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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

SMF 12/21/2007

**File Folder** FRANCE (7/28/82-8/31/82)

**FOIA**

S2007-081

**Box Number** 13

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49

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47436	CABLE	281742Z JUL 82 <b>R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	7/28/1982	B1
47437	CABLE	291615Z JUL 82 <b>R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	7/29/1982	B1
47438	CABLE	301120Z JUL 82 <b>R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	7/30/1982	B1
47439	CABLE	031052Z AUG 82 <b>R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	8/3/1982	B1
47440	CABLE	041807Z AUG 82 <b>R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	8/4/1982	B1
47441	CABLE	040943Z AUG 82 <b>R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	8/4/1982	B1
47442	CABLE	051446Z AUG 82 <b>R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	8/5/1982	B1
47443	CABLE	060026Z AUG 82 <b>R 4/23/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	8/6/1982	B1
47444	CABLE	062242Z AUG 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	8/6/1982	B1

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47445	CABLE	060934Z AUG 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	3	8/6/1982	B1
47446	CABLE	070247Z AUG 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	8/7/1982	B1
47447	CABLE	070249Z AUG 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	8/7/1982	B1
47448	CABLE	071605Z AUG 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	8/7/1982	B1
47449	CABLE	070959Z AUG 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	8/7/1982	B1
47450	CABLE	101705Z AUG 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	8/10/1982	B1
47451	CABLE	131039Z AUG 82 <b>R 11/1/2010 M081/1</b>	4	8/13/1982	B1
47452	CABLE	140104Z AUG 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	8/14/1982	B1
47453	CABLE	151035Z AUG 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	8/15/1982	B1
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47455	CABLE	201208Z AUG 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	8/20/1982	B1
47456	CABLE	212400Z AUG 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	8/21/1982	B1
47457	CABLE	261646 AUG 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	8/26/1982	B1
47458	CABLE	310122Z AUG 82 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	8/31/1982	B1

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47436

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PAGE 01      PARIS 5699      DTG: 281742Z JUL 82 PSN: 022603  
SIT560      DATE 08/10/82      TOR: 209/1810Z

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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2445  
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4841  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5372  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4428  
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 25699  
EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/28/02 (MARESCA, JOHN J) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, FR, LE, IS, UR

SUBJECT: LEBANON - MORE FRENCH VIEWS

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. QUAI NEA DIRECTOR SERGE BOIDEVAIX DISCUSSED HIS VIEWS ON THE LEBANESE SITUATION AND HIS RECENT BILATERALS IN MOSCOW WITH EMBOFF, JULY 27. AS WITH OUR OTHER RECENT CONTACTS WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS, BOIDEVAIX IS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE HABIB MISSION, BUT REALLY HAS NO OTHER SOLUTIONS TO OFFER. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL IF WE COULD GET AMBASSADOR HABIB TO PARIS EVEN BRIEFLY. FAILING THAT WE WOULD RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT PROVIDING US WITH A STATUS REPORT (PARTICULARLY IF THERE IS REASON

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOR OPTIMISM) WHICH WE COULD USE TO BRIEF HIGH-LEVEL FRENCH OFFICIALS, SUCH AS BOIDEVAIX AND QUAI SECGEN GUTHMANN. END SUMMARY.

3. BOIDEVAIX BELIEVES THAT WE ARE ALL WRONG IN OUR BASIC APPROACH TO THE CRISIS (A VIEW NOT UNLIKE THAT OF OTHER RANKING FRENCH OFFICIALS) AND THAT WE WILL NEVER GET THE PLO TO LEAVE BEIRUT. HE FEARS A LARGER CONFLICT DEVELOPING WHICH WILL PIT THE ISRAELIS AGAINST THE SYRIANS -- BEGINNING WITH THOSE IN THE BEKAA. IF THIS DOES NOT OCCUR THEN HE SEES THE CRISIS SIMPLY DRAGGING ON ALMOST ENDLESSLY.

4. SINCE BOIDEVAIX SAID THAT HE FELT HABIB WAS APPROACHING THE PROBLEM ALL WRONG, EMBOFF OFFERED TO PASS ALONG TO AMBASSADOR HABIB ANY THOUGHTS

BOIDEVAIX HAD ON WHAT HE MIGHT BE DOING. BOIDEVAIX FIRST THOUGHT THAT THE EVACUATION ISSUE COULD BE SPLIT UP, WITH THOSE PLO ELEMENTS THAT CAME FROM SYRIA BEING SENT BACK. THIS WOULD ONLY WORK IF THERE WERE SOME POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN IT FOR THE PLO. HOWEVER, LATER IN THE CONVERSATION, BOIDEVAIX EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT EVEN THAT WOULD NOT WORK. FINALLY BOIDEVAIX ADMITTED THAT FRANCE HAS BEEN SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM BUT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO COME UP WITH ONE. HE TALKED A BIT ABOUT THE "FRANCO-EGYPTIAN WORKING PAPER", BUT, IN EMBOFF'S VIEW, APPEARED LESS CONVINCED ABOUT ITS MERITS THAN OTHERS IN GOF.

5. BOIDEVAIX IS CONVINCED THAT ARAFAT AND THE PLO NO LONGER WANT TO LEAVE BEIRUT. ANY COMMITMENTS FROM ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO AMBASSADOR HABIB TO ACCEPT PLO COMBATANTS, CAN AND WILL BE UNDONE BY ARAFAT AT THE CRUCIAL MOMENT. ARAFAT, HE FEELS, STILL WIELDS THE THREAT OF GOING OVER THE HEADS OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO THE MASSES. THE PLO, WHICH WAS IN A MILITARILY WEAK POSITION IN BEIRUT THREE WEEKS AGO, IS NOW WELL DUG IN, WITH BUNKERS AND ALL.

6. THE ARAB LEAGUE EFFORTS, ITS MISSIONS TO EUROPE AND THE US AND THE TAIF MEETING, BOIDEVAIX DISMISSES AS ONLY PUBLIC RELATIONS MANEUVERS. THEIR SOLE AIM IS PLACATING DOMESTIC ARAB OPINION AND GIVING THE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

APPEARANCE OF DOING SOMETHING IN FACE OF CHARGES THAT ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAVE DONE NOTHING TO HELP THE PLO.

7. IN MOSCOW, DURING HIS BILATERAL ON JULY 20/21, BOIDEVAIX GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS KNOW WHAT THEY DO NOT WANT IN THE CURRENT CRISIS, BUT NOT WHAT THEY DO WANT. THEY RAISED THE OLD SAW OF BREZHNEV'S CALL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THE SOVIETS TOLD HIM THAT THEY HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE BASIC PREMISE OF THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN TEXT. (BOIDEVAIX ADDED THAT SYRIA IS THE ONLY ARAB COUNTRY THAT OPPOSES THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN DRAFT AND HE PRESUMES THAT IS PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF EGYPT'S INVOLVEMENT.)

8. DESPITE THEIR CLOSE TIES, BOIDEVAIX FOUND THE SOVIETS NOT WELL INFORMED ON THE PLO. HE IMPLIED THAT THE FRENCH WERE BETTER INFORMED BECAUSE OF THEIR CONTACTS WITH KADDOUMI. HE CITED, AS A CASE IN POINT, THE SHORT TEXT ON DISENGAGEMENT WHICH THE SOVIETS THOUGHT THE PLO WAS PUSHING AT THE UN AND WHICH THEY SAW AS A PLO EFFORT TO COUNTER THE FRENCH JUNE 25

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BY G1 NARA DATE 4/23/10

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PAGE 01  
SIT559

PARIS 5699  
DATE 08/10/82

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O 281742Z JUL 82  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0437

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2446  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 6588  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2137  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1142  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4842  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5373  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4429  
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RESOLUTION. ACCORDING TO BOIDEVAIX, THE PLO HAD  
GIVEN UP THE IDEA OF ITS RESOLUTION SOME TIME AGO AND  
FURTHERMORE IT WAS NEVER INTENDED TO COUNTER THE FRENCH  
MOVE.

9. WITH REGARD TO EVENTS AT THE UN, THE SOVIETS  
APPEARED TO BE OPERATING MORE ON CORRIDOR GOSSIP THAN  
ON DIRECT CONSULTATIONS. WHAT THE SOVIETS TOLD  
BOIDEVAIX ABOUT THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD A MULTINATIONAL  
FORCE, HE SAID, DID NOT GO BEYOND WHAT HAS BEEN  
REPORTED IN THE PRESS.

10. COMMENT: RANKING GOF MINISTRY EXTERNAL RELATIONS  
OFFICIALS HAVE SPENT A LOT OF TIME DISCUSSING THE  
MIDDLE EAST WITH US OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS. CLEARLY  
THIS IS AN INDICATION OF THEIR DESIRE TO BE CUT IN ON  
WHAT IS GOING ON AND PERHAPS REPRESENTS A REALIZATION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT FRENCH EFFORTS IN THE AREA, WHATEVER THEY ARE,  
WILL GO NOWHERE WITHOUT WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE US.  
WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO BRING  
THEM MORE INTO THE PICTURE ON WHERE AMBASSADOR HABIB  
IS THAN TO HAVE THEM CONTINUE TO RUN OFF IN THEIR  
OWN DIRECTION, ON THE BASIS OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION.  
IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR HABIB TO VISIT PARIS, THAT  
WOULD BE AN IDEAL WAY TO BRING THE FRENCH UP-TO-DATE  
AND WOULD MAXIMIZE OUR POSSIBILITY OF ENLISTING THEIR  
SUPPORT OR AT LEAST AVOIDING THEIR OPPOSITION. IF  
SUCH A VISIT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME, WE WOULD  
APPRECIATE RECEIVING SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF WHERE HABIB  
MISSION STANDS NOW, WHICH WE CAN USE WITH POLICY-MAKERS  
HERE. MARESCA

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PAGE 01      PARIS 5900      DTG: 291615Z JUL 82 PSN: 024147  
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DE RUHFR #5900/01 2101616  
O 291615Z JUL 82  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0494

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2447  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6601  
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EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/29/02 (MARESCA, JOHN J) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, PLO, FR, IS, LE, US  
SUBJECT: LEBANON: FRENCH VIEWS  
REF: PARIS 25699

1. C/- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. IN OUR CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH THE GOF OVER LEBANON, EMBOFF MET AGAIN JULY 29 WITH QUAI NEA DIRECTOR SERGE BOIDEVAIX. BOIDEVAIX REVEALED THE BASIS FOR FRENCH CONVICTION THAT THE PLO WILL NOT LEAVE BEIRUT, MUSED ABOUT WAYS OF OVERCOMING ISRAELI UNWILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THE PLO AND NOTED THAT THE GOF IS "TERRORIZED" OVER WHAT IT BELIEVES IS THE COMING BATTLE OF BEIRUT. HE REMAINS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNCONVINCED THAT THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN WORKING PAPER IN ANY WAY WILL HAMPER AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MISSION. END SUMMARY.

3. BOIDEVAIX REITERATED FRANCE'S FIRM CONVICTION THAT WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GET THE PLO TO LEAVE BEIRUT. HE SAID THIS CONVICTION IS BASED ON WHAT THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN TOLD DIRECTLY BY THE PLO'S HANI AL-HASSAN AND FAROUK KADDOUMI. THEY WERE ALSO SHOWN A MESSAGE SIGNED BY ARAFAT WHICH SAID THE PLO WOULD NOT LEAVE BEIRUT WITHOUT GAINING POLITICAL CONCESSIONS.

4. BASED PARTICULARLY ON COMMENTS MADE BY KADDOUMI, BOIDEVAIX BELIEVES THAT THE PLO LEADERSHIP IS GENUINELY WORRIED ABOUT LOSING FACE AMONG THEIR OWN PEOPLE. HE SAYS THEY FEAR ASSASSINATION BY OTHER PALESTINIANS IF THEY ARE SEEN AS CAPITULATING. THEREFORE, THEY WOULD

PREFER TO DIE A HERO'S DEATH FIGHTING FOR WEST BEIRUT THAN FROM AN ASSASSIN'S BULLET.

5. THE PALESTINIANS ALSO FEAR REVENGE BY THE PHALANGE AGAINST THOSE PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS WHO REMAIN IN WEST BEIRUT. EMBOFF COMMENTED THAT, IF THAT IS A TRUE CONCERN, IT DID NOT SEEM TO BE ONE THAT IS INSURMOUNTABLE. HE SUGGESTED THAT FRANCE, AND PERHAPS OTHERS, HAS A CERTAIN INFLUENCE WITH THE PHALANGE AND COULD SEEK GUARANTEES FOR THE CIVILIANS' SAFETY. BOIDEVAIX AGREED. BOIDEVAIX HAD RAISED THIS POINT IN DISCUSSING THE MATTER OF WHEN THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE SHOULD BE PUT INTO BEIRUT. AS WE HAVE REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, THE FRENCH BELIEVE THE INSERTION OF THE MNF AFTER A PLO PULLOUT IS WELL UNDERWAY IS TOO LATE.

6. BASED ON INFORMATION FROM THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV AND FROM A MEETING YESTERDAY (JULY 28) BETWEEN QUAI SEGGEN GUTHMANN AND ISRAELI AMBASSADOR ROSENNE, THE FRENCH ARE "TERRORIZED" (THE TERM USED BY BOIDEVAIX) THAT THE BATTLE OF BEIRUT WILL TAKE PLACE. A SIMILAR SENTIMENT WAS EXPRESSED BY THE QUAI'S IO DIRECTOR LEWIN IN DISCUSSING THE FRANCO-EGYPTIAN DRAFT AT THE UNSC. LEWIN TOLD EMBOFF THAT FRANCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY WANT TO PUSH ITS DRAFT IN THE UNSC, BUT BECAUSE OF THIS FEAR OF AN IMPENDING BATTLE IN BEIRUT THEY WANT SOMETHING (NOT FURTHER DEFINED) AT THE UN.

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. Musing on what else might be done in Lebanon, BOIDEVAIX THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO REACTIVATE THE JOINT LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN COMMITTEE, EVEN THOUGH IT HAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED ANYTHING. HE MOVED ON TO ANOTHER THOUGHT AND DID NOT EXPLAIN WHY THIS MIGHT BE USEFUL.

8. IN THE COURSE OF A DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTION OF DEALING WITH THE PLO, BOIDEVAIX PROPOSED THAT IN ORDER TO OVERCOME ISRAEL'S ADAMANT UNWILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THAT ORGANIZATION, SOME OTHER FORMULA BE FOUND. HIS IDEA IS THAT SOME NEW UMBRELLA PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATION OR EVEN A "PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT" BE SET UP TO DEAL WITH ISRAEL. IT WOULD INCLUDE NOT ONLY THE PLO BUT OTHERS, SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, WEST BANK MAYORS. EMBOFF EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT ISRAEL WOULD AGREE.

