,

- /S/ PIERRE E. T.

END TEXT.

ROBINSON

BT

#2427

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

32808

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE:

HCE159
STU9420
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHOT #2473 0892238
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 302238Z MAR 83
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1037
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 4247
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 5708
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1169
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6337
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 2309
BT

NLRR FISSY # 32808
BY CN NARA DATE 12/7/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ OTTAWA 02473

NOFORN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, US, CA

SUBJECT: CANADIAN OFFICIALS' REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT'S

- MARCH 30 SPEECH

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. EXTAFF DEFENCE RELATIONS DIVISION OFFICER EXPRESSED
TO EMBOFF MARCH 30 HIS AND HIS COLLEAGUES' ADMIRATION
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH THE SAME DAY ON OUR INF
NEGOTIATING POSTURE AS "HIGHLY EFFECTIVE" IN CONTENT
AND PRESENTATION.

3. ACCORDING TO OUR CONTACT (PROTECT), EXTAFF ARMS
CONTROL/SECURITY ISSUES SPECIALISTS PREPARED A BRIEFING
PAPER FOR PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND FOREIGN MINISTER
MACEACHEN WHICH RECOMMENDS THEY RESPOND TO PARLIAMENTARY
OR PRESS QUERIES, OR ISSUE A COMMUNIQUE, ON GOC'S
REACTION TO THE SPEECH MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- -- THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IS "WELCOMED" AS "A
SERIOUS AND IMPORTANT STEP" TOWARDS EVENTUAL GOAL OF
ELIMINATING ALL LAND-BASED INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES;
- -- US PROPOSAL MADE AFTER CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH
ITS ALLIES, INCLUDING CANADA;
- -- GOC CONSIDERS ZERO-OPTION "IDEAL" BUT, SINCE
SOVIETS HAVE REFUSED THIS, AND AS WAS EXPRESSED TO
VICE PRESIDENT BUSH DURING HIS VISIT HERE MARCH 23, GOC
ALSO URGED US TO CONSIDER "A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE;"
- -- THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 30 PROPOSALS MEET GOC
CRITERIA FOR AN "INTERIM AGREEMENT;"
- -- GOC IS "CONVINCED" THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IS

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 530

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 04/11/83//101

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CONDUCTIVE TO PROGRESS IN THE INF TALKS AND "URGES"
THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT IT.

4. FOREGOING, OF COURSE, IS STILL ONLY A RECOMMENDATION
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN ADOPTED AT GOC SENIOR LEVELS AND
SHOULD BE REGARDED ACCORDINGLY. EMBASSY WILL REPORT
ACTUAL GOC STATEMENTS AS THEY ARE ISSUED.

ROBINSON

BT

#2473

NNNN

SENSITIVE

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8302399

~~UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES~~

RECEIVED 09 APR 83 11

TO

CLARK

FROM HILL

dlb 1/24/07

DOCDATE 08 APR 83

KEYWORDS: ~~CANADA~~

AP

MACEACHEN, ALLAN

PHOTO REQUEST

SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST FOR MACEACHEN W/ PRES DURING 11 - 12 APR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 11 APR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

TYSON

WHEELER

COMMENTS

REF# 8310665

LOG

NSCIFID

(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 4/11	tellet sja memo		DF, CT, MW
DISPATCH	add 4/11	MW VIC COX	W/ATTCH	FILE PA (10)


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President for Canadian Deputy
Prime Minister Allan MacEachen

Due to scheduling considerations, it will not be possible for the President to meet with Minister MacEachen on April 11 or 12. For routine visits of this type, White House procedures require ten days' lead time to place events on the President's calendar. The Department is requested to provide this lead time whenever possible.


Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

TF

8:38 PM

MESSAGE NO. 723 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED PAGES one

FROM Michael Wheeler
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Log #2399 12

TO (NAME)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B</u>	<u>Charles Hill</u>	<u>Executive Secretary</u>	

REMARKS:


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 11, 1983

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Department of State

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President for Canadian Deputy
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Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CT*FROM: DENNIS *DB* BLAIRSUBJECT: Meeting with the President for Canadian Deputy
Prime Minister Allan MacEachen

Attached for your signature is a memorandum to State informing them that the President will not be able to meet with MacEachen. The memo also reminds State of the 10 days' lead time required for these requests. We have informed State by phone that this memo is coming.

