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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 12/20/2007

File Folder FRANCE (6/3/82-7/6/82)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 13

NOUZILLE

47

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47373	CABLE	031417Z JUN 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	6/3/1982	B1
47374	CABLE	151447Z JUN 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	6/15/1982	B1
47375	CABLE	171536Z JUN 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	6/17/1982	B1
47376	CABLE	181415Z JUN 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	6/18/1982	B1
47377	CABLE	241706Z JUN 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	6/24/1982	B1
47378	MEMO	RENTSCHLER TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH JEAN-LOUIS GERGORIN R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	6/24/1982	B1
47379	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE MCFARLANE'S MEETING WITH GERGORIN R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	6/24/1982	B1
47393	BIO	BIO	1	2/18/1981	B1
47380	CABLE	241706Z JUN 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	6/24/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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SMF 12/20/2007

File Folder FRANCE (6/3/82-7/6/82)

FOIA

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Box Number 13

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47

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47381	CABLE	250133Z JUN 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	6/25/1982	B1
47382	CABLE	250356Z JUN 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	6/25/1982	B1
47383	CABLE	251614Z JUN 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	6/25/1982	B1
47384	CABLE	291722Z JUN 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	6/29/1982	B1
47385	CABLE	291753Z JUN 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	6/29/1982	B1
47386	CABLE	021531Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	7/2/1982	B1
47387	CABLE	021653Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/2/1982	B1
47388	CABLE	021535Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/2/1982	B1
47389	CABLE	040157Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/4/1982	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47390	CABLE	061314Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/6/1982	B1
47391	CABLE	060115Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/6/1982	B1
47392	CABLE	061914Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/6/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47373

PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY IN 9424 DTG: 031417Z JUN 82 PSN: 056493
SIT685 DATE 06/03/82 TOR: 154/1425Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RDTG FONT RENT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: : FYI/RED TAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

FLASH
DE RUFHFR #9424 1541418
Z 031417Z JUN 82 ZFF-6 ZFF-4
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6820
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK FLASH
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTO 8005
SECTO

E.O. 12065: GDS - 6/3/88 (MCMANAWAY, CLAYTON E.)
TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)
SUBJECT: SPANISH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON FALKLANDS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE SECRETARY HAS CONSIDERED THE SPANISH SC RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A STRAIGHT CEASE FIRE. HIS INSTRUCTIONS ARE TO WORK WITH THE BRITISH TO AVOID ITS COMING TO A VOTE. SHOULD THIS ATTEMPT FAIL THE US SHOULD JOIN THE UK IN VETOING THE RESOLUTION. HAIG

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM07-081 #47373

BY CU NARA DATE 4/23/10

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47374

2

PAGE 01 PARIS 0686 DTG: 151447Z JUN 82 PSN: 019773
SIT657 DATE 06/17/82 TOR: 160/1640Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS KEMP NORT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUHFR #0686/01 1661451
O 151447Z JUN 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7788

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2389
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 4689
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 6482
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 4323
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1087
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 1360
AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0560
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5279
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4294
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 20686
EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/15/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, FR, IS, LE
SUBJECT: FRENCH EMISSARY TO BEIRUT--SHAMIR IN PARIS

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. A FRENCH EMISSARY HAS GONE TO BEIRUT TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS TO LEARN WHAT HIS PLANS ARE FOR THE NATIONAL SALVATION COUNCIL, FOR A LONGER-TERM SOLUTION, AND TO REAFFIRM FRANCE'S ATTACHMENT TO THE LEGALITY OF A LEBANESE STATE. ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR IS IN PARIS TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND AND FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON. FRANCE APPARENTLY WISHES TO ENSURE THAT IT WILL HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROBLEM OF LEBANON. THE GOF IS PROBABLY NOT DISTURBED BY THE EFFECT ISRAELI ACTION HAS HAD ON SYRIA'S ROLE IN LEBANON AND ON THE PALESTINIAN HOLD ON THE COUNTRY.
END SUMMARY.

3. FRANCIS GUTMANN, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE FRENCH MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS, HAS GONE TO BEIRUT JUNE 15 AS A SPECIAL EMISSARY TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT SARKIS. ACCORDING TO SOURCES AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY, THE AIM OF THE ONE-DAY VISIT BY GUTMANN IS TO LEARN FIRST-HAND WHAT SARKIS' PLANS ARE FOR HIS COUNCIL OF NATIONAL SALVATION AND FOR THE LONGER-TERM UNITY OF LEBANON. HE IS ALSO TO REAFFIRM FRANCE'S ATTACHMENT TO THE LEGALITY OF LEBANON AS A NATIONAL ENTITY.

4. THE DECISION TO SEND GUTMANN WAS APPARENTLY MADE LATE

JUNE 14 AFTER A SERIES OF MEETINGS ON THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. ACCORDING TO AN ISRAELI SOURCE, THE DECISION MADE AT THE ELYSEE REGARDING THE TRIP, AS WELL AS HAVING PRESIDENT MITTERRAND RECEIVE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, REPRESENTS A REVERSAL OF THE FRENCH APPROACH TO THE SITUATION. ACCORDING TO THIS THESIS, THE FRENCH REALIZED THAT FOLLOWING THE ARAB LINE TOO CLOSELY, REFUSING TO HAVE MITTERRAND SEE SHAMIR (AS WAS INITIALLY REPORTED IN PARIS), AND LEAVING THE FIELD IN LEBANON TOTALLY TO AMBASSADOR HABIB, WOULD PUT THE FRENCH TOO FAR OUT OF THE PICTURE AT A TIME WHEN FRANCE WOULD LIKE TO "MAKE A COMBACK IN THE MIDDLE EAST." WHILE WE DO NOT HOLD COMPLETELY WITH THE ISRAELI THEORY, WE BELIEVE THERE IS SOME TRUTH TO IT, PARTICULARLY THE PART ABOUT NOT WISHING TO LEAVE THE MEDIATING ROLE TOTALLY IN PHIL HABIB'S HANDS.

5. A RELIABLE SOURCE WHO SAW GUTMANN EARLY JUNE 14 BEFORE THE BEIRUT TRIP WAS LAID ON, FOUND GUTMANN VERY MUCH ON TOP OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. GUTMANN SAID THAT HE WAS APPALLED BY THE INDISCRIMINATE ISRAELI BOMBING AND DESTRUCTION IN LEBANON. GUTMANN ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING WHAT THE IMPACT OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN LEBANON CAN BE ON THE LONGER-TERM PROSPECTS OF GETTING THE MOSLEMS AND CHRISTIANS IN LEBANON BACK TOGETHER.

6. GUTMANN SAW "POSITIVE ASPECTS" IN BLOODING THE SYRIAN NOSE, BREAKING THE BACK OF THE PLO, AND PERHAPS PUSHING THE SYRIANS OUT OF LEBANON. AT THE WORKING LEVELS AT THE

PARIS 0686 DTG: 151447Z JUN 82 PSN: 019773
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

QUAI, WE HAVE RECEIVED SIMILAR REACTIONS ABOUT THE VALUE OF GETTING THE SYRIANS OUT OF LEBANON, THOUGH WITH SOME CONCERN BEING EXPRESSED REGARDING THE PRECIPITOUS NATURE OF EVENTS. AN ARAB DIPLOMAT HAS TOLD US THAT THERE IS A CONSENSUS AMONG AT LEAST SOME OF THE ARAB EMBASSIES IN PARIS THAT THE FRENCH ARE NOT REALLY DISPLEASED WITH WHAT IS HAPPENING IN LEBANON. THE FRENCH REALLY WANT TO SEE THE HAND OF THE CHRISTIAN LEBANESE STRENGTHENED, ACCORDING TO THIS THESIS, AND THE ISRAELIS ARE MAKING THAT HAPPEN.

7. QUAI SOURCES TELL US THAT THE GOF WILL BE PUTTING IN ADDITIONAL RELIEF AID TO LEBANON. AN AIRLIFT IS TO MASS-RELIEF SUPPLIES IN CYPRUS. ON JUNE 17 A FRENCH TROOP TRANSPORT IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WILL MOVE THE SUPPLIES TO A LEBANESE POINT. THIS SAME TRANSPORT MAY ALSO BE USED TO EVACUATE ANY FRENCH CITIZENS WHO WERE NOT BROUGHT OUT YESTERDAY ON PASSENGER SHIP WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO LEBANON FOR THAT PURPOSE.

8. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY MUCH ABOUT FOREIGN MINISTER

PARIS 0686

DTG: 151447Z JUN 82 PSN: 019773

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NLRR 107-081 #47374

BY CA NARA DATE 1/73/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 0686 DTG: 151447Z JUN 82 PSN: 019774
SIT858 DATE 06/17/82 TOR: 166/1841Z

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11. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. DEPARTMENT PASS
DAMASCUS IF DESIRED. GALBRAITH

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS NORT KEMP
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

PARIS 0686

DTG: 151447Z JUN 82 PSN: 019774

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUHFR #0686/02 1661453
O 151447Z JUN 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7789

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2390
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 4690
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 6483
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 4324
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1088
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 1361
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY 0561
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5280
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4295
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 20686

EXDIS

SHAMIR'S VISIT, THOUGH OUR SAME ISRAELI SOURCE NOTED A SENSE OF OPTIMISM AMONG THE ISRAELI DELEGATION THAT ACCOMPANIED SHAMIR TO PARIS. SHAMIR MET FOR AN HOUR AND ONE-HALF THIS MORNING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON (JUST BEFORE CHEYSSON AND ELYSEE SECRETARY-GENERAL PIERRE BEREGOVOY FLEW TO RIYADH TO PAY THEIR CONDOLENCES TO KING FAHD). INTERIOR MINISTER GASTON DEFFERRE IS SUBSTITUTING FOR CHEYSSON IN HOSTING A LUNCHEON AT THE QUAI FOR SHAMIR. MITTERRAND WILL RECEIVE SHAMIR AT 5:30 P.M. (LOCAL) JUNE 15 (TODAY). THIS WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A SHAMIR PRESS CONFERENCE AND A DINNER HOSTED BY PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE ALAIN POHER.

9. NOTE: CHEYSSON MET YESTERDAY WITH THE PLO'S

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

"FOREIGN MINISTER" FAROUK KADDOUMI.

