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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 12/20/2007

File Folder FRANCE (5/6/82-5/16/82)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 13

NOUZILLE

45

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47343	CABLE	061747Z MAY 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	6	5/6/1982	B1
47344	MEMO	NAU TO CLARK RE MEETING WITH ATTALI REPRESENTATIVES R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	5/7/1982	B1
47345	CABLE	071823Z MAY 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	5/7/1982	B1
47346	CABLE	111546Z MAY 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	5/11/1982	B1
47347	CABLE	110849Z MAY 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	5/11/1982	B1
47348	CABLE	111849Z MAY 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	5/11/1982	B1
47349	CABLE	111333Z MAY 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	5/11/1982	B1
47350	CABLE	131459Z MAY 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	5/13/1982	B1
47351	CABLE	132340Z MAY 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	5/13/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47352	CABLE	131850Z MAY 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	5/13/1982	B1
47353	CABLE	131910Z MAY 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	4	5/13/1982	B1
47354	MEMO	ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE MITTERRAND R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	5/14/1981	B1
47355	CABLE	151637Z MAY 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	5/15/1982	B1
47356	CABLE	152036Z MAY 82 R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	5/15/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47343

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 6131
SIT793 DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 061747Z MAY 82 PSN: 016582
TOR: 126/2213Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #6131/01 1261753
O 061747Z MAY 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5288

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 16131

EXDIS
FOR EUR/WE

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/6/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, FR, US

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION WITH MITTERRAND
- AT THE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON IN PARIS JUNE 3

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ISSUE: VERSAILLES ECONOMIC SUMMIT

-- A. BACKGROUND: MITTERRAND HAS TAKEN AN ACTIVE PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT. HE IS INTERESTED FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS IN MAKING IT A SUCCESS. HE IS ALSO INTELLECTUALLY INTRIGUED BY THE SUBJECT OF PARTICULAR FRENCH INTEREST, ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, AND HAS BEEN WORKING PERSONALLY ON IDEAS FOR INTRODUCTION INTO THE COMMUNIQUE.

-- MITTERRAND WANTS TO AVOID CONFRONTATION ON SUCH THORNY SUBJECTS AS INTEREST RATES AND NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS, WHERE FRENCH VIEWS AND INTERESTS DIFFER FROM OURS. HE ALSO WANTS SOMETHING POSITIVE TO COME OUT OF THIS SUMMIT. HE HOPES THAT HIS PERSONAL PROPOSAL TO SET UP A GROUP OF "WISE MEN" TO REPORT BACK TO NEXT YEAR'S SUMMIT ON THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY ISSUE WILL BE THE CENTRAL FEATURE AT VERSAILLES.

-- B. POINTS TO MAKE:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- AS THE NEXT SUMMIT HOST, THE U.S. HAS A SPECIAL INTEREST IN THE OUTCOME OF VERSAILLES AND IN PARTICULAR IN THE ISSUES SUCH AS ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY WHICH WILL FEED INTO THE U.S. SUMMIT IN 1983.

-- VERSAILLES WILL IN A SENSE BE UNIQUE IN THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE SUMMITS BEGAN ALL THE PARTICIPATING HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE MET AT THE PREVIOUS SUMMIT; IN 1983 THERE MAY BE SOME NEW FACES.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE HAS BEEN DISAGREEMENT ON SOME ISSUES -- PARTICULARLY INTEREST RATES AND NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIPS -- AND WE APPRECIATE PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S WILLINGNESS TO FIND CONSTRUCTIVE WAYS FOR BRIDGING OUR DIFFERENCES.

-- THERE HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY UNIVERSAL AGREEMENT IN RECENT YEARS THAT THE SUMMIT PREPARATION SHOULD BE LIGHTER AND LESS BUREAUCRATIC, BUT NEITHER THE CANADIANS

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NOR THE FRENCH SEEM TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN CUTTING BACK ON THE PREPARATORY WORK. DOES PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAVE ANY INSIGHTS THAT HE MIGHT PASS ON TO US?

3. ISSUE: NATO SUMMIT

-- A. BACKGROUND: THE LEVEL OF FRENCH PARTICIPATION AT THE NATO SUMMIT IS EXPECTED TO BE THE HIGHEST IN RECENT HISTORY. MITTERRAND WILL ATTEND THE DINNER FOR CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT ON JUNE 9. PRIME MINISTER MAUROY WILL ATTEND BOTH THE DINNER AND PLENARY MEETINGS JUNE 10. FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON WILL ALSO ATTEND THE PLENARY. WE WANT TO ENCOURAGE MITTERRAND TO ATTEND THE CEREMONY OF SPANISH ACCESSION AND GENERALLY TO EVOKE A FORTHCOMING POLITICAL STANCE FROM MAUROY AND CHEYSSON AT THE MEETINGS THEMSELVES.

-- B. POINTS TO MAKE:

-- WE UNDERSTAND FULLY THE POLITICAL BASIS FOR FRANCE'S PARTICULAR ROLE IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND HAVE BEEN PLEASED BY YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RECENT FORTHRIGHT STANCE ON IMPORTANT EAST-WEST ISSUES. FRANCE'S ROLE HAS HELPED TO GENERATE EFFECTIVE WESTERN CONSENSUS TO MEET THE CHALLENGES WHICH CONFRONT US.

-- THIS YEAR'S NATO SUMMIT WILL BE HISTORIC, SINCE WE WILL WELCOME SPAIN INTO THE ALLIANCE. WE HOPE FRANCE WILL BE REPRESENTED AT THE CEREMONY OF ACCESSION AT A LEVEL APPROPRIATE TO THIS HISTORIC OCCASION WHEN THE LEADERS OF THE ALLIANCE CONFER MEMBERSHIP ON SPAIN.

-- WE ARE ALSO PLEASED THAT FRANCE WILL BE REPRESENTED

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AT THE MEETING BY YOUR PRIME MINISTER. THIS WILL STRENGTHEN THE ALLIANCE'S COLLECTIVE RESOLVE.

4. ISSUE: CENTRA AMERICA AND CUBA

-- A. BACKGROUND: YOUR DISCUSSION OF THIS PROBLEM WITH MITTERRAND LAST MARCH RESULTED IN A DELAY OF FRENCH ARMS SHIPMENTS TO NICARAGUA, PENDING A JOINT ASSESSMENT

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 6131
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DE RUFHFR #6131/02 1261754
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5289

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 16131
EXDIS

OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND BY THE TWO AMBASSADORS IN MANAGUA. THE U. S. SIDE HAS BEEN SLOW TO GET THIS STARTED, AND HAS CHANGED THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FROM A ONE-TIME ASSESSMENT TO AN INDEFINITE STUDY PROCESS. MITTERRAND MAY WELL ACCUSE US OF DELIBERATELY DRAGGING OUR HEELS AND MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO RELEASE THE ARMS.

- ON CUBA, IT SEEMS THAT THE FRENCH ARE PROCEEDING WITH CAUTION AND DO NOT INTEND A DRAMATIC OPENING TO CUBA IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HOWEVER, THE POTENTIAL IS THERE, AND WE NEED TO REMIND THE FRENCH THAT WE ARE WORRIED ABOUT THEIR INTENTIONS.
- ON BOTH CUBA AND NICARAGUA, FRENCH POLICY IS INFLUENCED BY RADICAL MEMBERS OF THE NEW SOCIALIST TEAM. THEREFORE, IF WE DO NOT KEEP PUSHING ON THESE ISSUES, FRENCH POLICY COULD CREEP FURTHER IN DIRECTIONS WE DO NOT LIKE.

-- B. POINTS TO MAKE:

- OUR TWO AMBASSADORS IN NICARAGUA ARE MEETING, AND WE HOPE THAT A JOINT ASSESSMENT WILL SOON RESULT. WE APPRECIATE THE FACT THAT FRANCE HAS HELD BACK ARMS SHIPMENTS DURING THIS DELICATE PERIOD OF THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SANDINISTAS.
- IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE NICARAGUANS END THEIR SUPPORT OF THE SALVADORAN GUERILLAS; WE CANNOT ACCEPT EXPORTATION OF VIOLENCE AND REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMERICA.

-- WE ARE IN A DELICATE PROCESS OF MOVING TOWARD REALISTIC DISCUSSIONS WITH CUBA. CONTINUED FRENCH RESTRAINT TOWARD CUBA WILL BE MUCH APPRECIATED.

5. ISSUE: MIDDLE EAST

-- A. BACKGROUND: SINCE MITTERRAND'S VISIT TO ISRAEL AND HIS LAST MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, THERE HAS BEEN NO APPARENT MOVEMENT TOWARD RENEWED FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS. FRENCH RELATIONS WITH SYRIA HAVE PLUMMETED, PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF SYRIA'S ROLE IN ANTI-FRENCH TERRORISM BOTH IN LEBANON AND IN PARIS. THE FRENCH ARE INCREASING THEIR PRESENCE IN THE AREA BY FURNISHING AN ADDITIONAL BATTALION FOR UNIFIL AND ARE KEENLY INTERESTED IN THE UPCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN LEBANON.