9. MINIMIZE DAMASCUS CONSIDERED. DEPARTMENT PASS BEIRUT FOR HABIB, IF DESIRED.

PARIS 5900

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PAGE 01            PARIS 5900  
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O 291615Z JUL 82  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0495

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2448  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6602  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2140  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 25900  
MARESCA

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47438

5

PAGE 01                      PARIS 5964  
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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: GRAIN AGREEMENT

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DE RUFHFR #5964 2111120  
O 301120Z JUL 82  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0530

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PARIS 25964  
E.O. 12065: N/A  
TAGS: EAGR, ETRD, US, FR, UR  
SUBJECT: EXTENSION OF SOVIET GRAIN AGREEMENT  
REF: STATE 211921

1. WE CONVEYED TO MINISTRY EXTERNAL RELATIONS (JEAN-PAUL BARRE, ACTING CHIEF OF BILATERAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS) PRESIDENTIAL DECISION TO SEEK ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF GRAIN AGREEMENT AND DREW ON TALKING POINTS IN REFTEL.
2. BARRE TOOK CAREFUL NOTE AND SAID HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES. HE REACTED ONLY TO THE POINT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED TO FOREGO AN EXPANDED AGREEMENT DESPITE PRESSURES FROM THE U.S. FARM COMMUNITY, COMMENTING THAT HE FOUND IT CURIOUS THAT SUCH A POSSIBILITY HAD EVEN BEEN CONSIDERED.
3. AG COUNSELOR ALSO MADE SIMILAR APPROACH TO MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE CRESSON'S ASSISTANT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE RECEIVED THE NEWS WITH GREAT INTEREST BUT DID NOT COMMENT. MARESCA

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47439

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PAGE 01                      PARIS 6284  
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DE RUFHFR #6284 2151054  
O 031052Z AUG 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0672

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 26284  
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/03/02

TAGS: IS, LE, FR

SUBJECT: FRENCH FEAR ISRAELI ASSAULT ON WEST BEIRUT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER GUTMANN CALLED CHARGE URGENTLY MORNING 3 AUGUST TO CONVEY FRENCH FEAR THAT ISRAELIS MAY BE PREPARING TODAY FOR FINAL ASSAULT ON WEST BEIRUT. GUTMANN SAID THAT FRENCH HAD CONVERGENT INFORMATION FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES THAT ISRAELIS WERE REINFORCING THEIR TANK FORCES IN THE MUSEUM SECTOR AND ALL INDICATIONS SUGGESTED THAT THEY WERE PREPARING FOR AN "IMMINENT ASSAULT". GUTMANN SAID THAT ONE COULD NEVER HAVE FULL CERTAINTY OVER SUCH THINGS BUT THAT IN THIS CASE THE INDICATIONS WERE "IMPRESSIVE". GUTMANN ALSO SAID THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE PREPARING TO USE INCAPACITATING GAS AND THAT TRUCKS USED FOR THIS PURPOSE HAD BEEN SEEN APPROACHING THE AREA.

3. GUTMANN ASKED THAT THIS INFORMATION BE CONVEYED IMMEDIATELY TO WASHINGTON IN LIGHT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS YESTERDAY.  
MARESCA

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR

BY

CU NARA DATE

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~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47440

7

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 7036  
SIT611 DATE 08/10/82

DTG: 041807Z AUG 82 PSN: 032591  
TOR: 216/2141Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

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SIT: MCF JP WHLR SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #7036 2161815  
O 041807Z AUG 82 ZFFA  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 217036  
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DNG: CO 8/2/02

TAGS: PEPR, US, FR

SUBJECT: SECRETARY SHULTZ MEETING WITH FRENCH AMBASSADOR  
VERNIER-PALLIEZ

1. ~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SECRETARY SHULTZ MET ON JULY 31 WITH FRENCH AMBASSADOR  
VERNIER-PALLIEZ TO DISCUSS THE GENERAL STATE OF U.S. -  
FRENCH RELATIONS. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE BURT ALSO ATTENDED. THE SEC-  
RETARY BEGAN BY SAYING THAT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT HE HAD  
NOT BEEN ABLE TO MEET WITH FM CHEYSSON AT AN EARLY POINT.  
A MEETING HAD BEEN DISCUSSED FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN HIS  
NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION, BUT HE HAD NOT WANTED TO GIVE  
THE SENATE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS ACTING AS IF ALREADY  
CONFIRMED. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THEY  
WOULD GET TOGETHER SOON OR AT LEAST AT THE UNGA. VERNIER-  
PALLIEZ REPLIED THAT CHEYSSON UNDERSTANDS THE SITUATION.  
HE MENTIONED THAT CHEYSSON HAS INVITED THE SECRETARY TO  
MAKE AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO PARIS, PREFERABLY BEFORE THE  
UNGA. VERNIER-PALLIEZ NOTED THAT CHEYSSON BELIEVES IN  
ESTABLISHING GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH HIS COUNTER-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PARTS, IN ADDITION TO THE NORMAL RANGE OF AMBASSADORIAL  
MEETINGS.

3. SECRETARY SHULTZ TOLD VERNIER-PALLIEZ THAT ON BOTH  
OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL LEVELS WE HAVE ALWAYS HAD FUN-  
DAMENTALLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH FRANCE. THERE HAVE BEEN  
DIFFERENCES BUT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CONTAIN THEM AND  
MAINTAIN COOPERATION AT BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LEVELS.  
NOW, SOMEHOW, IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS THE SITUATION HAS  
DETERIORATED BADLY. TO SOME EXTENT THIS IS SEEN IN PUBLIC  
STATEMENTS BUT IT IS NOW ALSO SPILLING OVER INTO SUB-  
STANTIVE MATTERS OF GREAT CONCERN. THE SECRETARY  
POINTED TO THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM AS AN AREA WHERE WE  
HAVE BEEN WORKING TOGETHER WELL. HE NOTED THAT WE  
REALIZE THAT THERE CANNOT BE OVERT LINKAGE INVOLVING

CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, BUT WE ALL REALIZE THAT IT MUST  
SOMEHOW BE ACCOMPLISHED. NOW, FRANCE IS TRYING TO  
DISMISS THIS PROBLEM, WHICH REPRESENTS A SETBACK TO OUR  
EFFORTS TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT AND CANNOT BE IGNORED  
BY US.

4. THE SECRETARY ALSO MENTIONED CULTURE MINISTER LANG'S  
STATEMENTS IN MEXICO CITY, WHICH HE SAID WERE SIMPLY  
NOT CALLED FOR. HE ADDED THAT TO SOME EXTENT WE SHOULD  
NOT EVEN DIGNIFY STATEMENTS OF THAT SORT WITH A RESPONSE,  
BUT HE POINTED OUT THAT THEY ARE LIKE MARKERS ON A  
THERMOMETER REGISTERING HEAT AND INDICATIVE OF OUR  
RELATIONSHIP.

5. THE SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE ARE SUBSTANTIVE  
DIFFERENCES THAT SEPARATE US ON SUCH ISSUES AS SOVIET  
SANCTIONS, THE PIPELINE, STEEL AND GRAIN SUBSIDIES AND  
THERE ARE ALWAYS SOME PROBLEMS, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TO  
MAINTAIN AN OVERALL SENSE OF COOPERATION IN OUR RELATIONS.  
HE NOTED THAT IN RECENT WEEKS THERE HAS BEEN A BROAD  
EFFORT TO DAMPEN DOWN PUBLIC AIRING OF OUR DIFFERENCES:  
SCHMIDT'S AND PYM'S STATEMENTS OF THIS BEING A "FAMILY  
AFFAIR" HELPED PUT IT IN PERSPECTIVE; COLOMBO EMPHASIZED  
THE SAME BASIC CONCEPT. SECRETARY SHULTZ POINTED OUT  
THAT AFTER THE GOF'S PUBLIC STATEMENT ON PROCEEDING  
WITH THE PIPELINE CONTRACTS, PRESIDENT REAGAN WAS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ASKED FOR COMMENT. HE DECLINED AND USED SCHMIDT'S "FAMILY"  
REFERENCE. THUS, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE MAY BE  
DIFFERENCES, SOME EVEN IRRECONCILABLE, BUT THERE ARE STILL  
MUCH BROADER AREAS OF COOPERATION AND AGREEMENT. THE  
SECRETARY NOTED HIS IMPRESSION OF HIS MEETING WITH  
MITTERRAND: IT HAD PROCEEDED WELL AND THEY HAD GOTTEN  
ALONG; OBVIOUSLY HE HAS DIFFERENT IDEAS FROM OUR  
PRESIDENT ON ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, BUT BOTH ARE TRUE  
TO THEIR POINTS OF VIEW, AGREE ON THE NEED TO STIMULATE  
GREATER INVESTMENT AND ON THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF HIGH  
TECHNOLOGY AND HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH SOME  
IMPORTANT THINGS TOGETHER.

6. THEREFORE, THE SECRETARY SAID, THE MESSAGE TO BE  
TRANSMITTED WAS THE NEED TO DE-ESCALATE THE WAR OF WORDS  
AND TO PREVENT CURRENT PROBLEMS FROM POISONING THE  
ATMOSPHERE IN AREAS WHERE WE CAN WORK TOGETHER.

7. VERNIER-PALLIEZ REPLIED THAT HE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR  
DE-ESCALATION; THERE ARE SOME DISAGREEMENTS, BUT WE SHOULD  
ALLOW THEM TO COOL OFF AND DIFFERENCES SHOULD NOT BE  
OVERPLAYED. ON NAMIBIA, VERNIER-PALLIEZ SAID THAT  
CHEYSSON MAY HAVE BEEN MISQUOTED. IT HAD BEEN AGREED  
NOT TO MAKE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL A CONDITION AND THERE MAY  
HAVE BEEN SOME IMPRUDENT WORDS FROM ONE SIDE THAT CAUSED  
A RESPONSE. ON LANG, VERNIER-PALLIEZ SAID THAT HE NEVER  
REALLY MENTIONED THE U.S.

8. VERNIER-PALLIEZ SAID THAT MITTERRAND BELIEVES HE HAS  
MADE A MAJOR EFFORT ON U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS. ON THE  
ALLIANCE, HE HAS BEEN FIRMER THAN HIS PREDECESSOR, WHICH  
IS NOT EASY BECAUSE OF HIS POLITICAL LEANINGS, AND IN-  
CREASED THE DEFENSE BUDGET BY FOUR PERCENT IN REAL TERMS.  
HE HAS COME TO THE U.S. TWICE AND WAS ALSO DELIGHTED WITH  
HIS TALK WITH THE SECRETARY THIS SPRING. BUT HE HAD PUT  
GREAT HOPE IN THE VERSAILLES SUMMIT AND WAS VERY DIS-  
APPOINTED BY THE POST-SUMMIT DECISIONS. STILL, HE HAS  
NOT MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS REFLECTING THIS. HIS  
REPLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S BASTILLE DAY MESSAGE WAS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 7036

DTG: 041807Z AUG 82 PSN: 032591

PARTICULARLY WARM; ON SANCTIONS THE FRENCH STATEMENT  
WAS CAREFULLY WORDED AND APPLIES ONLY TO 1982 DELIVERIES.  
VERNIER-PALLIEZ STRESSED THAT THERE IS A TENDENCY FOR THE

SECSTATE WASHDC 7036

DTG: 041807Z AUG 82 PSN: 032591

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRESS TO ESCALATE PROBLEMS.

9. SWITCHING TO THE MIDDLE EAST, VERNIER-PALLIEZ SAID  
WE ARE NOT ALWAYS IN AGREEMENT, BUT WE HAVE TRIED TO  
ADJUST OUR VIEWS TO PROVIDE A GOOD IMPRESSION TO THE  
OUTSIDE WORLD. SECRETARY SHULTZ REPLIED THAT WE HOPE  
FOR ENOUGH AGREEMENT TO GET THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE  
TOGETHER. HE ADDED THAT WHEN - AND NOT IF - THE TIME  
COMES, WE WILL BE ABLE TO FACILITATE MOVEMENT OUT OF  
BEIRUT. VERNIER-PALLIEZ SAID THAT FRANCE HAS EXPLAINED  
ITS CONDITIONS FOR PARTICIPATION AND THAT IT WOULD BE  
DIFFICULT IF THERE WERE NO HINT OF THE PALESTINIANS'  
FUTURE INDICATED. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID THE GOF  
HAD READ THE SECRETARY'S DECLARATIONS ON THIS WITH THE  
GREATEST INTEREST. THE SECRETARY CONCLUDED SAYING THAT  
IT IS NOT WISE OR APPROPRIATE TO HAVE FORMAL LINKAGES  
ON THESE ISSUES, BUT THEY STILL MUST BE ADDRESSED URGENTLY.

SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 7036

DTG: 041807Z AUG 82 PSN: 032591

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47441

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PAGE 01      PARIS 6433  
SIT289      DATE 08/17/82

DTG: 040943Z AUG 82 PSN: 031758  
TOR: 216/0958Z

5. DEPARTMENT PASS BEIRUT.  
MARESCA

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR VP SIT KEMP EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: RED TAG/MNF

PARIS 6433

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUFHFR #6433 2160946

O 040943Z AUG 82 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0745

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2149

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5395

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1153

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2453

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4413

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 4708

BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 26433

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/04/02

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, PLO, LE, IS, FR

SUBJECT: FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN BEIRUT MNF

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ACTING FONMIN GUTMANN CALLED CHARGE MORNING OF AUGUST 4. STRESSING THAT THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE HELD IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, GUTMANN SAID THAT LAST NIGHT LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER HAD CALLED IN FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO BEIRUT TO SAY THAT LEBANESE AND PLO ACCEPTED HABIB EVACUATION PLAN, ON CONDITION THAT A FRENCH "ADVANCE CONTINGENT" WOULD ARRIVE IN BEIRUT ON D-DAY, AS A PRECURSOR OF THE MAIN MNF FORCE, WHICH WOULD ARRIVE ON D PLUS 5.

3. DURING THE NIGHT, GOF DECIDED IN PRINCIPLE TO ACCEPT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF, INCLUDING ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLO CONDITION MENTIONED ABOVE, ON CONDITION THAT ALL PARTIES COMMITTED THEMSELVES NOT TO FIRE ON THE FRENCH. DETAILS WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT ON-SITE AMONG AMBASSADORS IN BEIRUT. FRENCH WERE PREPARED TO IMMEDIATELY SEND A MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER TO BEIRUT. FOR THIS PURPOSE.

4. HOWEVER, GUTMANN CONTINUED, ISRAELI ATTACK AT DAWN TODAY HAD PUT ALL OF THIS IN SUSPENSE. GUTMANN NOTED BITTERLY THAT FRENCH EMBASSY RESIDENCE HAD BEEN AFFECTED AND QUAI WAS NOW COMMUNICATING WITH ITS AMBASSADOR BY TELEX. FRENCH UNDERSTANDING FROM HABIB WAS THAT AT LEAST 24-48 HOURS WOULD BE NEEDED BEFORE ANYONE COULD SEE CLEARLY WHERE THINGS STAND.

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M07-081 #47441  
BY av NARA DATE 4/23/10

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47442

10

PAGE 01      PARIS 6657      DTG: 051446Z AUG 82 PSN: 033572  
SIT172      DATE 08/16/82      TOR: 217/1457Z

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DE RUFHFR #6657 2171447

O 051446Z AUG 82

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

PARIS 6657

DTG: 051446Z AUG 82 PSN: 033572

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0825

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2455

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0005

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6617

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2151

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1156

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4416

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 4713

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5400

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4444

BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 26657

EXDIS

BEIRUT FOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, PLO, LE, IS, FR

SUBJECT: LEBANON: FRENCH VIEWS ON NEXT STEPS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FRENCH HAVE RECEIVED REPORT OF HAREL-VELIOTES MEETING, WHICH THEY SHARED WITH US. WE ARE MAINTAINING FREQUENT CONTACT WITH ACTING FONMIN GUTMANN AND ELYSEE ADVISOR VEDRINE, WHO ARE CONTROLLING GOF POSITIONS ON LEBANESE SITUATION.

