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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 12/20/2007

File Folder FRANCE (3/4/82-3/25/82)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 13

NOUZILLE

43

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47308	CABLE	040004Z MAR 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	3/4/1982	B1
47309	CABLE	051958Z MAR 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	3/5/1982	B1
47310	CABLE	061213Z MAR 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	4	3/6/1982	B1
47311	CABLE	090249Z MAR 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	5	3/9/1982	B1
47312	CABLE	091201Z MAR 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	3/9/1982	B1
47313	CABLE	091908Z MAR 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	3/9/1982	B1
47314	MEMO	MC FARLANE TO CLARK RE MITTERRAND VISIT R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	ND	B1
47315	MEMO	HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE MITTERRAND'S VISIT R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	3/3/1982	B1
47316	CABLE	112001Z MAR 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	4	3/11/1982	B1

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47317	CABLE	111956Z MAR 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	3/11/1982	B1
47318	CABLE	111209Z MAR 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	3/11/1982	B1
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47320	CABLE	152219Z MAR 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	3/15/1982	B1
47321	CABLE	191417Z MAR 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	3/19/1982	B1

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 6647
SIT103 DATE 03/05/82

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MESSAGE:

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O 040004Z MAR 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9631

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 056647
NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY
E. O. 12065: GDS 3/3/88 (BREMER, L. PAUL , II)

TAGS: OVIP (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.)

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH'S TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON

1. (~~C~~ ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS YOU WILL RECEIVE AUTHORIZATION TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON MARCH 10 TO PARTICIPATE IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE MITTERRAND VISIT. YOU SHOULD EXPECT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SECRETARY'S BRIEFING FOR THE PRESIDENT PRIOR TO THE MEETING WITH MITTERRAND AND IN THE MEETING THE SECRETARY WILL HAVE WITH MITTERRAND AND CHEYSSON AFTER LUNCH. IN KEEPING WITH FRENCH PREFERENCE CURRENT PLANS ARE THAT BOTH THE MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS AND THE LUNCHEON WILL BE HIGHLY RESTRICTED. HAIG

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BY CA NARA DATE 4/29/10

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 8083
SIT007 DATE 03/17/82

DTG: 051958Z MAR 82 PSN: 055677
TOR: 074/2308Z

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHFR #8083 0642002
O 051958Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1195

SECRET PARIS 08083
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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CROCKER
E.O. 12065: RDS-2 3/5/02 (MARESCA, JOHN J.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, US, AO, WA
SUBJECT: CROCKER/JORGE MEETINGS

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: MY APPROXIMATELY NINE HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH ANGOLAN FOREIGN MINISTER PAULO JORGE IN PARIS MARCH 4-5 SHARPENED OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPLEX OF KEY NAMIBIA-ANGOLA ISSUES. THERE IS SOME COMMON GROUND, AS IN JANUARY, ON THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES, BUT NO BREAKTHROUGH ON THE DIFFICULT PROCESS FOR GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE. WE AGREE THAT THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CUBAN TROOP PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACKS AGAINST ANGOLA, BUT DIFFER ON THE QUESTION OF THE TIMING--E.G. WHO MOVES FIRST OR SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENT. AS A MAJOR ASSERTION OF ANGOLAN CONTROL OVER THE CUBAN TROOP PROBLEM, JORGE REPEATEDLY POINTED TO THE FEBRUARY 4 ANGOLA-CUBA COMMUNIQUE WHICH STATED THAT CUBAN FORCES WILL BE WITHDRAWN AFTER THE SAG THREAT RECEDES AS A RESULT OF A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT. I BELIEVE THIS IS AN OPENING NEGOTIATING POSITION WHICH SETS A TOUGH BOTTOM LINE BUT INTER ALIA CONVEYS AN ANGOLAN MESSAGE TO US THAT IT IS A SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT COUNTRY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CAPABLE OF TAKING STEPS IN ITS OWN NATIONAL INTEREST. IN INFORMAL SIDE CONVERSATIONS, JORGE EXPRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT WE WERE GOING ROUND AND ROUND ON THE TIMING ISSUE AND MUST FIND A WAY TO DEAL WITH IT. JORGE SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT THE ANGOLANS CANNOT DO MORE PUBLICLY ON THE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL QUESTION AT THIS TIME BUT WANT TO KEEP THE DOOR OPEN TO OUR IDEAS IN PRACTICE. IN THIS CONNECTION, JORGE SHOWED SOME INTEREST IN OUR PROPOSAL FOR A CEASEFIRE PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION. SINCE THIS CEASEFIRE CONCEPT ADDRESSES THE ISSUE OF SAG ATTACKS, IT THEREFORE ENABLES US TO INSIST UPON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ON TERMS THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE ANGOLAN POSITION. JORGE ASKED A NUMBER OF PROBING QUESTIONS TO CLARIFY HOW SUCH A CEASEFIRE WOULD WORK IN PRACTICE AND SAID HE WOULD TAKE THE PROPOSAL BACK TO LUANDA FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COMPETENT AUTH-

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ORITIES. THIS MEETING WILL REQUIRE MORE DETAILED FOLLOW-UP TO EXPAND MPLA GRASP OF OUR IDEAS AND, POSSIBLY, CONFIDENCE THAT WE AND THEY CAN WORK SOMETHING OUT.

3. JORGE WAS CLEARLY ON A TIGHT LEASH. I CONVEYED A TOUGH MESSAGE THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT REMAIN ENGAGED IN EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE SOUTHERN AFRICA PROBLEM UNLESS THERE WERE CONCRETE MOVEMENT BY THE PARTIES--INCLUDING THEM--IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

4. WE ALSO TALKED IN DETAIL ABOUT PHASE I NAMIBIA ISSUES. I MADE THE SAME POINTS TO JORGE THAT YOU MADE TO SALIM. JORGE REMAINED FIRM ON THE FLS POINT THAT THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AS PROPOSED IN THE REVISED CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES IS TOO CUMBERSOME FOR USE IN NAMIBIA AND MAY REPRESENT SOME SORT OF UNHOLY CONTACT GROUP DEAL WITH THE SAG TO DISENFRANCHISE SWAPO. WE GAVE HIM MAXIMUM AMMUNITION IF THERE IS A DESIRE AMONG THE FLS/SWAPO TO BE PRAGMATIC. END SUMMARY.

5. MORE DETAILED REPORT WILL FOLLOW SEPTTEL.
GALBRAITH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DE RUFHFR #8145/01 0651215
O 061213Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1232

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CROCKER

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 03/06/82 (MARESCA, JOHN J) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, AO, US

SUBJECT: US/ANGOLA TALKS

REF: PARIS 8083

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY TRANSMITTED IN PARIS 8083. FOLLOWING IS FULLER REPORT OF OUR MEETINGS MARCH 4-5 IN PARIS WITH ANGOLAN DELEGATION LED BY FOREIGN MINISTER PAULO JORGE.

3. THIS SESSION WITH THE ANGOLANS WAS ESSENTIALLY JORGE'S NICKEL - HIS OPPORTUNITY TO REPLY TO THE DETAILED STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS TO RESOLVE THE REGIONAL PROBLEMS WHICH I HAD LAID OUT IN OUR JANUARY DISCUSSIONS. I BEGAN WITH A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE COMMON GROUND WE HAD ACHIEVED IN JANUARY AND THEN GAVE THE FLOOR TO JORGE. IMPLICIT IN MY MESSAGE WERE THE CARROTS OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND A BRIGHTER REGIONAL FUTURE, BUT THE THRUST OF MY PRESENTATION UNDERLINED THAT THE CLOCK WAS TICKING ON NAMIBIA AND THE TIME HAD COME TO WORK OUT PRECISE STEPS -- E.G., CREDIBLE PLANS -- WHICH THE PARTIES MUST MAKE TO RESOLVE THE REGIONAL PROBLEMS. I POINTED OUT TO JORGE THAT WE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WERE ENCOURAGED BY US/ANGOLAN AGREEMENT IN JANUARY ON SEVERAL BASIC POINTS, ESPECIALLY THAT THERE IS A RELATIONSHIP, HOWEVER DEFINED, BETWEEN THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE IN NAMIBIA, AND THAT WE SHOULD DEEPEN OUR DIALOGUE IN AN EFFORT TO WORK OUT THE SPECIFIC STEPS WHICH THE PARTIES, INCLUDING ANGOLA, COULD TAKE TO MOVE FORWARD IN RESOLVING THE REGIONAL ISSUES. I TOLD HIM THAT WE VIEWED ANGOLA AS AN INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT CAPABLE OF TAKING THE RESPONSIBLE STEPS WHICH ARE IN ITS OWN NATIONAL INTEREST. IN THIS CONTEXT, I UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE OF WORKING OUT AGREEMENT TO A CEASEFIRE PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION WHICH WOULD END SOUTH AFRICAN ATTACKS AND PERMIT CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. I ALLUDED TO POSITIVE ANGOLAN PUBLIC STATEMENTS -- INCLUDING THE ANGOLA-CUBA COMMUNIQUE OF FEBRUARY 4 -- SINCE OUR LAST MEETING WHICH HAVE UNEQUIVOCALLY STATED

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THAT THE CUBAN FORCES WILL BE WITHDRAWN WHEN "SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION" CEASES.

4. JORGE OPENED HIS PRESENTATION WITH A DETAILED EXPOSITION OF THE ANGOLAN POSITION ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. HE CITED THE ANGOLA-CUBAN COMMUNIQUE, WHICH REITERATED THAT CUBAN FORCES WILL BE WITHDRAWN AFTER A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT, AS THE DEFINITIVE STATEMENT OF THE ANGOLAN POSITION, MAKING CLEAR THAT ANGOLA REGARDED AS IN PART A RESPONSE TO OUR JANUARY MEETING AND AS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD. (WE SEE JORGE'S INSISTENCE ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CUBA-ANGOLA COMMUNIQUE IN PART AS A FIRM AFFIRMATION TO US OF ANGOLAN SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL QUESTION AND AS AN OPENING NEGOTIATING POSITION.) JORGE ENDED WITH THE FORMULATION THAT THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA IS RELATED TO SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION, NOT LINKED TO A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT PER SE. SINCE THE COMMUNIQUE PRESUMES THAT SAG ATTACKS WILL CEASE ONLY IN THE POST-SETTLEMENT PERIOD, IT REMAINS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE DOOR IS OPEN TO SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL AS CONTRASTED WITH A NAMIBIA FIRST POSITION. JORGE WENT ON TO ASK SHARP QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW A CEASEFIRE PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION WOULD WORK. HE LAID DOWN SOME HEAVY MARKERS ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY IF NOT IMPOSSIBILITY OF WORKING OUT ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CUBAN/ANGOLAN PULLBACK NORTH OF AN AGREED LINE. HE WAS NEVERTHELESS CAREFUL TO LEAVE OPEN THE DOOR ON THE CEASEFIRE PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION, SAYING THAT HE WOULD CARRY OUR CLARIFICATIONS BACK TO

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LUANDA FOR CONSIDERATION BY "THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES." THIS WAS JORGE'S BOTTOM LINE FOR THE SESSION.