10. COMMENT: IT APPEARS TO US THAT FRANCE, GIVEN ITS HISTORIC TIES TO LEBANON, WANTS TO BE SURE OF HAVING A ROLE IN SHAPING THE COURSE OF EVENTS THAT FOLLOW FROM THE ISRAELI INVASION. SOURCES AT THE WORKING LEVEL OF THE QUAI TELL US THAT THINKING HAS NOT ADVANCED BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS OF THE CEASEFIRE. AS ONE NEWSPAPER HAS POINTED OUT, THE "SOLEMN APPEAL" ISSUED LAST EVENING BY THE ELYSEE CALLED FOR A CEASEFIRE BUT DID NOT MENTION THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. THIS MAY WELL INDICATE THAT THE UPPER LEVELS OF THE GOF ARE THINKING ABOUT A LONGER-TERM SOLUTION. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT IT IS NOW EVEN MORE IMPORTANT FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB TO VISIT PARIS AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS CURRENT MISSION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47375

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PAGE 01 PARIS 1093 DTG: 171536Z JUN 82 PSN: 023096
SIT668 DATE 06/28/82 TOR: 168/1717Z

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SIT:
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #1093 1681537
O 171536Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7983

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 21093

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/17/02 (M. E. C. ELY) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, AF, UR, US, FR
SUBJECT: BRIEFING ALLIES ON U. S. -SOVIET DIALOGUE ON
AFGHANISTAN
REF: STATE 166452

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BRIEFING ON US-SOVIET DIALOGUE ON AFGHANISTAN WAS GIVEN JUNE 17 TO PIERRE BROCHAND, THE NEW CHIEF FOR SOUTH ASIA AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY (HIS LAST POST WAS CONSUL-GENERAL IN SAN FRANCISCO).
3. BROCHAND PROBED FOR A LINK BETWEEN THESE UP-COMING CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE CURRENT INDIRECT TALKS IN GENEVA. EMBOFF EMPHASIZED THERE WAS NO CONNECTION, EXCEPT INSOFAR AS WE SAW IT DESIRABLE THAT THE GENEVA TALKS NOT BE THE ONLY VENUE WHERE THE SOVIETS COULD SIGNAL INTEREST IN A SETTLEMENT IF AND WHEN THEY ARE READY TO DO SO.
4. BROCHAND COMMENTED THAT HE SAW THE GENEVA TALKS AS A BACKWARD STEP SINCE THEY COME CLOSE TO PROVIDING WESTERN RECOGNITION OF THE KARMAL GOVERNMENT AND THE "REGIONAL" TALKS DESIRED BY THE SOVIETS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GALBRAITH

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NLRR M07-081 #47375
BY CN NARA DATE 4/23/11

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SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47376

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PAGE 01 PARIS 1232 DTG: 181415Z JUN 82 PSN: 024844
SIT859 DATE 06/24/82 TOR: 165/1705Z

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EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUFHFR #1232/01 1651418

O 181415Z JUN 82

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8041

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 21232

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 6/18/82 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.) OR-M

TAGS: EEW, ESTC, EFIN, FR

SUBJ: DISCUSSIONS AT QUAI D'ORSAY ON GAS PIPELINE ROTORS

REF: STATE 165219

1. (S/ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: THE FRENCH HAVE MADE NO DECISION ON THE ADDITIONAL ROTORS. THE EUROPEAN COMPRESSOR MANUFACTURERS ARE WAITING TO SEE IF G.E. WILL BY A CHANGE IN U.S. REGS BE ALLOWED TO SUPPLY THEM. IF NOT, ALSTHOM-ATLANTIQUE MUST DECIDE WHETHER TO PRODUCE THE ROTORS. SPOKESMEN IMPLIED THAT ADDITIONAL U.S. RESTRICTIONS COULD STIFFEN EUROPEAN WILL TO FIND ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS AND CREATE U.S./EUROPEAN FRICTION. END SUMMARY.

3. I CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTRY SECRETARY GENERAL GUTMANN ON JUNE 17 TO TAKE UP THE ROTOR ISSUE RAISED IN REFTL. GUTMANN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ECONOMICS DIRECTOR PAYE AND EMBASSY ECONOMIC MINISTER ELY WAS WITH ME. I WENT OVER THE SITUATION WITH GUTMANN QUITE CAREFULLY TO AVOID AS FAR AS POSSIBLE CONFUSION ON THE FACTS OF THE SITUATION, ENDING BY ASKING HIM DIRECTLY WHETHER FRANCE WILL PERMIT DELIVERY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF APPROXIMATELY 100 ADDITIONAL ROTORS MANUFACTURED BY ALSTHOM ATLANTIQUE. I POINTED OUT THAT THE G.E. LICENSE AGREEMENT HAS A CLAUSE PROHIBITING SHIPMENT TO COUNTRIES TO BE SPECIFIED, SAYING THIS CLAUSE COULD BE INVOKED TO PREVENT ALSTHOM ATLANTIQUE FROM SHIPPING THE ORIGINAL 40 ROTORS AS WELL AS THE ADDITIONAL 100 OR SO NOW CONTEMPLATED.

4. GUTMANN AND PAYE ACCEPTED MY FACTUAL PRESENTATION. GUTMANN THEN ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS GIVING FRANCE A HOBSON'S CHOICE OF VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT VERSUS A LEGAL PROHIBITION INVOKED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THRU GENERAL ELECTRIC.

5. PAYE WENT INTO LENGTHY DISCUSSION, SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

- THE THREE EUROPEAN COMPRESSOR MANUFACTURERS HAVE FOUND THEMSELVES DEPRIVED OF ACCESS TO G.E.-MANUFACTURED ROTORS AND THUS UNABLE TO FULFILL THEIR CONTRACT, AND POSSIBLY SUBJECT TO PENALTIES UNDER THEIR CONTRACTS WITH U.S.S.R. PAYE MENTIONED THAT THEY HAVE TALKED ABOUT TAKING G.E. TO COURT IN THIS RESPECT.

- ALSTHOM ATLANTIQUE ACKNOWLEDGES ITS LICENSE IS SUBJECT TO U.S. PROHIBITIONS BUT BELIEVES THERE IS SOME QUESTION AS TO APPLYING IT TO EXISTING CONTRACTS. PAYE ADDED THAT ALSTHOM ATLANTIQUE REMAINS VERY UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT UPSETTING ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH G.E.

- THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES HAVE TOLD ALSTHOM ATLANTIQUE TO HOLD UP NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE THREE EUROPEAN MANUFACTURERS PENDING THE POSSIBILITY G.E. WOULD BE PERMITTED TO SUPPLY THEM AFTER THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT.

- THE 40 ROTORS BEING PRODUCED BY ALSTHOM ATLANTIQUE UNDER THE EXISTING CONTRACT ARE TO BE USED AS SPARES AND IF THE OTHER 100 CANNOT BE BOUGHT IT IS UNLIKELY THE SOVIETS WILL NEED THE 40 FOR THIS PIPELINE.

6. I SAID THAT AS FAR AS I COULD SEE, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS CONSIDERING WHETHER IT WOULD INCREASE THE RESTRICTIONS RATHER THAN RELAX THEM. PAYE COMMENTED THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO A DOUBLE PROBLEM

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND RETROACTIVITY BUT WE AGREED NOT TO ARGUE THE LAW.

7. AT THIS POINT GUTMANN COMMENTED THAT, AS PRESIDENT MITTERRAND HAS BEEN SAYING, FRANCE WILL NOT ENGAGE IN ECONOMIC WARFARE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. HE IGNORED MY REJOINDER THAT DEPLOING ECONOMIC WARFARE IS AN APPROACH ONE USES WHEN ONE WANTS TO JUSTIFY SELLING SOMETHING.

8. PAYE THEN SAID THAT IF G.E. IS NOT TO SUPPLY THE ROTORS, GOF WILL HAVE A CHOICE BETWEEN TELLING ALSTHOM ATLANTIQUE TO GO AHEAD (AFTER HAVING OBTAINED FURTHER LEGAL CLARIFICATION) OR PURSUING "OTHER WAYS". GUTMANN ADDED THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS WOULD MERELY ENCOURAGE THE EUROPEANS TO FOLLOW THESE "OTHER WAYS", SUCH AS JOINT SOVIET/ITALIAN OR SOVIET/FRENCH PROJECTS TO DEVELOP SEPARATE TECHNOLOGY, OR A REVIVAL OF THE ALTERNATE EUROPEAN PROJECTS WHICH HAD BEEN ADVANCED EARLIER, BUT

PARIS 1232

DTG: 181415Z JUN 82 PSN: 024844

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BY CH NARA DATE 4/23/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

6

PAGE 01
SIT932

PARIS 1232
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DTG: 181415Z JUN 82 PSN: 024835
TOR: 169/1710Z

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STU2265
DE RUFHFR #1232/02 1691419
O 181415Z JUN 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8042

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 21232

EXDIS
REJECTED BY THE USSR IN FAVOR OF G. E.

9. GUTMANN AND PAYE REPEATED THAT BLOCKING OF THE 40 ROTORS ALREADY CONTRACTED WAS A FALSE PRESSURE POINT SINCE THE 40 WILL BE WORTH NOTHING UNLESS THE OTHER 100 CAN IN SOME WAY BE OBTAINED. IN OTHER WORDS THEY MADE NO EFFORT TO SALVAGE THE 40 BY DENYING THEMSELVES THE CONTRACT FOR THE ADDITIONAL 100. THEY SEEMED RESIGNED TO THE LOSS OF THE 40, AS BEING ONLY ANCILLARY TO THE PURCHASE OF THE 100. AS FAR AS THEY WERE CONCERNED THE QUESTION WILL BE HOW BEST TO PROCEED TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF COMPRESSORS, THE SUPPLYING OF 100 ROTORS BY ALSTHOM ATLANTIQUE BEING ONLY ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION, AND NOT NECESSARILY THE FAVORED ONE.

10. WE ALSO DISCUSSED AS A MATTER OF EQUITY WHETHER OR NOT THE EUROPEAN SUPPLY CONTRACTS PRE-DATE U. S. ACTION. THE FRENCH POINTED OUT THAT THEY WERE SIGNED BEFORE THE POLISH EVENTS WHILE I STRESSED THAT U. S. OPPOSITION TO THE PIPELINE WAS PERFECTLY CLEAR LONG BEFORE (VIA OTTAWA AND THE RASHISH MISSIONS) AND THAT THE COMPANIES HAD ACCEPTED THE RISK OF U. S. OPPOSITION WHEN THEY SIGNED WITH THE USSR.

11. TO CONCLUDE THE CONVERSATION I SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS: THE U. S. HAS ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH WILL PERMIT ALSTHOM-ATLANTIQUE TO REPLACE THE G. E. ROTORS. THE FRENCH HAVE REPLIED THAT THEY HAD BEEN WAITING TO SEE IF THE U. S. WILL CONTINUE TO BLOCK G. E. EXPORTS. I ADDED THAT I THOUGHT OUR DECISION IS WHETHER OR NOT TO GO FURTHER. GUTMANN FINISHED MY SENTENCE WITH A SMILE BY SAYING THAT THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THE U. S. IS PREPARED TO PUT ON THE BRAKES BUT WHETHER TO GO FURTHER IN THE DIRECTION OF TROUBLE WITH THE EUROPEANS.