3. GUTMANN TOLD CHARGE AUGUST 5 THAT ALL INFORMATION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HE HAD RECEIVED INDICATED THAT FOLLOWING THE BLOWS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS, ARAFFT WAS IN AGREEMENT TO DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO EVACUATE BEIRUT. THUS IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR HAIB TO PUT BACK TOGETHER AN AGREEMENT FOR EVAAUATION, IF ISRAELIS WILL ABSTAIN FROM FURTHER MILITARY ACTION. GUTMANN, SAYING HE WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY, URGED THAT THE USG PRESS ISRAEL STRONGLY TO AVOID MILITARY ACTION. GUTMANN SAID DECLARATIONS WERE NOT ENOUGH AND THAT SOME FORM OF PRESSURE NOW HAD TO BE BROUGHT ON ISRAEL. ONLY THE USG COULD DO THIS. IF WE FAILED NOW, USG CREDIBILITY WOULD SUFFER ENORMOUSLY, AND THE WEST IN GENERAL WOULD BEAR PROFOUND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRAGEDY WHICH WOULD FOLLOW.

4. GUTMANN SAID THAT, STARTING TWO DAYS AGO, THE

FRENCH HAD DECIDED THAT HABIB HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AND THAT THE GOF SHOULD GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO HIS MISSION. GOF IS STILL GIVING FULL SUPPORT TO HABIB AND BELIEVES HIS EFFORTS ARE THE ONLY POSSIBLE AENUE TOWARDS SOLUTION. HOWEVER, THE ISRAELI ATTACK IS BEYOND HABIB S CONTROL AND ONLY DECISIVE USG PRESSURES CAN NOW HOLD THE ISRAELIS BACK TO PERMIT EVACUATION.

5. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.  
MARESCA

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M07-081 #47442  
BY CAI NARA DATE 4/23/10

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47443

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 8991 DTG: 060026Z AUG 82 PSN: 034667  
SIT156 DATE 08/16/82 TOR: 218/0329Z

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ANDREANI AND GERGORIN COME TO WASHINGTON. CONSEQUENTLY,  
IN APPROACH TO FRENCH, CHARGE SHOULD USE ANY  
APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO ENCOURAGE GUTMANN IN VIEW  
THAT ANDREANI SHOULD BE THE CHOICE. END FYI. SHULTZ

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

SECSTATE WASHDC 8991

DTG: 060026Z AUG 82 PSN: 034667

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #8991 2180044  
O 060026Z AUG 82  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9633

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 218991

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, ECON, FR, US  
SUBJECT: FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR BILATERAL TALKS ON ECONOMIC  
RELATIONS WITH THE USSR

REF: PARIS 26425

1. ~~C-ENTIRE~~ TEXT.

2. GUTMANN'S INFORMAL SUGGESTION APPEALS TO US. WE  
BELIEVE THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP WOULD BENEFIT  
FROM SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE EFFECT OF SANCTIONS  
ON THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND RELATED ISSUES. (FYI: ON THE  
OTHER HAND, WE HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO  
CONVINCE THE FRENCH AND TURN THEM AROUND. NEVERTHELESS,  
IT WOULD HELP DEFEND US AGAINST CRITICISM THAT WE ARE  
EITHER AVOIDING A MEETING WITH CHEYSSON OR REFUSING A  
DIALOGUE ON THIS ISSUE.) CHARGE SHOULD THEREFORE FOLLOW  
UP WITH GUTMANN AND SUGGEST THAT ANDREANI AND/OR GERGORIN  
LEAD A GROUP TO WASHINGTON SOME TIME DURING THE NEXT FEW  
WEEKS FOR SUCH AN EXCHANGE. IN RESPONDING TO GUTMANN'S  
PROPOSAL YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE EXPECT ANY PUBLIC  
COMMENT ON THE VISIT NOT TO MENTION THE LINK TO THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SANCTIONS QUESTION IN ORDER TO AVOID UNJUSTIFIED EX-  
PECTATIONS THAT WE MIGHT BE TALKING ABOUT THE RELAXATION  
OF SANCTIONS. YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE SURE THAT THE FRENCH  
UNDERSTAND THAT WE SEE THESE TALKS AS AN EXCHANGE OF  
INFORMATION ABOUT THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS AND NOT ABOUT  
THE MANNER IN WHICH SANCTIONS SHOULD BE APPLIED.

3. FOR OUR PART ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE BURT  
WOULD LEAD THE U.S. SIDE OF THE DISCUSSIONS. BURT IS  
AVAILABLE FOR THE FIRST THREE WEEKS OF AUGUST.

4. FYI -- FOR VARIETY OF REASONS, WE BELIEVE  
ANDREANI WOULD BE PREFERRED FRENCH INTERLOCUTOR,  
ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY WE HAVE NO OBJECTIONS IF BOTH

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NLRR 1007-081 #47443

BY CA NARA DATE 4/23/10

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~~SECRET~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 0505 DTG: 062242Z AUG 82 PSN: 049669  
SIT110 DATE 10/12/82 TOR: 229/2021Z

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DE RUEHC #0505 2182307  
O 062242Z AUG 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9724

INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0266  
AMCONSUL BOMBAY IMMEDIATE 6452  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 6207  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 220505  
NODIS  
VIENNA FOR USIAEA  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MUNC, PARM, TNUC, IN, FR, US  
SUBJECT: U.S.-INDIA NUCLEAR SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP

REF: (A) STATE 216963, (B) PARIS 26816

1. ON AUGUST 6, JEAN-PAUL REAU AND BERTRAND BARRE OF THE FRENCH EMBASSY VISITED DEPARTMENT TO MEET, AT THEIR REQUEST, WITH STOIBER AND DOOLEY (OES) AND BETTAUER (L).

2. REAU AND BARRE SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF PURPOSE OF DEMARCHE THAT FRIEDMAN HAD CARRIED OUT PER REF A. THEY SAID AMIGUES WANTED TO KEEP THINGS VERY SIMPLE AND GOF INTENTION HAD NOT/NOT BEEN TO PUT ALL POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL IN GOF EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH GOI. RATHER, THEY MERELY WISHED TO RELY ON THE USG-GOI AGREEMENT REMAINING VALID. THE FOUR REPEAT FOUR CONDITIONS GOF INTENDED TO REQUEST EXPLICITLY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FROM GOI WERE: (A) PEACEFUL USE COMMITMENT. (B) SUPPLY REMAINS SUBJECT TO USG-GOI AGREEMENT; (C) A REPROCESSING CLAUSE; (D) FALLBACK SAFEGUARDS.

3. WE REPEATED POINTS IN REF A. THAT USG WAS NOT/NOT SEEKING TO PLACE DEMANDS ON GOF OR TO REQUEST GOF TO TRANSMIT DEMANDS TO GOI. FURTHER, WE STRESSED THAT WE DID NOT WISH TO ENDANGER IN ANY WAY SOLUTION THAT HAD BEEN

REACHED ON TARAPUR. RATHER, USG WANTED TO EXPLAIN TO GOF ITS APPRECIATION OF THE KEY TERMS AND CONDITIONS THAT APPLIED UNDER THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USG AND GOI. WE EXPECTED THAT FRENCH SUPPLY WOULD BE UNDER THESE TERMS AND CONDITIONS. GOF COULD PIGGY-BACK ON USG ARRANGEMENTS OR SEEK SUPPLEMENTARY INDEPENDENT COMMITMENTS FROM GOI.

WHILE THERE WERE ADVANTAGES TO GOF HAVING CLEARLY SPECIFIED INDEPENDENT GOI COMMITMENTS ON ALL POINTS, ONLY GOF COULD TELL WHAT THE TRAFFIC WOULD BEAR IN THE CONTEXT OF GOF-GOI NEGOTIATIONS. WE POINTED OUT THAT GOF COULD ASK FOR SOME OR ALL THESE COMMITMENTS IN EITHER ITS EXCHANGE OF NOTES, OR CONTRACT, OR OTHER INSTRUMENT, IN EITHER SPECIFIC OR MORE GENERAL FORM. FINALLY, WE REVIEWED BENEFITS OF EXPLICIT GOI COMMITMENT EXCLUDING PNES AND OF NEW GOF-GOI-IAEA TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS, AS EXAMPLES OF AREAS WHERE GOF SHOULD CONSIDER SEEKING INDEPENDENT GOI COMMITMENTS. WE MADE CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT USG WOULD CONTINUE TO REGARD INDIAN COMMITMENTS AS BINDING, EVEN WITH REGARD TO FRENCH-SUPPLIED FUEL.

4. REF B ONLY RECEIVED AFTER MEETING DESCRIBED ABOVE. IN RESPONSE, YOU MAY DRAW ON ABOVE AND FURTHER INFORM AMIGUES AS FOLLOWS. AS HAVE SOUGHT TO MAKE CLEAR, WE DO NOT/NOT OBJECT TO GOF MERELY PIGGY-BACKING ON USG ARRANGEMENTS WITH GOI. AT LEAST GOF NOW UNDERSTANDS THE CONTENTS OF THOSE ARRANGEMENTS. ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE TEXT OF GOI-USG NOTES ARE NOW IN FINAL, WE HAVE NOT/NOT RESOLVED ALL DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ON THE INTERPRETATIONS OF ALL PROVISIONS -- PARTICULARLY THE REPROCESSING CLAUSE AND THE CONTINUATION OF CONTROLS AFTER 1993. HOWEVER, WHILE RESERVING ITS RIGHTS, GOI HAS MADE CLEAR TO USG THAT IT DOES NOT INTEND TO TAKE UNILATERAL ACTIONS ON ANY OF THOSE DIFFERENCES.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

5. SUBSEQUENTLY, AFTER TALKING WITH AMIGUES, REAU CALLED

TO SAY THAT GOF WANTED TO MAKE SURE USG UNDERSTOOD THAT PARIS DID NOT/NOT INTEND TO NEGOTIATE NEW ARRANGEMENTS WITH GOI, BUT INTENDED RATHER TO RELY ON USG ARRANGEMENTS WITH GOI. HE ASKED IF GOI SHARED THIS UNDERSTANDING, AND WE CONFIRMED THAT GOI PROBABLY DID NOT EXPECT TO NEGOTIATE NEW DETAILED NON-PROLIFERATION ARRANGEMENTS WITH GOF, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD BEEN FOREWARNED THAT GOF MIGHT INSIST ON NEW TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 0505

DTG: 062242Z AUG 82 PSN: 049669

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NLRR 007-08 1 47444

BY AN NARA DATE 5/19/10

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STU3718  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUFHFR #6751/01 2180937  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 060934Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0853  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 26751  
NODIS

FOR SECRETARY AND AF FROM CROCKER

3.0. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: US, WA

SUBJECT: WESTERN FIVE MEETING ON NAMIBIA/ANGOLA

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WESTERN FIVE CONTACT GROUP MET IN PARIS AUGUST 5 AT AFRICA DIRECTORS' LEVEL TO REVIEW SITUATION IN NAMIBIA/ANGOLA NEGOTIATIONS AND DETERMINE NEXT STEPS. PURPOSE OF CG MEETING CALLED AT OUR REQUEST IN MIDST OF AUGUST VACATION SCHEDULE IN PARIS, WAS TO INVOLVE FURTHER OUR FASTIDIOUS ALLIES IN THE ANGOLA TRACK OF OUR EFFORT WHILE SEEKING THEIR HELP AND SUGGESTIONS IN MOVING THE MPLA TOWARD AN ACCEPTABLE COMMITMENT ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. WE ALSO NEEDED TO GET AGREEMENT IN ARRANGING THE SCENARIO FOR THE POSSIBLE SHOWDOWN IN NEW YORK IF THE ANGOLA TRACK DOES NOT MOVE.

3. DIRECTORS REACHED CONSENSUS ON SEVERAL ISSUES UPON WHICH RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD BE CARRIED BACK TO CAPITALS/MINISTERS. MOST CONTENTIOUS QUESTION WAS WHETHER OR NOT TO SLOW THE PACE ON THE NAMIBIA TRACK TO AVOID SHOWDOWN WHEN, WITH RESOLUTION OR REMAINING NAMIBIA PHASE II ISSUES, IT WILL EMERGE THAT CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL IS ALL THAT STANDS IN THE WAY OF THE CG AND THE FRONT LINE STATES (FLS) TAKING THE NAMIBIA PACKAGE TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR AN ENABLING RESOLUTION. WE ARGUED FOR COMPLETING THE PHASE II NAMIBIA ISSUES EXPEDITIOUSLY IN ORDER TO HEIGHTEN AND FOCUS THE PRESSURE ON THE ANGOLANS TO BEGIN TALKING TURKEY ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. AFTER MUCH HUMMING AND HAWING AS THE OTHER FOUR CAME TO TERMS WITH THE FACT THAT THEY ARE NOW REALLY ON THE SPOT ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND THE ANGOLA TRACK IN GENERAL, IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WAS NOT POLITICALLY FEASIBLE - WITH THE AFRICANS, THE SOUTH AFRICANS, THE UN, OR THE

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NLRR 107-081 #47445

BY CA NARA DATE 5/9/10

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WORLD - NOW TO DELIBERATELY APPLY THE BRAKES TO THE PROCESS. WITH VARYING DEGREES OF ENTHUSIASM WE CONCLUDED THAT NATURE JUST MUST TAKE ITS COURSE ON THE NAMIBIA PHASE II ISSUES. THUS, IT APPEARS THAT THE CG DIRECTORS WILL MEET THE FLS IN NEW YORK ON AUGUST 12, TO PURSUE LOOSE ENDS OF PHASE II.

4. STEPS WERE THEN CONSIDERED TO BRING PROGRESS ON THE ANGOLA TRACK OR AT LEAST TO FOCUS THE BURDEN FOR THE IMPASSE ON ANGOLA AND ITS FRIENDS IN THE FACE OF THE IMPENDING SHOWDOWN WHEN AND IF NAMIBIA PHASE II IS FINISHED. I TOOK GREAT PAINS TO UNDERLINE FOR THE ALLIES THE REASONABLENESS OF THE SUCCEEDING PRESENTATIONS WE HAVE MADE TO THE ANGOLANS, IN FIVE MAJOR MEETINGS (THREE CROCKER/JORGE AND TWO WALTERS/DOS SANTOS) OVER THE PAST SEVEN MONTHS OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MPLA. THE ALLIES SEEMED PERSUADED OF OUR GOOD FAITH AND SAVVY, IN THIS EFFORT, AS WELL AS OUR DETERMINATION NOT TO GET ROLLED ON THE CUBAN ISSUE.

5. IT WAS NONETHELESS DECIDED THAT WE MUST LABOR ON TOGETHER - WITH PREDICTABLY VARYING LEVELS OF ENTHUSIASM. FIRST OF ALL, IT WAS UNANIMOUSLY AGREED THAT THE US MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE ACTIVELY AND CREATIVELY ITS BILATERAL DIALOGUE WITH ANGOLA, RESPONDING TO ANGOLAN POSITIONS AND CONTINUING TO PUT FORWARD AS WIDE A RANGE OF FRESH IDEAS AS POSSIBLE, FIRST, TO PROVIDE THE ANGOLANS AN OPENING TO COME FORWARD TO DO BUSINESS WITH US, AND, SECOND, TO CONTINUE TO DEVELOP UPON OUR ALREADY IMPRESSIVE TRACK RECORD FOR BEING REASONABLE IF A SHOWDOWN CAME AND IT WAS NECESSARY IN THAT EVENT TO DEFEND THE BECALMING OF THE NAMIBIA PROCESS. IN THAT REGARD, THE US MENTIONED OUR PLANNED NEXT MEETING WITH THE MPLA AND THE POSITIONS WE WOULD BE TAKING TO THAT MEETING -- ON THE CBI, A POSSIBLE US LIAISON OFFICER TO CARRY FORWARD INTENSIVE TALKS IN LUANDA, A CONTINUING US ROLE AS A MEDIATOR DEFUSING ANGOLAN/SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, POSSIBLE GUARANTEES AND ASSURANCES, AND POSSIBLE EVENTUAL SOUTH AFRICAN/ANGOLAN PROXIMITY TALKS.