5. JORGE'S PRESENTATION CLEARLY REFLECTED THE ANGOLANS' DESIRE TO APPEAR CONSISTENT AND FIRM ON THE ISSUE OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WHILE NOT CLOSING THE DOOR ON COMPROMISE. HIS PRESENTATION WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A MORALISTIC TONE AND LEGALISTIC ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE ILLEGALITY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA. IN REPLY I DID NOT SEEK TO WIN DEBATING POINTS BUT RATHER KEPT BRINGING HIM FIRMLY BACK TO REALITY BY UNDERLINING THE NEED TO WORK OUT PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS ON THE GROUND, INCLUDING THE SAG'S PHYSICALLY STRONG POSITION IN NAMIBIA. I MADE CLEAR THAT THE SAG WILL NOT SETTLE ON NAMIBIA UNLESS THEY FEEL, AT A MINIMUM, THAT A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT WILL NOT LEAVE THEM IN A LESS SECURE POSITION THAN THEY ARE IN NOW. THIS MEANS AGREEMENT HAS TO BE REACHED ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL

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O 061213Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1233

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 08145
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TO BE PHASED WITH SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM NAMIBIA.

6. I LEFT THE BALL IN THE ANGOLANS' COURT. I STRESSED THAT WE HAD DEVELOPED THE CONCEPT OF A CEASEFIRE PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION IN AN EFFORT TO ADDRESS THE SECURITY CONCERNS OF ALL THE PARTIES -- INCLUDING THE ANGOLANS -- AND TO HELP FACILITATE EARLY AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIA. I TOLD JORGE THAT WE HAD OBTAINED SOUTH AFRICAN AGREEMENT TO THE GENERAL PARAMETERS OF A CEASEFIRE TO INCLUDE: (1) CESSATION OF SAG MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AND WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTHERN ANGOLA; (2) CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, BY SWAPO, AND (3) THE PULLBACK OF ALL FORCES ON THE ANGOLA SIDE, INCLUDING FAPLA AND THE CUBANS, NORTH OF AN AGREED LINE TO BE DETERMINED. JORGE LISTENED TO THIS WITH INTEREST AND ASKED PROBING QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW IT WOULD WORK IN PRACTICE, BUT MADE NO COMMITMENTS.

7. THE NEXT MOVE IS BASICALLY THEIRS, ALTHOUGH JORGE INVITED US TO PROVIDE THEM FURTHER SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON OUR PROPOSALS. WHILE THEY NEED TIME TO CONSIDER OUR RESPONSES TO THEIR QUESTIONS ON THE CEASEFIRE PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION PROPOSAL, WE SHOULD NOT LET THE PROCESS DRAG OUT. IT WAS CLEAR THAT JORGE WAS ON A SHORT LEASH AND WILL HAVE TO CARRY OUR MESSAGE TO THE PARTY LEADERSHIP.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE ANGOLANS' APPARENT EFFORT TO CLARIFY EXACTLY HOW THE CEASEFIRE PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION WOULD WORK CANNOT BE ASSESSED UNTIL THEY HAVE CHEWED IT OVER FURTHER AND ARE PREPARED TO SIT DOWN AND WORK-OUT THE DETAILS. IN THE MEANTIME, IF THEY AND THE FRONT LINE STATES REMAIN INTRANSIGENT ON THE REVISED CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES, THE RESULTING SLOWDOWN IN THE MOMENTUM OF THE NAMIBIA PROCESS WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR SINGLENESSE OF PURPOSE ON THE NECESSITY FOR RESOLUTION OF THE CUBAN TROOP PROBLEM SIMULTANEOUS WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT.

8. IN THE FORMAL SESSIONS WE AND THE ANGOLANS SHARPENED THE FOCUS ON OUR COMMON GROUND AND POINTS OF DIFFERENCE. BUT ON ANOTHER, DEEPER LEVEL WE WERE IN PART STILL ESTABLISHING GROUNDS FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, CLEARING

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AWAY THE UNDERBRUSH OF YEARS OF HOSTILITY AND SUSPICION, VERY DIFFERENT VIEWS OF HISTORY, AND IN SOME WAYS INCOMPATIBLE LOGICAL PROCESSES AND RHETORIC WITH THE OBJECT OF SEEKING PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS IN QUESTION. JORGE GAVE LABORIOUS REFORMULATIONS OF THE ANGOLAN POSITION BUT LACKED THE FLEXIBILITY TO ENTER INTO MEANINGFUL GIVE AND TAKE. THIS RAISES AGAIN THE QUESTION OF WHO SPEAKS FOR ANGOLA. JORGE MAY BE OUR INTERLOCUTER BECAUSE HE IS THE NEUTRAL COMPROMISE CHOICE-- AT WORST A POWERLESS FRONT MAN -- OF WARRING PARTY FACTIONS WHO CANNOT EASILY COME TO AGREEMENT ON A POLICY TOWARDS THE U. S., OR HIS RELATIVE INFLEXIBILITY COULD REFLECT OUTSIDE PRESSURES ON THE REGIME NOT TO MOVE TOO QUICKLY WITH US, IF AT ALL. BUT WE DO NOT KNOW THIS YET, AND HIS ROLE WITH US COULD IN PART ALSO BE AN MPLA EFFORT TO SMOKE US OUT ON OUR BOTTOM LINE AND DETERMINE HOW MUCH MANEUVERING ROOM THERE IS VIS-A-VIS THE U. S.

9. IN INFORMAL SIDE CONVERSATIONS, JORGE LEFT LITTLE DOUBT THAT HE WANTS TO FIND A WAY TO REACH WORKABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE REGIONAL PROBLEMS -- I. E., NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA. I SUSPECT THAT WHEN THE MPLA HAS MADE A FINAL DECISION TO COME TO TERMS, WE MAY BE DEALING WITH AN INTERLOCUTER WITH APPROPRIATE PARTY CREDENTIALS, PERHAPS AS WELL AS JORGE.

10. I CONCLUDED OUR DISCUSSIONS PLACING ON THE TABLE AGAIN WHAT WE CONSIDER THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF A

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REGIONAL SOLUTION, INCLUDING A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT, WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES, AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. I EMPHASIZED THAT OUR DISAGREEMENT CENTERED ON THE ISSUE OF THE TIME FRAME WITHIN WHICH THESE ELEMENTS SHOULD COME TOGETHER. JORGE DID NOT COMMENT BUT PICKED UP OUR POSITION FROM THE TABLE AND WILL CARRY IT BACK TO LUANDA.
GALBRAITH

PARIS 8145

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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E.O. 12065: RDS-3, 3/5/02 (HOLMES, H. ALLEN) EUR

TAGS: PINT, OVIP, FR

SUBJECT: COURTESY CALL ON THE SECRETARY BY FRENCH AMB-
ASSADOR VERNIER PALLIEZ, MARCH 4

1. ~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: DURING A COURTESY CALL MARCH 4 FRENCH AMBASSADOR VERNIER PALLIEZ AND THE SECRETARY REVIEWED TOPICS LIKELY TO COME UP IN THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND MITTERRAND MARCH 12. VERNIER PALLIEZ ALSO RAISED LOPEZ PORTILLO'S CENTRAL AMERICAN PROPOSAL AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IT MIGHT CONTAIN THE SEEDS FOR DE-ESCALATION IN THE AREA. END SUMMARY.

3. AFTER INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IN GENERAL THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN PLEASED WITH FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY UNDER MITTERRAND. HE SAID THAT FRANCE HAD TRADITIONALLY TAKEN A STRONG POSITION ON EAST-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WEST ISSUES, AND ON THIRD WORLD ISSUES FRANCE HAD OFTEN SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ACTION WHEN OTHERS WOULD NOT. THE FRENCH SEEMED MORE THAN ANY OTHER PEOPLE TO HAVE A NATIONAL STRATEGIC SENSE.

4. VERNIER PALLIEZ AGREED AND NOTED THAT THERE ARE VERY FEW PACIFISTS IN FRANCE. THE 3 PERCENT REAL INCREASE IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET HAS EVOKED VIRTUALLY NO PROTEST, AND ANTI-NUCLEAR PROTESTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT NUCLEAR POWER RATHER THAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS FRENCH ATTITUDE COULD PERHAPS BE TRACED BACK TO DE GAULLE'S DECISION TO DEVELOP AN INDEPENDENT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE.

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5. IN AGREEMENT, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT ALTHOUGH AT THE TIME THE ALLIANCE AGONIZED OVER DE GAULLE'S ACTIONS, WESTERN SECURITY HAD ULTIMATELY BEEN ENHANCED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT FRENCH STRATEGIC FORCE. SOVIET UNION REALISES THIS AND FOR THIS REASON WANTS TO ENSNARE THE FRENCH AND BRITISH INF SYSTEMS IN THE U. S. -SOVIET INF TALKS.

6. TURNING TO THE PLANNED MITTERRAND VISIT THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IN MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MEETING CHEYSSON HAD INDICATED A STRONG FRENCH DESIRE THAT IT BE KEPT VERY SMALL WITH ONLY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND PRESIDENTS ON EACH SIDE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE PERSONALLY HAD NO PREFERENCE BUT THE U. S. WOULD SEEK TO ACCOMMODATE FRENCH DESIRES.

