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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 12/21/2007

File Folder FRANCE (7/7/82-7/27/82)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 13

NOUZILLE

48

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47404	CABLE	071719Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/7/1982	B1
47405	MEMO	STOESSEL TO THE PRESIDENT RE RESOLVING THE WEST BEIRUT CRISIS R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/8/1982	B1
47406	LETTER	DRAFT RR TO MITTERRAND R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	5	ND	B1
47408	CABLE	080209Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/8/1982	B1
47411	CABLE	090440Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/9/1982	B1
47412	CABLE	091653Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/9/1982	B1
47413	CABLE	101029Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/10/1982	B1
47414	CABLE	121800Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/12/1982	B1
47415	CABLE	161715Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/16/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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48

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47416	CABLE	172047Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/17/1982	B1
47417	CABLE	191100Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/19/1982	B1
47418	CABLE	210520Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	7/21/1982	B1
47419	CABLE	221437Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	7/22/1982	B1
47421	CABLE	221418Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	7/22/1982	B1
47423	CABLE	221414Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/22/1982	B1
47424	CABLE	242207Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	7/24/1982	B1
47426	CABLE	261146Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/26/1982	B1
47428	CABLE	261550Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	7/26/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47430	CABLE	261735Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	7/26/1982	B1
47432	CABLE	270151Z JUL 82 R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081	4	7/27/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47404

PAGE 01 PARIS 3356
SIT458 DATE 07/09/82

DTG: 071719Z JUL 82 PSN: 050683
TOR: 188/1829Z

WARFARE AGAINST THE PLO.

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS KEMP NORT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #3356 1881720
O 071719Z JUL 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9173

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2424
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 6538
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1123
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4362
USLO RIYADH 0576
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5334
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4374

BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 23356
EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/7/02 (MARESCA, JOHN J) OR-M
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, FR, LE, US
SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON LEBANON
REF: PARIS 23235 (NODIS/NOTAL)

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING DISCUSSIONS JUNE 7 WITH VISITING EUR OFFICIAL (HAASS) AND EMBOFF, QUAI DEPUTY DIRECTOR RAPIN AND DIRECTOR FOR MIDEAST BOIDEVAIX REVIEWED LEBANON SITUATION. BOIDEVAIX HAD JUST COME FROM A MEETING WITH GUTMANN.

3. IN TERMS OF CONVERSATIONS HERE IN PARIS, BOIDEVAIX SAID THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW BEYOND THE READ-OUT THE AMBASSADOR RECEIVED PREVIOUS EVENING (REFTEL). RAPIN SAID THAT KADDOUMI AND THE OTHER TWO ARAB LEAGUE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EMISSARIES WERE LEAVING PARIS, SINCE IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE MEETINGS, AND THAT THEY WOULD-PERHAPS RETURN AT THE END OF THE WEEK. HE ADDED THAT NOTHING DEFINITE WAS SET.

4. BOIDEVAIX INDICATED FRUSTRATION AND CONSTERNATION ABOUT THE FLOOD OF NEWS MEDIA REPORTS INDICATING THAT A DEAL HAD BEEN WRAPPED UP FOR PLO WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BEIRUT. HE REFERRED TO A RECENT ITEM FROM TEL AVIV CLAIMING THAT ARAFAT HAD SIGNED AN AGREEMENT. HE CONTRASTED THIS PUBLIC TREATMENT WITH THE ACTUAL REALITY OF LITTLE MOVEMENT ON THE CRUCIAL ELEMENT OF PLO AGREEMENT TO DEPART. ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS WERE PUTTING OUT FALSE REPORTS TO WEAKEN THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT, BOIDEVAIX SAID HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS WERE MORE LIKELY ENGAGING IN A KIND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL

5. ON A POSSIBLE FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN SOME MILITARY FORCE TO FACILITATE PLO WITHDRAWAL, BOIDEVAIX INDICATED CONSIDERABLE PESSIMISM ABOUT REACHING THAT POINT. HE MADE CLEAR THAT SHOULD EVENTS REACH THAT POINT, THERE WOULD BE NO REAL OBSTACLES TO FRENCH PARTICIPATION, EITHER TECHNICAL OR POLITICAL (READ FRENCH INTERNAL POLITICS). HOWEVER, BOIDEVAIX WENT ON TO EMPHASIZE THREE CONDITIONS SEEN BY FRENCH AS ESSENTIAL:

- A) PLO WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW (NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVING A SIGNED AGREEMENT);
- B) AGREEMENT OF OTHER PARTIES; AND
- C) SOME KIND OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL BLESSING OF THE ACTIONS, ALTHOUGH HE STATED THAT THIS NEED NOT BE A RESOLUTION REQUIRING FORMAL VOTE.

6. BOTH RAPIN AND BOIDEVAIX REFERRED TO THE PAPER BEING CIRCULATED IN NEW YORK AS A "WORKING PAPER". SEVERAL TIMES EACH OF THEM USED THE TERM "DRAFT DECLARATION", STOPPED, AND CORRECTED THEMSELVES TO SAY THAT IT WAS A 'WORKING PAPER'. BOIDEVAIX GAVE NO INDICATION OF HASTE, BUT RATHER INDICATED THAT THE IDEA WAS TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF PUTTING TOGETHER A CONSENSUS AT THE UN ON ELEMENTS OF AN OVERALL SOLUTION TO THE LEBANON POSITION. NOTWITHSTANDING THIS EFFORT, BOTH RAPIN AND BOIDEVAIX EXPRESSED DEEP PESSIMISM OVER LEBANON'S FUTURE, EVEN IF WITHDRAWAL OF PLO AND OTHER FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES COULD BE ACHIEVED.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. WE ASKED FOR BOIDEVAIX' ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA THAT NOW WAS THE TIME TO CAPITALIZE ON THE PLO WEAKNESS TO PUSH FORWARD WITH CAMP DAVID TO SETTLE THINGS ON A GRANDER SCALE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BOIDEVAIX SAID HE WAS NOT SURE YET THAT THE PLO WAS WEAKER POLITICALLY. HE ADDED THAT IN ANY EVENT THIS WOULD BE CLEARER A BIT LATER--SAY ABOUT THE END OF JULY. HE SHOWED OBVIOUS RELUCTANCE TO BE DRAWN OUT FURTHER ON THE ISSUE OF THE LARGER PEACE PROCESS.

GALBRAITH

PARIS 3356

DTG: 071719Z JUL 82 PSN: 050683

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 24 7/10/1

BY CA NARA DATE 4/23/10

~~SECRET~~

4752 2
~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Acting Secretary

Subject: Resolving the West Beirut Crisis:
French Conditions on Participation

The French Ambassador informed us tonight that France's "Agreement in principle" to join us in an international force is still in effect. He then put forth a list of conditions which would have to be satisfied before they could take their final decision.

With one exception, none of these conditions give us any problem; they are, in fact, the same conditions we apply to ourselves (e.g., the parties involved must agree to such a force). The exception is the French requirement that the United Nations "acquiesce" in or "bless" French participation in the force. It was clear from the Ambassador's presentation that the French have in mind a process by which -- whether they would want to send their UNIFIL battalion or some other unit -- the Secretary General would consult with Security Council members to seek their views. This, of course, would virtually ensure that France's condition cannot be met, thereby making it impossible for us to plan effectively to insert the international force in a timely fashion. The Soviets would of course object when consulted by the Secretary General, leaving the final decision in the hands of third parties at just the time when rapid and decisive action will be crucial.

We told the French the above, and indicated we would probably want to look at other alternatives. The French Ambassador agreed to report our discussion to Paris and seek to clarify whether France intends to stick to this line. Attached for your approval is a letter from you to President Mitterrand which reenforces the points made here today, and provides him with an opportunity to retreat on the UN "acquiescence" point if he wishes.

Additionally we have had informal signals from the Italians that they might be persuaded to participate. Thus, I have also attached for your approval a letter from you to Prime Minister Spadolini asking Italy to be our partner in the international force. If we have not received a change in signals from the French by late Friday Washington time we would give this letter to the Italian Ambassador here and ask for the earliest possible reply.

~~SECRET~~

RDS-3 7/8/02

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-181 #474/65

BY CW NARA DATE 1/23/00

47406

Dear Francois:

Let me say first how gratified I am that France has been considering joining the United States in an international force to help the Government of Lebanon reestablish its authority over its own capital.

I have just heard the report of your Ambassador's meeting tonight with Undersecretary Eagleburger. As I am sure your Ambassador's report will make clear, the positions of France and the United States at this point are, with one exception, virtually identical. We have both decided in principle to participate in an international force, and we both now require that certain conditions be met -- such as the acceptance of the force by the parties involved -- before taking our final decisions.

I fear, however, that one condition which France poses, as conveyed by your Ambassador, would seem to render French participation close to impossible. The U.S. intends to notify the Secretary General of our intention to provide a force at the request of the Government of Lebanon, and to invite the UN to supply observers. France's position, on the other hand, would require "acquiescence" in, or blessing of, France's

His Excellency

Francois Mitterrand,

President of the French Republic,
Paris.

DECLASSIFIED/REF/FOUO
NLRR 107-081 #47406
BY CJ NARA DATE 4/23/10

4

participation by the UN or the Secretary General. In our view, this would inevitably require consultations with the Security Council and invite a negative Soviet response which would then render the Secretary General incapable of providing a positive answer. Such a process also would put the decision on whether to deploy the force into the hands of third parties at the very moment when the Lebanese will require the immediate help of the force.

I understand, Mr. President, France's desire for some form of United Nations approval. I, too, would want this if I thought there was any way to assure that it could be obtained quickly and without crippling amendments or conditions. Unfortunately, I see no possible way to avoid Soviet intransigence. Thus, I see no alternative but to proceed with regard to the UN as I have outlined above. Regrettably, close as we are to agreement, this difference of view appears to foreclose the Franco-American force that we had earlier contemplated. Since time is rapidly becoming critical I am sure that you will understand that the United States must, within the course of the day, begin the search for alternative partners.

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 47406 (x/80)

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

BY CU NARA DATE 4/25/10

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Although our governments have naturally been in close touch as the dangerous situation in Lebanon has evolved, I am writing to you urgently now because we are nearing a crucial point when we will either be able to resolve the situation without renewed violence or witness further tragedy in Beirut. My emissary, Ambassador Habib, has been making good progress in recent days in ameliorating the immediate crisis in Beirut. He reports that the Lebanese Government and PLO may be nearing an agreement. As you know, a key step in the resolution of the crisis will be the safe and orderly departure of PLO personnel out of West Beirut and out of Lebanon.

In this connection, I have decided in principle that, if the Government of Lebanon should formally request our assistance and other parties to the conflict agree, the U.S. would contribute a contingent to a peacekeeping force for Beirut. The mission of the peacekeeping force would be to assist the Lebanese armed forces in overseeing the safe and orderly departure of PLO personnel from Beirut and to assist the Lebanese Government in reasserting its authority in the Beirut area.

We would expect the peacekeeping force to be in Beirut for a comparatively brief period, perhaps up to thirty days. Although its personnel would be armed, we do not anticipate that the peacekeeping force would become involved in any

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

- 2 -

hostilities. While we recognize that no peacekeeping force can be completely immune from the risk of isolated incidents, we would not permit any U.S. forces to be deployed to Beirut until we had received assurances from relevant governments and parties concerning their safety, and had taken other precautions.

The situation in Beirut is very fluid. The peacekeeping force might have to begin its mission in a week or less. Because of this urgency, because the Lebanese Government wants the peacekeeping force organized outside the UN, and because of the clear opportunity for the Soviets to block any action, it will not be possible to put the peacekeeping force under a UN umbrella. We would, however, keep the Secretary General informed about developments and invite him to send observers.

I know how concerned your Government is about developments in Lebanon and that you are committed to help achieve a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Beirut. Thus, I would like Italy to consider seriously the possibility of contributing troops should you receive a formal Lebanese proposal to participate in a peacekeeping force. Italy, like the United States, would of course not undertake such a responsibility lightly. Nor would I ask you to consider this possibility were it not for the fact that we are reaching the moment of truth in Lebanon and success or failure is now largely

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

- 3 -

hanging on the creation of a peacekeeping force. I am also mindful in appealing to you of Italy's special interest in the Middle East and of your personal courage in taking difficult decisions in cooperation with the United States to promote peace and security. Time is short. I would appreciate hearing back from you as soon as you and your colleagues have had an opportunity to consider this matter.

Warm regards,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Giovanni Spadolini,
President of the Council of Ministers
of the Italian Republic,
Rome.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 09 JUL 82 12

TO PRESIDENT

FROM STOESSEL, W

DOCDATE 08 JUL 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

ITALY

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

LEBANON

ISRAEL

SPADOLINI, GIOVANNI

HS

CM

SUBJECT: PROPOSED LTRS TO MITTERRAND & SPADOLINI RE RESOLVING WEST BEIRUT CRISIS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 10 JUL 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

TANTER

KEMP

WHEELER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47408

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 8347 DTG: 080209Z JUL 82 PSN: 051341
SIT808 DATE 07/19/82 TOR: 189/0354Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS KEMP NORT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #8347 1890228
O P 080209Z JUL 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8018

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 7967
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1048
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1695
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0236
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 3695
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 7671
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 7386
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9713
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 188347

NODIS

E O. 12065: RDS-1, 7/72002 (VELIOTES, NICHOLAS A.)

TAGS: PEPR, LE, US, MILI, FR

SUBJECT: FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL FORCE FOR
BEIRUT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER CALLED IN FRENCH AMBASSADOR
VERNIER-PALLIEZ LATE AFTERNOON OF JULY 7 TO ASK FOR FIRM
GOF POSITION ON FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL
FORCE FOR BEIRUT. EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT, WHILE THERE IS
STILL NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLO AND GOL, SOME PROGRESS IS
BEING MADE, INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF OUR BEGINNING MILITARY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

STAFF TALKS IF FRENCH ARE TO PARTICIPATE. HOWEVER, IF
FRENCH DECIDE THEY CANNOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE FORCE, WE MUST
KNOW THAT NOW, SO WE WOULD STILL HAVE TIME TO MAKE OTHER
ARRANGEMENTS. VERNIER-PALLIEZ UNDERTOOK TO POSE QUESTION
TO PARIS AND SEEK AS QUICK A RESPONSE AS POSSIBLE.

