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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 12/21/2007

File Folder FRANCE (9/1/82-9/30/82)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 13

NOUZILLE

50

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47467	CABLE	071636Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	9/7/1982	B1
47469	CABLE	141856Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	9/14/1982	B1
47470	CABLE	141808Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	9/14/1982	B1
47473	CABLE	150147Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	9/15/1982	B1
47474	CABLE	161933Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	9/16/1982	B1
47476	MEMO	SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE FRENCH SALE D 5/7/2011 M081/1	2	9/18/1982	B1
47479	MESSAGE	DRAFT RR TO MITTERRAND	2	ND	B1
47481	CABLE	201130Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	9/20/1982	B1
47482	CABLE	211837Z SEP 82 (STATE DEPARTMENT RETURNED FULL COPY OF CABLE) R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	9/21/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 13

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50

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
47483	CABLE	241227Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	9/24/1982	B1
47484	CABLE	241526Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	9/24/1982	B1
47485	CABLE	241607Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	9/24/1982	B1
47486	CABLE	251312Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	4	9/25/1982	B1
47487	CABLE	271723Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	10	9/27/1982	B1
47488	CABLE	271745Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	9/27/1982	B1
47489	CABLE	291103Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	9/29/1982	B1
47490	CABLE	300951Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	9/30/1982	B1
47491	CABLE	301206Z SEP 82 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	9/30/1982	B1

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47467

PAGE 01 PARIS 0496
SIT178 DATE 09/17/82

DTG: 071636Z SEP 82 PSN: 021836
TOR: 250/1752Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP VP WHLR SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFA #0496 2501636
O 071636Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2483

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 30496

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: NATO, SP, FR

SUBJECT: THE PSOE AND NATO

REF: STATE 250320

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON SEPT. 7 I RAISED WITH ATTALI THE PROBLEM OF THE PSOE TRYING TO HALT THE PROCESS OF SPAIN'S INTEGRATION INTO NATO, SHOULD THEY COME TO POWER. I NOTED THAT MITTERRAND HAD EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH FELIPE GONZALEZ AND SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON GONZALEZ ON THIS ISSUE.

3. ATTALI SAID MITTERRAND DOES INDEED HAVE VERY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH GONZALEZ. HE RECALLED THAT MITTERRAND HAD BEEN ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ON ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD NATO, AND THOUGHT HE WOULD ALSO BE WILLING TO INTERVENE PERSONALLY WITH GONZALEZ. ATTALI SAID HE WOULD SPEAK TO MITTERRAND IMMEDIATELY ON THE SUBJECT. GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 47467

BY CV NARA DATE 8/19/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47469

2

PAGE 01 PARIS 1386
SIT158 DATE 09/17/82

DTG: 141856Z SEP 82 PSN: 031454
TOR: 257/2119Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #1386 2571856
O 141856Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2894

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 31386

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, US, SP, FR
SUBJECT: THE PSOE AND NATO
REF: STATE 257358

1. ~~(SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AMBASSADOR HAD FOLLOWED UP WITH ATTALI PRIOR TO
RECEIPT OF REFTEL. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS ON THIS
ISSUE AND WILL REPORT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.
GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 #47469
BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47470

3

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 7663
SIT101 DATE 09/17/82

DTG: 141808Z SEP 82 PSN: 031544
TOR: 257/2239Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #7663 2571923
O P 141808Z SEP 82
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0000
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0000
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0000
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 0000
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 257663

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, LE, FR, IS, XF

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON MIDDLE
EAST ISSUES

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FRENCH AMBASSADOR VERNIER-PALLIEZ MET SEPTEMBER 13
WITH UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER TO DISCUSS LEBANON,
RESULTS OF THE FEZ SUMMIT AND THE PIPELINE (SEPTEL).
VERNIER-PALLIEZ OPENED BY SAYING THAT, IN A RECENT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN ISRAEL AND
MFA DG KIMCHE, THE AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN STRUCK BY ISRAELI
INSISTENCE ON A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AS WELL AS THE
WITHDRAWAL OF ALL PLO MILITARY AND POLITICAL ELEMENTS
FROM THE NORTH OF LEBANON. EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT WE HAD
NOT HEARD OF ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON THE REMOVAL OF PLO
POLITICAL ELEMENTS. EAGLEBURGER ADDED THAT WE HAD BEEN
MOST IMPRESSED BY THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FRENCH TROOPS IN
BEIRUT.

3. ISRAEL-LEBANON PEACE TREATY: THE AMBASSADOR ASKED
WHAT OUR VIEW OF A POSSIBLE ISRAEL-LEBANON PEACE TREATY
WAS AND WHETHER, WITHOUT SUCH A TREATY, ISRAEL WOULD
INSIST ON A BUFFER ZONE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. EAGLEBURGER

RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS VERY HEAVY ISRAELI PRESSURE ON
PRESIDENT-ELECT BASHIR GEMAYEL TO CONCLUDE SUCH A
TREATY. THE U.S. FAVORS A TREATY IN THE ABSTRACT, BUT
NOT AS A CONDITION FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. ISRAELI
PRESSURE NOW ON BASHIR IS VERY UNHELPFUL, AS BASHIR MUST
BE GIVEN ENOUGH MANEUVERING ROOM TO ATTRACT THE LEBANESE
MUSLIMS TO HIS ADMINISTRATION. ALSO THE U.S. IS NOT
OPPOSED TO A CONCEPT OF A BUFFER ZONE IN SOUTHERN
LEBANON, BUT NOT AS A DEVICE BY ISRAEL TO EXTEND THE AREA
OF ITS CONTROL 40 KILOMETERS INTO LEBANESE TERRITORY.
FOR EXAMPLE, SUCH A BUFFER ZONE COULD NOT BE POLICED BY
SAAD HADDAD OR ANY OTHER ISRAELI PUPPET. UNIFIL COULD
POLICE SUCH A ZONE, BUT ISRAEL AT THIS STAGE IS FIRMLY
OPPOSED TO ANY UN ROLE. THE USE OF UNIFIL WOULD ALSO
REQUIRE WORKING OUT A MORE PRECISE MANDATE, A DISCUSSION
THAT COULD LEAD TO PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. IN PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, EAGLEBURGER
TOLD VERNIER-PALLIEZ THAT SOME KIND OF BUFFER ZONE IS AN
ACCEPTABLE CONCEPT. BOTH EAGLEBURGER AND VERNIER-PALLIEZ
AGREED THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S. AND FRANCE
TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN
LEBANON. AMBASSADOR HABIB PLANS TO STOP IN PARIS WHEN HE
RETURNS TO THE AREA IN LATE SEPTEMBER. AMBASSADOR DRAPER
WILL BRIEF FRENCH AMBASSADORS DURING HIS UP-COMING
NEGOTIATIONS AND WILL GIVE VERNIER-PALLIEZ A FULL
PERSONAL READ-OUT WHEN HE (DRAPER) RETURNS TO WASHINGTON.

SECSTATE WASHDC 7663

DTG: 141808Z SEP 82 PSN: 031544

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. THE SYRIANS: VERNIER-PALLIEZ ASKED WHETHER WE HAVE
ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE SYRIANS WANT TO LEAVE LEBANON AND
WHETHER WE STILL CONSIDER THEM TO BE UNDER SOVIET
CONTROL. OUR IMPRESSION, EAGLEBURGER SAID, IS THAT SYRIA
IS INTERESTED IN LEAVING LEBANON, BUT ONLY IN THE CONTEXT
OF AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WE HAVE NEVER BELIEVED THAT
SYRIA IS UNDER SOVIET CONTROL BUT RATHER UNDER SOVIET
INFLUENCE. THIS INFLUENCE MAY HAVE DIMINISHED AS A
RESULT OF SYRIA'S MILITARY DEFEAT, ALTHOUGH WE DO HAVE
EVIDENCE THAT CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT IS
AGAIN BEING SHIPPED INTO SYRIA.

5. THE FEZ SUMMIT: EAGLEBURGER ASKED WHAT WORD FRANCE
HAS FROM THE ARABS ON THE FEZ SUMMIT. THE FRENCH BELIEVE
THE SUMMIT PRODUCED A SIGNIFICANT POSITIVE RESULT IN THAT
IT DID NOT REJECT OR SPEAK NEGATIVELY ABOUT THE REAGAN
INITIATIVE. VERNIER-PALLIEZ MENTIONED THAT GUTTMAN HAD
MET WITH ARAFAT BEFORE THE FEZ SUMMIT AND HAD FOUND HIM
VERY CAUTIOUS AND FEELING VERY RESPONSIBLE; ARAFAT
BELIEVES HE MUST ACT CREDIBLY. FROM THE EGYPTIANS,
FRANCE HAS HEARD A VERY POSITIVE REACTION: THE FEZ PLAN
IS "IDEAL" BUT THERE IS NO WAY SPELLED OUT TO DELIVER

THESE RESULTS. FRANCE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE EGYPTIANS ARE
WAITING TO SEE WHAT REACTION THE U.S. WILL HAVE TOWARD
NEW SETTLEMENTS, AS A TEST OF U.S. CREDIBILITY.
EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT WE WILL HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME
HANDLING THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE, AS WE DO NOT WISH TO
DRIVE WHAT IS NOW DIVIDED PUBLIC OPINION IN ISRAEL BACK
TO BEGIN. FOR EXAMPLE, WE ISSUED A VERY GOOD STATEMENT
ON THE SETTLEMENT ISSUE AFTER THE ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT OF
NEW SETTLEMENTS LAST WEEK, BUT CRAFTING ACTIONS RATHER
THAN WORDS WILL BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. THE ARABS MUST
UNDERSTAND THAT WE MUST BE EXTREMELY CAREFUL IN HOW WE
HANDLE THE ISRAELIS ON THIS ISSUE. EAGLEBURGER NOTED
THAT THE KEY QUESTION FOR US IN THE POST-FEZ PERIOD, IS
WHETHER KING HUSSEIN HAS RETAINED ANY FLEXIBILITY. WE
UNDERSTAND THAT THE FEZ COMMUNIQUE IS THE ARAB STARTING

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 141808Z SEP 82 PSN: 031544

POSITION ONLY, JUST AS ISRAEL'S IS; WE INTERPRET THE COMMUNIQUE AS LEAVING ROOM FOR MANEUVER. VERNIER-PALLIEZ AGREED THAT KING HUSSEIN'S ATTITUDE WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AND BOTH HE AND EAGLEBURGER AGREED THAT SAUDI ATTITUDES TOWARD HUSSEIN'S PARTICIPATION WAS ALSO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CRUCIAL. EAGLEBURGER NOTED THAT SEVERAL MODERATE ARABS WANT TO KEEP THE DOOR OPEN TO ALLOW HUSSEIN TO DEVELOP HIS POSITION. IN ANSWER TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, EAGLEBURGER ASSURED HIM THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PLO MEMBERS IN THE ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION ASSIGNED TO COME TO WASHINGTON.

6. FRENCH-EGYPTIAN RESOLUTION: AT THE VERY END OF THE CONVERSATION, VERNIER-PALLIEZ NOTED THAT FRANCE IS NOT PRESSING FOR THE FRENCH-EGYPTIAN RESOLUTION IN THE UN; IT IS ON THE TABLE, BUT IT WILL HAVE TO BE ADJUSTED.

7. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

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~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

5

47473

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 8709 DTG: 150147Z SEP 82 PSN: 032444
SIT071 DATE 09/17/82 TOR: 258/1407Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC 8709

DTG: 150147Z SEP 82 PSN: 032444

SIT: CKLS EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #0709 2580235

O 150147Z SEP 82

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 2092

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0662

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 258709

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EEWT

SUBJECT: FRENCH CONCERN ABOUT ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION
BETWEEN DRESSER AND CREUSOT LOIRE

REFS: (A) STATE 255978; (B) STATE 256760

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS THAT FRENCH, AND PARTICULARLY CHEYSSON, CONSIDER THAT THE U.S. IS DISCRIMINATING UNJUSTLY BETWEEN CREUSOT LOIRE AND DRESSER (FRANCE) IN THE APPLICATION OF ITS TEMPORARY DENIAL ORDERS (TDO). ACTUAL LEGAL SITUATION WAS EXPLAINED IN REFTELS AND INDICATES THAT OPPOSITION BY CREUSOT LOIRE TO MODIFICATION OF TDO TO INCLUDE CREUSOT SUBSIDIARIES, AS WELL AS TO LIMIT SCOPE OF ORDER TO OIL AND GAS ITEMS, IS REASON ALL THE OTHER FIRMS, INCLUDING DRESSER (FRANCE), AGAINST WHICH WE HAVE INVOKED TDO'S, ARE IN DIFFERENT SITUATION FROM CREUSOT. WE THEREFORE DO NOT ACCEPT THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOTION THAT WE ARE DISCRIMINATING VS CREUSOT.

3. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO MAKE CLEAR TO CHEYSSON ACTUAL LEGAL SITUATION AS WE SEE IT AND ASSURE HIM THAT NO DISCRIMINATION VS CREUSOT IS INTENDED OR DESIRED AS FAR

AS WE ARE CONCERNED. OUR EFFORTS AT THIS POINT ARE DIRECTED AT BRINGING THE TREATMENT OF CREUSOT LOIRE IN LINE WITH THAT OF THE OTHER COMPANIES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT INCLUSION OF THEIR SUBSIDIARIES IS OUT OF LINE WITH TREATMENT ACCORDED OTHER FIRMS. SHULTZ

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 107-081 #47473

BY CU NARA DATE 8/19/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47474

6

PAGE 01
SIT155

PARIS 9/17 1805
DATE 09/17/82

DTG: 161933Z SEP 82 PSN: 034794
TOR: 259/2229Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE

DE RUFHFR #1805 2581936

R 161933Z SEP 82

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3106

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 31805

NODIS

FOR AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, WI, FR, AO

SUBJECT: FRANCE AND THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. QUAI AF DIRECTOR AUSSEIL, IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF SEPTEMBER 15, WAS VERY ANXIOUS FOR SOME NEWS ON PROGRESS ON THE ANGOLA TRACK -- SOMETHING CONCRETE SUCH AS AN AGREEMENT ON A TIME TABLE. IT APPEARS FROM AUSSEIL'S REMARKS THAT PRESSURE MAY BE MOUNTING ON HIM HERE ON THE ANGOLA ISSUE AND THAT THERE MAY BE MORE UNHELPFUL PUBLIC STATEMENTS FORTHCOMING, THOUGH WE THINK AUSSEIL WILL BE ABLE TO HOLD THOSE OFF UNTIL AFTER SEPTEMBER 30/OCTOBER 1 CG MEETINGS IN NEW YORK. THIS WILL BE HIS TOP PRIORITY WHEN HE SEES YOU AT THOSE MEETINGS. MARESCA

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 #47471/

BY CN NARA DATE 5/15/10

SECRET

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

7
ID 8290741

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 20 SEP 82 12

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G *smf 12/21/07*

DOCDATE 18 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

COMMUNICATIONS

EXPORT CONTROLS

USSR

SANCTIONS

SUBJECT: FRENCH SALE *of* COMMUNICATIONS SWITCHING EQUIPMENT TO USSR

.....
ACTION: PRES APPROVED RECOM

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII
.....

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

.....
ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH

FILE _____

(C)

8

SYSTEM II
90741

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8

9/18

Brian,

Original went to
Pres. this morning.
Put in Sys II. No copies.

J

SYSTEM II
90741

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

September 18, 1982

Admiral Poindexter -

This is being returned for your records.
The original was brought back to the
State Department by Secretary Shultz

Al ~~Adams~~

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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47476 MEMO

2 9/18/1982 B1

SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE FRENCH SALE

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
47479	MESSAGE DRAFT RR TO MITTERRAND	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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14

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47481

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 2069
SIT459 DATE 09/23/82

DTG: 201130Z SEP 82 PSN: 039282
TOR: 263/1143Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP TEIC SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #2069 2631130
O 201130Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3213

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0044
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5498
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4560
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2491
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 6764
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1194
BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 32069
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 09/20/2002
TAGS: PERP, UNSC, MILI, FR, LE, IS
SUBJECT: FRENCH POSITION ON MNF FOR BEIRUT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-081 #47481
BY CU NARA DATE 5/9/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 PARIS 2069

DTG: 201130Z SEP 82 PSN: 039282

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ACCORDING TO QUAI MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA DIRECTOR BOIDEVAIX, FRENCH PLANNING ON THE QUESTION OF MNF IS TEMPORARILY ON HOLD PENDING REPLY FROM ISRAEL ON WHAT TYPE OF FORCE THE GOI IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT.

3. IN THE MEANTIME, BOIDEVAIX TELEPHONED FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO UN AT 6 AM (NY TIME) WITH INSTRUCTION TO SEE UNSYG FIRST THING THIS MORNING TO GET HIM TO GET THE ADDITIONAL UN OBSERVERS IN PLACE IN BEIRUT. FRENCH THINK PEREZ DE CUELLAR IS BEING LAX IN MOVING THING ALONG. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IS ALSO TO URGE UNSYG TO MAKE URGENT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DEMARCHE ON ISRAELIS WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF A NEW FORCE FOR BEIRUT.

4. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
GALBRAITH

PARIS 2069

DTG: 201130Z SEP 82 PSN: 039282

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 PARIS 2361 DTG: 211837Z SEP 82 PSN: 041288
SIT414 DATE 09/23/82 TOR: 264/1852Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFA #2361 2641844
O 211837Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3355

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0049
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5505
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6769
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 2493
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4570
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1199
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2221
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 32361
EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, FR, US, LE, IS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR HABIB'S MEETING WITH CHEYSSON

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DURING LUNCHEON WITH FONMIN CHEYSSON SEPTEMBER 21, HABIB DISCUSSED A NUMBER OF ASPECTS OF PLANNING FOR MNF. SPECIFIC ISSUES DISCUSSED ARE OUTLINED BELOW.
END SUMMARY.

3. FRENCH CONTINGENT; CHEYSSON EXPLAINED THAT FRENCH PLAN TO SEND IN ABOUT 1,000 TROOPS FROM FRANCE. IN ADDITION ABOUT 300-400 TROOPS WOULD BE TAKEN FROM THE FRENCH UNIFIL CONTINGENT, IF REQUIRED. THIS ARRANGEMENT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WOULD GIVE FLEXIBILITY PLUS A DE FACTO LINK WITH THE UN. (CHEYSSON NOTED THAT THE FRENCH HAD OFFERED THE LEBANESE HELP IN CLEARING MINES. THE PERSONNEL FOR SUCH AN OPERATION WOULD ALSO BE DRAWN FROM THE FRENCH UNIFIL CONTINGENT AND THUS WOULD PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL DE FACTO LINK WITH THE UN.)

4. THE FRENCH FORCES ARE PREPARED TO BEGIN LANDING IN THE BEIRUT AREA BY THURSDAY NIGHT, SEPTEMBER 23RD. THE FIRST 350 WOULD BE LANDED ON THURSDAY BY SHIP. AN ADDITIONAL 200 WOULD LAND ON SATURDAY AFTERNOON, POSSIBLY AT THE AIRPORT. A FURTHER 550 WOULD BE LANDED BY HELICOPTER FROM THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER FOCH ON MONDAY. VEHICLES AND LIGHT APC'S WOULD BE LANDED BY FERRY ON MONDAY. CHEYSSON SPECIFIED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT PROVIDE A LIAISON OFFICER AT US CINCEUR HEADQUARTERS IN STUTTGART.

HABIB ASKED IF WASHINGTON HAD AGREED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD GO IN ON THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23. HE POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS DIFFERENT FROM BEING READY TO GO IN ON THAT DAY. THE ACTUAL TIME OF ENTRY WOULD DEPEND ON FIRM ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW AND HABIB WANTED TO SEE THE EXACT TERMS OF ISRAELI ACCEPTANCE. HABIB ALSO NOTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE ITALIANS NOT COME IN LATE.

5. MNF MISSION: CHEYSSON AGREED THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MNF SHOULD GENERALLY PARALLEL THOSE PREVIOUSLY USED. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT LEBANESE CHAIRMANSHIP OF COORDINATION COMMITTEES WAS A GOOD IDEA SINCE IT DEMONSTRATES THAT THE MNF IS TO SUPPORT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. CHEYSSON STRESSED THAT THE MNF MISSION NOW IS QUITE DIFFERENT. BEFORE IT WAS TO PERMIT PLO EVACUATION; NOW IT IS TO PROTECT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION.

6. HABIB REPLIED THAT THE MISSION WAS NOT THAT DIFFERENT, IN THE SENSE THAT THE MNF WOULD PROVIDE A PRESENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE LAF. CHEYSSON ACCEPTED THE UTILITY OF A COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE MNF WITHOUT NECESSITY FOR A CHAIRMAN AFTER HABIB NOTED THAT PREVIOUSLY THE LEBANESE PREFERRED SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT. THE U.S. IS RELUCTANT TO PARTICIPATE IN A PATROL FUNCTION SINCE THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE A POLICE ROLE, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO OUR CONCEPT OF THE MNF. HABIB THOUGHT THIS PROBLEM COULD BE HANDLED THROUGH ASSIGNMENT OF MISSIONS TO THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF THE MNF ON THE GROUND IN BEIRUT. OUR MARINE UNIT WOULD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BE RESPONSIBLE FOR A SPECIFIC AREA AND WOULD OPERATE WITHIN THAT AREA, E.G. THE AIRPORT. THEY COULD NOT BE SPLIT UP. CHEYSSON INDICATED THAT THE FRNCH UNDERSTOOD THE SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON THE US ROLE AND ALSO THE US PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO THE TIME LIMITATION FOR DEPLOYMENT IN BEIRUT. HE AGREED THAT SPECIFIC MISSIONS COULD BE WORKED OUT IN BEIRUT. IF THE US CONTINGENT CANNOT PATROL THEN THE OTHER UNITS WILL HAVE TO DO SO, IN VIEW OF THE MISSION FOR PROTECTING CIVILIANS. SUCH PATROLS WILL HAVE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH THE LEBANESE ARMY. CHEYSSON BELIEVED THE FRENCH CONTINGENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCOMPANY THE LEBANESE ARMY EVEN IN THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS.

7. HABIB INDICATED HIS PRELIMINARY THINKING THAT THE FRENCH COULD TAKE CONTROL OF THE AREA FROM THE MUSEUM SECRET NORTH TO THE WATER. THE ITALIANS COULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EASTERN FRINGE AND THE US CONTINGENT COULD OCCUPY THE AIRPORT AND RUN IT. HABIB SPECIFIED THAT WE WANT TO

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 DE RUHFRA #2361 2641845
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 EXDIS

CONTROL THE AIRPORT AND NOT LEAVE IT IN ISRAELI HANDS. THE QUESTION, SAID HABIB, IS HOW FAR INTO THE POPULATED AREA OF WEST BEIRUT THE PATROLS WOULD GO. HE AGREED THAT THE FRENCH COULD PATROL WITH THE LEBANESE ARMY, WHICH THEY HAD SHOWN THEY COULD DO.

8. CONDITIONS FOR TERMINATION OF MISSION: CHEYSSON REFERRED TO THE IMPORTANT PROBLEM OF LANGUAGE ON THE TERMINATION OF THE MISSION. FRANCE WANTS TO INCLUDE A PROVISION INDICATING THAT DEPARTURE WILL DEPEND ON AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE THREE MNF COUNTRIES AND WITH THE LEBANESE. CHEYSSON SAID THE FRENCH WERE PUT ON THE SPOT THE LAST TIME BY THE FACT THAT THE US WAS ABLE TO DECIDE UNILATERALLY WHEN IT WISHED TO LEAVE. CHEYSSON SAID THAT THE SECRETARY'S ANSWER ON THIS POINT WAS SATISFACTORY BUT HAS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOT YET BEEN PUT ON PAPER. THOUGH HE HAD NOT SPOKEN DIRECTLY TO THE SECRETARY ON THIS POINT, CHEYSSON SAID HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE SECRETARY HAD AGREED THAT THE TERMINATION OF THE MNF MANDATE WOULD BE DECIDED BY THE THREE MNF POWERS PLUS LEBANON.

9. WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS FROM BEIRUT: HABIB SAID HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE FRENCH HAD INTRODUCED THE CONCEPT OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL "IN DEPTH". ("BEIRUT ET SES ALENTOURS.") HE THOUGHT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE ISRAELIS WITHDRAW FROM THE BEIRUT AREA AND NOT JUST FROM WEST BEIRUT. HABIB MENTIONED THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM OF ISRAELI TROOPS TO THE NORTH OF BEIRUT. THESE WOULD NOT WITHDRAW AT THE SAME TIME AS WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THEM, THE ISRAELI SHOULD MOVE THEIR SUPPLY LINES EASTWARD. HABIB SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THIS

FIRST WITH THE COORDINATING GROUP IN BEIRUT AND THEN WITH THE ISRAELIS.

