

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country  
File: Records, 1981-1985  
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**Box:** 14

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

SMF 1/2/2008

**File Folder** FRANCE (01/01/1983-01/251983)

**FOIA**

S2007-081

**Box Number** 14

NOUZILLE

56

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48263	CABLE	RE MITTERRAND	3	1/3/1983	B1
48243	MEMO	SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	ND	B1
48244	CABLE	031429Z JAN 83 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	1/3/1983	B1
48245	MEMO	BLAIR TO MCFARLANE RE CRAY COMPUTERS <b>R 6/25/2010 MR081/1</b>	1	1/6/1983	B1
48246	CABLE	071834Z JAN 83 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	1/7/1983	B1
48247	CABLE	110200Z JAN 83 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	1/11/1983	B1
48248	CABLE	111751Z JAN 83 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	1/11/1983	B1
48249	CABLE	121257Z JAN 83 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	1/12/1983	B1
48250	MEMO	FROM CLARK RE MEETING WITH CHIRAC <b>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48251	TALKING POINTS	FOR MEETING WITH CHIRAC <b>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	ND	B1
48252	PAPER	BRIEFING PAPER RE VISIT OF CHIRAC <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	ND	
48264	BIO	BIO	1	12/29/1982	B1 B3
48253	MEMO	BLAIR TO CLARK RE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH CHIRAC <b>R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1</b>	1	1/11/1983	B1
48254	BIO	BIO <b>D 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1</b>	1	1/1/1983	B1
48255	BIO	BIO <b>D 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1</b>	1	1/1/1983	B1
48257	PROFILE SHEET	NSC PROFILE SHEET <b>R 6/25/2010 MR081/1</b>	1	1/14/1983	B1
48256	MEMO	BLAIR TO MCFARLANE RE HENRU VISIT <b>R 5/7/2011 M081/1</b>	2	1/14/1983	B1
48258	CABLE	141124Z JAN 83 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	1/14/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48259	MEMO	BOVERIE TO CLARK RE VISIT BY FRENCH DEFENSE OFFICIALS <b>R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	2	1/18/1983	B1
48260	MEMO	BLAIR TO MCFARLANE RE BREAKFAST ITEM <b>R 6/25/2010 MR081/1</b>	1	1/20/1983	B1
48261	CABLE	211815Z JAN 83 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	3	1/21/1983	B1
48262	CABLE	210918Z JAN 83 <b>R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081</b>	1	1/21/1983	B1

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FRANCE (01/01/1983-01/25/1983)

*FOIA*  
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NOUZILLE

*Box Number*  
14

56

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
48263	CABLE  RE MITTERRAND	3	1/3/1983	B1

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48243 4

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George F. Shultz *LFS*  
SUBJECT: My Meeting with French President Mitterrand

I had an especially interesting meeting today (September 28th) with Francois Mitterrand. We covered a wide range, including East-West issues, Lebanon, Chad, and the US-French bilateral relationship. Although a full record of the meeting will be sent to you and Bill Clark shortly, I wanted to give you a few highlights right away.

On East-West relations, Mitterrand believes as I do that even before the Korean airliner incident the Soviets had embarked upon a more aggressive course -- a course resulting in large part from their recognition that despite their best efforts the Western Alliance had held together and INF deployments would proceed as planned. Mitterrand said he thus saw the need for the West to prepare for a "chillier" climate internationally and not lose its nerve when dealing with Moscow. In this context, he, like us, is paying close attention to developments in Bonn and recognizes full well that Helmut Kohl is facing a difficult set of challenges in the coming months. I believe we can count on Mitterrand to be helpful in this regard.

We spoke next of Lebanon, about which he was surprisingly upbeat, saying that the next step beyond the cease-fire was for the Gemayel government to push ahead in its efforts toward promoting national reconciliation and strengthening its armed forces. Mitterrand suggested that rather than relying upon external pressure to get the Syrians out, we ought to consider adopting a longer term perspective, one which was based on his conviction that the nationalist tendencies shared by all the competing Lebanese factions would gradually bring them together. At the end of this process, he believed the Syrian presence would come to be viewed as an irritant by most Lebanese and the Syrians would be left with few options but to withdraw. I found this vision an intriguing one, and have asked my Middle East specialists to explore it and see if it can be used to our benefit.

DECL: OADR

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NLRR M67-081 #48243  
BY CN NARA DATE 5/11/10

Mitterrand defended French policy in Chad, saying that those portions of the country now occupied by Qadhafi do not provide him a base from which to destabilize black Africa. Moreover, if the Libyans in Chad were to try to move south, France is prepared to resist. While stating that France was not going to use military force against Libyan territory for fear of being viewed as a colonial power, Mitterrand stressed his determination to thwart Qadhafi's ambitions in Africa.

When we turned to our own relationship, I made a strong pitch to Mitterrand on the need for enhanced consultation and cooperation. I added that while we would disagree at times, more often than not our interests coincide, especially in the key spheres of security and East-West relations. He seemed to agree.

In short, I came away from the session heartened. I have now met with President Mitterrand on several occasions and believe we are developing the kind of good personal chemistry that I hope can be used to minimize the misunderstandings which all too often bedevil one of our most important relationships.

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48244

6

PAGE 01 PARIS 0027 40027 DTG: 031429Z JAN 83 PSN: 061911  
SIT193 DATE 01/04/83 TOR: 003/1933Z

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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUHFR #0027/01 003143Z  
O 031429Z JAN 83  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0151

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 00027  
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: ECON, NATO, ESTC, FEWT, FR  
SUBJECT: CHEYSSON'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY ON EAST-  
WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS  
REF: 82 STATE 360071

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DURING LUNCHEON WITH DCM AND ECONMIN DEC. 29, QUAI DIRECTOR OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS PAYE EXPANDED ON FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARD FOLLOW-UP TO RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS. PAYE, WHO ALMOST CERTAINLY DRAFTED CHEYSSON'S LATEST LETTER TO THE SECRETARY (REFTEL), WAS AS PRICKLY AS EVER IN DEFENDING THE FRENCH CONCEPT OF HOW DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE PURSUED. HE GAVE NO GROUND ON ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE AND REFLECTED THE FAMILIAR FRENCH SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE US PURSUING ECONOMIC WARFARE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND TRYING TO IMPOSE OUR POLICIES ON THE ALLIES. BUT HE ALSO APPEARED TO WANT TO GET THIS ISSUE BEHIND US, AND REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT FOR THE ALLIES TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF GETTING THEIR ECONOMIES MOVING AGAIN THAN IT WAS TO IMPOSE RESTRAINTS ON TRADE WITH THE USSR. AND HIS BOTTOM LINE WAS CLEARLY THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD NOW MOVE AHEAD ON THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

STUDIES WHICH HAVE BEEN OUTLINED, AND SEE IF THEY CAN BE COMPLETED BEFORE NEXT SPRING'S ROUND OF HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS. DESPITE THE CLEAR DISCREPANCIES WHICH PERSIST BETWEEN THE FRENCH VIEWS AND OURS, WE AGREE WITH PAYE THAT THE BEST COURSE NOW IS TO PRESS AHEAD.  
END SUMMARY.