RECOMMENDATIONOKNO7—

That you sign the memorandum to the State Department at Tab I.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to State Department

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

2399

15

April 8, 1983

83 APR 8 P11:01

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOMSubject: Meeting with the President for Canadian Deputy Prime
Minster Allan MacEachen

Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Allan MacEachen will be in Washington April 11 and 12 to meet with Secretary Shultz and other senior Administration officials. Deputy Prime Minister MacEachen has expressed the desire to call on the President briefly if the President's schedule permits. The Department supports this request and recommends that the President agree to a brief call and photo opportunity for Mr. MacEachen either Monday afternoon or early Tuesday morning. A copy of Mr. MacEachen's schedule as it now stands is attached.

*Charles Hill*Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Schedule of Mr. MacEachen

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By 216 NARA, Date 1/21/07~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

Washington Schedule for
Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
Allan J. MacEachen

Sunday, April 10

1:15 p.m. Arrive Andrews AFB
7:00 p.m. Dinner at residence of Secretary Shultz

Monday, April 11

10:00 a.m. Meet with Secretary Shultz
12:15 p.m. Luncheon in honor of Minister MacEachen
Host: Secretary Shultz
1:45 p.m. Meet with Members of the International
Joint Commission
2:30 p.m. Call on the Vice President
5:00 p.m. Press Conference
7:30 p.m. Attend, with Secretary Shultz, US and
Canadian Chambers of Commerce reception,
Madison Hotel
8:00 p.m. Dinner at residence of Canadian Ambassador

Tuesday, April 12

10:30 a.m. Depart Andrews AFB for Ottawa

RECEIVED 18 APR 83 18

TO

WHEELER

FROM CHEW, D

DOCDATE 16 APR 83

17

KEYWORDS: ECONOMICS

CANADA

TRUDEAU, PIERRE E

SUBJECT: REQUEST TREASURY PARTICIPATION IN TRUDEAU VISIT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 20 APR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BAILEY

NAU

FORTIER

COMMENTS

*Usual Memo
Wheeler to Chew -
Sec. Legan will
be invited to
attend any meetings
with Trudeau on
economic matters*

REF#

LOG 8302221

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 4/20 No further Action Required

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(PA)

(C)



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

April 16, 1983

2634

18

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER
STAFF SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Treasury Participation in Visit of
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau

Prime Minister Trudeau will be in Washington April 28 to discuss Williamsburg Economic Summit issues with President Reagan. Treasury will be prepared to provide briefing materials on Summit and macroeconomic issues for discussion during the Prime Minister's meetings.

Although Secretary Regan will not be able to attend a scheduled White House lunch due to a prior commitment to attend a Development Committee luncheon, the Secretary would like to be included at any other meetings between President Reagan and the Prime Minister that include Summit or economic topics on their agenda. Should briefing material on economic issues be prepared by other agencies for the President, Treasury would like to have an opportunity to review such papers.

Please keep me advised of the plans for this visit and of any assistance Treasury can provide to contribute to the success of the meeting.


David L. Chew
Executive Assistant
of the Secretary

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8302634

RECEIVED 18 APR 83 18

TO WHEELER FROM CHEW, D

DOCDATE 16 APR 83

KEYWORDS: ECONOMICS CANADA TRUDEAU, PIERRE E

SUBJECT: REQUEST TREASURY PARTICIPATION IN TRUDEAU VISIT

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
BAILEY
NAU
FORTIER

COMMENTS CORRECTED PROFILE SHEET, NO ACTION IS REQUIRRED.

REF# LOG 8302221 NSCIFID (M / L)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

April 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER
STAFF SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Treasury Participation in Visit of
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau

Prime Minister Trudeau will be in Washington April 28 to discuss Williamsburg Economic Summit issues with President Reagan. Treasury will be prepared to provide briefing materials on Summit and macroeconomic issues for discussion during the Prime Minister's meetings.

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Please keep me advised of the plans for this visit and of any assistance Treasury can provide to contribute to the success of the meeting.


David L. Chew
Executive Assistant
of the Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

RECEIVED 12 MAY 83 16

TO CLARK FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 12 MAY 83 21

KEYWORDS: CANADA

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

TRUDEAU, PIERRE E

ACCESS REQUEST

NATO

INF

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PRES LTR TO TRUDEAU RE OPEN LTR ON AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR
ARMS CONTROL

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 12 MAY 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLAIR

COMMENTS LOGGED PER BLAIR.