10. FUTURE PLANS: CHEYSSON SAID THAT BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IN BEIRUT THE FRENCH WOULD BE "BLINDLY BEHIND" US EFFORTS TO OBTAIN WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM LEBANON. THE FRENCH CONSIDERED THIS A TOP PRIORITY WHICH NEEDED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE THE REAGAN MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE COULD MOVE FORWARD. HABIB SAID THE ORDER OF US PRIORITIES FOR LEBANON WAS CLEAR: FIRST, BEIRUT MUST BE SECURE. SECOND, LEBANON MUST HAVE A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT WHICH CAN CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES. THIRD, THERE MUST BE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL EXTERNAL FORCES FROM LEBANON. ALL THIS NEEDS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME SO THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE COULD BE PURSUED ON AN ACCELERATED BASIS.

11. HABIB SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS STRONGLY COMMITTED TO THIS SET OF PRIORITIES AND THAT TO ACCOMPLISH IT HABIB WOULD NOT CONFINE HIS DISCUSSIONS TO LEBANON BUT WOULD ALSO VISIT ISRAEL, SYRIA, JORDAN AND PERHAPS SAUDI ARABIA. HABIB SAID HE WOULD BEGIN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. HABIB NOTED IN PASSING THAT THE SYRIANS ASSERT THAT THEIR FORCES ARE NOT ILLEGAL AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE EQUATED TO ISRAELI FORCES IN A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL. MEANWHILE THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE SETTING A NUMBER OF CONDITIONS FOR THEIR WITHDRAWAL WHICH APPEAR TO BE IRRELEVANT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ONE PROBLEM WOULD BE TO AVOID EQUATING SYRIAN PRESENCE WITH ISRAELI PRESENCE OTHERWISE THE SYRIANS WILL BALK. HOWEVER, THE SYRIANS DO WANT TO GET OUT OF LEBANON UNDER THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THEY RECOGNIZE IT IS THE ONLY WAY TO OBTAIN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WHICH MEANS THAT WE SHOULD SEEK CONCURRENT WITHDRAWAL.

12. CHEYSSON STRESSED THE FRENCH DESIRE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THE US AND INDICATED THAT FRANCE COULD BE HELPFUL BECAUSE IT HAS A SEPARATE VOICE AND INFLUENCE WITH A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. HE REGRETTED THAT THE DISPUTE BETWEEN MITTERRAND AND BEGIN HAD BROKEN OUT INTO THE OPEN AT THIS TIME SINCE HE THOUGHT THERE WAS NOW AN OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE THE WHOLE SITUATION FORWARD. HABIB SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS DETERMINED TO BRING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES IN LEBANON UNDER CONDITIONS IN WHICH LEBANON WILL BE INDEPENDENT AND NOT DIVIDED OR SIMPLY AN ISRAELI PROTECTORATE. CHEYSSON INDICATED HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE HABIB AGAIN IN ABOUT TWO MONTHS TO REVIEW WHERE THINGS STAND. HABIB SAID HE WOULD ONLY STAY IN THE MIDDLE EAST A SHORT TIME ON THIS VISIT BUT WOULD PROBABLY BE

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INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

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NLRR M07-081 #47482
BY CU NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 32361

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, FR, US, LE, IS
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3 of 9

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PAGE 03 PARIS 32361 01 OF 03 211848Z

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
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PAGE 03 PARIS 32361 02 OF 03 211850Z

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS

RETURNING TO THE AREA LATER IN THE YEAR AND WOULD PLAN TO
CONSULT IN PARS AT THAT TIME. MEANWHILE AMBASSADOR
DRAPER WOULD REMAIN IN THE AREA TO HELP IMPLEMENT THE US
PROPOSALS FOR LEBANON.

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13. LATER IN THE DAY, HABIB HAD A TWENTY MINUTE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND DURING WHICH HE COVERED MANY OF THE SAME POINTS. HABIB OUTLINED FOR HIM HIS MISSION AND MITTERRAND EXPRESSED FRANCE'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE FULLY. MITTERRAND SAID HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE MANNER IN WHICH FRANCE AND US COOPERATION HAD BEEN CONDUCTED PREVIOUSLY. HABIB ASSURED HIM WE WILL CONTINUE IN THE SAME SPIRIT. THE FRENCH PRESIDENT EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT HABIB SHOULD CONTINUE TO PERSIST IN HIS EFFORTS

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14. EMBASSY COMMENT; MITTERRAND MADE A BIG POINT OF EXTOLLING THE PERSONAL SUCCESS HABIB HAS HAD IN THIS AFFAIR AND WAS GENUINELY PLEASED TO KNOW HIM. GALBRAITH

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 32811

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: FR, US, PEPR

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH CHEYSSON

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: SINCE THIS IS CHEYSSON'S FIRST MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY, HE WILL REGARD IT NOT ONLY AS THE TRADITIONAL PRE-UNGA DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC ISSUES BUT ALSO AS THE OCCASION FOR MAKING THE SECRETARY'S ACQUAINTANCE. THE GROUND HAS BEEN LAID BY CHEYSSON'S FREQUENT TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY. QUAI OFFICIALS HAVE GONE OUT OF THEIR WAY TO STRESS CHEYSSON'S SATISFACTION WITH THESE CONVERSATIONS, AND THE GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP HE FEELS HE HAS ESTABLISHED AS A RESULT. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND AND GIVEN THE EVIDENT GOV DETERMINATION TO AVOID LETTING CONTENTIOUS ISSUES CONTAMINATE THE WHOLE US-FRENCH RELATIONSHIP, WE BELIEVE CHEYSSON WILL BE AT PAINS TO MAKE THIS FIRST MEETING AS PRODUCTIVE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR A SOLID RELATIONSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME HE CAN, OF COURSE, BE COUNTED ON TO STATE FRENCH VIEWS FORCEFULLY AND FRANKLY. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME OF THE ISSUES THAT CHEYSSON MAY RAISE. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

A. PIPELINE/SANCTIONS.

THIS IS NATURALLY THE ISSUE CHEYSSON WILL BE MOST ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS. WE SEE NO SIGN THAT THE FRENCH FEEL IT IS UP TO THEM TO COME UP WITH A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE; IN THEIR VIEW IT IS UP TO THE US TO MAKE THE NEXT MOVE. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY ARE WELL AWARE THAT THE US IS CONFIDENT OF ITS POSITION AND FEELS NO PRESSURE TO MODIFY IT. THE BELIEF OF SEVERAL WEEKS AGO THAT THE US WAS LOOKING FOR A FACE-SAVING SOLUTION HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED AS WISHFUL THINKING. CHEYSSON WILL NO DOUBT MAKE THE FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS: CONTINUING DAMAGE TO THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP, WHICH FAR OUTWEIGHS ANY COST TO THE SOVIETS; THE AFFRONT TO FRENCH NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY; THE DISREGARD FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL PRACTICE, ETC. BUT THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TACTICALLY NOT TO APPEAR TO SEEK A DEAL WITH US, AND

THERE IS ONLY MODEST EXPECTATION THAT EUROPEAN MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY WILL PRODUCE A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PIPELINE DISPUTE WILL BE A LONG-TERM AFFAIR, CHEYSSON WILL PROBABLY WANT TO CONTAIN THE PIPELINE DISPUTE AND PREVENT IT FROM DAMAGING OTHER AREAS OF THE RELATIONSHIP.

B. MIDDLE EAST.

THE FRENCH HAVE INDICATED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MIDDLE EAST PEACE INITIATIVE AND, SO LONG AS IT HAS ARAB BACKING, WILL WORK WITH US. HOWEVER, CHEYSSON DOES NOT BELIEVE IT GOES FAR ENOUGH IN THAT IT DOES NOT HOLD OUT THE PROSPECT OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE. COOPERATION ON THE MNF HAS BEEN EXCELLENT. CHEYSSON WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE MNF'S ROLE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON.

C. EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

CHEYSSON WILL WISH TO HEAR FIRST HAND THE SECRETARY'S GENERAL VIEWS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THEIR LIKELY FUTURE DEVELOPMENT, INCLUDING OF COURSE THE SITUATIONS IN POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN. IN THEIR GENERAL ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, THE FRENCH ARE PERHAPS CLOSER TO THE US VIEW THAN MOST OTHER EUROPEANS. THUS THEY SEE LITTLE PROSPECT FOR LASTING OR SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT SO LONG AS THE SITUATIONS IN POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN REMAIN UNCHANGED. THEY FEEL LITTLE PRESSURE TO PROCLAIM THEIR CONTINUED ALLEGIANCE TO DETENTE. (IN FACT THE WORD ITSELF HAS BEEN EXCISED FROM THEIR OFFICIAL VOCABULARY.) IN THEIR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRESCRIPTIONS, HOWEVER, THEY DIFFER FROM THE US. LIKE THE OTHER EUROPEANS THEY HAVE LONG BELIEVED EAST-WEST TRADE (WITH STRATEGIC SAFEGUARDS) IS NOT ONLY AN ECONOMIC NECESSITY BUT IN THE LONG-TERM BENEFICIAL. THEY BELIEVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE INEFFECTIVE IN MODIFYING SOVIET BEHAVIOR. THEY WANT US TO MOVE TOWARDS AN EVENTUAL RESCHEDULING OF THE POLISH DEBT AND HAVE BLOCKED US CONSISTENTLY IN EXPANDING THE EAST-WEST COMPETENCE OF NATO. SIMILARLY SOME DEGREE OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE IS SEEN AS BENEFICIAL IN PROVIDING A NON-MILITARY DIMENSION. FINALLY, CONCERNS ABOUT GERMANY ARE NEVER FAR FROM FRENCH EAST-WEST CALCULATIONS. A LONG-STANDING OBJECTIVE IS TO PRECLUDE A SITUATION WHERE GERMANY'S RELATIONS WITH THE EAST ARE MOVING FURTHER AND FASTER THAN THOSE OF EUROPE AS A WHOLE AND TO AVOID A CORRESPONDING WEAKENING OF GERMANY'S

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 32811

EXDIS

TRANS-ATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN TIES.

D. INF/START.

AS THE FRENCH HAVE DONE ON OTHER OCCASIONS, CHEYSSON MAY URGE THAT THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS BE MERGED IN ORDER TO COUNTER THE DECOUPLING EFFECTS OF SOVIET PRESSURES TO NEGOTIATE ON A EURO-STRATEGIC BALANCE WHICH WOULD NECESSARILY INCLUDE FRENCH AND BRITISH FORCES. ASSURANCES THAT THE US WILL NEITHER INCLUDE NOR ALLOW COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY FORCES ARE ALWAYS WELCOME TO THE FRENCH, THOUGH WE BELIEVE THEY HAVE CONFIDENCE IN OUR POSITION ON THIS POINT.

- OF GREATER CONCERN TO CHEYSSON WILL BE THE PROSPECTS FOR INF DEPLOYMENT IN 1983, PARTICULARLY IN GERMANY. THEY SHARE THE US AND NATO ASSESSMENT THAT THE DEPLOYMENTS ARE NECESSARY FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE BALANCE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME THEY ARE APPREHENSIVE OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION THAT COULD DEVELOP IN GERMANY: WIDESPREAD DEMONSTRATIONS, A LEFTWARD DRIFTING SPD IN OPPOSITION AND A WORSENING ECONOMY. CONSISTENT WITH FRANCE'S NON-PARTICIPATORY ROLE ON STRATEGIC ISSUES, CHEYSSON WILL PROBABLY NOT ADVOCATE ANY PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION BUT MAY WELL WANT TO HEAR THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS.

E. DISAPPOINTING FRENCH DEFENSE BUDGET FOR 1983.
THE SECRETARY MAY WISH TO EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS FRANCE IS NOT LEADING THE ALLIANCE IN TERMS OF REAL GROWTH OF ITS DEFENSE BUDGET. THE ANNOUNCED TEN PERCENT NOMINAL RISE COULD BE SWAMPED BY INFLATION, WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO BE HELD TO THE OPTIMISTIC EIGHT PERCENT RATE BEING PLANNED FOR BY THE GOF. THIS COULD MEAN A SUBSTANTIAL NET DECREASE IN FRENCH DEFENSE SPENDING IN 1983. THE NEW FRENCH DEFENSE BUDGET COULD ENCOURAGE OTHER ALLIES TO DO LESS FOR THEIR OWN DEFENSE AND MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO GENERATE CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR MAINTAINING

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F. CSCE.