3. IN PAYE'S INITIAL REVIEW OF CHEYSSON'S LETTER, HE HIGHLIGHTED TWO POINTS: THE INCLUSION IN THE STUDY OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE, WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE WASHINGTON DISCUSSION BUT NOT IN THE SECRETARY'S LETTER SUMMARIZING THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY, AND NATO'S ROLE, WHICH HE MELLIFLUOUSLY DESCRIBED AS MERELY A CONTINUATION OF NATO'S TRADITIONAL MANDATE FOR STUDYING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIES OF THE SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES. WHEN WE PROBED ON THE AGRICULTURAL STUDY,

PAYE SAID BRUSQUELY THAT IF WE WISHED TO DISCUSS STRATEGIC TRADE WITH THE EAST, THERE WERE OTHERS WHO WISHED TO DISCUSS AGRICULTURAL TRADE. HE IMPLIED THAT INCLUSION OF A STUDY OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE HAD BEEN AGREED DURING THE WASHINGTON TALKS, AND THAT WE MAY HAVE CONVENIENTLY OVERLOOKED IT. AS FOR THE NATO ROLE, PAYE REPEATED THE SAME THEME THAT TUAL DEPSECEN MARTIN USED TWO WEEKS AGO (PARIS 43741): FRANCE COULD NOT BE IN A POSITION WHERE IT APPEARED THAT NATO WAS COORDINATING WESTERN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. THUS THERE COULD BE NO STUDY WHICH IMPLIED OVERALL NATO SUPERVISION.

4. WITH REGARD TO THE STUDY OF ENERGY NEEDS, PAYE WAS EMPHATIC THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE A STUDY OF OVERALL WESTERN ENERGY NEEDS. IT COULD NOT FOCUS ONLY ON WEST EUROPEAN NEEDS; US AND JAPANESE NEEDS WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE INCLUDED. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EC HAD DONE SOME WORK IN THIS AREA, AND CHEYSSON HAD DELIBERATELY INCLUDED A REFERENCE TO THE EC'S WORK IN HIS LETTER.

5. PAYE WAS ALSO MINIMALIST IN HIS APPROACH TO COCOM'S WORK. THIS WOULD SIMPLY BE A CONTINUATION OF THE NORMAL WORK OF THE LIST REVIEW CONFERENCE WHICH IS CURRENTLY IN SESSION AND WHERE NATIONAL DELEGATIONS HAVE ALL THE INSTRUCTIONS AN AUTHORITY THEY NEED. INSPIRED BY AMBASSADOR KATZ'S IDEAS IN PARIS 44387, WE ASKED PAYE IF HE THOUGHT CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE STRATEGIC IM-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PLICATIONS OF OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION EQUIPMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, MIGHT NOT BE BEYOND THE SCOPE AND EXPERTISE OF THE COCOM DELEGATIONS AND THE COCOM SECRETARIAT AS CURRENTLY CONSTITUTED. TO CONSIDER SUCH A SUBJECT, DIDN'T PAYE THINK IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO REINFORCE DELEGATIONS OR SECRETARIAT WITH PERSONNEL WHO COULD DRAW THE BROAD CONNECTION BETWEEN SUCH EXPLORATION AND SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES? NOT AT ALL, PAYE SAID. COCOM DELEGATIONS WERE FULLY COMPETENT, AND IF THEY NEEDED INSTRUCTIONS ON SUBJECTS BEYOND THEIR EXPERTISE, ALL THEY HAD TO DO WAS ASK FOR SUCH INSTRUCTIONS. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ANYTHING BEYOND THE EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS.

6. ON TIMING OF COMPLETION OF THE STUDIES, PAYE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE QUITE ACCEPTABLE IF THE STUDIES COULD BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO NEXT SPRING'S SERIES OF HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS. BUT HE WONDERED WHY WE WERE "IN SUCH A RUSH" TO COMPLETE THEM, AND HYPOTHESIZED THAT WE WISHED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE COULD PRESS ALL THE ALLIES INTO LINE WITH OUR OWN POLICIES BEFORE WE OPENED BROAD NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR. WE RETORTED THAT THIS SEEMED A DELIBERATELY MISCHIEVOUS INTERPRETATION; ALLIED UNITY IN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WAS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL THE ALLIED COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY DURING THE COMING YEAR, WHICH PROMISED TO

PARIS 0027

40027 DTG: 031429Z JAN 83 PSN: 061911

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NLRR MD7-081 #48244

CV CN NARA DATE 5/19/10

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 AMEM SSSY PARIS 140027 DTG:031429Z JAN 83 PSN: 061918  
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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUFHFR #0027/02 0031433  
O 031429Z JAN 83  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0152

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 00027  
NODIS

BE A DIFFICULT ONE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE USSR.  
PAYE REPLIED WITH THE USUAL FRENCH LINE: FRANCE WOULD NOT  
JOIN IN A KIND OF ECONOMIC WARFARE AGAINST THE USSR,  
WHICH THE FRENCH DO NOT BELIEVE CAN CHANGE SOVIET  
SOCIETY.

7. PAYE NEVERTHELESS CLEARLY THOUGHT IT WOULD BE  
DESIRABLE TO MOVE BEYOND THE US-FRENCH DISPUTE OVER  
ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. HE RETURNED SEVERAL  
TIMES TO THE NOTION THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT FOR  
WESTERN COUNTRIES TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF GETTING  
THEIR ECONOMIES MOVING AGAIN THAN IT WAS TO RESTRICT  
TRADE WITH THE EAST. IN THIS CONNECTION HE NOTED  
THAT THE PIPELINE DISPUTE HAD REVEALED THE NEED TO  
RESOLVE A PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING SOVEREIGNTIES WHICH  
ARISES OUT OF CLAUSES COMMONLY INCLUDED IN INTERNATIONAL  
LICENSING AGREEMENTS. PAYE RECOGNIZED THAT A SOVEREIGN  
COUNTRY HAS THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER ITS  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (SUCH AS TECHNOLOGY), BUT ASSERTED  
THAT SUCH CONTROL CANNOT BE EXERCISED AFTER THE COUNTRY  
WHICH HAS RECEIVED THE LICENSE HAS CONTRACTED WITH  
A THIRD COUNTRY TO USE THAT TECHNOLOGY. PAYE  
IMPLIED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD BE RAISING THIS ISSUE  
WITH A VIEW TOWARD FINDING A SOLUTION, BUT HE DID  
NOT INDICATE HOW OR WHERE THEY WOULD BROACH THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SUBJECT.