7. WITH REGARD TO AGENDA ITEMS, THE SECRETARY SAID A MAJOR TOPIC WOULD OF COURSE BE ECONOMIC QUESTIONS. BEYOND THAT, HE SAID, HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT A DIVERGENCE THAT WAS DEVELOPING BETWEEN THE U. S. AND FRANCE ON THIRD WORLD ISSUES, ESPECIALLY THOSE INVOLVING THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. THE SECRETARY SAID U. S. HAD NOT MADE A PUBLIC ROW OVER THE FRENCH DECISION TO SELL ARMS TO NICARAGUA, BUT AS HE HAD TOLD DEFENSE MINISTER HERNU AND FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON THIS ACTION HAD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DONE A LOT OF DAMAGE TO THE AMERICAN PSYCHE. MORE RECENTLY THERE HAD BEEN A NUMBER OF REPORTS THAT PRIVATE FRENCH CITIZENS HAD BEEN SELLING ARMS TO GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR. THE PRESIDENT WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THESE REPORTS AND WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY RAISE THEM WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. THE SECRETARY SAID U. S. CONCERN ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA DERIVES FROM ITS PROXIMITY AND RESULTANT STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE.

8. ANOTHER SUBJECT OF CONCERN IS TERRORISM. RECENT INCIDENTS IN PARIS, INCLUDING THE ASSASSINATION OF LT. COL. RAY, HAVE FOCUSED U. S. ATTENTION ON THIS SUBJECT. IN PAST YEARS WE HAVE NOT BEEN ALTOGETHER HAPPY WITH THE APPROACH FRENCH GOVERNMENTS HAVE TAKEN TOWARDS THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM. AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH HAS JUST BEEN INSTRUCTED TO RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH

PRIME MINISTER MAUROY AND THE PRESIDENT WILL RAISE IT WITH MITTERRAND.

9. PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD ALSO WANT TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST, ESPECIALLY SINCE MITTERRAND WILL JUST HAVE RETURNED. THE U. S. PERCEIVES A SHIFT TOWARD A MORE BALANCED FRENCH POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS IS A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT. THE U. S. AND FRANCE SHOULD STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH ON MIDDLE EAST QUESTION, ALWAYS RECOGNIZING THAT HISTORY HAD PLACED ON THE U. S. A SPECIAL BURDEN. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT MITTERRAND'S CURRENT VISIT TO ISRAEL REQUIRED DELICATE HANDLING. VERNIER PALLIEZ SAID THAT MITTERRAND'S APPROACH IS TO BE DIRECT AND TELL EVERYBODY THE SAME THING. THE SECRETARY SAID PRIME MINISTER BEGIN MIGHT BENEFIT FROM SUCH DIRECTNESS, AND HE WOULD BE EQUALLY DIRECT IN RETURN.

10. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT FRANCE AND THE U. S. SHOULD

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CONTINUE TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH ON DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON. THE ISRAELIS ARE SPRING-LOADED TO REACT TO ANY PROVOCATION, SO GREAT CARE MUST BE TAKEN. THE PLO, THE LEBANESE AND THE SYRIANS SHOULD ALL RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO BE VERY CAREFUL.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 090249Z MAR 82 PSN: 046308

11. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT FRANCE HAD REACTED STRONGLY TO DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND.

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AFTER DISCUSSING THE YAMAL PIPELINE, THE SECRETARY NOTED THE BUCKLEY MISSION WOULD SOON BE GOING TO EUROPE TO DISCUSS WITH MAJOR ALLIES THE QUESTION OF FUTURE CREDITS. THIS SUBJECT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVIEWED EVEN IF THE POLISH CRISIS HAD NOT OCCURRED. THE USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS TO FINANCE INVESTMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION IS QUESTIONABLE AT BEST. VERNIER PALLIEZ SAID THAT FROM A BUSINESSMAN'S POINT OF VIEW IT HAD NOT BEEN A VERY GOOD INVESTMENT EITHER.

12. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IF THE ALLIES COULD REACH SOME AGREEMENT TO RESTRICT FUTURE CREDITS IT WOULD REDUCE PRESSURES IN THE U. S. TO STOP THE PIPELINE.

13. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS ALSO VERY CONCERNED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE MISCALCULATING IN POLAND, THAT

THEY DID NOT REALIZE THAT CONTINUED REPRESSION WOULD BE LIKELY TO PROVOKE POPULAR RESISTANCE WHICH IN THE END WOULD LEAD TO DIRECT SOVIET INTERVENTION. HE SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO APPLY PRESSURE NOW TO PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRAGIC SITUATION. THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF APPLYING PRESSURE WOULD BE IN THE AREA OF FUTURE CREDITS. HE REPEATED HIS BELIEF THAT ALLIED AGREEMENT IN THIS AREA WOULD LESSEN PRESSURES IN THE U. S. AGAINST THE PIPELINE.

14. A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TOPIC THE PRESIDENT WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS IS THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. IT IS VITAL THAT FRANCE AND THE U. S. WORK TOGETHER TO KEEP WEST GERMANY ENGAGED AS A LEADING MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF THE WEST. DEVELOPMENTS IN RECENT MONTHS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ALLIES NEED TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE INTERNAL FRAGILITY IN BONN. THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE UNSETTLED SITUATION IS THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

QUARTER CENTURY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IS HAVING SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IS HAVING TROUBLE WITH HIS TRADE UNION SUPPORTERS. THIS IS COMPLICATED BY FACTIONALISM IN THE SPD WHERE DIFFERENT GROUPS FRUSTRATED BY ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, PRESSURES FOR ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER ANCILLARY ISSUES ARE TOYING WITH INTER-GERMAN SOLUTIONS. PARIS, LONDON AND WASHINGTON MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE CONSEQUENCES IF GERMANY SHOULD START TO DRIFT. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD TOLD CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT THAT IF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC PRESUMED TO BECOME A BROKER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY. VERNIER PALLIEZ SAID HE THOUGHT MITTERRAND SHARED THAT VIEW AND BELIEVED THAT SCHMIDT'S VISIT TO PARIS LAST WEEK HAD BEEN HELPFUL.

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15. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HISTORICALLY, WHEN U. S. - FRG RELATIONS BECAME STRAINED, FRANCE HAD STEPPED IN TO KEEP GERMANY ANCHORED TO THE WEST. THE CURRENT SITUATION REQUIRES FRANCE AND THE U. S. TO BE VERY SENSITIVE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN BONN. THE PRESIDENTS SHOULD CERTAINLY DISCUSS THIS QUESTION.

16. VERNIER PALLIEZ THEN TURNED TO CENTRAL AMERICA AND ASKED THE SECRETARY FOR THE U. S. REACTION TO LOPEZ PORTILLO'S SPEECH. THE SECRETARY SAID THE SPEECH CLOSELY PARALLELED THE PROPOSAL THAT THE U. S. HAD MADE TO NICARAGUA LAST FALL - WITH ONE CRUCIAL OMISSION. IN LOPEZ PORTILLO'S PROPOSAL THE NICARAGUANS NEED NOT AGREE TO FOREGO THE "RIGHT" TO CONTINUE TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN THE AFFAIRS OF NEIGHBORING STATES. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U. S. IS PREPARING A RESPONSE TO LOPEZ PORTILLO'S

SPEECH, AND IN FACT HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH MEXICAN FOREIGN MINISTER CASTANEDA IN NEW YORK MARCH 6 TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSAL.

17. THE SECRETARY SAID THE ENTIRE GUERRILLA OPERATION IN EL SALVADOR IS BEING RUN BY NICARAGUA AND CUBA. HE SAID HE REALIZED THAT MANY FRIENDS OF THE U. S. ARE CONCERNED THAT THE U. S. IS RADICALIZING THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA BY TAKING A CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH.

SECSTATE WASHDC 1600
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

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THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION HAD TRIED VERY HARD TO HAVE A DIALOGUE WITH FIDEL CASTRO, BUT AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE EFFORT WAS BEING MADE THE CUBANS WERE STEPPING UP THEIR EFFORTS TO EXPORT REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA. FIDEL CASTRO MUST BE CONVINCED THAT THE RISKS OF THESE ACTIVITIES OUTWEIGH POTENTIAL GAINS. THE U. S. WILL NOT CONDUCT BUSINESS AS USUAL WHILE CUBA ATTEMPTS TO TAKE OVER THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AMERICA. THE U. S. IS IN TOUCH WITH CASTRO AND WILL STAY IN TOUCH, BUT IF HE FORCES THE U. S. TO ACT IT WILL ACT.

18. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF NICARAGUA VERNIER PALLIEZ SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE LOPEZ PORTILLO SPEECH HAD WITHIN IT SEEDS OF A PROCESS OF DE-ESCALATION IN WHICH EACH SIDE COULD TAKE PARALLEL STEPS TO REDUCE TENSION. THE SECRETARY SAID THE U. S. HAD DISCUSSED WITH NICARAGUA LAST FALL MUTUAL GUARANTEES, ETC. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT NICARAGUA REFUSED TO DENY ITSELF THE "RIGHT" OF INTERVENTION IN EL SALVADOR. VERNIER PALLIEZ SAID THAT FRANCE DID NOT WISH TO BE PROVOCATIVE IN CENTRAL AMERICA. WHAT IT IS TRYING TO DO IS OFFER FRENCH EXPERIENCE BASED ON ITS OWN MISTAKES IN THE PAST. VERNIER PALLIEZ SAID THE FRENCH SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT FEELS IT HAS ADVICE TO OFFER AND IT FEELS IT CAN BE HELPFUL. IT ALSO THINKS THAT THE PROPOSALS BY LOPEZ PORTILLO MIGHT BE WORTH PURSUING AND IS GLAD TO HEAR THAT THE U. S. WILL NOT DISMISS THEM WITHOUT CONSIDERATION. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE U. S. WOULD CERTAINLY STUDY THE MEXICAN PROPOSAL. IF CASTANEDA AGREES THE U. S. PLANS TO ANNOUNCE THE MEETING BETWEEN HIM AND THE SECRETARY THAT WILL TAKE PLACE MARCH 6. HOWEVER IF THIS DOES NOT WORK IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THE U. S. TO DO MORE. THE U. S. WOULD NOT INTRODUCE MILITARY FORCES INTO CENTRAL AMERICA. THAT WOULD BE INSANITY,

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BUT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO DO SOMETHING MORE THAN
IT IS NOW DOING. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED BY SAYING
HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE FRANCE'S UNDERSTANDING
AND COOPERATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA. FRANCE HAS CREDIBILITY
IN THE REGION AND COULD BE VERY HELPFUL.

HAIG

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END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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47312

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 8324
SIT182 DATE 03/11/82

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DE RUFHFR #8324 0681203
O 091201Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1330

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 08324
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/9/12 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, FR, US
SUBJECT: (S) DEALING WITH MITTERRAND

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MITTERRAND'S UPCOMING VISIT IS AN IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY, AND WE SHOULD MAKE THE MOST OF IT. I SEE THREE BROAD COMPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES FOR THE PRESIDENT: DEVELOP A PERSONAL RAPPORT WITH MITTERRAND; THROUGH A DISCUSSION OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR ESTABLISH A COMMON BASE ON WHICH BOTH LEADERS CAN AGREE; AND PRESS MITTERRAND ON SOME KEY SPECIFIC ISSUES.