REF# 8314541

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i> <i>Pres</i>	<i>5/13</i> <i>MAY 13 1983</i>	<i>reply to the decision</i> <i>decision via PDB</i>		
	<i>C 5/16</i>	<i>Noted by Pres</i>		<i>DB, CT, SK</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

7A *H*

National Security Council
The White House

661

Package # 3248 22

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>JK</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

0930

Dir,
 send Bud copy of Tab A from file.
 Tab I sent to Pres. at 0915. 5/13
 J

DECLASSIFIED

The President has seen _____

NLRR FISSY # 32809

BY CJ NARA DATE 12/7/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3248

32809

CONFIDENTIAL

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada

DATE: As soon as convenient.

RECOMMENDED BY: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

PURPOSE: To express appreciation for the Prime Minister's open letter in support of NATO INF policies and solicit his cooperation during the Williamsburg Summit.

BACKGROUND: On Tuesday, May 10 Prime Minister Trudeau wrote an open letter to many Canadian newspapers in support of NATO INF policies. He attacked the hypocrisy of those who demonstrated against Western military policies and spare the Soviet Union. He expressed support for the agreement for Canada to provide testing facilities for American cruise missiles. A copy of the Prime Minister's letter is attached, with the highlights underlined.

A second purpose of the call would be to solicit Trudeau's support for a harmonious, successful summit in view of French President Mitterrand's recent contentious statements on economic issues.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: 1. To express appreciation for the Prime Minister's open support for Western defense and NATO INF policies.

2. To indicate the importance of harmonious summit in which differences of view are expressed but the overall outcome of the summit emphasizes unity.

Tab A Copy of Prime Minister Trudeau's open letter

Date of Submission

Action Call made

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

AN OPEN LETTER TO ALL CANADIANS

In recent months I have received a great number of letters and petitions protesting against the possible testing of cruise missiles in Canadian territory. Because it was physically impossible to send a personal reply to all those who had expressed their concerns to me, I gave a public response when I spoke last month at a dinner in honour of Vice-President George Bush.

Because this whole question continues to weigh heavily upon the consciences of those in government and the general public, I have now decided to address myself directly to Canadians through this open letter. My purpose is to explain the position of the Government of Canada on the testing of the cruise missile, and on the broader issue of disarmament.

By way of a preamble, let me point out that our freedom to discuss and argue issues is what gives to our democracy its greatness and its strength; but that same freedom can also make us appear vulnerable in the face of Soviet totalitarianism.

In recent years, the Soviet Union has deployed hundreds of new SS-20 missiles, each equipped with three nuclear warheads, capable of reaching all the great cities of western Europe. However, there has not been any significant outburst of public opposition, either inside or outside the USSR.

- 2 -

That the Soviet people have not protested against this action of their leaders surprises no one. What is surprising, however, is that those in the West who are opposed to new nuclear weapons have remained relatively silent about the installation of the SS-20s. In contrast, they are now taking to the streets to oppose the possible deployment of American Pershing II and cruise missiles to protect Europe against the Soviet nuclear threat.

What is particularly surprising in Canada is to see protesters opposing the possible testing of cruise missiles in Canadian territory, but not opposing the fact that similar missiles are already being tested in the Soviet Union, as was confirmed in December by General-Secretary Andropov.

Because people in the free world feel powerless to influence the leaders of the USSR, there is a great temptation to direct the whole force of their anguish and their protests against the only decision-makers who are sensitive to public opinion, namely the leaders of the democratic countries. Having convinced themselves that it is useless to denounce the SS-20s, people find it easier, I suppose, to forget about them. The strange result of this forgetfulness is that it somehow becomes possible to portray the Soviet Union not as the aggressor, but as the innocent target. This represents a curious amnesia and reversal of roles, which the Soviet leaders are quick to exploit for their own purposes.

They hope, obviously, that one-sided information, and one-sided protests, will lead to the unilateral disarmament of the West. Indeed, there is a segment of public opinion in western Europe which has already adopted that policy.

During the first special session on disarmament at the United Nations, I proposed, in the name of Canada, a strategy of suffocation. It was designed to smother, even in the laboratory, the development of any new nuclear weapons systems. Obviously, my proposal had to apply to both sides or to neither. There certainly was no suggestion in that proposal that the West should disarm unilaterally.

- 3 -

Because our strategy of suffocation was rejected by the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the continued deployment of the SS-20s, a weapon much superior to the SS-4 and 5, there was no question of urging its acceptance by the NATO countries alone. That is why we allied ourselves with the two-track strategy of our NATO partners. Those two tracks are to seek to negotiate the removal of the Soviet SS-20s, and at the same time, to prepare for the deployment of new American missiles in Europe so as to pressure the Soviet Union toward serious negotiations, and so as not to leave our European allies in a vulnerable position, if the negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces ended in failure.