12. COMMENT: GUTMANN AND PAYE WERE NONCOMBATIVE. THEY AVOIDED ACCUSATIONS OF BAD FAITH OR DIRECT ARGUMENTS THAT THE U. S. SHOULD RELEASE THE ROTORS AS A GESTURE OR IN RECOGNITION OF THE INEVITABILITY OF THE PROJECT GOING AHEAD. AT THE SAME TIME THEY GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THE GOF ACCEPTS THE U. S. VIEW THAT SUPPLYING ADDITIONAL ROTORS WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO SUBSTITUTE FOR U. S. SUPPLIERS. THEY SEEMED RESIGNED TO THE FACT THAT OUR NEXT ACT MAY CUT OFF THE FIRST 40 AS WELL AS THE ADDITIONAL 100.
GALBRAITH
BT

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47377

7

PAGE 01
SIT658

PARIS 2019
DATE 06/28/82

DTG: 241706Z JUN 82 PSN: 033376
TOR: 175/1908Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #2019 1751707
O 241706Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8469

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 22019
MODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH
E. O. 12065: RDS 1 6/24/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, ECON, FR
SUBJ: US - FRENCH RELATIONS: A WORSENING ATMOSPHERE

1. ~~IS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I AM CONCERNED OVER THE SUDDEN CONVERGENCE OF SEVERAL ISSUES THAT HAVE COMBINED DRAMATICALLY TO WORSEN OUR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE. THESE ISSUES INCLUDE MUTUAL DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT, THE WORSENING OF THE FRENCH ECONOMIC SITUATION AND RELATED FRENCH ACCUSATIONS THAT U. S. MONETARY POLICY IS RESPONSIBLE, AND THE COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASE AGAINST FRENCH STEEL. WHILE THE STRENGTHENED SANCTIONS AGAINST THE PIPELINE HAVE NOT YET CAUSED MUCH OF A ROW HERE, THEY MAY WELL.

3. TO COUNTERACT THIS WORSENING ATMOSPHERE I WOULD SUGGEST THAT NOW WOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO MAKE A DELIBERATELY POSITIVE GESTURE TOWARD THE FRENCH, SUCH AS LIFTING OUR COCOM OBJECTIONS TO THE SALE OF MT-20 EQUIPMENT TO BULGARIA OR OFFERING SOMETHING IN THE MILITARY FIELD WHICH WOULD COST US NOTHING BUT WOULD BE VALUABLE TO THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FRENCH. I WOULD APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT'S ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE GESTURE.

4. REQUEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT FOR BURT IN BONN. GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED PARIS 2019

DTG: 241706Z JUN 82 PSN: 033376

NLRR 107-081 #47377
BY GL NARA DATE 4/23/10

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4334

47378

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8

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *JMR*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Jean-Louis Gergorin (Friday,
June 25 at 3:00 p.m.)

State prepared the attached background and bio data (Tab A) which you may care to draw on during your meeting tomorrow with the Quai's Policy Planning Director, Jean-Louis Gergorin. Since the stuff is rather bland, I recommend you use your time with Gergorin to get across the following points:

-- Arms Sales to Nicaragua. We have been informed of the shipment of three Alouette helicopters to Nicaragua and are very disappointed. Western military support for the Marxist forces there is not going to contribute to peace and stability in Central America.

-- Sanction Extension Decision. It would be useful to reiterate the core of principle behind this issue and the fact that the President's personal word was on the line. Nothing has changed for the better in Poland since the December 30 imposition of sanctions, and in fact conditions have worsened. The West has a responsibility to address this situation unambiguously.

-- Credit Restrictions. Say nice things about the Versailles Summit - the great job the French did as hosts, etc. -- but emphasize the dead seriousness of our attachment to a credit-restricting regime vis-à-vis the East.

-- Arms Control. Gergorin is particularly savvy on arms control issues, and may well reassert the usual French theology about the independence of the French nuclear deterrent (cannot be considered in any part of START). I suggest you give him a rundown on our initiatives and where we hope to go.

-- Other Issues. Time permitting, you might want to touch on the Middle East and the Falklands, bringing Gergorin up-to-date on developments in both areas (and our views).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 6/24/88

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NLRR 007-081-#47378

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY CN NARA DATE 4/23/10



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

8217555

9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24, 1982

47379

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Deputy Assistant McFarlane's Meeting with
Jean-Louis Gergorin, June 25 at 3:00 p.m.

Attached is the biographic material requested for use in Mr. McFarlane's meeting with Jean-Louis Gergorin, Director, Center for Analysis and Forecasting, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Gergorin will be in Washington to attend a Euro-American seminar sponsored by the Rand Corporation for whom Gergorin worked in the early 1970s. At a dinner hosted by the French Ambassador on Friday, June 25, he will have the occasion to meet a number of personalities including Fred Ikle, Eugene Rostow and Deputy Assistant Secretary Jim Dobbins of the State Department.

Gergorin is one of the "youngest and brightest" at the Quai d'Orsay and is in charge of the policy planning staff which he created. He is also an expert on defense and strategic issues. While no longer the prominent figure he was at the Quai under Francois Poncet, he survived the change of government and continues to work closely with Cheysson. Gergorin technically is on loan from the prestigious Conseil d'Etat, and will continue to be a very influential figure in French strategic thinking for a long time to come. He is very well acquainted with the United States, and has a wide range of important US contacts in academia and government.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 6/24/88

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NLRR 107-081 47379

BY CU NARA DATE 4/23/10

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B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

National Security Council
The White House

234

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Package #

4334

22 JUN 25 AM : 28

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u></u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u></u>	<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Judge Clark	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
John Poindexter	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Staff Secretary	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Sit Room	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other

COMMENTS

Today at 3 pm

Mtg was cancelled at 2:15 pm 6/25
Unable to reschedule, given events
of the day.

12

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

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amp
12/20/07

ID 8204334

RECEIVED 23 JUN 82 10

TO WHEELER FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 22 JUN 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE AM GERGORIN,

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TALKERS FOR MCFARLANE MTG W/ FRENCH POLICY PLANNING
DIRECTOR ON JUN 25

ACTION: WHEELER SGD MEMO DUE: 24 JUN 82 STATUS D FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
STATE Rentschler
Wheeler

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Rentschler	S 6/24	Rec'd 8/8 Talkers	6/24	MD-
McFarlane	IX 6/24	For info		
	6/29	OBE/MTG cancelled		MD-100

DISPATCH LDX 6/22 by Wheeler's office W/ATTCH FILE PA (C)✓

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47380

13

PAGE 01
SIT644

PARIS 2019
DATE 06/28/82

DTG: 241706Z JUN 82 PSN: 033376
TOR: 175/1908Z

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #2019 1751707
O 241706Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8469

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 22019
NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH
E.O. 12065: RDS 1 6/24/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, ECON, FR
SUBJ: US - FRENCH RELATIONS: A WORSENING ATMOSPHERE

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I AM CONCERNED OVER THE SUDDEN CONVERGENCE OF SEVERAL ISSUES THAT HAVE COMBINED DRAMATICALLY TO WORSEN OUR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE. THESE ISSUES INCLUDE MUTUAL DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT, THE WORSENING OF THE FRENCH ECONOMIC SITUATION AND RELATED FRENCH ACCUSATIONS THAT U.S. MONETARY POLICY IS RESPONSIBLE, AND THE COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASE AGAINST FRENCH STEEL. WHILE THE STRENGTHENED SANCTIONS AGAINST THE PIPELINE HAVE NOT YET CAUSED MUCH OF A ROW HERE, THEY MAY WELL.

3. TO COUNTERACT THIS WORSENING ATMOSPHERE I WOULD SUGGEST THAT NOW WOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO MAKE A DELIBERATELY POSITIVE GESTURE TOWARD THE FRENCH, SUCH AS LIFTING OUR COCOM OBJECTIONS TO THE SALE OF MT-20 EQUIPMENT TO BULGARIA OR OFFERING SOMETHING IN THE MILITARY FIELD WHICH WOULD COST US NOTHING BUT WOULD BE VALUABLE TO THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FRENCH. I WOULD APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT'S ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE GESTURE.

4. REQUEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT FOR BURT IN BONN. GALBRAITH

PARIS 2019

DTG: 241706Z JUN 82 PSN: 033376

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NLRR M07-081-47380

BY CL NARA DATE 4/23/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47381 14

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 6206 DTG: 250133Z JUN 82 PSN: 033980
SIT657 DATE 06/28/82 TOR: 176/0314Z

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6206 1760151
O 250133Z JUN 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7270

~~SECRET~~ STATE 176206
NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND CHESHERS FROM AS CROCKER
E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 3 (6/24/12, CROCKER, CHESTER A)
TAGS: PEPR, AO, FR
SUBJECT: ANGOLAN MESSAGE ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ANGOLAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN AMBASSADOR ELISIO DE FIGUEIREDO SAW GENERAL WALTERS ON JUNE 24 TO TRANSMIT A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS AS FOLLOWS: THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAS APPROACHED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO ACT AS GUARANTOR THAT CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE PLACE AS OUTLINED IN THE ANGOLA-CUBA COMMUNIQUE OF FEBRUARY 4, 1982 IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS WITHDRAW FROM NAMIBIA. FIGUEIREDO SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD AGREED TO ACT AS GUARANTOR OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. FIGUEIREDO DESCRIBED THIS MESSAGE AS A RESPONSE TO GENERAL WALTERS' PRESENTATION IN LUANDA ON JUNE 7 WHICH HAD ADDRESSED THE NECESSITY TO PROVIDE ASSURANCES TO THE SOUTH AFRICANS ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL.

3. WHEN PRESSED AS TO WHETHER THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRESENTED THEIR "PLAN" FOR WITHDRAWAL (WHICH IS REFERRED TO IN THE ANGOLA-CUBAN COMMUNIQUE) TO THE FRENCH, FIGUEIREDO WOULD SAY ONLY THAT THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO INDICATE TO THE FRENCH WHAT "MECHANISM FOR WITHDRAWAL" WOULD COME INTO EFFECT AFTER SAG WITHDRAWAL FROM NAMIBIA, AND THAT THE ANGOLANS WERE PREPARED TO GIVE THE FRENCH A SENSE OF THE TIMING FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ENVISAGED BY THE ANGOLANS. HE DID NOT RULE OUT FURTHER "GESTURES" ON THIS SCORE BUT AVOIDED SPECIFICS.

4. WE NEED TO CONFIRM THE ABOVE THROUGH A DISCREET HIGH-LEVEL APPROACH TO THE FRENCH ASAP. WE NEED AS FULL A PICTURE AS POSSIBLE OF THE THINKING ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WHICH THE ANGOLANS MAY HAVE SHARED WITH THE FRENCH. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT WE ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE

FRENCH HAVE A SENSE THAT THE ANGOLAN POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL MAY BE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO ENTERTAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME ARRANGEMENT FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL PARALLEL WITH SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM NAMIBIA. GENERAL WALTERS UNDERLINED TO FIGUEIREDO -- AND YOU MAY REITERATE THIS TO THE FRENCH -- THAT A PROMISE OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ONLY AFTER THE COMPLETION OF SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO MEET SOUTH AFRICAN CONCERNS AND THAT INFLEXIBILITY ON THIS COULD CAUSE THE HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US ON NAMIBIA TO BE LOST. IF FIGUEIREDO'S ACCOUNT OF THE ANGOLAN APPROACH TO THE FRENCH IS ACCURATE, WE WILL WANT TO EXPLORE THIS FURTHER WITH THE FRENCH ONCE WE HAVE ASSESSED IT FURTHER.

5. IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH US IN WASHINGTON DURING THE CG MEETINGS, QUAI AFRICAN DIRECTOR AUSSEIL SAID NOTHING ABOUT SUCH AN ANGOLAN APPROACH TO THE FRENCH. I SUGGEST THAT THIS MESSAGE BE RAISED WITH AUSSEIL.
HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 6206

DTG: 250133Z JUN 82 PSN: 033980

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NLRR M07-081 #47381
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15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 6329
SIT634 DATE 06/28/82

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6329 1760422
O O 250356Z JUN 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0000
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0000
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
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~~SECRET~~ STATE 176329
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 6/24/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)
TAGS: MOPE, PEPR, LE, IS, PLO, UNSC, FR
SUBJECT: APPROACH TO FRENCH ON WEST BEIRUT PROBLEM AND
FRENCH UNSC RESOLUTION.

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER CALLED IN VERNIER-PAILLEZ
TONIGHT AND PRESENTED HIM WITH FOLLOWING POINTS:

BEGIN TEXT:

-- CHEYSSON TOLD HAIG THAT THE GOF WOULD PASS TO THE PLO
OUR SPECIFIC THOUGHTS ON WHAT STEPS THE PLO IN BEIRUT
WOULD HAVE TO TAKE WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IN ORDER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO ASSURE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM IN AND
AROUND BEIRUT.

-- HERE ARE THOSE SPECIFICS:

(1) ALL PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS IN WEST BEIRUT AND THE CAMPS
TO THE SOUTH OF THE CITY WILL HAND OVER ALL ARMS TO
THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AND TURN THESE AREAS OVER TO
THE CONTROL OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON.

(2) THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PLO AND SUCH OTHERS AS MAY
CHOOSE TO JOIN THEM WILL DEPART LEBANON UNDER SAFE
CONDUCT, MONITORED, AND ASSISTED IF REQUESTED BY
OUTSIDE OBSERVERS.

-- WE WOULD ASK THAT YOU ALSO TELL THE PLO THAT
IMMEDIATELY AFTER AGREEMENT TO THESE POINTS IS GIVEN,
STEPS WILL BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT ISRAELI FORCES WILL
ADJUST THEIR LINES SO THAT THE FOREGOING STEPS WILL NOT
BE SEEN TO BE CARRIED OUT UNDER THREAT OF ISRAELI GUNS.

-- WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT IN PASSING ON THE ABOVE THE
FRENCH GOVERNMENT ALSO ADVISE THE PLO, IN THE STRONGEST
TERMS, TO COMMUNICATE ITS AGREEMENT AT ONCE TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE.

-- THE SECRETARY HAS ALSO ASKED THAT YOU INFORM THE FOREIGN
MINISTER THAT, WITH REGARD TO THE GOF'S CALL FOR A SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION, THE GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON AND
SAUDI ARABIA BELIEVE THIS STEP TO BE EXTREMELY UNWISE.
THEY BELIEVE (AS WE DO) THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
SUCH AS YOU ENVISAGE COULD BRING ABOUT THE VERY THING
WE ALL SEEK TO PREVENT -- AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON WEST
BEIRUT.

-- THUS, WE BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT IT WOULD BE BEST AT
THIS TIME TO AVOID FURTHER ACTIVITY IN THE SECURITY
COUNCIL.

-- SHOULD THE GOF DECIDE, NEVERTHELESS, TO PURSUE A
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE
LIMITED TO A CALL FOR EARLY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PLO AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON ON THE FUTURE OF THE PLO IN
WEST BEIRUT.

-- IN ADDITION, THE RESOLUTION MIGHT PROPOSE A UNIFIL
OBSERVER (OR FRENCH OBSERVER OR FORCE) TO:

- ---OBSERVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLO-GOVERNMENT OF
LEBANON AGREEMENT, ONCE REACHED;

- ---ASSIST IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT AGREEMENT IF SO
REQUESTED BY THE PARTIES.

-- IN ANY EVENT, WE DO NOT BELIEVE SUCH A RESOLUTION
OUGHT TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL BEFORE
THE EVENING OF JUNE 25, NEW YORK TIME. END TEXT.

3. VERNIER-PAILLEZ SAID THAT HE WOULD COMMUNICATE THE
MESSAGE TO HIS GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY. SPEAKING
PERSONALLY, HE SAID HE WAS SURE THAT FRANCE WOULD SEE
THAT THE TWO POINT MESSAGE GOT TO THE PLO IN BEIRUT,
BUT THOUGHT THAT FRANCE WOULD DELIVER THE MESSAGE "LIKE
A POSTMAN", I.E., WITHOUT ADVISING THE PLO TO AGREE.

4. ON THE UNSC RESOLUTION, VERNIER-PAILLEZ SAID THE
FRENCH WERE CONVINCED THAT THE PLO WOULD NEVER LAY
DOWN ITS ARMS. THEREFORE, FRANCE BELIEVED THAT
SOMETHING OTHER THAN SIMPLY "SURRENDER OR DIE" SHOULD
BE PROPOSED, AND THIS WAS THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE
FRENCH DRAFT. THE FRENCH RESOLUTION, HE SAID, HAD THE
APPROVAL OF SARKIS. EAGLEBURGER COMMENTED THAT, IN OUR
VIEW, IT IS NOT WISE TO ENCOURAGE THE PLO TO HANG ON IN
BEIRUT IN EXPECTATION THAT THE WORLD WILL SOMEHOW STEP
IN TO PREVENT THE ISRAELIS FROM ATTACKING. WE DO NOT
WANT TO SEE AN ISRAELI ASSAULT ON THE PLO IN BEIRUT,
BUT WE DO NOT HOLD THE ILLUSION THAT WE CAN STOP THEM
IF THEY DETERMINE TO DO IT. THE FRENCH RESOLUTION IN
OUR VIEW COULD WELL TEND TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION IN
THE PLO THAT TIME IS ON THEIR SIDE -- WHILE AT THE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

16

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 6329

DTG: 250356Z JUN 82 PSN: 034506

SAME TIME IT COULD INDUCE THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE QUICKLY
BEFORE PRESSURE ON THEM MOUNTS FURTHER.

SECSTATE WASHDC 6329

DTG: 250356Z JUN 82 PSN: 034506

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

5. FOR PARIS: THIS MESSAGE IS FYI; YOU NEED NOT FOLLOW-
UP ON YOUR END. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 6329

DTG: 250356Z JUN 82 PSN: 034506

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47383

17

PAGE 01 PARIS 2118 DTG: 251614Z JUN 82 PSN: 034960
SIT625 DATE 06/28/82 TOR: 176/1618Z

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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #2118 1761614
O 251614Z JUN 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8518

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 22118
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/25/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G) OR-M
TAGS: ETRD, MNUC, PARM, FR
SUBJECT: MITTERRAND REMARKS IN KRAFT COLUMN
REFS: (A) STATE 172201, (B) STATE 170402, (C) PARIS 20250

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. EMBASSY CARRIED OUT PARALLEL DEMARCHES WITH RESPECT INSTRUCTION (REF A) CONCERNING JOSEPH KRAFT'S QUOTATION OF MITTERRAND ON SS-20 LEVELS.
3. ON INF REMARKS POLITICAL COUNSELOR (ACCOMPANIED BY POL/MIL OFFICER) SAW ELYSEE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR HUBERT VEDRINE JUNE 25 IMMEDIATELY AFTER LATTER'S RETURN FROM ACCOMPANYING MITTERRAND IN SPAIN. POLCOUNSELOR POINTED OUT TO VEDRINE SERIOUSNESS OF EFFECT OF SUCH DECLARATIONS OF OUR INF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. VEDRINE TOOK NOTE OF OUR DEMARCHE AND STATED HE WOULD CONVEY IT DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. WE NOTED THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF ELYSEE COULD ISSUE A CLARIFICATION, AND VEDRINE IMPLIED THAT THIS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN NOTING THAT HE THOUGHT KRAFT REMARKS WENT BEYOND WHAT MITTERRAND HAD BEEN SAYING ON THIS ISSUE, E.G., THAT "OPTIMUM OUTCOME WOULD BE SOVIET CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD MAKE NATO DEPLOYMENTS UNNECESSARY."

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. TO MAKE CERTAIN MESSAGE REACHED MITTERRAND, IT WAS ALSO CONVEYED BY DEFENSE ATTACHE TO MITTERRAND'S PERSONAL MILITARY ASSISTANT, GENERAL SAULNIER, WHO IMMEDIATELY UNDERSTOOD POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF KRAFT QUOTATION IN CONTEXT OF GENEVA INF NEGOTIATIONS AND PLEDGED TO PASS IT ON.
5. WHILE SPEAKING TO VEDRINE, WE ALSO TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY OUR "CONFUSION AND DISMAY" AT ANSWER WHICH MITTERRAND HAD GIVEN TO QUESTION ABOUT UNSSOD IN HIS RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH HE IMPLIED VAGUELY THAT THE U.S. WAS COLLUDING WITH SOVIETS IN PRESSING FOR INCLUSION OF FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES IN BILATERAL US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS OUT OF A DESIRE TO REINTEGRATE FRANCE INTO NATO'S INTEGRATED COMMAND (REF C). WE NOTED THAT THIS REMARK CONTRADICTED THE NUMEROUS HIGH-LEVEL ASSURANCES

WHICH SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS HAD REPEATEDLY GIVEN THE GOF CONCERNING THE FIRM USG POSITION THAT THIRD COUNTRY FORCES WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. VEDRINE ALSO UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY OUR REACTIONS ON THIS ISSUE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND.

6. AS REGARDS KRAFT'S REPORT ON MITTERRAND'S COMMENTS ON EXPORT CREDITS, MINECON ASKED ELYSEE STAFFER CHRISTIAN SAUTTER ABOUT MITTERRAND'S REFERENCE TO U.S. INTEREST RATES. SAUTTER WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH KRAFT ARTICLE. WE POINTED OUT THAT U.S. LENDERS HAVE NO WAY OF MAKING CONCESSIONAL INTEREST RATES AVAILABLE. SAUTTER COMMENTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD MISSPOKEN IN HIS REFERENCE TO INTEREST RATES OFFERED BY AMERICAN PRIVATE INTERESTS, INTENDING TO REFER TO FRG INTEREST RATES.