3. IN REVIEWING U.S. POSITION ON THIS ISSUE, EAGLEBURGER
MADE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL MAJOR POINTS:

-- PUBLIC STATEMENTS NOTWITHSTANDING, THERE ARE INDICA-
TIONS THAT THE PLO ACCEPTS U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF.

-- U.S. UNDERSTANDS GOF DESIRE FOR UN SPONSORSHIP FOR
MNF, BUT WE BELIEVE WE CANNOT GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THIS BECAUSE OF SOVIET PROBLEM. WE WOULD, HOWEVER,

AGREE TO NOTIFY SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MNF AND TO
INVITE THE UN TO SEND OBSERVERS.

-- THE U.S. WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE MNF WITHOUT A
FORMAL GOL REQUEST AND AGREEMENT FROM THE OTHER PARTIES.
WE ARE ASKING FRANCE TO PARTICIPATE WITH THESE SAME
CONDITIONS IN MIND.

4. IN COURSE DISCUSSION, WE MADE POINT THAT EGYPTIANS
HAD CLEARLY DELINKED FUTURE OF PEACE PROCESS FROM
CURRENT COOPERATION ON LEBANON. WE ALSO STRESSED POSITIVE
SAUDI ROLE IN SUPPORT OF HABIB'S EFFORTS, ALSO WITH NO
PRECONDITIONS RE U.S. POSTURE ON PALESTINIAN ISSUE. IN
BOTH CASES, OUR ARAB FRIENDS ACCEPTED SUBSTANTIALLY SAME
U.S. POSTURE RE FUTURE OF PEACE PROCESS AS THAT CONTAINED
IN REAGAN LETTER TO MITTERAND. STOESEL

SECSTATE WASHDC 8347

DTG: 080209Z JUL 82 PSN: 051341

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 1067-081 #47408

BY CN NARA DATE 4/23/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47411

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 9411 DTG: 090440Z JUL 82 PSN: 053129
SIT407 DATE 07/09/82 TOR: 190/0454Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB RENT KEMP NORT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: FYI

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #9411 1900451
O O 090440Z JUL 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 8099
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 1732

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7820

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 189411

NODIS

PARIS FOR AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH. PLEASE DELIVER OOB

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 7/8/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS: LE, FR

SUBJECT: LEBANON: REAGAN TO MITTERRAND LETTER ON FRENCH
PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING FORCE FOR BEIRUT

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PARA 3 CONTAINS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN
TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND ON FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE
PEACEKEEPING FORCE FOR BEIRUT. IT SHOULD BE DELIVERED
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. BEGIN TEXT

DEAR FRANCOIS:

LET ME SAY FIRST HOW GRATIFIED I AM THAT FRANCE HAS BEEN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONSIDERING JOINING THE UNITED STATES IN AN INTERNATIONAL
FORCETO HELP THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON REESTABLISH ITS
AUTHORITY OVER ITS OWN CAPITAL.

I HAVE JUST HEARD THE REPORT OF YOUR AMBASSADOR'S MEETING
TONIGHT WITH UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER. AS I AM SURE
YOUR AMBASSADOR'S REPORT WILL MAKE CLEAR, THE POSITIONS
OF FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES AT THIS POINT ARE, WITH
ONE EXCEPTION, VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL. WE HAVE BOTH DECIDED
IN PRINCIPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE, AND
WE BOTH NOW REQUIRE THAT CERTAIN CONDITIONS BE MET -- SUCH
AS THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE FORCE BY THE PARTIES INVOLVED --
BEFORE TAKING OUR FINAL DECISIONS.

I FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT ONE CONDITION WHICH FRANCE POSES,
AS CONVEYED BY YOUR AMBASSADOR, WOULD SEEM TO RENDER

FRENCH PARTICIPATION NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE. THE U.S. INTENDS
TO NOTIFY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF OUR INTENTION TO
PROVIDE A FORCE AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
LEBANON, AND TO INVITE THE UN TO SUPPLY OBSERVERS.
FRANCE'S POSITION, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD REQUIRE
"ACQUIESCENCE" IN OR APPROVAL OF, FRANCE'S PARTICIPATION
BY THE UN OR THE SECRETARY GENERAL. IN OUR VIEW, THIS
WOULD INEVITABLY REQUIRE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SECURITY
COUNCIL AND INVITE A NEGATIVE SOVIET RESPONSE WHICH WOULD
MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PROVIDE
A POSITIVE ANSWER. SUCH A PROCESS ALSO WOULD PUT THE
DECISION ON WHETHER TO DEPLOY THE FORCE INTO THE HANDS
OF THIRD PARTIES AT THE VERY MOMENT WHEN THE LEBANESE WILL
REQUIRE A TIMELY COMMITMENT AND PROMPT DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES.
I UNDERSTAND, FRANCOIS, FRANCE'S DESIRE FOR SOME FORM OF
UNITED NATIONS APPROVAL. I, TOO, WOULD WANT THIS IF I
THOUGHT THEREWERE ANY WAY TO ASSURE THAT IT COULD BE
OBTAINED QUICKLY AND WITHOUT CRIPPLING AMENDMENTS OR
CONDITIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, I SEE NO POSSIBLE WAY TO -
AVOID SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE. THUS, I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE
BUT TO PROCEED WITH REGARD TO THE UN AS I HAVE OUTLINED
ABOVE. REGRETTABLY, CLOSE AS WE ARE TO AGREEMENT, THIS
DIFFERENCE OF VIEW PROMISES TO FORCLOSE THE FRANCO-AMERICAN
FORCE THAT WE HAD EARLIER CONTEMPLATED. SINCE TIME IS

RAPIDLY BECOMING CRITICAL I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL UNDER-
STAND THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST, WITHIN THE COURSE OF
THE DAY, BEGIN THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE PARTNERS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, RON. END TEXT STOESSEL

SECSTATE WASHDC 9411

DTG: 090440Z JUL 82 PSN: 053129

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NLRR M07-081 447411
4/23/00

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 3677
SIT554 DATE 07/19/82

DTG: 091653Z JUL 82 PSN: 054028
TOR: 190/1816Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT KEMP NRTH
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: RED TAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #3677 1901653
O 091653Z JUL 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9362

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PARIS 23677
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/9/02 (MARESCA JOHN J.) OR-M
TAGS: UNSC, PEPR, LE, FR
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION AT QUAI ON LEBANON
REF: STATE 189411

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. POLCOUNS AND EMBOFF MET WITH QUAI MIDDLE EAST DIRECTOR BOIDEVAIX JULY 9 AS FOLLOW-UP TO PRESIDENTIAL LETTER (REFTEL) AND TO MAINTAIN CONTACT ON LEBANON DEVELOPMENTS.
3. LETTER HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED TO MITTERRAND IN HUNGARY. HE AND CHEYSSON RETURN TO PARIS LATE THIS EVENING. CHEYSSON IS HANDLING THIS ISSUE DIRECTLY WITH MITTERRAND.
4. BOIDEVAIX MADE CLEAR THAT IT WOULD TAKE AN ACT OF POLITICAL WILL FOR THE FRENCH TO OVERRIDE THEIR CURRENT ANALYSIS OF THE LEBANESE SITUATION AND AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN MULTINATIONAL FORCE. AS IT STANDS NOW, FRENCH WILL NOT JOIN FORCE WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT OF WHOLE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT (INCLUDING WAZZAN, SARKIS AND MILITARY), PLO, AND "MINIMUM CONSENSUS IN UNSC." GALBRAITH

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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BY AN NARA DATE 4/23/10

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12

PAGE 01 PARIS 3715 DTG: 101029Z JUL 82 PSN: 055210
SIT546 DATE 07/19/82 TOR: 191/1236Z

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AFTERNOON. BIANCO, WHO HAD BEEN INFORMED OF MY CONVERSATION WITH CHEYSSON, THOUGHT THE REMAINING OBSTACLES TO PLO CONCURRENCE RELIEVED THE TIME PRESSURE TO SOME EXTENT.

5. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED.
GALBRAITH

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RDTG KEMP NORT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PARIS 3715

DTG: 101029Z JUL 82 PSN: 055210

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #3715 1911029
O 101029Z JUL 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9383

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 23715
MODIS
FOR EAGLEBURGER FROM AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/10/92 (EVAN G. GALBRAITH) OR-M
TAGS: UNSC, PEPR, LE, FR
SUBJECT: LEBANON - FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN MNF
REF: STATE 189411

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. TO CONFIRM OUR NOCTURNAL TELEPHONE CONVERSATION, CHEYSSON TOLD ME LATE LAST NIGHT ON RETURNING FROM HUNGARY THAT HE AND MITTERRAND READ PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER ON THE AIRPLANE AND WHILE A REPLY WAS NOT YET PREPARED CHEYSSON KNEW WHAT IT WILL SAY, NAMELY:
THE FRENCH ARE PREPARED TO SUPPLY TROOPS PROVIDED ALL PARTIES AGREE TO THEIR COMING IN. BY ALL PARTIES THE FRENCH MEAN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, THE PLO AND THE ISRAELIS. HE DID NOT INCLUDE SYRIA. THE LEBANESE HAVE ASKED THE FRENCH AND CHEYSSON SAID THE ISRAELIS HAVE AGREED VIA THE USG AND IT IS A QUESTION OF THE PLO WHO HAVE ESTABLISHED NINE CONDITIONS, THREE OF WHICH RAISED OBSTACLES. THESE ARE:
- A. THE FORCE BE ACCEPTED OR AGREED TO (THIS NEEDS CLARIFICATION) BY THE UN;
- B. THAT THE ISRAELIS MOVE BACK 5 MILES; AND
- C. THAT ALL THEIR ARMS INCLUDING HEAVY ARMS BE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EVACUATED WITH THEM.

3. CHEYSSON SAID PRESUMABLY WE ALL AGREE THAT TO AVOID THE RISK OF A FIGHT THE PLO HAD TO ACQUIESE BEFORE ANY TROOPS WOULD COME IN. I CONCURRED AND ASKED IF THEY HAD ANY THOUGHTS OF HOW TO RESOLVE THESE THREE PLO IMPOSED OBSTACLES BUT HE SOUNDED STYMIED.

4. COMMENT: IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE FRENCH ARE NO LONGER INDEPENDENTLY REQUIRING UN APPROVAL; THE CONDITION REMAINS ONLY AS A PLO REQUIREMENT. HOPEFULLY MITTERRAND'S WRITTEN REPLY WILL CONFIRM THIS. WE SHOULD NOW CONCENTRATE ON POSSIBILITIES FOR OBTAINING SOME FORM OF TACIT UN APPROBATION OR ACQUIESCENCE WHICH WILL SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT. NEW ELYSEE SEC GEN BIANCO TOLD DCM THIS MORNING THAT WE COULD NOT EXPECT A REPLY BEFORE THIS

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BY GA NARA DATE 4/23/10

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13

PAGE 01 PARIS 3831
SIT537 DATE 07/19/82

DTG: 121800Z JUL 82 PSN: 000475
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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT KEMP EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #3831 1931800
O 121800Z JUL 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9457

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 23831
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7-12-12 (MARESCA, JOHN J.) OR-M
TAGS: MARR, MPOL, LE, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH CONTRIBUTION TO MNF: FRENCH EXPLANATION
OF LANGUAGE ON RELATIONSHIP TO UN
REF: BEIRUT 4556

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE ASKED ELYSEE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR (VEDRINE) FOR EXPLANATION OF DIFFERENCE IN LANGUAGE USED IN FRENCH NOTE TO LEBANESE (RETEL) AND MITTERRAND'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT REGARDING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MNF AND UN. WE ASKED VEDRINE FOR A MORE PRECISE EXPLANATION OF WHAT FRENCH HAVE IN MIND. VEDRINE SAID THE REASON THE FORMULATIONS WERE DIFFERENT WAS THAT THE FRENCH DELIBERATELY WISHED TO AVOID A PRECISE DEFINITION OF THIS RELATIONSHIP AT THIS TIME. THEY ARE CURRENTLY LOOKING FOR THE MINIMAL FORMULA UNDER WHICH THE UN SECGEN CAN BE NOTIFIED OF THE MNF AND WILL "TAKE NOTE" (PRENDRE ACTE). THE FRENCH SEE THE CURRENT SITUATION AS ONE IN EVOLUTION AND CONSIDER IT DISADVANTAGEOUS TO BE TOO SPECIFIC ABOUT THIS POINT NOW. VEDRINE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO ENGAGE SOME ACTION AT THE UN WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO CREATE OBSTACLES.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED. GALBRAITH

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NLRR 107-081 #1211A
BY AL NARA DATE 9/23/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

14

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PAGE 01 PARIS 4344
SIT977 DATE 07/19/82

DTG: 161715Z JUL 82 PSN: 006687
TOR: 197/1829Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #4344 1971719
O 161715Z JUL 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9695

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 24344
EXDIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 7/17/92 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, NU, FR
SUBJ: POSSIBLE SHULTZ - CHEYSSON MEETING
REF: (A) PARIS 24107; (B) STATE 196678

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. REGARDING PARAGRAPH 4 OF REFTEL (B) I RECOMMEND SECRETARY SHULTZ NOT RECEIVE FORMIN CHEYSSON AT THIS TIME. CHEYSSON HAS BEEN THE ARCHITECT OF FRANCE'S CENTRAL AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND HIS RECENT GLORIFICATION OF DANIEL ORTEGA OF NICARAGUA IN PARIS IS TOO MUCH. IN ADDITION TO ACTS IN REFTEL (A), CHEYSSON'S OSTENTATIOUS GREETING OF ORTEGA AT THE PRESIDENTIAL TRIBUNE AT THE 14TH OF JULY CELEBRATION BEFORE THE APPROVING SMILE OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR HAD AN ALMOST ANTI-AMERICAN EFFECT; EYES TURNED TO ME. I DO NOT THINK WASHINGTON HAS BEEN FIRM ENOUGH WITH FRANCE OVER THE REINSTALLATION OF FRENCH ARM SHIPMENTS TO NICARAGUA AND IF THE SECRETARY REFUSED TO SEE CHEYSSON IT COULD MAKE THEM QUESTION FRANCE'S LOVE AFFAIR WITH NICARAGUA. GALBRAITH

