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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File  
**Folder Title:** Canada (11/16/1983-11/25/1983)  
**Box:** 12

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

DLB 1/24/2007

**File Folder** CANADA (11/16/1983-11/25/1983)

**FOIA**

F1554

**Box Number** 12

TAMMY NEMETH

13

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
32819	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: TRUDEAU'S "PEACE INITIATIVE" <i>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</i>	3	11/16/1983	B1
32820	MEMO	ROBET MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: TELEPHONE CALL TO YOU FROM PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU NOVEMBER 17 <i>R 12/19/2011 F1554/1</i>	1	ND	B1
32821	MEMO	TY COBB TO ADM POINDEXTER, RE: TRUDEAU-REAGAN CALL <i>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</i>	1	11/17/1983	B1
32822	PAPER	TALKING POINTS [TELEPHONE CALL WITH TRUDEAU] <i>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</i>	1	ND	B1
32823	FORM	RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL - PIERRE TRUDEAU, PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA <i>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</i>	1	ND	B1
32824	LETTER	REAGAN TO TRUDEAU <i>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</i>	3	11/14/1983	B1
32825	MEMO	TYRUS COBB TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRESIDENT FROM PRIME MINSITER TRUDEAU ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17 <i>R 12/19/2011 F1554/1</i>	1	11/16/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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13

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
32827	MEMO	DRAFT VERSION OF #32830. DUPLICATE CONTENTS <b>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</b>	1	11/16/1983	B1
32829	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #32831 <b>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</b>	1	ND	B1
32830	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: POSSIBLE TRUDEAU TELEPHONE CALL TO THE PRESIDENT <b>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</b>	1	11/16/1983	B1
32831	PAPER	TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT WITH CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU ON THE TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVE <b>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</b>	1	ND	B1
32832	CABLE	#141728Z NOV 83 - LETTER - REAGAN TO TRUDEAU; DUPLICATE CONTENTS OF #32824 <b>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</b>	5	11/14/1983	B1
32833	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #32819 <b>R 12/7/2007 NLRRF1554</b>	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 16 NOV 83 10

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

db 11/21/07

DOC DATE 16 NOV 83 13

URGENT

KEYWORDS

INF

TRUDEAU, PIERRE E

START

MBFR

DAM, K

SUBJECT. PM TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 18 NOV 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COBB

LINHARD

MATLOCK

SOMMER

FORTIER

KRAEMER

LEHMAN, R

COMMENTS

REF# 8335049

LOG 8307741

NSCIFID

( HW )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Cobb 12/1/83 close out NAR

C 12/1

NFAR per Cobb

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA  
181

(C)

  
SECRET

November 16, 1983 0261

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Trudeau's "Peace Initiative"

As the result of Ken Dam's November 15 visit to Ottawa and further elaboration by Trudeau himself, we now have a clearer idea of content of the initiative about which he wrote the President. It consists of proposals for:

1. A five-power nuclear arms control negotiation "without prejudice to the INF or START talks" and recognizing the "rights of the US and the USSR as strategic equals."
2. Efforts to restore the vitality of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a consequence of agreement on reductions by the five nuclear powers.
3. Emphasis on high-level East-West dialogue, including through a Ministerial-level opening of the Stockholm CDE and a Ministerial-level MBFR meeting; in MBFR we would also renew efforts to reach agreement.
4. Agreements to ban testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems, restrict "excessive mobility" of ICBMs, and require that future strategic weapon systems be fully verifiable by national technical means.

Trudeau returned on Friday from a visit to the five INF basing countries and France, where he discussed his ideas with heads of state/government and the Pope. Although he claims publicly that his interlocutors were very supportive, we understand that his reception was in fact decidedly mixed. For example, the Italians (Craxi and Andreotti) reportedly found his initiative "dangerous and untimely." Margaret Thatcher apparently rejected the idea of a five-power nuclear arms control negotiation. We are awaiting reports from other capitals. Meanwhile, Trudeau plans to discuss his ideas with Nakasone this Saturday, and he may make a presentation on the subject at the subsequent Commonwealth meeting in New Delhi. He also has written Moscow and Beijing, but neither has yet replied.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1554 #32819

BY CW NARA DATE 12/7/07

~~SECRET~~

~~- 2 -~~

We can support Trudeau's efforts to mobilize support for a more effective NPT and, depending on the substance of his proposals, we may be able to agree with some of his other initiatives, such as his interest in ensuring the verifiability of mobile ICBMs. We do, however, have significant problems with some other elements of the initiative, which Ken Dam flagged today in general terms. In particular:

-- While we do not oppose a five-nuclear power negotiation in principle, its proposal now is untimely. This initiative is certain to be neuralgic with the UK, France and China, will only serve to focus attention on third country systems even as we attempt to keep it on the US-Soviet balance, and could undermine the prospects for START and INF.