THE WESTERN POSITION AT MADRID MAY ALSO BE RAISED BY CHEYSSON. IF SO, HE WILL URGE THE US TO JOIN THE ALLIES AND THE NNA IN RESUMING NEGOTIATION ON THE NNA DOCUMENT.

FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AND EVEN IMPATIENCE THAT THE US POSITION AT OSLO LAST WEEK SHOWED NO SIGNS OF GIVE, AND HAVE EXPRESSED FEARS THAT CONTINUED US-EUROPEAN DIVERGENCE ON CSCE WILL LEAD TO US ISOLATION AT MADRID. WHILE THEY, PERHAPS MORE THAN MOST OF OUR OTHER ALLIES, ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THE POLISH CONSIDERATIONS WHICH UNDERLIE OUR POSITION, THEY SHARE THE GENERAL EUROPEAN CONCERN THAT CONTINUED STALEMATE IN MADRID WILL DESTROY OR DISCREDIT THE CSCE PROCESS. THE FRENCH ALSO SEE OPENING OF A CDE AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT WHICH WILL COMPLEMENT INF AND START NEGOTIATIONS AND FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON SOVIET CONVENTIONAL BUILDUP. CHEYSSON MAY BE EXPECTED TO ARGUE THAT THE CSCE PROCESS IS VITAL TO THE EUROPEANS AND THAT IT HAS BENEFITTED THE WEST MORE THAN THE EAST.
G. TERRORISM.

THE SECRETARY MAY WISH TO EXPLORE WITH CHEYSSON THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM SPILL-OVER EFFECT OF MIDDLE EAST TURBULENCE. THE SEPTEMBER 17 ANTI-ISRAELI CAR BOMBING WHICH INJURED OVER 40 SCHOOL CHILDREN IN DOWNTOWN PARIS IS THE MOST RECENT IN A LONG SERIES OF TERRORIST ACTIONS IN FRANCE.

- BROAD NEW ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES ANNOUNCED IN AUGUST AND A FEW EARLY ANTI-TERRORIST "COUPS" HAVE GIVEN WAY TO SKEPTICISM OVER THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO CONTROL THE TERRORIST PROBLEM. PRIME MINISTER MAUROY HINTED RECENTLY THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT MAY TIGHTEN UP ON ASYLUM AND TRY TO CRACK DOWN HARDER ON

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TERRORISTS. BUT, WHILE TERRORISM IS CLEARLY A SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEM FOR THE GOVERNMENT (POLLS PLACE IT AT THE HEAD OF PUBLIC CONCERNS), MITTERRAND HAS NOT BOWED TO LAW AND ORDER ADVOCATES WHO INSIST THAT TOUGHER JUDICIAL GUIDELINES AND A DRASTIC CHANGE IN ASYLUM POLICIES ARE THE ONLY WAY TO CURE THE URBAN TERRORISM HEADACHE.

- 8 WE HAVE ENCOURAGED FRENCH COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS AND HAVE RECEIVED GOOD COOPERATION FROM THEM ON PROTECTION OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. CHEYSSON IS UNDOUBTEDLY AWARE OF THE SPECIAL THREAT POSED TO ISRAELI AND AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES IN FRANCE AS A RESULT OF THE BEIRUT MASSACRES.

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H. NAMIBIA.

CHEYSSON WILL BE LOOKING FOR SIGNS OF REAL PROGRESS ON THE ANGOLA TRACK OF THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS. HE IS PROBABLY SKEPTICAL THAT ANY WILL BE FORTHCOMING. THE FRENCH MAY HAVE HAD THEIR OWN CONTACTS WITH THE MPLA, AND THE QUAI'S DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS HAS JUST BEEN TO HAVANA. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO FIND OUT WHAT THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN UP TO.

I. CHAD.

THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE FRENCH BELIEVE WE ARE WORKING AGAINST THEM IN CHAD AND THAT WE MAY, IN PART, BE RESPONSIBLE FOR HABRE'S NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FRENCH. THE SECRETARY SHOULD ASSURE CHEYSSON THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE AND THAT IN NO WAY ARE WE SEEKING A PRIMARY ROLE IN CHAD.

J. VIETNAM/KAMPUCHEA.

FRANCE SAYS IT HAS WARMED ITS RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM IN ORDER TO INDUCE HANOI INTO A SETTLEMENT ON KAMPUCHEA, AND HELP VIETNAM REDUCE ITS DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION. THE FRENCH TILT TOWARD VIETNAM HAS NOT YET BORNE ANY FRUIT, SO CHEYSSON MAY NOT RAISE THE SUBJECT. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE GOOD IF THE SECRETARY COULD MENTION KAMPUCHEA BRIEFLY--TO SIGNAL OUR CONTINUING CONCERN, AND AVOID A FRENCH CONCLUSION THAT KAMPUCHEA NO LONGER WORRIES US.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. THE MEETING WITH CHEYSSON IS TAKING PLACE AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF SERIOUS SLIPPAGE IN POPULARITY OF THE MITTERRAND/MAUROY GOVERNMENT. POLLS PUBLISHED SEPTEMBER 24 SHOW THE GOVERNMENT'S POPULARITY FALLING TO A NEW ALL TIME LOW WITH, FOR THE TIME BEING, MORE RESPONDENTS HOLDING A NEGATIVE OPINION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S PERFORMANCE THAN THOSE WHO APPROVE. THIS DECLINE IN POPULARITY WILL NO DOUBT BE ON CHEYSSON'S MIND.
GALBRAITH

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, LE, MO, FR

SUBJECT: FONMIN CHEYSSON'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADORS
- GALBRAITH AND WALTERS

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. WALTERS, ASKED WHERE HE HAD BEEN, GAVE CHEYSSON A SUMMARY OF THE READOUT ON THE FES SUMMIT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM KING HASSAN. CHEYSSON COMMENTED THAT THE KING HAD EMERGED GREATLY STRENGTHENED FROM THE SUMMIT. HE HAD MANAGED IT IN A MASTERLY AND STATESMANLIKE WAY. BRILLIANT WAS THE WORD CHEYSSON USED TO DESCRIBE HASSAN.

3. THE IDEA OF TWO TOP LEVEL COMMITTEES WAS DISCUSSED AND CHEYSSON SAID THAT HE AND NOT PRESIDENT MITTERRAND WOULD MEET WITH ARAFAT AT THIS STAGE. IF THE MATTER WERE HANDLED AT CHIEFS OF STATE LEVEL, MITTERRAND WOULD NOT SEE ARAFAT, EVEN AS PART OF A LARGE GROUP, UNLESS AND UNTIL MITTERRAND WAS READY TO RECEIVE HIM ALONE, WHICH WOULD NOT BE UNTIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 HAD BEEN ACCEPTED. CHEYSSON SAID FRANCE HAD URGED ARAFAT TO ACCEPT RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 AND HE HAD INFORMATION THAT THREE ARAB COUNTRIES HAD ALSO URGED ARAFAT TO FOLLOW THIS COURSE. IN MAKING IT CLEAR THAT HE, NOT THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRESIDENT, EXPECTED TO BE THE INTERLOCUTOR, CHEYSSON SHOWED AN ANXIOUSNESS PERSONALLY TO PRESS ARAFAT INTO ACCEPTING THESE PRE-CONDITIONS.

4. ON THE MATTER OF LEBANON, CHEYSSON SAID THAT HE WOULD FOLLOW OUR LEADERSHIP BLINDLY. WHEN WALTERS EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE BLINDLY, HE SAID "YES BUT ONLY ON LEBANON." HE STATED THAT HE WAS SURPRISED HOW MUCH DIFFICULTY PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD EXPERIENCED IN GETTING AUTHORITY FROM CONGRESS TO SEND THE U.S. CONTINGENT OF THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE TO BEIRUT. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR EACH OF US TO SEND TROOPS ELSEWHERE IN LEBANON OUTSIDE OF BEIRUT AND FELT THAT THE EVACUATION OF LEBANON BY THE ISRAELIS AND SYRIANS WOULD BE A MATTER OF MONTHS RATHER THAN WEEKS.
GALBRAITH

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FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12356: DECL 9/24/88
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, FR
SUBJECT: (U) INCREASED TERRORIST THREAT
REF: STATE 236087

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

1. (U) ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. THE BEIRUT MASSACRES RAISE THE PROBLEM OF A POSSIBLE NEW WAVE OF REVENGE TERRORISM, AIMED AT AMERICAN PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE. WE BELIEVE THE ENTIRE AMERICAN COMMUNITY HAS NOW BECOME A POSSIBLE TARGET FOR EXTREMIST VIOLENCE. WHILE WE ARE TAKING WHATEVER STEPS WE CAN TO PROTECT OUR PEOPLE, EMBASSY RESOURCES AND OPTIONS ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED. THIS TELEGRAM ANALYZES THE PROBLEM AND THE LIMITATIONS ON WHAT THIS (OR ANY) EMBASSY CAN DO IN RESPONSE. IT ALSO SUMMARIZES ACTIONS WE ARE UNDERTAKING TO SUPPLEMENT OUR CURRENT LEVEL OF SECURITY. END SUMMARY.

3. THE CYCLE OF TERRORISM WHICH HAS MADE PARIS THE SITE OF A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS IN RECENT MONTHS HAS BEEN GIVEN

NEW MOMENTUM BY LAST WEEK'S TRAGIC MASSACRE IN BEIRUT. IN VIEW OF THE DELIBERATE, COLD-BLOODED KILLING OF WOMEN, CHILDREN AND OLD MEN IN THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS, WE FORESEE THE REAL POSSIBILITY THAT PALESTINIAN OR OTHER EXTREMISTS MAY NOW INCLUDE AMERICAN DEPENDENTS AS TARGETS AS THEY SEEK TO AVENGE THE KILLING OF INNOCENTS IN LEBANON. WHILE WE HAVE HERETOFORE EXPECTED DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS TO BE THE MOST LIKELY OBJECTS OF TERRORIST ATTENTIONS, WE FEEL WE MUST NOW FACE UP TO THE REASONABLE POSSIBILITY THAT ALL MEMBERS OF THE STAFF, AS WELL AS CHILDREN AND SPOUSES, MAY BE AT RISK.

4. THE SEPTEMBER 17 BOMBING OF AN ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC CAR IN FRONT OF THE LYCEE CARNOT IN PARIS WHICH INJURED NEARLY FIFTY PERSONS, INCLUDING 42 SCHOOL CHILDREN, IS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT COULD HAPPEN IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE REFUGEE CAMP MASSACRES. WE MUST ALSO RECALL THAT THE SAVAGE ATTACK AT THE GOLDENBERG RESTAURANT CAME IN THE WAKE OF INTENSE ISRAELI BOMBING OF BEIRUT. OUR CONSIDERED VIEW IS THAT ANOTHER UPSWING IN THE TERRORIST CURVE MUST BE EXPECTED. THE CLIMATE IS SUCH THAT WE MUST BE PREPARED FOR THE MOST EXTREME AND INDISCRIMINATE EVENTUALITY.

5. WE ASSUME THAT ATTEMPTS TO EXTRACT REVENGE FOR THE REFUGEE CAMP MASSACRES COULD COME QUICKLY. OUR THINKING -- WHICH PARALLELS THAT OF ISRAELI EMBASSY OFFICIALS WITH WHOM WE HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT -- IS THAT TERRORISTS MAY SEEK OUT EASY, EXPOSED TARGETS WHICH WOULD HAVE MAXIMUM

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SHOCK EFFECT. AMERICAN-IDENTIFIED SCHOOLS, CHURCHES AND HOMES OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATS ARE OBVIOUS PLACES TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTS. MEMBERS OF THIS MISSION ARE WELL AWARE OF THE CONTINUED NEED FOR SOUND SECURITY PRACTICES IN LIGHT OF THE INCREASED THREAT LEVEL OF RECENT MONTHS. THEY NOW MUST DEAL WITH POSSIBLE THREATS IN A FAMILY CONTEXT. WE WERE INDEED FORTUNATE THAT THE BOMB DIRECTED AGAINST COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR GRANT DID NOT GO OFF WHEN HE, HIS WIFE AND SON WERE INSIDE THEIR CAR. TWO POLICEMEN WERE KILLED TRYING TO DEFUSE THE BOMB. THE NEXT TIME THE TURN OF EVENTS MAY BE DIFFERENT.