8. PAYE THOUGHT THE BEST COURSE NOW FOR CONTINUATION  
OF THE DISCUSSION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS WOULD BE TO  
MOVE AHEAD WITH THE STUDIES WHICH HAD BEEN OUTLINED.  
HE DID NOT SEE ANYTHING TO BE GAINED IN FURTHER DIS-  
CUSSION OF HOW THE STUDIES SHOULD BE STRUCTURED. HE  
ADVISED US NOT TO REOPEN ISSUES OF PRINCIPLE WHICH WOULD  
OBLIGE THE FRENCH TO RESTATE THEIR OWN PRINCIPLED  
POSITIONS AND WOULD NOT ADVANCE MATTERS. HE SPECI-  
FICALLY ADVISED AGAINST US ANNOUNCEMENTS OF BROAD OB-  
JECTIVES SUCH AS A CENTRALLY-COORDINATED TRADE POLICY  
TOWARD THE USSR, WHICH WOULD CALL FOR A FRENCH RETORT.  
A BETTER APPROACH WOULD BE TO WORK QUIETLY IN REGULAR  
CHANNELS AND SEE WHAT KIND OF RESULTS CAN BE AGREED.

9. COMMENT: THERE ARE CLEARLY A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC  
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR APPROACH TO THIS PROGRAM OF  
STUDIES AND THE ONE REFLECTED IN CHEYSSON'S LETTER AND  
PAYE'S AMPLIFYING REMARKS. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY,  
THERE IS UNDERLYING THE FRENCH POSITION A MINIMALIST  
ATTITUDE WHICH APPEARS BROADLY TO CONTRADICT OUR OB-  
JECTIVES. CHEYSSON HAS DRAWN BACK ABOUT AS FAR AS  
HE CAN WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY RENEGING ON COMMITMENTS HE  
AND MITTERRAND GAVE DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT HERE.  
WE BELIEVE THIS SITUATION RESULTS PARTLY FROM THE  
NATURAL TENSION WITHIN THE FRENCH POSITION BETWEEN THE  
DESIRE TO MAINTAIN A FIRM POLICY TOWARD MOSCOW AND THE  
NEED TO DEMONSTRATE INDEPENDENCE AND RETAIN MAXIMUM  
FREEDOM TO INCREASE EXPORTS TO THE USSR. THE COMPLEX  
POLITICAL PRESSURES ON MITTERRAND'S GOVERNMENT DO NOT  
HELP; HE IS LOOKING OVER HIS SHOULDER AND TRYING TO  
STEM CRITICISM FROM COMMUNISTS, GAULLISTS AND  
CENTRISTS, NOT TO MENTION THE VARIED FACTIONS OF HIS  
OWN SOCIALIST PARTY.

10. THIS HAVING BEEN SAID, WE AGREE WITH PAYE'S BOTTOM  
LINE: THAT IT WILL ADD NOTHING TO DISCUSS PRINCIPLES  
OR PROCEDURES ANY FURTHER, AND THAT OUR BEST COURSE  
OF ACTION NOW IS TO FORGE AHEAD WITH THE STUDIES WHICH  
HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. IN SOME OF THEM (PARTICULARLY  
AT NATO) WE FORESEE A CONTINUING TENSION AS WE PURSUE  
OUR EFFORTS TO BROADEN THE STUDY'S SCOPE AND SIGNI-  
FICANCE, WHILE THE FRENCH TRY TO NARROW THEM. WE SHOULD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THIS PATIENTLY BUT WITHOUT  
LETTING THE FRENCH GET OUT OF THE COMMITMENTS THEY HAVE  
GIVEN AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL ABOUT COMPLETING THESE  
STUDIES BEFORE NEXT SPRING'S MEETINGS.

11. ONE SMALL BUT POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT TECHNICAL  
POINT: WE RECEIVED THE ORIGINAL FRENCH TEXT OF  
CHEYSSON'S LETTER FROM THE FRENCH, AND HAVE NOTED AN  
ERROR IN THE REFTEL TRANSLATION. WITH RESPECT TO THE  
RELATIONSHIP OF JAPAN TO THE NATO STUDY, CHEYSSON SAYS  
JAPAN SHOULD NOT BE "ASSOCIATED WITH" IT ("ASSOCIE A"),  
VICE "PARTICIPATION IN" AS TRANSLATED REFTEL. THE  
BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL FRENCH ARE OBVIOUS.

12. DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO BONN, LONDON, BRUSSELS FOR  
USEC AND USNATO. WE ARE PROVIDING A COPY TO USOEC  
FOR AMBASSADOR KATZ.  
GALBRAITH

AMEM SSSY PARIS 140027 DTG:031429Z JAN 83 PSN: 061918

CONFIDENTIAL

NSC/S PROFILE

~~TOP SECRET~~

ID 8390009

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*smf*  
*1/2/83*

RECEIVED 06 JAN 83 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM BLAIR

DOC DATE 06 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

COMPUTERS

SUBJECT: SALE OF CRAY COMPUTERS TO FRANCE RE 7 JAN SIGNIFICANCE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( B / *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>C</i>	<i>JAN 10 1983</i>	<i>Clark noted</i>		<i>DB</i>

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490

National Security Council  
The White House

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Package # 90009

83 JAN 6 PM: 39

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action			

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

① Bud,  
I think the Judge may  
be ready to move on this  
now. Shultz has been talking  
to Judge on this. J

10

SYSTEM II:  
90009

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~  
INFORMATION

SENSITIVE

48245

January 6, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 #48245

BY RW NARA DATE 6-25-10

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Cray Computers for France: Significance of  
January 7

You asked me this morning the significance of the January 7 "deadline" for the Cray computers for France. That is the date on which Cray had planned to ship the two computers to France. (U)

On December 23 Richard Perle called the Washington representative of Cray and told him, "Merry Christmas, it looks as if you have your licenses." Based on that phone call, Cray notified the French, notified the banks and arranged with the shipping company to load their computers on January 7. On December 27, the Commerce Department notified Cray by telephone that the computers were approved and told the Cray Washington representative to come over in the afternoon to pick up the approved licenses. When he arrived, he was told that in fact the licenses were not approved. (C)

The January 7 date is therefore not important in itself. The purchase contracts state that the computers must be delivered in France and installed by early March. (C)

I think the issue really boils down to whether or not these Crays are an effective and appropriate lever to use with the French. Because of the Japanese competition, I believe they are not. If we need to punish the French by failing to fulfill the MT-20 undertakings, the effective tools are the Strategic Nuclear Cooperation Program and sanctions against Thompson-ESF, the company which makes the MT-20. (TS/S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

2 1/9  
Bud: what game is Perle playing?  
Please call him & get it straight.  
Was it that Perle who asked you  
to stop it on 23rd?  
Done. f

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48244

11

PAGE 01 PARIS 0769 6 DTG: 071834Z JAN 83 PSN: 067789  
SIT743 DATE 01/10/83 TOR: 007/2054Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLSMCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT FONT BOSH