Having declared our support for the two-track strategy, Canada should bear its fair share of the burden which that policy imposes upon the NATO alliance.

It is hardly fair to rely on the Americans to protect the West, but to refuse to lend them a hand when the going gets rough. In that sense, the anti-Americanism of some Canadians verges on hypocrisy. They're eager to take refuge under the American umbrella, but don't want to help hold it.

When we seek to apply moral principles to this issue, it's easy to become trapped in positions which are either too complex or too simple. The former can paralyze us. The latter can deceive us.

Into the trap of over-complication fall those who insist that no moral position is valid which does not take into account every possible future breakthrough in nuclear weapons technology, every possible future difficulty in detecting the actions of the other side. Into the trap of over-simplification fall those who are content to talk about how many bowls of rice could be purchased for the price of a missile, or who condemn governments for spending anything at all on defence.

- 4 -

I do not deny that there is an element of truth and validity in an unconditionally pacifist position. I simply say that it is simplistic to ignore the real, complex and often immoral world to which our moral choices must apply. The Pope himself recognized this fact in a message he sent last June to the second United Nations special session on disarmament. "In current conditions", he wrote, "deterrence based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself, but as a step toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable".

I believe that the Soviet peoples desire peace just as much as the peoples of the free world. But I also know that the Soviets are very heavily armed. In these circumstances, it would be almost suicidal for the West to adopt a policy of unilateral disarmament, or a policy of suffocating the development of new means of defending ourselves against the Soviet SS-20s. That is the kind of heroic moral choice which an individual could make in his personal life, but does anyone have the right to impose that choice upon a whole nation, or upon the community of free countries?

When the choice is between steadfastness or weakness in the face of totalitarianism, history should have taught us that to refuse to risk one's life in defence of liberty is to risk losing liberty, without any guarantee of saving one's life.

That is why the Government of Canada has chosen, not without anguish or full awareness of the risk, to join our NATO partners in adopting a policy of strength in reaction to the Soviet Union.

In supporting the two-track strategy of the Atlantic alliance, however, we shall insist that progress be made simultaneously on both tracks. This combination of steadfastness of purpose and willingness to negotiate seems to be bearing fruit, as witness the latest offer of General-Secretary Andropov to take into account the numbers of warheads as well as missiles.

Indeed, are we to think that this new-found flexibility of Mr. Andropov is a straightforward show of goodwill? Are we to believe seriously that, on two occasions since last December, the Soviets would have contemplated publicly a reduction of their nuclear forces if we had weakened in our resolve?

To me, the answer is clear. And it is absolutely essential that the United States continue their efforts to negotiate the removal of the SS-20s in exchange for the non-deployment of new American missiles in Europe, or at least to negotiate smaller numbers of missiles on each side.

I hope that my explanation of our policy will have established that, were we to agree to collaborate in testing the guidance system of the Cruise missile, it would be because of our solidarity with the other Western democracies, in a world which has turned a deaf ear to our suggested strategy of suffocation.

That being said, however, I would add that we should not abandon hope for the ending of the nuclear arms race.

All the people of the world, whether they be friends or enemies, value their own lives, and the lives of those they love. If the discovery of the terrible secrets of the atom gives us the power to destroy the whole planet, there is a still more powerful force which can save it --- our love for our children, and our love of life.

Therefore, I shall continue to believe that our strategy of suffocation is the best strategy.

The great powers of the world refuse to accept it now. But that will not stop us from repeating our proposal at every opportunity, until the recognition of its truth frees us all from moral anguish and from fear.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "B. Lind". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large loop at the beginning and a long, sweeping underline.

Ottawa, May 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

May 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CNT*FROM: DENNIS *Dub* LAIRSUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call to Prime Minister
Trudeau

Attached is a memorandum to the President recommending that he call Prime Minister Trudeau to express appreciation for Trudeau's recent open letter concerning INF and to gather further support from Trudeau for a harmonious summit at Williamsburg.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Tab I Recommended Phone call

Tab A Copy of Trudeau Open Letter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987

By dlb NARA, Date 1/24/02



3248
8314541
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 12, 1983

SECRET
URGENT

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

32910

Subject: Recommended Letter from the President to Prime
Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada on Trudeau's "Open
Letter" on Cruise Missile Testing

Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau has written an "open letter" to his countrymen which, in very forthright and unequivocal language, links the possible testing of US air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM's) in Canada to his nation's NATO responsibilities. The unprecedented statement, which has appeared in newspapers throughout Canada and which Trudeau himself largely wrote, supports the 1979 NATO two-track decision and criticizes the anti-Americanism of ALCM-testing critics as verging on "hypocrisy." The statement has put Canadian opponents of ALCM testing very much on the defensive and, while not promising Cabinet approval of our request to test, strongly implies such approval will be granted.