-- The MBFR talks continue to be blocked by Soviet refusal to move on either data or verification. Trudeau appears to be proposing nothing less than that we accept the Soviet position on one or both of these issues.

-- We see nothing to be gained by a Ministerial-level CDE meeting. The Secretary has made it clear to key Allies that he would find it difficult, if not impossible, to attend a Ministerial CDE opening in January and that we therefore do not want to be boxed in on this.

-- Trudeau's suggestions concerning a high-altitude ASAT ban could cut directly across the direction of our own policies.

While we have serious problems with Trudeau's proposals, we can also expect some of them to fall of their own weight, and indeed the whole initiative, designed primarily for domestic purposes, may not prove sustainable for long. We believe therefore that we should maintain our current posture of avoiding public criticism while privately expressing our reservations. We will also inform other key Allies, particularly the UK and France, of our attitude, and seek their views before giving the Canadians any definitive reaction.


Foreign Minister MacEachen, during today's meeting with Ken Dam in Ottawa, again raised the idea of an early Trudeau meeting with the President to discuss his initiative, in addition to the planned state visit. (The President's reply to Trudeau expressed a willingness to meet without mentioning any time frame; we have been non-committal with the Canadians about specifics while exploring internally the possibility of a

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 3 -

January Trudeau visit.) MacEachen has now indicated that December is much better for them than January. We will be providing you with our views on a Trudeau visit soon.

*for*   
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

SECRET

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8308303

TO MCFARLANE FROM COBB  
HILL, C

RECEIVED 16 NOV 83 20  
DOCDATE 16 NOV 83 17  
16 NOV 83

KEYWORDS: CANADA

ASIA

TRUDEAU, PIERRE E

GLOBAL

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CALL TO PRES FROM PM TRUDEAU 17 NOV RE GLOBAL PEACE EFFORTS  
& TALKERS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION DUE: 17 NOV 83 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

## COMMENTS

REF# 8335168 LOG NSCIFID ( MR CL )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
President	P 11/17	For info VIA PDB		
-	11/17	Recd State Talkers /memo		
C	11/17	NEAR Per Cobb		✓
-	12/5	Originals returned		CO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(PA) (P)



# National Security Council The White House

146

System # I  
Package # 8303

1. 53

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary			
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary	<u>4</u>		<u>I</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

## DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

## COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

MEMORANDUM

8303

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

32820

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

*BR*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to You from Prime Minister Trudeau  
November 17

Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau has indicated that he must speak with you regarding his global peace initiatives prior to his departure for Japan. We are not enthusiastic about his venture, but feel that it is imperative that you accept his telephone call. We recommend that you express appreciation for his concerns and his call to you, but reserve direct comment on his initiatives pending further study. Your reply to Trudeau's letter to you outlining his program (Tab B) noted considerable reservations regarding the timing and substance of several of his proposals.

Deputy Secretary Dam met with Canadian Minister of External Affairs MacEachen Tuesday and the Trudeau program was discussed.

Talking points for your use are at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

OK

NO

*Mr*

—

That you accept Trudeau's telephone call Thursday morning.

Tab A Talking Points  
Tab B Your letter to Trudeau

*Yes he brought up Stockholm.*

Prepared by:  
Tyrus W. Cobb

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

**Historical File**

**DECLASSIFIED**

NLRRF 1554 # 32820

BY *RW* NARA DATE 12/19/11

32821

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADM POINDEXTER  
FROM: TY COBB *mc*  
SUBJECT: TRUDEAU-REAGAN CALL

NOTED

Prime Minister Trudeau's call to President Reagan was primarily designed to inform the President that Trudeau had raised the possibility of Head of State/Government participation at the opening session of the Stockholm CDE in January. Trudeau indicated that he had received a positive reaction from Thatcher, the only other one with whom he has discussed this initiative. Trudeau feels that it would demonstrate that the West is serious in reducing East-West tensions and in finding means to reduce the levels of armaments.