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-- B. POINTS TO MAKE:
- -- WE WILL BE MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT IN THE COMING MONTHS TO PURSUE AUTONOMY TALKS.
- -- WHAT IS MITTERRAND'S PERCEPTION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER PROGRESS?

6. ISSUE: U. S. MILITARY RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO
-- A. BACKGROUND: THE FRENCH ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE DEVELOPING U. S. MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH MOROCCO. OSTENSIBLY, THIS CONCERN DERIVES FROM A BELIEF THAT TOO CLOSE AN EMBRACE OF KING HASSAN BY THE U. S. (E. G., FREQUENCY OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS AND PUBLICITY GIVEN TO THEM) COULD (A) DO HIM HARM WITHIN HIS OWN COUNTRY, (B) UNDERCUT HIS POTENTIAL AS A REGIONAL "NON-ALIGNED" LEADER AND (C) DETRACT FROM HIS ROLE AS A RELIGIOUS LEADER. IN FACT, THE FRENCH CONCERNS PROBABLY ARISE ONLY IN PART OUT OF THE FOREGOING. THEY LIKELY SEE OUR RELATIONSHIP DOING HARM TO THEIR ALREADY TARNISHED RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO AND MOST IMPORTANTLY UPSETTING FRANCE'S EFFORTS TO WORK OUT CLOSER TIES WITH ALGERIA. THE ALGERIANS, THEY PROBABLY FEAR, MIGHT BE PUSHED CLOSER TO THE SOVIETS IN ORDER TO COUNTERBALANCE US INFLUENCE IN MOROCCO OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO IMPOSE DEMANDS IN THE MILITARY FIELD ON THE FRENCH THAT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO MEET.
-- B. POINTS TO MAKE:
- -- WE ARE NOT SEEKING TO COMPETE WITH FRANCE IN MOROCCO.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- -- OUR MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH MOROCCO IS LIMITED TO CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS FOR ENROUTE ACCESS AND MORE REGULARIZED CONSULTATIONS.
- -- WHAT IS MITTERRAND'S ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA AND HOW IT IS AFFECTED BY OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH MOROCCO.

PARIS 6131

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 6131
SIT791 DATE 05/11/82

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DE RUFHFR #6131/03 1261755
O 061747Z MAY 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5290

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 16131
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7. ISSUE: TERRORISM

-- A. BACKGROUND. THE LONG-STANDING AND CYNICAL FRENCH ATTITUDE OF AVOIDING THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM SO LONG AS THE VICTIMS ARE NOT FRENCH IS CHANGING IN THE WAKE OF A SPATE OF INCIDENTS WHICH HAVE KILLED FRENCH CITIZENS. TERRORISM HAS NOW BECOME A MAJOR POLITICAL ISSUE IN FRANCE, AND THE INITIAL FALLOUT HAS BEEN NEGATIVE FOR MITTERRAND AND THE SOCIALISTS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED A SERIES OF ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES -- TIGHTENING UP ON IMMIGRATION POLICIES, INCREASING POLICE POWER, PUTTING PRESSURE ON EMBASSIES KNOWN TO HAR- BOR TERRORISTS, DOWNGRADING OF RELATIONS WITH SYRIA BY EXPELLING TWO OF HER DIPLOMATS, AND RECALLING THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO DAMASCUS. BUT ONE IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM, THE LIBERAL FRENCH TRADITION OF POLITICAL ASYLUM, IS IDEOLOGICALLY IMPORTANT TO THE SOCIALISTS, AND THEY HAVE SO FAR FAILED TO FACE UP TO ITS REFORM. IN SPITE OF MITTERRAND'S OWN COMMITMENT TO GET TOUGH AND THE GOVERNMENT'S NEW ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES, WE HAVE NOT YET SEEN A CHANGE IN THE NEGATIVE FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARD BROADER INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. THE FRENCH HAVE OPPOSED OUR EFFORTS TO INSCRIBE TERRORISM ON THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT AGENDA AND HAVE RESISTED OUR CALL FOR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

A PRE-SUMMIT MEETING OF TERRORISM EXPERTS.

-- B. POINTS TO MAKE:

-- WE APPRECIATE THE RECENT CHANGE IN FRENCH POLICY REGARDING TERRORISM AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S STEPPED UP EFFORTS TO COMBAT IT. THE FIGHT MUST BE WAGED ON AN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, AND WE STAND READY TO LEND OUR SUPPORT.
-- WE APPRECIATE EFFORTS TO APPREHEND THE MURDERERS OF OUR ASSISTANT MILITARY ATTACHE IN PARIS, LT. COL RAY, AND CONTINUED POLICE PROTECTION OF OUR EMBASSY AND ITS PERSONNEL. BUT WE CANNOT REALLY SOLVE THE PROBLEM UNLESS WE ATTACK ITS ROOT CAUSE--THE FACILITY WITH WHICH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS OPERATE INFRANCE.
-- WHILE WE RESPECT THE FRENCH TRADITION OF POLITICAL ASYLUM, IN AN AGE OF RAMPANT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE LEGITIMATE RIGHT OF POLITICAL ASYLUM WITHOUT GIVING ENCOURAGEMENT TO

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DTG: 061747Z MAY 82 PSN: 016586

THOSE WHO SUPPORT TERRORISM.

- -- WE AGREE THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE FOR SOME TIME SUPPORTED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. WE ALSO CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE LIBYANS CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN TRAINING, SUPPLYING AND HARBORING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS.

8. ISSUE: DEALING WITH ALLIANCE PUBLIC OPINION

-- A. BACKGROUND: IN RECENT MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN A SURGE OF PACIFIST AND NEUTRALIST THINKING IN EUROPE, WHICH HAS BEEN NOTABLY ABSENT IN FRANCE. THIS HAS BEEN FOCUSED ON THE PENDING INSTALLATION OF PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES, AND HAS BEEN MIRRORRED IN THE UNITED STATES BY GROWING NEO-ISOLATIONIST SENTIMENT FAVORING WITHDRAWAL OF U. S. FORCES FROM EUROPE AND PROPOSALS FOR A USG DECLARATION OF NON FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WITH ITS BROAD CONSENSUS IN FAVOR OF A STRONG INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENT-BASED DEFENSE, FRANCE HAS BEEN RELATIVELY IMMUNE FROM SUCH SENTIMENTS.

-- B. POINTS TO MAKE:

- -- WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT GROWING PACIFIST SENTIMENT IN EUROPE, ESPECIALLY IN GERMANY.

- -- THIS PHENOMENON STRENGTHENS DESIRES AMONG SOME SEGMENTS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF U. S. FORCES FROM EUROPE. WE WANT TO COUNTER THIS, AS WE ARE CONVINCED THAT HAVING OUR FORCES IN EUROPE IS IN OUR FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST AS WELL AS IN THAT OF EUROPE.

- -- I KNOW THAT YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE ALREADY

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SPOKEN OUT ELOQUENTLY AND FORTHRIGHTLY ON THIS SUBJECT.

- -- WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY NEWS YOU MAY HAVE ON THIS SUBJECT AND ANY IDEAS YOU MAY HAVE FOR STEMMING THIS DEVELOPMENT, AND PARTICULARLY FOR REASSURING THE GERMANS.

GALBRAITH

PARIS 6131

DTG: 061747Z MAY 82 PSN: 016586

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

May 7, 1982

*Noted
cc to Deaver*

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

HENRY R. NAU *HRN*

47344

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Attali Representatives on
French President's Technology Report

Bob Hormats, Beryl Sprinkel, and I met for two hours with Pierre Morel and Marc de Brichanbault of Jacques Attali's office, to discuss the French President's report on technology. This was the first detailed presentation of the contents of the report.

The report will contain three parts:

- First part identifies the new technologies of the future, micro-electronics, bio-technology, new material, space and oceans, and emphasizes the social and political problems which these technologies will create.
- The second part identifies five major areas in which Summit leaders have political interests at stake in the new technologies -- employment consequences, protectionism, risk of concentration and monopolies, inequality with developing countries spawned by technology, and consequences for the social and cultural identity of individual nations.
- The third part proposes cooperative efforts to achieve new growth through technology, to develop human resources through greater cooperation in vocational training, etc., and to cope with the impact of technology on culture. The centerpiece here is a study group of prominent industrial and government leaders that would develop cooperative projects and report back to Summit leaders at the next Summit.

In our response, we emphasized the political attractiveness of the subject because it deals with the longer-term and represents a more fundamental approach to our economic problems and because it offers hope in the midst of the present recession. We urged that the report be positive about the benefits of technology and not overemphasize centralized management of technology either by government or

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industry. We supported the ideas of a study group as long as its work was closely integrated with existing institutions and activities already underway in these institutions.