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTTTSTT

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUFHFR #0769 0071836

O 071834Z JAN 83

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0430

SECRET PARIS 00769

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EEWT, ESTC, FR

SUBJECT: FRENCH MT-20 SALE TO USSR

REF: (A) STATE 000113

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PER INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL, MINECON RAISED SUBJECT OF FRENCH MT-20 SALE TO SOVIETS WITH QUAI ECONOMIC DIRECTOR PAYE DURING ELYSEE RECEPTION JAN 4. AT PAYE'S SUGGESTION MINECON ON JAN 7 MADE DETAILED DEMARCHE CONSISTING OF REFTEL TALKING POINTS TO BARRE, PAYE'S ASSISTANT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MT-20 FILE. FRENCH COCOM REPRESENTATIVE DELANDES AND EMBOFF WERE ALSO PRESENT. MINECON EMPHASIZED IN PRESENTATION THAT DEMARCHE EXPANDED ON THE EARLIER PAYE-MINECON CONVERSATION AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AT THAT LEVEL. HE ALSO NOTED THAT SIMILAR HIGH LEVEL APPROACHES WOULD BE MADE TO ELYSEE AND MOD.

3. BARRE NOTED THE POINTS, SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT THEM TO PAYE AND RESPONDED TO THEM IN SAME MANNER AS OTHER GOF OFFICIALS. HE REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF THE MT-20 DECISION. THE GOF, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VARIDUS USG OBJECTIONS AND CONCERNS, DECIDED AFTER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LONG, THOROUGH CONSIDERATION TO APPROVE THE MODIFIED THOMSON CONTRACT. THE GOF BELIEVES THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY. THE GOF RESPONDED TO OUR LIST OF QUESTIONS (WHICH HE TERMED IN PASSING AS UNUSUAL AND EXCESSIVE) IN AS MUCH DETAIL AND PRECISION AS THE PRESERVATION OF INDUSTRIAL SECRETS PERMITS. IT HAS ALREADY GONE TO A GOOD DEAL OF TROUBLE TO BE RESPONSIVE. IT STANDS READY TO ANSWER FURTHER QUESTIONS THAT DO NOT THREATEN COMMERCIAL CONFIDENTIALITY. HOWEVER BARRE POINTED OUT THE "POST OPERATIVE" NATURE OF SUCH AN EXERCISE.

4. WITH REGARDS TO COCOM, BARRE STATED THAT THE FRENCH REPORTS OF THE REAGAN-MITTERRAND MEETING CONTAIN NO REFERENCE TO A FRENCH PROMISE TO SUBMIT THE MT-20 CASE TO THAT ORGANIZATION. THE GOF DECISION

AGAINST SUBMISSION OF THE CASE STEMS FROM THE US NO-EXCEPTION POLICY, WHICH THE FRENCH CONSIDER IS CONTRARY TO THE COCOM RULES.

5. NEITHER BARRE NOR DESLANDES WERE AWARE OF THE PERLE-HERNU LETTERS, BUT BOTH REITERATED THAT THE THOMSON SALE CONTAINED ONLY OUTDATED AND NON-SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY. BARRE SUGGESTED THAT IF THE US WISHED TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE THIS QUESTION, THE UPCOMING HERNU VISIT TO WASHINGTON OFFERS A POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY. MINECON COMMENTED THAT IT IS HIGHLY LIKELY THAT THE DOD WILL RAISE THE MATTER WITH HERNU. GALBRAITH

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NLRR 007-081 #48246

BY CW NARA DATES 1/19/10

SECRET

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48247

12

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 70411 DTG: 110200Z JAN 83 PSN: 071762  
SIT799 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 011/0421Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB KEMP SIT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: SEE 9 JAN SHULTZ REPORTPORT---FURTHER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #7041 0110208  
O 110200Z JAN 83 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 9277

~~SECRET~~ STATE 007041  
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, AO

SUBJECT: WISNER CONVERSATION WITH AUSSEIL

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 7-081 #48247

BY CU NARA DATE 5/19/11

REF: RANNEBERGER-CHESHES TELCON 1-10-83

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AF DAS WISNER CALLED AUSSEIL ON THE 10TH TO DISCUSS STATE OF PLAY OF FRENCH INITIATIVE WITH THE MPLA. WISNER EMPHASIZED THE URGENT NECESSITY TO OBTAIN AN MPLA RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSALS THE FRENCH HAVE TABLED. AUSSEIL AND FRENCH ASSESSMENT IS THAT THERE IS A MAJOR SHAKE-UP UNDERWAY WITHIN THE MPLA AND THAT AN MPLA RESPONSE IS UNLIKELY WHILE THE RESHUFFLING IS IN PROGRESS. AUSSEIL AGREED, HOWEVER, TO RAISE WITH PENNE AND CHEYSSON TO MAKE A QUIET, PERSONAL MOVE TO NUDGE THE MPLA, PERHAPS THROUGH A PENNE OR CHEYSSON NOTE TO ANGOLAN PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS.

3. WISNER PROMISED AUSSEIL OUR READOUT OF SITUATION WITHIN MPLA. YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS BY SEPTTEL. AUSSEIL WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE THIS BY OOB ON THE 11TH.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. IN DELIVERING OUR READOUT, YOU SHOULD ASK AUSSEIL IF HE HAS HAD OPPORTUNITY TO FOLLOW-UP WITH PENNE AND

CHEYSSON. IN YOUR CONVERSATION WITH PENNE ON THE 11TH (PER REF) YOU SHOULD NOT ALLUDE TO WISNER/AUSSEIL TELCON, BUT YOU SHOULD UNDERSCORE TO PENNE OUR VIEW OF THE URGENT NECESSITY TO OBTAIN AN MPLA RESPONSE TO THE FRENCH PROPOSALS AND ASK WHAT FRENCH ARE CONTEMPLATING TO NUDGE THE MPLA.

5. IN SHARING OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE MPLA INTERNAL SITUATION YOU SHOULD MAKE THE POINT THAT OUR ANALYSIS POINTS TO A POSSIBLY PROTRACTED PERIOD OF FERMENT WITHIN THE MPLA. THIS LEADS US TO CONCLUDE THAT WE CANNOT WAIT FOR A DECISIVE OUTCOME BEFORE NUDGING THE MPLA FURTHER. SHULTZ

SECRET

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48248

13

PAGE 01                      PARIS 1123                      32744                      DTG: 111751Z JAN 83 PSN: 072545  
SIT032                      DATE 02/20/83                      TOR: 011/1810Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT EOBTBEMP  
EOB: NTS: CHECKLIST  
WHSR COMMENT: F Y I                      DVICE AS TO FURTHER DISSEM. BERM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHFR #1123 0111753  
O 111751Z JAN 83 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0603

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 01123  
NODIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, AO, FR  
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND ANGOLA  
REFS: (A) STATE 7041, (B) 82 STATE 360070

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PENNE TOLD EMBOFF THAT YESTERDAY (JANUARY 10) HE HAD SOMEONE WHO KNOWS DOS SANTOS WELL AND WHO WAS LEAVING FOR LUANDA CARRY A MESSAGE TO THE ANGOLAN PRESIDENT. SUBSEQUENTLY, AUSSEIL CONFIRMED THE FOREGOING WITH SLIGHT VARIATION, SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT SURE BUT HE BELIEVES THE PERSON PENNE GAVE THE MESSAGE TO WAS AN EMISSARY FROM LOPO DO NASCIMENTO. AS BEST WE CAN GATHER, THE MESSAGE SIMPLY ASKED ABOUT A REPLY TO THE FRENCH PROPOSALS.