6. WE HAVE SO FAR BENEFITTED FROM EXCELLENT COOPERATION FROM FRENCH AUTHORITIES UPON WHOM WE MUST ULTIMATELY RELY FOR PROTECTION. THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION FOR THE EMBASSY, SOME ANNEXES AND THE MOST SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE MISSION IS, WE BELIEVE, AN ADEQUATE DETERRENT TO TERRORIST ACTION. OUR CONCERN NOW IS FOR THE SOFTER TARGETS TO WHICH TERRORISTS ARE LIKELY TO TURN IN THIS NEW AND HIGHLY-CHARGED ENVIRONMENT OF RECRIMINATION AND THE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 32873
POSSIBLE DESIRE FOR REVENGE. WHILE WE DO NOT HAVE THE
FUNDS NOR THE AUTHORITY TO SEND GUARDS TO EVERY AMERICAN
INSTITUTION IN PARIS, WE HAVE TAKEN AND/OR ARE CONSIDER-
ING THE FOLLOWING STEPS TO HELP PROTECT THE APPROXIMATELY
1,000 OFFICIAL AMERICAN EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS AND THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MORE VULNERABLE TARGETS IN THE PRIVATE AMERICAN COMMUNITY:

- -- OBTAINED APPROVAL FOR SPECIAL LIVING QUARTERS ALLOWANCES FOR GARAGE RENTAL.
- -- OBTAINED APPROVAL FOR REGULAR LICENSE PLATES TO REPLACE READILY-IDENTIFIABLE DIPLOMATIC PLATES.
- -- REQUESTED 24-HOUR POLICE COVERAGE FOR USG HOUSING COMPOUNDS AT NEUILLY AND BOULOGNE.
- -- RECONVENED EXPANDED COUNTRY TEAM AND EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE TO DISCUSS THREAT LEVEL.
- -- PREPARE TALKING POINTS FOR AGENCY/SECTION HEADS TO USE IN BRIEFING THEIR EMPLOYEES. EMPLOYEES IN TURN WILL BE ASKED TO BRIEF FAMILY MEMBERS USING PREPARED TALKING POINTS TO ENSURE UNIFORMITY OF INFORMATION.
- -- CONTACT PRIVATE AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS TO DISCUSS NATURE OF NEW THREAT AND TO DETERMINE IF THEY NEED EMBASSY ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING ADDITIONAL POLICE SUP-

PORT. THESE INSTITUTIONS INCLUDE THE AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS WHERE THE MAJORITY OF DEPENDENTS ARE ENROLLED. RSO HAS ALREADY RECOMMENDED THAT THESE SCHOOLS CONDUCT SURVEYS OF ALL BUS STOPS TO DETERMINE SAFETY OF THE SITE ITSELF AND TO ESTABLISH SAFE-HAVENS FOR THE CHILDREN.

- -- REVIEW THE ADVISABILITY OF CONDUCTING OUTSIDE EMBASSY AND PRIVATE AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN LIGHT OF THEIR VISIBILITY AND VULNERABILITY.

7. THE EMBASSY SPENDS APPROXIMATELY \$1,150,000 A YEAR FOR GUARD SERVICES, AND WHERE THESE GUARDS ARE NOT BACKED UP BY MARINES, THEY SERVE AT BEST AS A VISIBLE DETERRENT. SCATTERED PRIVATE GUARDS ARE SIMPLY NOT ADEQUATE PROTECTION AGAINST DETERMINED EXTREMIST VIOLENCE. REINFORCED POLICE PROTECTION AT EACH EXPOSED LOCATION IS THE IDEAL SOLUTION BUT IT IS AN UNREALISTIC EXPECTATION. PROFESSIONAL ARMED GUARDS AT ALL USG LOCATIONS WOULD INCREASE OUR COSTS THREE OR FOUR-FOLD, WITHOUT CONSIDERING PRIVATE SECTOR INSTITUTIONS WHICH CANNOT INCUR SUCH COSTS. THESE FACTORS CLEARLY LIMIT WHAT WE CAN DO.

8. WE WOULD APPRECIATE A REVISED DEPARTMENT ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT THREAT LEVEL, TOGETHER WITH SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL STEPS WHICH WE COULD IMPLEMENT TO ENHANCE OUR SECURITY. WE WOULD PARTICULARLY RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT FOCUS ON THE PROBLEM OF PROVIDING PROTECTION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOR DEPENDENTS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS. ALSO, IF OTHER POSTS IN WESTERN EUROPE ARE TAKING OTHER KINDS OF MEASURES, WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT THEM TO SEE IF THEY COULD BE APPLIED HERE.

9. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. GALBRAITH

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MESSAGE:

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 271552

NODIS
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
E.O. 12356:DECL:OARD
TAGS: EEWT
SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH THE FIVE ON SANCTIONS-RELATED
ISSUES

REF: STATE 263795

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHETHER OR NOT A MULTILATERAL MEETING WITH THE ALLIES
ON SANCTIONS-RELATED AND OTHER EAST/WEST ISSUES
MATERIALIZES, THESE WILL BE KEY TOPICS FOR THE SECRETARY'S
--- BILATERAL AND OTHER MEETINGS AT THE MARGINS OF
THE UNGA. AN NSC MEETING, SEPTEMBER 22, APPROVED THE
APPROACH TO BE TAKEN BY THE SECRETARY. COUNSELOR BUCKLEY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SEPARATELY CALLED IN, SEPTEMBER 23, WASHINGTON
AMBASSADORS (U.K., FRG, FRANCE, ITALY) IN ORDER TO
PREPARE THE GROUND FOR THE NEW YORK BILATERALS. THIS
CABLE REPORTS ON THOSE CALLS.

3. THE COUNSELOR INFORMED EACH AMBASSADOR THAT THE
PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED, IN THE NSC MEETING, HIS STRONG
CONCERN THAT PRESSURE BE MAINTAINED ON THE SOVIETS, AND
HIS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE TACTICS THAT

WOULD PRODUCE EQUAL OR GREATER PRESSURE, SHOULD THE
ALLIES SO PROPOSE. MR. BUCKLEY TRACED THE ORIGIN OF U.S.
OIL-AND GAS-RELATED SANCTIONS FROM THE 1978 SOVIET
DISSIDENT INCIDENTS, THROUGH THE INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN,
INTO THE PRESENT POLISH SITUATION. AFTER ASKING THE

AMBASSADORS FOR THEIR PERSPECTIVE ON NEW YORK, THE
COUNSELOR OUTLINED U.S. VIEWS ON SANCTIONS AND
LONGER-TERM SOVIET ECONOMIC ISSUES:

-- MULTILATERAL ACTION TO DEPRIVE THE SOVIETS OF
SELECTED, HIGH-TECHNOLOGY OIL AND GAS ITEMS WOULD MAKE IT
EASIER FOR THE U.S. TO LIFT RETROACTIVE ASPECTS OF ITS
OWN SANCTIONS;

-- WORK ON RESTRAINING CREDIT TO THE SOVIETS HAS STALLED,
AND SHOULD MOVE FORWARD, USING OUR PRE-VERSAILLES
PROPOSALS AS A BASIS;

-- COCOM NEEDS TIGHTENING AND, ESPECIALLY, IMPROVED
ENFORCEMENT; AND

-- WE NEED TO AVOID FUTURE EUROPEAN CONTRACTS FOR SOVIET
GAS WHICH COULD DISPLACE NON-SOVIET SUPPLIERS FROM THE
1990'S MARKET.

4. U.K. AMBASSADOR WRIGHT OBSERVED THAT MRS. THATCHER
TOOK "NO PLEASURE" FROM THE PRESENT "SPAT IN THE
ALLIANCE." THE AMBASSADOR SAW DETENTE AS FOUNDED ON
GERMAN AND BERLIN AGREEMENTS, AND THE HELSINKI FINAL
ACT. HE SAID THE U.S. SHOULD CONVEY STRONGLY TO EUROPEAN
PUBLICS ITS "SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE" IN ARMS CONTROL
TALKS. WRIGHT CHARACTERIZED THE U.K. AS "ON THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SIDELINES" ON FUTURE ENERGY SOURCING, DUE TO NATIONAL
SELF-SUFFICIENCY. WRIGHT QUESTIONED WHETHER SUCH WEIGHTY
ISSUES CAN BE AIRD FULLY IN THE TIME AVAILABLE IN NEW
YORK.

5. FRG AMBASSADOR HERMES OBSERVED THAT, REGARDLESS OF THE
OUTCOME OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, FRG FOREIGN
POLICY WOULD REMAIN CONSTANT IN ITS BROAD LINES. IN NEW
YORK, HOWEVER, THE FRG REPRESENTATIVE COULD NOT "SPEAK UP
AS A FOREIGN MINISTER." THE AMBASSADOR STRONGLY
CRITICIZED A RECENT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ACTION
SEEKING TO PARE U.S. TROOP STRENGTH IN THE FRG,
EMPHASIZING THAT IT SENT THE "WRONG SIGNAL" TO THE USSR,
EUROPEANS AND THE BROADER U.S. PUBLIC. ON FUTURE
AVOIDANCE OF SOVIET ENERGY SOURCING, HERMES SAID THE FRG
NEEDS "COMPETITIVE SUPPLIERS" AS WELL AS THE AVAILABILITY

OF PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVES. HE RAISED THE "BROADENING
CONSEQUENCES" OF U.S. SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT, INCLUDING
IMPACT ON THIRD-COUNTRY FIRMS AND U.S. BUSINESS. THE
FRG'S FRAU STEEG HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN TALKS ON CREDIT
RESTRAINTS, ALTHOUGH THE FRG DOES NOT ITSELF GIVE
"CREDITS." HERMES CLOSED WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT
SANCTIONS SHOULD BE "REVERSIBLE" AND, IN THE FRG VIEW,
LINKED TO FULLFILMENT OF THE NATO THREE CONDITIONS
CONCERNING POLAND.

6. FRENCH AMBASSADOR VERNIER-PALLIEZ,

ATTEMPTED A REBUTTAL OF COUNSELOR BUCKLEY'S POINTS. HE
QUESTIONED THE AVAILABILITY OF VIABLE ENERGY

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 271552

NODIS

BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC

ALTERNATIVES, INCLUDING NORWEGIAN GAS, AND SUGGESTED THE
U.S. DEREGULATE ITS OWN NATURAL GAS PRICING TO ELIMINATE
A "BASIC PROBLEM." FRANCE HAS TROUBLE WITH CREDIT
RESTRAINT, BECAUSE OTHER NATIONS CAN OFFER BETTER
NON-SUBSIDIZED INTEREST RATES DUE TO LOWER DOMESTIC RATES
OF INFLATION. WHILE ACCEPTING THAT A REVIEW OF ITEMS ON
THE COCOM CONTROL LIST IS USEFUL, HE CAUTIONED AGAINST
ANY USE OF COCOM FOR A FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSE.
VERNIER-PALLIEZ SAID THE U.S. SHOULD RECOGNIZE IT HAS NO
"REAL LEADERSHIP" IN OIL AND GAS TECHNOLOGIES, EXCEPT
PERHAPS IN THE SHORT TERM OF 3-4 YEARS. (COUNSELOR
BUCKLEY RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. HOPED THE POLISH
SITUATION WOULD BE RESOLVED BY THAT TIME.)

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7. ITALIAN AMBASSADOR PETRIGNANI PUT ON DISPLAY AN IMPRESSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISSUES, AND CONVEYED ACCEPTANCE OR OPENMINDEDNESS ON ALL POINTS RAISED BY MR. BUCKLEY. MOREOVER, PETRIGNANI STRESSED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER COLOMBO IS MOST ANXIOUS THAT THE PROPOSED FIVE-FOREIGN MINISTER MEETING IN NEW YORK BE HELD. COLOMBO WILL BEND HIS SCHEDULE, WITH THESE TALKS HAVING THE HIGHEST PRIORITY. THERE SHOULD BE NO PRECONDITIONS FOR TALKS. PETRIGNANI HEARD A "RUMOR" THAT THE EC COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, SEPTEMBER 20-21 IN BRUSSELS, AGREED TO THE MULTILATERAL. HE WOULD CHECK THAT OFFICIALLY WITH ROME, AND GET BACK TO MR. BUCKLEY. PETRIGNANI CONFIRMED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT AN UNDERTAKING OF ALLIED "REVIEW" OF SELECTED OIL AND GAS ITEMS WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE U.S. TO MODIFY ASPECTS OF ITS OWN MEASURES. THE AMBASSADOR VIEWED IT IS "PROPER" THAT THE EUROPEANS MAKE PROPOSALS, BUT ALSO "PRACTICAL" TO UNDERSTAND THE U.S. IDEAS. PETRIGNANI WONDERED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ENOUGH TIME AVAILABLE IN NEW YORK, AND OPINED THAT COLOMBO MIGHT WISH ALSO TO DISCUSS LEBANON, BROADER RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, ARMS CONTROL INCLUDING INF, AND THE NATO MINISTERIAL IN CANADA.