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National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 3262

22 MAY 8 12:08

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u> </u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	<u> </u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	<u> </u>
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Sit Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other

COMMENTS

Please send a cc to
Deaver. *Done*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 08 MAY 82 14

TO - CLARK

FROM NAU

12/20/07

DOC DATE 07 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

MOREL, PIERRE

FRENCH SUMMIT

DE BRICHANBAULT, M

ATTALI, JACQUE

SUBJECT: MTG W/ ATTALI REPS RE FRENCH PRES TECHNOLOGY REPORT

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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SIT540 DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 071823Z MAY 82 PSN: 018203
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DE RUFHFR #6297 1271823
O 071823Z MAY 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5377

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 16297
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/7/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G) OR-M
TAGS: EEWT, ESTC, COCOM, FR
SUBJECT: RESPONSE FROM MOD HERNU TO ASD PERLE LETTER
REFS: (A) PARIS 16010, (B) PARIS 16180, (C) PARIS 15862

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AFTERNOON MAY 6 MOD DELIVERED MINDEF HERNU'S RESPONSE TO ASD PERLE'S LETTER ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, MT-20 CASE AND LICENSING OF COMPUTER EQUIPMENT FOR EXPORT (REF A). INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS BELOW.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR:
AS I INFORMED YOU IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RECEIPT OF MR. PERLE'S LETTER, WE HAVE TAKEN CAREFUL NOTE OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED FOR THE DELIVERY OF THE CRAY ONE COMPUTER, WHICH RESULTED FROM THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE CHIEFS OF STATE OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES AT THE TIME OF THEIR RECENT MEETING IN WASHINGTON. THEREFORE, THERE SEEMS TO ME TO BE NO OBSTACLE TO THE DELIVERY OF THE COMPUTER. WITH RESPECT TO THE OTHER QUESTION WHICH IS MENTIONED IN MR. PERLE'S PAPER, I WOULD LIKE TO REITERATE THAT THIS MATTER IS UNDERGOING AN IN-DEPTH EXAMINATION BY THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GOVERNMENT IN ORDER THAT THE SAID CONTRACT WILL PRESENT NO MILITARY RISKS. MR. PERLE IN HIS LETTER HAS TAKEN NOTE OF WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN ABLE TO BE DONE IN THIS DIRECTION. AS I INDICATED AT THE TIME OF MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST JANUARY, THIS MATTER WILL BE PRESENTED BILATERALLY (AND IF APPROPRIATE, IN COCOM) WHEN THE MANNER OF EXECUTION WILL HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY REVIEWED. (COMPLIMENTARY CLOSE) SIGNED CHARLES HERNU
END TEXT.

4. EMBASSY COMMENT: ALTHOUGH GOF POSITION IS STILL TO DENY ANY DIRECT LINK BETWEEN MT-20 CASE AND SHIPMENT OF CRAY ONE, WE REGARD THIS TEXT AS OFFERING ABOUT AS MUCH AS COULD BE EXPECTED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. IT CONFIRMS THE ASSURANCES IN THE PERLE LETTER OFFERED BY PAYE (REFS) AND REITERATES THE INTENT OF THE GOF TO REMOVE ANYTHING OF

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BY CA NARA DATE 4/29/10

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12

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 071823Z MAY 82 PSN: 018203

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE FROM THE CONTRACT. AT THIS POINT IT PROBABLY IS BEST COURSE OF ACTION TO USE TEXT OF HERNU LETTER AND ASSURANCES GIVEN DURING ASD PERLE VISIT TO SEEK MORE DETAILED BRIEFING OF CONTENT OF MT-20 CONTRACT FROM GOF FOR DOD COMMUNICATIONS SPECIALIST TEAM ALONG LINES OF THAT GIVEN ASD BRYEN MAY 4 BY DIRECTOR GENERAL DONDOUX OF PTT. WE WILL THEN BE IN POSITION TO FOCUS OUR PRESSURE ON SPECIFIC PORTIONS OF CONTRACT WE WILL WANT TO STOP WHICH REMAIN AFTER FRENCH REVIEW.

5. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO USMISSION NATO AND TO OSD FOR ASD/ISP PERLE. GALBRAITH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 7633 DTG: 111546Z MAY 82 PSN: 023515
SIT809 DATE 05/19/82 TOR: 131/1555Z

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WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7633 1311556
O 111546Z MAY 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3964

INFO AMEMBASSY MANAGUA IMMEDIATE 4823
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7540
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 127633
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 5/10/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, FR, NU
SUBJECT: (S) JOINT ASSESSMENT BY FRENCH AND US IN NICARAGUA
REF: A. STATE 126151, B. PARIS 11958

1. ~~(B - ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT, AS HE HIMSELF PREVIOUSLY ACKNOWLEDGED (PARA 3, REF B), PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND HE HAVE MADE A COMMITMENT THEMSELVES THAT THERE WILL BE NO ARMS DELIVERIES TO NICARAGUA UNTIL OUR AMBASSADORS IN MANAGUA HAVE MADE THEIR JOINT ASSESSMENT. HAIG

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14

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47347

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 6584
SIT702 DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 110849Z MAY 82 PSN: 023106
TOR: 131/1052Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

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SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #6584 1310849
O 110849Z MAY 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5532

INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0535
AMEMBASSY BONN 9051
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 3086
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2045
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5026
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 16584

EXDIS
USEEC

DEPARTMENT FOR UNDER SECRETARY BUCKELY
PASS TREASURY FOR CORNELL

EO 12065: RDS-1 5/11/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.) OR-M

TAGS: EFIN, FR

SUBJECT: THE USSR, THE EXPORT CREDIT CONSENSUS AND
- THE FOLLOW-UP TO THE BUCKLEY MISSION

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SECRETARY REGAN AND I MET AT THE RESIDENCE WITH
FINANCE MINISTER DELORS ON MAY 9. DELORS STATED THAT
FRANCE, IN THE INTERESTS OF HARMONY WITH THE UNITED
STATES AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, IS PREPARED
TO TAKE MEASURES FOR THE CONTROL OF EXPORT CREDIT TO
THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WERE NOT IN FRANCE'S COMMERCIAL
INTEREST. SPECIFICALLY, FRANCE WILL AGREE:
A) TO PLACE RUSSIA IN CATEGORY I OF THE CONSENSUS;

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

B) TO RAISE THE CATEGORY I MINIMUM INTEREST RATE TO
12.5 PERCENT; AND
C) TO EXPLORE WAYS OF DECREASING THE PERCENTAGE OF
EACH EXPORT TRANSACTION FINANCED BY CREDIT BY SUCH
TECHNIQUES AS INCREASING THE DOWN PAYMENT TO PERHAPS
30 PERCENT. THIS REFLECTS A DECISION BY GOF TO FIND
WAYS TO COOPERATE WITH THE BUCKLEY MISSION. DELORS
SAID FRANCE EXPECTS TO LOSE (TO GERMANY, JAPAN AND
ITALY) ABOUT FIVE BILLION OF EXPORTS AS A RESULT
OF THEIR NEW POLICY. THEY ARE NOT ASKING A QUID PRO
QUO FROM THE U. S.

3. AT A SUBSEQUENT INFORMAL MEETING WITH SECRETARY
REGAN AND MESSRS. SPRINKEL AND LELAND AFTER DINNER,
TREASURY DIRECTOR CAMDESSUS REVIEWED THESE POINTS AND
PROMISED TO PUT THEM IN WRITING FOR THE NEXT MEETING

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DTG: 110849Z MAY 82 PSN: 023106

ON THIS SUBJECT ON MAY 14.

4. OTHER POINTS MADE BY DELORS:

A) FRANCE FORESEES TWO DIFFICULT ECONOMIC YEARS AHEAD. INFLATION, THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, LACK OF INVESTMENT AND THE DEFICIT IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM HEAD THE LIST. HE HOPES TO ATTACK INFLATION SUCCESSFULLY ALBEIT SLOWLY (DOWN TO 10 PERCENT BY END OF 1982), PRINCIPALLY BY LIMITING WAGE INCREASES, AND ALSO BY STABILIZING THE FRANC. DURING THIS TWO-YEAR PERIOD, FRANCE WILL NEED EXTERNAL FINANCING. (SECRETARY REGAN AND I SAID LOANS FROM THE U.S. WOULD COME FROM PRIVATE BANKS WHICH TODAY ARE READY TO DO BUSINESS WITH FRANCE. OUR BOND MARKET IS ALSO OPEN AND RECEPTIVE.)

B) AS TO INVESTMENTS BY FRENCH COMPANIES IN THE U.S., HE REITERATED HIS UNDERSTANDING WITH ME THAT HE WOULD ADVISE THE EMBASSY OF ANY PROPOSED PURCHASES.

SECRETARY REGAN AGREED THIS WAS A GOOD ARRANGEMENT.

C) A NUMBER OF AMERICAN COMPANIES WANT TO BUY HOWMET TURBINES, THE U.S. SUBSIDIARY OF THE RECENTLY NATIONALIZED ENTERPRISE PUK (AND A PRIME DEFENSE CONTRACTOR). THE GOF DOES NOT WANT TO SELL BUT WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS HAVING A PARTNER.