3. PENNE SAID THAT HE FELT THAT WITH THE INTERNAL RESCHUFFLING GOING ON IN LUDANA, IT WAS UNLIKELY WE WOULD HEAR BACK SOON. HE NOTED IN PASSING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ONE OF THE PEOPLE CURRENTLY IN TROUBLE WITH DOS SANTOS WAS ANGOLAN AMBASSADOR TO PARIS ALMEIDA.

4. EMBOFF PASSED BLIND COPY OF PARA 3 THROUGH 8 OF STATE 6832 TO AUSSEIL. AFTER READING THE PAPER, AUSSEIL COMMENTED THAT IT TRACKED WITH INFORMATION AVAILABLE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO THE FRENCH. GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR 107-0817418248  
BY CW NARA DATE 5/19/10

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48249

14

PAGE 01      PARIS 1268      1124      DTG: 121257Z JAN 83 PSN: 073896  
SIT781      DATE 01/18/83      TOR: 012/1346Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOBWHLR JP VP EOB SIT  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST---

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHFR #1268 0121258  
O 121257Z JAN 83 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0698

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 01268  
NODIS  
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR--AS BUR AND DAS DOBBINS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, FR  
SUBJECT: HANS-JOCHEN VOGEL CALL ON PRESIDENT MITTERRAND  
REF: PARIS 01267

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE SURMISE THAT EITHER BY ANDROPOV'S DESIGN OR AT VOGEL'S OWN INITIATIVE, THE LATTER'S BREAKFAST MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND TOMORROW COULD BE THE OCCASION FOR VOGEL TO PASS TO FRENCH A NEW TWIST ON THE ANDROPOV PROPOSAL FOR COMPENSATION TO THE SOVIETS FOR FRENCH AND UK WEAPONS IN THE INF TALKS. IN EVENT ANDROPOV IS ATTEMPTING TO USE THE GERMAN SPD AS AN INTERMEDIARY FOR GOING AROUND THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN GENEVA AND DEALING DIRECTLY WITH THE FRENCH AND BRITISH ON THIS ISSUE, DEPARTMENT MAY WISH US TO DISCUSS THIS ANGLE WITH ELYSEE STAFF BEFORE VOGEL BREAKFASTS WITH MITTERRAND TOMORROW. IF SO, WE WILL NEED INSTRUCTIONS PASSED TO US BY SECURE PHONE ASAP THIS AFTERNOON (PARIS TIME).

3. IF WE ARE TO MAKE ANY SUCH DEMARCHE TODAY AT ELYSEE, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR US TO HAVE THUMBNAIL BRIEFING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ON HIGH LEVEL EXCHANGES WITH VOGEL IN WASHINGTON TO PASS TO MITTERRAND'S STAFF. GALBRAITH

PARIS 1268

1124

DTG: 121257Z JAN 83 PSN: 073896

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 107-181 #48249

BY GI NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

0300

*President's*  
*see* 11/13  
P 15

MEETING WITH JACQUES CHIRAC, MAYOR OF PARIS  
DATE: Thursday, January 13, 1983  
LOCATION: Oval Office  
TIME: 11:30 - 11:50 a.m.  
FROM: William P. Clark *WPC*

48250

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of the meeting is to maintain contact with one of the two leaders of the opposition party in France (Chirac and Giscard d'Estaing are still rivals for leadership of the French Right); to win support from Chirac for U.S. policies; to repay Chirac's courtesy in receiving you both when you toured Europe as a candidate in 1978 and during your visit to Paris in June, 1982. (C)

II. BACKGROUND

Jacques Chirac is visiting the United States to enhance his credentials as an international statesman as he leads his party into municipal elections in March. He has openly attacked the Mitterrand government for its mishandling of the French relationship with the United States. He will be attempting to use his meeting with you to demonstrate that he is the man eventually to lead France, and to take further swipes at Mitterrand. He may well be President of France some day, but we have five more years of Mitterrand, and in addition, Chirac himself is a strong nationalist, and would be not much easier to deal with on tough French-U.S. issues than either Mitterrand or Giscard. Therefore, while you should welcome Chirac's support for your policies, you should be a little bit wary of his motives. That being said, it is true that Chirac's approaches to domestic economic policy and to security policy are very close to your own. These are fruitful areas to compare notes. In addition, Chirac has done hard work on an international association of conservative parties, the EDU (European Democratic Union), to act as a counterweight to the Socialist International.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S. The President  
The Vice President  
William Clark  
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs  
designate, Richard R. Burt  
Robert C. McFarlane  
NSC Staff member, Commander Dennis Blair, USN  
Secretary Shultz  
Meese, Baker, Deaver will attend at their discretion

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLRR 107-081 #48250

BY CU NARA DATE 4/29/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

16

French

Jacques Chirac, Mayor of Paris  
Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, former French Ambassador  
to the U.S. (1972-77)  
Jean de Lipkowski, French Parliamentarian, Foreign  
Affairs Advisor to Chirac  
Interpreter

IV. PRESS PLAN

Following the Oval Office meeting, you and Chirac will step out onto the Rose Garden colonnade for photographs. In case of poor weather, the photos will be taken in the Oval Office.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

11:30 Chirac and party arrive in Oval Office for meeting  
11:50 President and Chirac step outside for pictures

Attachments:

Talking Points  
State Department memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS

17

-- WELCOME TO THE WHITE HOUSE. YOU HAVE RECEIVED ME TWICE IN PARIS, BUT THIS IS MY FIRST CHANCE TO HOST YOU HERE IN WASHINGTON.

42251

-- THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL BE VISITING PARIS AGAIN NEXT MONTH. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WILL BE HAVING A SEPARATE MEETING WITH HIM.

-- WE FEEL THAT OUR DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICIES ARE SUCCEEDING AND WE WILL STICK WITH THEM. WHAT IS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN FRANCE AND EUROPE?

-- THIS IS A PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT YEAR FOR U.S.-EUROPEAN UNITY. WHAT CAN WE DO TO EMPHASIZE OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND PREVENT THE SOVIETS FROM CAPITALIZING ON DISSENSION BETWEEN US?