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8. COMMENT: IT SEEMED TO US THAT PETRIGNANI WAS NOT ONLY MORE FORTHCOMING, BUT ALSO THE MOST RESPONSIVE TO THE POINTS RAISED BY COUNSELOR BUCKLEY. HE MAY WELL HAVE BEEN THE ONLY AMBASSADOR SPEAKING FROM INSTRUCTIONS, AND THEREFORE HIS REMARKS SEEM MORE SIGNIFICANT. END COMMENT.

9. THE SECRETARY BEGINS HIS DISCUSSIONS THIS WEEKEND AND, THEREFORE, YOU ARE NOT BEING REQUESTED TO DISCUSS THE ABOVE WITH YOUR HOST GOVERNMENTS. WE WOULD, OF COURSE WELCOME ANY INFORMATION YOU CAN PROVIDE REGARDING REACTION OF HOST GOVERNMENTS TO SEPTEMBER 23 BUCKLEY BRIEFINGS. SHULTZ

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EXDIS
FOR COUNSELOR JAMES BUCKLEY AND UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
NSC FOR CLARK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ENRG, EEWT, NO, UR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH'S MEETING WITH ESSO
- - OFFICIALS
REF: A) PARIS 32328 (NOTAL), B) HAGUE 6872 (NOTAL),
- C) PARIS 31284, D) BONN 20206, E) OSLO 4691

1. (7 - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: AT AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH'S REQUEST R.G.
REID, PRESIDENT OF ESSO EUROPE, AND BRICE A. SACHS,
VICE PRESIDENT OF ESSO EUROPE, MET WITH HIM SEPTEMBER 10.
ALSO PRESENT WERE AMBASSADOR DYESS, HAGUE EMBOFF ALLEN

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EXDIS
AND PARIS EMBOFF WIENER. IN THE TWO AND A HALF HOUR SESSION REID AND SACHS REVIEWED ESSO'S JUST-COMPLETED ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LONG-RANGE NATURAL GAS OUTLOOK. THEY REPORTED THAT IN THE PAST 18 MONTHS THE GAS MARKET HAD CHANGED RADICALLY FROM A COMPLETE SELLERS' MARKET TO A BUYERS' MARKET, A CHANGE BROUGHT ABOUT LARGELY BY A REDUCTION IN DEMAND PROJECTIONS. ON THE SUPPLY SIDE THE SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IS THE SOVIET UNION. SINCE CONTRACTS FOR THE SOVIET PIPELINE ARE MUCH LOWER THAN ORIGINALLY EXPECTED, THE SOVIETS COULD END UP WITH SUFFICIENT EXCESS CAPACITY BY THE 1990'S, TO ALLOW THEM TO CONTROL THE MARKET AND PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER EUROPEAN GAS. ESSO IS PUSHING FOR A POLITICAL/ STRATEGIC DECISION BY THE EUROPEANS TO MAKE A COMMITMENT TO DEVELOP NORWEGIAN GAS, EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE MORE COSTLY THAN SOVIET GAS. END SUMMARY.

EXDIS
3. REID AND SACHS SAID THAT ESSO'S RECENTLY COMPLETED GAS FORECAST, WHICH THEY CAUTIONED IS PROPRIETARY AND COMMERCIALY SENSITIVE, CONFIRMS A DRAMATIC CHANGE FROM A SELLERS' MARKET TO A BUYERS' MARKET IN THE LAST 18 MONTHS - 2 YEARS. AS RECENTLY AS 1979 GAS DEMAND WAS INCREASING AT 10 - 12 PERCENT ANNUALLY; IN THE LAST TWO YEARS IT HAS SHOWN A 2 - 4 PERCENT ANNUAL DECLINE. INDUSTRY EXPERTS ASSUME GAS WILL RESUME GROWTH, BUT THEY EXPECT A REDUCED RATE OF INCREASE IN GAS PRICES OVER THE NEXT 15-20 YEARS. WHEREAS IN THE PAST GAS PRICES HAVE DEPENDED ON GENERAL ECONOMIC FACTORS, THE ESSO OFFICIALS SAID THAT THE FUTURE TREND IS FOR CLOSER TRACKING BETWEEN GAS AND OIL PRICES, WITH GAS BECOMING CHEAPER RELATIVE TO OIL. CURRENTLY GAS IS PRICED AT ABOUT 85 PERCENT OF OIL; PREVIOUSLY IT WAS AT APPROXIMATELY PARITY. GAS IS EXPECTED TO REPRESENT 16 PERCENT MARKET SHARE OF ALL FUELS IN EUROPE BY 2000. (BETWEEN 1979 AND 1981 GAS EARNED A 14 PERCENT MARKET SHARE.)

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EXDIS

4. THE MAJOR CHANGE IN PROJECTED GAS PRICES CAN BE EXPLAINED BY THE CHANGE IN PREDICTED DEMAND. ESSO POINTED OUT THAT THE STRENGTH OF THE FORCES AFFECTING DEMAND CONTINUES TO SURPRISE INDUSTRY ANALYSTS. IN FACT SOME OF THE APPARENT GROWTH IN THE DEMAND FOR GAS IN THE LATE 70'S WAS FALSE AND REPRESENTED SUBSTITUTION. IN AN INDUSTRY WITH A THIRTEEN-YEAR LEAD TIME, DECISIONS WERE MADE BASED ON THOSE FALSE RATES. ALTHOUGH INDUSTRY EXPERTS DO NOT WELL UNDERSTAND THE FORCES CURRENTLY AFFECTING DEMAND, AND WHILE THEY ADMIT THAT TO SOME EXTENT WE ARE SEEING SHORT-TERM EFFECTS OF THE ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN, ESSO BELIEVES THAT MUCH OF THE CHANGE IN THE MARKET IS A LONG-TERM ONE WHICH REFLECTS PERMANENT ADJUSTMENTS SUCH AS FUEL-SWITCHING, INCREASES IN INDUSTRIAL EFFICIENCY, ETC.

EXDIS

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5. ONE NOTABLE CHANGE IN MARKET IS THE RECENT PHENOMENON OF SHORT TERM (THREE MONTHS TO ONE YEAR) SALES. (IN THE PAST, GAS WAS SOLD ONLY ON LONG-TERM BASIS.) IN THE TOTAL BUYERS' MARKET OF TODAY, LONG-TERM CONTRACTS ARE NO LONGER REQUIRED AND RUHRGAS IS CURRENTLY "SUCKING THE RUSSIANS IN" TO THE SHORT-TERM MARKET. THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN PLAYING THE MARKET, MAKING THREE - TWELVE MONTH SALES WHICH UNDERCUT THE MARKET PRICE BY ABOUT THREE PERCENT. ESSO OFFICIALS EXPECT SOVIET SPOT SUPPLEMENTAL SALES -- MOSTLY AIMED AT THE GERMAN

EXDIS

MARKET -- TO CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS AT LEAST. (ESSO'S DATA ON FUTURE EUROPEAN GAS DEMAND IS PRESENTED IN CHARTS 1, 2 AND 3 WHICH WILL BE POUCHED.) (COMMENT: IN A FOLLOW-UP CONVERSATION, BT

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EXDIS

SACHS ELABORATED ON ESSO'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE SHORT-TERM MARKET. ESSO FIRST BECAME AWARE OF THESE SALES IN THE SPRING OF 1982. THEY ARE AWARE OF THREE SUCH SALES, ONE NINE-MONTH CONTRACT FOR .8 BCM, AND TWO SMALLER SALES, FOR A TOTAL OF ABOUT 1.5 BCM. THEY ARE ALSO AWARE OF A SOVIET OFFER OF A SALE OF 1.5 BCM WHICH DID NOT GO THROUGH.)

6. TURNING TO THE SUPPLY SIDE OF THE EQUATION, ESSO OFFICIALS REVIEWED THEIR PREDICTIONS FOR SOVIET NATURAL GAS EXPORTS TO CONTINENTAL EUROPE 1982 - 2000 (SEE CHART 4 TO BE POUCHED). THESE FIGURES REPRESENT A DRASTIC REDUCTION IN PERCEPTIONS OF JUST 18 MONTHS AGO, WHEN SOVIETS HAD HOPED TO HAVE CONTRACTS FOR 2ND TRANCHE DELIVERIES OF 40 BCM/YEAR BY 1986. (BECAUSE OF DEMAND

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FORCES, RUHRGAS BEGAN SQUEEZING SOVIETS TOWARD THE END OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF GAS PURCHASES.) THE CONTRACTS FOR THE SECOND TRANCHE ARE NOW EXPECTED TO TOTAL, AT THE HIGHEST, ONLY 26 - 28 BCM PER YEAR, WITH THE PLATEAU NOT BEING REACHED UNTIL 1989-90, AFTER A MUCH MORE GRADUAL BUILDUP. THIS MOST OPTIMISTIC CASE ASSUMES SALES OF 10 BCM FOR GERMANY, 8 BCM FOR FRANCE, 8 BCM FOR ITALY AND 3 BCM FOR BELGIUM. HOWEVER, BELGIUM IS NOW CONSIDERED UNLIKELY TO PURCHASE AND ITALY STILL MAY OPT OUT. THERE WILL LIKELY BE FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF CONTRACTED-FOR GAS DUE TO FLEXIBILITY IN THE ALREADY-SIGNED CONTRACTS. RUHRGAS HAS CONTRACTED FOR 10 BCM, BUT THEIR CONTRACT PROVIDES FOR AN OPTION TO REDUCE PURCHASES BY UP TO 10 PERCENT ON TWO OCCASIONS, APRIL 1, 1982 AND OCTOBER 1982. (THUS THEY WOULD HAVE THE OPTION OF REDUCING THE 10 BCM BY A TOTAL OF NEARLY 20 PERCENT.) RUHRGAS ASKED FOR A DEFERMENT OF THE APRIL 1 OPTION; AND ESSO EXPECTS ANOTHER DEFERMENT ON OCTOBER 1. ESSO AND OTHER RUHRGAS SHAREHOLDERS WOULD LIKE RUHRGAS TO EXERCISE BOTH 10 PERCENT OPTIONS BECAUSE THEY EXPECT THE MARKET PRICE TO GO BELOW THE MINIMUM CONTRACT PRICE (ABOUT \$4.85). (ESSO OFFICIALS DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN CONTRACTS INCLUDE THE SAME OPTIONS FOR REDUCED PURCHASES.)

EXDIS

7. ESSO OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN GAS DEMAND IN THE 1980S IS ADEQUATELY COVERED BY CONTRACTED GAS SUPPLIES. HOWEVER, THEIR LONG-RANGE FORECAST SHOWS A SUPPLY/DEMAND GAP DEVELOPING IN THE 1990S AND WIDENING TO ABOUT 75 BCM PER YEAR BY THE YEAR 2000. GIVEN THE LONG LEAD TIME REQUIRED, THEY BELIEVE THAT PURCHASE DECISIONS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE BY CONTINENTAL GAS IMPORTERS WITHIN THE NEXT 5 YEARS IN ORDER TO COVER THE DEMAND GAP PROJECTED FOR THE END OF THE CENTURY. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE

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FUTURE IMPACT OF EXCESS SOVIET GAS SUPPLIES. THEY SAID THAT THE SOVIETS CURRENTLY HAVE EXCESS CAPACITY; WITH SOME DIVERSION FROM DOMESTIC USES AND MINOR IMPROVEMENTS IN EXISTING INFRASTRUCTURE, THEY ESTIMATE THIS CURRENT EXCESS CAPACITY TO BE 14 - 15 BCM. WITH THE ADDITIONAL EXCESS CAPACITY WHICH WILL BE ADDED WITH THE PIPELINE ESSO FEARS THE SOVIETS COULD CONTROL THE MARKET AND UNDERCUT THE PRICE OF BOTH DUTCH AND NORWEGIAN GAS.

EXDIS
8. ESSO OFFICIALS NOTED THAT THE ROSY FORECAST FOR THE SOVIET UNION AS A FUTURE SUPPLIER WOULD CHANGE IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO FALL DOWN TECHNICALLY AND COME TO BE PERCEIVED AS UNRELIABLE SUPPLIERS.