D) WITH RESPECT TO LOANS TO THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE, THE GOF IS DIVIDED INTO TWO CAMPS: THOSE THAT WISH TO DIFFERENTIATE AMONG THEM AND THOSE THAT DO NOT. DELORS REGARDS HIMSELF AS A DIFFERENTIATIONIST.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

(COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE DISTINCTION WAS NOT ALTOGETHER CLEAR, HE WAS PRESUMABLY DEFINING NON-DIFFERENTIATIONISTS AS THOSE THAT WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE TO GIVE CREDIT WITHOUT REGARD TO POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS.)

E) DELORS MADE A POINT OF TELLING US THAT FRANCE LINKS TOGETHER ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND POLITICAL ISSUES INVOLVING THE USSR, E. G. THEIR ATTITUDE ON CREDITS COULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE GENEVA INF TALKS. HE FEELS THIS APPROACH SHOULD BE SHARED BY ALL THE ALLIES AND FEELS THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT IS A GOOD PLACE FOR THIS MATTER TO BE DISCUSSED. I INFORMED HIM OF THE BILATERAL LUNCH AT THE ELYSEE OF JUNE 3 AND HE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT BE A SUBJECT TO BRING UP.

GALBRAITH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47348

16

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 6744
SIT488 DATE 05/18/82

DTG: 111849Z MAY 82 PSN: 024113
TOR: 131/2239Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHFR #6744 01 1311852
C 111849Z MAY 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5608

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 16744
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/11/02 (MARESCA, JOHN J.) OR-M

TAGS: OECD, PFOR, FR

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STOESSEL'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER CHEYSSON

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: DEPUTY SECRETARY STOESSEL MET WITH FORMIN
CHEYSSON ON MAY 11, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM MARESCA. SUBJECTS
COVERED INCLUDED FALKLANDS, VERSAILLES SUMMIT, AND MIDDLE
EAST. CHEYSSON URGED THAT HE AND THE SECRETARY MAINTAIN
CLOSE CONTACT DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS, IN CASE THERE IS
A BRITISH LANDING IN THE FALKLANDS. END SUMMARY.

3. FALKLANDS: CHEYSSON BEGAN BY REITERATING HOW USEFUL
IT IS FOR HIM TO HAVE A CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE SECRETARY. HE THEN TURNED TO THE FALKLANDS SITUA-
TION, AND NOTED THAT, EXCEPT FOR ARGENTINA'S ACT OF
AGGRESSION, THE BRITISH CASE IS VERY WEAK. NEVERTHELESS,
BECAUSE OF THIS AGGRESSION, FRANCE STANDS FIRMLY WITH
THE BRITISH ON THIS ISSUE. THERE WAS NO PUBLIC PRESSURE
IN FRANCE TO CHANGE THIS STANCE AND CHEYSSON FULLY EX-
PECTED IT TO CONTINUE. CHEYSSON SAID THIS SHOWED HOW
CLOSE THE FRENCH AND BRITISH PEOPLES ARE IN THEIR VALUES
AND ATTITUDES. HOWEVER, CHEYSSON SAID, THE BRITISH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SHOULD NOT TRY TO LINK THE FALKLANDS WITH OTHER ISSUES,
AS HE SAID THEY WERE NOW TRYING TO DO WITH THE AGRI-
CULTURE DISPUTE WITHIN THE EC. THERE WAS NO LOGIC IN
SUCH LINKAGE AND BRITAIN'S EC PARTNERS WOULD REJECT IT.
AT THE END OF THE MEETING, CHEYSSON RETURNED TO THE
FALKLANDS ISSUE. HE TOLD STOESSEL IT WOULD BE VERY IM-
PORTANT FOR HIM AND SECRETARY HAIG TO REMAIN IN CLOSE
CONTACT DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS, IN CASE THERE SHOULD
BE A BRITISH LANDING IN THE FALKLANDS. CHEYSSON SAID
THURSDAY AND FRIDAY OF THIS WEEK WOULD BE ESPECIALLY
IMPORTANT. STOESSEL INDICATED THE SECRETARY WOULD
BE TRAVELLING TO ANKARA AND ATHENS, BUT IT WOULD BE
POSSIBLE TO REACH HIM.

4. VERSAILLES SUMMIT: CHEYSSON SAID IT WOULD BE IM-
PORTANT TO HAVE A SINGLE, SIMPLE AND POSITIVE IDEA WHICH

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DTG: 111849Z MAY 82 PSN: 024113

WOULD BE ARTICULATED AFTER THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT, SINCE THE PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE WERE DISCOURAGED AND NEEDED "TO SEE THE END OF THE TUNNEL." CHEYSSON CITED THE EXAMPLE OF THE TOKYO SUMMIT, WHEN A STRONG SINGLE THEME EMERGED. THIS NEED NOT BE AN AGREED POLICY. IN RESPONSE TO STOESSEL'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE FRENCH HAVE SOMETHING SPECIFIC IN MIND, CHEYSSON SAID THE FRENCH THOUGHT A SYSTEM FOR CONSULTATION ON EXCHANGE RATES WOULD BE A POSSIBILITY. THE FRENCH BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE CONSTANT CONSULTATION AMONG THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DOLLAR, THE YEN, AND THE ECU. STOESSEL SAID HE THOUGHT WE WOULD BE OPEN TO FRENCH SUGGESTIONS, WHICH WE WOULD STUDY CAREFULLY.

5. MIDEAST: CHEYSSON CITED THE PROBLEM FACING THE ADDITIONAL FRENCH TROOPS BEING ADDED TO THE UNIFIL CONTINGENT. AND THE FRENCH REQUEST FOR A U.S. DEMARCHE TO THE ISRAELIS ON THIS SUBJECT. HE NOTED THAT HADDAD'S FORCES IN PROXIMITY TO THE NEW PROPOSED FRENCH POSITIONS COULD BE REPLACED BY LEBANESE FORCES, IF THAT WOULD HELP. CHEYSSON WAS TOLD THAT FOLLOWING HIS MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY ON THIS SUBJECT, NEW INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN SENT FROM WASHINGTON, AND WE WOULD NOW BE SUPPORTING THE FRENCH WITH THE ISRAELIS. CHEYSSON WAS CLEARLY VERY GRATEFUL. HE ASKED THAT THIS REMAIN BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRANCE. THE ADDITIONAL FRENCH TROOPS WOULD EMBARK IN ABOUT A WEEK FOR LEBANON ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT A SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THIS POINT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. BEGIN AND CAMP DAVID: CHEYSSON SAID BEGIN HAD BECOME IMPOSSIBLE TO DEAL WITH AND SEEMED BLIND TO THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE, THOUGH HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN A RESISTANCE FIGHTER AND SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION BETTER. HE SAID THAT BEGIN HASN'T UNDERSTOOD THE MEANING OF THE RESISTANCE IN THE LEFT BANK AND THAT IT WOULD INCREASE IN INTENSITY BECAUSE OF ISRAELI POLICIES. STOESSEL SAID WE WOULD BE PRESSING THE AUTONOMY TALKS IN THE COMING MONTHS, AND HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM AS A SITE FOR THOSE TALKS. CHEYSSON SAID THE FRENCH ATTITUDE ON THE PEACE MOVES WAS WELL UNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON. HE ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO EXPAND THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS SO THAT ONE SIDE MIGHT CONSIDER IT A PROLONGATION OF CAMP DAVID, WHILE THE OTHER MIGHT SEE IT AS A NEW INITIATIVE. IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO INCLUDE JORDAN IN THE PROCESS, AND THIS MIGHT BE A WAY TO MAKE THAT POSSIBLE. STOESSEL NOTED THAT IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE INTENTION TO INCLUDE JORDAN; THIS DID NOT SEEM TO BE A REAL POSSIBILITY RIGHT NOW BUT MIGHT DEVELOP IN THE FUTURE.

7. CHEYSSON WAS FORCED TO CONCLUDE THE MEETING AT THIS POINT WHEN HE RECEIVED A SERIES OF PHONE CALLS APPARENTLY RELATING TO URGENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BRUSSELS ABOUT THE

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DTG: 111849Z MAY 82 PSN: 024113

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

17-A

PAGE 01
SIT487

PARIS 6744
DATE 05/18/82

DTG: 111849Z MAY 82 PSN: 024114
TOR: 131/2239Z

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NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHR =6744/02 1311853
O 111849Z MAY 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5609

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 16744
NODIS
PROBLEM OF EC AGRICULTURAL PRICES.