6. IT THEN CAME TO THE POINT OF WHAT THE OTHERS COULD DO TO SUPPORT AND REINFORCE THE US EFFORT TO BRING THE ANGOLANS AROUND. THE US SIDE INFORMED THE CG OF THE PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS IN THE WORKS TO BE SENT TO FLS LEADERS NYERERE OF TANZANIA, KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA, MUGABE OF ZIMBABWE, AND MASIRE OF BOTSWANA AND ASKED IF OTHER CG MEMBERS COULD GO AND DO LIKEWISE, EACH

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15  
~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      PARIS 6751      DTG: 060934Z AUG 82 PSN: 034847  
SIT609      DATE 08/10/82      TOR: 218/1024Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR VP EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHFR #6751/02 2180938  
O 060934Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0854

PARIS 6751

DTG: 060934Z AUG 82 PSN: 034847

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 26751

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY AND AF FROM CROCKER  
USING ITS OWN LANGUAGE AND PARTICULAR FORMULATION,  
CONSISTENT WITH BASIC CG POLICY REGARDING THE ANGLOAN  
TRACK. (THE PURPOSE OF THESE LETTERS IS TO PUT THE  
FLS ON NOTICE OF THE NEED FOR MOVEMENT ON THE ANGOLAN  
TRACK IF THE NAMIBIA PROCESS IS TO CONTINUE TO MOVE  
FORWARD.) UK, FRG, AND CANADIAN REPS SAID THEY WOULD  
SO RECOMMEND. FRENCH DIRECTOR AUSSEIL (PROTECT)  
LOOKED AT THE TABLE MOURNFULLY, MAKING NO COMMITMENT AND  
THEN SUGGESTED ANOTHER MANEUVER WHICH MAY GET THE FRENCH  
SHOULDER MORE OR LESS TO THE WHEEL ON THE ANGOLA TRACK.

7. THE PRESENTLY DORMANT NAMIBIA "INTERNATIONAL  
STATUS" PAPER, EXHORTING ALL - INCLUDING THE FUTURE  
GOVERNMENT OF NAMIBIA - TO RENOUNCE AGGRESSION,  
FOREIGN FORCES, AND OTHER EVIL IN NAMIBIA, WAS RECAST  
AS A REGIONAL PEACE EXHORTATION THAT WOULD BE  
INCLUDED AS PART OF THE UNSC ENABLING RESOLUTION.  
THIS BRIEF PROPOSAL FOR MUTUAL AND RECIPROCAL NON-  
AGGRESSION AND GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS BETWEEN  
NAMIBIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS WILL BE FLOATED BY THE US  
WITH THE MPLA TO SEE IF IT WOULD COMFORT THEM AND IF  
SO THE FIVE WOULD THEN TRY IT OUT IN NEW YORK AND FLS  
CAPITALS. (THE FRENCH WOULD BE FULLY INVOLVED IN  
THIS ENDEAVOR, GIVEN THAT THE "INTERNATIONAL STATUS"

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PAPER HAS BEEN THEIR BABY SINCE ITS CONCEPTION.)

8. THE OTHER CG MEMBERS ARE NOW VERY FIRMLY ON NOTICE  
THAT WE ARE NEARLY AT THE CRITICAL JUNCTION OF THE NAMIBIA  
AND ANGOLAN TRACKS AND THAT THEY HAD BETTER DO THEIR  
PART. IN ADDITION, HOLDING A MEETING IN PARIS THE AGENDA  
OF WHICH WAS PRIMARILY THE ANGOLA TRACK HELPED  
UNDERMINE, TO SOME DEGREE, CHEYSSON'S RECENT NASTY  
COMMENTS ABOUT THAT ASPECT OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN EFFORT.

9. ALLIANCE UNITY WAS OBVIOUSLY AN ISSUE IN THE  
BACKGROUND OF THE CG'S DISCUSSION OF THIS COMMON AND  
SO FAR SUCCESSFUL EFFORT. COOPERATION ON THE CONTENTIOUS  
ANGOLAN TRACK WILL BE A TEST CASE OF ALLIED UNITY AND  
READINESS TO SUBMERGE PURIST POLITICAL IMPULSES FOR  
OVERARCHING STRATEGIC GOALS. THE CHICKEN-AND-EGG ASPECT

OF CG COHERENCE WAS RECORDED WHEN FRENCH AFRICA  
DIRECTOR AUSSEIL TOLD ME PRIVATELY THAT IT WOULD HELP  
HIM GET CHEYSSON TO COOPERATE ON THE ANGOLA TRACK IF  
YOU WERE TO MEET WITH CHEYSSON. (WITHOUT KNOWING THE  
FULL RANGE OF RELEVANT FACTORS, I DO BELIEVE FOR  
AFRICAN REASONS AN EARLY MEETING COULD PLAY A DECISIVE  
ROLE IN REDUCING CHEYSSON'S GRAND STANDING AT OUR EXPENSE  
- A GALLIC PRACTICE THAT COULD SERIOUSLY HEMORRAGE  
US CREDIBILITY AND LEVERAGE AT THE CRUNCH POINT IF  
WE ARE FORCED INTO PUBLIC DECLARATIONS ABOUT ANGOLAN  
UNWILLINGNESS TO DEAL SERIOUSLY.) ON LEAVING PARIS  
I HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT WE WILL HAVE WILLING  
CHEERLEADERS IF THE GOING GETS ROUGH ON ANGOLA. BUT  
WE MAY HAVE SOME FURTHER QUIET REINFORCEMENT IN THE  
INTERIM, AND WE CAN REST ASSURED THAT OUR PARTNERS ARE  
NOW INVOLVED IN OUR ANGOLA POLICY BEYOND  
PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY SHOULD THE TEMPTATION ARISE TO  
PILLORY US FOR OUR POLICY OF DE FACTO LINKAGE.  
MARESCA

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47446

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 0888 DTG: 070247Z AUG 82 PSN: 036181  
SIT124 DATE 08/16/82 TOR: 219/0455Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR VP KEMP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #0888 2190447  
O 070247Z AUG 82  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9760

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8827  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 8624  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2345  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1132  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1744  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4083  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMME 0490  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 220888

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/6/02

TAGS: PEPR, PLO, LE, EG

SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEW OF PLO WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE  
LEBANON

REF: PARIS 26657

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL REPORTS CHANGE OF FRENCH VIEW ON WILLINGNESS  
OF PLO TO LEAVE BEIRUT. IT ALSO REPORTS GOF BELIEVES  
HABIB IS MAKING PROGRESS AND THAT IT IS WILLING TO  
SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE GOF UP ON THIS OFFER. WE  
CONTINUE TO BELIEVE EGYPTIAN COOPERATION IN RELOCATING  
PLO IS CRITICAL TO SUCCESS OF HABIB EFFORT. ONE ELEMENT  
IN GOE'S RELUCTANCE UNCONDITIONALLY TO ACCEPT THE PLO IS  
ITS BELIEF THAT THE PLO DOES NOT WANT TO LEAVE  
BEIRUT. WHILE WE HAVE ARGUED THAT PLO'S BEIRUT  
LEADERSHIP IS COMMITTED TO LEAVING BEIRUT, GOE, WHICH MAY  
BE HEARING A DIFFERENT STORY FROM ITS CAIRO PLO CONTACTS,  
HAS YET TO BE PERSUADED. GIVEN FRENCH-EGYPTIAN  
COOPERATION ON A UNSC RESOLUTION ON LEBANON AND FOREIGN  
MINISTER ALI'S STOP IN PARIS AFTER HIS WASHINGTON VISIT,

WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR GOF TO WEIGH IN WITH  
THE EGYPTIANS ABOUT THE PLO'S WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE  
BEIRUT. GOE MAY FIND FRENCH PERCEPTION OF THIS FACT TO  
BE MORE CREDIBLE/ACCEPTABLE THAN OURS.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: EMBASSY SHOULD THANK GUTMANN FOR  
FRENCH OFFER TO HELP HABIB NEGOTIATIONS, INDICATE  
IMPORTANCE OF EGYPTIAN COOPERATION TO SUCCESS OF HABIB  
EFFORT, AND ASK FOR FRENCH TO SHARE URGENTLY WITH GOE  
THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF PLO DESIRE TO LEAVE BEIRUT NOW.  
SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 0888

DTG: 070247Z AUG 82 PSN: 036181

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-081 #47446

BY CU NARA DATE 5/19/10

SECRET



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47447 -17

PAGE 01      SECSTATE WASHDC 0896      DTG: 070249Z AUG 82 PSN: 036204  
SIT122      DATE 08/16/82      TOR: 219/0522Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR VP KEMP EOB SIT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #0896 2190515

O 070249Z AUG 82

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9761

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 6756

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4084

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1133

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 9147

AMEMBASSY JIDDAH IMMEDIATE 8319

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8828

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1745

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 8625

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2346

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 220896

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, US, FR, LE

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM CHEYSSON TO SECRETARY

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ TEXT.

2. THE FOLLOWING LETTER WAS DELIVERED TO THE DEPARTMENT  
AUGUST 6 FROM FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON TO SECRETARY  
SHULTZ:

BEGINNING QUOTE:

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION IS SUCH THAT I AM RESUMING  
CONTACT WITH YOU DURING A TRIP TO ASIA WITHOUT AWAITING  
MY RETURN TO FRANCE.

FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, THE CEASE-FIRE IN LEBANON HAS BEEN  
REPEATEDLY VIOLATED, DESPITE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, YOUR  
NUMEROUS DEMARCHES, AND EVEN THE INTERVENTION OF YOUR  
PRESIDENT, ALL OF WHICH WE APPLAUD. THESE VIOLATIONS  
WERE COMMITTED IN DEFIANCE OF SUCCESSIVE UN SECURITY  
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THE SITUATION IN WEST BEIRUT

MAY IMMINENTLY REACH A POINT OF NO RETURN. WE DOUBTLESS  
HAVE LITTLE TIME BEFORE THE IRREPARABLE OCCURS, LEAVING  
COUNTLESS VICTIMS, SULLYING THE REPUTATION OF ISRAEL,  
AND THREATENING STABILITY AND FUTURE PEACE THROUGHOUT  
THE REGION, WITH DIRE AND UNCONTROLLABLE CONSEQUENCES

FOR THE SECURITY OF THE STATES TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED.

THE URGENCY EXISTS AND, IN THESE TRAGIC MOMENTS IN THE  
HISTORY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST, THE CREDIBILITY  
AND INFLUENCE OF OUR COUNTRIES WILL BE AT STAKE, IF IN THE  
FINAL EFFORT, THEY CANNOT HELP SAVE WHAT CAN STILL BE  
SAVED.

IN THE HOURS AHEAD, THE FATE OF BEIRUT AND ITS CIVILIAN  
POPULATIONS MUST TAKE PRIORITY OVER ANY OTHER CON-  
SIDERATION. YOU ARE AWARE OF OUR VIEWS ON THE POLITICAL  
FUTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT OF THE  
CONFLICT. THEY ARE UNCHANGED, BUT THE TIME HAS PAST,  
AND HAS NOT YET RETURNED, TO ADVANCE THEM, AS THE LATEST  
MESSAGES FROM THE HEAD OF THE PLO AND THE CONCLUSIONS  
OF THE RECENT JIDDAH CONFERENCE CONFIRM.

IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I PROPOSE TO YOU WITH THE UTMOST  
INSISTENCE THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT USE ITS  
GREAT AUTHORITY AND ITS INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE  
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO HALT ITS MILITARY VENTURE, ABIDE  
BY THE LATEST SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, AND THUS MAKE  
IT POSSIBLE TO SAVE AND NEUTRALIZE BEIRUT.

FOR MY PART, I SHOULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW THAT WE, SEEKING  
TO PREVENT THE IRREVERSIBLE, ARE PREPARED TO RESPOND  
IMMEDIATELY TO THE LEBANESE REQUESTS, NOW CONFIRMED  
BY THE PLO, AND THUS SUPPORT THE LATEST PROPOSALS OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

YOUR ENVOY, MR. HABIB, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE MOST  
RECENT MODIFICATIONS CALLED FOR BY THE LEBANESE AND  
PALESTINIANS, WHICH SEEK TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF  
PROPERTY AND PERSONS. THE LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN  
COMMISSION OF BEIRUT IS WORKING ON THIS, AND WE HAVE  
DETACHED AN OFFICER TO IT. I ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE  
PREPARED TO ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITIES THAT COULD,  
AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES, BE INCUMBENT-UPON US  
IN IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSALS. WE HAVE ALREADY SO  
INFORMED THE LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS, AS WELL AS THE  
UN SECRETARY GENERAL. WITHIN A FEW HOURS, A FRENCH  
ADVANCE DETACHMENT COULD TAKE UP POSITION IN BEIRUT  
AS A PART OF THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL BUFFER FORCE,  
WHETHER OR NOT IT BE UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS. IN  
ANY EVENT, THE PRESENCE OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS  
WILL BE OF VALUABLE ASSISTANCE.

CONVINCED THAT IN THESE CRUCIAL MOMENTS COOPERATION  
BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES CAN BE REAFFIRMED,  
I AWAIT YOUR REPLY AND ASSURE YOU OF MY WARM REGARDS  
AND HIGH CONSIDERATION.

CLAUDE CHEYSSON.

P.S. IF YOU DEEM IT USEFUL, I CAN PHONE YOU FROM SEOUL,  
WHERE I WILL STILL BE AT 8:00 P.M., OR FROM HONG KONG  
TOMORROW AROUND NOON LOCAL TIME, OR UPON MY ARRIVAL  
IN DELHI, WHERE I WILL SPEND 24 HOURS.

CLAUDE CHEYSSON. END QUOTE.

SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 0896

DTG: 070249Z AUG 82 PSN: 036204

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1218  
SIT093 DATE 08/16/82

DTG: 071605Z AUG 82 PSN: 036860  
TOR: 219/1935Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT KEMP RENT  
EOB: RED TAG  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

FLASH  
DE RUEHC #1218 2191610  
Z O 071605Z AUG 82 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS FLASH 0000  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI FLASH 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 221218

EXDIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL 0ADR  
TAGS: PEPR, FR, US, LE  
SUBJECT: A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY TO  
CHEYSSON

1. FOLLOWING LETTER WAS DELIVERED TO THE DEPARTMENT ON  
AUGUST 9.

2. BEGIN TEXT:  
AUGUST 6, 1982  
MR. SECRETARY,  
THE URGENCY OF THE SITUATION IS SUCH THAT I AM RESUMING  
CONTACT WITH YOU DURING A TRIP TO ASIA WITHOUT WAITING MY  
RETURN TO FRANCE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOR SEVERAL WEEKS, THE CEASE-FIRE IN LEBANON HAS BEEN  
REPEATEDLY VIOLATED, DESPITE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS, YOUR  
NUMEROUS DEMARCHES, AND EVEN THE INTERVENTION OF YOUR  
PRESIDENT, ALL OF WHICH WE APPLAUD. THESE VIOLATIONS  
WERE COMMITTED IN DEFIANCE OF SUCCESSIVE UN SECURITY  
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THE SITUATION IN WEST BEIRUT MAY  
IMMINENTLY REACH A POINT OF NO RETURN. WE DOUBTLESS HAVE  
LITTLE TIME BEFORE THE IRREPARABLE OCCURS, LEAVING  
COUNTLESS VICTIMS, SULLYING THE REPUTATION OF ISRAEL, AND  
THREATENING STABILITY AND FUTURE PEACE THROUGHOUT THE  
REGION, WITH DIRE AND UNCONTROLLABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE  
SECURITY OF THE STATES TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED.