7. SAUTTER OBSERVED THAT PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S POSITION ON CREDITS TO THE USSR REMAINS AS STATED IN HIS JUNE 9 PRESS CONFERENCE (SEE PARIS 20464): HE BELIEVES THAT ALL CREDITS, NOT JUST GOVERNMENT CREDITS, SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO CRITICAL EXAMINATION. WHEN WE POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT THE USE OF OFFICIAL GUARANTEES SHOULD BE CUT BACK TO ALLOW BANKERS TO MAKE DECISIONS ON ALL LENDING TO THE USSR ON THE BASIS OF MARKET FACTORS, SAUTTER QUICKLY NOTED THAT MITTERRAND IN NO WAY HAD THIS IN MIND SINCE INTEREST RATES AND GUARANTEES ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN TRADE SYSTEM.
GALBRAITH

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47384

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PAGE 01 PARIS 2496
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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 22496
MODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 6/29/12 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, FR, US
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON'S MEETING WITH MITTERRAND

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON BRIEFED DCM IN DETAIL ON HIS ONE-AND-ONE-QUARTER HOUR PRIVATE MEETING WITH MITTERRAND JUNE 28. NIXON SAID MITTERRAND OPENED THE DISCUSSION WITH A 20-MINUTE PRESENTATION ON THE MAIN ISSUES IN US-FRENCH RELATIONS. HE SAID MITTERRAND DID NOT EXAGGERATE HIS POINTS AND WAS NOT BELLIGERENT, BUT WAS NEVERTHELESS FORTHRIGHT AND CANDID IN EXPLAINING HIS VIEWS. MITTERRAND, AS USUAL, SPOKE MAINLY IN GENERALITIES AND AVOIDED SPECIFICS.

3. ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, MITTERRAND DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION US MEASURES ON STEEL OR US MONETARY POLICIES, AND CITED US INTEREST RATES ONLY IN PASSING. NEVERTHELESS, HE WAS "APOCALYPTIC" ON THE OVERALL EFFECTS IN EUROPE OF CURRENT US ECONOMIC POLICIES. HE SAID THE US IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CURRENT SITUATION AND MUST MAKE PROGRESS IN LOWERING INTEREST RATES OR THE RESULTS IN WESTERN EUROPE WILL BE "CATASTROPHIC". MITTERRAND SAID THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS WERE LESS IMPORTANT IN FRANCE THAN ELSEWHERE IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EUROPE, PARTICULARLY GERMANY, THE UK AND ITALY. FRANCE, HE THOUGHT, IS BETTER OFF THAN MOST WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND ITS GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM IS MORE STABLE. HE ARGUED THAT FRENCH TRADE WITH THE USSR IS VERY SMALL AND THUS FRANCE WOULD NOT BE GREATLY AFFECTED BY EXTENDED US SANCTIONS. MITTERRAND SAID FLATLY THAT SANCTIONS WOULD NOT WORK AND CITED HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS TO PROVE THIS.

4. NIXON SAID MITTERRAND'S MOOD WAS MEASURED AND LOW-KEY. HE ARGUED THAT HE HAD SHOWN SINCE TAKING OFFICE THAT HE WAS STRONG ON DEFENSE AND FIRMLY ANTI-SOVIET. THUS HE WAS DISAPPOINTED ABOUT US ECONOMIC POLICIES AND CONCERNED OVER THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

5. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, MITTERRAND SAID HE WAS DISAPPOINTED IN THE US VETO OF THE FRENCH UNSC DRAFT RESOLUTION ON

LEBANON. (MITTERRAND WAS SO WELL-INFORMED ON THE DETAILS OF THE RESOLUTION LANGUAGE THAT NIXON GOT THE IMPRESSION HE MAY HAVE HAD A HAND IN DRAFTING IT.) MITTERRAND THOUGHT IRAN WAS THE KEY COUNTRY FOR THE FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST. IF THE SITUATION WAS ALLOWED TO DETERIORATE FURTHER, IRANIAN FUNDAMENTALISTS COULD BE THE BIG WINNERS. NIXON SAID HE ARGUED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD SERVED THEIR OWN INTERESTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR INVASION OF LEBANON BUT THAT THEY HAD REACHED A POINT WHERE THE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES WHICH WOULD LIKELY RESULT FROM FURTHER MILITARY ACTION WOULD HURT THEIR OWN INTERESTS. IN PARTICULAR, FURTHER MILITARY ACTION WOULD JEOPARDIZE ISRAELI RELATIONS WITH THE US AND FRANCE. NIXON SAID WE NEED A BREAKTHROUGH ON PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY. (IN LATER COMMENTS TO THE PRESS, NIXON SAID THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD APPOINT A VERY STRONG NEGOTIATOR FOR THE PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY TALKS.) MITTERRAND THOUGHT THE SOVIETS HAD TAKEN A MODERATE POSITION ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON BECAUSE OF THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE. ACCORDING TO MITTERRAND, THIS SHOWED HOW PREOCCUPIED THEY WERE WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT US INF MIGHT BE INSTALLED IN WESTERN EUROPE. NIXON SAID HE TOLD MITTERRAND THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD BEEN VERY FIRM WITH BEGIN AND HAD LINKED CONTINUING US SUPPORT WITH PROGRESS ON A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HE SAID HE AND MITTERRAND HAD AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO EXERT CONTINUING PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS TO REACH A SOLUTION.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. MITTERRAND ALSO DISCUSSED THIRD WORLD ISSUES WITH NIXON. ON NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR HE REASONED THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS WERE NOT COMMUNIST WHEN THEY BEGAN BUT COULD BECOME COMMUNIST IF THEY WERE CUT OFF FROM WESTERN CONTACT. MITTERRAND ALSO ARGUED THAT MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH ARE UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE WANT TO MOVE AWAY FROM DEPENDENCE ON THE USSR.

7. MITTERRAND QUESTIONED NIXON ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SECRETARY HAIG'S RESIGNATION AND THE IMPLICATION OF THE APPOINTMENT OF SECRETARY SHULTZ. IN HIS REPLY NIXON SAID HE STRESSED THAT US FOREIGN POLICY WAS THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY, NOT THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND THAT THIS WOULD ENSURE CONTINUITY. HE ALSO STRESSED HIS RESPECT FOR BOTH SECRETARIES HAIG AND SHULTZ. MITTERRAND REFLECTED PERSONAL WARMTH TOWARD PRESIDENT REAGAN AND A RESPECT FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ WHICH HE GAINED DURING THEIR RECENT MEETING. NIXON SAID HE THOUGHT SECRETARY SHULTZ, AS AN ECONOMIST, WAS LIKELY TO BE MORE INTERESTED IN

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ECONOMIC POLICIES. HE URGED MITTERRAND TO AVOID DIRECT
CRITICISM OF THE US ADMINISTRATION AND TO WAIT A BIT TO
SEE IF TRANS-ATLANTIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS CAN BE IMPROVED.
HE TOLD MITTERRAND THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO JEOPAR-
DIZE THE GOOD OVERALL RELATIONS WHICH HAVE EXISTED THUS
FAR BETWEEN THE TWO ADMINISTRATIONS.

8. FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON SAID HE WOULD REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ON THIS AND OTHER MEETINGS HE HAS DURING HIS
EUROPEAN TRIP WHEN HE RETURNS TO THE U. S.
GALBRAITH

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5317

AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 4916

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EXDTS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE, PRIORITY

AND TO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS, IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/29/82 (MARESCA, JOHN J) OR-M

TAGS: UNSC, MILI, PEPR, IS, LE

SUBJECT: FRENCH RESOLUTION ON LEBANON

REFS: (A) PARIS 21466 (NOTAL), (B) USUN 1817

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. THE FRENCH INITIATIVE LAST WEEK IN INTRO-

DUCTING ITS RESOLUTION AT THE UNSC EMANATED DIRECTLY FROM PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. THE PARAMETERS FOR NEGOTIATING CHANGES IN THE TEXT WERE SET BY THE PRESIDENT. WE SEE A VARIETY OF EXPLANATIONS OR PERHAPS A COMBINATION OF THEM AS BEING BEHIND THE FRENCH ACTION. THE FRENCH BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT A ROLE FOR A "MODERATE AND UNIFIED" PLO MUST BE PRESERVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. FAILURE TO DO SO, IN THEIR VIEW, WOULD BE A GRAVE HISTORICAL ERROR. THE FRENCH FAULT US FOR DEALING WITH THE ISSUE ON TOO NARROW A PLANE. END SUMMARY.

3. THE FRENCH UN INITIATIVE WAS PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S PERSONALLY. AT 7:30 P.M. THURSDAY, JUNE 24, INSTRUCTIONS CAME TO THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS TO DRAFT LANGUAGE OF A RESOLUTION WITHIN PARAMETERS SET BY THE PRESIDENT AND TO SEND IT OUT TO THE FRENCH UN MISSION, ACCORDING TO A WELL-PLACED SOURCE AT THE QUAI. ONCE DRAWN UP, WE UNDERSTAND, THERE WERE SOME TELEPHONE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN MINISTER OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS CHEYSSON AND SECRETARY HAIG. THE MANEUVERING ROOM FOR THE FRENCH UN AMBASSADOR WAS APPARENTLY LIMITED. ANY CHANGES WERE NEGOTIATED BY PHONE DIRECTLY WITH CHEYSSON OPERATING UNDER PRESIDENTIAL GUIDELINES. IN FACT, WE WERE TOLD CHEYSSON WAS UP LATE INTO THE NIGHT OF FRIDAY/SATURDAY (JUNE 25-26) ON THE PHONE WITH THE FRENCH UN MISSION. MITTERRAND HIMSELF RULED OUT INCLUSION OF ANY REFERENCE TO DISARMING THE PLO, REPORTEDLY BECAUSE IT WOULD CREATE A CLIMATE NOT CONDUCTIVE TO NEGOTIATIONS

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITH THE PALESTINIANS.

4. WE SEE A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR FRENCH BEHAVIOR ON THE LEBANON INITIATIVE, AND BELIEVE THAT THE ANSWER LIES IN SOME COMBINATION OF THESE. FIRST, THERE IS THE EXPLANATION PROVIDED US BY OUR CONTACTS AT THE QUAI'S MIDDLE EAST DIVISION. NOTING MITTERRAND'S PERSONAL ROLE AND INVOLVEMENT, OUR SOURCE CLASSIFIES IT AS A MORAL STAND GUIDED BY MITTERRAND'S PERSONAL CONVICTION THAT A BATTLE OF BEIRUT MUST BE AVOIDED. HE LIKENED MITTERRAND'S CONVICTION ON THIS ISSUE TO HIS DETERMINATION TO GO TO ISRAEL AND ADDRESS THE KNESSET DESPITE WARNINGS FROM THE BUREAUCRACY OF THE DIRE CONSEQUENCES FOR FRANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. MITTERRAND, ACCORDING TO RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT HAPPENS IN BEIRUT.