8. DEPT REPEAT AS DESIRED.
GALBRAITH

~~SECRET~~

18

47349

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 6618
SIT697 DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 111333Z MAY 82 PSN: 023422
TOR: 131/1456Z

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #6618/01 1311334
O 111333Z MAY 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5551

INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 1772
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2055
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 4652
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 6393
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 8456
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 5214
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 16618

EXDIS
USOEC
DEPARTMENT PASS DOD
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 05/10/12 (STOESSEL, WALTER) OR-M
TAGS: MPOL, PARM, AR, DA, UK, XF
SUBJECT: STOESSEL-OLESEN BILATERAL IN PARIS, MAY 10,
-- 1982

1. (CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: IN MAY 10 MEETING AT THE MARGINS OF THE
OECD MINISTERIAL IN PARIS, DEPUTY SECRETARY STOESSEL AND
DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER OLESEN REVIEWED OUTSTANDING
ISSUES. THE DANISH WELCOMED RECENT U.S. INITIATIVE ON
NUCLEAR ARMS QUESTIONS AND TOOK "MODEST" CREDIT FOR
RAISING THEIR DEFENSE BUDGET SLIGHTLY. STOESSEL STRESSED
THAT DANISH PM JORGENSEN'S RECENT CRITICISMS OF THE U.S.
IN THE PRESS WERE UNHELPFUL. OLESEN ACKNOWLEDGED THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DIFFICULTY BUT STRESSED THE TRADITION OF "NOT SO DIPLO-
MATIC PUBLIC DEBATE" IN DENMARK AND VERY STRONG U.S. -
DANISH FRIENDSHIP. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OLESEN SAW AN
EC TENDENCY TOWARDS RECOGNIZING THE PLO AND HAS ADVISED
THE ISRAELIS TO TAKE THE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE. REGARD-
ING THE FALKLANDS, OLESEN REPORTED HIS "GUESS" THAT THE
EC WOULD NOT RENEW SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA WHEN THEY
EXPIRE MAY 17. END SUMMARY.

3. DANISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS. OLESEN
PRAISED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MAY 9TH SPEECH FOR TAKING THE
OFFENSIVE. OLESEN SAID THAT THE DANISH WERE "REALISTIC
BUT POSITIVE" ON ARMS NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSIDERED THAT
THE U.S. REACTION TO THE ISSUES HAD BEEN GOOD. IN
RESPONSE TO OLESEN'S ASSUMPTION THAT INF AND "START" NEG-
TIATIONS WOULD BE COMBINED, STOESSEL SAID THAT INF NEG-

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BY AN NARA DATE 4/29/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 111333Z MAY 82 PSN: 023422

TIATIONS WOULD BE SEPARATE FROM, BUT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF, "START": WHETHER OR NOT A COMBINATION OF INF WITH "START" WOULD OCCUR AT SOME FUTURE DATE REMAINS TO BE SEEN. OLESEN NOTED THAT THE ONGOING NUCLEAR DEBATE IN DENMARK REFLECTED A BROADLY-BASED, SPONTANEOUS MOVEMENT, ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN SOME COMMUNIST INFILTRATION. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THE DEBATE, FORMERLY CONCENTRATED ON WESTERN ARMS, NOW INCLUDED ARMS IN BOTH EAST AND WEST. HE ALSO NOTED THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT A BUILDUP IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WOULD BE NEEDED IF THERE WERE LESS RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR ARMS (I.E., A NON-FIRST-USE AGREEMENT).

4. DEFENSE BUDGET. OLESEN SAID THAT THE DANISH GOVERNMENT TOOK "MODEST" CREDIT FOR RAISING THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND OBSERVED THAT ITS ACCOUNTING IN THESE MATTERS WAS ACCURATE AND HONEST, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT 20 PERCENT INFLATION LAST YEAR. HE SAID THAT THE DANISH PARLIAMENT HAD AGREED ON DEFENSE EXPENDITURES FOR THE NEXT THREE YEARS AND THIS PLAN, WHICH HAD A BROAD BASIS OF SUPPORT IN PARLIAMENT, WOULD BE CONTINUED BY ANY FUTURE GOVERNMENT.

5. PRIME MINISTER JORGENSEN'S COMMENTS. STOESSEL RAISED THE ISSUE OF RECENT PUBLIC COMMENTS BY PRIME MINISTER JORGENSEN, INCLUDING PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE COMPARISON BETWEEN U. S. ACTIVITIES IN EL SALVADOR AND SOVIET ACTIONS IN POLAND. OLESEN REPLIED THAT THE DANISH TRADITION WAS ONE OF VERY OPEN AND "NOT SO DIPLOMATIC" DEBATE. IN HIS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

VIEW, THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS HAVE NOT DAMAGED FUNDAMENTALLY GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U. S. AND DENMARK. AFTER STOESSEL REITERATED THAT COMMENTS IN THE MEDIA LIKE THE PRIME MINISTER'S ARE TROUBLING, OLESEN SAID THAT HE "SAW THE POINT." HE WENT ON TO NOTE HOWEVER, IN GENERAL, MORE CONSULTATION AND LESS TRANSMISSION ONLY OF INFORMATION ABOUT U. S. INTENTIONS WOULD BE HELPFUL. OLESEN CONCLUDED THAT VERY STRONG DANISH FRIENDSHIP FOR THE UNITED STATES WAS BASED ON WIDE POPULAR UNDERSTANDING RESULTING FROM PUBLIC DEBATE AIRING THE ISSUES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

6. MIDDLE EAST. OLESEN SAID THAT AT THE INFORMAL WEEKEND MEETING IN BELGIUM ON MAY 8-9, EC FOREIGN MINISTERS AGREED THAT BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TINDEMANS WILL VISIT THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SHORTLY AND WILL REPORT BACK ON THE SITUATION TO EC FOREIGN MINISTERS IN JUNE. OLESEN NOTED THAT THERE WERE NO CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EC DISCUSSION, BUT HE FELT THERE IS A "TENDENCY" TOWARDS RECOGNIZING THE PLO. GREECE HAS ALREADY RECOGNIZED IT, AND

PARIS 6618

DTG: 111333Z MAY 82 PSN: 023422

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECALLED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01
SIT912

PARIS 6618
RECALLED

DTG: 111333Z MAY 82 PSN: 023424
TOR: 131/1457Z

DISTRIBUTION: RCAL /001

OP IMMED
STU0087
DE RUFHFR #6618/02 1311336
O 111333Z MAY 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5552

INFQ AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 1773
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2056
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 4653
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 6394
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 8457
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 5215

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 16618

EXDIS
FRANCE IS "ON THE WAY." OLESEN BELIEVES THAT THIS TREND WILL PUT ISRAEL IN A "BAD POSITION" AND HAS ADVISED THEM TO UNDERTAKE A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE TO BRING THE PLO TO THE TABLE, WHICH, IF THEY WERE TO ACCEPT, WOULD MEAN THAT THEY HAD IN REALITY RECOGNIZED ISRAEL. OLESEN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH BEGIN WERE WITHOUT SUCCESS ON THIS POINT, AND HE HAS TRIED TO PRESS GOOD FRIENDS IN THE LABOR PARTY TO ADVOCATE THIS POSITION. STOESEL BRIEFED OLESEN ON HIS RECENT DISCUSSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND EXPLAINED THAT OUR NEXT TASK WAS TO GET AUTONOMY TALKS GOING AIMED AT ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. REGARDING LEBANON, OLESEN SAID THAT THE FRENCH ARE READY TO SEND A BATTALION TO UNIFIL BUT THAT THEY DO NOT WISH TO DO SO UNTIL AN ISRAELI TANK 300 YARDS AWAY FROM THE NIGERIAN COMMAND POST IS MOVED. (SEE SEPTTEL FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS POINT IN STOESEL'S TALKS AT QUAI D'ORSAY.)

EXDIS
7. EC POSITION ON FALKLANDS. OLESEN SAID THAT THE IRISH DO NOT WANT TO PROLONG EC SANCTIONS AND THAT THE DANISH AND DUTCH HAD JOINED SANCTIONS HOPING TO AVOID A MILITARY CONFRONTATION. ACCORDINGLY, THE TIME AT PRESENT WAS NOT RIPE FOR A DECISION TO PROLONG SANCTIONS AND OLESEN'S "GUESS" IS THAT THERE WILL BE NO PROLONGATION ON MAY 17. HE OBSERVED THAT ARMED CONFLICT OVER THE FALKLANDS WAS WORRISOME AND NOTED THAT THE BRITISH EXTENSION OF ZONE OF INTERDICTION TO TWELVE MILES OFF THE ARGENTINIAN SHORE WAS NOT HELPFUL AT A TIME WHEN THE UN WAS TRYING TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. ACCORDING TO OLESEN, UK TOUGHNESS ON THE BUDGET ON AGRICULTURAL PRICES HAS UPSET THE OTHER COUNTRIES, AND HE FORESAW THE POSSIBILITY OF A DECISION BY NINE OF THE TEN COUNTRIES ON AGRICULTURAL PRICES WHICH WOULD BE AN HISTORIC PRECEDENT WITH POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. COMMENT: THE CONTEXT OF OLESEN'S REMARKS IMPLIED THAT THERE COULD WELL BE A LINK BETWEEN THE WILLINGNESS OF SOME COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT SANCTIONS AGAINST ARGENTINA AND UK STUBBORNNESS ON AGRICULTURAL PRICES.
KATZ
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47350