THE URGENCY EXISTS AND, IN THESE TRAGIC MOMENTS, IN THE  
HISTORY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST, THE

CREDIBILITY AND INFLUENCE OF OUR COUNTRIES WILL BE AT  
STAKE, IF IN THE FINAL EFFORT, THEY CANNOT HELP SAVE WHAT  
CAN STILL BE SAVED.

IN THE HOURS AHEAD, THE FATE OF BEIRUT AND ITS CIVILIAN  
POPULATIONS MUST TAKE PRIORITY OVER ANY OTHER  
CONSIDERATION. YOU ARE AWARE OF OUR VIEWS ON THE  
POLITICAL FUTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT  
OF THE CONFLICT. THEY ARE UNCHANGED, BUT THE TIME HAS  
PAST, AND HAS NOT YET RETURNED, TO ADVANCE THEM, AS THE  
LATEST MESSAGES FROM THE HEAD OF THE PLO AND THE  
CONCLUSIONS OF THE RECENT JIDDA CONFERENCE CONFIRM.

IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I PROPOSE TO YOU WITH THE  
UTMOST INSISTENCE THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT USE  
ITS GREAT AUTHORITY AND ITS INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE THE  
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO HALT ITS MILITARY VENTURES, ABIDE  
BY THE LATEST SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, AND THUS MAKE  
IT POSSIBLE TO SAVE AND NEUTRALIZE BEIRUT.

FOR MY PART, I SHOULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW THAT WE, SEEKING  
TO PREVENT THE IRREVERSIBLE, ARE PREPARED TO RESPOND  
IMMEDIATELY TO THE LEBANESE REQUESTS, NOW CONFIRMED BY  
THE PLO, AND THUS SUPPORT THE LATEST PROPOSALS OF YOUR  
ENVOY, MR. HABIB, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE MOST RECENT  
MODIFICATIONS CALLED FOR BY THE LEBANESE AND  
PALESTINIANS, WHICH SEEK TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF PROPERTY  
AND PERSONS. THE LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN COMMISSION OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BEIRUT IS WORKING ON THIS, AND WE HAVE DETACHED AN  
OFFICER TO IT. I ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO  
ASSUME THE RESPONSIBILITIES THAT COULD, AT THE REQUEST OF  
THE PARTIES, BE INCUMBENT UPON US IN IMPLEMENTING THE  
PROPOSALS. WE HAVE ALREADY INFORMED THE LEBANESE AND  
PALESTINIANS AS WELL AS THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. WITHIN  
A FEW HOURS, A FRENCH ADVANCE DETACHMENT COULD TAKE UP  
POSITION IN BEIRUT AS PART OF THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL  
BUFFER FORCE, WHETHER OR NOT IT BE UNDER THE UNITED  
NATIONS. IN ANY EVENT, THE PRESENCE OF UNITED NATIONS  
OBSERVERS WILL BE OF VALUABLE ASSISTANCE.

CONVINCED THAT IN THESE CRUCIAL MOMENTS COOPERATION  
BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES CAN BE REAFFIRMED, I  
AWAIT YOUR REPLY AND ASSURE YOU OF MY WARM REGARDS AND  
HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

CLAUDE CHEYSSON.

P.S. IF YOU DEEM IT USEFUL, I CAN PHONE YOU FROM SEOUL,  
WHERE I WILL STILL BE AT 8:00 P.M., OR FROM HONG KONG  
TOMORROW AROUND NOON LOCAL TIME, OR UPON MY ARRIVAL IN  
DELHI, WHERE I WILL SPEND 24 HOURS.

3. EMBASSY PARIS SHOULD IMMEDIATELY DELIVER THE FOLLOWING  
REPLY FROM THE SECRETARY TO QUAI FOR TRANSMITTAL TO  
CHEYSSON. EMBASSY DELHI SHOULD TRY TO DELIVER TEXT TO  
CHEYSSON PARTY DIRECTLY.

4. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

WE SHARE YOUR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE NEED TO PREVENT  
FURTHER TRAGEDY AND BLOODSHED TO THE INNOCENT INHABITANTS  
OF BEIRUT WHO HAVE ALREADY ENDURED SO MUCH SUFFERING.  
THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE IT CLEAR TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN,

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1218

DTG: 071605Z AUG 82 PSN: 036860

FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY OF REESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING A STRICT CEASEFIRE. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL CANNOT DOUBT THE SERIOUSNESS AND GRAVITY WITH WHICH WE VIEW THEIR DISPROPORTIONATE AND INSUPPORTABLE RESPONSES TO ALLEGED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FIRING INCIDENTS FROM THEIR ADVERSARIES.

WE ARE WORKING STRENUOUSLY TO RESTORE A SITUATION IN BEIRUT WHICH WILL PERMIT AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MISSION TO PROCEED EXPEDITIOUSLY AND SUCCESSFULLY. WE HAVE INDICATED IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT THERE ARE COMPELLING HUMANITARIAN REASONS FOR THE STRICT MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE AND THE RESTORATION OF WATER, POWER AND SHIPMENTS OF FOOD AND MEDICINE. EVEN AS THIS LETTER IS BEING WRITTEN WE ARE PREPARING FURTHER MOVES TO ENCOURAGE ISRAELI COOPERATION IN EASING CIVILIAN SUFFERING.

MEANWHILE, AMBASSADOR HABIB IS CONTINUING HIS EFFORTS TO SECURE A-TIMELY AND ACCEPTABLE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO FORCES FROM BEIRUT.--I AM PLEASED TO REPORT TO ODOFTPAT UORCES EFFORTS ARE YIELDING SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS. THE PLO HAS DROPPED ITS INSISTENCE ON TAKING THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS WITH THEM AND HAVE CEASED LINKING THEIR WITHDRAWAL TO RECEIVING SOME MAJOR POLITICAL CONCESSION. AMBASSADOR HABIB EXPECTS TO PRODUCE AN AGREED PACKAGE ACCEPTED BY THE PLO AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO. WE WOULD THEN PRESENT THIS TO THE ISRAELIS AND INSIST UPON THEIR ACCEPTANCE AS WELL.

IN THIS REGARD, I WANT TO EXPRESS TO YOU MY DEEPEST APPRECIATION AND GRATITUDE FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT'S FORTHRIGHT AND UNEQUIVOCAL DECISION TO DISPATCH FRENCH TROOPS AS SOON AS REQUIRED TO FACILITATE THE ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF PLO FORCES FROM BEIRUT. THIS IS A DECISION THAT DEMANDS RESPECT AND ADMIRATION FROM ALL WHO WISH TO SEE AN END TO THE BLOODSHED AND A CHANCE FOR LEBANON TO SURVIVE ITS TERRIBLE ORDEAL. YOUR GOVERNMENT'S DECISION HEARTENS ALL OF US.

FINALLY, I WANT TO ASSURE YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT THAT WE FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT THE TRAGIC EVENTS IN LEBANON HAVE MADE IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE UNDERTAKE RENEWED EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH ADDRESSES THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE LONG-SUFFERING PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

SINCERELY,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

END TEXT. SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 1218

DTG: 071605Z AUG 82 PSN: 036860

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01                      PARIS 6926  
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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 26926  
EXDIS  
BEIRUT FOR HABIB  
EO 12356: DECL: 8/7/02  
TAGS: PEPR, PLO, LE, EG  
SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEW OF PLO WILLINGNESS TO LEAVE LEBANON  
REF: STATE 220888

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT

2. IN GUTMANN'S ABSENCE, CHARGE SAW CHEYSSON'S DIRECTEUR DU CABINET (SCHEER) MORNING OF AUGUST 7. CHARGE THANKED SCHEER FOR CHEYSSON'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY (STATE 220896) AND MADE REFTEL DEMARCHE. SCHEER SAID GOF WOULD IMMEDIATELY MAKE MAXIMUM EFFORT WITH EGYPTIANS, PER OUR REQUEST.

3. SCHEER WAS AWARE OF ISRAELI OPPOSITION TO ENTRY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF MNF BEFORE PLO WITHDRAWAL. HE REFLECTED DEEP FRENCH SUSPICION OF ISRAELI MOTIVATIONS, NOTING BITTERLY THAT ISRAELI MILITARY HAD DELIBERATELY HIT FRENCH GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS IN BEIRUT WITH ROCKETS. SCHEER URGED STRONG U.S. MEASURES TO RESTRAIN ISRAELIS, BUT THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT ISRAELIS WERE NOW BEYOND ANYONE'S CONTROL. "SHARON MAY EVEN BE BEYOND BEGIN'S CONTROL." SCHEER SAID THE FRENCH COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE LOGIC OF OUR VETO IN NEW YORK LAST NIGHT, GIVEN THE PRESENT SITUATION.

4. SCHEER MADE IT CLEAR THAT GOF WOULD NOT TRY TO INSERT ITS TROOPS BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND PLO WITHOUT FIRM COMMITMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE FIRED UPON.  
MARESCA

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PAGE 01 PARIS 7177 DTG: 101705Z AUG 82 PSN: 040466  
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BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 27177

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, PLO, LE, IS, FR  
SUBJECT: BEIRUT: THE VIEW FROM PARIS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THERE IS A RISING MOOD OF DESPAIR AND DISGUST IN EUROPE ABOUT ISRAELI ACTIONS IN BEIRUT. THIS IS PERHAPS STRONGER IN FRANCE, WITH ITS SPECIAL TIES TO LEBANON, THAN IT IS ELSEWHERE. BUT WE SUSPECT THE SAME PHENOMENON EXISTS THROUGHOUT WESTERN EUROPE. WASHINGTON SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS MOOD AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. THERE IS VERY LITTLE SYMPATHY HERE FOR THE ISRAELI POSITION. AT AN EARLIER STAGE THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISRAELI MOVE INTO SOUTHERN LEBANON, BUT THIS UNDERSTANDING, AND WHATEVER GOOD WILL THE ISREALIS ENJOYED, HAS BEEN LARGELY USED UP BY THEIR BRUTAL BOMBARDMENTS OF BEIRUT. TV REPORTS OF THE SIEGE HAVE EVOKED SYMPATHY FOR THE PLO, EVEN FROM MANY WHO WERE PREVIOUSLY HOSTILE.

4. THE RESULTS ARE SEVERAL. THE UNDERSIDE OF THE ANTI-SEMITIC ROCK HAS BEEN EXPOSED WITH THE ATTACK ON GOLDENBERG'S RESTAURANT, CULMINATING A WEEK DURING WHICH THERE WERE FOUR VIOLENT ANTI-JEWISH INCIDENTS IN PARIS. EMOTIONS ARE RUNNING HIGH IN THE WAKE OF THE GOLDENBERG RESTAURANT INCIDENT. SOME FRENCH JEWS HAVE ACCUSED THE GOVERNMENT OF ENCOURAGING SUCH ATTACKS BY ITS PRO-PLO STANCE, AND OF BEING LAX ON TERRORISTS. THE FRENCH MEDIA HAVE ALSO BEEN ACCUSED OF SUMPATIZING WITH THE

PLO. (THE PLO HAS MINIMIZED DIRECT BACKLASH AGAINST THEMSELVES BY CONDEMNING THE ATTACK.) THE ANTI-SEMITIC SKELETONS IN FRANCE'S CLOSET ARE BEING RECALLED (FORTY YEARS AGO PARIS POLICE ROUNDED UP FRENCH JEWS FOR DEPORTATION IN A BICYCLE STADIUM--THE INFAMOUS "VEL D'HIV"). WE MUST EXPECT MORE ATTACKS LIKE THE ONE ON GOLDENBERG'S RESTAURANT.

5. REGRETFULLY, WE MUST REPORT THAT MUCH OF THE DESPAIR HERE ABOUT THE SITUATION IN BEIRUT IS DIRECTED AT US. THE USG IS SEEN AS SHARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ISRAEL'S ACTIONS THROUGH A KIND OF PASSIVE COMPLICITY. THE FRENCH, EVEN THOSE WHO UNDERSTAND THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL, AND THE US DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT, BELIEVE WE HAVE BEEN TOO PATIENT WITH BEGIN AND SHARON. THEY SEE US AS THE ONLY POSSIBLE CONTROL ON ISRAELI ACTIONS, AND OUR FAILURE TO GO BEYOND RESTRAINING WORDS AS AN INDICATION OF EITHER IMPOTENCE OR COOPERATION.

6. THE AFTERMATH OF THE BEIRUT SIEGE LOOMS IN SHARPLY NEGATIVE TERMS. IF THE ISRAELIS, ON SOME PROVOCATION OR PRETEXT, WERE TO CRUSH THE PLO IN A FINAL SURGE THROUGH WEST BEIRUT, THE TRAGEDY WOULD OF COURSE BE INDESCRIBABLE IN HUMAN AND POLITICAL TERMS. BUT EVEN IF PHIL HABIB SUCCEEDS--AND WE ALL PRAY THAT HE DOES--A PLO EVACUATION WILL BE AN EMOTIONAL LANDMARK WHICH WILL LIVE FOR GENERATIONS AS A SYMBOL OF ISRAELI FORCE AND PALES-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TINIAN MARTYRDOM. FRENCHMEN (AND, WE SUSPECT, EUROPEANS GENERALLY) WILL BE DEEPLY MOVED BY TV FILMS OF A RAGGED PLO ARMY AND THEIR FAMILIES EMBARKING ON SHIPS FOR AN UNKNOWN FATE. EUROPEAN SYMPATHY FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE WILL LIKELY INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY, ALONG WITH PRESSURES TO MAKE POLITICAL GESTURES TOWARD THE PLO. ARAFAT, WHO HAS COME ACROSSHEEE IN RECENT DAYS AS A SOMEWHAT REASONABLE LEADER OF A TRAGIC PEOPLE WITH A JUST CAUSE, MAY COME OUT LOOKING LIKE A DETERMINED HERO. WE MAY APPEAR AS ACCOMPLICES OF THE ISRAELIS, HAVING OBTAINED WHAT THEY WANTED AT MINIMAL COST.

7. THIS SITUATION COULD LEAD TO AN EVEN DEEFER DIVERGENCE ALTERNATIVE OF A PLO ANNIHILATION. ONCE THE PLO IS OUT OF BEIRUT, THEY WILL ONCE AGAIN BE CRITICAL OF OUR ROLE AND PRESS THE PLO'S CASE. A SENIOR ALLIED AMBASSADOR HERE SEES THIS AS POTENTIALLY THE MOST DIVISIVE ISSUE BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE US.

8. THERE ARE PERHAPS WAYS WE COULD IMPROVE OUR SITUATION. WE COULD MAKE CLEAR TO THE EUROPEANS THE KINDS OF

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01  
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EXDIS

RESTRAINTS WE ARE EXERCISING ON THE ISRAELIS. WE COULD  
MAKE A PUBLIC COMMITMENT NOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RE-  
BUILDING OF BEIRUT AND THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE LEBANESE  
STATE. WE COULD EVEN CONSIDER WHAT KIND OF GESTURE  
MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TOWARD THE PLO AT THE MOMENT OF ITS  
HUMILIATION. AFTER ALL, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO BUILD  
WHATEVER GOOD WILL WE CAN AMONG PALESTINIANS IN ORDER  
TO ENGAGE THEM IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. AND IN ANY  
EVENT, WE WILL WANT MAXIMUM UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION  
AMONG OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES.

9. I SUBMIT THE ABOVE SADLY, BECAUSE I HAVE NOT SEEN MUCH  
REFORTING ON THE EUROPEAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CRISIS,  
AND IN THE BELIEF THAT WASHINGTON SHOULD UNDERSTAND THE  
MOOD HERE AS THE BEIRUT SIEGE APPROACHES ITS DENOUEMENT.