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BY AI NARA DATE 4/23/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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15

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 9275 DTG:172047Z JUL 82 PSN: 008342
SIT774 DATE 07/19/82 TOR: 198/2226Z

SECSTATE WASHDC 9275

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EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #9275 1982052
O 172047Z JUL 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8613

INFO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1152
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 199275
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 07/17/02 (BURT, RICHARD)
, AGS: PEPR, MOPS, IZ, IR, NATO, US FR
SUBJECT: IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT: FRENCH REACTION TO
ACTING SECRETARY'S MESSAGE

REF: (A) PARIS 24345 (NOTAL); (B) STATE 196690

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN RESPONSE TO REFTEL (A), YOU SHOULD INFORM THE
QUAI THAT WE AGREE WITH THE FRENCH THAT CONSULTATIONS
AT FOUR SHOULD BE THE PRINCIPAL FOCUS FOR POLITICAL
DISCUSSIONS ON THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT. WE ALSO AGREE
THAT OTHER ALLIES MAY HAVE LITTLE TO CONTRIBUTE ON THIS
SUBJECT. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT THEY MAY PROFIT
FROM DISCUSSIONS AT NATO. CONSEQUENTLY, WE INTEND,
WHILE MAINTAINING THE LOCUS OF CONSULTATIONS IN THE
QUAD, TO AIR THE PROBLEM AT NATO AND KEEP THE ALLIES
INFORMED OF OUR THINKING AS APPROPRIATE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. EMBASSY SHOULD ALSO REMIND YOUR GOF INTERLOCUTORS
THAT, AS WE HAVE NOTED IN THE PAST, WE CAN ONLY
MAINTAIN THE FOUR-POWER FORUM AS A PRINCIPAL FOCUS FOR

SENSITIVE CONSULTATIONS SO LONG AS THE BROADER NATO
CONSULTATIONS PROCESS IS SUSTAINED AS A HEALTHY AND
VIALE MECHANISM. SHULTZ

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BY CU

NARA DATE 1/23/10

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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PAGE 01 PARIS 4402
SIT832 DATE 07/23/82

DTG: 191100Z JUL 82 PSN: 010802
TOR: 201/0517Z

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SIT: MCF JP VP RENT EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #4402 2001100
O 191100Z JUL 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9746
USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PARIS 24402
USOEC
PASS USTR FOR AMBASSADOR MACDONALD
STATE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HORMATS
COMMERCE FOR UNDER SECRETARY OLMER
E. O. 12065: GDS 07/19/88 (KATZ, A.) OR-M
TAGS: OCON, OECD
SUBJECT: U. S. REPRESENTATION AT THE STEEL COMMITTEE
- MEETING, JULY 21-22, 1982

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I HEAR VIA KAY STOCKER THAT AMBASSADOR MACDONALD IS CONSIDERING MISSING THE FIRST DAY OF STEEL COMMITTEE. I THINK THIS WILL BE VERY BADLY RECEIVED BY THE EUROPEANS. DOUBTLESS YOU RECALL THAT THE COMMUNITY CITED THEIR ACTIONS IN THE STEEL COMMITTEE AS ONE OF THE WAYS (THE RESPONSIBLE WAYS) THAT THEY WILL REACT TO OUR PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON STEEL. THUS THE DEBATE ON WEDNESDAY WILL CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT PART OF OUR MANAGING THIS IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE FLAP IN US-EC RELATIONS. IF DAVE MACDONALD IS UNABLE TO CHANGE HIS SCHEDULE WE SHOULD TRY OUR BEST TO HAVE ANOTHER HIGH LEVEL REPRESENTATIVE ON WEDNESDAY, E. G. OLMER OR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HORMATS. EVEN THOUGH THIS DISCUSSION IS ESSENTIALLY RITUAL IT IS AN IMPORTANT RITUAL. KATZ

PARIS 4402

DTG: 191100Z JUL 82 PSN: 010802

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BY Q NARA DATE 4/23/10

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17

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 1991
SIT799 DATE 08/10/82

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TOR: 203/2325Z

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EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #1991 2020719

O 210520Z JUL 82 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0000

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 201991

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3, 7/20/02 (MICHEL, JAMES H.)

TAGS: PARM, IN, PEPR, MNUC, TECH

SUBJECT: US-INDIA NUCLEAR SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP

REF: (A) NEW DELHI 12176 (NOTAL), (B) 81 STATE 331715,
(C) 81 PA, IS 35851, (D) 81 PARIS 36459 (E) 81 STATE 306846,
(F) 81 STATE 214724

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THIS TELEGRAM CONTAINS INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARIS
(PARAS 7-11) AND FYI MATERIAL FOR DELHI. TEXT OF POINTS WE
WILL USE IN WASHINGTON AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS ARE IN
PARAS 4-6. END SUMMARY.

3. FOR NEW DELHI: CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS
CONCERNING PROPOSED TARAPUR SETTLEMENT HAVE TAKEN PLACE
(AND ARE CONTINUING). ON FRIDAY JULY 23 UNDER SECRETARY
KENNEDY WILL MEET WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY RASGORTA AND MAKE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

POINTS IN PARA 4 BELOW (AND PARA 5 IF NECESSARY). WE HAVE
DETERMINED, IN CONSULTATION WITH AMBASSADOR BARNES, THAT
MAKING THE PRESENTATION HERE RATHER THAN IN DELHI WOULD BE
THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED. WE WILL ADVISE IF THERE ARE ANY
STEPS THAT NEED TO BE TAKEN IN DELHI.

4. BEGIN WASHINGTON TALKING POINTS:

-- WE HAVE HELD, AND ARE CONTINUING TO HOLD,
CONSULTATIONS WITH LEADERS OF OUR CONGRESS CONCERNING
THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT ON TARAPUR.

-- AS WE EXPECTED, MANY QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN RAISED NOT
ONLY ABOUT THE TERMS OF THE SETTLEMENT, BUT THE PROCEDURES
THAT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED IN REVISING OUR AGREEMENT FOR

COOPERATION.

-- HOWEVER, I AM PLEASED TO REPORT THAT WE BELIEVE WE HAVE
A SUFFICIENT BASIS TO PROCEED WITH THE SETTLEMENT, AS LAID
OUT IN THE U.S. PAPER OF DECEMBER 17 OF LAST YEAR.

-- IT IS CLEAR THAT CONGRESSIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF SUBSTITUTE
FRENCH SUPPLY UNDER OUR AGREEMENT IS ON THE BASIS - AS
STATED IN OUR PAPER- THAT ALL EXISTING SAFEGUARDS AND
CONTROLS ON THE TARAPUR FUEL AND EQUIPMENT AND DERIVED
MATERIAL AS SET OUT IN THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION
WILL REMAIN INTACT AND, AMONG OTHER THINGS, NO STEPS
WILL BE MADE TO REPROCESS SPENT FUEL PRODUCED AT TARAPUR
WITHOUT U.S. AGREEMENT. WE TOLD THE CONGRESSMEN THAT WE
ARE NOT PREPARED TO GIVE SUCH AGREEMENT IN THE FORESEEABLE
FUTURE, AND WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE NEW SUPPLY ARRANGE-
MENTS WOULD REMOVE TARAPUR AS AN ISSUE BETWEEN US.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN OUR TWO
COUNTRIES ARE ACCURATELY REFLECTED IN THIS PROPOSED
EXCHANGE OF NOTES. WE ARE PRESENTING THIS NON-PAPER
DESCRIBING THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT TO THE FRENCH, WHOM
WE ARE CONSULTING AT THIS TIME AS WELL. (FYI: TEXTS TO
BE HANDED OVER ARE SET OUT IN PARA 6 BELOW.)

-- WE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE IN A POSITION TO EXCHANGE NOTES
PRIOR TO THE VISIT OF MRS. GANDHI, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE
OUR MUTUAL DESIRE TO RESOLVE THIS MATTER PRIOR TO HER

SECSTATE WASHDC 1991

DTG: 210520Z JUL 82 PSN: 014845

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.

5. BEGIN CONTINGENCY POINTS:

(IF THE INDIANS BALK AT OUR STATEMENT ON REPROCESSING)
-- WE ARE SIMPLY NOT IN A POSITION WHERE WE CAN, UNDER OUR
AGREEMENT, APPROVE REPROCESSING OF MATERIAL PRODUCED AT
TARAPUR.

-- (IF NECESSARY) THIS REMAINS CONTRARY TO BASIC U.S.
POLICY.

-- (IF NECESSARY) WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO HELP YOU ADDRESS
ANY CONCERNS YOU MAY HAVE REGARDING THE STORAGE OF
TARAPUR SPENT FUEL. I UNDERSTAND THAT WE HAVE COOPERATED
IN THIS REGARD IN THE PAST. (FYI: ABOUT FOUR YEARS AGO
WE MADE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE INDIANS FOR THE RERACKING OF
TARAPUR SPENT FUEL.) END CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS.

6. TEXTS OF DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO IN PARAS 4 AND 9.

FYI. WHEN WE PRESENT NOTES IN WASHINGTON, WE WILL MAKE
CLEAR THAT THE EXCHANGE COULD TAKE PLACE EITHER IN
WASHINGTON OR NEW DELHI; IF WASHINGTON CHOSEN, TEXTS WILL
BE MODIFIED TO REFLECT THIS. END FYI.

A. PROPOSED NOTE TO INDIA

THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES REFERS THE MINISTRY OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TO RECENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN REPRESENT-
ATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND INDIAN GOVERNMENTS RELATING
TO THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERN-
MENTS CONCERNING THE CIVIL USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY, SIGNED
AT WASHINGTON AUGUST 6, 1963 (THE "AGREEMENT FOR COOPERA-
TION") AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS.

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18

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 1991

DTG: 210520Z JUL 82 PSN: 014845

THE EMBASSY CONFIRMS THAT, WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE II A OF THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WAIVES ITS RIGHT TO HAVE THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA PURCHASE FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ANY ENTITY ACTING ON ITS BEHALF, AS NEEDED, ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA FOR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ENRICHED URANIUM FOR USE AS FUEL AT THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ALSO WAIVES ITS RIGHT UNDER THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION THAT THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION BE OPERATED ON NO OTHER SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL THAN THAT MADE AVAILABLE BY THE UNITED STATES. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WILL IN THE FUTURE, UNLESS OTHERWISE MUTUALLY AGREED BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, OBTAIN ALL ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR ENRICHED URANIUM CONTAINING NO MORE THAN TWENTY PERCENT U-235 FOR FUEL FOR THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE AND THAT THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER

STATION MAY BE OPERATED ON SUCH FUEL.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONFIRMS THAT THE CONTRACT REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE II A OF THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION, I.E., THE CONTRACT OF SALE OF ENRICHED URANIUM BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, SIGNED AT NEW DELHI MAY 17, 1966, AS AMENDED, SHALL BE SUSPENDED, UNTIL OTHERWISE AGREED BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONFIRMS THAT THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION, THE RELATED EXCHANGE OF LETTERS OF SEPTEMBER 16 AND 17, 1974, AND THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RELATING TO SAFEGUARDS PROVISIONS, SIGNED AT VIENNA JANUARY 27, 1971, SHALL REMAIN IN EFFECT IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.

B. PROPOSED INDIA NOTE TO THE U.S.

THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REFERS THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES TO RECENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS RELATING TO THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CONCERNING THE CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON, AUGUST 6, 1963 (THE "AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION") AND RELATED INSTRUMENTS.

THE MINISTRY CONFIRMS THAT, WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE II A OF THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION, THE GOVERNMENT OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INDIA WAIVES ITS RIGHT TO HAVE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, OR ANY ENTITY ACTING ON ITS BEHALF, SELL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, AS NEEDED, ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA FOR ENRICHED URANIUM FOR USE AS FUEL AT THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WILL IN THE FUTURE, UNLESS OTHERWISE MUTUALLY AGREED BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, OBTAIN ALL ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR ENRICHED URANIUM CONTAINING NO MORE THAN TWENTY PERCENT U-235 FOR FUEL FOR THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE AND WILL OPERATE THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION ON SUCH FUEL.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA CONFIRMS THAT THE CONTRACT

REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE II A OF THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION, I.E., THE CONTRACT OF SALE OF ENRICHED URANIUM BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, SIGNED AT NEW DELHI, MAY 17, 1966, AS AMENDED, SHALL BE SUSPENDED, UNTIL OTHERWISE AGREED BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA CONFIRMS THAT THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION, THE RELATED EXCHANGE OF LETTERS OF SEPTEMBER 16 AND 17, 1974, AND THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RELATING TO SAFEGUARDS PROVISIONS, SIGNED AT VIENNA, JANUARY 27, 1971, SHALL REMAIN IN EFFECT IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.

C. U.S. NON-PAPER DESCRIBING PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT

THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA WILL RESPECTIVELY WAIVE THEIR RIGHTS TO EXCLUSIVE USE OF U.S. ORIGIN FUEL FOR THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION, THUS PERMITTING INDIA TO OBTAIN ITS FUEL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION FROM FRANCE. THE 1963 AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA, THE RELATED EXCHANGE OF LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 16 AND 17, 1974, AND THE 1971 TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.

THE ENRICHED URANIUM CONTAINING NO MORE THAN TWENTY PERCENT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

U-235 WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE BY FRANCE TO INDIA ON TERMS AND CONDITIONS CONSISTENT WITH THOSE IN THE 1963 AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION AND WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THAT AGREEMENT CONCERNING MATERIAL USED IN OR PRODUCED AT THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION.