The President and the Prime Minister have exchanged letters and held discussions on these topics, most recently during Trudeau's April 28 White House visit. We recommend strongly that the President write the Prime Minister to convey his thanks for his courageous statement and note that it supports the interests of the NATO Alliance. A suggested text and a copy of Trudeau's "open letter" are attached.


Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Suggested text of the President's letter to Trudeau
2. Text of Trudeau's "Open Letter"

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1554 #37810

BY CU NARA DATE 12/7/07

SECRET

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

32811

Suggested Letter

Dear Pierre:

I was most heartened to read your recent open letter to the Canadian people concerning cruise missile testing and Canada's role in supporting NATO's two-track policy on INF deployment. You have explained well the challenge our countries and the other allies face and the need for all NATO nations to meet this challenge together to preserve and strengthen peace. Your forthright statement will be welcomed by everyone who shares our commitment to both a credible defense effort and meaningful, sincere negotiations to reduce the menace of modern weapons.

I look forward to seeing you soon in Williamsburg.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

The Right Honorable

Pierre Elliott Trudeau, P.C., M.P.,

Prime Minister of Canada,

Ottawa.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1554 7432811

BY OK NARA DATE 12/7/07

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 143

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 08/10/83//222

SITUATION: NODIS IN
SUBJECT CATEGORY: EU

32812

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE171
VSK376 634 UTS7249
PP RUEHC RUEHSD
DE RUEHOT #4979 1871613
ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY CAPTION ADX277553 UTS7249-634) MCN NAR
P 061612Z JUL 83
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2430
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ OTTAWA 04979
EXDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (EXDIS VICE NODIS PER STATE 188107)
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CA, US
SUBJECT: MACEACHEN/SHULTZ BILATERAL JUNE 28 IN BANGKOK--
- CANADIAN VIEWS
REF: SECTO 7082
1. ~~AS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. CANADIAN RECORD OF SHULTZ/MACEACHEN BILATERAL AT
BANGKOK TRACKS REFTEL. IN THE COURSE OF REVIEWING MEET-
ING, HOWEVER, WE DID OBTAIN SOME ADDITIONAL CANADIAN
DETAIL AND PERSPECTIVE ON SEVERAL POINTS:
- -- SALMON: CANADIAN NOTE TAKER REPORTED THAT WHILE
THE SECRETARY AGREED TO GO BACK TO THE ALASKAN SENATORS
HE ALSO CAUTIONED MACEACHEN THAT HE WAS NOT/NOT SURE HOW
MUCH HEADWAY HE WOULD MAKE.
- -- NEP: THE CANADIAN RECORD SHOWS CLEARLY THAT
MACEACHEN MADE NO/NO LINK BETWEEN ALCM TESTING AND NEP/
BACK-IN. RATHER THE CANADIAN RECORD SHOWS THAT MACEACHEN
SUGGESTED THAT THE TWO MINISTERS CONTINUE THEIR DIALOGUE
ON BACK-IN AND IN THE MEANTIME FINISH THE ALCM MATTER.
- -- EXTRATERRITORIALITY: HERE, WHILE THERE IS NO/NO
DIFFERENCE IN THE RECORD OF THE MEETING, STANFORD POINTED
OUT THAT MACEACHEN INTENDED TO COME BACK TO HIS QUESTION
OF WHETHER OR NOT THE US WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT CANADIAN
REGULATION OF CANADIAN SUBS IN THE US AT A FUTURE MEETING.
STANFORD SAID IT IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE TO GOC TO
CLARIFY WHETHER USG IS ASSERTING A JURISDICTION THAT IT
WOULD NOT ACCEPT IF ASSERTED BY OTHERS.
3. EMBASSY SUGGESTS THAT S/S DOWN GRADE REFTEL AND THIS
MESSAGE TO EXDIS OR LIMDIS.
ROBINSON
BT
#4979

DECLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

NLRR 1554 #32812

BY CA NARA DATE 12/7/07