10. DEPARTMENT PASS BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS IF DESIRED.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MARESCA

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PAGE 01      PARIS 7636      DTG: 131039Z AUG 82 PSN: 044566  
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4908  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 27636  
EXDIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, FR, US  
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S MEETING IN PARIS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DURING HER STOPOVER IN PARIS AUGUST 11, AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK, ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE, HAD A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH ACTING FONMIN FRANCIS GUTMANN. DISCUSSION WAS USEFUL AS A DEMONSTRATION OF US WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO, AND TAKE ACCOUNT OF, EUROPEAN VIEWS. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK EXPLAINED US VIEWS ON CURRENT ISSUES. WE HOPE AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK CAN RETURN TO PARIS IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, WHEN CHEYSSON AND ELYSEE OFFICIALS WILL BE AVAILABLE TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE. END SUMMARY.

3. AFTER A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE UN, GUTMANN OPENED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

A REVIEW OF BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE SAID THAT THE US AND FRANCE WERE IN BROAD AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY ON BASIC SECURITY MATTERS, AND THEREFORE IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HAVE DISAGREEMENTS ON A CERTAIN NUMBER OF ISSUES. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR RECOGNIZING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE OTHER PARTY IN THIS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK AGREED THAT THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL ACCORD ON BASIC ISSUES AND THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO TOLERATE THE INDEPENDENT POSITIONS OF THE OTHER PARTY.

4. GUTMANN NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME SERIOUS DIFFERENCES RECENTLY: ON MONETARY ISSUES, INTEREST RATES, AND THE SOVIET PIPELINE. WITH REGARD TO THE PIPELINE, HE SAID THAT THE FRENCH DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE US OBJECTIVE--WAS IT TO WEAKEN THE USSR GENERALLY,

OR WAS IT TO PRESSURE THE SOVIETS TO ALTER THE SITUATION IN POLAND? GUTMANN SAID THAT WHEN CHEYSSON HAD LAST SEEN AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH, THE FRENCH HAD FOUND THAT US STATEMENTS HAD SIMPLY GONE TOO FAR AND FELT THE NEED TO MAKE A GENERAL STATEMENT ABOUT THE STATE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. THE FRENCH HAD GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE US WAS DEALING WITH SUBJECTS ONE-BY-ONE, IGNORING EUROPEAN INTERESTS AND THE OVERALL EFFECT ON RELATIONS WITH EUROPE OF THE POLICY DECISIONS BEING TAKEN. GUTMANN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DURING THE LAST TWO WEEKS THERE HAD BEEN A DIFFERENT TONE IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

5. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK AGREED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR EACH SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC TO LISTEN CAREFULLY TO THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER SIDE. WITH REGARD TO THE PIPELINE, SHE NOTED THAT THE US VIEW FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE REPRESSION IN POLAND HAD BEEN THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SHOW THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS REPRESSION AS THOUGH NOTHING UNUSUAL HAD HAPPENED. THE US GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN LOOKING FOR WHAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DO IN RESPONSE TO THIS SOVIET REPRESSION. THERE HAD BEEN LOTS OF TALK ABOUT SUCH POSSIBILITIES WITH THE FRENCH AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THEN THE FRENCH SIGNED THEIR GAS CONTRACT WITH THE USSR AND FOLLOWED THAT WITH AN AGREEMENT ON LOW INTEREST RATES FOR FINANCING THE PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION. THE USG WAS SHOCKED BY THESE SUDDEN STEPS, COMING IN THE WAKE OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE POLISH REPRESSION. THE US CONTINUED TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITIES FOR RESPONDING TO SOVIET REPRESSION. THERE WAS A BROAD DEBATE WITHIN THE USG ON THIS SUBJECT. SECRETARY HAIG HAD ARGUED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO FIND OTHER AREAS OF THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR WHERE WE COULD AGREE ON COORDINATED ACTION WITH THE EUROPEANS. THE PRESIDENT WAS VERY FRUSTRATED DURING THIS PERIOD AND SAID AT LEAST FIVE TIMES PUBLICLY THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE ADDITIONAL SANCTION MEASURES IF THE SITUATION IN POLAND DID NOT IMPROVE SIGNIFICANTLY.

6. GUTMANN NOTED THAT MANY VOICES IN EUROPE FAVORED A MORE NEUTRALIST STANCE. HE SAID THAT THE ONLY TIME THE WEST HAD SUCCEEDED IN PUSHING THE SOVIETS BACK FROM A POSITION THEY HAD TAKEN WAS WHEN THERE WAS QUICK JOINT ACTION. IF THE WEST HAD ACTED WITHIN TWO OR THREE DAYS AFTER THE POLISH REPRESSION--BY CUTTING OFF GRAIN SALES OR OTHER SIMILAR ACTIONS--THIS MIGHT HAVE HAD SOME EFFECT. IN FACT, THE FRENCH HAD UNDERTAKEN MORE ACTIONS THAN THE OTHER EUROPEANS. GUTMANN RECALLED THAT SECRETARY HAIG HAD LUNCHEONED WITH THE EC AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON ON DECEMBER 28 BUT HAD

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NOT MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF SANCTIONS. ON DECEMBER 29 THE SANCTIONS WERE ANNOUNCED WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION. NOW, HOWEVER, TOO MUCH TIME HAD PASSED AND IT WAS TOO LATE TO TRY TO AFFECT SOVIET POLICIES ON POLAND.

7. AS FAR AS THE FRENCH-SOVIET GAS CONTRACT WAS CONCERNED, GUTMANN SAID THIS HAD BEEN IN THE WORKS FOR ABOUT TEN YEARS AND SHOULD HAVE SURPRISED NO ONE. GUTMANN ALSO NOTED THAT ACTIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN IN THE CREDITS AREA. THE FRENCH WERE PLEASED WITH THE OECD CONSENSUS DECISION TO MOVE THE SOVIETS INTO THE HIGHEST CATEGORY FOR CREDIT RATES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE GOF TO END ITS SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT-GUARANTEED CREDITS. FRANCE HAS A VERY SERIOUS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH IS GETTING WORSE. THE FRENCH CANNOT AFFORD TO AGGRAVATE THIS PROBLEM BY RESTRICTING OR ENDING THE SYSTEM

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF GOVERNMENT-GUARANTEED CREDITS ON WHICH FRENCH EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION DEPEND.

8. GUTMANN NOTED THAT THE DEFENSE EFFORT OF THE SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN IMPORTANT AND THE GOF PLANS TO CONTINUE THIS EFFORT. THE FRENCH ARE ALSO MAKING A BROAD EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN A STRONG DEFENSE. HOWEVER, THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT RECENT US POLICY DECISIONS WILL UNDERCUT GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED DEFENSE EFFORTS IN WESTERN EUROPE WITHOUT HURTING THE SOVIETS. GUTMANN THOUGHT THERE SHOULD BE A BETTER SYSTEM OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE US AND THE EUROPEANS ON THE ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN THE USSR AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR INFLUENCING IT. GUTMANN SAID FRANKLY THAT THE US APPEARS TO BELIEVE THAT PRESSURE ON THE

SOVIETS CAN CHANGE THEIR POLICIES IN POLAND, WHEREAS THE FRENCH AND OTHER EUROPEANS SIMPLY DON'T BELIEVE THIS.

9. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK REPLIED THAT THE USG IS NOT CERTAIN THAT PRESSURE ON THE USSR WILL SUCCEED IN CHANGING SOVIET POLICY, BUT THE USG IS CERTAIN THAT WE SHOULD NOT USE OUR TECHNOLOGY AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO HELP THE SOVIET ECONOMY AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIETS ARE REPRESSING THE POLES. THE USG CANNOT ACCEPT A SITUATION WHERE WE ARE LENDING MONEY AT ATTRACTIVE RATES AND THUS SUBSIDIZING SOVIET REPRESSION.

10. GUTMANN REPLIED THAT WHEN THE FRENCH EXTENDED CREDIT TO THE SOVIET UNION IT WAS FOR COMMERCIAL REASONS. FRANCE NEEDS TO EXPORT TO THE SOVIET UNION, AND THIS IS ALSO IMPORTANT IF PUBLIC OPINION IS TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT A STRONG DEFENSE. GUTMANN SAID THE FRENCH WERE AFRAID OF BECOMING "PENINSULAR" IN WESTERN EUROPE. IF GERMANY SHOULD MOVE TOWARD A MORE NEUTRALIST POSITION AND WITH SCANDINAVIA A DE FACTO NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, FRANCE WOULD BE IN AN ISOLATED POSITION. OTHER COUNTRIES IN EUROPE SEEMED LESS INTERESTED IN DEFENSE. THE FRENCH WERE AFRAID THAT RECENT US POLICY DECISIONS RISKED AUGMENTING GERMAN RELUCTANCE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES.

11. GUTMANN THOUGHT THAT EARLIER IN THE MITTERRAND

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ADMINISTRATION THERE HAD PERHAPS BEEN TOO MUCH IDEALISM ABOUT THE FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. BUT HE NEVERTHELESS ARGUED THAT US BEHAVIOR--ESPECIALLY ITS TONE--COULD BRING A NEGATIVE REACTION IN WESTERN EUROPE AND WEAKEN EUROPE'S WILL TO CONTINUE A STRONG DEFENSE EFFORT. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S QUESTION, GUTMANN EXPLAINED THAT THE TONE OF THE US ATTITUDE TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE WAS USUALLY THAT OF A PARENT TO A CHILD WHO HASN'T YET UNDERSTOOD WHAT IS WANTED. THIS WAS TRUE WITH RESPECT TO THE US POSITION ON CREDITS. GUTMANN SAID THE EUROPEANS OFTEN UNDERSTAND PERFECTLY WELL THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A US POLICY DECISION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE FRENCH HAD UNDERSTOOD IMMEDIATELY THAT THE US DECISION ON GRAIN SALES TO THE USSR HAD BEEN BASED ON THE NEED OF US FARMERS TO EXPORT GRAIN.

12. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK SAID THE US APPRECIATES VERY MUCH FRANCE'S WILL TO DEFEND ITSELF. WE UNDERSTAND THAT FRANCE IS NOT JUST A COUNTRY BUT A CIVILIZATION WITH A STRONG COMMITMENT TO INDEPENDENCE. WE RESPECT THIS AND CERTAINLY THE MAJORITY OF AMERICANS DO NOT TREAT THE FRENCH AS CHILDREN. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL REALITIES IN THE ALLIED COUNTRIES.

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EXDIS

BUT JUST AS FRANCE HAS THE RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE SO DO WE. THERE HAS TO BE A MUTUALITY OF RESPECT AND UNDERSTANDING. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK NOTED THAT OUR POLICY DECISIONS HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN WITHOUT CONSULTATIONS AND THAT THEY WERE IN FACT BASED ON INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS SUCH AS THE GATT, AS WELL AS AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE COMPANIES CONCERNED. THE USG BELIEVES WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE SUCH DECISIONS WITHOUT SHOCKING THE EUROPEANS.

13. GUTMANN NOTED THAT WHAT WAS UNIQUE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION WAS THAT IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THE EUROPEANS HAVE BEEN UNANIMOUS IN REACTING AGAINST A US DECISION. GUTMANN THOUGHT IT WAS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THERE MIGHT BE AN ACCUMULATION OF BILATERAL DIFFERENCES SUCH AS THE STEEL PROBLEM. THE NUMBER OF ISSUES WHICH HAD ARISEN AT THE SAME TIME WAS PERHAPS UNUSUAL, BUT THE TWO SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC DO NOT ALWAYS HAVE THE SAME

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONCEPTION OF THESE ECONOMIC ISSUES. BUT THAT ALL THE EUROPEANS SHOULD AGREE ON A NEGATIVE RESPONSE TOWARD THE US WAS TRULY SURPRISING.

14. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK THOUGHT THERE WERE HISTORIC EXPLANATIONS FOR THESE PHENOMENA. THE WEST HAD ARRIVED AT A PERIOD WHICH WAS THE END OF THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA. WHILE THE EUROPEANS BROADLY SHARE THE SAME VIEWPOINT ON MOST ISSUES, THERE ARE SOME DIFFERENCES WITH THE U.S. THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE TWO SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC HAVE DIVERGED ON THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS. THE US RESPECTS EUROPE, BUT WE ASK THAT THE EUROPEANS RESPECT OUR VIEWS AS WELL. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK CITED THE EXAMPLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA. FOR AMERICANS IT WAS INCREDIBLE THAT FRANCE WOULD WORK WITH THE NICARAGUANS, INCLUDING SUPPLYING ARMS,

AT A TIME WHEN WE WERE VIRTUALLY IN A MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH NICARAGUA. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF SECURITY FOR THE US AND THE US PERCEPTION WAS THAT THERE WAS A CHASM BETWEEN OUR POLICY AND FRENCH ACTIONS IN THE AREA.

15. GUTMANN RECOGNIZED THAT THE FRENCH ARMS CONTRACT WITH NICARAGUA HAD CAUSED A PROBLEM FOR THE US. THE FRENCH BELIEVED THE SANDINISTA REGIME COULD BE WEANED AWAY FROM DEPENDENCE ON CASTRO AND THE SOVIETS, BUT THEY WERE NOT ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT FRENCH ACTIONS WOULD ADD TO SECURITY IN THE AREA. HOWEVER, GUTMANN ARGUED THAT CENTRAL AMERICA IS A PROBLEM FOR FRANCE AS WELL BECAUSE US AND FRENCH SECURITY ARE LINKED. GUTMANN THOUGHT US POLICY IN EL SALVADOR DURING THE PAST FIVE MONTHS HAD BEEN CLEVER, BUT HE WAS NOT SURE THAT IN THE END IT LED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

16. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK SAID WE HOPED FRANCE WOULD NOT OPPOSE US MORE THAN ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THIS IS AN AREA OF KEY STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO US. THE SOVIETS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY SEE CENTRAL AMERICA AS THE SOFT UNDERBELLY OF THE US. THE US DID NOT WANT TO SEE MARXIST POWER EXPANDED IN CENTRAL AMERICA. GUTMANN SAID THAT THE MOMENT MIGHT COME WHEN CASTRO WOULD WANT TO LEAVE THE SOVIET CAMP AND THE FRENCH WISHED TO PROVIDE HIM WITH A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

17. ON AFRICA, GUTMANN THOUGHT US AND FRENCH VIEWS WERE CLOSE. THE FRENCH WISHED TO AVOID INSTABILITY AND PRESS AHEAD WITH INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. THE AFRICAN EXAMPLE SHOWED THAT THE US AND FRANCE ARE OFTEN CLOSER THAN WE THINK IN OUR APPROACH TO ISSUES, BUT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONSULTATIONS ACROSS THE ATLANTIC. GUTMANN SAID THAT FOR THE LAST TWO WEEKS THE US AND FRANCE HAD BEEN AGREED ON THE COURSE TO FOLLOW IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD MAKE THE BEST OF THAT SITUATION.

18. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK SAID THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD ASKED HER TO EXPRESS TO THE FRENCH THE USG'S SATISFACTION WITH US-FRENCH COOPERATION ON LEBANON. GUTMANN NOTED THAT THE US AND FRANCE HAVE NOT ALWAYS HAD THE SAME ANALYSES OR OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. FOR THE MOMENT OUR OBJECTIVES ARE THE SAME IN BEIRUT. HOWEVER, BEYOND BEIRUT THE LARGER MIDDLE EAST ISSUES REMAIN. GUTMANN SAID THE FRENCH WERE CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THE US ADMINISTRATION WAS BROADENING ITS REFLECTIONS ON MIDDLE EAST POLICY, AND APPRECIATED THIS.