7. FOR PARIS. WE RECEIVED INDICATIONS FROM GOI IN LATE JUNE (REF A) THAT INDIA WAS INTERESTED IN TAKING STEPS TO RESOLVE OUR LONG-STANDING DISPUTE RE FUEL SUPPLY FOR THE U.S.-SUPPLIED NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS AT TARAPUR BEFORE MRS. GANDHI'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON JULY 28-29. DELAY IN APPROACHING FRANCE WAS NECESSITATED BY NEED FOR HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS WHICH WAS COMPLICATED BY CONGRESSIONAL RECESS. KEY CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS ON THIS MATTER, WHICH RAISES SENSITIVE QUESTIONS (REF B), TOOK PLACE JULY 19-20 AND ARE CONTINUING.

8. ACTION REQUESTED. EMBASSY SHOULD APPROACH URGENTLY HIGHEST APPROPRIATE FRENCH OFFICIALS, DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS BELOW (WHICH MAY BE PROVIDED IN WRITING), TO RAISE AGAIN MATTER OF GOF LEU FUEL SUPPLY FOR THE TARAPUR REACTORS. OUR INFORMATION REFS (C-F) IS THAT THE GOF WOULD BE WILLING TO SUPPLY TARAPUR IF INDIA SO REQUESTS AND THE U.S. DOES NOT OBJECT. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO CONFIRM THAT THIS IS GOF POSITION, AND, FURTHER, THAT GOF CONCURS IN BASIC ARRANGMENT DESCRIBED IN NON-PAPER.

9. WE HAVE HAD A BREAKTHROUGH IN OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE INDIANS CONCERNING A RESOLUTION OF U.S.-INDIAN DIFFERENCES OVER SUPPLY OF LEU TO THE TARAPUR REACTORS, A MATTER WHICH WE HAVE RAISED WITH YOU BEFORE.

-- THE INDIANS INDICATED TO US VERY RECENTLY THAT THEY

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 1991

DTG: 210520Z JUL 82 PSN: 014845

WISHED TO PURSUE A U.S. SETTLEMENT PROPOSAL, AND REACH AN UNDERSTANDING PRIOR TO PRIME MINISTER GANDHI'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK (JULY 29-30).

-- AS IS REFLECTED IN THE DOCUMENTS I WILL GIVE YOU, THIS PROPOSAL WOULD INVOLVE A SUSPENSION OF THE U.S. - INDIA ENRICHMENT SERVICES CONTRACT IN FAVOR OF FRENCH

SECSTATE WASHDC 1991 DTG: 210520Z JUL 82 PSN: 014845
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SUPPLY FOR THE TARAPUR REACTORS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD INVOLVE KEEPING IN FORCE THE U.S. - INDIA AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION AND WITH IT THE SAFEGUARDS AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PREVIOUSLY SUPPLIED U.S. EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL. WE WOULD WAIVE THE PROVISION OF THE COOPERATION AGREEMENT THAT ONLY U.S. - SUPPLIED FUEL BE USED AT TARAPUR.

-- WE HAVE HAD EARLIER INDICATIONS FROM YOU THAT FRANCE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPLY THE FUEL, UNDER APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS, IF THE U.S. DOES NOT OBJECT AND IF THE INDIANS SO REQUEST THE FUEL.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT WE ARE NOW AT A STAGE WHERE THE INDIANS WILL MAKE SUCH A REQUEST. AS I MENTIONED, THEY HAVE ASKED US TO PURSUE THIS COURSE AND ARE AWARE THAT WE ARE CONSULTING WITH YOU AT THIS TIME.

-- GIVEN THE TIME CONSTRAINTS (FOR WHICH WE APOLOGIZE) WE WOULD APPRECIATE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONFIRMATION THAT FRANCE WILL BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE SUBSTITUTE SUPPLY FOR TARAPUR UNDER THIS APPROACH. IT WOULD BE

VERY USEFUL IF WE WOULD HAVE AN ANSWER BY OPENING OF BUSINESS FRIDAY, JULY 23, WHEN UNDER SECRETARY KENNEDY WILL MEET WITH THE INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY IN WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS TARAPUR. IF YOU AGREE TO THIS COURSE, WE ARE READY TO FOLLOW UP THIS DISCUSSION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH YOU CONCERNING THE ARRANGMENT, PRIOR TO FURTHER CONSULTATIONS BY THE U.S. OR FRANCE WITH INDIA.

-- I AM GIVING YOU THREE DOCUMENTS AT THIS TIME: A DRAFT EXCHANGE OF THE NOTES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND INDIA, AND A U.S. NON-PAPER WHICH DESCRIBES THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT (WHICH IS ALSO BEING PRESENTED TO THE INDIANS). WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT THE INDIANS WILL HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH THESE DOCUMENTS.

-- AS YOU WILL RECALL, WE HAVE ASKED THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE THAT IT AGREE TO REQUIRE FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AS A CONDITION FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT NEW SUPPLY COMMITMENT TO A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE. IN OUR PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT, WE POINTED OUT THAT NON PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MAY BE SERVED IN RARE INSTANCES BY A RECIPIENT COUNTRY'S ACCEPTING A DIFFERENT TYPE OF SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENT. THE USG HAD THIS PARTICULAR CASE IN MIND IN MAKING THIS RESERVATION, AND THIS PROPOSAL SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS A CHANGE IN OUR POLICY REGARDING FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE SETTLEMENT THAT WE ENVISAGE WITH INDIA REPRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL NON-PROLIFERATION GAIN CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF BOTH THE U.S. AND FRANCE, AND THAT THIS OPPORTUNITY IS ONE THAT MUST BE SEIZED. WE MUCH APPRECIATE THE COOPERATION OF YOUR COUNTRY

IN THIS REGARD.

10. TEXTS OF NOTES AND NON-PAPER TO BE HANDED OVER ARE IN PARA 6. EMBASSY SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE THE FRENCH COPIES OF THE U.S. - INDIA AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION (14 UST 1484; TIAS 5446; 488 UNTS 21) AND THE U.S. - INDIA-IAEA TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT (22 UST 200; TIAS 798 UNTS 115; ALSO IN IAEA INFCIRC DOCUMENT SERIES), IF IT HAS THEM AVAILABLE, AS WELL AS THE OTHER DOCUMENT REFERRED TO IN THE NON-PAPER, I.E. THE SEPTEMBER 17, 1974 LETTER FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, THE TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS.

BEGIN TEXT.

"R. (MISS) DIXY LEE RAY
CHAIRMAN
UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
U.S.A.

DEAR DR. RAY,

I THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER DATED 16TH SEPTEMBER 1974.

THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WOULD LIKE TO REASSURE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THAT THE SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL THAT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER MADE AVAILABLE FOR, OR USED, OR PRODUCED IN THE TARAPUR ATOMIC POWER STATION LOCATED AT TARAPUR WILL BE DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO THE NEEDS OF THAT STATION UNLESS OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HEREAFTER SPECIFICALLY AGREE THAT SUCH MATERIAL BE USED FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

SECSTATE WASHDC 1991 DTG: 210520Z JUL 82 PSN: 014845
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

I HOPE THAT WITH THE ASSURANCE, THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WILL PROMPTLY PROCEED WITH FURTHER SHIPMENTS.

WITH BEST WISHES,

YOURS SINCERELY,

(SIGNED)

HOMI N. SETHNA
(SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY)

11. AS POINTED OUT IN REF E, THIS MATTER IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, PARTICULARLY FROM THE INDIAN SIDE. PLEASE URGE THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE STRICTEST CONFIDENTIALITY ON YOUR GOF INTERLOCUTORS. ANY FRENCH REACTIONS, QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS WHETHER AT TIME OF PRESENTATION OF PROPOSAL OR SUBSEQUENT THERETO SHOULD BE NOTIFIED TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY. - SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 1991

DTG: 210520Z JUL 82 PSN: 014845

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20

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PAGE 01 PARIS 5013
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #5013 2031525
O 221525Z JUL 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0065

UNCLAS PARIS 25013
E. O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PEPR, US, FR
SUBJECT: CHEYSSON DENIES PLANNING WASHINGTON VISIT

1. DURING A TV NEWS PROGRAM EVENING JULY 21, FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON SAID THAT HE DOES NOT INTEND TO GO TO WASHINGTON "FOR THE MOMENT". HE CLAIMED THAT HE HEARD ABOUT SUCH A TRIP FROM THE MEDIA. REPORTING ON HIS REMARKS, AFP NOTES THAT THE MINISTER HIMSELF HAD INDICATED TO THE PRESS IN BRUSSELS ON MONDAY NIGHT THAT HE INTENDED TO MEET SECRETARY SHULTZ NEXT WEEK.

2. THE DISCUSSION ON TV ABOUT THE TRIP WAS FOLLOWED BY REMARKS BY CHEYSSON ABOUT A "PROGRESSIVE DIVORCE" BETWEEN THE US AND EUROPE OVER ECONOMIC ISSUES. CHEYSSON SAID "WE NO LONGER SPEAK THE SAME LANGUAGE. THERE IS A REMARKABLE INCOMPREHENSION BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE US... THE US SEEMS TOTALLY INDIFFERENT TO OUR PROBLEMS". THIS IS SERIOUS, HE SAID, BECAUSE THE US IS OUR PRINCIPAL ALLY. "WE MUST BE ABLE TO TALK TO EACH OTHER".

3. IN RESPONSE TO NUMEROUS PRESS INQUIRIES ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHEYSSON TRIP TO WASHINGTON WE ARE SAYING THE FOLLOWING: WE HAVE NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ANY PLANNING FOR A SPECIFIC VISIT BY MINISTER CHEYSSON TO THE U. S. WE OBVIOUSLY THINK IT IS DESIRABLE THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ AND MINISTER CHEYSSON GET TOGETHER. IT'S A MATTER OF WORKING OUT A CONVENIENT DATE.

4. WE HAVE ALSO HAD PRESS INQUIRIES ON THE FRENCH DECISION, ANNOUNCED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, TO HONOR PIPELINE CONTRACTS AND ON THE NATURE OF THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING TODAY WITH CHEYSSON. ON THE FORMER, WE HAVE DECLINED TO COMMENT AND HAVE SAID THAT IF THERE IS AN OFFICIAL REACTION, IT WILL COME FROM WASHINGTON. ON THE LATTER, WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT THE MEETING WITH CHEYSSON WAS AT THE INVITATION OF THE FRENCH AND THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THEM, NOT US, TO COMMENT ON ITS SUBSTANCE. GALBRAITH

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21

PAGE 01 PARIS 4999
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DE RUFHFR #4999/01 2031440
O 221437Z JUL 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0056

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 24999
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/22/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.) OR-M
TAGS: PFOR, EEWT, FR, US
SUBJECT: CHEYSSON'S VIEWS ON DETERIORATION OF TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONS

1. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: CHEYSSON CALLED ME IN JULY 22 TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERN OVER DETERIORATION OF TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONS AND TO WARN ME ABOUT MAKING COMMENTS ON THE PIPELINE SANCTIONS DISPUTE WHICH WERE CRITICAL OF FRENCH GOVERNMENT POLICY. CHEYSSON CALLED THE CUMULATIVE EFFECTS OF THE SEVERAL US-EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ISSUES AN "AGGRESSION" AGAINST THE EUROPEANS, AND SAID THIS WAS NOT THE TIME FOR THE FRENCH TO HAVE A "POLEMIC" WITH THE US AMBASSADOR IN PARIS. HOWEVER, WE FINALLY AGREED THAT IT WAS THE PROPER ROLE OF AN AMBASSADOR TO REPRESENT HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS, PUBLICLY AS WELL AS PRIVATELY. CHEYSSON REGRETTED THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ TO SEE HIM, BUT UNDERSTOOD THE PRESSURES ON THE SECRETARY'S TIME AND LOOKED FORWARD TO AN EARLY MEETING. END SUMMARY.

3. CHEYSSON CALLED ME IN JULY 22 WITHOUT EXPLAINING IN ADVANCE WHAT THE MEETING WAS ABOUT. QUAI SECCEN GUTMANN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WAS PRESENT AND I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DCM MARESCA. CHEYSSON WENT INTO A LONG PRESENTATION ON THE DETERIORATION OF US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS, USING VERY STRONG LANGUAGE. HE SAID THERE WAS NO LONGER ANY DIALOGUE, THAT WASHINGTON DID NOT SEEM TO TAKE EUROPEAN VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT, THAT THE SANCTION EXTENSION DECISION WAS TAKEN WITHOUT CONSULTATION, THAT FRANCE WAS NOT ALONE AND ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WERE CRITICAL OF WASHINGTON'S ECONOMIC POLICIES, AND THAT RECENT POLICY DECISIONS AMOUNTED TO AN "AGGRESSION: AGAINST EUROPE. CHEYSSON SAID THIS ISSUE HAD COME UP IN THE JULY 21 MEETING OF THE FRENCH CABINET, AND THUS HIS DEMARCHE REPRESENTED THE VIEW OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, NOT JUST THE FOREIGN MINISTER. CHEYSSON ALSO SAID, IN REFERENCE TO MY PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET GAS PIPELINE, THAT IT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR AN AMBASSADOR ACCREDITED TO THE GOF TO COMMENT ON

FRENCH GOVERNMENT POLICIES. WITH ALL THE PRESENT PROBLEMS, CHEYSSON NOTED, NOW WAS NOT THE TIME TO HAVE A POLEMIC WITH THE US AMBASSADOR IN PARIS.

4. IN REPLY I DREW ON STATE 202110, AND RECALLED THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE IT CLEAR LAST DECEMBER THAT THE PIPELINE SANCTIONS WOULD BE EXTENDED IF THE POLISH SITUATION DID NOT IMPROVE. I ALSO EXPLAINED OUR RATIONALE FOR THE SANCTIONS, AS I DID EARLIER THIS WEEK TO ATTALI, AND WENT THROUGH THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MATTER. AS FOR MY PUBLIC COMMENTS, I INDICATED THAT IT WAS THE EUROPEANS WHO HAD LOUDLY AND PUBLICLY CRITICIZED THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO EXTEND THE PIPELINE SANCTIONS, AND WASHINGTON CLEARLY FELT THAT WE NEEDED TO EXPLAIN OUR CASE MORE FULLY SO THAT IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD IN EUROPE. I TOLD CHEYSSON THAT MY COMMENTS HAD NOT, IN FACT, BEEN CRITICAL OF THE GOF POLICIES, BUT HAD SIMPLY EXPLAINED OUR OWN VIEWS. I ASKED CHEYSSON WHETHER HE AGREED THAT IT WAS THE PROPER FUNCTION OF AN AMBASSADOR (I NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION VERNIER-PALLIEZ' RECENT PUBLIC REMARKS) TO EXPLAIN THE POLICIES OF HIS GOVERNMENT PRIVATELY, BUT ALSO PUBLICLY WHEN ISSUES BECOME PUBLIC.