3. IT IS IMPORTANT WITH MITTERRAND TO ESTABLISH PERSONAL RELATIONS. HE IS A POLITICAL ANIMAL, STICKS TO HIS FRIENDS, AND CAN BEAR GRUDGES FOR SLIGHTS. HE IS AT ONCE COMPLEX (NICKNAMED "THE FLORENTINE") AND PEASANT-SIMPLE. HE DOGGEDLY PURSUES A FEW PLAIN BUT LOFTY OBJECTIVES. THROUGH YEARS OF POLITICAL TESTING HE HAS ACQUIRED A DEEP-SET IDEOLOGY WHICH IS SOCIALIST, HUMANIST, AND POPULIST. HE IS FOR THE LITTLE GUY WHO HAS NEVER HAD A CHANCE AND THIS APPLIES AS MUCH TO COUNTRIES AS IT DOES TO INDIVIDUALS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. I RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT BEGIN HIS TALKS WITH MITTERRAND ON THIS HUMAN LEVEL. IF POSSIBLE, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD AT FIRST TAKE MITTERRAND TO HIS FAMILY QUARTERS AND TALK ABOUT HIS PERSONAL INTERESTS--THE RANCH, HORSES, FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, ETC. IT WOULD BE EXCELLENT IF THE PRESIDENT COULD INVITE MITTERRAND TO VISIT HIM AT THE RANCH ON SOME FUTURE TRIP. BEAR IN MIND THAT MITTERRAND'S PASTIMES ARE HOMELY--READING AND WALKING--AND THAT HIS COUNTRY HOUSE IN THE FLAT WOODLANDS OF THE LANDES IS EXTREMELY MODEST. MITTERRAND NEED NOT BE DAZZLED; HE WILL RESPOND BETTER TO SMALL GESTURES OF HUMAN WARMTH.

5. FOLLOWING THIS LEAD-IN, THE PRESIDENT COULD SLIP INTO A DISCUSSION OF HIS OWN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. THE SIMILARITY OF EACH PRESIDENT'S DECENTRALIZATION PLAN WOULD BE

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BY CW NARA DATE 4/20/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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A GOOD OPENER. THIS CONVERSATION SHOULD BE UP-BEAT, CONCENTRATING ON THE PRESIDENT'S ASPIRATIONS TO BUILD TOWARD THE "SHINING CITY ON A HILL." IT IS IMPORTANT THAT MITTERRAND FEEL HE SHARES OVERALL, LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVES WITH THE PRESIDENT.

6. I RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT THEN TURN NATURALLY TO THE OVERALL STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR. THIS IS THE BROADLY CONTROLLING ISSUE ON WHICH HE AND MITTERRAND CAN AGREE. SUCH A DISCUSSION SHOULD BE ON A GENERAL PLANE, BUT SHOULD BRING OUT THE FACT THAT SOVIET EFFORTS IN SUCH AREAS AS CENTRAL AMERICA AND AFGHANISTAN ARE VERY MUCH A PART OF THE STRATEGIC EQUATION, AND THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR US TO UNDERSTAND THOSE WHO ARGUE FOR STRONGER U.S. DEFENSES IN EUROPE (FRENCH SUPPORT FOR INF) AND AT THE SAME TIME CONTRIBUTE TO THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF OUR OPPONENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA (FRENCH ARMS SALE TO NICARAGUA). IT WOULD BE WELL TO EMPHASIZE HOW CLOSE EL SALVADOR IS TO OUR FRONTIERS; THE PHYSICAL PROXIMITY OF A POTENTIAL THREAT TO SECURITY IS SOMETHING THE FRENCH UNDERSTAND. FOR THIS REASON IT IS POSSIBLE HE WILL BACK DOWN ON NICARAGUA.

7. THIS DISCUSSION SHOULD LEAD TO AN EXCHANGE ON THE SPECIFIC ISSUES IN US-FRENCH RELATIONS (PARIS 7321) MITTERRAND WILL ARGUE THAT IT IS A MISTAKE TO CONSIDER CENTRAL AMERICA AN EAST-WEST PROBLEM, AND WILL TRY TO ESTABLISH THE INTEREST RATE ISSUE AS IMPORTANT. THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRESIDENT SHOULD BE PREPARED TO SHOW MITTERRAND HOW ALL THESE PROBLEMS ARE LINKED, AND TO CONVINCE HIM THAT OUR SHARED OVERALL OBJECTIVES REQUIRE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT IN THESE AREAS AS WELL AS IN THOSE WHERE WE AGREE.
GALBRAITH

PARIS 8324

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 08424
EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 03/09/02 (MARESCA, JOHN J.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, FR, US, IS, XF
SUBJECT: MITTERRAND VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND THE SEARCH
FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE
REF: PARIS 7321 (NOTAL)

1. ~~(C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAS COMPLETED A VERY SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO ISRAEL. HE HAS ADOPTED A BALANCED APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT WHICH CALLS FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS BASED ON PRIOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION BY EACH OF THE RIGHT OF THE OTHER TO EXIST. HE ALSO FAVORS THE EVENTUAL ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT, DURING HIS MEETINGS WITH MITTERRAND, WELCOME THE SHIFT IN FRENCH POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNDER HIS GOVERNMENT AND NOTE OUR DESIRE TO WORK WITH THE FRENCH IN THIS AREA. END SUMMARY.

3. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAS RETURNED FROM WHAT HAS BEEN PLAYED IN PARIS AS A VERY SUCCESSFUL TRIP TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ISRAEL. THE POSITION HE TOOK THERE, PARTICULARLY IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE KNESSET IS A BALANCED ONE. HE CALLED FOR A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE PALESTINIANS BASED ON A PRIOR MUTUAL RECOGNITION BY EACH OF THE RIGHT OF THE OTHER TO EXIST AND A PRIOR MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF DIRECT OR INDIRECT WAR. IN THE FRENCH VIEW SUCH A DIALOGUE COULD LEAD, AT THE PROPER TIME, TO A PALESTINIAN STATE.

4. WE FIND HIS FORMULATION, WHILE MORE PRECISE THAN OURS ON THE QUESTION OF A PALESTINIAN STATE, CLOSER TO OUR OWN THAN THOSE OF PREVIOUS FRENCH GOVERNMENTS, AND CERTAINLY CLEARER THAN THE CONFLICTING REMARKS OF VARIOUS TOP FRENCH OFFICIALS OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS. MITTERRAND CLEARLY REJECTS THE IDEA THAT AUTONOMY TALKS CAN LEAD ANYWHERE. IN HIS VIEW, DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES

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BY CN NARA DATE 7/19/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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CONSTITUTE THE ONLY WAY TO REACH A SETTLEMENT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT MITTERRAND HAS NOT RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY, AT SOME TIME AND UNDER THE RIGHT CONDITIONS, OF A MEETING WITH ARAFAT. FURTHERMORE, THE FRENCH MAINTAIN REGULAR CONTACT, INCLUDING AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL, WITH THE PLO OFFICE IN PARIS.

5. WHILE NOTING THAT FRANCE IS NEITHER AN ARBITRATOR NOR A MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE PEOPLES AND STATES OF THE REGION, MITTERRAND HELD OUT THE IDEA THAT FRANCE IS A TRADITIONAL INTERLOCUTOR OF THE PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST. AND, WHILE HE SPOKE OF A "REGIONAL INITIATIVE," MITTERRAND FULLY RECOGNIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S. ROLE IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM AND PROBABLY WOULD BE OPEN TO SUGGESTION THAT FRANCE AND THE U.S. COORDINATE THEIR APPROACHES IN WORKING TOWARD A SETTLEMENT.

6. THE REGIONAL INITIATIVE FOR WHICH FRANCE IS LOOKING COULD BE A REVIVED FAHD PLAN OR ANY OTHER STEP EMANATING FROM THE MIDDLE EAST THAT COULD BE VIEWED CREDIBLY AS SUCH AN INITIATIVE. NOTHING IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN FROM THE PARIS END BEFORE APRIL 25. STARTING AT THAT TIME, MITTERRAND PROBABLY WOULD AVOID ANY GRAND DECLARATIONS, BUT PROCEED RATHER THROUGH A PROCESS OF SMALL, CONCRETE STEPS. THESE WILL INCLUDE A VISIT BY MITTERRAND TO JORDAN SOMETIME THIS SPRING, POSSIBLY NEW ARMS SALES TO EGYPT, A VISIT TO PARIS BY FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AT THE END OF MAY, AND PERHAPS ENCOURAGING PRESIDENT MUBARAK

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO TRY TO RENEW TIES IN THE ARAB WORLD.

7. MITTERRAND'S STAND MAY BE COURAGEOUS IN VIEW OF THE LONG HISTORY OF CLOSE FRENCH TIES WITH THE ARAB STATES AND FRANCE'S COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT FRANCE RUNS ANY GRAVE RISK WITH THE ARABS, AND CERTAINLY FACES NO MORE THREAT OF ECONOMIC RETALIATION THAN DOES THE U.S. FRENCH RELATIONS WITH SYRIA ARE ALREADY STRAINED, BUT ECONOMIC TIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA, MILITARY SALES TO EGYPT, THE NUCLEAR DEAL WITH IRAQ, AND FRANCE'S HELP FOR MOROCCO AND ITS MAJOR EFFORT VIS-A-VIS ALGERIA PROVIDE A SOLID BASIS FOR FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB WORLD.