19. EMBASSY COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THIS DISCUSSION WAS

PARIS 7636

DTG: 131039Z AUG 82 PSN: 044593

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01  
SIT896

PARIS 7636  
DATE 08/16/82

DTG: 131039Z AUG 82 PSN: 044596  
TOR: 225/1214Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP RENT EOB SIT  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY  
DE RUFHFR #7636/04 2251048  
P 131039Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1228

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4461  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2815  
AMEMBASSY BONN 9633  
AMEMBASSY ROME 4747  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4911  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 PARIS 27636  
EXDIS

USEFUL IF ONLY TO SHOW THE FRENCH THAT SENIOR US OFFICIALS ARE LISTENING TO THEIR VIEWS AND TAKING THEM INTO ACCOUNT. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK PATIENTLY HEARD GUTMANN OUT, BUT WAS FIRM AND RATIONAL IN EXPLAINING US POLICIES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SHE MAY PASS THROUGH PARIS AGAIN IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, ON HER RETURN TO NEW YORK, AND WE WILL TRY TO ARRANGE ADDITIONAL MEETINGS AT THAT TIME, HOPEFULLY WITH CHEYSSON AND SENIOR ELYSEE OFFICIALS. SUCH MEETINGS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO OUR CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH THE FRENCH AND TO OUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE SECRETARY'S FIRST MEETING WITH CHEYSSON.

20. THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT SEEN BY AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK BEFORE HER DEPARTURE FROM PARIS.  
MARESCA

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47452

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PAGE 01  
SIT879

SECSTATE WASHDC 8230  
DATE 08/16/82

DTG: 140104Z AUG 82 PSN: 045525  
TOR: 226/0608Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS KEMP  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #8230 2260139  
O 140104Z AUG 82  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0150  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2481  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1321  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 228230  
EXDIS  
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, US, XF, LE, FR  
SUBJECT: CHEYSSON'S CALL TO SECRETARY

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON CALLED SECRETARY ON AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 13 TO DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION IN BEIRUT. CHEYSSON NOTED HE HAD RECEIVED DISQUIETING REPORTS ABOUT A SENSE OF DETERIORATION IN THE ATTITUDE OF HABIB'S INTERLOCUTORS CONCERNING THE PROSPECTS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON PLO EVACUATION. SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THIS WAS ACCURATE DESCRIPTION DURING THE LATEST HEAVY ISRAELI BOMBARDMENTS. HOWEVER, ATMOSPHERE IS MORE UP-BEAT IN AFTERMATH OF LATEST CEASE-FIRE WHICH APPEARS TO BE HOLDING WELL AND HABIB IS BACK IN NEGOTIATIONS.

3. CHEYSSON ALSO RAISED ISRAELI OBJECTIONS TO ARRIVAL ON E-DAY OF VANGUARD OF FRENCH FORCES. HE EMPHASIZED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT EARLY ARRIVAL OF SOME FRENCH WAS BEING INSISTED UPON BY THE LEBANESE MUSLIMS. THERE WAS A BRIEF EXCHANGE OF CURRENT STATUS OF HABIB NEGOTIATIONS.

4. AT END OF CONVERSATION CHEYSSON MADE CLEAR THAT FRANCE WAS FIRM IN ITS DECISION TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THE U. S. IN THIS ENTERPRISE ALONG AGREED LINES DESPITE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES. SECRETARY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CHEYSSON'S CALL AND REITERATION OF FRENCH COOPERATIVE POSITION.

SHULTZ

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NLRR M07-081 #47452

BY CU 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47453

28

PAGE 01 PARIS 7789 DTG: 151035Z AUG 82 PSN: 046672  
SIT851 DATE 08/16/82 TOR: 227/1052Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT KEMP  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUHFRA #7789 2271036  
O 151035Z AUG 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

PARIS 7789

DTG: 151035Z AUG 82 PSN: 046672

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1302

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0012  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2466  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6646  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2164  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5422  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1167  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 4752  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4434  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 27789  
EXDIS  
CORRECTED COPY (REF A CHANGED)  
E.O. 12065: DNG: OADR  
TAGS: MILI, MOPS, PEPR, LE, PLO, FR  
SUBJ: FRENCH POSITION ON MNF FOR BEIRUT  
REF: A) PARIS 27787, B) MARESCA/SCHNEIDER TELECON AUG 14

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CONFIRMING REF (B), QUAI POLITICAL DIRECTOR ANDREANI CALLED CHARGE EVENING AUG 14 TO MAKE ONE SPECIFIC POINT WITH REGARD TO FRENCH POSITION ON MNF. ANDREANI SAID FRENCH CAN CONSIDER SOME POSSIBLE VARIATIONS IN THE SCENARIO FOR THE ENTRY OF THE FIRST MNF ECHELON INTO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BEIRUT, BUT IT WOULD BE "UNACCEPTABLE" IF FRANCE WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE FIRST ECHELON, WITH SOME OTHER NATIONALITY SUBSTITUTING FOR FRENCH TROOPS. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD PUT INTO QUESTION FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF. ANDREANI POINTEDLY NOTED THAT THIS WAS THE FRENCH POSITION, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT THE PLO AND/OR LEBANESE MIGHT BE WILLING TO ACCEPT. ANDREANI SAID CHEYSSON WOULD CALL THE SECRETARY TO MAKE THIS POINT DIRECTLY.

3. COMMENT: THE POLITICAL STAKES FOR FRANCE IN THIS AFFAIR HAVE GROWN CONSIDERABLY. THE ISRAELI SIEGE OF BEIRUT HAS BECOME A MAJOR DOMESTIC ISSUE, ENTANGLED WITH THE QUESTION OF ANTI-SEMITIC TERRORISM IN FRANCE. MITTERRAND IS TO APPEAR LIVE ON TV TUESDAY EVENING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND TERRORISM. HE CANNOT AFFORD TO APPEAR WEAK ON TERRORISM, BUT HE ALSO

CANNOT BACK DOWN BEFORE BEGIN'S PROVOCATIVE ADVICE TO FRENCH JEWS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES IF THE GOF CANNOT DEFEND THEM. THESE ELEMENTS APPEAR TO HAVE COALESCED, AND THE GOF HAS APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT FOLLOWING BEGIN'S ATTACKS EXCLUSION OF THE FRENCH FROM THE FIRST ECHELON WOULD BE SEEN AS A MAJOR POLITICAL DEFEAT RESULTING FROM BEGIN'S DISTRUST OF FRANCE.

4. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.  
MARESCA

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NLRR M07-081 #47453

BY CN

5/19/10

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47454

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 2599 DTG:182344Z AUG 82 PSN: 051536  
SIT217 DATE 08/20/82 TOR: 231/0304Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP RENT EOB SIT  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #0599 2310247  
O 182344Z AUG 82  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0442

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 4146  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 1965  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9244  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 9229  
COMMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1639  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 7162  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 232599  
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC  
E.O. 12356:DECL; 8/18/88  
TAGS: ESTC, EEWT, FR  
SUBJECT: PIPELINE SANCTIONS: GOF TO ORDER DRESSER-  
FRANCE TO FULFILL ITS CONTRACT

REFS: PARIS 27788 (NOT SENT ROME)  
STATE 231470

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FRENCH EMBASSY FIRST SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  
PHILIPPE SELZ CALLED ON EUR/WE ACTING DIRECTOR GELBARD  
LATE AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 18 WITH A DEMARCHE: THE  
GOF WILL ULTIMATELY ORDER DRESSER-FRANCE TO DELIVER  
THE 3 COMPRESSORS UNDER CONTRACT FOR THE SOVIET PIPELINE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IF DRESSER DOES NOT COMPLY VOLUNTARILY TO MINISTER  
OF INDUSTRY CHEVENEMENT'S AUG 18 LETTER. CHEVENEMENT'S  
LETTER WENT TO FOUR COMPANIES, ALSTHOM, CREUSOT-LOIRE,  
DRESSER-FRANCE AND ROCKWELL VALVE, ASKING THEM TO FULFILL  
THEIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS IN SPITE OF THE U.S.  
SANCTIONS. (SELZ SAID THE EMBASSY HERE DID NOT HAVE A  
COPY OF THE LETTER). DRESSER-FRANCE DOES NOT WISH TO  
VIOLATE THE U.S. SANCTIONS. HOWEVER, IF THE COMPANY  
REFUSES TO ACCEDE TO THE GOF'S "ASKING" THEM TO FULFILL  
THEIR CONTRACT, THE GOVERNMENT WILL, BY "ACTE DE

REQUISITION," ORDER THEM TO DO SO. SELZ EXPLAINED  
THAT UNDER FRENCH LAW THIS IS A LEGAL ORDER (NOT A  
TAKEOVER) WITH PENALTIES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE. SELZ  
ALSO MAINTAINED THAT DRESSER-FRANCE IS NOT BEING  
SINGLED OUT BECAUSE IT IS AN AMERICAN COMPANY, (HE

REFERRED TO IT AS A FRENCH COMPANY BECAUSE IT IS  
SUBJECT TO FRENCH LAW) BUT THAT IT WAS SIMPLY A  
QUESTIONS OF THE CALENDAR FOR DELIVERIES. SELZ ALSO  
EXPRESSED THE GOF'S HOPE THAT IN RESPONSE TO THE EC'S  
DEMARCHÉ, THE U.S. WILL LIFT THE SANCTIONS PRIOR TO  
AUGUST 24.

3. GELBARD TOLD SELZ THAT AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE,  
GIVEN THE EVENTS IN POLAND, THERE WAS, IN HIS OPINION,  
NO CHANCE THAT THE SANCTIONS WOULD BE LIFTED IN THE NEAR  
FUTURE. SPEAKING AS A NON-LAWYER HE ALSO PERSONALLY  
QUESTIONED THE LEGAL AUTHORITY OF THE GOF TO INTERVENE  
IN THIS TRANSACTION WITHOUT RECOURSE TO THE COURTS,  
PARTICULARLY AGAINST A WHOLLY-OWNED SUBSIDIARY OF AN  
AMERICAN COMPANY WHICH HAS OBLIGATIONS TO ABIDE BY U.S.  
AS WELL AS FRENCH LAW. HE TERMED THE PENDING GOF  
ACTION VERY UNFORTUNATE, AND ONE THAT WILL CAUSE  
PROBLEMS FOR OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. SELZ LEFT THE  
IMPRESSION THAT THE GOF IS DETERMINED TO TAKE THIS  
COURSE OF ACTION NO MATTER WHAT. THE EMBASSY HERE  
WILL BE OFFICIALLY INFORMING THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT  
ON AUGUST 19.

SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 2599

DTG:182344Z AUG 82 PSN: 051536

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 1007-081 747454  
BY CA NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47455

30

PAGE 01      PARIS 8420      DTG: 201208Z AUG 82 PSN: 053675  
SIT195      DATE 09/17/82      TOR: 232/1316Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB KEMP

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUHFR #8420 2321208

O 201208Z AUG 82 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1550

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 28420

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, LE, US, PLO, IT, FR

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER ON DEPLOYMENT OF U.S.

- - TROOPS TO BEIRUT

REF: STATE 233870

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS IN REFTL, CHARGE SPOKE WITH QUAI DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL MARTIN, INFORMED HIM OF OUR INTENTION TO NOTIFY THE UNSYG OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES IN BEIRUT AS PART OF MNF AND SUGGESTED THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT ALSO WISH TO PROVIDE A SIMILAR NOTIFICATION TO THE UNSYG. MARTIN SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO NOTIFY THE UNSYG IN A LETTER WHICH CHARACTERIZES THE MNF OPERATION AS "IN THE SPIRIT" OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT AVOIDS ANY SPECIFIC LINK BETWEEN THE MNF AND THE UN. MARTIN PROMISED TO SEND A COPY OF THE TEXT TO US AND SAID THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE PASSED TO THE DEPARTMENT THROUGH HAREL.

3. ADDRESSING LEBANESE INTENTIONS, MARTIN SAID THAT THE FRENCH UNDERSTAND THAT AMBASSADOR TUENI PLANS TO MAKE A DEMARCHE TO SYG CUELLAR IN WHICH HE WILL PASS TO HIM COPIES OF THE LETTERS FROM THE GOL TO THE GOF, GOI AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

USG REQUESTING THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE MNF. MARTIN SAID THAT THE GOF BELIEVES IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIREABLE IF THE PLO WERE TO MAKE A PARALLEL DEMARCHE. (HE PREFACED THIS WITH A COMMENT THAT HE REALIZED THAT ON THIS POINT THE USG AND GOF WERE LIKELY TO HAVE "DIVERGENT VIEWS".)

4. ONE OF OUR BRITISH COLLEAGUES HAS TOLD US THAT IN A BRIEFING TO EC EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVES YESTERDAY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MIDDLE EAST LUCET INFORMED THEM OF FRENCH INTENTIONS TO CONTACT THE UNSYG AND SAID FRANCE WOULD BE ENCOURAGING THE OTHER "INTERESTED PARTIES" TO DO LIKEWISE.

5. AFTER THIS CABLE WAS WRITTEN, WE RECEIVED THE TEXT OF THE FRENCH LETTER TO SECRETARY-GENERAL CUELLAR. THE

LETTER STATES THAT "IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND TO PRESSING REQUESTS FROM THE PLO", FRANCE HAS TWO OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON. THESE ARE TO CONTRIBUTE TO BRINGING AN END TO THE "INSUPPORTABLE ORDEAL" OF THE ASSIEGED POPULATION BY GUARANTEEING THE CARRYING OUT OF AN ACCORD WHICH WILL PERMIT THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS TO DEPART WEST BEIRUT WITH SECURITY AND DIGNITY, AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE CARRYING OUT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508, 509, 512, 513, 515, 516, 517, 518 AND PARTICULARLY OF THOSE WHICH CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND THE SENDING OF UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS. THE LETTER ALSO STATES THAT "IF, IN THE COURSE OF THE 30 DAY MANDATE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OR ONE OF THE BELLIGERENTS CHALLENGES THE ACCORD, THE FRENCH CONTINGENT WOULD WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY." FRENCH TEXT OF LETTER WILL BE SENT SEPTEL.

6. IN A NOTE ATTACHED TO THE LETTER, MARTIN SAID THAT BOTH TUENI AND TERZI WOULD BE MAKING SIMILAR DEMARCHES TO CUELLAR TODAY.

7. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO BEIRUT, ROME, USUN. MARESCA

PARIS 8420

DTG: 201208Z AUG 82 PSN: 053675

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-081 47455

BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

31

47456

PAGE 01      SECSTATE WASHDC 5822      DTG: 211400Z AUG 82 PSN: 055580  
SIT842      DATE 08/31/82      TOR: 233/1640Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

11TH AUGUST, 1982

DEAR SIR:

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF VP PIPE RENT EOB SIT  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #5822 2331405  
O 211400Z AUG 82  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

FOLLOWING THE ORDER FOR STORAGE GIVEN TO YOU RECENTLY BY MR. ALEXANDRE (AND WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN CONFIRMED) WE CONFIRM THAT THE EQUIPMENT IN YOUR WAREHOUSE IN CONNECTION WITH THIS ORDER (I.E. 3 COMPLETE COMPRESSOR UNITS) IS NOT CONSIDERED AS READY FOR SHIPMENT.

TO BE MORE PRECISE, AND FOR ALL EQUIPMENT FOR THE ABOVE CONTRACT, ALL SHIPMENT IS FORBIDDEN UNTIL FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN TO YOU IN WRITING AND FROM THE SIGNATORY OF THIS LETTER.