5. CHEYSSON CONTESTED MY LEGAL ARGUMENTS. HE ADMITTED THAT IT WAS NORMAL FOR A COMPANY GRANTING A LICENSE TO POSE CONDITIONS, BUT ASSERTED THAT IT WAS "ABERRANT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW" TO ASSERT A CONTRAVENING CLAUSE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN A LICENSING AGREEMENT AFTER A CONTRACT HAS BEEN SIGNED BY THE LICENSEE WITH A THIRD COUNTRY. MORE BROADLY, CHEYSSON ARGUED THAT OVER THE LONG TERM OUR POLICY WOULD HELP THE SOVIETS BY FORCING THEM TO DEVELOP THE ALLOYS AND TECHNICAL CAPACITY TO BUILD LARGE COMPRESSORS, A THING THEY ARE PRESENTLY UNABLE TO DO. HE ASSERTED THAT ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DECISION WITHOUT CONSULTATION WAS NOT PROPER BEHAVIOR BETWEEN ALLIES. AS FOR WHAT KIND OF COMMENTS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR AN AMBASSADOR, CHEYSSON AGREED AN AMBASSADOR SHOULD EXPLAIN HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS, PUBLICLY AS WELL AS PRIVATELY. HE SEEMED BOTHERED PARTICULARLY BY MY COMMENT SPECULATING AS TO WHAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT MIGHT DO.

6. I SAID I REGRETTED IT IF MY COMMENTS SOMETIMES SEEMED TOO CLEAR AND DIRECT, BUT THAT I WAS TRYING TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO MANY TRANS-ATLANTIC PROBLEMS AND SHARED CHEYSSON'S INTEREST IN MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND COOPERATION. I SAID I AND MY EMBASSY

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BY CU NARA DATE 4/23/10

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22

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PAGE 01 PARIS 4999
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O 221437Z JUL 82 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0057

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 24999
NODIS

WERE ALWAYS AVAILABLE FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE QUAI OR TO
REPORT FRENCH VIEWS, AND THAT WE WOULD BE HELPFUL WHEN-
EVER WE COULD.

7. AS I WAS LEAVING, I TOLD CHEYSSON I WOULD BE IN
WASHINGTON IN ABOUT TEN DAYS. HE REGRETTED THAT A MEET-
ING WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD NOT PROVED POSSIBLE
TO ARRANGE, BUT SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE PRESSURES ON
THE SECRETARY'S TIME. HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO THE
SECRETARY HIS DESIRE TO ESTABLISH WITH HIM THE SAME
KIND OF CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WHICH HE HAD WITH SEC-
RETARY HAIG.
GALBRAITH

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23

PAGE 01 PARIS 4990 DTG: 221418Z JUL 82 PSN: 014284
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P 221418Z JUL 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0051

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 2633
AMEMBASSY BONN 9520
AMEMBASSY ROME 4654
USMISSION USNATO 2238
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4807
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 24990
EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/22/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, FR
SUBJECT: CHIRAC'S VIEWS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: I LUNCHED WITH CHIRAC ON JULY 20. DCM MARESCA AND CHIRAC'S PRINCIPAL DEPUTY, ALAIN JUPPE, ALSO ATTENDED. CHIRAC WAS EXPANSIVE AND ARTICULATE. OUR WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION TOUCHED ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN FRANCE, THE SOVIET GAS PIPELINE, HIS PROJECT FOR AN "INTERNATIONAL" OF CONSERVATIVE PARTIES, EUROPEAN DEFENSE, GERMANY, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHIRAC TRIP TO THE US. END SUMMARY.

3. INTERNAL FRENCH SITUATION: CHIRAC SAID HE HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION DURING THE LAST THREE MONTHS THAT THE SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT COULD NOT LAST OUT ITS FULL MANDATE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EARLIER, HE HAD ASSUMED THAT IT WOULD TAKE LONGER TO REACH A CRISIS POINT, BECAUSE FRANCE WAS, AFTER ALL, A WEALTHY COUNTRY. ALSO, HE HAD THOUGHT MITTERRAND WOULD BE MORE CLEVER IN HIS POLITICAL MOVES. NOW, HOWEVER, CHIRAC CITED THE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL ERRORS (E.G. THE UNPOPULAR EFFORT TO DIVIDE PARIS INTO COMMUNES, EACH WITH ITS OWN MAYOR, IN ORDER TO DILUTE CHIRAC'S POWER BASE), THE AUSTERITY MEASURES, THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNISTS IN DECISION-MAKING, AND AN OVERALL SENSE OF LOSS OF DIRECTION. THESE HAD BUILT UP TO A POINT WHERE SOCIAL UNREST AFTER THE AUGUST VACATION PERIOD SEEMED LIKELY. CHIRAC WAS VAGUE ABOUT WHICH GROUPS WOULD STIMULATE THIS UNREST--IT COULD BE THE CGT, THE FARMERS OR OTHERS, AND HE SAID OF COURSE THE LEADERS OF THE OPPOSITION WOULD SEEK TO PREVENT REAL CONFRONTATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, HE PREDICTED THAT SOCIAL

UNREST WOULD LEAD THE COMMUNISTS TO BREAK WITH THE GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO BUILD UP THEIR OWN SUPPORT AMONG THE WORKING CLASS. ONCE THIS HAPPENS, SAID CHIRAC, THE SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT IS FINISHED. THE COMMUNISTS, THROUGH THE CGT, WILL AGITATE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, AND WILL BLACKMAIL THE GOVERNMENT BY THREATENING NON-COOPERATION DURING NEXT SPRING'S MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. THE ELECTIONS WILL IN ANY EVENT SHOW THAT THE SOCIALISTS ARE NO LONGER IN THE MAJORITY. CHIRAC BELIEVES MITTERRAND WILL THEN BE FORCED TO CALL ANTICIPATED LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, WHICH THE RIGHT WILL WIN. HE CITED PAST HISTORY TO SHOW THAT SOCIALIST GOVERNMENTS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN SHORT-LIVED IN FRANCE.

4. PIPELINE: CHIRAC WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE PIPELINE, AND PROMISED HE WOULD SEND ME THE TEXT OF A SPEECH HE MADE AGAINST IT TO THE GATHERING OF EUROPEAN CONSERVATIVE PARTY REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS LAST MONTH. CHIRAC ASSERTED THAT MITTERRAND'S DECISION TO SIGN THE GAS CONTRACT WITH THE SOVIETS, AND TO MOVE AHEAD ON THE PIPELINE, WAS DUE TO THE PRESSURE OF THE FRENCH COMMUNISTS. CHIRAC BELIEVES THAT ON KEY ISSUES THE COMMUNISTS PRESS MITTERRAND TO TAKE DECISIONS FAVORABLE TO MOSCOW, AND MITTERRAND IS OBLIGED TO YIELD IN ORDER TO KEEP THEM IN HIS GOVERNMENT. CHIRAC SAID THE AVERAGE FRENCHMAN IS WELL AWARE THAT THE COMMUNISTS WERE BEHIND THE PIPELINE DECISION, AND WERE DEEPLY RESENTFUL OF THIS DEVELOPMENT. CHIRAC PREDICTED THAT MITTERRAND'S NEED

PARIS 4990

DTG: 221418Z JUL 82 PSN: 014284

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO KEEP THE COMMUNISTS HAPPY WOULD LEAD TO A SUMMIT MEETING WITH BREZHNEV "WITHIN SIX MONTHS". HOWEVER, HE ALSO BELIEVED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO REVERSE THE PIPELINE DECISIONS IF THERE WERE GOVERNMENT CHANGES IN FRANCE AND THE FRG (SEE BELOW).

5. CONSERVATIVE "INTERNATIONAL": CITING THE NEED TO OFFSET THE INFLUENCE OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL, CHIRAC RECOUNTED HIS EFFORTS, BEGINNING WITH MRS. THATCHER SOME YEARS AGO, TO FOUND AN "INTERNATIONAL" OF CONSERVATIVE--OR AT LEAST NON-SOCIALIST--PARTIES. THE FIRST MEETING THIS SPRING WAS TO HAVE BEEN HELD IN OSLO, BUT CHIRAC ASKED THE NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER TO YIELD AND HOLD IT IN PARIS, FOR POLITICAL REASONS. THE MEETING WAS HELD AT THE PARIS CITY HALL UNDER CHIRAC'S CHAIRMANSHIP, AND WAS, IN CHIRAC'S VIEW, HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL. ONLY THE DUTCH, AND THE ITALIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, WHO ARE ALREADY THE MAJOR PARTICIPANT IN A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT INTERNATIONAL, WERE NOT REPRESENTED. CHIRAC PLANS TO MERGE HIS GROUP WITH A SIMILAR PACIFIC REGIONAL GROUP TO FORM A WORLD MOVEMENT WHICH WILL SERVE AS A PLATFORM FOR CONSERVATIVE VIEWS.

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24

PAGE 01 PARIS 4990 DTG: 221418Z JUL 82 PSN: 014285
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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 2634
AMEMBASSY BONN 9521
AMEMBASSY ROME 4655
USMISSION USNATO 2239
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4808
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 24990
EXDTS

6. EUROPEAN DEFENSE: CHIRAC ARGUED THAT IT WAS ABSURD FOR EUROPE TO DEPEND ON THE US FOR ITS DEFENSE. THE TIME HAD COME TO DEVELOP AN INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN DEFENSE BASED ON A STRONG LINK TO THE US IN A REVITALIZED NATO (CHIRAC WAS CAREFUL TO NOTE THAT THIS DID NOT MEAN FRANCE WOULD REENTER NATO). CHIRAC BELIEVES SUCH A EUROPEAN DEFENSE CAN ONLY BE CREDIBLE IF THE WEST GERMANS HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE THINKS WESTERN EUROPE IS READY FOR SUCH A STEP, ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS AND RESENTFUL. CHIRAC SAID IT WAS NECESSARY NOW TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION FOR THE PROVISION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO THE GERMANS. HE STIPULATED THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD ONLY BE GIVEN TO THE FRG AFTER A CHANGE IN THE WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

7. GERMANY: CHIRAC THOUGHT SCHMIDT'S DAYS ARE NUMBERED,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND THAT WITHIN A YEAR THE CDU WOULD TAKE POWER UNDER HELMUT KOHL. HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE A MAJOR POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE IT WOULD ENSURE THAT U.S. INF WOULD BE INSTALLED ON SCHEDULE. KOHL'S GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE DETERRED FROM INF INSTALLATION BY A FEW PROTESTERS. CHIRAC CLEARLY VIEWED INSTALLATION OF US INF AS ESSENTIAL, AND ARGUED THAT THE ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL AND EVEN ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, WERE MISTAKES. THE US, CHIRAC SAID, SHOULD HAVE INSTALLED INF BEFORE ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS. CHIRAC ALSO PREDICTED THAT MITTERRAND WOULD CHANGE HIS POSITION ON INF WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, IN RESPONSE TO COMMUNIST PRESSURES. CHIRAC NOTED THAT FORESTALLING INSTALLATION OF US INF IS THE NUMBER ONE PRIORITY FOR THE SOVIETS, WHO WILL BE EXERTING MAXIMUM PRESSURES ON MITTERRAND, THROUGH THE FRENCH COMMUNISTS, TO CHANGE HIS POSITION. ALL THE

SOVIETS WANT OUT OF FRANCE RIGHT NOW, SAID CHIRAC, IS A CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC FRENCH POSITION ON INF.

8. POSSIBLE TRIP TO US: CHIRAC REMINISCED WARMLY ABOUT HIS STUDENT DAYS IN THE US. HE WAS STRONGLY SUPPORTIVE OF MOST OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES. HE SAID ALL HIS ADVISORS ARE URGING HIM TO VISIT THE US, AND HE HAS AN OPEN INVITATION TO VISIT MAYOR KOCH IN NEW YORK. CHIRAC RECALLED THAT, AS THE PRESIDENT WAS GOING DOWN THE STAIRS AFTER THEIR MEETING IN CHIRAC'S OFFICE, HE ASKED CHIRAC TO CALL ON HIM IN WASHINGTON. BUT CHIRAC RECOGNIZED THAT THIS WAS NOT NECESSARILY AN OFFICIAL INVITATION: "THESE ARE THE THINGS PEOPLE SAY IN STAIRWAYS." CHIRAC WAS VERY SPECIFIC THAT, IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN FRANCE, HE COULD NOT VISIT THE US WITHOUT SEEING THE PRESIDENT, AND THEREFORE HE WOULD NOT PLAN TO VISIT UNLESS A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT WAS FIXED. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD BE A POLITICAL MISTAKE FOR HIM, SINCE IT WOULD SIGNAL THAT HE IS NOT VIEWED AS A SERIOUS OPPOSITION LEADER. I SAID I WOULD BE RECOMMENDING THAT THE PRESIDENT RECEIVE HIM.