8. MITTERRAND BELIEVES FIRMLY BOTH IN FRIENDSHIP FOR ISRAEL AND IN A SOLUTION WHICH INCLUDES A HOMELAND FOR THE PALESTINIANS. HE BELIEVES THAT ISRAEL AND THE PLO MUST DEAL WITH EACH OTHER. BEHIND THESE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS THERE IS MITTERRAND'S OWN BACKGROUND, AS WELL AS DOMESTIC FRENCH POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING HIS VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. WORLD WAR II, INCLUDING THE HOLOCAUST, MADE A DEEP IMPACT ON MITTERRAND'S PSYCHE. HE HAS LONGSTANDING TIES WITH ISRAEL'S LABOR PARTY. MANY FRENCH JEWS (MOSTLY OF NORTH AFRICAN ORIGIN) HAVE LONG HELD PROMINENT POSITIONS IN THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY. PART OF THE LEFT-WING OF THAT PARTY, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS PRO-PALESTINIAN.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 8424
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INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5082
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 08424
EXDIS

THERE IS NO JEWISH VOTE IN FRANCE IN THE SAME SENSE AS
IN THE U. S. HOWEVER, IN A COUNTRY WHERE A FEW HUNDRED
THOUSAND VOTES CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE (AND THERE ARE
700,000 JEWS IN FRANCE), MITTERRAND IS INTERESTED IN
CULTIVATING FRENCH JEWS. GISCARD WAS WIDELY CRITICIZED
BY LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY FOR HIS PRO-
ARAB TILT.

9. RECOMMENDATION: WE RECOMMEND THAT THE PRESIDENT
WELCOME THE FACT THAT FRANCE HAS ADOPTED A MORE BALANCED
APPROACH TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. HE
SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT WE ARE GRATIFIED THAT WE CAN WORK
TOGETHER IN THIS ARENA. GALBRAITH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1982

WPC HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JACQUE HILL

FROM:

CHARLES P. TYSON *CT*

SUBJECT:

President's Meeting and Luncheon
with President Mitterrand
Friday, March 12

Attached is copy of memorandum I sent to Bill in California.

I have been advised by Poindexter through Wheeler of the makeup of the Oval Office meeting and luncheon. You will note the cross-outs reflect this.

I
18-ATHE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Recommended Participants in President's
Meeting with Mitterrand

Because of the sensitivity of the issues to be discussed -- Franco-American relations involving Poland, Central America, economic policy, etc. -- the March 12 meeting and working lunch which the President is scheduled to have with French President François Mitterrand should be relatively restricted (the indications we have at present are that Mitterrand will bring only Foreign Minister Cheysson with him from Paris). I also believe the President needs 90 minutes in the Oval Office with Mitterrand rather than 60 minutes (translation will consume a good bit of time).

In light of these circumstances, I recommend that U.S. participation in the Mitterrand visit be structured as follows:

Oval Office (11 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.)

The President
~~The Vice President~~
Secretary Alexander Haig
William P. Clark
~~NSC Notetaker~~

Working Lunch in Cabinet Room (12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m.)

- 1 The President
~~The Vice President~~
- 2 Secretary Alexander Haig
~~Secretary Donald Regan (for discussions of Economic Summit matters)~~
~~Secretary Caspar Weinberger~~
~~Edwin Meese~~
~~James Baker~~
~~Michael Deaver~~
- 3 William P. Clark
~~Acting EUR Assistant Secretary Allen Holmes~~
- 4 ~~Assistant Secretary (Economic Policy) Robert Hormats (to underline vis-a-vis the French his stature as U.S. "sherpa" for Versailles)~~
- 5 ~~NSC Senior Staff Member Jim Rentschler~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 3, 1982

1406

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: CHARLES P. TYSON
JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Recommended Participants in President's
Meeting with Mitterrand

Your memo to Mike Deaver (Tab 1) provides NSC recommendations on the composition of the President's March 12 meeting and working lunch with French President François Mitterrand. I flag a number of key items in connection with this package:

-- First, you should know that Secretary Haig's preference, as relayed by EUR, is to keep both the Oval Office Meeting and the working lunch as restricted as possible; in fact, the Secretary favors a two on two arrangement, with the President and him carrying our side, and only Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Cheysson on the French side.

-- Second, there is some concern in State that the time set aside in the Oval Office - 60 minutes - is not sufficient and should be expanded to 90 minutes (mainly because translation requirements will consume a good part of the meeting).

-- Third, we anticipate a public announcement on Mitterrand's visit, released simultaneously here and in Paris on March 5.

As against the Secretary's push for ultra-restricted sessions, you should know that the White House has customarily gone with one of two formulas for a restricted meeting in the Oval Office: either a one on one (President and Mitterrand) with a notetaker on each side (usually a senior NSC staffer); or a line-up on our side which includes the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Affairs Advisor, an NSC notetaker, and possibly our Ambassador if the other side wants to include theirs. Of the two formulas, the second strikes me as by far the more appropriate in the case of Mitterrand, and I have organized your memo accordingly.

RECOMMENDATION:

OK

NO

— That you sign the memo to Deaver at Tab I

ALTERNATE RECOMMENDATION:

OK

NO

— That the participants be limited to the two on two arrangement Secretary Haig favors.

Deaver

19

*Judge, this is memo
you gave Mitter
on Thursday
morn'g.*

20

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Recommended Participants in President's
Meeting with Mitterrand

Because of the sensitivity of the issues to be discussed -- Franco-American relations involving Poland, Central America, economic policy, etc. -- the March 12 meeting and working lunch which the President is scheduled to have with French President Francois Mitterrand should be relatively restricted (the indications we have at present are that Mitterrand will bring only Foreign Minister Cheysson with him from Paris). I also believe the President needs 90 minutes in the Oval Office with Mitterrand rather than 60 minutes (translation will consume a good bit of time).

In light of these circumstances, I recommend that U.S. participation in the Mitterrand visit be structured as follows:

Oval Office (11 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.)

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Alexander Haig
William P. Clark
NSC Notetaker

Working Lunch in Cabinet Room (12:30 p.m. to 1:30 p.m.)

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Alexander Haig
Secretary Donald Regan (for discussions of Economic Summit matters)
Secretary Caspar Weinberger
Edwin Meese
James Baker
Michael Deaver
William P. Clark
Acting EUR Assistant Secretary Allen Holmes
Assistant Secretary (Economic Policy) Robert Hormats (to underline vis-a-vis the French his stature as U.S. "sherpa" for Versailles)
NSC Senior Staff Member Jim Rentschler

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

22
8/12/20/07

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TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

John: this is it

URGENT

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BE

March 3

PROPOSED PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT

At the invitation of President Reagan, President Francois Mitterrand of France will make a working visit to Washington on March 12. Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson and Secretary of State Haig will participate in the conversations.

Dictated over phone by Clay McManaway

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By sm NARA, Date 12/20/07

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47314

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NLRR M07-081 #47314

BY CN NARA DATE 4/29/10

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Judge Clark

Subject: Mitterand Visit

1. Attached is the text of an announcement of the Mitterand visit. It should be posted by Larry Speakes at 8:00am your time Friday March 8. It will be simultaneously posted here (11:00a.) and in France (5:00pm). I will send "boiler plate" Q's and A's tomorrow.

2. Also attached is a memo from Al on the visit. Frankly he seems to me to be setting the President up to be nice to Mitterand. Maybe I'm wrong.

As a ~~separate but related~~ matter, Al says, and I agree with him, that the meeting with the President and the lunch must be confined to the President, Al and you on the U.S. side versus Mitterand and Cheysson on theirs. This is a request of Mitterand which, considering the tone of the talks, is a good idea.

Talk to
Mike Deaver

3/5

~~Bud~~
Bud

The Judge discussed this with Mike Deaver who has no problem with it. Judge feels it is not necessary to send Al's memo to the President.

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JH

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NLRR MD7-081#47315

BY CN NARA DATE 4/29/10 THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

/SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO: THE PRESIDENT

March 3, 1982

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

SUBJECT: Looking Forward to Mitterrand's Visit March 12

Our honeymoon with Francois Mitterrand is over. A number of his early actions, particularly on East-West and Middle East issues, seemed to indicate favorable change from the policies of Giscard, and he maintained a strong African policy.

However, major differences are now clear. Mitterrand has taken actions which show little regard for important US interests. Examples include the French-Mexican declaration on El Salvador, the decision to normalize relations with Libya, arms sales to Nicaragua, rumors of a possible initiative with Cuba, the announcement of the Siberian gas purchase agreement just before my last Gromyko meeting, incessant criticism of our economic policy and continued permissiveness on terrorism in spite of the Ray murder.

Mitterrand's visit provides the chance to make clear our priorities and interests. You will have to be blunt with him about these differences and he must understand we will not tolerate French mischief in areas important to us. Since the French can be helpful, we want to build on issues where we think alike, while minimizing areas of conflict. One way to get Mitterrand's interest is to offer him France's long wanted "special relationship" with us. This would take the form of regular consultations which could be used to get greater cooperation and remind the French of the obligations of partnership, especially of taking each other's interests into account before taking foreign policy decisions.

Mitterrand's concern about a deteriorating bilateral relationship, desire for a successful Versailles summit and especially his interest in a good personal relationship with you give us useful leverage over the next few months. A good relationship with us is politically important to him, and we want him to know we are prepared to cooperate--but only if he works with us. If he chooses not to, he must know that we will be less cooperative in our special assistance programs and even compete in areas of traditional French primacy. You must bring this point home during your meetings with him.

The visit involves a small meeting followed by a working lunch. I plan to talk with him and Cheysson afterwards reinforcing your approach. I will also send you detailed briefing materials to follow this preliminary memorandum.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 8838
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1589

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 08838
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB
E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 3/11/02 (HABIB, P.C.)
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, JO
SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: SUMMING-UP REPORT

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT).

2. THIS REPORT IS INTENDED TO SUMMARIZE THE PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS I HAVE REACHED AFTER A TWO AND A HALF WEEK TRIP, DURING WHICH I VISITED LEBANON, ISRAEL, SYRIA, JORDAN, AND SAUDI ARABIA, AND HAD LENGTHY TALKS WITH THE PRINCIPAL LEADERS THERE, ALONG WITH OPPOSITION FIGURES IN ISRAEL AND IMPORTANT POLITICIANS IN LEBANON. (I ALSO HAD BRIEF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER, AND THE ELYSEE, AND DRAPER BRIEFED A BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE REPRESENTATIVE WHILE WE WERE IN PARIS.)

3. YOU WILL RECALL THAT YOU AND THE PRESIDENT ENTRUSTED ME WITH TWO BASIC TASKS:

- (1) PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING THE JULY CEASE-FIRE, THEREBY REDUCING THE CHANCES THAT MAJOR MILITARY ACTION WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH CONSEQUENCES HARMFUL TO OVERALL AMERICAN INTERESTS.
- (2) EXAMINING WHAT COULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE THE INTERNAL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LEBANESE SITUATION WHICH, IF LEFT STATIC AND UNTENDED, COULD PRODUCE FUTURE MAJOR CONFRONTATIONS AND BLOW-UPS.