-- WE ARE STILL LOOKING FOR ACTIONS, NOT WORDS, FROM THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP. SO FAR THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE CHANGE WHAT IS YOUR ASSESSMENT?

DECLASSIFIED / RE/0450  
NLRR 107-081 \*48251  
BY CN NARA DATE 4/29/10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING PAPER

18  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Visit of Jacques Chirac, Mayor of Paris  
Thursday, January 13, 11:30 A.M.

48252

I. SETTING AND OBJECTIVES

Mayor Chirac is the leader of the largest and strongest (in terms of legislative seats) opposition political party in France, the Gaullist Rally for the Republic. Chirac has both long and short term objectives in meeting with President Reagan. He has a long-standing, determined ambition to be the next President of France. His meeting with the President provides him an opportunity to maintain contact with a world leader, legitimize his own international credentials and build relations for the future. In the near term, he may see the meeting as generating some favorable domestic publicity that could aid him and his party in the March elections for control of French city halls. Chirac is expected to be reelected as Mayor of Paris without great difficulty.

The President's objective is to maintain contact with a major French political figure who well may have a future leadership role. While it is by no means certain that Chirac will attain his goal, it cannot be discounted since at the moment he is the front-runner among opposition leaders. In addition, the President, when in France last June, encouraged Chirac to call at the White House. As he did in June, the President will find Chirac an engaging interlocuter, supportive of the President's political philosophy. It should be noted, however, that were Chirac President of France today, he would be no less insistent in proclaiming French national sovereignty and "independence" vis-a-vis the United States than the current French Government has been over the past several months. Gaullist criticism of US economic and monetary policies, particularly the fluctuating strength of the dollar, would be equally as pointed, perhaps even more so.

II. ISSUES TO BE RAISED:

Chirac is particularly supportive of the President on the nature of the Soviet threat, the need for INF deployment failing any progress in Geneva, and the desirability of programs to encourage free enterprise, fight inflation, and stimulate business development and economic growth in the industrialized countries. He will be interested in having the President's views on these subjects, particularly US-Soviet (and East-West) relations in the light of the Andropov succession. The President may also wish to ask Chirac about

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DECL: OADR

NLRR M07-081 + 48752  
BY GL NARA DATE 5/19/10

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

his efforts to make the European Democratic Union (EDU) a counterweight to the Socialist International. Chirac hosted a meeting of the EDU in Paris last July. The Republican National Committee is sponsoring the next meeting, here in Washington January 25-29. A photo opportunity with the President is scheduled for January 28.

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48264	BIO	1	12/29/1982	B1
	BIO			B3

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498

**National Security Council  
The White House**

Package # 0300

'83 JAN 12 12:02

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information   A-Action   R-Retain   D-Dispatch   N-No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

**DISTRIBUTION**

**COMMENTS**

CHIRAC MTG

Brian,  
Tab I taken to Darnai's  
Ok.  
Kathy 1/12

NW  
21

MEMORANDUM

0300

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

48253

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

January 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

DENNIS C. BLAIR *DCB*

SUBJECT:

President's Meeting with the Mayor of Paris,  
Jacques Chirac, January 13, 1983

Attached for your signature is the briefing memo to the President for the Chirac meeting. The memo warns the President about Chirac's agenda for this meeting and outlines several safe topics towards which the President can lead the discussion. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve ☒ \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Tab I	Briefing memo
Tab II	Talking Points
Tab III	State briefing memo
Tab IV	Bio of Chirac

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 007-0811 #48253

BY RW NARA DATE 10/1/10



S/S 8300447 7935

United States Department of State ~~add-on~~

Washington, D.C. 20520

0300  
22

January 7, 1983 83 JAN 7 PII: 21


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
(with SECRET attachment)

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Mayor Jacques Chirac's Appointment  
with the President

Attached is a briefing memorandum for the  
President's meeting with Jacques Chirac, Mayor of Paris  
and leading French opposition leader, on Thursday,  
January 13, 11:30 a.m.

  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Briefing Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By 404 NARA, Date 1/2/02

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DECL: OADR

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48254	BIO  BIO	1	1/1/1983	B1

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48255	BIO  BIO	1	1/1/1983	B1

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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## CHIRAC VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

January 11 - 14, 1983

## January 11

- 9:00 A.M. Arrive New York via AF 001 (lodging at Gracie Mansion)
- 12:30 P.M. Working Lunch with New York City Officials
- 2:30 P.M. Visit to New York Times
- 4:00 P.M. Meeting with Jewish Community Leaders
- 5:30 P.M. Meeting with Henry Kissinger
- 8:00 P.M. Dinner offered by Mayor Koch

## January 12

- 10:00 A.M. Meeting with UN Secretary General Perez De Cuellar
- 11:30 A.M. Meeting with Mayor Koch followed by Joint Press Conference
- 12:30 P.M. Lunch in Chinatown with Mayor Koch
- 3:00 P.M. Departure for Washington (lodging at Madison Hotel)
- 6:00 P.M. Private Meeting with de Larosiere at World Bank
- 7:00 P.M. Meeting with French Community at French Church
- 8:00 P.M. Dinner hosted by Senator Mathias

## January 13

- 9:30 A.M. Meeting with Mayor Barry
- 11:30 A.M. Meeting with the President
- 1:00 P.M. Lunch followed by Speech ("The State of Europe") at CSIS
- 4:00 P.M. Meeting with the Vice President
- 5:00 P.M. Meeting with Secretary Shultz
- 6:30 P.M. Meeting with French Journalists
- 8:00 P.M. Dinner hosted by the French Ambassador

January 14

- 7:00 A.M. TODAY Show
- 8:00 A.M. Breakfast with American Journalists
- 10:30 A.M. Secretary Weinberger
- 12:30 P.M. Lunch at Washington Post
- 4:30 P.M. Speech at New York University Institute  
for French Studies ("Democracy in Paris")
- 9:30 P.M. Depart for Paris vis AF 022

LIST OF PARTICIPANTSUNITED STATES

The President

Richard R. Burt  
Assistant Secretary  
for European Affairs, designate  
Department of State

FRENCH

Jacques Chirac  
Mayor of Paris  
(phonetic: SheeRAHK)

Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet  
former French Ambassador  
to the US, 1972-77  
(kohSYOOskoh-mawreeZAY)

Jean de Lipkowski  
French Parliamentarian  
Foreign Affairs Adviser  
(duh leepkofSKEE)

Prince Constantin  
Andronikof  
Interpreter

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8300300

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 12 JAN 83 13

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 07 JAN 83

BLAIR

11 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

AP

CHIRAC, JACQUES

SUBJECT: BRIEFING PAPERS / BIOS / TALKING POINTS FOR PRES 13 JAN MTG W/ MAYOR  
CHIRAC

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 12 JAN 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8300447

LOG 8207936

NSCIFID

( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Pres</i>	<i>1P</i> JAN 1 3 1983	<i>for info</i>	<i>VP, Em, TB, MD</i>	
	JAN 1 3 1983	<i>Pres noted</i>		<i>DB, CT</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *OK* (C) *N*

RECEIVED 14 JAN 83 13

TO MCFARLANE FROM BLAIR

DOCDATE 14 JAN 83

18257

KEYWORDS FRANCE  
VISIT

NUCLEAR MATTERS

HERNU

SUBJECT. HERNU VISIT &amp; STRATEGIC NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROGRAM

ACTION. FOR DECISION

DUE.