9. COMMENT: OUR DISCUSSION WAS FRIENDLY AND RELAXED, AND I PLAN TO SEE CHIRAC PERIODICALLY TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH HIS VIEWS. THE SITUATION MAY NOT BE EXACTLY AS HE DESCRIBES IT (FOR EXAMPLE, I BELIEVE HE TENDS TO UNDERESTIMATE MITTERRAND'S DETERMINATION AND ABILITY TO STAY IN OFFICE). BUT HE IS NEVERTHELESS THE MOST

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROMINENT OPPOSITION LEADER, AND THE POLITICAL SITUATION HERE COULD EVENTUALLY LAUNCH HIM INTO A KEY NATIONAL POSITION.
GALBRAITH

PARIS 4990

DTG: 221418Z JUL 82 PSN: 014285

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47423

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PAGE 01 PARIS 4989
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

PRIORITY
DE RUFHFR #4989 2031415
P 221414Z JUL 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0050

INFO EC COLLECTIVE
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PARIS 24989
EXDIS
STATE FOR JAMES BUCKLEY
PASS TO NSC FOR WILLIAM CLARK; COMMERCE FOR OLMER;
DEFENSE FOR FRED IKLE
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 7/22/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.) OR-M
TAGS: EEWT, ESTC, UR, FR
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH JACQUES ATTALI ON PIPELINE
- SANCTIONS
REF: PARIS 23921

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING MY RECENT BREAKFAST MEETING WITH SPECIAL
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR JACQUES ATTALI I WENT OVER WITH
HIM THE REASONING FOR THE U. S. SANCTIONS THAT I LAID
OUT IN REFTEL. ATTALI WAS ACCOMPANIED BY JEAN-PIERRE
BIANCO, HIS ASSOCIATE WHO IS THE NEW SECRETARY GENERAL
OF THE PRESIDENCY.

3. I TOLD ATTALI THAT THE DEPENDENCY ARGUMENT, WHATEVER
ITS INITIAL FORCE, HAS NOW RECEDED SUBSTANTIALLY AND
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED OF MORE THAN SECONDARY IMPORTANCE,
WHILE THE HARD CURRENCY EARNINGS WOULD BE LARGELY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ABSORBED BY DEBT SERVICE, AT LEAST IN THE INITIAL
YEARS OF GAS DELIVERIES. MY MAIN POINT (AS LAID OUT
IN MORE DETAIL IN REFTEL) WAS THAT THE PIPELINE WILL
MAKE AN ENORMOUS CONTRIBUTION TO THE ECONOMIC STRENGTH
OF THE USSR AT A TIME WHEN IT IS IN DIFFICULTY.

4. ATTALI COMMENTED THAT THIS ARGUMENT WAS NEW TO HIM
AND INTERESTING AND THAT IT MADE A GREAT DEAL OF SENSE
IN EXPLAINING THE U. S. ACTIONS, ADDING THAT THE GOF HAS
LONG ASSUMED THAT THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE USSR
WAS BROADLY IN THE INTEREST OF THE WEST. HE SAID HE
WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONVEY OUR DISCUSSION TO PRESIDENT
MITTERRAND.
GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED 4/74/23
NLRR 107-081
BY GL NARA DATE 4/23/10

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PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 6623
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EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHC #6623 2052230
O 242207Z JUL 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

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AMCONSUL BOMBAY IMMEDIATE 0000
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E.O. 12065: GDS 7/23/88 (KENNEDY, RICHARD)
TA TNUC, ENRG, PARM, IN
SUBJECT: TARAPUR NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY

REF: A) STATE 20199; B) PARIS 25012

1. SUMMARY: INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY RASGOTRA MET WITH UNDER SECRETARY KENNEDY AND OTHER DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS FRIDAY, JULY 23 TO DISCUSS EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE TARAPUR NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY ISSUE. KENNEDY BRIEFED HIM ON CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS AND PROVIDED HIM WITH TWO DRAFT NOTES (REF A) WHICH WHEN EXCHANGED BETWEEN INDIA AND THE U.S. WOULD CONSTITUTE THE BASIS FOR A NEW ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY INDIA WOULD BE FREE TO SEEK FUEL FROM FRANCE. END SUMMARY.

2. INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY RASGOTRA CALLED ON UNDER SECRETARY KENNEDY FRIDAY, JULY 23 TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS ON THE TARAPUR NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY ISSUE. KENNEDY SAID HE WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK FRANKLY WITH THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THAT HE WAS HAPPY A WAY HAD BEEN FOUND TO GET THROUGH A PROBLEM IN A MANNER WHICH WOULD MEET BOTH U.S. AND INDIAN NEEDS. REFERRING TO EARLIER

DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR BARNES AND RASGOTRA, AS WELL AS OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GOI, KENNEDY SAID THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROPOSED SOLUTION WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND THE RESPONSE HAD BEEN SUPPORTIVE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT WE HAD TOUCHED BASE WITH THE FRENCH AND THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE INDIANS ALONG THE LINES PROPOSED BY AMBASSADOR BARNES.

3. RASGOTRA SAID THAT HE HAD SERVED TWO TOURS IN WASHINGTON AND HENCE HAD A VESTED INTEREST IN GOOD INDO-U.S. RELATIONS. TARAPUR, HE ADDED, HAD BEEN AN

IRRITANT IN THOSE RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECT OF A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM WAS GOOD NEWS INDEED. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SUBSTITUTE ARRANGEMENT WITH FRANCE WAS WITHIN THE "FOUR CORNERS OF THE 1963 AGREEMENT." KENNEDY SAID THE AGREEMENT WOULD REMAIN IN FORCE BUT THAT WE WOULD WAIVE OUR RIGHT OF EXCLUSIVE SUPPLY WHILE INDIA WOULD WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO DEMAND THAT WE SUPPLY NUCLEAR FUEL; ALL ELSE WOULD REMAIN THE SAME. FRANCE WOULD ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT WITH INDIA TO SUPPLY THE FUEL.

4. RASGOTRA SAID THAT INDIA HAD UNDERSTOOD FRANCE WOULD ACT AS THE U.S.'S AGENT. KENNEDY SAID THAT THAT WOULD NOT BE THE CASE, BUT RATHER THE U.S. WOULD USE ITS GOOD OFFICES WITH FRANCE TO FACILITATE A NEW ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN FRANCE AND INDIA. FRANCE, HE ADDED, HAD INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE AMENABLE TO SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.

5. RASGOTRA SAID THAT INDIA WAS CONCERNED THAT ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1963 AGREEMENT NOT BE "ENHANCED." HE ADDED, "WE DON'T WANT A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE THAT WOULD ENHANCE OUR OBLIGATIONS." HE THEN ASKED IF THAT WERE LIKELY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. KENNEDY SAID THAT AS FAR AS THE U.S. WAS CONCERNED, NO, BUT HE OF COURSE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR FRANCE. DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISOR MICHEL SAID THAT OUR PREVIOUS COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE FRENCH HAD BEEN IN TERMS OF THE NEW ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN FRANCE AND INDIA BEING CONSISTENT WITH THE 1963 BILATERAL AGREEMENT. KENNEDY ADDED THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE IAEA TRILATERAL AGREEMENT.

7. RASGOTRA ASKED WHEN INDIA SHOULD BEGIN DIRECT DISCUSSIONS WITH FRANCE. MICHEL RESPONDED THAT THAT SHOULD TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS THE U.S. AND INDIA WERE

CERTAIN THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD ONE ANOTHER AND WERE IN AGREEMENT. KENNEDY ADDED THAT HE HAD DRAFT NOTES TO LEAVE WITH RASGOTRA (REF A). THE NOTES WHEN EXCHANGED WOULD CONSTITUTE AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND THE U.S. FOR THE U.S. TO WAIVE ITS EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SUPPLY NUCLEAR FUEL AND FOR INDIA TO WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO DEMAND THAT THE U.S. SUPPLY IT.

8. RASGOTRA SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO STUDY THE DRAFT NOTES FURTHER AND WOULD BE TALKING WITH AMBASSADOR BARNES. HE SAID HE HOPED TO GET THE MATTER OUT OF THE WAY QUICKLY AS TARAPUR HAD BEEN A "SPANNER" IN THE BILATERAL WORKS. KENNEDY SAID THAT IF IT WERE NOT POSSIBLE TO GET THE MATTER WRAPPED UP BEFORE PRIME MINISTER GANDHI'S VISIT, WE HOPED AT LEAST TO HAVE A BASIS FOR CLEAR UNDERSTANDING.

9. RETURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF HIS CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS, KENNEDY SAID THAT HE WANTED TO SPEAK FRANKLY. THE CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAD GONE WELL, BUT THERE NO DOUBT WOULD BE SOME MEMBERS WHO WOULD MAKE UNCOMPLIMENTARY NOISES AT A SUBSEQUENT POINT. THIS HE SAID WAS INEVITABLE IN A DEMOCRACY.

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27

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 6623

DTG: 242207Z JUL 82 PSN: 017863

10. AMBASSADOR BARNES SAID THAT WE WOULD NEED TO
FOCUS ON HOW TO ANSWER QUESTIONS THAT MAY ARISE DURING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SECSTATE WASHDC 6623

DTG: 242207Z JUL 82 PSN: 017863

MRS. GANDHI'S VISIT. KENNEDY SAID TO RASGOTRA THAT WE
WOULD NEED INDIA'S HELP TO DEVELOP LANGUAGE THAT NOTED
THE INTERESTS AND KEY OBJECTIVES OF BOTH PARTIES HAD
BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. AMBASSADOR BARNES SAID WE
WOULD ALSO NEED TO WORK OUT WHAT TO SAY WITH THE
FRENCH. KENNEDY SAID WE NEED TO SETTLE FIRST ON WHAT
WE SHOULD SAY HERE.

11. IN CLOSING RASGOTRA SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THE
PREVIOUS DAY FROM SOME OF HIS OWN CONGRESSIONAL
SOURCES THAT THE CONSULTATIONS HAD GONE WELL. ALMOST
AS AN AFTER THOUGHT HE ASKED IF THE FRENCH PRICES
WOULD BE THE SAME. KENNEDY SAID WE HAD NOT TAKEN THAT
UP WITH THEM.

12. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH UNDER SECRETARY
KENNEDY, RASGOTRA AND BARNES ADJOURNED TO DEPUTY LEGAL
ADVISOR MICHEL'S OFFICE WHERE THEY DISCUSSED A NUMBER
OF TECHNICAL POINTS IN THE TWO DRAFT NOTES THAT
KENNEDY HAD GIVEN TO RASGOTRA. DURING THIS DISCUSSION
RASGOTRA SEEMED PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF FRANCE NOT ACTUALLY ACTING AS THE

AGENT OF THE U.S. UNDER THE PROPOSED NEW
ARRANGEMENT. AFTER SOME BACK AND FORTH MICHEL ASKED
RASGOTRA IF THE INDIAN CONCERNS HAD TO DO WITH THE
APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO INDIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES
OTHER THAN TARAPUR. RASGOTRA RESPONDED TERSELY,
"YES." MICHEL RESPONDED THAT SUCH A DEMAND BY FRANCE
WAS NOT ANTICIPATED.

13. RASGOTRA ALSO ASKED BARNES AND MICHEL A NUMBER OF
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LEGAL INTENT OF SEVERAL
CONSTRUCTIONS IN THE DRAFT NOTES. IN PARTICULAR, HE
EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE NOTES MIGHT RULE OUT A
FUTURE INDIAN REQUEST FOR A JOINT DETERMINATION TO
PERMIT REPROCESSING. BARNES AND MICHEL, WHILE MAKING
CLEAR THAT U.S. AGREEMENT TO A JOINT DETERMINATION ON
REPROCESSING COULD NOT BE EXPECTED IN THE FORESEEABLE
FUTURE, REASSURED RASGOTRA ON ALL OF THESE POINTS
THAT THERE WERE NO ULTERIOR U.S. MOTIVES. ON THE

SECSTATE WASHDC 6623

DTG: 242207Z JUL 82 PSN: 017863

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONTRARY, THE SOLE OBJECTIVE WAS TO DISPOSE OF THE
FUEL SUPPLY ISSUE LEAVING OTHER QUESTIONS HAVING TO DO
WITH THE 1963 AGREEMENT ON THE TABLE WITHOUT PREJUDICE
TO THE LEGAL POSITION OF EITHER SIDE.

14. RASGOTRA SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH NEW
DELHI IMMEDIATELY AND ASK FOR A QUICK REACTION. HE
SAID THAT HE HOPED TO HAVE A RESPONSE BY SUNDAY, JULY
25 AT THE LATEST. STOESEL

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28

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PAGE 01 PARIS 5259 DTG: 261146Z JUL 82 PSN: 019227
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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHFR #5259 2071146
O 261146Z JUL 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0220

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PARIS 25259
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/26/02 (MARESCA, JOHN J) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, FR, US, WA
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: MESSAGE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY
- CROCKER FROM AUSSEIL

1. ~~C~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. QUAI AF DIRECTOR AUSSEIL HAS ASKED EMBOFF TO PASS THE FOLLOWING THREE NAMIBIA-RELATED MESSAGES TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER, INCLUDING HIS ASSURANCES THAT FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON'S RADIO REMARKS ON NAMIBIA DO NOT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN FRENCH POLICY.
3. AUSSEIL ASKS THAT, IF IN YOUR OPINION, THE IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL STATUTE OR GUARANTEE SHOULD BE RESURFACED IN THE NEGOTIATION, LET HIM KNOW; HE MUST PREPARE THE GROUND.
4. AUSSEIL HOPES TO TAKE VACATION BEGINNING AT THE END OF THIS WEEK. HOWEVER, SHOULD YOU, AT ANY POINT, FEEL IT NECESSARY FOR HIM TO COME TO JOIN THE TALKS, HE WILL BE AVAILABLE TO DO SO.
5. FINALLY, AND MOST IMPORTANT, AUSSEIL URGED EMBOFF TO ASSURE YOU THAT CHEYSSON'S REMARKS ON NAMIBIA/ANGOLA

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LAST WEEK ON RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONAL DO NOT SIGNAL ANY CHANGE WHATSOEVER IN THE FRENCH POSITION. HE SAID YOU HAD CALLED HIM ABOUT IT AND HE WANTED TO BE SURE YOU UNDERSTOOD. BANGING HIS FISTS ON HIS DESK IN DISGUST, HE LAMENTED THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT PROMPTED CHEYSSON. HE NOTED THAT CHEYSSON'S QUESTIONER WAS SIMON MALLEY (DIRECTOR OF THE PRO-COMMUNIST AFRIQUE-ASIE) AND THAT HE KEPT HAMMERING AWAY AT CHEYSSON. AUSSEIL THEN ADDED THE FOLLOWING, ASKING THAT IT NOT BE CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON (SO PLEASE PROTECT). HE SAID THAT PRIOR TO THE RADIO PROGRAM, THERE WAS A PREPARATORY MEETING WITH CHEYSSON. AUSSEIL WARNED CHEYSSON ABOUT THOSE TYPES OF QUESTIONS RELATING TO ANGOLA. AUSSEIL SPECULATED THAT EITHER CHEYSSON WAS HAVING PROBLEMS HANDLING MALLEY OR HE MAY HAVE BEEN BURNISHING HIS CREDENTIALS IN SOCIALIST PARTY CIRCLES.