4. THE CEASE-FIRE: I BELIEVE THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN EARLY BREAKDOWN HAS BEEN REDUCED. ISRAEL, LEBANON, SYRIA, AND SAUDI ARABIA -- EACH IN ITS OWN WAY -- REAFFIRMED THE DESIRABILITY OF MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND FAHD INTENDED TO PRESS ARAFAT TO COMPLY. EVERYTHING WE HAVE HEARD INDIRECTLY FROM THE PLO INDICATES THEIR INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE TERMS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. I EXPLICITLY DESCRIBED TO ALL LEADERS WHY WE BELIEVED THE RECENT FATAH INCURSION ACROSS THE JORDAN RIVER WAS A CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION BECAUSE IT ORIGINATED IN LEBANON. I USED TO GOOD EFFECT THE ARGUMENT THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT SEND GUNBOATS OUT INTO INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND THEN BOMBARD TARGETS IN LEBANON, AND ARGUE THAT SINCE THE

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VESSELS CAME FROM INTERNATIONAL WATERS THIS WOULD NOT BE A VIOLATION. I SAID IT WOULD BE A VIOLATION JUST AS A COMMANDO GROUP COMING FROM LEBANON AND MOVING THROUGH SYRIA AND JORDAN WOULD BE. BEGIN APPLAUDED MY USE OF THIS SIMILE. HE REPEATED TO ME HIS PLEDGE THAT ISRAEL WILL NOT BE THE FIRST TO BREAK THE CEASE-FIRE.

5. I GRAPHICALLY DESCRIBED TO ALL CONCERNED THE GRAVE IMPLICATIONS OF A CEASE-FIRE BREAKDOWN AND THE POSSIBLE MAGNITUDE OF AN ISRAELI MILITARY RESPONSE. IT IS CLEAR THAT IF THERE IS A MAJOR INCIDENT INVOLVING THE LOSS OF ISRAELI LIVES THE REACTION WILL BE DRASTIC. I GAVE AMPLE WARNING TO BE PASSED TO THE PLO OF THE DANGER FROM A MAJOR PROVOCATION. FOR ITS PART, ISRAEL HAS BEEN LEFT IN NO DOUBT OF DEEP US RESERVATIONS OVER MAJOR ISRAELI MILITARY ACTION IN LEBANON, AND I UNDERLINED THE WAY THAT BELLICOSE ISRAELI STATEMENTS AND LEAKS HAD CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE WHICH HAD BECOME HIGHLY NEGATIVE AND EMBARRASSING TO ISRAEL'S IMAGE. AFTER A GREAT DEAL OF HEATED ARGUMENT I AM HOPEFUL THAT BEGIN, AT LEAST, ACCEPTS THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO APPEAR LESS BELLICOSE. HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE SHARON IS CONVINCED.

6. I TRIED ALSO TO SET A RECEPTIVE STAGE FOR THE UNIFIL COMMANDER'S FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL ON THE BEST WAYS TO MAKE USE OF UNIFIL'S EXPANDED FORCE; AND SAM LEWIS AND MORRIS DRAPER FOLLOWED UP THIS WITH CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY ON THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

POSSIBILITY OF "TRADE-OFFS", UNDER WHICH THE UN MIGHT TRY TO PERSUADE THE PALESTINIANS TO WITHDRAW THEIR HEAVY WEAPONRY OUT OF RANGE OF ISRAEL.

7. INTERNAL LEBANESE SITUATION: I SECURED CROWN PRINCE FAHD'S STRONG COMMITMENT TO STAY FULLY ENGAGED IN LEBANON, AND TO WORK FOR THE STAGED WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN TROOPS.
SECRET

I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT WE MUST HAVE AN ARAB FULCRUM TO APPLY LEVERAGE TO THE SYRIANS, WHO REMAIN HARD AND UNYIELDING IN ALL MATTERS LEBANESE.

8. SIMILARLY, I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT THE US MUST PURSUE -- WITHOUT VARIATION -- ITS POLICY OF

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 08838

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PRESERVING AND STRENGTHENING A UNITED, INTEGRAL LEBANON, SOVEREIGN WITHIN ITS TRADITIONAL BORDERS. WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE DIVERTED INTO POORLY THOUGHT THROUGH SCHEMES FOR PARTITIONING THE COUNTRY INTO THREE, FOUR, OR MORE AREAS OR WORKING FOR A FORM OF CANTONIZATION WHICH REDUCES TO IMPOTENCE THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

9. THE FORTHCOMING LEBANESE ELECTIONS INHERENTLY HAVE ELEMENTS WHICH COULD PRODUCE EITHER MAJOR MARONITE-SYRIAN CLASHES, OR ANOTHER LEBANESE CIVIL CONFLICT, OR ISRAELI MILITARY INTERVENTION, OR A COMBINATION OF ALL THREE. AGAIN, HOWEVER, I AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES HAVE THE CAPACITY TO HANDLE THE SITUATION, INCLUDING HEAVY SYRIAN INTIMIDATION -- AND WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO GO BEYOND DEMONSTRATIONS OF OUR ALREADY PRONOUNCED INTEREST IN THE OUTCOME. THE STAGE MAY BE SET FOR AN ELECTORAL IMPASSE, AND A LEBANESE FORM OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS, AT WHICH POINT THE LEBANESE GENIUS FOR COMPROMISE MAY HELP PRODUCE AN OUTCOME SATISFACTORY TO US INTERESTS. THERE IS PLENTY OF ROOM FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE EVENT THINGS BEGIN TO GET OUT OF HAND.

10. SOME RELATED IMPRESSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS: ASSAD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REMAINS CONVINCED WE ARE TRYING TO DESTABILIZE HIS REGIME, DESPITE MY CATEGORICAL DENIALS AUTHORIZED BY YOU AND THE PRESIDENT. WHILE ASSAD'S REGIME IS A DEPLORABLE ONE IN MANY RESPECTS, WE MUST STAY ALOOF FROM THE FORCES NOW AT WORK WHICH SOONER OR LATER MAY BRING HIM DOWN, SINCE THESE FORCES INCLUDE FANATIC MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISTS WHOSE OBJECTIVES ARE EVEN MORE ANTITHETICAL TO US THAN THOSE OF THE PRESENT REGIME. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE SYRIAN LEADERSHIP DURING WHAT COULD BE A LENGTHY INTERIM PERIOD IN PURSUIT OF OUR GREATER OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON AND THE REGION. -- WHILE I PERSONALLY FAVOR CLOSER CONSULTATIONS WITH ISRAEL OVER CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES, INCLUDING MAJOR SYRIAN MILITARY ACTION IN LEBANON, WE SHOULD NOT AGREE TO ESTABLISHMENT OF A FORMAL US-ISRAELI COMMISSION OR COMMITTEE, AS PROPOSED BY BEGIN. IT IS NOT NECESSARY,

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GIVEN OUR ABILITY TO CONSULT INFORMALLY AND REGULARLY WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE INEVITABLE LEAK OF A FORMAL ARRANGEMENT COULD DAMAGE US GREATLY IN THE ARAB WORLD. THE SAME THING APPLIES TO THE SUGGESTION THAT A TRI-PARTITE MECHANISM BE ORGANIZED WITH ISRAEL AND FRANCE. -- I, THEREFORE, RECOMMEND THAT WE PUT TOGETHER A STATE-CIA-DOD TEAM UNDER DRAPER FOR REGULAR, SYSTEMATIC CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS BEGINNING IN APRIL AND CONTINUING AT APPROXIMATELY TWO-MONTH INTERVALS THROUGH THIS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT YEAR AHEAD. -- WE SHOULD GIVE STRONG SUPPORT TO UN AND UNIFIL EFFORTS TO MAKE EFFECTIVE USE OF ITS EXPANDED FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN THE SO-CALLED "GAP", EVEN THOUGH THIS WILL ENCOUNTER STRONG ISRAELI RESISTANCE AND SUSPICION. THE SHI'A INHABITANTS ARE AMONG THE MOST RELIABLE AND STRONGEST SUPPORTERS OF A UNITED LEBANON AND THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT; HOWEVER, THEY DESPERATELY NEED TO SEE PROGRESS TOWARDS AND EXTENSION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IN THE AREA. -- WE SHOULD SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO REAFFIRM OUR SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S INTEGRITY; IN THIS CONNECTION, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR YOU TO RECEIVE LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTROS IN WASHINGTON IN APRIL OR MAY. -- IF A STRONG PRESIDENT EMERGES FROM THE LEBANESE ELECTIONS, WE SHOULD CONSIDER SPECIAL LEGISLATION TO GIVE LEBANON A REAL SHOT IN THE ARM ECONOMICALLY, AND THEREBY INDUCE SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF COUNTRIES TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL FUNDING CONTRIBUTIONS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

11. PUBLIC HANDLING OF OUR EFFORTS: THROUGHOUT THE TRIP I HAVE AVOIDED ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS OR PRESS BACKGROUNDING. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER THE UTILITY OF MY SAYING A FEW WORDS TO THE PRESS AFTER I HAVE REPORTED TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT, AS WE HAVE DONE IN THE PAST. MARESCA

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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 08837

EXDIS

FROM HABIB FOR THE SECRETARY

E. O. 12065: 3/11/92 (HABIB, P.C.)

TAGS: PEPR, MQPS, XF, LE, IS, SY, SA, JO

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: MEETING WITH CHEYSSON - MARCH 11

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AT HIS REQUEST, I MET THIS EVENING WITH CHEYSSON FOR ABOUT FORTY MINUTES. I BRIEFED HIM ON MY TRIP TO THE AREA IN GENERAL TERMS. HE POSED SOME QUESTIONS AND MADE SOME POINTS WHICH HE MAY BRING UP ALSO IN HIS MEETING WITH YOU ON FRIDAY, NAMELY:

-- HE MAY BE INTRIGUED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING PRESSURE TO THE SYRIANS BY ENCOURAGING THE KUWAITIS, THE SAUDIS, AND THE GULF STATES TO CUT OFF THEIR SUBSIDIES FOR THE SYRIAN FORCES IN LEBANON. HE NOTED THE DECISION OF THE KUWAITI PARLIAMENT RECOMMENDING AGAINST FURTHER SUBSIDIES FOR THE ADF; HE NOTED SAUDI ARABIA, AMONG OTHER ARAB STATES, HAD ABSTAINED ON THE LAST ARAB LEAGUE DECISION TO RENEW THE ADF MANDATE.