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PAGE 01
SIT432

PARIS 7041
DATE 05/18/82

DTG: 131459Z MAY 82 PSN: 027687
TOR: 134/0120Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUFHFR #7041 1331459
R 131459Z MAY 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5799

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PARIS 17041
PASS NSC WILLIAM CLARK FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH
E. O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (CLARK, WILLIAM)

SUBJ: VERSAILLES SUMMIT

DEAR BILL: YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE WHITE HOUSE HAVE
PREEMPTED THE MOST IDEAL ROOMS IN OUR RESIDENCE FOR
THE PERIOD WHEN THE PRESIDENT WILL BE HERE PRIOR TO THE
SUMMIT, I.E., JUNE 2 TO 4, BUT WE HAVE A MIDDLE
SIZED TWIN BED GUEST ROOM WITH BATH UP IN OUR AREA
WHICH I HAVE SAVED FOR YOU IN THE EVENT THAT IT WOULD
BE USEFUL. IT IS ONE FLOOR ABOVE THE PRESIDENT,
SEPARATED FROM MY NOISY CHILDREN. PLEASE LET ME
KNOW IF THIS IS USEFUL. LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU.
GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 7-081 47350
BY CA NARA DATE 4/22/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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47351

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 0789 DTG: 132340Z MAY 82 PSN: 027842
SIT767 DATE 05/19/82 TOR: 134/0324Z

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0789 1340025
O 132340Z MAY 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4188

INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 8182
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 130789 TOSEC 070035
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/13/02 (SCANLAN, J.D)
TAGS: EEWT, ESTC, COCOM, FR
SUBJECT: COMPUTERS FOR FRANCE

REFS: (A) PARIS 16297, (B) STATE 127633, (C) PARIS 16010;
(D) PARIS 16910

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR SHOULD INFORM MINDEF HERNU THAT PURSUANT
TO DISCUSSIONS DURING THE MARCH VISIT OF PRESIDENT
MITTERRAND TO WASHINGTON, AND SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGES BETWEEN
OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, THE USG IS APPROVING TRANSFER OF THE
REQUESTED CRAY COMPUTER AND TWO CYBER 750 COMPUTERS AS
EXEMPTIONS TO THE FOWLER-DEBRE AGREEMENTS OF 1966. STOESSEL

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-081 #47351

BY CA NARA DATE 4/29/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47352

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 7110
SIT434 DATE 05/18/82

DTG: 131850Z MAY 82 PSN: 027173
TOR: 133/1858Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: FYI

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFA #7110 1331852
O 131850Z MAY 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5838
BT

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NLRR MD7-081 #47352

BY CL NARA DATE 4/29/10

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 17110

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND JUDGE CLARK, NSC FROM BOB HORMATS
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 05/12/12 (HORMATS, ROBERT) OR-M
TAGS: ECON, OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD), FR
SUBJECT: PRE-SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND
PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI

1. ~~(SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. AT OUR SUMMIT PREPARATORY MEETING, I MENTIONED TO YOU AND MIKE DEEVER THE DESIRE OF THE JAPANESE FOR A PRE-SUMMIT MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IN PARIS OR AT VERSAILLES. I ALSO INDICATED THAT, IN LIGHT OF MIXED REPORTS ON THE QUALITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPANESE TRADE PACKAGE, I DID NOT THINK AT THE TIME THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO SAY YES TO THE JAPANESE UNTIL WE HAD A BETTER INDICATION OF WHERE THEY WERE COMING OUT ON TRADE.

3. IN LIGHT OF YESTERDAY'S DISCUSSION BILL BROCK, LIONEL OLMER, DAVE MACDONALD AND I HAD WITH JAPANESE MINISTER ABE, AND THE PROBABILITY THAT WE WILL NEED JAPANESE SUPPORT ON ISSUES OF MAJOR INTEREST TO THE PRESIDENT AT VERSAILLES, I NOW BELIEVE IT IS DESIRABLE TO TENTATIVELY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BLOCK OUT A TIME FOR PRIME MINISTER SUZUKI TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT.

4. BILL BROCK'S ANALYSIS OF THE PRELIMINARY SKETCH GIVEN US OF THE JAPANESE TRADE PACKAGE (WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE ANNOUNCED ON MAY 27 OR 28) IS THAT IT HAS A NUMBER OF ENCOURAGING ELEMENTS, ALTHOUGH THE DETAILS WILL NOT BE FINALIZED FOR A WEEK OR TWO. THUS WHILE WE NEED NOT GIVE THE JAPANESE A FINAL ANSWER NOW, THE PROBABILITY OF A GOOD PACKAGE MAKES IT DESIRABLE THAT WE PROCEED ON THE BASIS THAT A MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SUZUKI SHOULD TAKE PLACE BOTH TO ENABLE THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CREDIT FOR HAVING ENCOURAGED THE JAPANESE TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTIONS AND TO PIN DOWN THEIR SUPPORT FOR US ON IMPORTANT ISSUES. BILL BROCK CONCURS IN THIS.

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5. I WOULD APPRECIATE A TENTATIVE TIME BEFORE I MEET WITH
MATSUNAGA (JAPANESE SHERPA) ON SATURDAY.

6. THANKS.
KATZ

PARIS 7110

DTG: 131850Z MAY 82 PSN: 027173

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47353

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 7120
SIT692 DATE 05/19/82

DTG: 131910Z MAY 82 PSN: 027533
TOR: 133/2336Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #7120/01 1331913
O 131910Z MAY 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5848

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 17120
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CROCKER
E.O 12065: RDS-1 /13/02 (CROCKER, CHESTER A) OR-P
AGS: PEPR, SF, WA
SUBJECT: THE MAY 12-13 CONTACT GROUP MEETINGS IN PARIS
REF: PARIS 16807

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. IN THE PARIS CONTACT GROUP MEETING, OUR ALLIES REACTED WITH LESS APPREHENSION AND MORE ENERGY THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED TO SOUTH AFRICA'S VENTURESOME PROPOSAL THAT WE MOVE FORWARD AT A RAPIDLY ACCELERATED PACE ON NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE PREDICTABLY UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT THE INCREASINGLY EXPLICIT ANGOLA/CUBAN WITHDRAWAL SIDE OF THE AGENDA, THEY SEE NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE UP THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHALLENGE. IF THE SAG IS WILLING TO PRIME THE PUMP WITH A DECISION ON THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO CONCLUDE PHASE I. IN HIS REGARD, THE GROUP MADE REMARKABLE PROGRESS IN AGREEING TO PROPOSALS ON PHASE II ISSUES FOR EARLY DISCUSSION WITH THE SAG IN THE U.S. APROPOS OF ALL OF THIS, CHEYSSON WANTS THE SITUATION DISCUSSED AT YOUR LEVEL IN LUXEMBOURG ON SUNDAY NIGHT. I BELIEVE THIS BE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE ADDITIONAL NSUS IN PARTICULAR ON THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ANGOLA TRACK. THE ATMOSPHERE IS FAVORABLE, AND WE MUST PUSH AHEAD QUICKLY. END SUMMARY.

3. I BEGAN THE MAY 12-13 CONTACT GROUP MEETING WITH A DETAILED ORAL DEBRIEF IN RESTRICTED SESSION ON THE RESULTS OF OUR SESSIONS IN GENEVA WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. I LAID OUT THE CHALLENGE THE SAG HAS PUT ON THE TABLE FOR US, EMPHASIZING THAT IN ESSENCE THE SAG, FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS, WANTS A CONSUMMATION OF THIS PROCESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ACCORDINGLY, THEY ARE PREPARED TO BE ACCOMMODATING ON PHASE II ISSUES ON NAMIBIA IF WE DELIVER FOR OUR PART, INCLUDING ON ANGOLA. MY CG COLLEAGUES IN THE FIRST INSTANCE CONCENTRATED THEIR INTEREST ON THE VARIOUS PROFFERED SAG CONCESSIONS ON NAMIBIA. WHILE CONCLUDING THAT THE SAG'S PROMISED POSITIONS COULD MAKE THE RIGOROUS

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DTG: 131910Z MAY 82 PSN: 027533

TIMETABLE ACHIEVABLE, E.G., SAG ANNOUNCEMENT ON JULY 15 OF AN AUGUST 15 IMPLEMENTATION DATE FOR UNSC RESOLUTION 435, THEY WERE INSISTENT THAT WE COULD NOT GO FORWARD IN THE ABSENCE OF A SAG DECISION ON EITHER PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION OR SINGLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO DECLARE PHASE I A VICTORY AND PUT IT BEHIND US. ACCORDINGLY, I CONTACTED THE SOUTH AFRICANS AT THE END OF THE DAY TO GIVE THEM THAT STATE OF PLAY. IN ORDER TO ENHANCE PROSPECTS FOR RAPID AND FAVORABLE SAG REPLY ON PHASE I, I'VE SIGNALLED TO THE SAG THAT OTHERWISE THE FIVE MAY FEEL OBLIGED TO REQUEST ONE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL.