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29

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUFHFR #5339 2071550
O 261550Z JUL 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0260

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PARIS 25339
EXDIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/26/02 (GALBRAITH, EVAN G.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, EEWT, FR, US
SUBJECT: FRENCH GOVERNMENT POSITION ON PIPELINE CONTRACTS
REF: STATE 204253

1. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DCM ASKED QUAI SECGEN GUTMANN JULY 26 TO CLARIFY TWO POINTS ABOUT THE GOF DECLARATION ON CONTRACTS RELATED TO CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET PIPELINE:
- (A) WHAT WAS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF USE OF THE YEAR 1982 IN THE DECLARATION? DID THAT IMPLY THAT THE GOF WAS NOT DIRECTING FIRMS TO MAKE DELIVERIES SCHEDULED FOR 1983, SUCH AS ALSTHOM-ATLANTIQUE?
- (B) WHAT WAS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REFERENCE TO "EXISTING CONTRACTS"? DID IT IMPLY THAT THE FRENCH WOULD NOT SEEK TO SUBSTITUTE FOR GE IN ITS CONTRACT FOR ROTORS?
3. IN REPLY, GUTMANN SAID THE DECLARATION WAS A POLITICAL ONE, AND NOT A LEGAL ONE. WE SHOULD NOT TRY TO FIND LOOPHOLES OR TO JUSTIFY OUR OWN POSITION BY STUDYING THE DECLARATION AS LAWYERS. AS FOR THE DATE 1982, IT WAS USED SIMPLY TO PERMIT THE US TO ADJUST ITS POLICY BEFORE THE SCHEDULED 1983 DELIVERY DATE OF THE ALSTHOM-ATLANTIQUE ROTORS. THE INTENTION OF THE GOF IS CLEAR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND FIRM: THAT FRENCH COMPANIES SHOULD CARRY OUT THEIR CONTRACTS.

4. REGARDING THE "EXISTING CONTRACTS" LANGUAGE, GUTMANN SAID THE FRENCH WERE TRYING TO BE REASONABLE AND WERE RESPONDING TO WHAT THEY CONSIDERED AN UNREASONABLE US POSITION, ESPECIALLY ITS RETROACTIVE ASPECT. THE GOF FOCUS WAS ITS DETERMINATION TO CARRY OUT ITS OWN CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS. THAT BEING SAID, HOWEVER, GUTMANN THOUGHT THAT IF FRANCE WAS GOING TO "SIN" IN AMERICAN EYES, BY CARRYING OUT FRENCH CONTRACTS, THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFERENCE IF THEY ALSO SUBSTITUTED FOR GE ON ITS CONTRACT.
GALBRAITH

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PAGE 01 PARIS 5398
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DE RUHFR #5398/01 2071737

O 261735Z JUL 82

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0286

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2438

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6578

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2130

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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5360

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4420

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EXDYS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/26/82 (MARESCA, JOHN J) OR-P

TAGS: PEPR, UNSC, PLO, FR, IS, LE, US

SUBJECT: LEBANON: FRENCH PERSPECTIVE

1. C/- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE GOF HAS NO FAITH IN THE HABIB MISSION AND BELIEVES THAT IT IS ONLY TACKLING THE ISSUE OF DISENGAGEMENT FROM BEIRUT. THE FRENCH ARE UNSURE HABIB IS HANDLING THE WIDER QUESTION OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND ARE CONVINCED WE ARE NOT TRYING TO SOLVE THE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL PROBLEM WHICH THEY BELIEVE IS LINKED TO THE DISENGAGEMENT. THE FRENCH WOULD LIKE TO SEE US ACCEPT DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE PLO AND TO RECOGNIZE IT. THEY BELIEVE WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN STALLING TACTICS OVER THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN DRAFT AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT WE ARE WORKING TO SABOTAGE IT. THE FRENCH CANNOT SEE HOW THEIR DRAFT IN ANY WAY RUNS COUNTER TO AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MISSION. THESE VIEWS CAME ACROSS IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE QUAI'S SECRETARY GENERAL AND ITS SUB-DIRECTOR FOR ISRAEL AND LEBANON.

3. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE HAVE BEEN MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, THE GOF BELIEVES THAT OVER THE LAST TWO WEEKS THE U.S. HAS SHOWN NO DESIRE TO WORK WITH FRANCE ON THE LEBANON CRISIS. THE FRENCH ALSO SEE THE U.S. AS WORKING TO SABOTAGE THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN UN RESOLUTION. THESE SENTIMENTS WERE PUT FORWARD BY QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL GUTMANN IN MEETING WITH THE DCM. THE FRENCH HAVE LITTLE OR NO FAITH THAT THE HABIB MISSION WILL SUCCEED AND PLAN "ANY TIME NOW" TO TABLE THE RESOLUTION IN THE UNSC. GUTMANN WOULD NOT

4. IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING BETWEEN THE QUAI'S SUB-DIRECTOR FOR ISRAEL, EGYPT AND THE LEVANT, RAPIN, AND EMBOFF (WHO ALSO ATTENDED THE GUTMANN MEETING), RAPIN EXPANDED ON THE POINTS MADE BY GUTMANN (ABOVE AS WELL AS SOME REPORTED BELOW). THE FRENCH SEE THE HABIB MISSION AS DEALING ONLY WITH THE PROBLEMS OF A DISENGAGEMENT IN BEIRUT AND NOT WITH THE REAL POLITICAL PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIANS. DEALING WITH THE DISENGAGEMENT ISSUE WAS WHAT THE FRENCH HOPED TO ACCOMPLISH ON JUNE 24 WHEN THEY DREW UP THEIR INITIAL UNSC RESOLUTION. THEY ARE NOT AT ALL SURE HABIB IS ALSO ATTEMPTING TO DEAL WITH THE LARGER ISSUE OF A PULLOUT OF THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS FROM LEBANON. THEY FEEL THE U.S. HAS NOT ACCEPTED THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THE POLITICAL PROBLEM AND DISENGAGEMENT.

5. ACCORDING TO RAPIN, THE GOF HAS DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING WHY THE U.S. OPPOSES THEIR TABLING THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION. THE FRENCH DO NOT SEE HOW IT COULD RUN COUNTER TO WHAT AMB. HABIB IS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH. THEY BELIEVE, FURTHERMORE, THAT WE HAVE ENGAGED IN DISINGENUOUS TACTICS AT THE UN. RAPIN CLAIMED THAT AMB. KIRKPATRICK HAD STALLED HER FRENCH COLLEAGUE FOR SEVERAL DAYS (UP TO LAST WEDNESDAY) BY GIVING THE IMPRESSION WE WERE GOING TO COME FORWARD WITH SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS TO THE DRAFT. ON WEDNESDAY, WE SAID WE WOULD HAVE NONE. AT THAT POINT FRANCE DETERMINED TO GO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FORWARD, BUT DECIDED NOT TO TABLE THE RESOLUTION LAST FRIDAY (JULY 23) AT OUR BEHEST. RAPIN, DISCLAIMING CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE, WAS SURE FRANCE WOULD TABLE IT BEFORE THE END OF THIS WEEK.

6. ACCORDING TO GUTMANN, WE MISSED OUR OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE RESULTS IN LEBANON ABOUT THREE WEEKS AGO. GUTMANN TERMS THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION AS A FRAMEWORK FOR CARRYING THINGS FORWARD IN LEBANON. HE SAID THAT FRANCE'S ACTIONS IN LEBANON HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN NOT BECAUSE FRANCE IS PRO-PALESTINIAN BUT BECAUSE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PLO WOULD BE A TRAGIC ERROR. REVEALING A BIT OF FRENCH FRUSTRATION, RAPIN SAID WE WERE IN A POSITION TO GET CONCESSIONS OUT OF THE PLO BUT THAT FRANCE IS NOT ABLE TO GIVE THEM WHAT THEY WANT--NAMELY DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE U.S. AND U.S. RECOGNITION.

7. GUTMANN SEES ARAFAT'S POSITION AS FOUNDERING AND BELIEVES THAT THE LATTER DOES NOT WANT TO REMAIN IN BEIRUT, WHERE HE'S A PRISONER. HOWEVER, HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT DAMASCUS IS THE RIGHT PLACE FOR ARAFAT. WITHOUT EXPANDING ON THE COMMENT, GUTMANN NOTED THAT IT

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BY CI NARA DATE 4/23/10

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31

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 5398
SITS05 DATE 07/27/82

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 25398
EXDIS

8. THE QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL IS SKEPTICAL ABOUT ANY POSITIVE RESULTS FOLLOWING FROM THE KHADDAM/SA'UD ARAB LEAGUE MISSION TO WASHINGTON. HE SAID THE FRENCH HAVE SOLID INFORMATION THAT IT WAS KHADDAM WHO PUSHED FOR THE SPECIFIC MAKE-UP OF THE DELEGATION THAT WENT TO WASHINGTON, AND BY INFERENCE SUSPECTS THAT THE SYRIANS MAY BE UP TO SOMETHING. RAPIN EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT WE WERE ONLY WORKING ON INTERIM MEASURES FOR PLACING THE PLO COMBATANTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

9. GUTMANN IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT WHEN THE MULTINATION-AL FORCE WOULD MOVE INTO BEIRUT, AND NOTES THAT THIS IS A MAJOR CONCERN OF THE PLO. HE BELIEVES THAT IT MUST BE INSERTED BEFORE A PLO PULLOUT BEGINS; OTHERWISE THE PLO WILL BE EXPOSED AND IN REAL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DANGER OF BEING WIPED OUT.

10. GUTMANN IS ALSO SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE DOCUMENT REPORTEDLY SIGNED BY ARAFAT ACCEPTING UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. THIS, OR ANY SIMILAR DOCUMENT, HE SEES ONLY AS A GESTURE AIMED AT WINNING A PUBLIC OPINION VICTORY. RAPIN'S VIEW DIFFERED FROM GUTMANN'S; THE SPECIFIC DOCUMENT SIGNED BY ARAFAT DOES NOT MATTER. WHAT MATTERS, ACCORDING TO RAPIN, IS THAT ARAFAT IS SENDING US A CALCULATED SIGNAL. HE IS TELLING US THAT HE IS READY TO SIGN WHATEVER WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. AS SOON AS WE GIVE HIM AN INDICATION THAT THINGS ARE EVOLVING IN A DIRECTION THAT THE PLO WANTS (AGAIN, DIRECT CONTACTS AND RECOGNITION).

11. DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. APPROPRIATE POST

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47432

32

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 7814 DTG: 270151Z JUL 82 PSN: 020227
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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 207814
NOD/S

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/26/02 (BURT, RICHARD)
TAGS: PEPR, AF, UR, US
SUBJECT: BRIEFING ALLIES ON US-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON
AFGHANISTAN

REF: A) STATE 166452 B) STATE 200790 (NOTAL)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS ANTICIPATED REFTELS, A US TEAM HEADED BY AMBASSADOR HARTMAN CONDUCTED SOME FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DETAILED DISCUSSIONS ON AFGHANISTAN WITH A SOVIET MFA TEAM HEADED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BY ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO ON JULY 22-23. ADDRESSEE POSTS SHOULD BRIEF HOST GOVERNMENT FOREIGN MINISTRIES AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS PARA 3 BELOW. IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS-YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE OUR CONCERN FOR CONFIDENTIALITY OF OUR DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS.

3. PRESENTATION FOR HOST GOVERNMENTS:

--AS WE INFORMED YOU, THE US EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT, CONDUCTED TWO DAYS OF

DISCUSSIONS WITH A SOVIET MFA TEAM ON JULY 22-23. THE US SIDE WAS LED BY AMBASSADOR HARTMAN, AND FOR THE PURPOSE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, HIS STAFF WAS BOLSTERED BY PRESENCE

OF THREE OFFICE-LEVEL PARTICIPANTS FROM WASHINGTON. SOVIET SIDE WAS HEADED BY ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO AND INCLUDED MFA PARTICIPANTS FROM USA DIVISION AND MIDDLE EAST DIVISION.

--AMBASSADOR HARTMAN BEGAN US PRESENTATION BY NOTING OUR HOPE THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS MIGHT LEAD TO PROGRESS ON PROBLEM WHICH REMAINS MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO IMPROVEMENT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS. WHILE EMPHASIZING THAT WE DID NOT EXPECT THESE DISCUSSIONS TO RESULT IN SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS, HARTMAN STATED THAT WE WISHED TO PROVIDE SOVIET SIDE WITH OUR VIEWS ON MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE AFGHANISTAN QUESTION AND HEAR SOVIET VIEWS. HARTMAN ALSO UNDERScoreD THAT OUR PRESENTATION WOULD REFLECT THE PREVAILING INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON AFGHANISTAN AND OUR DEEP CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN.

--KORNIYENKO'S OPENING STATEMENT OUTLINED SOVIET POSITION ALONG FAMILIAR LINES. HE CATEGORICALLY ASSERTED THAT SOVIET SIDE WOULD NOT DISCUSS INTERNAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN ALTHOUGH OTHER "EXTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL" ASPECTS MIGHT BE DISCUSSED. HE THEN GAVE FAMILIAR SOVIET VIEW OF EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE APRIL 1978, FOCUSsing ON SOVIET CHARGES THAT AFGHAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES WERE RECEIVING EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO OVERTHROW KABUL REGIME.