5. AFTER ADVANCING THESE "MORAL" ARGUMENTS, THE QUAI OFFICIAL OUTLINED FRANCE'S POLITICAL POSITION AS HE SEES IT. FRANCE BELIEVES (AS REPORTED IN REF A) THAT A UNIFIED

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AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 5957
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AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 4569

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5318
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 4917
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AND MODERATE PLO MUST REMAIN INTACT SO THAT THERE IS
SOMEONE WITH WHOM TO NEGOTIATE; DESTROYING THE PLO WOULD
WORK AGAINST WESTERN INTERESTS; "WOULD RENEW THE ERROR OF
1948"; AND THAT "WE WOULD BE SET BACK THIRTY YEARS."
HE ARGUED THAT
WASHINGTON IS LEAVING TOO MUCH TO ISRAEL, STATING THAT
EVEN UNDER CAMP DAVID WE ALLOWED ISRAEL TO NARROW A
WIDER SADAT INITIATIVE TO SUIT ITS PURPOSES. FRANCE
WANTS US TO ENLARGE NEGOTIATIONS AND DEAL WITH THE PLO.

6. COMMENT. IN OUR VIEW, THERE ARE OTHER FACTORS.

FRANCE UNDOUBTEDLY WANTS TO BE SEEN DOING SOMETHING IN
THE CURRENT CRISIS. AS NOTED IN REF A, FRANCE HAS BEEN
ENGAGED IN A CAMPAIGN TO REGAIN LOST GROUND WITH THE
ARABS THAT RESULTED FROM MITTERRAND'S TRIP TO ISRAEL
AND TO RESTORE ITS BONA FIDES AS A FRIEND OF THE ARAB
CAUSE. IF THIS WAS A MAJOR ELEMENT IN FRENCH THINKING,
IT COULD EXPLAIN THEIR RESISTANCE TO AMENDMENTS. THEY
MAY ACTUALLY HAVE WISHED TO PROVOKE A US VETO, FEELING AN
APPROVED RESOLUTION WOULD NOT GREATLY AFFECT THE SITUATION,
WHILE ONE VETOED BY THE US WOULD SET OFF THE FRENCH POSI-
TION FROM OURS. OTHER PROBLEMS IN FRANCO-US RELATIONS MAY
HAVE RENDERED THE FRENCH MORE WILLING TO DIVERGE FROM US
ON THIS ISSUE.

7. IN ANY CASE, FRENCH DO NOT APPEAR TO BE GREATLY
DISTURBED BY OUR VETO. ELYSEE SECEN SHRUGGED IT OFF IN
A JUNE 28 CONVERSATION WITH DCM, SAYING FRENCH UNDER-
STOOD REASONS FOR OUR POSITION, AND CAREFULLY DISTINGUISH-
ING BETWEEN THIS DIFFERENCE OF VIEW AND OUR BILATERAL
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, WHICH HE CLEARLY CONSIDERED MAJOR.

8. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
GALBRAITH

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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 22952

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/2/02 (MARESCA, JOHN J) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, EG, FR, IS, LE, XF

SUBJECT: LEBANON - FRENCH DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES

REF: PARIS 22822

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: QUAI NEA DIRECTOR BOIDEVAIX SAYS BOUTROS GHALI WANTS FRANCE TO WORK WITH EGYPT ON A NEW UNSC RESOLUTION. EGYPT'S OVERRIDING FEAR IS THAT DOMESTIC PRESSURE IN FACE OF INACTION COULD FORCE A CHANGE IN ITS POLICY. PLO'S QADDOUMI TOLD BOIDEVAIX IT HAS GAINED ITS AUTONOMY FROM THE CURRENT CRISIS. GOF BELIEVES WE ARE TRYING TO PUSH THE PLO INTO SYRIA, WHICH IN ITS VIEW WOULD BE COMMITTING THE ERROR OF SERVING IT UP TO THE SOVIETS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WHERE THE PLO SHOULD GO REMAINS UNRESOLVED. FRENCH EMISSARY GUTMANN HAS GONE TO THE AREA WITH NO PLAN, BUT TO SEE WHAT MIGHT BE DONE. END SUMMARY.

3. ON JULY 1 EMBOFF DISCUSSED CURRENT FRENCH MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES WITH THE QUAI'S DIRECTOR FOR NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, SERGE BOIDEVAIX. COVERED IN THE CONVERSATION (DURING A RECEPTION) WERE BOIDEVAIX'S MEETING WITH PLO'S QADDOUMI IN TUNIS, THE FUTURE OF THE PLO, THE TALKS WITH BOUTROS GHALI, AND THE GUTMANN MISSION.

4. TALKS WITH BOUTROS GHALI: BOIDEVAIX SAID THE EGYPTIANS' PRIMARY CONCERN WAS TO DO SOMETHING. THE OVERRIDING FEAR OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT IS THAT IF IT IS NOT PERCEIVED WITHIN EGYPT AS DOING ENOUGH TO

RESOLVE THE SITUATION, IT WILL COME UNDER SUCH DOMESTIC PRESSURE THAT IT WILL BE "FORCED TO CHANGE ITS POLICY." THE EGYPTIANS WANT THE FRENCH TO JOIN THEM IN SOME TYPE OF UN RESOLUTION. ACCORDING TO BOIDEVAIX, THE EGYPTIANS ARE NOT SURE THEMSELVES WHAT THEY WANT AT THE UN.

5. BOIDEVAIX ASSURED EMBOFF THAT THE GOF WILL MOVE CAUTIOUSLY AND FIRST UNDERTAKE APPROPRIATE CONSULTATIONS, "NOT LIKE JUNE 25," HE ADDED. BOIDEVAIX CONFIRMED WHAT WE HAD HEARD PREVIOUSLY, NAMELY THAT FRANCE'S UNSUCCESSFUL UN RESOLUTION WAS IN EFFECT A WHIM OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. BOIDEVAIX SAID IT AROSE ALL OF A SUDDEN WHEN MITTERRAND RETURNED FROM MADRID AND REVIEWED THE DOSSIER ON LEBANON. HE SAID THE MINISTRY WAS LITERALLY GIVEN 35 MINUTES TO DRAW UP THE RESOLUTION AND "WE MADE A NUMBER OF ERRORS."

6. MEETING WITH THE PLO'S QADDOUMI: QADDOUMI TOLD BOIDEVAIX THAT THOUGH DEVASTED BY THE ISRAELI ACTION, THE PLO HAS GAINED ONE THING OUT OF IT ALL--ITS AUTONOMY. QADDOUMI SAID THE PLO DOES NOT WANT TO LOSE IT AGAIN BY BEING FORCED TO GO TO SYRIA. BOIDEVAIX CLAIMED THAT THE GOF COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT THE US WAS DOING, AS THE GOF HEARD WE ARE TRYING TO GET THE PLO TO GO TO SYRIA. THIS IN BOIDEVAIX'S ESTIMATION WOULD BE A GRAVE ERROR. WE WILL BE SERVING UP THE PLO TO THE SOVIETS "ON A SILVER PLATTER". WHEN EMBOFF SUGGESTED THAT THE PLO IS ALREADY UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE, BOIDEVAIX SAID THAT EVEN QADDOUMI, WHO IS CONSIDERED A PRO-SOVIET TYPE, REFLECTED GENUINE DISENCHANT-

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MENT WITH THE SOVIETS.

7. APPARENTLY, THE PLO HAS NOT DECIDED WHAT IT WANTS OR WHERE IT WANTS TO GO. AFTER NOTING THE RISKS OF GOING TO SYRIA, QADDOUMI SAID THEY COULD NOT GO TO EGYPT EITHER. HE TOLD BOIDEVAIX THAT AT A MINIMUM, THEY WANT AN "EMBASSY AND AN OFFICE IN LEBANON." QADDOUMI TALKED OF HAVING SEVERAL OFFICES THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH ARAFAT TRAVELLING BETWEEN THEM. CLEARLY THIS WAS AN ISSUE YET TO BE RESOLVED.

8. GUTMANN MISSION: APPARENTLY THE GUTMANN MISSION IS ANOTHER FRENCH EFFORT TO BE SEEN DOING SOMETHING--WHATEVER. BOIDEVAIX SAID THAT HE CARRIED NO PROJECTS OR PLANS WITH HIM. HE HAS GONE TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. BOIDEVAIX EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THIS TIME GUTMANN WOULD HAVE A CHANCE TO CONSULT WITH AMBASSADOR HABIB. IN CONNECTION WITH THE GUTMANN MISSION, BOIDEVAIX WANTED TO KNOW WITH WHOM HABIB IS DEALING. EMBOFF TOLD HIM HE HAD NO INFORMATION, BUT SUGGESTED PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN AND PERHAPS

PARIS 2952

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23

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 2952
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DE RUFHFR #2952/02 1821533
O 021531Z JUL 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8956
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2419
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6530
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2120
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AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4356
USLO RIYADH 0574
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 4924
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4352
BT

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 22952
OTHERS

9. BOIDEVAIX HOPES EXTERNAL RELATIONS MINISTER CHEYSSON CAN DEVELOP A PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH SECRETARY-DESIGNATE SCHULTZ WHICH COULD FACILITATE DEALING WITH THE CRISIS. HE HAS RECOMMENDED THAT CHEYSSON MAKE A QUICK TRIP TO WASHINGTON AS SOON AS SECRETARY-DESIGNATE SCHULTZ IS IN OFFICE.

10. COMMENT: WE GET THE IMPRESSION, NOT ONLY FROM TALKING WITH BOIDEVAIX BUT BY JUDGING BY OUR EARLIER MEETINGS AT THE QUAI, THAT THE FRENCH ARE ENGAGED IN A LOT OF FRENETIC ACTIVITY, BUT ARE STILL TRYING TO DETERMINE WHAT THEY WANT TO DO.

11. DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. GALBRAITH

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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47387

PAGE 01
SIT582

SECSTATE WASHDC 4187
DATE 07/19/82

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DE RUEHC #4187 1831708
O 021653Z JUL 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7763

~~SECRET~~ STATE 184187
NODIS

FOR CHESHES

E. O. 12065: RDS-3 7/1/02 (SIMPSON, DANIEL H.)

TAGS: PEPR, AO

SUBJECT: ANGOLAN MESSAGE ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL

REF: PARIS 22768

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AF ASST. SEC. CROCKER WILL DISCUSS SUBJECT REFTEL WITH AUSSEIL IN NEW YORK NEXT WEEK. YOU SHOULD ALSO DISCUSS IT WITH PENNE UPON HIS RETURN IN EFFORT TO CLARIFY SUBSTANCE OF NASCIMENTO'S DISCUSSIONS WITH MITTERRAND AND PENNE.