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M07-081 #48257

BY RW NARA DATE 6-25-10

REF# LOG 8190126 8190149 NSCIFID NSDD0046 ( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 5/02 OBE / original not returned

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

## MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SENSITIVEACTION

January 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: DENNIS A. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Hernu Visit and Strategic Nuclear Cooperation Program (S)

Once again, there are three different interpretations as to what was decided at yesterday's breakfast meeting discussion of this subject. (C)

State: There was consensus among principals on option #4 of the basic paper: to respond favorably to new French requests, but choose specific quids when appropriate, as decided by the Executive Committee of McFarlane, Ikle and Eagleburger. (S)

OSD: The unnumbered option which Secretary Weinberger tabled at the breakfast was accepted completely: no activity beyond that currently scheduled will be agreed to until "each separate program element" is reviewed with the French "at the policy level." (S)

NSC: I interpreted what you told me yesterday as consistent with the State view: that the program will continue at roughly the current level, but with "targets of opportunity" quids to be evaluated and decided by the Executive Committee. (S)

We can sort out these different interpretations at the first Executive Committee meeting. The problem is that Weinberger will be talking to Hernu on Tuesday. Perle tells me that the principals at the breakfast meeting "deputized" Weinberger to tell Hernu that (quoting from the DoD paper with the unnumbered option): The U.S. will be "reviewing program elements with the French at a policy level, and no new activity beyond that presently scheduled will be agreed to until the review is complete." (TS)

Under the NSC/State interpretation Weinberger would say:  
We will be considering favorably new French requests when the program is expanding, and at the same time we expect that there will be specific U.S. requests to the Government of France for which we will ask special consideration.

Unless DoD's interpretation is correct and Weinberger was authorized to tell the French we are freezing the program, I recommend that DoD be required to send to NSC and State the talking points Weinberger will use with Hernu. If necessary

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

48256  
DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR MD 7-181 #48256  
BY [signature] NARA DATE 12/14/05 5/9/11

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

we can convene a meeting of the Ikle, McFarlane and Eagleburger Executive Committee on Monday afternoon to resolve any differences.

\_\_\_\_ Yes: Call DoD and task them to send the talking points to NSC and State by Monday morning. If necessary to resolve differences, schedule an Executive Committee meeting Monday afternoon.

\_\_\_\_ No. Weinberger has his instructions and it was agreed at the breakfast that he will tell the French that we will freeze new requests and hold a policy review with them.

New Subject: MT-20 and Crays

You mentioned yesterday that the Crays had also been discussed at the breakfast meeting. Do you need any further staffing on this? The French are unclear as to how strongly the USG feels about the MT-20 and what the linkage is between the MT-20s and the Crays. There is confusion in the USG on both scores. Again, unless there was complete agreement at the breakfast, I think that DoD should send NSC and State a piece of paper with talking points on the subject, at least for a check on factual accuracy. (TS)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 PARIS 1629 0156 DTG: 141124Z JAN 83 PSN: 076900  
SIT930 DATE 01/18/83 TOR: 014/1158Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOBMP EOB VP EOB SIT KEMP BOSH  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTT-IST--

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUHFR #1629/01 0141128  
O 141124Z JAN 83  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0885

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 01629  
MODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DOD FOR ASD/ISP RICHARD PERLE  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PEPR, EEWT, FR  
SUBJECT: FRENCH MT-20 SALE TO THE SOVIET UNION  
REFS: A) STATE 113, B) PARIS 769, C) 82 PARIS 39167

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PER INSTRUCTIONS REF A, EMBOFF JANUARY 13 FOLLOWED UP DEMARCHE ON SUBJECT MADE BY MINECON AT QUAI (REF B) BY CALLING ON FRENCH DELEGUE GENERAL POUR L'ARMEMENT JEAN MARTRE AT MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. ALSO PRESENT WERE MARTRE'S ASSISTANTS FOR MT-20 DOSSIER HENRI CONZE, ENG. COLONEL SEMERIA AND ENG. GENERAL RENAUD, THE HEAD OF THE FRENCH ARMAMENTS MISSION IN THE U.S., WHO HAD DISCUSSED SUBJECT WITH ASD RICHARD PERLE JANUARY 11 IN WASHINGTON.

3. MARTRE NOTED POINTS MADE REFTEL AND STATED THAT, SPEAKING FRANKLY, HE HAD TO ADMIT THAT GOF HAD PROBABLY NOT PROVIDED SUFFICIENT INFORMATION FOR USG TO SATISFY ITSELF THAT MT-20 SALE DID NOT INCLUDE ANY TECHNOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY VALUE. HOWEVER, GOF HAD SUCCEEDED (MARTRE IMPLIED BY VIRTUE OF MOD/DGA EFFORTS) IN CUTTING "NINETY OR NINETY-FIVE"

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PERCENT OF THE PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY OUT OF THE CONTRACT. WHAT REMAINED WAS SIMPLY OLDER TECHNOLOGY OF NO REAL STRATEGIC OR MILITARY VALUE TO THE SOVIET UNION. NONETHELESS, MARTRE COULD UNDERSTAND HOW THE WRITTEN ANSWERS WHICH THE GOF HAD SUPPLIED TO OUR QUESTIONS (REF C) DID NOT ADEQUATELY DEMONSTRATE THAT FACT.