4. ALSO, AT THE END OF THE FIRST DAY, THE AFRICA DIRECTORS MET WITH CHEYSSON, WHO WAS SURPRISED AND DELIGHTED BY THE APPARENT CHANGE OF POSITION BY THE SOUTH AFRICANS AT GENEVA. WHILE THE OTHER DIRECTORS URGED CAUTION AND RECALLED PAST DISAPPOINTMENT, CHEYSSON SAID THE RESULTS FROM GENEVA GIVE US NEW HOPE. AS HE SAID TO YOU EARLIER TODAY ON THE TELEPHONE, CHEYSSON IS ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION AT THE LUXEMBOURG MINISTERIAL, WHILE NOTING THAT MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON A SAG RESPONSE ON THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM. CHEYSSON, TO THE DISMAY OF MY GERMAN COLLEAGUES, WAS UPBEAT ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, REMARKING, "I BELIEVE IT CAN BE ACHIEVED. I REALLY DO." AFTER THE MEETING, MY FRENCH COLLEAGUES UNDERLINED CHEYSSON'S POSITIVE TONE BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THE QUAI

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WOULD HAVE TO PLAY IT IN A GINGERLY MANNER, AS THERE ARE THOSE IN MITTERRAND'S SOCIALIST PARTY WHO THINK THAT CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA ARE A GOOD IDEA.

5. REACTING TO THE SITUATION, THE CG MEETINGS HAVE MADE REMARKABLY RAPID PROGRESS ON THE PROPOSALS WE WOULD USE IN PHASE II DISCUSSIONS ON THE SIZE, COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNTAG AND UN IMPARTIALITY. IN PARTICULAR, WE HAVE FRAMED PROPOSALS ON BOTH ISSUES WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO MEET SAG CONCERNS--AS REFORMULATED AT GENEVA-- WITHOUT RAISING TOO MANY COMPLICATIONS WITH EITHER THE AFRICANS OR THE UN. ASSUMING CAPITALS AGREE WITH THE SUBSTANCE AND MINISTERS DECIDE AT LUXEMBOURG TO GO AHEAD FOLLOWING A POSITIVE SAG RESPONSE ON PHASE I, WE WOULD PLAN TO SOUND OUT RELIABLE INTERLOCUTORS IN THE UN SECRETARIAT, THE SOUTH AFRICANS (BILATERALLY) AND SELECTED AFRICANS (IN THAT ORDER). AFTER THOSE SOUNDINGS, WE WOULD GO AHEAD FORMALLY WITH OUR PHASE II PROPOSALS BEFORE MAY 31, AS THE SAG URGED.

6. ON ANGOLA, I HAVE MADE MY COLLEAGUES WELL AWARE OF

PARIS 7120

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 7120
SIT691 DATE 05/19/82

DTG: 131910Z MAY 82 PSN: 027535
TOR: 133/2337Z

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O 131910Z MAY 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5849

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 17120
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WHAT MUST HAPPEN AND THEY HAVE REACTED WITH VARYING DEGREES OF ENTHUSIASM. THE GERMANS, WELL AWARE OF GENSCHER'S STRONG VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE, REMAIN GLOOMILY CONVINCED THAT IT SIMPLY CANNOT BE PULLED OFF. THE BRITISH ARE SUPPORTIVE BUT KNOW THAT LONDON IS TOTALLY PREOCCUPIED BY THE FALKLANDS. I AM NOT SURE THAT THE CANADIANS UNDERSTAND WHAT IS HAPPENING, BUT WANT GENERALLY TO BE PART OF IT. THE FFENCH ARE THE MOST OPTIMISTIC, AND THEIR EXTREME DISCRETION ABOUT THE CUBAN ISSUE IS ACCOMPANIED BY THE GREATEST IMAGINATION, ENERGY AND--I BELIEVE--READINESS TO HELP IN CREATING THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR THE MPLA TO TAKE TOUGH DECISIONS. I SPECIFICALLY RAISED A NUMBER OF WAYS IN WHICH OUR ALLIES COULD HELP PUSH FORWARD THE ANGOLA TRACK: BY INDICATING THEY SHARE OUR OBJECTIVE, BY CONFIRMING THAT FACTUALLY THERE WILL BE NO NAMIBIA IF THERE IS NO ANGOLA, BY ADDING TO THE IMPRESSION OF POTENTIAL WESTERN ECONOMIC CARROTS, BY PUSHING FRIENDLY AFRICANS TO WEIGH IN WITH THE MPLA, AND BY THINKING CREATIVELY ABOUT BUILDING ON THE EANES VISIT A SECURITY DIMENSION THAT WOULD SIGNAL ALTERNATIVES TO THE CUBANS. THE ALLIES TOOK COPIOUS NOTES ON ALL THIS. I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD NUDGE THEIR THINKING FURTHER ALONG THESE LINES.

7. IN SUM, OUR ALLIES RECOGNIZE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROPOSAL IS ON THE WHOLE A POSITIVE, IF RISKY, STEP. THEY BELIEVE WE MUST CAREFULLY BUT FORTHRIGHTLY TAKE WHAT THE SAG HAS OFFERED, IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE WILLING NOW TO PRIME THE PUMP A BIT MORE AND CONCLUDE PHASE ONE. OUR COLLEAGUES WONDER WHETHER SOUTH AFRICAN INTIMATIONS AT GENEVA OF MODERATION ON SPECIFIC ISSUES WILL BE FULFILLED. THEY FEAR THAT THE SAG DATES ARE AN ULTIMATUM WHICH MEAN THAT IF EVERYTHING IS NOT CARRIED OUT ON SCHEDULE, THE WHOLE ENTERPRISE TURNS INTO A LARGE PUMPKIN WHICH WE COLLECTIVELY WILL BE LEFT HOLDING. (I HAVE RESPONDED THAT WHILE THE SAG IS DEADLY SERIOUS ABOUT THE DATES, WE WILL TELL THEM THAT THE DATES MUST BE CONSIDERED SERIOUS TARGETS NOT RIGID DEADLINES.) FINALLY OF COURSE THERE IS THE ANGOLA DIMENSION INCLUDING CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, SAVIMBI AND RECONCILIATION, THE ROLE OF THE SOVIETS, AND EVERYTHING THAT THIS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 131910Z MAY 82 PSN: 027535

ENTAILS.

8. BETWEEN NOW AND SUNDAY EVENING IN LUXEMBOURG, THERE WILL BE AMPLE TIME FOR SECOND THOUGHTS AND GROWING DOUBTS AMONG THE ALLIES. THUS, YOU WILL NEED TO REINFORCE TENTATIVE CONSENSUS WITHIN THE CG WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN PARIS AND STRESS THAT EVERYONE IS GOING TO HAVE TO PULL ON HIS OAR IF THIS ENTERPRISE IS TO SUCCEED. SIMILARLY, YOU WILL HAVE TO UNDERLINE FOR THE ALLIES THAT ANGOLA IS NO LONGER A SPECTATOR SPORT FOR THEM. ON THE PLUS SIDE FOR THE ALLIES, YOU SHOULD ASSURE THEM THAT WE INTEND TO HOLD THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO THEIR COMMITMENTS IF THIS WORKS OUT. AMONG THOSE COMMITMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE AN UNDERTAKING BY THE SAG THAT THEY TOO MUST HELP THE ANGOLA TRACK ALONG IN POSITIVE WAYS AT THE APPROPRIATE POINTS. THE ALLIES WILL CERTAINLY RAISE THIS ASPECT WITH YOU.

9. I PLAN TO BE IN LUXEMBOURG FOR THE SUNDAY MEETING AND WILL BE SENDING MORE MATERIAL FOR IT SHORTLY.
MARESCA

PARIS 7120

DTG: 131910Z MAY 82 PSN: 027535

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

47354

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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P. 1-20
P has *can*

CONFIDENTIAL

May 14, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*
SUBJECT: Mitterrand and the Campaign: Foreign
Policy Vagueness (C)

While it may be some time before we see any precise contours to a Mitterrand Presidency in France, a sampling of his campaign rhetoric could be useful as a clue to probable foreign policy positions. With that in mind, I have put together the attachment, which provides a quick rundown of relevant direct and indirect quotes from Mitterrand himself. (U)

If these quotes strike you as vague, there is good reason: Mitterrand's political career has been built on pragmatism (some would say opportunism), and he was particularly careful in his most recent campaign to avoid definitive stands on foreign issues. Indeed, French commentators early on labeled him "an artist of ambiguity" - a characterization which Giscard tried and failed to exploit by pointing to his rival as a front for a Communist takeover. (C)

Mitterrand's very evasiveness on foreign issues in a campaign directed primarily toward internal discontent may be in our favor; it suggests a leader who is coming to power unencumbered by firm promises which he must now redeem at our expense. (C)

CONFIDENTIAL
Review on May 11, 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLRR 107-081 #47354
BY *CU* NARA DATE 4/29/10

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A

Mitterrand and the Presidential campaign:
Foreign Policy Statements

-- On his approach to the Presidency: "If you are dreaming of a Socialist who would not practice socialism, then count me out."