The President was quite cordial and properly noncommittal. He indicated that the January workload here would be an obstacle, but that he would discuss the matter with George Shultz and Ken Dam (Dam was briefed on this Tuesday in his discussions with Foreign Minister McEachen).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/SENSITIVE

17 NOV 83

DECLASSIFIED  
NLR F1554 #32821  
BY CL NAR DATE 12/7/07

TALKING POINTS

578.70

-- Thank you for your letter. My reply set out our thoughts and concerns. Ken Dam outlined our views in detail with Foreign Minister MacEachen last Tuesday.

-- What was the reaction in Europe to your initiatives? Please keep me informed of your discussions in Asia.

-- (If asked) Head of Government Attendance at Stockholm CDE Opening: Not enthusiastic. This is particularly inopportune time to hold discussions at that level. A Summit is unlikely to be productive now. Should focus on negotiating confidence and security building proposals. Soviets will concentrate on hollow, superficially attractive proposals.

-- (If asked) Five-Power Nuclear Conference: Not practical at present time and could undercut prospects for achieving verifiable and substantial reductions at the INF and START talks.

-- (If asked) Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Agree that more attention should be given. We are in communication on this.

-- Your proposals are interesting and we are examining them in detail. We can discuss further at later date.

DECLASSIFIED / RE (CASE)

NLRR F1554 \*32822

BY CN NARA DATE 12/7/07

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8303

30623

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada

DATE: November 17, 1983

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane, State Department

PURPOSE: Trudeau has asked to speak with you regarding his global peace initiatives prior to leaving for Japan on Thursday, November 17.

BACKGROUND: Trudeau has launched an ambitious global peace initiative that included a European foray to meet with NATO leaders, two major speeches and a letter to you. A trip to Japan is planned and he may also go to the USSR. Trudeau's efforts have been coolly received in Europe, but he has portrayed them positively. We recommend that you receive Trudeau's call, but avoid endorsement of his initiatives, and express a willingness to meet without agreeing to specific agenda items or time.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: Talking points attached.

Attachments:

Tab A Talking Points  
Tab B Your letter to Trudeau

Date of Submission \_\_\_\_\_

Action

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1554 #32823

BY ON NARA DATE 12/7/07

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

22321

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 14, 1983

Dear Pierre:

I appreciate your thoughtful letter regarding the state of East-West relations and the level of tension in international politics. Recent developments in the Soviet Union indeed merit our attention, and the question whether Yuri Andropov has succeeded in establishing political control in the USSR bears our careful consideration. Much attention has also been drawn to the militarization of that society, a development that may be a factor in the deterioration of East-West relations.

I share your view that Western governments must sustain their efforts to place international politics on a more stable footing. As you suggested, I think it would be useful for us to meet to examine the long-term strategy we in the West ought to pursue to bring the Soviet Union and its Allies into a more stable and predictable pattern of international behavior.

There are three broad aspects of world security which deserve our concerted attention: first, the steady growth in Soviet military power -- far beyond legitimate defensive needs -- and the growing propensity of the Soviets to use it, both directly and indirectly, in destabilizing fashion; second, the high levels of armaments in general, which make the world more dangerous than ever; and third, the virtual absence of trust in the East-West relationship, which undermines our ability to achieve progress in the first two areas. We certainly will not be able to put all these problems to rest at once, but I believe that we must pursue a strategy which addresses all of them simultaneously, since they are linked in important ways.

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NLRR #1554 #32824

BY AN NARA DATE 10/7/07

Progress in arms reduction, for example, will be very difficult if the Soviet Union continues to use its military power irresponsibly, and if Soviet authorities continue to evade full compliance with past agreements. Such actions undermine the minimal foundation of confidence on which any agreement must rest and underscore the necessity of proceeding with our program of nuclear and conventional force modernization.