YOURS ETC. SIGNED: J. LERY. END TEXT. SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 5822

DTG: 211400Z AUG 82 PSN: 055580

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0668

~~SECRET~~ STATE 235822

EXDIS, EYES ONLY FOR CHARGE FROM BURT  
E.O. 12356: OADR  
TAGS: ETRD, EEWT, FR, US  
SUBJECT: GOF ACTION ON POTENTIAL SHIPMENT OF DRESSER-  
PRODUCED COMPRESSORS TO USSR

1. DRESSER INDUSTRIES U.S. HAS ESTABLISHED THAT IT HAS DONE ALL IT CAN, BY INSTRUCTIONS TO ITS FRENCH SUBSIDIARIES, AND BY SUBSEQUENT ORDERS BY THE SUBSIDIARY TO THE SHIPPING AGENT, TO AVOID SHIPMENT OF ITS COMPRESSORS TO THE USSR. (SEE TEXT BELOW OF DRESSER LETTER TO SHIPPING AGENT.) THIS LEAVES THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CLEARLY AND SOLELY RESPONSIBLE IF, E.G. BY ACT OF REQUISITION, IT ORDERS THE COMPRESSORS TO BE SHIPPED. SHOULD THIS OCCUR BEFORE THE USG HAS REACHED A DECISION ON HOW PRECISELY TO IMPLEMENT THE PIPELINE SANCTIONS, THAT DECISION COULD BE PREJUDICED, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO FRANCE. (FYI, THE SIG/IEP WILL PROBABLY MEET TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE ON TUESDAY, AUGUST 24.)

2. WITH THIS AS BACKGROUND, YOU SHOULD SEEK AN APPOINTMENT FOR AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE MONDAY, AUGUST 23 WITH HIGHEST AVAILABLE QUAI OFFICIAL (E.G. GUTMANN).

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

YOU SHOULD TELL HIM THAT IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TOOK ANY PRECIPITATE ACTION IN

THE DRESSER CASE. YOU CANNOT, OF COURSE, OFFER ANY "QUID PRO QUO" FOR FRENCH INACTION. YOU CAN IMPLY, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS A PERIOD WHEN WASHINGTON IS EXAMINING FUTURE STEPS, AND THAT ANY FRENCH STEP WOULD BE TAKEN VERY SERIOUSLY HERE.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF DRESSER LETTER TO SHIPPING AGENT:

TO: SOFECOMS (PACKING SERVICES)  
-- 170 BLD. JULES DURAND  
-- LA HAVRE

REF: COMPRESSOR FOR USSR GAS PIPELINE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 107-081 #47456

BY CIV NARA DATES 5/9/10

~~SECRET~~



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UNCLASSIFIED  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      PARIS 8580      DTG: 211243Z AUG 82 PSN: 055340  
SIT854      DATE 08/31/82      TOR: 233/1259Z

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THEIR SON TO AIRPORT, THE BOMB APPARENTLY FELL OFF,  
WITHOUT EXPLODING, AND IT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY OBSERVED  
IN STREET.MARESCA

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF HKY SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUHFR #8580 2331248  
O 211243Z AUG 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1622  
DIA WASHINGTON DC//  
BT

UNCLAS PARIS 28580  
FOR SY/CC/TAGS  
E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, FR  
SUBJECT: BOMB EXPLOSION IN PARIS

1. AT 1225 LOCAL TIME AUGUST 21 ASSISTANT DEFENSE  
ATTACHE LIVING IN 7TH ARRONDISSEMENT ON AVE.  
DE LA BOURDONNAIS OBSERVED FROM HIS APARTMENT  
WINDOW A PACKAGE BEING PLACED ON TOP OF AUTOMOBILE  
FURTHER DOWN STREET BELOW. FRENCH POLICE WERE  
CALLED TO SCENE BY ATTACHE, AND WHILE INVESTIGATING  
THE PARCEL, IT EXPLODED KILLING A BOMB TECHNICIAN  
AND CRITICALLY WOUNDING HIS ASSISTANT AND ANOTHER  
POLICEMAN.

2. BOMB WAS PLACED ON CAR IN FRONT OF 50 AVE. DE  
LA BOURDONNAIS, IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO APARTMENT  
BUILDING HOUSING EMBASSY COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR  
RODRICK GRANT AND ONE BLOCK FROM CHARGE MARESCA'S  
RESIDENCE (A WELL KNOWN PARIS ADDRESS). CHARGE  
HAS REQUESTED POLICE PROTECTION AT HIS RESIDENCE  
OVER WEEKEND. EMBASSY SECURITY OFFICERS EXPECT  
MORE DETAILED REPORT FROM FRENCH POLICE 1400  
HOURS LOCAL.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. RECENT POLICE REPORTS TO US INDICATE THAT AGENCY  
FRANCE PRESSE HAS RECEIVED ANONYMOUS TELEPHONE CALL  
STATING THAT ACTION DIRECT WAS TAKING RESPONSIBILITY  
FOR BOMBING AND THAT IT WAS NOT RPT NOT DIRECTED  
AT TUNISIAN EMBASSY (WHICH IS ALSO IN NEIGHBORHOOD)  
BUT AT AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN BUILDING. THIS STORY  
IS NOW BEING PICKED UP BY PRESS AND MEDIA.

4. IN RESPONSE TO ANY QUESTIONS DIRECTED TO THE  
EMBASSY, WE HAVE DEVELOPED THE FOLLOWING: "THE IN-  
VESTIGATION IS IN THE HANDS OF THE FRENCH POLICE,  
AND WE HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN THEM."

5. RECENT ADDITIONAL DETAILS INDICATE THAT BOMB  
HAD BEEN ATTACHED BY MAGNETS TO BOTTOM OF COUNSELOR  
GRANT'S VEHICLE. WHEN FAMILY USED CAR TO TAKE

PARIS 8580

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01      PARIS 9159  
SIT656      DATE 08/31/82

DTG: 261646Z AUG 82 PSN: 006191  
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BETWEEN THE TWO COMPANIES. THE DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE ACCESS TO THESE CONTRACTS, POSSIBLY AS A RESULT OF THE ATTEMPT BY DRESSER-USA TO ENJOIN US GOVERNMENT ACTION AGAINST IT, AND GIROUX BELIEVES THIS POSSIBILITY IS AT LEAST WORTH EXAMINING. MARESCA

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHFR #9159 2381647  
O 261646Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1918

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PARIS 29159  
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/26/88

TAGS: ETRD, EEW, FR

SUBJECT: FRENCH REQUISITION OF DRESSER-FRANCE: LEGAL

- ASPECTS OF

REF: GELBARD/REYNDERS TELCONS OF 8/25 AND 8/26

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, EMBASSY YESTERDAY ARRANGED FOR THE SERVICES ON A RETAINER BASIS OF FRENCH ATTORNEY PHILIPPE GIROUX TO ASSIST THE EMBASSY AND DEPARTMENT ON THE PIPELINE PROBLEM. THE DETAILS OF THE ARRANGEMENT WITH GIROUX BEING REPORTED BY SEPTEL.

3. GIROUX MET WITH THE CHARGE TODAY. DURING THE MEETING, GIROUX REVIEWED HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE LEGAL ADVISOR'S OFFICE YESTERDAY. AS THE DISCUSSIONS PROCEEDED, GIROUX MADE ONE POINT WHICH HE SAID HE HAD NOT MENTIONED BEFORE. AFTER NOTING THAT DRESSER-FRANCE COULD APPEAL THE ORDER OF REQUISITION, A PROCESS WHICH COULD TAKE YEARS, OR SEEK A SUSPENSION OF THE ORDER ON THE GROUNDS OF IRREVERSIBLE DAMAGE, AN IMPLAUSIBLE ARGUMENT FOR A MANUFACTURER ORDERED TO MANUFACTURE HIS PRODUCT, GIROUX SAID THAT DRESSER-USA MIGHT ALSO SEEK A SUSPENSION OF THE ORDER. GIROUX PRE-DICATED THIS HYPOTHESIS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE CON-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TRACT BETWEEN DRESSER-USA AND DRESSER-FRANCE CONTAINS A STANDARD INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT CLAUSE UNDER WHICH A LICENSEE AGREES TO RESPECT ALL ORDERS, PRESENT OR FUTURE, OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE LICENSOR. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, DRESSER-USA COULD ARGUE THAT THE FRENCH ORDER OF REQUISITION WAS CAUSING IT, DRESSER-USA, IRREVERSIBLE DAMAGE.

4. HAVING POSED HIS THEORY, GIROUX WAS QUICK TO DISCOUNT IT. HE SAID A FRENCH COURT WOULD NOT WANT TO HANDLE SUCH A CASE AND WOULD PROBABLY REASON THAT THE DAMAGE TO DRESSER-USA WAS CAUSED BY US, NOT FRENCH LAW. FURTHERMORE, FROM HIS EXPERIENCE GIROUX DOUBTED THAT A CONTRACT BETWEEN A PARENT COMPANY AND A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY WOULD GO INTO SUCH TECHNICALITIES. HE SAID NONETHELESS THAT HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE TERMS OF RELEVANT CONTRACTS

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SIT083 DATE 10/12/82

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TOR: 243/0325Z

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NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHC #4415 2430133  
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 0000  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0000  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0000  
AMEMBASSY ROME 0000  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0000  
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BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/30/88

TAGS: ETRD, EEWT, UR, FR

SUBJECT: SANCTIONS ISSUE: FRENCH CHARGE CALLS TO DISCUSS  
ACTIONS AGAINST DRESSER AND CREUSOT-LOIRE.

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FRENCH CHARGE HAREL CALLED ON ACTING ASST. SEC. BLACKWILL  
AND LEGAL ADVISER ROBINSON ON FRIDAY AFTERNOON (8/27) TO  
DISCUSS TEMPORARY DENIAL ORDERS ON DRESSER-FRANCE AND  
CREUSOT-LOIRE. THE FRENCH DID NOT LODGE ANY FORM OF  
OFFICIAL PROTEST, BUT CAME IN WITH A JUST-RECEIVED CABLE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FROM PARIS ASKING FOR CLARIFICATION OF A NUMBER OF LEGAL  
QUESTIONS, PARTICULARLY ABOUT INTERPRETATIONS OF CERTAIN  
CLAUSES AND PARAGRAPHS OF THE DENIAL ORDERS.

3. GENERAL THRUST OF QUESTIONS WERE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

-- WHY WERE SANCTIONS APPLIED AGAINST CREUSOT-LOIRE AND  
SPECIFICALLY WHAT IS SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REFERENCE TO THAT  
COMPANY'S HAVING A LICENSE FROM COOPER INDUSTRIES?

-- COULD WE CLARIFY POINT 5 OF THE TEMPORARY DENIAL ORDER,  
THE REFERENCE TO FUTURE EXPORTS?

-- HOW DOES THE ORDER AFFECT DRESSER FRANCE'S LICENSING  
AGREEMENT WITH DRESSER USA? DOES THE ORDER COMPEL DRESSER  
USA TO REVOKE DRESSER FRANCE'S LICENSE UNDER TERMS OTHER  
THAN THAT SPECIFIED IN THE ORIGINAL LICENSING CONTRACT?  
IF THE ANSWER IS YES, DOES THIS REVOCATION APPLY ONLY TO

ITEMS MANUFACTURED FOR EXPORT TO THE USSR?

-- WHAT IS THE EXTENT OF THE TERRITORIAL EXTENSION? DOES  
THE ORDER PROHIBIT THE USE OF AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY IN  
EXPORTS ONLY TO THE SOVIET UNION OR WOULD IT PRECLUDE SUCH  
USE IN ITEMS FOR EXPORT TO OTHER COUNTRIES, FOR EXAMPLE,  
THE NETHERLANDS?

-- WOULD "OLD" (E.G. PREVIOUSLY EXPORTED) PRODUCTS/TECH-  
NOLOGY, PREVIOUSLY EXPORTED FROM THE US, FALL UNDER THE  
ORDER? (I.E. IS THE ORDER RETROACTIVE?)

-- DOES THE ORDER AFFECT EXPORTS BY THE COMPANIES TO THE  
U.S.? (THEY WERE TOLD THE ORDER COVERED ONLY THE EXPORT  
OF GOODS/SERVICES/DATA FROM THE U.S.)

-- DOES THE ORDER APPLY TO SUBSIDIARIES OF CREUSOT-LOIRE  
OR COMPANIES CONTROLLED BY CREUSOT-LOIRE? (THE SPECIFIC  
REQUEST WAS FOR CLARIFICATION OF LANGUAGE RE SUCCESSORS,  
ASSIGNEES, ETC., PAGE THREE, ITEM NUMBER II OF DENIAL  
ORDER.)

-- WHAT IS THE INTERPRETATION OF THE ENTIRE ITEM IV, PAGE  
FIVE OF ORDER AND HOW DOES IT RECONCILE WITH ITEM II?

THE LEGAL ADVISER EXPLAINED THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND PRO-  
CEDURAL NATURE OF THE DENIAL ORDER, STATING THAT HE COULD  
NOT AT THIS TIME GIVE THEM MUCH IN THE WAY OF A REPLY. HE  
NOTED THAT THE INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS WHICH WILL NOW TAKE  
PLACE WILL STUDY SUCH ISSUES AS THE RELATIONSHIP OF  
CREUSOT-LOIRE TO DRESSER, AS WELL AS OTHER CONTRACTUAL  
RELATIONSHIPS. HE REFERRED THE FRENCH TO THE DEPARTMENT  
OF COMMERCE FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION, STATING THAT THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MATTER WOULD NOW PROCEED UNDER THE DOC REGULATORY FRAME-  
WORK. DEPARTMENT SUBSEQUENTLY ARRANGED AN APPOINTMENT  
FOR THE CHARGE TO SEE COMMERCE GENERAL COUNSEL UNGER AT  
5 P.M. ON FRIDAY. WILL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A READ-OUT OF  
THAT SESSION.

5. ACTING ASSISTANT SEC. BLACKWILL, IN CONCLUSION, STATED  
THAT AT THE HEART OF THIS ISSUE WAS THE QUESTION OF SAN-  
CTIONS AGAINST THE USSR AND THE DECISION TAKEN LAST DECEM-  
BER BY THE PRESIDENT TO REACT VIGOROUSLY TO SOVIET ACTION  
VIS-A-VIS POLAND. GIVEN THE FACT THAT THERE HAD BEEN  
LITTLE IMPROVEMENT IN THAT SITUATION, THE PRESIDENT AND THE  
SECRETARY BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS NO CHOICE BUT TO MAINTAIN  
AND BROADEN THE SANCTIONS, AS HAD BEEN DONE IN JUNE. THE  
ACTION TAKEN AGAINST THE FRENCH COMPANIES WAS IN RELATION  
TO VIOLATIONS OF THE SANCTIONS. WE KNEW THE FRENCH DIS-  
AGREED WITH US ON THE BASIC ISSUE OF THE SANCTION, AND WE  
KNEW THIS DISAGREEMENT WAS A SERIOUS ONE. NONETHELESS, IT  
WAS OUR INTENT TO ATTEMPT TO CONFINE OUR DISAGREEMENT TO  
THE TRADE QUESTION AND NOT LET IT SPILL OVER INTO OTHER  
AREAS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WHICH WERE HARMONIOUS  
AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL. IN SAYING THIS HE SAID HE WAS  
ONLY REPEATING THE POINT THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD MADE  
THE PREVIOUS DAY TO FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON.

6. HAREL REPLIED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD LEFT CHEYSSON WITH  
THE IMPRESSION THAT THE TERMS OF THE DENIAL ORDER WOULD NOT  
BE AS STIFF AS THEY TURNED OUT TO BE. HE SAID THE FRENCH  
ALSO HOPED THE DISAGREEMENT COULD BE CONTAINED, BUT THAT  
THE FRENCH REACTION WOULD DEPEND, IN LARGE PART, ON THE  
NATURE OF THE ANSWERS WE GIVE THEM TO THEIR QUESTIONS RE  
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS.

SHULTZ

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