3. FORMULATION IN PARA. 2 REFTEL WHICH STATES THAT NASCIMENTO SAID "CUBAN TROOPS WOULD LEAVE ANGOLA, BUT THAT ANGOLANS DID NOT WANT ANY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL MADE BEFORE A NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT IS ARRANGED" IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE. ONE COULD CONSTRUE THIS FORMULATION IN SEVERAL WAYS: EITHER AS MEANING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF PHASE III OR AFTER CONCLUSION OF PHASE III, THUS LEAVING OPEN QUESTION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF TIMING OF CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. ONE POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION IS THAT CUBANS WOULD DISCREETLY AND QUIETLY WITHDRAW WITHIN TIMEFRAME WE HAVE SUGGESTED. WE NEED TO CLARIFY THIS WITH OUR FRENCH INTERLOCUTORS. STOESSEL

SECSTATE WASHDC 4187

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PAGE 01 PARIS 2954 DTG: 021535Z JUL 82 PSN: 044133
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DE RUHFR #2954 1821535

O 021535Z JUL 82

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2420

AMEMBASSY CAIRO 6531

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1028

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4353

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 22954

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/2/02 (DE TARR, FRANCIS) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR, FR, IS, LE

SUBJECT: FRENCH DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY IN LEBANESE

CRISIS: ISRAELI VIEW

1. ~~C~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBOFF DISCUSSED WITH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR JULY 2 THE RECENT SPATE OF FRENCH DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AND THE APPARENT SHIFT IN FRENCH POLICY RESULTING FROM THE LEBANESE CRISIS. NEEDLESS TO SAY THE ISRAELIS ARE VERY UNHAPPY ABOUT CURRENT FRENCH POLICY.

3. THE ISRAELIS, BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED THEM BY SOMEONE IN THE FRENCH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (DGSE), LAY THE CAUSE FOR THE SWITCH IN FRENCH POLICY DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. MITTERRAND REPORTEDLY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FELT ISRAEL HAD BETRAYED HIM. AFTER HIS VISIT TO ISRAEL, HE FELT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSULTED BEFORE ISRAEL DID ANYTHING IN LEBANON. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN DID SEND HIM A PERSONAL MESSAGE WITHIN HOURS OF THE MOVE INTO LEBANON (OUR SOURCE SAYS HE WAS THE ONLY EUROPEAN LEADER TO RECEIVE SUCH A MESSAGE). HOWEVER, MITTERRAND CONSIDERED IT TOO LATE.

4. NOTE THE SAME SGD SOURCE TOLD THE ISRAELI EMBASSY THAT MITTERRAND WAS ANGRY WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AS WELL BECAUSE HE FELT HE TOO HAD BETRAYED HIM IN HIS POST-VERSAILLES ACTIONS. THIS FEELING OF BETRAYAL BY ISRAEL AND THE US WAS A FACTOR IN MITTERRAND'S MOVING FORWARD PRECIPITOUSLY WITH FRANCE'S UNSC INITIATIVE.

5. THE ISRAELIS PLACE THE QUAI D'ORSAY AND CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE SOCIALIST PARTY IN "THE ANTI-ISRAELI CAMP". THEY BELIEVE THAT PRESSURE FROM WITHIN THE SOCIALIST PARTY COUPLED WITH URGINGS FROM EXTERNAL RELATIONS MINISTER CHEYSSON LED MITTERRAND TO APPROVE FRENCH EFFORTS TO SAVE THE PLO FROM DESTRUCTION.

6. ISRAELI AMBASSADOR ROSENNE (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS POLITICAL COUNSELOR) CALLED ON SERGE BOIDEVAIX, HEAD OF THE QUAI NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICAN DIRECTORATE JULY 1 TO EXPRESS ISRAELI'S "PROFOUND ASTONISHMENT" AT FRENCH ANTI-ISRAELI INITIATIVES IN THE EEC AND AT THE UN. ISRAEL CHOSE THE TERM USED TO BE JUST SHORT OF A FORMAL PROTEST. THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR ACCUSED FRANCE OF TRYING NOT ONLY TO SAVE THE PLO POLITICALLY BUT MILITARILY AS WELL. OUR SOURCE NOTED THAT THE FRENCH DID NOT DENY IT.

7. IN DISCUSSING THE UN INITIATIVE, BOIDEVAIX PROVIDED ROSENNE BASICALLY THE SAME STORY HE DID TO US (WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED). HE CLAIMED THAT, GIVEN THE SHORT LEAD ALLOWED BY THE PRESIDENT, THE GOF DID NOT HAVE TIME TO CONSULT WITH ISRAEL. ROSENNE POINTED OUT THAT FRANCE HAD TIME TO CONSULT FIRST WITH THE PLO. BOIDEVAIX ADMITTED IT AND CLAIMED THAT THE US HAD ENCOURAGED FRANCE TO CONTACT THE PLO. EMBOFF POINTED OUT THAT TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE WE WERE NOT CONSULTED PRIOR TO MITTERRAND MAKING HIS

PARIS 2954

DTG: 021535Z JUL 82 PSN: 044133

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PUBLIC STATEMENT ON JUNE 24.

8. ON THE CURRENT MISSION OF QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL FRANCIS GUTMANN, BOIDEVAIX PRESSED ROSENNE FOR ASSURANCES THAT HE WOULD BE RECEIVED BY FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR. EVEN THOUGH SUCH A MEETING WAS AGREED TO BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, ROSENNE WISHING TO MAKE THE FRENCH SQUIRM, REFUSED TO CONFIRM AN APPOINTMENT. OUR SOURCE SAID THERE WAS SOME FEELING WITHIN HIS EMBASSY THAT GUTMANN SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN ONLY BY ISRAEL MFA SECRETARY GENERAL KIMCHE. HE ADDED THAT GUTMANN WILL BE ASSURED A VERY COLD WELCOME IN ISRAEL. "HE IS GOING TO GET IT ON BOTH CHEEKS -- AND I DON'T MEAN KISSES".
GALBRAITH

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BY CN NARA DATE 4/23/10

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DE RUEHC #5664 1850114
O 040157Z JUL 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7835
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE -

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1591
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WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7804
USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 9514
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 185664 TOSEC 100062
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MILITARY HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12065: RDS 7/3/02 (EAGLEBURGER, L.S.)
TAGS: MILI LE FR US
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH FRENCH ON PEACEKEEPING FORCE
- FOR LEBANON

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS MESSAGE IS TO GIVE YOU SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS REGARDING POSSIBLE FRENCH PARTICIPATION WITH US AND THE LEBANESE IN A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN BEIRUT. FRENCH AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IS CONDITIONED ON A REQUEST FROM THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND ACCEPTANCE BY ALL OTHER CONCERNED PARTIES.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. FRENCH PREFERENCE IS TO SEND THE BATTALION THAT RECENTLY ARRIVED IN THE UNIFIL AREA AND IS CURRENTLY OPERATING UNDER UN AUSPICES. THEY ARE INVESTIGATING WHETHER IT WOULD BE PERMISSIBLE TO SIMPLY INFORM THE SECRETARY -GENERAL OR IF UN PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED. WE ARE DISCOURAGING ANY APPROACH TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

4. IF THE UNIFIL BATTALION CANNOT BE EMPLOYED FOR POLITICAL REASONS, THE FRENCH WOULD SEND A BATTALION FROM THEIR RAPID INTERVENTION FORCE IN FRANCE. IT IS CURRENTLY ON24 HOURSTAND-BY ANDTHEYWOULD PLANTO FLY

IT TO CYPRUS AND SHIP IT TO BEIRUT. HOWEVER, IF THE

BEIRUT AIRPORT IS AVAILABLE THAT WOULD BE A PREFERABLE OPTION. EVEN IF BATTALION FROM FRANCE IS USED, THE FRENCH WOULD WANT TO INFORM THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL (POSSIBLY BY LETTER) AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT. WE WOULD CONSIDER A SIMILAR NOTIFICATION CONCERNING THE COMMITMENT OF US FORCES. IN ADDITION, FRENCH HAVE SUGGESTED TO US THAT AT APPROPRIATE TIME SECRETARY GENERAL BE REQUESTED TO SEND OBSERVERS.

5. FRENCH AMBASSADOR VERNIER-PALLIEZ WAS ASKED TO ALERT GOF AUTHORITIES TO OUR DESIRE FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING WITH EUCOM. HE SUBSEQUENTLY CALLED BACK TO GIVE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE. DETAILS CONCERNING CONTACTS EXPECTED TOMORROW AND LIAISON MAY BE POSSIBLE EARLY NEXT WEEK.

6. COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED OTHER THAN TO INDICATE THAT THIS WOULD BE A SUBJECT FORCONSULTATION. FRENCH ARE AWARE THAT THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT TO BE IN COMMAND.

7. FRENCH ARE EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF LEAKS. THIS IS A JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE.

END OF MESSAGE STOESSEL

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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BY CW NARA DATE 4/23/10

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PAGE 01 PARIS 3101
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DE RUFHFR #3101 1871314
O 061314Z JUL 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9036

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 23101
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/6/02 (MARESCA, JOHN J.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, AO
SUBJECT: ANGOLAN MESSAGE ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL
REF: STATE 184187

1. ~~S~~ - ENITRE TEXT

2. PENNE SAYS THAT LOPO DE NASCIMENTO TOLD PRESIDENT MITTERRAND THAT ANGOLA WAS READY TO UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT THAT THE CUBANS WILL DEPART ANGOLA. PENNE SAID THE ANGOLANS ACCEPT THE IDEA OF SIMULTANEITY BETWEEN THE BEGINNING OF A CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AND THAT OF THE SOUTH AFRICANS. THE ONLY THING THE ANGOLANS DO NOT WANT IS FOR ANYTHING TO BE MADE PUBLIC BEFORE HAND WHICH WOULD MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THEY ARE GIVING IN TO "BLACKMAIL".

3. PENNE NEVER ANSWERED THE DIRECT QUESTION ON HOW ANGOLANS MAY HAVE COME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE A FRENCH AGREEMENT TO GUARANTEE THE CUBAN'S WITHDRAWAL. PENNE SAID THAT HE REALLY DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT EXACTLY THE FRENCH WOULD BE GUARANTEEING. IF IN THE END THE CUBANS DID NOT LEAVE, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY, WHAT WOULD FRANCE DO? IN ANY EVENT, HE ADDED, WE HAVE THE ANGOLAN GUARANTEE THEY WILL LEAVE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. N.B. PRESUME DEPARTMENT IS AWARE THAT AUSSEIL IS NOT COMING TO THE US THIS WEEK -- HE IS OFF TO BANGUI. HE SAID THAT HE WILL BE AVAILABLE TO JOIN THE TALKS ON NAMIBIA AFTER JULY 14. GALBRAITH

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PARIS 3101

DTG: 061314Z JUL 82 PSN: 048868

NLRR MD7081 #47390

BY CN NARA DATE 4/23/10

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DE RUEHC #6131 1870059
O 060115Z JUL 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7882

INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 9585
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 186131 TOSEC 100102
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 1, 3 7/5/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)
TAGS: PEPR, XF, FR, US, LE, IS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT MITTERAND

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN
TO PRESIDENT MITTERAND BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS.

3. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

FRANCE'S DECISION, IN PRINCIPLE, TO CONTRIBUTE A FORCE TO
ASSIST IN OBSERVING AND SUPERVISING THE ARRANGEMENTS
BEING WORKED OUT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON FOR THE
DEPARTURE OF THE PLO AND OTHER ARMED ELEMENTS FROM BEIRUT
IS AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT. THE RAPID CREATION AND
DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH A FORCE IS CRITICAL TO THE EFFORT TO
AVOID FURTHER VIOLENCE AND BLOODSHED IN THAT CITY. I
KNOW THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT THIS MUST BE THE FOCUS OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ALL OUR EFFORTS IN THE HOURS AND DAYS AHEAD.

THE FACT THAT THE SITUATION IN WEST BEIRUT IS UPPERMOST
IN OUR MINDS DOES NOT OBSCURE THE NECESSITY TO LOOK
BEYOND TO THE NEED TO ADDRESS THE DEEPER ISSUES INVOLVED
IN LEBANON AND THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. FOREMOST
ASPECTS. I AM KEENLY AWARE THAT A SOLUTION TO THE ISSUES
CURRENTLY FACING US IN THE LEBANON CONTEXT CAN ONLY BE A
FIRST STEP TOWARD A BROADER SOLUTION ENCOMPASSING-THE-
PALESTINIANS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AS WELL AS ISRAEL
AND THE ARAB STATES.

YOUR CONCERN IN THIS REGARD IS ONE WHICH WE SHARE AND I
WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW I SEE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE PEACE
PROCESS, ONCE WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE DANGER OF FURTHER
BLOODSHED IN LEBANON HAS BEEN AVERTED.- I DO-NOT BELIEVE

WE CAN TAKE STEPS NOW, BEFORE A SOLUTION FOR LEBANON IS
IN HAND, BUT WE ARE MINDFUL OF THE NEED TO PRESS ON AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER.

I FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE ARRANGEMENT WE RE SEEKING FOR
THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD BETWEEN ISRAELI OCCUPATION AND
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE CANNOT BECOME A SUBSTITUTE FOR THAT
PEACE, WHICH MUST BE BASED FIRMLY ON SECURITY-COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242 AND 338. IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT A
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD IS NECESSARY BECAUSE -FULL PEACE
CANNOT BE ACHIEVED OVERNIGHT. UNTIL PEACE CAN BE
NEGOTIATED, THE PALESTINIANS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA
STRIP NEED TO BE RELIEVED OF THE BURDENS OF MILITARY
OCCUPATION SO THAT THEY CAN, THROUGH NEGOTIATION,
PARTICIPATE IN DETERMINING THEIR OWN FUTURE.

MR. PRESIDENT, THE ARRANGEMENTS THE UNITED STATES SEEKS
FOR THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WOULD PROVIDE AN HONORABLE
BASIS FOR PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS
AND ARE NOT AN ATTEMPT EITHER TO PERPETUATE EXISTING
ISRAELI OCCUPATION POLICIES, OR TO PREJUDGE CAMP DAVID'S
"FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS" IN ISRAEL'S FAVOR.

THE CRISIS IN LEBANON HAS GIVEN THE PEACE PROCESS A
GREATER SENSE OF URGENCY, AND HAS LED-MANY OF -OUR FRIENDS
TO PROPOSE NEW INITIATIVES OR NEW CONCEPTS WHICH THEY-
FEEL COULD ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE ALREADY HAVE IN CAMP DAVID MOST OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE
IDEAS WE HAVE HEARD FROM OUR FRIENDS IN RECENT-DAYS. THE
WIDESPREAD SENSE OF AN URGENT NEED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES
OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IS UNDERSTANDABLE. BUT-THEFACT
IS THAT IF WE MOVE QUICKLY TO PUT THE TRANSITIONAL REGIME
IN PLACE, CAMP DAVID PROVIDES THAT FINAL STATUS
NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BEGIN "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE," BUT NOT
LATER THAN THE THIRD YEAR OF THE TRANSITIONAL-PERIOD. WE
WILL NEED THE AGREEMENT OF EGYPT, ISRAEL AND THE
PALESTINIANSELECTED TO THE TRANSITIONAL REGIME BEFORE WE

CAN SET A DATE FOR THESE TALKS. CLEARLY, THE SOONER
THESE TALKS BEGIN THE BETTER.

I AM SURE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT I
CAN SAY NO MORE AT THIS TIME. OUR ROLE AS MEDIATOR
BETWEEN THE PARTIES PRECLUDES ME FROM TAKING POSITIONS
NOW WHICH ANY OF THE PARTIES COULD CLAIM PREJUDGE THE
OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE YET TO BEGIN.

COOPERATION BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE
INTERESTS OF PEACE IS AN IDEA DEEPLY ENGRAVED IN AMERICAN
HISTORY AND TRADITION. WORKING TOGETHER, I BELIEVE WE
CAN SUCCEED IN OUR EFFORTS TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF
LEBANON IN BUILDING A NEW FUTURE FOR ITS PEOPLE.

WARM REGARDS.

SINCERELY

RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT. STOESSER

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NLRR MD7-081 #47391
BY AI NARA DATE 4/73 /10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DE RUHFR #3235 1871915

O 061914Z JUL 82 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9114

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 23235

MODIS

E.O. 12965: RDS-1 7/6/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.) OR-M

TAGS: XF, LE, FR

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL GUTMANN
ON LEBANON

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I MET WITH GUTMANN IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO OBTAIN HIS FIRSTHAND IMPRESSIONS. GUTMANN GAVE DCM AND MYSELF A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETINGS WITH NUMEROUS LEBANESE LEADERS, ARAFAT, AND HIS VISITS TO JERUSALEM AND DAMASCUS. THE FOLLOWING POINTS OF INTEREST EMERGED DURING THE DISCUSSION.

3. GUTMANN ARGUED THAT IF THE PLO CAN SEE NO POLITICAL PROSPECTS, THEY WILL NOT LEAVE WEST BEIRUT AND MANY OF THE YOUNG FANATICS WILL DIE FIGHTING A LAST STAND. FRENCH BELIEVE A UNSC RESOLUTION COULD PROVIDE THE POLITICAL COVER THE PLO NEEDS. GUTMANN TOLD PLO REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE FRENCH WERE WORKING WITH THE EGYPTIANS ON A UNSC RESOLUTION. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE IF THE US WOULD AGREE TO A SIMPLE TEXT WHICH REPRESENTS A POLITICAL ADVANCE FOR THE PLO. (IN AN ASIDE GUTMANN SAID MANY PEOPLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST BELIEVED IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE PLO WOULD CHANGE ITS NAME.) IF THE US

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CANNOT AGREE TO SUCH A UNSC TEXT, THEN FROM THE FRENCH POINT OF VIEW IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE A BROAD-TEXT WHICH CLEARLY REFLECTS FRENCH CONVICTIONS EVEN IF THE US VETOES IT. I REPEATED THE ARGUMENTS EAGLEBURGER USED WITH VERNIER-PALLIEZ IN STATE 186127.

4. GUTMANN URGED ARAFAT TO BEGIN WORKING ON THE LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR EVACUATION OF THE PLO AND PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS--EVEN BEFORE POLITICAL DECISIONS FOR EVACUATION WERE TAKEN. ARAFAT WANTS PROTECTION AGAINST REPRISALS FOR PALESTINIANS WHO STAY BEHIND AFTER EVACUATION OF PLO FORCES. HE ASKED WHY ADVANCE PLANNING WAS NECESSARY SINCE AFTER THE POLITICAL DECISIONS WERE TAKEN IT WOULD STILL TAKE SOME TIME BEFORE A UN FORCE ARRIVED TO SUPERVISE THE EVACUATION. GUTMANN ARGUED THAT ARRANGEMENTS SUCH AS ZONES OF EMBARKATION COULD NEVERTHELESS

BE DECIDED IN ADVANCE. THESE ARRANGEMENTS HAD TO BE DEFINED BY THE LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN COMMISSION, AND GUTMANN SAID PRINCE SAUD HAD TOLD HIM LAST NIGHT THAT THIS COMMISSION HAS FINALLY MET TO WORK OUT THESE PROBLEMS. GUTMANN SAID THE EVACUATION ARRANGEMENTS WOULD ONLY BE FOR 4,000 PLO GUERRILLAS. AN ADDITIONAL 2,000 PLO FIGHTERS WERE INTEGRATED INTO THE SYRIAN ARMY. GUTMANN SAID ARAFAT DOES NOT OBJECT TO THEIR WITHDRAWAL BUT CONSIDERS IT A SYRIAN RESPONSIBILITY.

5. GUTMANN WAS DISTURBED BY THE FACT THAT US REPRESENTATIVES CONTINUE TO REFER TO A "FRANCO-AMERICAN FORCE". HE THOUGHT THE ARABS COULD NOT ACCEPT A FORCE WITH THIS LABEL; IT WOULD HAVE TO BE LABELLED A UN FORCE, A UNIFIL, OR A MULTINATIONAL FORCE. GUTMANN ADDED THAT HE AND CHEYSSON HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT SENDING FRENCH FORCES INTO BEIRUT. GUTMANN THOUGHT THAT VERNIER-PALLIEZ WAS OUT IN FRONT OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ON THIS POINT. GUTMANN WARNED THAT DIFFICULTIES IN LEBANON MAY ONLY BE BEGINNING. EVEN AFTER THE ISRAELIS, THE PLO AND SYRIANS LEAVE, LEBANESE FACTIONS WILL CONTINUE FIGHTING ONE ANOTHER. HABIB SEEMS TO BELIEVE A PEACE-KEEPING FORCE COULD LEAVE BEIRUT IN ONE MONTH; IT MAY BE MORE REALISTIC TO THINK IN TERMS OF YEARS.

6. GUTMANN SUMMARIZED THE POSITION THE FRENCH WERE TAKING WITH THE PLO AS FOLLOWS. THEY RECOGNIZE ISRAELI AGGRESSION BUT IT CREATES A NEW SITUATION. THEY ARE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

URGING THE PLO TO LEAVE WEST BEIRUT BUT RECOGNIZE THAT PALESTINIANS HAVE A CAUSE WHICH IS JUST. THE FRENCH ARE PREPARED TO MARK A POLITICAL ADVANCE FOR THE PLO AT THE UN OR ELSEWHERE IN ORDER TO OFFSET PLO LOSSES ON THE GROUND. FRANCE IS PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE TO A UN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE AND IS ALSO WORKING WITH THE EGYPTIANS FOR A UNSC RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD ADVANCE THE PLO'S POLITICAL POSITION.

7. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED.
GALBRAITH

PARIS 3235

DTG: 061914Z JUL 82 PSN: 049409

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BY CN NADA DATE 7/23/10

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