With respect to the specific aspects of your East-West agenda, let me say that I fully share your desire to see more progress in all of these areas. In the MBFR talks, we continue to be frustrated by the Soviet refusal to provide essential data on their troop levels. But we are beginning to make limited progress on verification.

At the Stockholm CDE, we will begin to negotiate confidence and security building measures aimed at reducing the risk of war in Europe. While we in the West approach this forum with sincere interest in achieving meaningful progress, the real question is whether or not the USSR will engage in substantive discussions or continue to promote hollow, but superficially attractive, proposals.

Your emphasis on combatting horizontal nuclear proliferation is fully shared here in Washington and is a concern about which we have communicated recently. Progress on this front could serve as the first step in securing agreement in other arms control fora. Given the convergence of Western and Soviet interests in nuclear nonproliferation, there is reason for optimism here.

As for the convening of a five-power conference on reducing nuclear armaments, we have no fundamental objections to such a development at some point. I am concerned, however, that the real focus of our attention should be on achieving verifiable and

substantial reductions at the negotiations currently in progress, particularly at the INF and START talks. It does not seem likely that opening up yet another forum at this time would improve the prospects for successful arms control agreements or the political climate between East and West. I would also note that both our British and French Allies, as well as the Chinese, have indicated a willingness to reconsider their current attitude toward arms control limitations on their nuclear forces only under conditions which do not seem likely to be met in the near future. We respect the reasons which have led these governments to take this position, and feel it would be counterproductive if the impression were to be created that there were differences within the Alliance on this issue.

These are all matters which we can discuss further when we meet. It is most important for us to find a way to persuade Moscow that we are resolute in defending the values of our societies. At the same time, we and our Allies are prepared to engage in a meaningful dialogue and serious negotiations aimed at reducing tensions and threats to peace. As we go forward in this effort, I am sure you will agree that we must not allow the open and frank discussion, which is essential to the Alliance, to mislead the Kremlin regarding our total commitment to preserving our way of life. The strength and unity of the North Atlantic Alliance are essential if we are to convince our adversaries that a reduction of arms and of international tensions is in their interest.

Pierre, I found both your letter and your speech in Guelph insightful and thought-provoking. I look forward to seeing you for a detailed discussion.

Sincerely,

Ron

The Right Honorable  
 Pierre Elliott Trudeau, P.C., M.P.  
 Prime Minister of Canada  
 Canada



UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
 (CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S))  
 RECEIVED 16 NOV 83 20  
 d/b 1/24/02 DOC DATE 16 NOV 83 26

TO MCFARLANE FROM COBB

KEYWORDS: CANADA

ASIA

TRUDEAU, PIERRE E

GLOBAL

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CALL TO PRES FROM PM TRUDEAU 17 NOV RE GLOBAL PEACE EFFORTS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION DUE: 17 NOV 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

# COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( MR )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
MCFarlane	X	"1/16 Fwd to Pres for Decision		
Pres	P	"1/17 For Info via PAB		
	C	"1/17 NFAR per Cobb		
	C	12/02 DNR		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)

864

**National Security Council  
The White House**

RECEIVED

8 NOV 16 P 5: 23

System # I<sup>27</sup>  
Package # 8303  
RA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>JS</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>JS</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	<u>JS</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>JS</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			<u>11/17</u>
Executive Secretary	<u>Tab I left with</u>		
NSC Secretariat	<u>Pres at 0930</u>		
Situation Room			<u>JS</u>
Executive Secretary			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

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cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

**COMMENTS**

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

32825

ACTION

November 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT:

Telephone Call to the President from  
Prime Minister Trudeau on Thursday,  
November 17

Prime Minister Trudeau wants to telephone the President prior to departing on his trip to Asia where he will carry his global peace initiatives a step further. We are not enthusiastic over the Prime Minister's efforts to date, but feel that the President should accept Trudeau's call. The attached memorandum from you to the President provides background on the Trudeau program and talking points.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve ☒Disapprove ☐*TM*  
Jack Matlock, Peter *PS* Sommer and Ron *R* Lehman concur.