--KORNIYENKO STATED THAT IT WOULD BE IN US AND SOVIET

SECSTATE WASHDC 7814 DTG: 270151Z JUL 82 PSN: 020227
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INTEREST TO RESOLVE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF AFGHANISTAN QUESTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH MAY 14, 1980 AND AUGUST 24, 1981 PROPOSALS OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. HE CONCLUDED THAT IN CONTEXT OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT, SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE REMOVED FROM AFGHANISTAN.

--HARTMAN SET FORTH BASIC ELEMENTS OF US APPROACH INCLUDING: 1) WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES; 2) INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND GUARANTEES; 3) AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION; 4) RETURN OF REFUGEES; 5) INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THESE ELEMENTS.

--SOVIET WITHDRAWAL: HARTMAN EMPHASIZED OUR VIEW THAT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR

SETTLEMENT, BUT THAT WE RECOGNIZED THE PRACTICAL NEED FOR SUCH WITHDRAWAL TO TAKE PLACE IN PHASES AS HAD BEEN SUGGESTED IN SOME PREVIOUS SOVIET STATEMENTS. HARTMAN NOTED THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT SOVIET FORMULATIONS WHICH RESERVED THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES AS A MATTER TO BE DISCUSSED EXCLUSIVELY BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE KABUL AUTHORITIES.

--WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT US AND OTHER COUNTRIES HAD LEGITIMATE CONCERNS ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES, KORNIYENKO STEADFASTLY MAINTAINED THAT MODALITIES AND TIMETABLES FOR SUCH WITHDRAWAL WOULD REMAIN EXCLUSIVELY BILATERAL PREROGATIVE OF USSR AND DRA. KORNIYENKO TOOK ISSUE WITH US "OVER EMPHASIS" ON WITHDRAWAL AND ASSERTED THAT SOVIET FORCES WERE IN AFGHANISTAN AT INVITATION OF

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THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AND UNDER PROVISIONS OF UN CHARTER.

--INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES: AMBASSADOR HARTMAN PRESSED SOVIET SIDE TO DEFINE FURTHER WHAT SORT OF GUARANTEES IT SAW AS NECESSARY TO FACILITATE A SETTLEMENT. KORNIYENKO REPLIED THAT SOVIETS SEE TWO TYPES OF GUARANTEES AS NECESSARY. FIRST TYPE WOULD BE "MATERIAL, PHYSICAL" GUARANTEES TO BE ARRIVED AT IN BILATERAL OR TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS, PAKISTAN AND IRAN. HE CITED C-OSING OF ALLEGED GUERRILLA TRAINING CAMPS IN PAKISTAN AS EXAMPLE OF THIS KIND OF GUARANTEE. ACCORDING TO KORNIYENKO, SECOND TYPE OF GUARANTEE WOULD BE "POLITICAL AND MORAL" UNDERSTANDINGS TO BE REACHED BY MAJOR EXTERNAL POWERS CONCERNING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AFGHANISTAN'S NONALIGNED STATUS, ITS SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

--AFGHAN SELF-DETERMINATION: HARTMAN STRESSED THAT US HAD NO PREFERRED POLITICAL OUTCOME FOR AFGHANISTAN AND COULD ACCEPT ANY AFGHAN GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD ULTIMATELY PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. WE COULD NOT, HOWEVER, ACCEPT SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT PRESENT KABUL REGIME MET THIS CRITERIA WHEN THERE IS MASSIVE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN COUNTRY. KORNIYENKO CATEGORICALLY REFUSED TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION AND ASSERTED THAT US AND USSR HAD FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT AND INCOMPATIBLE APPROACHES TO THIS QUESTION. THROUGHOUT THE DISCUSSIONS KORNIYENKO PORTRAYED OUR STAND AS IMPERMISSIBLE INTRUSION IN AFGHANISTAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND FUNDAMENTAL FLAW IN OUR APPROACH TO SETTLEMENT.

--RETURN OF REFUGEES: KORNIYENKO DISPUTED OUR FIGURE OF TWO MILLION AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN, AND ASSERTED THAT MANY AFGHANS IN THAT COUNTRY ARE EITHER ARMED COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES OR NOMADS. HE MAINTAINED THAT GENUINE REFUGEES COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF DRA'S AMNESTY PROGRAM AND THAT REFUGEE QUESTION COULD BE RESOLVED IN CONTEXT OF OVERALL SETTLEMENT. HARTMAN REJECTED KORNIYENKO'S EFFORT TO "DEFINE AWAY" REFUGEE QUESTION AND MADE CLEAR THAT SAFE AND HONORABLE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES REMAINED MAJOR CONCERN OF US, PAKISTAN AND THE REFUGEES THEMSELVES.

--INTERRELATIONSHIP OF ELEMENTS: HARTMAN EMPHASIZED THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT SOVIET/AFGHAN PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXTERNAL GUARANTEES OF AFGHANISTAN'S BORDERS WHILE SOVIET TROOP PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN REMAINED UNAFFECTED. KORNIYENKO CLAIMED THAT SOVIETS SEE NECESSITY FOR INTEGRATED APPROACH IN WHICH WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES COULD BE IMPLEMENTED ALONG WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT, SPECIFICALLY GUARANTEES.

--IN RESPONSE TO HARTMAN'S PROBING, KORNIYENKO REPEATEDLY STATED THAT SOVIET UNION WOULD AGREE TO ARRANGEMENTS WHEREBY WE COULD BE ASSURED THAT SOVIET TROOPS WOULD NOT REMAIN AT THEIR CURRENT LEVELS UNTIL EXTERNAL GUARANTEES HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED. KORNIYENKO SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT

SECSTATE WASHDC 7814 DTG: 270151Z JUL 82 PSN: 020233
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REDUCTION OF SOVIET FORCES MIGHT PROCEED IN TRAIN WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF EXTERNAL GUARANTEES OF AFGHAN SECURITY.

--HOWEVER, WHEN PRESSED TO DESCRIBE HOW SUCH ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED, KORNIYENKO REVERTED TO WELL KNOWN SOVIET SUGGESTION FOR THREE NEGOTIATING TRACKS (BILATERAL TALKS BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS, MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AMONG EXTERNAL POWERS, AND SOVIET-DRA NEGOTIATIONS ON SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWALS). HE ASSERTED THAT ALL THREE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS COULD PROCEED AT THE SAME TIME AND THAT THE VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS OF ALL THREE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE "KEPT INFORMED" OF PROGRESS BEING MADE IN ALL THREE NEGOTIATIONS.

--HARTMAN POINTED OUT THAT WE COULD HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN SUCH A COMPLEX SYSTEM OF NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY WHEN SOVIET SIDE RESERVED FULL RIGHT TO DECIDE CRITICAL ISSUE OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL WITH DRA. HOWEVER, KORNIYENKO

RESISTED ANY DISCUSSION OF COMMON FORUM FOR NEGOTIATIONS, SUCH AS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROPOSAL ADVANCED BY THE EC OR FORMAL, LEGAL LINK BETWEEN SOVIET-DRA AGREEMENT ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT.

--ON SECOND DAY OF DISCUSSIONS US SIDE AGAIN PRESSED SOVIETS FOR CLARIFICATIONS OF THEIR PROPOSED MODALITIES FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND UNDERScoreD THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT UNILATERAL SOVIET ASSURANCES THAT ITS TROOP WITHDRAWALS

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34

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WOULD PROCEED IN PARALLEL WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER ASPECTS OF THE SETTLEMENT. KORNIYENKO CLAIMED IN RESPONSE THAT OUR CONCERN ABOUT SUCH MODALITIES WAS EFFORT TO AVOID COMING TO GRIPS WITH CENTRAL QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY OF THE DRA.

--HARTMAN RESPONDED THAT WE INDEED COULD NOT ACCEPT LEGITIMACY OF THE CURRENT KABUL REGIME BECAUSE IT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO AN IMPORTANT SEGMENT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. NEVERTHELESS, WE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS IN ANYONE'S INTEREST TO PROLONG THE EXISTING SITUATION AND THUS SOUGHT SOME WAY TO RESOLVE IT. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT US AND SOVIET APPROACHES REMAIN FAR APART, PARTICULARLY ON KEY QUESTION OF LEAVING SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EXCLUSIVELY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DRA.

--KORNIYENKO ASSERTED THAT THERE WAS FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OF PRINCIPLE IN OUR APPROACHES THAT COULD NOT BE BRIDGED BY DISCUSSION OF MODALITIES. HARTMAN REPLIED THAT SUCCESSIVE OVERWHELMING VOTES IN FAVOR OF AFGHANISTAN RESOLUTIONS IN THE UNGA WERE EVIDENCE THAT MANY OTHER COUNTRIES SHARED OUR VIEWS ON THE ELEMENTS ESSENTIAL FOR A SETTLEMENT. AS FOR THE SOVIET INSISTENCE ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE DRA, WE FELT THE ONLY FAIR TEST OF WHETHER CURRENT REGIME ACTUALLY REFLECTED WISHES OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WOULD BE IF SOVIET TROOPS WERE WITHDRAWN. WE WOULD THEN SEE WHAT HAPPENED.

--KORNIYENKO ASSERTED THAT PAKISTAN HAD AT ONE POINT BEEN WILLING TO ENTER DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE

DRA AND THAT THE US HAD PRESSURED PAKISTAN TO BACK AWAY. HARTMAN VIGOROUSLY REJECTED THIS CHARGE, NOTING THAT US HAD SUPPORTED PAKISTAN IN DECISION WHICH GOP HAD REACHED AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER ISLAMIC AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES.

--KORNIYENKO SUMMED UP DISCUSSIONS BY AGAIN ASSERTING THAT US AND SOVIET APPROACHES WERE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT. BECAUSE US IS UNWILLING TO RECOGNIZE DRA, OUR APPROACH CANNOT LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT.

--HARTMAN REITERATED THAT WE COULD NOT INDEED RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMACY OF A GOVERNMENT THAT WAS SO CLEARLY IMPOSED AND MAINTAINED BY SOVIET TROOPS. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAD FELT IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE SOVIET SIDE KNOW OUR VIEWS AND OUR CONVICTION THAT PROCEDURES COULD AND SHOULD BE FOUND TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS IN A WAY THAT WOULD NOT THREATEN LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORS.

--IN ADDITION TO ISSUES DISCUSSED ABOVE, SOVIET SIDE EXPRESSED FOLLOWING VIEWS ON RELATED TOPICS:

A. EC CONFERENCE PROPOSAL: IN RESPONSE TO OUR EXPRESSIONS FOR SUPPORT OF PROPOSAL, SOVIETS AGAIN REJECTED IT BECAUSE IT DID NOT PROVIDE FOR PARTICIPATION OF DRA AS LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN FROM THE OUTSET.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

B. ROLE OF IRAN: SOVIETS THROUGHOUT DISCUSSIONS SEEMED AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN HOW IRAN MIGHT FIT INTO THE SOVIET CONCEPTION OF A SETTLEMENT. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT SOVIETS VIEW IRANIAN INTRANSIGENCE AS REAL HINDERANCE TO ACHIEVEMENT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN AFGHANISTAN.

C. UN INITIATIVE AND THE GENEVA TALKS: KORNIYENKO MAINTAINED THAT SOVIET UNION HAD NO ROLE IN THE TALKS AND DID NOT EXPECT TO SEE A PROPOSAL EMERGE FROM THE UN PROCESS. WHILE SUGGESTING THAT ANY DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PARTIES COULD BE SEEN AS "POSITIVE", HE DECLINED TO ASSESS PROSPECTS FOR THE PROCESS, CITING SOVIET "UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE TRUE INTENTIONS" OF PAKISTAN.

--AT CONCLUSION OF DISCUSSIONS HARTMAN SAID THAT WE WOULD CAREFULLY ASSESS WHAT HAD BEEN SAID AND MADE NO COMMITMENT TO RESUME DISCUSSIONS IN THIS FORM. HE DID, HOWEVER, UNDERSCORE THAT SOVIET UNION WOULD CONTINUE TO HEAR FROM US ON THE QUESTION OF AFGHANISTAN.

--OBVIOUSLY, WE WILL THOROUGHLY EVALUATE THESE DISCUSSIONS BUT OUR PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT IS THAT, WHILE

KORNIYENKO HAD SOME NEW FORMULATIONS AND ELABORATIONS OF SOVIET POSITIONS, HE BROKE NO NEW GROUND ON SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR SETTLEMENT.

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35

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--THIS MAY REFLECT SOVIET DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE LONG
TERM STRUGGLE AND THAT SHORT ATTENTION SPAN OF WORLD
OPINION WILL OVER LONG HAUL REDUCE PRESSURE ON THEM.

--IN THIS CONNECTION, WE BELIEVE OUR DISCUSSIONS WERE
USEFUL IN DRIVING HOME TO MOSCOW THAT AFGHANISTAN ISSUE
WILL NOT GO AWAY AND THAT IT REMAINS MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO
IMPROVEMENT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE
THAT OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE FOR THE DISCUSSIONS WAS
ACHIEVED, DESPITE HARD SOVIET LINE ON VIRTUALLY ALL
ISSUES.

--IT WILL BE IMPORTANT IN THE COMING PERIOD TO KEEP
MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON SOVIET UNION, PARTICULARLY AS WE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

APPROACH UNGA DEBATE ON AFGHANISTAN. WOULD APPRECIATE
YOUR IDEAS ON HOW THIS MIGHT BEST BE DONE.

4. FOR USNATO: YOU SHOULD BRIEF RESTRICTED NAC ON OUR
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, EMPHASIZING OUR CONCERN FOR
CONFIDENTIALITY OF OUR EXCHANGES WITH MOSCOW.

5. FOR ISLAMABAD: WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN
PAKISTANI VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS TO SUSTAIN INTERNATIONAL
PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE CONSIDERING WHETHER
TO BRIEF THE UN ON OUR DISCUSSIONS BUT WOULD APPRECIATE
HAVING PAKISTANI VIEWS ON THIS IN ADVANCE. STOESSEL

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