-- On the possibility of a center-right legislature: "If the French find pleasure in not being logical with themselves, then I will govern accordingly."

-- On the Soviet military buildup: "Moscow seeks to neutralize Europe with its SS-20s, a move France will adamantly resist;" but "The Brezhnev proposal is worth studying as a possible initial negotiating position" and "The U.S. and its allies should consider abandoning the plan to install Pershing missiles in Europe."

-- On East-West relations: "France will be firmly anchored in Western Europe and will build bridges to the other Europe."

-- On Europe: "France under Socialism will defend its interests inside the Community, notably in the agricultural sector."

-- On the Middle East: "I support Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized frontiers" and "I support the Palestinian people's right to a homeland; the Camp David accords offer a possible avenue to a settlement which should not be discarded."

-- On the Third World: "A Socialist-led France will be responsive to human rights and revolutionary struggles" and "U.S. interference in El Salvador is intolerable."

-- On the Atlantic Alliance: "Soviet threats against Poland make the Alliance increasingly necessary for a free Europe" and "As French President I would place our nuclear deterrent at the West's disposal in case of war;" but "There is a need to redefine French interests vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance and vice versa."

-- On relations with the U.S.: "It's only by saying no to your friends that you merit their friendship and esteem" (He coupled this on a number of occasions with the assertion that "France will play an independent role vis-à-vis the superpowers and resist both U.S. and Soviet imperialism.")

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PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 3514
SIT402 DATE 05/18/82

DTG: 151637Z MAY 82 PSN: 030254
TOR: 135/2008Z

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHC #3514 1351642
O C 151637Z MAY 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 4407

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 7851
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8727
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0673
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 133514
EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 5/15/82 (VELIOTES, NICHOLAS)
TAGS: PBOR, MILI, LE, IS, FR
SUBJECT: LETTER TO CHEYSSON

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SECRETARY HAS APPROVED FOLLOWING LETTER FROM HIM TO
CHEYSSON. PLEASE DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR CLAUDE:

IN RESPONSE TO YOUR LETTER OF MAY 8, I INSTRUCTED OUR
EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV TO TAKE UP ONCE AGAIN THE ISSUE OF
HADDAD'S ENCROACHMENTS. OUR DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION MADE
A VERY STRONG DEMARCHE TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ON THE SUBJECT. THEY PROMISED TO GIVE US A FORMAL RESPONSE
TO OUR PRESENTATION. LATER OUR AMBASSADOR, SAMUEL LEWIS,
WHO HAD BEEN IN HAIFA AND WAS UNABLE TO MAKE THE DEMARCHE
HIMSELF, UNDERScoreD OUR POSITION WITH THE ISRAELIS.

IN ALL CANDOR, CLAUDE, I MUST INFORM YOU THAT AS ON
PREVIOUS OCCASIONS OUR DIPLOMATS WERE LEFT WITH THE IM-
PRESSION THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT INCLINED TO EXERT

PRESSURE ON HADDAD TO PULL BACK FROM ENCROACHMENTS IN
UNIFIL'S ZONE. SUCH A RESPONSE WAS NOT UNEXPECTED,
BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS MATTER VIGOROUSLY
WITH SENIOR ISRAELI OFFICIALS.

AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, EVENTS OF THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS
HAVE RAISED TENSIONS ALONG THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE BORDER

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BY CW NARA DATE 4/29/10

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DTG: 151637Z MAY 82 PSN: 030254

AND ERODED OBSERVANCE OF THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WHICH AMBASSADOR HABIB SO PAINSTAKINGLY NEGOTIATED LAST JULY AND NURTURED EVER SINCE. IN VIEW OF THIS SITUATION WE BELIEVE IT MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER THAT UNIFIL BE STRENGTHENED. FRANCE IS THE IDEAL COUNTRY TO DO THIS GIVEN ITS TRADITIONALLY CLOSE TIES WITH THE ARABS OF THE AREA, THE CURRENT STATE OF FRANCO-ISRAELI RELATIONS FOLLOWING PRESIDENT MITTERAND'S VISIT, AND THE RESPECT ACCORDED THE FRENCH ARMY WHOSE PROFESSIONALISM AND PERFORMANCE ARE SO JUSTLY ADMIRERD AND RESPECTED.

AS A SOLDIER, I FULLY APPRECIATE YOUR CONCERN ABOUT PLACING FRENCH TROOPS IN A POSITION SUCH AS THIS. AT THE SAME TIME WE HAVE ALL BEEN FORCED TO RECOGNIZE AND LIVE WITH CONSIDERABLE AMBIGUITY AND LESS THAN IDEAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS AREA AND OTHERS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

I WAS HEARTENED BY WALT STOESSEL'S REPORT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH YOU ON THIS SUBJECT. IT IS MY HOPE, CLAUDE, THAT FRANCE WILL NOT ALLOW THE ISSUE OF THESE ENCROACHMENTS TO INTERFERE WITH THE TIMELY DEPLOYMENT OF FRENCH TROOPS WITH UNIFIL. YOU HAVE MY ASSURANCE THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS MATTER WITH THE ISRAELIS SHOULD THEIR FORMAL RESPONSE TO OUR DEMARCH PROVE UNSATISFACTORY.

WITH BEST REGARDS,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SINCERELY,

ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
END TEXT. STOESSEL

SECSTATE WASHDC 3514

DTG: 151637Z MAY 82 PSN: 030254

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47356

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 7345
SIT390 DATE 05/18/82

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DE RUFHFR #7345 1352039
O 152036Z MAY 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG NIACT IMMEDIATE 6955
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5971
BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 17345
NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM U/S BUCKLEY
E. O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 5/15/02 (BUCKLEY, JAMES L.)
TAGS: EEWT, EFIN, UR, PEPR
SUBJECT: MAY 14 MEETING ON CREDIT RESTRAINTS
1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED BY NOW THE REPORT ON PARIS
MEETING ON CREDIT RESTRAINTS AS WELL AS ALAN HOLMES'
VERBAL SUMMARY.
3. THE STARK FACTS ARE THAT DESPITE FINANCE MINISTER
DELORS EARLIER ASSURANCES OF COOPERATION TO SECRETARY
REGAN, PRIME MINISTER MAUROY INSTRUCTED PAYE THURSDAY
NIGHT TO TELL US THAT GOF WOULD NOT JOIN IN ANY REGIMEN
SPECIFICALLY AIMED AT SOVIETS AND WOULD WORK TO REDUCE
OFFICIAL INTEREST SUBSIDIES ONLY THROUGH OECD CONSENSUS
MECHANISM.
4. PAYE RELAYED THESE INSTRUCTIONS AT FRIDAY MEETING.
HE ALSO STATED THAT FRANCE WAS IN ANY EVENT PRECLUDED
BY A PROTOCOL WITH SOVIETS, WHICH EXPIRES IN 1985, FROM
JOINING IN ANY AGREEMENT TO REDUCE PERCENTAGE OF ANY
TRANSACTION THAT COULD BE COVERED BY OFFICIAL CREDITS OR
CREDIT GUARANTEES (STEEG INITIATIVE). HE ALSO SAID
FRANCE REJECTED THE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO PLACE A

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

QUANTITATIVE LIMIT ON OFFICIAL CREDIT SUPPORTS EVEN
THOUGH THIS APPROACH IS PERMITTED UNDER PROTOCOL. ALL
OTHER PARTICIPANTS INDICATED INTEREST IN SOME VARIATION
OR OTHER OF STEEG INITIATIVE.
5. UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW ANY
MEANINGFUL RESTRAINTS ON OFFICIAL CREDITS CAN BE ACHIEVED
UNLESS FRENCH REVERSE THEIR POSITION OR FIND A WAY AROUND
THE PROTOCOL. THEREFORE, I SUGGEST YOU ADVISE CHEYSSON
OF OUR DISAPPOINTMENT IN STRONGEST TERMS ESPECIALLY IN
LIGHT DELORS EARLIER ASSURANCES AND FAILURE OF FRENCH
SIDE TO ADVISE OF PROTOCOL IMPEDIMENT DURING THE THREE
WEEKS WHEN STEEG INITIATIVE WAS UNDER ACTIVE DISCUSSION.
HE SHOULD ALSO BE ADVISED THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY
OF RESOLVING CREDITS ISSUE PRIOR TO SUMMIT UNLESS FRENCH
MAKE NECESSARY CHANGES IN POSITION AND ADVISE US OF THAT
FACT WITHIN NEXT WEEK.

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NLRR 1007-081 #47356

BY CN NARA DATE 4/29/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 152036Z MAY 82 PSN: 030967

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PARIS 7345

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