Tab I	Memo to the President
Tab II	Recommended Phone Call
Tab A	Talking Points
Tab B	President's letter to Trudeau
Tab III	State memo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF 1554 #32825

BY *RW* NARA DATE *12/11*



30



Drafted: EUR/CAN:RJMontgomery/jkb  
11/16/83 x. 23135 #3392a

Cleared: EUR/CAN - JCNelson  
EUR/RPM - RCaldwell  
EUR - JDobbins  
EUR - RBurt

~~SECRET~~

32827

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Possible Trudeau Telephone Call to the President

We understand that Prime Minister Trudeau may try to call the President before he leaves Ottawa on Thursday for Asia. Trudeau evidently wants to sound out the President on our reaction to his "peace initiative" and report on his recent trip to Europe, where he met with leaders of the five INF basing countries and France and the Pope. Trudeau may also want to discuss his upcoming meetings with Nakasone, and with Indira Gandhi and other leaders at the New Delhi Commonwealth Conference. One specific idea Trudeau may try to sell to the President is a Head of State opening for the CDE conference in Stockholm next January, a proposal which presents many problems for us.

Since his October 27 speech in Guelph which launched his peace effort, Trudeau has sought to present a favorable public image of his initiative. Although he claims he received "strong endorsement" and "clear expressions of support" in Europe, reports from our Embassies indicate that the Italians, British and the French were less than enthusiastic. We therefore must be on guard so that he does not portray the President as endorsing or encouraging his initiative while we avoid taking the lead in scuttling it.

Trudeau now has received the President's response (Enclosure 2) to his letter on the initiative. He has also given a speech (November 13) that spells out his ideas more fully. As our previous memo to NSC (Enclosure 3) indicated, these ideas present several problems. Ken Dam registered these points with Foreign Minister MacEachen when they met in Ottawa on Tuesday morning. Although we recommend that the President receive Trudeau's call, we urge that the President not go beyond what his letter said and that he reiterate his willingness to meet Trudeau without agreeing to specifics. Talking points are attached (Enclosure 1).

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Talking Points
2. President's Letter to Trudeau (State 324115 NODIS)
3. Hill-McFarlane Memo of November 15

~~SECRET~~  
DECL. CADR

DECLASSIFIED 30677  
NLRR 1554 #88600  
BY CL NARA DATE 12-7-07

~~SECRET~~

Talking Points  
For the President with Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau  
on the Trudeau Peace Initiative

32029

- Thank you for your letter, to which I've now responded. My letter sets out our thoughts and concerns. At this stage, I have no further comments beyond those contained in the letter and what Deputy Secretary Dam expressed to Prime Minister MacEachen on Tuesday.
- I am interested in the reactions to your ideas which you received in Europe and hope you will also keep us informed of your Asian discussions.
- We have real difficulties with a CDE Summit meeting in Stockholm. For one thing, this is a particularly inopportune time for the Soviets to participate at that level. For my part, I don't think such a Summit at this time is feasible or likely to be constructive.
- It would be useful for us to discuss your ideas further. Our staffs can work out an appropriate time.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR #1554 132629  
#87801

BY CN NARA DATE 12/1/07

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 16 NOV 83 20

TO MCFARLANE

FROM COBB

DOCDATE 16 NOV 83 33  
16 NOV 83

HILL, C

KEYWORDS: CANADA

ASIA

TRUDEAU, PIERRE E

GLOBAL

SUBJECT. TELEPHONE CALL TO PRES FROM PM TRUDEAU 17 NOV RE GLOBAL PEACE EFFORTS  
& TALKERS

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR DECISION

DUE: 17 NOV 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

## COMMENTS

REF# 8335168 LOG NSCIFID ( MR )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Z 11/17 rec'd State Draft/Talkers

COBB 11/17 call completed today NFAR.

C 11/17 No Further Action Per Cobb

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)MR



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INTERNAL NSC ROUTING

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~~Cobb~~

Terry: Please  
combine w/ 8303  
that was completed today.



S/S 8335168

United States Department of State XR-8335108

8303

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 16, 1983

**SECRET**  
**NODIS**

32115 PII: 52

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Possible Trudeau Telephone Call to the President

32850

We understand that Prime Minister Trudeau may try to call the President before he leaves Ottawa on Thursday for Asia. Trudeau evidently wants to sound out the President on our reaction to his "peace initiative" and report on his recent trip to Europe, where he met with leaders of the five INF basing countries and France and the Pope. Trudeau may also want to discuss his upcoming meetings with Nakasone, and with Indira Gandhi and other leaders at the New Delhi Commonwealth Conference. One specific idea Trudeau may try to sell to the President is a Head of State opening for the CDE conference in Stockholm next January, a proposal which presents many problems for us.