EXDIS
9. ESSO OFFICIALS FORESEE NO NEW NORWEGIAN GAS DEVELOPMENT UNTIL INTO THE 1990S (SLEIPNER) AND EVEN THE LATE 90S (31/2). THEY CLAIM THAT, IF DRIVEN TO MATCH THE RUSSIAN PRICE, THE ECONOMICS DO NOT FAVOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SLEIPNER FIELD. THE ESSO OFFICIALS COMMENTED THAT WITH 7.8 PERCENT FINANCING THEY COULD SELL NORWEGIAN GAS CHEAPER. BUT SUCH A DEAL WOULD REQUIRE GOVERNMENT SUPPORT, AND THEY KNOW THEY WOULD NEVER GET THE TERMS THE SOVIETS GOT. (COMMENT: ONE FACTOR IN NORWEGIAN GAS PRICING NOT MENTIONED BY THE ESSO OFFICIALS WAS THE "CUT" TO BE TAKEN IN THE FORM OF TAXES BY THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT, A FACTOR WHICH SHELL

EXDIS
OFFICIALS LATER TOLD AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH THEY BELIEVED MIGHT BE ADJUSTED TO MAKE NORWEGIAN GAS COMPETITIVE.)

10. AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE DUTCH SELLING THEIR GAS IN THE SHORTRUN TO HAVE IT REPLACED LATER BY NORWEGIAN GAS WHICH COULD THEN BE STORED IN THE GRONIGEN FIELD. ECONOMICALLY, SAYS ESSO, SUCH A SWITCH DOES NOT MESH BECAUSE OF THE \$1.00 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE GRONIGEN PRICE AND THE STATFJORD

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PRICE. THUS THE DUTCH WOULDN'T ACCEPT SUCH AN ARRANGE-
MENT UNLESS THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT MADE UP THE DIF-
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 33072

EXDIS

REFERENCE IN PRICE. ESSO COULD NOT DEVELOP A FIELD BASED
ON A PLAN TO REPLACE DUTCH GAS WITH NORWEGIAN GAS THAT
WOULD BE MORE EXPENSIVE. THIS PLAN WOULD WORK ONLY IF
EUROPE MADE A STRATEGIC POLITICAL DECISION TO PAY MORE
FOR THE NORWEGIAN GAS TO AVOID BUYING SOVIET GAS. ESSO,
AS HALF OWNER OF THE GRONIGEN FIELD, WOULD BE HAPPY TO
HAVE THE INCOME FROM RENTING IT OUT TO STORE THE
NORWEGIAN REPLACEMENT GAS.

11. ESSO OFFICIALS EMPHASIZED THAT IN THEIR VIEW THE
ONLY WAY TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT OF A SOVIET-CONTROLLED
GAS MARKET IN THE FUTURE WAS TO MAKE POLITICAL DECISIONS
NOW THAT WOULD COMMIT THE EUROPEANS TO BUY NON-SOVIET
GAS, EVEN AT HIGHER PRICES. REFLECTING ON THE CURRENT
PREDICAMENT FROM THE ESSO POSITION AS BOTH SELLER

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EXDIS
S
ESSO IS AN EQUITY OWNER OF THE SLEIPNER FIELD) AND BUYER (ESSO IS A 15 PERCENT SHAREHOLDER OF RUHRGAS), REID AND SACHS COMMENTED THAT 18 MONTHS AGO DURING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN RUHRGAS AND THE SOVIETS, ESSO SAT ON ITS HANDS AND DID NOT OBJECT TO THE DEAL. THIS WAS PARTLY BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WERE SEEN AS VERY RELIABLE SUPPLIERS, AND PARTLY DUE TO THE PRESSURE RUHRGAS WAS GETTING FROM THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT TO MAKE THE DEAL.

EXDIS
S
12. ESSO WOULD NOW LIKE TO SEE THE SECOND TRANCHE CONTRACTS WORKED TO A MINIMUM, FOLLOWED BY AN AGREEMENT BY THE EUROPEANS TO BUY NO MORE SOVIET GAS. THEY ADMIT THAT THE KEY CRITERION IN DETERMINING THE FUTURE MARKET IS CONSUMING NATION POLICY, AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IS THE CRUCIAL ONE. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW NORWEGIAN GAS DEPENDS ON A GERMAN GOVERNMENT DECISION TO OPT FOR EUROPEAN GAS.

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13. COMMENT: IN RESPONSE TO THE QUERIES POSED IN REFTELS D AND E, WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING EXPLANATION: IN THEIR CONVERSATION SEPTEMBER 10, ESSO OFFICIALS INDICATED THAT WHEN THEY WERE SPEAKING OF "SECOND TRANCHE" CONTRACTS (PARA 7) THEY WERE REFERRING TO CONTRACTS FOR DELIVERIES THROUGH THE NEW PIPELINE. THEY FURTHER INDICATED AS REPORTED IN REFTEL C THAT THE EXCESS CAPACITY FROM THE PIPELINE ADDED TO THE CURRENT EXISTING SOVIET CAPACITY, WHICH THEY ESTIMATE TO BE 14-15 BCM, WOULD HAVE YIELDED FUTURE SOVIET EXCESS CAPACITY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF 28 BCM. IN A FOLLOW-UP CONVERSATION SACHS CLARIFIED THIS POINT. THE SOVIETS SOUGHT 40 BCM IN SECOND TRANCHE CONTRACTS, BUT NOT ALL OF THIS GAS WOULD HAVE BEEN DELIVERED THROUGH THE NEW PIPELINE; SOME OF IT WOULD HAVE COME FROM THE EXISTING EXCESS CAPACITY. ESSO BELIEVES THAT WHEN OPERATING AT MAXIMUM CAPACITY THE NEW PIPELINE WILL HAVE A THROUGHPUT OF ABOUT 33 BCM. THEREFORE, ESSO BELIEVES THAT FUTURE

RECALLED

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

37

PAGE 03 OF 03 PARIS 3072

DTG: 271723Z SEP 82 PSN: 049628

SOVIET EXCESS CAPACITY WOULD TOTAL THE CURRENT 14-15 BCM
PLUS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 33 BCM AND THE EVENTUAL
TOTAL OF NEW CONTRACTS, WHICH COULD BE AS LOW AS 20 BCM.
GALBRAITH
BT

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

474886

38

PAGE 01 PARIS 3080
SIT388 DATE 09/28/82

DTG: 271745Z SEP 82 PSN: 049680
TOR: 270/2020Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

PARIS 3080

DTG: 271745Z SEP 82 PSN: 049680

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SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUFHFR #3080 2701746

O 271745Z SEP 82

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3701

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 33080

EXDIS

FOR AF ASST SECRETARY CROCKER AND AF/S SIMPSON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, AD

SUBJECT: FRENCH POSITION ON ANGOLA TRACK

REF: STATE 270231

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE GATHER FROM DISCUSSION WITH RANNEBERGER DURING PARIS TRANSIT 9/25 THAT AF WAS NOT AWARE OF AUSSEIL TRIP TO CUBA UNTIL A FEW DAYS AGO. HIS SEEMS TO INDICATE SOME PROBLEMS IN THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FOR MESSAGES WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT. ON SEPTEMBER 2 IN PARIS 30149 WE INFORMED THE DEPARTMENT OF THE FORTH-COMING FRANCO-CUBAN BILATERALS. ON SEPTEMBER 16 IN PARIS 31659 WE REPORTED THE DATES OF TRIP (SEPTEMBER 19-22) AND OUR DISCUSSION OF THE VISIT WITH AUSSEIL.

3. WITH REGARD TO THE FRENCH POSITION ON THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS AND THE ANGOLA TRACK, OUR BELIEF IS THAT THE FRENCH ARE NOT WORKING AGAINST US. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, TRYING TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES IN THE EVENT THAT OUR EFFORTS WITH THE ANGOLANS FAIL. (WE HAVE SEEN SIMILAR FRENCH BEHAVIOR IN THE RECENT PAST IN RELATION TO THE MIDDLE EAST.) IF THE ANGOLA TRACK FAILS, THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FRENCH WOULD MOST LIKELY COME OUT PUBLICLY STATING THAT EVERYTHING IS IN PLACE ON THE NAMIBIA SIDE FOR INDEPENDENCE AND THAT ONLY US AND SAG INTRANSIGENCE ON THE CUBAN ISSUE IS HOLDING THINGS UP. THE FRENCH WOULD NOTE THAT THEY NEVER FAVORED LINKAGE OF THE TWO AND ARE PREPARED TO SEE NAMIBIA ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT ANY CUBAN WITHDRAWAL.
GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 #47488
BY CU NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47489

39

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 3801 DTG: 291103Z SEP 82 PSN: 053622
SIT825 DATE 10/12/82 TOR: 273/1503Z

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EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: -----RED TAG-----

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHC #3801 2721114

O 291103Z SEP 82 ZFF5

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 9796

~~SECRET~~ STATE 273801 TOSEC 130029

NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION PARIS LONDON BONN ROME

TOKYO OTTAWA BRUSSELS DTD SEP 28.

QUOTE: ~~SECRET~~ STATE 273801

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY, BRUSSELS FOR AMB. VEST ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD)

SUBJECT: 1983 ECONOMIC SUMMIT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE MUST BE HELD IN THE
UTMOST CONFIDENCE UNTIL THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE
BY THE WHITE HOUSE. PLEASE TAKE EVERY PRECAUTION TO AVOID
A LEAK FROM YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT'S SIDE. WE ARE STRIVING
DILIGENTLY TO DO THE SAME FROM THIS SIDE.

3. THERE FOLLOWS A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO HIS
SUMMIT COLLEAGUES AND A DRAFT PRESS RELEASE TO BE ISSUED
BY THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCING THE PLACE AND, IF POSSIBLE,
THE DATE FOR THE 1983 ECONOMIC SUMMIT. IN THE INTEREST
OF INSURING THAT THE PRESS RELEASE IS NEWS RATHER THAN A

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONFIRMATION OF RUMORS WE WANT TO MOVE VERY QUICKLY FROM
THIS CABLE TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT. WE PROPOSE TO ISSUE THE
PRESS RELEASE ON FRIDAY, OCTOBER 1 AT APPROXIMATELY
9:00 AM, EDT (1300 Z). PARALLEL ANNOUNCEMENTS IN
PARTICIPANT CAPITALS ARE WELCOME.

4. ACTION REQUESTED. DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO
THE ADDRESSEE AND TO THE HOST COUNTRY PERSONAL REPRESENTA-
TIVE, INDICATING OUR SUGGESTED SCHEDULE FOR ISSUING
THE PRESS RELEASE. IF YOU ANTICIPATE ANY SERIOUS
DIFFICULTY IN MEETING THE SCHEDULE, NOTIFY THE DEPARTMENT
BY IMMEDIATE CABLE NO LATER THAN OPENING OF BUSINESS
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30. (IF ANY SUMMIT PARTICIPANT
CANNOT AGREE TO THE PROPOSED DATES, THE ALTERNATIVE
LANGUAGE OF THE PRESS RELEASE WILL BE USED.) UNDER ANY

BUT THE MOST EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ANNOUNCEMENT
WILL BE MADE ON OCTOBER 1.

5. TEXT OF REAGAN LETTER.

DEAR (USE FIRST NAME),

SINCE YOU DID ME THE HONOR AT VERSAILLES OF ACCEPTING MY
OFFER TO HOST THE 1983 SUMMIT, I HAVE BEEN LOOKING
FORWARD TO PROPOSING A SITE AND A DATE. IT IS NOW A
GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME TO EXTEND A FORMAL INVITATION TO
JOIN ME AT WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA FOR THE 1983 SUMMIT
OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES.

I SUGGEST THAT WE MEET THERE FOR THE WEEKEND OF
JUNE 10-12, 1983. ON THIS POINT, I WOULD ASK YOUR
AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO THIS MEETING AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO
EXPLORE TOGETHER THE BREADTH, DEPTH AND DIRECTION OF
OUR COMMON EFFORTS FOR GLOBAL PEACE AND PROSPERITY.

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN

SECSTATE WASHDC 3801

DTG: 291103Z SEP 82 PSN: 053622

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. TEXT OF DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS INVITED THE HEADS OF STATE AND
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN,
ITALY AND JAPAN AS WELL AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION TO JOIN HIM AT WILLIAMSBURG, VA. FOR THE 1983
SUMMIT OF INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. THE SUMMIT WILL TAKE
PLACE OVER A TWO-DAY PERIOD, JUNE 10-12, 1983 (ALTERNATE
LANGUAGE, IN MID-JUNE).