-- WE CAUTIONED HIM AGAINST EXPECTING TOO MUCH. THE KUWAITI PARLIAMENT DECISION IS NOT BINDING ON THE KUWAITI GOVERNMENT; AS HIS MIDDLE EAST ADVISER ALSO CONFIRMED. THE ISRAELIS HAD TOLD US THAT CUT OFF OF ADF SUBSIDIES WOULD NOT BE TOO HARD ON THE SYRIANS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOR AT LEAST NINE MONTHS; THESE SUBSIDIES ARE ONLY A SMALL PART OF THE TOTAL ARAB SUBSIDIES PROVIDED TO SYRIA FOR THE STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL, WHICH THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO CUT COMPLETELY. FINALLY, WE NOTED THAT PRESSURES FROM THE SAUDIS AND THE GULF STATES, IF APPLIED TO SYRIA, MIGHT WELL HAVE AS THEIR PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES GETTING SYRIA TO CHANGE ITS POSITION ON THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR RATHER THAN BEING HELPFUL ABOUT LEBANON.

-- CHEYSSON NOTED THAT IN HIS RECENT VISITS TO ABU DHABI AND BAGHDAD, HE HAD HEARD VIRTUALLY NO TALK ABOUT THE PALESTINIANS, THE PLO OR ISRAEL; THE FOCUS WAS ON IRAN AND A POTENTIAL IRANIAN THREAT.

-- CHEYSSON WAS CONVINCED FROM HIS TRIP TO ISRAEL THAT THE ISRAELIS FEEL STRONGLY NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO HAVE REAL PROBLEMS OR CRISES WITH THE US. MARESCA

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NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/11/12 (MARESCA, JOHN J.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, FR, US

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY MITTERRAND CONFIDANT ON HIS VISIT
TO WASHINGTON

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. CHARGE HAD A LONG PRIVATE CONVERSATION MARCH 10 WITH A FRENCH BUSINESSMAN WHO HAS BEEN A CLOSE FRIEND OF MITTERRAND'S FOR FORTY YEARS (THEY ESCAPED FROM A GERMAN PRISON CAMP TOGETHER), AND SEES HIM SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK. OUR INTERLOCUTOR STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE MITTERRAND ATTACHES TO HIS MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND MITTERRAND'S FEELING THAT HE CAN USE THE VISIT TO BUILD A SPECIAL PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT. MITTERRAND SEES MANY SIMILARITIES BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE PRESIDENT, BASED ON THEIR LONG PARALLEL EXPERIENCE OF POLITICAL LIFE. MITTERRAND SEES THE PRESIDENT AS STRAIGHTFORWARD AND TRUSTWORTHY, TWO OF THE QUALITIES HE VALUES MOST, AND PARTICULARLY LIKES THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT SPEAKS PLAINLY AND IS NOT AN INTELLECTUAL.

3. OUR INTERLOCUTOR UNDERLINED MITTERRAND'S FRIENDSHIP FOR AMERICA, AND HIS PROFOUND DISTRUST OF THE SOVIETS. HE QUOTED MITTERRAND AS SAYING ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

"AMERICA IS THE LAST BASTION OF DEMOCRACY." HE PORTRAYED MITTERRAND AS A DEEPLY LOYAL PERSON WHOM WE SHOULD VALUE AS A MAN WE COULD COUNT ON IN DIFFICULT TIMES. HE RECOGNIZED THE DOUBTS WE HAD ABOUT MITTERRAND'S INCLUSION OF COMMUNISTS IN HIS GOVERNMENT, BUT PREDICTED THAT THE COMING CANTONAL ELECTIONS (MARCH 14 AND 21) WOULD SHOW COMMUNIST STRENGTH AT ONLY 12-13 PERCENT OF THE ELECTORATE. THIS WOULD INDICATE MITTERRAND IS ACHIEVING HIS OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING THE COMMUNISTS TO A MARGINAL ROLE IN FRENCH POLITICS.

4. OUR CONTACT SAID THE MAIN SUBJECT ON MITTERRAND'S MIND (NO SURPRISE) WAS U. S. INTEREST RATES. HE ARGUED THAT A HEALTHY EUROPEAN ECONOMY WAS IN U. S. INTERESTS. CHARGE REPLIED THAT INTEREST RATES HAD TO BE HIGHER THAN INFLATION RATES, AND WOULD COME DOWN NATURALLY WHEN

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INFLATION COMES UNDER CONTROL. HE ADDED THAT PRESSURES TO REDUCE INTEREST RATES ARTIFICIALLY WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO MAINTAIN ITS INCREASED DEFENSE BUDGET, WHICH WAS INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN EUROPEAN DEFENSE.

5. CHARGE SAID IT WAS ALSO NOT IN EUROPEAN INTEREST TO FUEL PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, SINCE THAT COULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTH OF ISOLATIONIST SENTIMENT IN THE U. S. HE ARGUED THAT THE FRENCH ARMS SALE TO NICARAGUA HAD BEEN A MISTAKE. PRIOR TO THAT, FRENCH POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA HAD BEEN CONDUCTED ON AN IDEALISTIC PLANE; BUT THE ARMS SALE LOWERED THIS LEVEL AND TOUCHED VERY SENSITIVE U. S. NERVES. CHARGE WARNED THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT FRENCH POLITICAL GESTURE TOWARD CUBA, SUCH AS A CASTRO VISIT TO PARIS, WOULD CAUSE MAJOR PROBLEMS FOR US. OUR INTERLOCUTOR REFLECTED CAREFULLY ABOUT ALL THIS. HE APPEARED TO ACCEPT THAT THE NICARAGUA ARMS SALE MAY NOT HAVE BEEN WHOLLY IN KEEPING WITH THE FRENCH OBJECTIVE OF CONTAINING THE SPREAD OF CUBAN AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS CERTAIN MITTERRAND WOULD NOT MAKE A MAJOR POLITICAL GESTURE TOWARD CUBA.

6. CHARGE SAID HE THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT WELL TOUCH ON THESE SUBJECTS IN HIS MEETING WITH MITTERRAND. OUR CONTACT SAID HE WOULD SEE MITTERRAND MARCH 11 AND WOULD GO OVER ALL THESE POINTS WITH HIM.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MARESCA

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Department of State

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SECRET PARIS 08872

NODIS

E.O. 12865: RDS-1, 2 3/12/82 (MARESCA, JOHN J.) OR-M
TAGS: FR, NU, MASS
SUBJECT: SEEKING FRENCH AGREEMENT TO SUSPEND ARMS
DELIVERIES TO NICARAGUA

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FOLLOWING A NUMBER OF DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH
KEY OFFICIALS AND OTHERS CLOSE TO MITTERRAND IN THE LAST
FEW DAYS, WE BELIEVE THERE MAY BE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN
THE FRENCH POSITION ON ARMS SALES TO NICARAGUA. THE
FRENCH ARE UNLIKELY TO CANCEL THE SALE OUTRIGHT, BUT
MIGHT BE AMENABLE TO SOME FORM OF SUSPENSION OR DELAY IN
DELIVERY.

3. ACCORDINGLY, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH AMBASSADOR
GALBRAITH, WE RECOMMEND THAT DURING MITTERRAND'S VISIT
TO WASHINGTON THE U.S. SIDE SEEK FRENCH AGREEMENT TO
SUSPEND ARMS DELIVERIES TO NICARAGUA PENDING AN IN-DEPTH
EXAMINATION OF CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY. SUCH AN
EXAMINATION COULD BE LINKED WITH THE JOINT STUDY WHICH
MITTERRAND AGREED SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY THE FRENCH
AND U.S. AMBASSADORS IN MANAGUA.
MARESCA

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #9216/01 0742221
O 152219Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1773

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 8636
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 09216

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM UNDER SECRETARY BUCKLEY
PASS DEF FOR SECRETARY WEINBERGER FROM UNDER SECRETARY

- IKLE

PASS TREASURY FOR SECRETARY REGAN FROM ASSISTANT SECRETARY

- LELAND

PASS COMMERCE FOR SECRETARY BALDRIGE FROM UNDER SECRETARY

- OLMER

PASS NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK FROM DR. BAILEY

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/15/92 (BUCKLEY, JAMES L.)

TAGS: EFIN, EEWT, UR

SUBJECT: FIRST DAY TALKS IN BONN

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)~~

2. OUR TALKS TODAY IN BONN WITH FRG DELEGATION HEADED BY FOREIGN OFFICE STATE SECRETARY LAUTENSCHLAGER REVEALED ANTICIPATED GERMAN SKEPTICISM REGARDING OBJECTIVES OF OUR MISSION BALANCED BY OBVIOUS DESIRE TO KEEP IN STEP WITH U.S. AND MAINTAIN ALLIED UNITY. GERMANS ARE CLEARLY CONCERNED ABOUT PRESIDENTIAL REACTION TO OUTCOME OF OUR TALKS AND IMPLICATIONS ENSUING DECISIONS WILL HAVE FOR THEIR PIPE LINE CONTRACTS. TO THIS EXTENT, OUR MESSAGE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SEEMS TO HAVE GOTTEN THROUGH AT THE LAUTENSCHLAGER LEVEL. THE ONLY ROOM FOR ENCOURAGEMENT CAME WHEN, AT CONCLUSION OF MORNING SESSION, ECONOMICS MINISTRY STATE SECRETARY VON WUERZEN ASKED POINTEDLY "WHAT DO YOU EXPECT OF US ON HERMES"?, IMPLYING PERHAPS THAT ADJUSTMENTS COULD BE MADE IN HERMES PROCEDURES. HOWEVER, IT WAS CLEAR THROUGHOUT THAT GERMANS WILL RESIST MOVES WHICH THEY SEE AS THREATENING THEIR TRADE.