Since his October 27 speech in Guelph which launched his peace effort, Trudeau has sought to present a favorable public image of his initiative. Although he claims he received "strong endorsement" and "clear expressions of support" in Europe, reports from our Embassies indicate that the Italians, British and the French were less than enthusiastic. We therefore must be on guard so that he does not portray the President as endorsing or encouraging his initiative while we avoid taking the lead in scuttling it.

Trudeau now has received the President's response (Enclosure 2) to his letter on the initiative. He has also given a speech (November 13) that spells out his ideas more fully. As our previous memo to NSC (Enclosure 3) indicated, these ideas present several problems. Ken Dam registered these points with Foreign Minister MacEachen when they met in Ottawa on Tuesday morning. Although we recommend that the President receive Trudeau's call, we urge that the President not go beyond what his letter said and that he reiterate his willingness to meet Trudeau without agreeing to specifics. Talking points are attached (Enclosure 1).

*Robert Miley*  
Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

## Enclosures:

1. Talking Points
2. President's Letter to Trudeau (State 324115 NODIS)
3. Hill-McFarlane Memo of November 15

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BY CIL NADANATE 10/17/87

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Talking Points  
For the President with Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau  
on the Trudeau Peace Initiative

- Thank you for your letter, to which I've now responded. My letter sets out our thoughts and concerns. At this stage, I have no further comments beyond those contained in the letter and what Deputy Secretary Dam expressed to Prime Minister MacEachen on Tuesday.
- I am interested in the reactions to your ideas which you received in Europe and hope you will also keep us informed of your Asian discussions.
- We have real difficulties with a CDE Summit meeting in Stockholm. For one thing, this is a particularly inopportune time for the Soviets to participate at that level. For my part, I don't think such a Summit at this time is feasible or likely to be constructive.
- It would be useful for us to discuss your ideas further. Our staffs can work out an appropriate time.

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BY CU NARA DATE 12/7/07



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EUR: JDOBBINS  
EUR: JMEDAS  
NSCSTAFF: TCOBB  
S/S: BMCKINLEY  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, CA

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO PRIMIN TRUDEAU

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THERE FOLLOWS THE PRESIDENT'S RESPONSE TO PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 24. THE TEXT SHOULD BE PASSED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. A SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR PIERRE:

I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFUL LETTER REGARDING THE

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BY CJ NARA DATE 12/7/07



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STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE LEVEL OF TENSION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION INDEED MERIT OUR ATTENTION, AND THE QUESTION WHETHER YURI ANDROPOV HAS SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE USSR BEARS OUR CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. MUCH ATTENTION HAS ALSO BEEN

DRAWN TO THE MILITARIZATION OF THAT SOCIETY, A DEVELOPMENT THAT MAY BE A FACTOR IN THE DETERIORATION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS MUST SUSTAIN THEIR EFFORTS TO PLACE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ON A MORE STABLE FOOTING. AS YOU SUGGESTED, I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR US TO MEET TO EXAMINE THE LONG-TERM STRATEGY WE IN THE WEST OUGHT TO PURSUE TO BRING THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES INTO A MORE STABLE AND PREDICTABLE PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.

THERE ARE THREE BROAD ASPECTS OF WORLD SECURITY WHICH DESERVE OUR CONCERTED ATTENTION: FIRST, THE STEADY GROWTH IN SOVIET MILITARY POWER -- FAR BEYOND LEGITIMATE DEFENSIVE NEEDS -- AND THE GROWING PROPENSITY OF THE SOVIETS TO USE IT, BOTH DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY, IN DESTABILIZING FASHION; SECOND, THE HIGH LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS IN GENERAL, WHICH MAKE THE WORLD MORE DANGEROUS THAN EVER; AND THIRD, THE VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF TRUST IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP, WHICH UNDERMINES OUR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN THE FIRST TWO AREAS. WE CERTAINLY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PUT ALL THESE PROBLEMS TO REST AT ONCE, BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST PURSUE A STRATEGY WHICH ADDRESSES ALL OF THEM SIMULTANEOUSLY, SINCE THEY ARE LINKED IN IMPORTANT WAYS.