THE SUMMIT REPRESENTATIVES COME TOGETHER ANNUALLY TO
DISCUSS CURRENT ECONOMIC CONCERNS. THE LAST TIME THE
UNITED STATES HOSTED AN ECONOMIC SUMMIT WAS IN 1976 IN
PUERTO RICO.

7. TELEPHONE INQUIRIES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO
MARSHALL CASSE, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, 632-3256. DAM UNQUOTE DAM

SECSTATE WASHDC 3801

DTG: 291103Z SEP 82 PSN: 053622

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-081 #47489

BY CIN NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47490

40

PAGE 01 PARIS 3497 DTG: 300951Z SEP 82 PSN: 053416
SIT828 DATE 10/12/82 TOR: 273/1130Z

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IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #3497/01 2730956
O 300951Z SEP 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3893

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 33497
NODIS
FOR AF ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: AO, SF, WA
SUBJECT: WHAT HAPPENED IN ANGOLA

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. THE FOLLOWING PAPER MAY BE USEFUL TO SECRETARY IN PREPARATION FOR HIS OCTOBER 1 CONTACT GROUP MINISTERIAL:

3. IN THE WAKE OF FRANK WISNER'S SEPTEMBER 27-29 TALKS IN LUANDA, A CONSIDERABLE GAP REMAINS BETWEEN WHAT THE ANGOLANS PROFESS TO BE ABLE TO DO ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND WHAT WE WILL NEED TO MOVE THE NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT PROCESS FORWARD TO IMPLEMENTATION. IN BRIEF, IN SESSIONS WHICH WE HAD PREVIEWED TO THEM AS BEING OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE, THE ANGOLANS WERE ONLY WILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES "TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF A SMALL INITIAL REDUCTION OF CUBAN FORCES AFTER SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES IN NAMIBIA HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO 1,500 TROOPS" UNDER THE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE IN THE UN PLAN. THEY WOULD NOT DISCUSS NUMBERS WHICH THEY SAID WERE THE EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF ANGOLA AND CUBA TO DECIDE. THEY ADMITTED THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER REDUCTIONS DURING THE NAMIBIA IMPLEMENTATION TIME FRAME BUT AT NO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TIME INDICATED THAT ALL CUBAN COMBAT FORCES WOULD BE OUT BY THE TIME THE REMAINING SOUTH AFRICANS LEAVE. ADDITIONALLY, WISNER HAD TO DEAL WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PAULO JORGE AND DID NOT SEE PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS AS WE HAD ON PREVIOUS VISITS.

4. WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ANGOLAN POSITION DID NOT PROVIDE US WITH SUFFICIENT LEVERAGE VIS-A-VIS PRETORIA TO MOVE AHEAD TO IMPLEMENTATION; HOWEVER, WE WERE PREPARED TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE OPEN AND WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST TO ENGAGE IN PUBLIC RECRIMINATION. THE ANGOLANS, FOR THEIR PART, AGREED TO PROTECT THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND SAID THAT THEY REMAIN COMMITTED TO KEEPING THE TALKS GOING. WE BROUGHT THEM TO AGREE THAT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE OVER THE PAST 18 MONTHS AND THEY ADMITTED THAT THEY ACCEPT

THE FACT THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UN PLAN FOR NAMIBIA PROMISES A NEW SECURITY CONTEXT IN WHICH THEY CAN MAKE THEIR PLANS. THEY ARE COMMITTED TO THE PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK AS A WAY OF BRINGING THE SETTLEMENT TO A CLOSE. IT REMAINS FOR US TO FIND A FORMULA FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WHICH DOES NOT THREATEN THEIR SHAKY REGIME AND SAVES FACE. THIS WILL NOT BE EASY.

5. ON REFLECTION, WE BELIEVE THAT THE APPARENTLY INTRANSIGENT ANGOLAN POSITION ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL MAY BE INTERPRETED IN ONE OF TWO WAYS:

- IT IS FIRM AND IS THE RESULT OF HARDLINE PRESSURE INSIDE THE MPLA COUPLED TO A SOVIET DECISION THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO CHECK UP ON OUR SOUTHERN AFRICA STRATEGY. IF THIS IS THE CASE, WE CAN EXPECT SHRILL ANGOLAN PUBLIC RHETORIC IN THE DAYS AHEAD, NOTABLY IN PAULO JORGE'S UNGA SPEECH OCTOBER 4 IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE MUTUAL PLEDGES FOR PUBLIC RESTRAINT WE MADE AT THE END OF THE WISNER VISIT. FURTHERMORE, WE SHOULD EXPECT A LOUD DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE -- BACKED BY A CHORUS OF RELUCTANT FRONT-LINE AFRICAN VOICES -- AGAINST "LINKAGE" WHICH WOULD ULTIMATELY BE AIMED AT A UN CONFRONTATION DESIGNED TO SPLIT THE CONTACT GROUP AND TO ENGENDER AN ISOLATED US VETO OF A PREEMPTIVE ENABLING RESOLUTION ON NAMIBIA WITH THE ULTIMATE AIM BREAKING APART OVER NAMIBIA/ANGOLA POLICY.

- ALTERNATIVELY, THE ANGOLAN POSITION IS SOFTER THAN THEY ARE PREPARED TO SAY NOW AND IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

A WAY-STATION TO A MORE REASONABLE STANCE. IN THIS ANALYSIS, IT IS THE PRODUCT OF A CURIOUS CONJUNCTION OF DISPARATE FORCES IN THE MPLA -- HARDLINERS WHO GENUINELY BELIEVE IN IT, OTHERS WHO THINK THE US CAN BE WAVED OFF THE ISSUE, AND POTENTIAL MODERATES WHO HAVE AN INTEREST IN PROVING THAT INTRANSIGENCE WILL NOT WORK. THUS, DOE SANTOS BY NOT SEEING WISNER MAY HAVE SOMEWHAT DISTANCED HIMSELF FROM THIS GAMBIT. IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THAT THE ANGOLANS RESENT THE PRESSURE THEY HAVE FELT FROM US, SEVERAL OF OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS, AND INDIRECTLY THE AFRICAN FRONT LINE. THE ANGOLANS ARE INTENSELY PROUD, SUSPICIOUS AND DO NOT WANT TO BE HUSTLED. SUPPORTING THIS THEORY WOULD BE THE REPORT OF THE HIGHLY COMPETENT ZAMBIAN AMBASSADOR IN LUANDA WHO TOLD US THAT DOS SANTOS HAD TOLD KAUNDA THAT, AT THE END OF THE DAY, A REASONABLE AGREEMENT COULD ENTAIL SOME WITHDRAWAL

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 1007-001 #47490
BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 3497 DTG: 300951Z SEP 82 PSN: 053419
SIT827 DATE 10/12/82 TOR: 273/1132Z

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUHFR #3497/02 2730959
O 300951Z SEP 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3894

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 33497

NODIS

EARLY IN PHASE III, MORE LATER ON IN III AND THE
REMAINDER LEAVING RIGHT AFTER NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE.
POSSIBLE SOFTNESS IN THE ANGOLA POSITION IS CONGRUENT
WITH THE REPORT OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WHO TOLD US
THE ANGOLANS HAVE ASKED THE VIETNAMESE FOR ADVICE ON
HOW TO NEGOTIATE WITH AMERICANS AND HANOI HAS SUGGESTED
THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH IMPATIENT AMERICANS IS TO
STONEWALL THEM AND WAFOR CONCESSIONS.

6. WE SHOULD HAVE INDICATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON
WHICH INTERPRETATION SEEMS MORE LIKELY; HOWEVER, IN THE
MEANTIME, WE SHOULD CONTINUE THE CALM, NON-CONFRONTA-
TIONAL BUT UNYIELDING LINE WHICH WISNER TOOK IN LUANDA.
WE MAY BE WITNESSING THE SAME NERVOUSNESS FROM THE AN-
GOLANS THAT WE HAVE SEEN FROM THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND
OTHERS AS THE END GAME COMES INTO SIGHT. AT THE SAME
TIME, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT WE SHALL FACE A VERY ROCKY
PATCH OF ROAD WITH NERVOUS ALLIES, INCREASINGLY DIFFI-
CULT SOUTH AFRICANS, RESTLESS AFRICANS AND AN IMPATIENT
UN LEADERSHIP. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT DOS SANTOS'
FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR, CARLOS FERNANDEZ, TOLD WISNER
AT THE END OF THE VISIT THAT WE SHOULD REGARD THIS
LATEST ROUND IN OUR EXCHANGE AS "EXTREMELY POSITIVE".
THERE ARE THOSE IN THE "INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY" FERNAN-
DEZ SAID WHO EXPECTED A RUPTURE; THE DECISION TO CON-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TINUE, HE ADDED, IS A SIGN OF GOOD SENSE AND MATURITY.

7. IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION IS
A STEADY AND PURPOSEFUL PURSUIT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.
WE NEED TO TEST ANGOLAN COMMITMENT TO RESTRAINT AND CON-
TINUED NEGOTIATIONS. ANY ATTEMPT TO THREATEN OR PRESSURE
THEM COULD WELL GENERATE A MOST DIFFICULT COUNTER-REAC-
TION. IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN NOT TO BRING THEM TO AN AGREE-
MENT. WE ALSO DO NOT FAVOR TRYING TO OUTFLANK THE
ANGOLANS BY GOING TO THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIETS WILL SEE
OUR VULNERABILITY AND EXPLOIT IT; THE ANGOLANS WILL NOTE
WE HAVE GONE BEHIND THEIR BACKS AND BECOME OBDURATE.

8. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE RECOMMEND THAT THE
FOLLOWING ACTIONS BE CONSIDERED:

- THE ALLIES: THE SECRETARY WILL NEED TO LEVEL

WITH OUR CG PARTNERS ON THE STATE OF PLAY WITH LUANDA
WHILE EMPHASIZING THAT IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE
ANGOLAN POSITION WE RECEIVED IN LUANDA IS MUTABLE OR
NOT. WE WILL NEED TO STRESS THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR
THE CG TO CLOSE RANKS, ESPECIALLY IN EXPECTATION OF A
POSSIBLY VOLATILE SITUATION ON NAMIBIA AT THE UNGA.
- THE ANGOLANS. WE SHOULD MEET WITH PAULO JORGE IN
NY AT A LEVEL TO BE DECIDED TO UNDERLINE OUR VIEW OF
THEIR POSITION ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL DOES NOT GIVE
US THE LEVERAGE WE NEED WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND, AT THE
SAME TIME, TO EMPHASIZE THAT WE WILL NOT TAKE THE LEAD IN
TERMINATING THE DIALOGUE.
- THE FRONT LINE STATES. EITHER BILATERALLY OR
COLLECTIVELY WE WILL NEED TO SPELL OUT IN A NON-CON-
FRONTATIONAL MANNER THAT THE ANGOLANS HAVE NOT YET
GIVEN US THE LEVERAGE TO MOVE TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION.
- THE SOUTH AFRICANS. WE WILL NEED TO FOLD OUR
ANGOLAN PROBLEM INTO THE LARGE ISSUE OF KEEPING THE
INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT SAG ON BOARD. BLUNT TALK PREEMP-
TIVELY MAY BE THE BEST APPROACH. IN THIS CONTEXT IT MAY
BE NECESSARY TO SPEED UP PLANS FOR A PIK BOTHA VISIT.

9. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO USUN FOR AF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER. GALBRAITH

PARIS 3497

DTG: 300951Z SEP 82 PSN: 053419

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

47491

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PAGE 01 PARIS 3506
SIT826 DATE 10/12/82

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #3506 2731207
O 301206Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3904

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 33506
NODIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ECON, FR
SUBJECT: ECONOMIC SUMMIT
REF: STATE 273801

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE ATTALI TELEPHONED AMBASSADOR TODAY, SEPT. 30, TO REPORT THAT THE SUMMIT DATES PROPOSED IN REFTEL LETTER WERE QUOTE IMPOSSIBLE UNQUOTE AND THE FRENCH WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ATTEND A SUMMIT PRIOR TO LATE JUNE OR EARLY JULY. HE ADDED THAT TWO OTHER SHERPAS HAD TOLD HIM THEIR GOVERNMENTS HAD PROBLEMS WITH PROPOSED DATES. ATTALI AGREED THAT PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT, IF IT IS TO BE MADE FRIDAY, MIGHT REFER TO SUMMIT BEING HELD QUOTE NEXT SUMMER UNQUOTE.
GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 1007-081 ⁴⁷⁴⁹¹
BY AL NARA DATE 5/19/16

~~SECRET~~