3. OUR MEETING WITH GENSCHER FOLLOWING LUNCH WAS NOT ENCOURAGING. HE STRESSED, AS EXPECTED, NEED TO PUT OUR OBJECTIVES IN BROADER POLITICAL CONTEXT AND NEED FOR ALLIED UNITY. HE CLAIMED, HOWEVER, THAT FRG HAD ALREADY DONE ITS PART IN POST-DECEMBER 13 SANCTIONS EFFORT AND WAS NOT TERRIBLY ENCOURAGING REGARDING PURPOSE OF OUR MISSION.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 007-081 #47320

BY CU NARA DATE 4/29/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 152219Z MAR 82 PSN: 055459

4. NEXT STEPS IN GERMANY, AS LAUTENSCHLAGER DESCRIBED THEM TO US, ARE AN INNER MINISTERIAL MEETING TOMORROW TO BE FOLLOWED BY CABINET DISCUSSIONS ON WEDNESDAY. I BELIEVE OUR CHANCES OF A FAVORABLE DECISION ON WEDNESDAY WILL BE ENHANCED IF YOU AND OTHER CABINET OFFICERS WHOSE DEPARTMENTS ARE INVOLVED IN THIS MISSION COULD CONTACT DIRECTLY THEIR GERMAN COLLEAGUES (GENSCHER, APEL, MATTHOFER AND LAMBSDORFF), EITHER BY TELEPHONE OR MESSAGE, MAKING FOLLOWING POINTS:

- 1. WE ATTACH ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE TO SUCCESSFUL WESTERN EFFORT TO CURB FLOW OF SUBSIDIZED OFFICIAL CREDIT AND CREDIT GUARANTEES TO THE SOVIET UNION.
- 2. THIS IS JUSTIFIED ON ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC GROUNDS. SOVIET UNION IS NOT A GOOD CREDIT RISK; IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL ITS HELSINKI OBLIGATIONS, MOST BLATANTLY BUT NOT UNIQUELY IN POLAND; AND
- 3. OUR ASSISTANCE TO SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THROUGH SUBSIDIZED CREDITS WORKS TO OUR STRATEGIC DIS-ADVANTAGE BY MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO AVOID SOME OF THE TOUGH DECISIONS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE TO BE FACED DUE TO THEIR DECLINING ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THEIR ENORMOUS ARMAMENTS PROGRAM. I BELIEVE THESE APPROACHES ARE HIGHLY DESIRABLE IN MAKING CLEAR TO ALL CONCERNED IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS ISSUE. EVEN GENSCHER, JUDGING FROM HIS REMARKS TODAY, DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE GOTTEN THE MESSAGE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

5. EUROPEANS WILL CLEARLY DISCUSS THESE SUBJECTS AMONG THEMSELVES MOST SPECIFICALLY AT MARCH 22-23 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING. WE ASKED GERMANS TO GET BACK TO US SOMETIME NEXT WEEK WITH RESPONSE TO THREE QUESTIONS.

- 1. DO THEY SHARE OUR BASIC CONCEPT?; IF SO ARE THEY PREPARED TO JOIN IN AN EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A COCOM-LIKE MECHANISM TO MONITOR CREDITS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND WORK WITH US TO RESTRICT OFFICIAL CREDITS AND CREDIT GUARANTEES, AND
- 2. ARE THEY PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE TYPE OF DETAILED

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SIT118 DATE 03/17/82

DTG: 152219Z MAR 82 PSN: 055460
TOR: 075/0042Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

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NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHFR #9216/02 0742222
O 152219Z MAR 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1774

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 8637
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 09216

EXDIS

INFORMATION ON THEIR CREDIT RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE SOVIET
UNION WHICH WOULD BE NEEDED TO MAKE A MONITORING
MECHANISM EFFECTIVE?

3. PENDING AGREEMENT ON A MECHANISM AND RESTRAINTS,
WOULD THEY JOIN US IN A PAUSE, PERHAPS IMPLEMENTED BY
SIMPLY STOPPING PAPER PROCESS, ON FUTURE HERMES
GUARANTEES?

6. FOR THE MOMENT, GERMANS ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER "YES"
ONLY ON QUESTION OF GREATER TRANSPARENCY ON CREDIT
GUARANTEES. THEY ARE APPREHENSIVE OF OUR MOTIVES BUT
ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY AWARE OF THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES
OF FAILURE. MESSAGES SUCH AS THOSE SUGGESTED IN
PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE WILL ENSURE THAT THIS UNDERSTANDING IS
SHARED AT THE TOP LEVEL OF THE INTERESTED MINISTRIES,
AND THAT ALTERNATIVES ARE CLEAR FOR GERMAN DECISION
MAKERS. GALBRAITH

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SIT853 DATE 03/26/82

DTG: 191417Z MAR 82 PSN: 003637
TOR: 078/1648Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

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NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #3405 0781432
O O 191417Z MAR 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0733
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 7883
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1753
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2036

INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE 8386
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 8485
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 073405
EXDIS, BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
E. O. 12065: RDS - 1 3/17/02 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)
TAGS: EFIN, EEW

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY MISSION ON EAST/WEST ECONOMIC
RELATIONS

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOR ACTION ADDRESSEES: AMBASSADORS SHOULD DELIVER
THE LETTER IN PARA 3 BELOW. ADDRESSED TO
THE FOREIGN MINISTER FROM SECRETARY HAIG. EMBASSIES
SHOULD ENSURE THAT LETTER DELIVERED TO RESPECTIVE FOREIGN
MINISTERS BEFORE MARCH 22-23 EC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DEAR (HANS DIETRICH/CLAUDE/PETER/EMILIO):

"PRESIDENT REAGAN AND I ASKED FOR THE SPECIAL ATTENTION
OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO THE INTERAGENCY MISSION HEADED BY
UNDER SECRETARY JAMES L. BUCKLEY, AND COMPOSED OF SENIOR
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. I THANK YOU FOR THEIR
RECEPTION IN CAPITAL'. MY GOVERNMENT NOW WANTS TO WORK
WITH YOURS TO SEE THAT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WHICH TOOK

PLACE SETS THE STAGE FOR EXPEDITIOUS, EFFECTIVE AND
MUTUALLY AGREED ACTION.

WHAT THE MISSION SOUGHT WAS COMMON GROUND AMONG OUR
CLOSEST EUROPEAN ALLIES ON HOW TO BEGIN CONTROLLING THE
INCREASING VOLUMES OF SUBSIDIZED OFFICIAL CREDIT AND
GUARANTEES TO THE SOVIET UNION. YOU HAVE HEARD FROM THE

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MISSION OUR CONCERN THAT THE UNREGULATED AND COMPETITIVE PROVISION OF THIS CREDIT, TOGETHER WITH QUESTIONS OF SOVIET CREDITWORTHINESS AND OF ALLOCATION OF WESTERN RESOURCES, REQUIRE A COMPREHENSIVE WESTERN STRATEGY. THE NEED FOR JOINT ACTION IN SUCH AN IMPORTANT AREA OF CONCERN GAINS URGENCY FROM EVENTS IN POLAND, AND FROM THE GROWING PERCEPTION AMONG OUR PUBLICS THAT WESTERN SUBSIDIES OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY ARE CONTRIBUTING UNDULY TO SOVIET MILITARY DEVELOPMENT.

THE POINT OF DEPARTURE RECOMMENDED BY THE BUCKLEY MISSION WAS THAT RESTRAINT SHOULD TARGET THE FLOW OF MEDIUM-AND LONG-TERM SUBSIDIZED OFFICIAL CREDITS, AND GUARANTEES. BOTH CREDITS AND GUARANTEES HAVE IN THE LAST YEAR WORKED INCREASINGLY AGAINST THE SIGNALS OF OUR FREE MARKETS. THERE IS APPARENT CONSENSUS THAT ACTION IS-NECESSARY, AND THAT THE COMPETITIVE PROVISION OF FINANCING TO-THE SOVIETS, AT BELOW COST, IS UNDESIRABLE.

WHILE A LINK BETWEEN TRADE AND OFFICIAL CREDIT EXISTS, THE US IS NOT SEEKING ECONOMIC WARFARE WITH THE-SOVIET UNION. HOWEVER, "BUSINESS AS USUAL" IS ALSO INAPPROPRIATE, AND, IN THE CASE OF CREDIT, DAMAGING TO OUR NATIONS' OWN BEST ECONOMIC INTEREST.

WE HAVE BEGUN TO ESTABLISH ACCORD ON PREMISES. THERE IS APPARENT AGREEMENT THAT WE NEED MORE TRANSPARENCY IN-THE EXTENSION TO THE SOVIET UNION OF OFFICIAL CREDIT AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GUARANTEES. OUR GOVERNMENTS UNDERSTAND THAT-THE SOVIET UNION IS "DIFFERENT" IN TRADE AND STRATEGIC TERMS. WE KNOW THAT THE FLOW OF CREDIT TO THE SOVIET UNION HAS RECEIVED TOO LITTLE COLLECTIVE ATTENTION ON OUR PART. I THINK WE ALSO CAN AGREE THAT, FOR EFFECTIVENESS AND FOR ALLIED UNITY, OUR ACTIONS SHOULD BE JOINTLY UNDERTAKEN IN THE SPIRIT OF BURDEN-SHARING AND EQUITY.

YOU KNOW THAT MY COUNTRY HAS BEEN MAKING SACRIFICES IN THE AREA OF CREDIT AND GUARANTEES SINCE 1974, AND-THAT WE MORE RECENTLY HAVE FORGONE HUNDREDS OF MTLLIONS OF DOLLARS OF ADDITIONAL TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS PART OF OUR SANCTIONS IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET-INSPIRED

REPRESSION IN POLAND. MOREOVER, IN RESPONSE TO STRONG AMERICAN OPINION, PRESIDENT REAGAN MUST FACE ADDITIONAL DECISIONS INVOLVING THE APPLICABILITY AND POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF OUR DECEMBER 30 ECONOMIC MEASURES AGAINST THE USSR IF OUR COLLECTIVE ACTION APPEARS INSUFFICIENT TO THE CHALLENGES WE FACE TOGETHER.

YOU HAVE LEARNED HOW DEEPLY WE FEEL ABOUT THE NEED TO ACT JOINTLY AND FORCEFULLY TO BRING THE UNRESTRAINED FLOW OF SUBSIDIZED CREDIT UNDER CONTROL. IT WAS NOT OUR EXPECTATION THAT, DURING THE INSERT CAPITAL, MEETINGS WITH THE MISSION DISPATCHED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN, ALLIED POLICIES COULD BE FORGED INTO A FINISHED PRODUCT. THE NEXT STEP, I BELIEVE, IS TO EXCHANGE NATIONAL VIEWS ON WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO REACH DECISIONS ON THIS CRUCIAL PROBLEM. I EARNESTLY SOLICIT YOUR PROPOSALS, TOGETHER WITH YOUR CONSIDERED ADVICE ON HOW BEST MULTILATERALLY TO ORGANIZE OURSELVES TO THE TASK. YOU WILL BE RECEIVING THE FULLEST ATTENTION OF MY GOVERNMENT ON THIS MATTER. SINCERELY, AL. END TEXT. STOESSEL

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DTG: 191417Z MAR 82 PSN: 003637

~~SECRET~~