PROGRESS IN ARMS REDUCTION, FOR EXAMPLE, WILL BE

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VERY DIFFICULT IF THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO USE ITS MILITARY POWER IRRESPONSIBLY, AND IF SOVIET AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO EVADE FULL COMPLIANCE WITH PAST AGREEMENTS. SUCH ACTIONS UNDERMINE THE MINIMAL FOUNDATION OF CONFIDENCE ON WHICH ANY AGREEMENT MUST REST AND UNDERSCORE THE NECESSITY OF PROCEEDING WITH OUR PROGRAM OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE MODERNIZATION.

WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF YOUR EAST-WEST AGENDA, LET ME SAY THAT I FULLY SHARE YOUR DESIRE TO SEE MORE PROGRESS IN ALL OF THESE AREAS. IN THE MBFR TALKS, WE CONTINUE TO BE FRUSTRATED BY THE SOVIET REFUSAL TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL DATA ON THEIR TROOP LEVELS. BUT WE ARE BEGINNING TO MAKE LIMITED PROGRESS ON VERIFICATION.

AT THE STOCKHOLM CDE, WE WILL BEGIN TO NEGOTIATE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AIMED AT REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR IN EUROPE. WHILE WE IN THE WEST APPROACH THIS FORUM WITH SINCERE INTEREST IN

ACHIEVING MEANINGFUL PROGRESS, THE REAL QUESTION IS WHETHER OR NOT THE USSR WILL ENGAGE IN SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS OR CONTINUE TO PROMOTE HOLLOW, BUT SUPERFICIALLY ATTRACTIVE, PROPOSALS.

YOUR EMPHASIS ON COMBATTING HORIZONTAL NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS FULLY SHARED HERE IN WASHINGTON AND IS A CONCERN ABOUT WHICH WE HAVE COMMUNICATED RECENTLY. PROGRESS ON THIS FRONT COULD SERVE AS THE FIRST STEP IN SECURING AGREEMENT IN OTHER ARMS CONTROL FORA. GIVEN THE CONVERGENCE OF WESTERN AND SOVIET INTERESTS IN NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION THERE IS REASON FOR OPTIMISM

HERE.

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AS FOR THE CONVENING OF A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE ON REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, WE HAVE NO FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIONS TO SUCH A DEVELOPMENT AT SOME POINT. I AM CONCERNED, HOWEVER, THAT THE REAL FOCUS OF OUR ATTENTION SHOULD BE ON ACHIEVING VERIFIABLE AND SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS CURRENTLY IN PROGRESS, PARTICULARLY AT THE INF AND START TALKS. IT DOES NOT SEEM LIKELY THAT OPENING UP YET ANOTHER FORUM AT THIS TIME WOULD IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFUL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS OR THE POLITICAL CLIMATE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. I WOULD ALSO NOTE THAT BOTH OUR BRITISH AND FRENCH ALLIES, AS WELL AS THE CHINESE, HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO RECONSIDER THEIR CURRENT ATTITUDE TOWARD ARMS CONTROL LIMITATIONS ON THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES ONLY UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH DO NOT SEEM LIKELY TO BE MET IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE RESPECT THE REASONS WHICH HAVE LED THESE GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE THIS POSITION, AND FEEL IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IF THE IMPRESSION WERE TO BE CREATED THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THIS ISSUE.

THESE ARE ALL MATTERS WHICH WE CAN DISCUSS FURTHER WHEN WE MEET. IT IS MOST IMPORTANT FOR US TO FIND A WAY TO PERSUADE MOSCOW THAT WE ARE RESOLUTE IN DEFENDING THE VALUES OF OUR SOCIETIES. AT THE SAME TIME, WE AND OUR ALLIES ARE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE AND SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT REDUCING TENSIONS AND THREATS TO PEACE. AS WE GO FORWARD IN THIS EFFORT, I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE THAT WE MUST NOT ALLOW THE OPEN AND FRANK DISCUSSION, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL TO THE ALLIANCE, TO MISLEAD THE KREMLIN

REGARDING OUR TOTAL COMMITMENT TO PRESERVING OUR WAY OF LIFE. THE STRENGTH AND UNITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE ARE ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO CONVINCE OUR ADVERSARIES THAT A REDUCTION OF ARMS AND OF

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INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS IS IN THEIR INTEREST.

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PIERRE, I FOUND BOTH YOUR LETTER AND YOUR SPEECH IN  
GUELPH INSIGHTFUL AND THOUGHT-PROVOKING. I LOOK  
FORWARD TO SEEING YOU FOR A DETAILED DISCUSSION.

SINCERELY,

RON

END TEXT. SHULTZ

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United States Department of State

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Washington, D.C. 20520

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SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Trudeau's "Peace Initiative"

As the result of Ken Dam's November 15 visit to Ottawa and further elaboration by Trudeau himself, we now have a clearer idea of content of the initiative about which he wrote the President. It consists of proposals for:

1. A five-power nuclear arms control negotiation "without prejudice to the INF or START talks" and recognizing the "rights of the US and the USSR as strategic equals."
2. Efforts to restore the vitality of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a consequence of agreement on reductions by the five nuclear powers.
3. Emphasis on high-level East-West dialogue, including through a Ministerial-level opening of the Stockholm CDE and a Ministerial-level MBFR meeting; in MBFR we would also renew efforts to reach agreement.
4. Agreements to ban testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems, restrict "excessive mobility" of ICBMs, and require that future strategic weapon systems be fully verifiable by national technical means.

Trudeau returned on Friday from a visit to the five INF basing countries and France, where he discussed his ideas with heads of state/government and the Pope. Although he claims publicly that his interlocutors were very supportive, we understand that his reception was in fact decidedly mixed. For example, the Italians (Craxi and Andreotti) reportedly found his initiative "dangerous and untimely." Margaret Thatcher apparently rejected the idea of a five-power nuclear arms control negotiation. We are awaiting reports from other capitals. Meanwhile, Trudeau plans to discuss his ideas with Nakasone this Saturday, and he may make a presentation on the subject at the subsequent Commonwealth meeting in New Delhi. He also has written Moscow and Beijing, but neither has yet replied.

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BY CJ NARS DATE 12/7/07

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We can support Trudeau's efforts to mobilize support for a more effective NPT and, depending on the substance of his proposals, we may be able to agree with some of his other initiatives, such as his interest in ensuring the verifiability of mobile ICBMs. We do, however, have significant problems with some other elements of the initiative, which Ken Dam flagged today in general terms. In particular:

-- While we do not oppose a five-nuclear power negotiation in principle, its proposal now is untimely. This initiative is certain to be neuralgic with the UK, France and China, will only serve to focus attention on third country systems even as we attempt to keep it on the US-Soviet balance, and could undermine the prospects for START and INF.

-- The MBFR talks continue to be blocked by Soviet refusal to move on either data or verification. Trudeau appears to be proposing nothing less than that we accept the Soviet position on one or both of these issues.

-- We see nothing to be gained by a Ministerial-level <sup>CDE</sup> ~~MBFR~~ meeting. The Secretary has made it clear to key Allies that he would find it difficult, if not impossible, to attend a Ministerial CDE opening in January and that we therefore do not want to be boxed in on this.

-- Trudeau's suggestions concerning a high-altitude ASAT ban could cut directly across the direction of our own policies.

While we have serious problems with Trudeau's proposals, we can also expect some of them to fall of their own weight, and indeed the whole initiative, designed primarily for domestic purposes, may not prove sustainable for long. We believe therefore that we should maintain our current posture of avoiding public criticism while privately expressing our reservations. We will also inform other key Allies, particularly the UK and France, of our attitude, and seek their views before giving the Canadians any definitive reaction.

Foreign Minister MacEachen, during today's meeting with Ken Dam in Ottawa, again raised the idea of an early Trudeau meeting with the President to discuss his initiative, in addition to the planned state visit. (The President's reply to Trudeau expressed a willingness to meet without mentioning any time frame; we have been non-committal with the Canadians about specifics while exploring internally the possibility of a

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January Trudeau visit.) MacEachen has now indicated that December is much better for them than January. We will be providing you with our views on ~~the most desirable timing for a~~ Trudeau visit soon.

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

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