4. IN ORDER TO REASSURE THE U.S. OF ABOVE, MARTRE STATED HE WAS SENDING GENERAL RENAUD BACK TO THE U.S. TO MEET AGAIN WITH ASD PERLE JANUARY 17 AT THE PENTAGON ARMED WITH THE "SECRET DETAILS" OF THE CONTRACT, WHICH WOULD PROVE HOW IT HAD BEEN GUTTED OF ADVANCED PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY. RENAUD WOULD SHOW THAT DATA TO PERLE ON A DISCREET AND HIGHLY CLASSIFIED BASIS AND MARTRE BELIEVED IT WOULD SATISFY USG PROBLEMS ABOUT THE CONTRACT. MARTRE STATED THAT THE DATA WHICH

WOULD BE SHOWN PERLE FELL INTO THE CATEGORY OF COMMERCIAL SECRETS WHICH WOULD NOT NORMALLY BE FURNISHED ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY, BUT THAT FRANCE WOULD BE WILLING TO SUPPLY IT TO THE U.S. ON THIS OCCASION IN RESPECT TO THIS ONE CONTRACT ON A BASIS OF TRUST AND IN THE "WELL UNDERSTOOD SPIRIT THAT THE GOALS OF FRANCE AND THE U.S. AS ATLANTIC ALLIES AGAINST A COMMON THREAT WERE IN FULL STRATEGIC ACCORD." MARTRE FURTHER NOTED THAT THE MISSION OF GENERAL RENAUD IN THIS INSTANCE MUST BE HANDLED WITH GREAT DISCRETION, IMPLYING THAT THIS PROCEDURE WAS NOT SOMETHING BEING UNDERTAKEN IN ACCORD WITH OTHER GOF MINISTRIES WORKING THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROBLEM. ACCORDINGLY, UNTIL WE LEARN OTHERWISE, WE SUGGEST DEPARTMENT AND DOD NOT REFER TO THIS PROCEDURE IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH OTHER GOF MINISTRIES ON THE SUBJECT OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO THE EAST.

5. DCM ALSO DISCUSSED MT-20 SALE WITH GENERAL SAULNIER AT ELYSEE JANUARY 13. DCM WENT CAREFULLY THROUGH REF A TALKING POINTS, NOTING WE HAD MADE SAME DEMARCHE TO QUAI AND MARTRE. SAULNIER LISTENED ATTENTIVELY, AND QUESTIONED ONLY ONE POINT: HE ASKED FOR THE EXACT SENSE OF LANGUAGE IN FOURTH TALKING POINT "THAT TRANSFER OF INTEGRATED CIRCUIT PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY TO THE USSR IS ENVISAGED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MT-20 CONTRACT." SAULNIER REMARKED THAT THE PHRASE "ENVISAGED IN CONNECTION WITH" WAS AMBIGUOUS, AND NOTED THAT THIS RECALLED DETAILED DISCUSSION FRENCH HAD WITH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SOVIETS ON THE CONTRACT LANGUAGE COVERING THE SAME POINT. FRENCH HAD, IN FACT, GONE OVER BOTH RUSSIAN AND FRENCH LANGUAGE VERSIONS TO ELIMINATE AMBIGUITY ON TRANSFER OF PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY FROM THE RE-NEGOTIATED CONTRACT.

6. DCM SAID IT WAS LIKELY MT-20 CONTRACT WOULD ARISE DURING HERNU'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, AND NOTED THAT HERNU HAD TOLD SECRETARY SHULTZ HE WISHED TO ENSURE THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRANCE ON DEFENSE-RELATED ISSUES. DCM EXPRESSD HOPE THAT FRENCH WOULD ARRANGE TO PROVIDE THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHICH HAD BEEN REQUESTED, IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS ISSUE.

7. SAULNIER REITERATED THAT A STUDY GROUP OF FRENCH EXPERTS HAD CONCLUDED THAT NO MILITARILY-RELEANT TECHNOLOGY WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE SOVIETS THROUGH

PARIS 1629 0156 DTG: 141124Z JAN 83 PSN: 076900

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NLRR 1007-081 # 98758

BY GW NARA DATE 5/19/10

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PAGE 01            PARIS 1629            0156            DTG: 141124Z JAN 83 PSN: 076901  
SIT928            DATE 01/18/83            TOR: 014/1158Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLSS EOBMP EOB VP EOB SIT KEMP BOSH  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTT-IST--

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUFHFR #1629/02 0141129  
O 141124Z JAN 83  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0886

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 01629

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DOD FOR ASD/ISP RICHARD PERLE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, EEWT, FR

SUBJECT: FRENCH MT-20 SALE TO THE SOVIET UNION

THIS SALE. HE NEVERTHELESS SAID HE WOULD CALL HERNU  
IMMEDIATELY TO SEE HOW FURTHER INFORMATION COULD BE  
PROVIDED TO US. GALBRAITH

~~SECRET~~

507

# National Security Council The White House

33

1210P  
JAN 18 1983

Package # 0445

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	I
Bud McFarlane	2	m	
Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	I
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

## DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

## COMMENTS

Kay: sent to  
Daily ops this  
done WZ

~~SECRET~~

0445

34

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

48259

~~SECRET~~

Jan 18, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD T. BOVERIE *B*

SUBJECT: Visit by French Defense Officials

WPC HAS REC

I was visited yesterday afternoon by Jean-Francois Dubost and Francois Heisbourg, advisors to the French Minister of Defense. They were accompanied by John Paul Reau of the French Embassy. Dubost and Heisbourg are in Washington in conjunction with the MOD's meetings today with Secretary Shultz and Secretary Weinberger.

Main Messages:

The main messages they wished to convey are as follows:

- France is a loyal ally of the U.S.
- Extreme care must be exercised by the U.S. and France with respect to the Soviet peace proposals. Questions related to the INF dual-track decision should be resolved in a way which guarantees the strength of the Alliance. They said that we should not allow Soviet superiority, which would be the case if agreed to letting the Soviets have the same forces as the U.S., France, Britain, and the PRC combined. They said we should stand firm on three principles: (1) bilateral U.S./Soviet negotiations, (2) no geographical constraints, and (3) forces of other countries not included; if we depart from these principles, it will be divisive for the Alliance.
- We should do nothing which increases the sense of insecurity in the FRG and propels them in the wrong direction. This even includes items such as specialty metals and POMCUS, which in the past may have been considered simply as irritants but which today present very difficult problems for the pro-U.S. FRG government. (The Frenchmen made this latter point to SFRC staffers just before visiting me.)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR *MOA-081-48259*

BY *GN* NARA DATE *4/29/10*

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

2

Other Points

Other points they made are as follows:

- France is emphasizing its nuclear forces. The French government is going vigorously to the French people to explain its course of action, emphasizing that a credible nuclear deterrent prevents war. They want to "occupy this ground now," and preclude the creation of a situation which others would try to exploit. Public reaction to French nuclear policy is good.

- The pacifist movement in France is weak. It has long been in the hands of the Communists, and the intellectuals and public know this.

- France is a Catholic country, and there is a healthy skepticism about intermingling of religious and temporal matters.

- The visitors were seized by Gwertzman's article in the New York Times about Rostow and seemed a little worried about its effect on Europeans. I explained that the Rostow situation reflected a management change, not a change in policy or philosophy.

cc: Sven Kraemer  
Al Myer  
Bob Helm  
Dennis Blair  
Bob Kimmitt

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR.

~~SECRET~~

France

36

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8300445

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*sup*  
*1/2/88*

RECEIVED 18 JAN 83 12

TO CLARK

FROM BOVERIE

DOCDATE 18 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY

FRANCE

DUBOST, J

HEISBOURG, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: TALKS W/ FRENCH DEFENSE OFFICIALS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

KRAEMER

MYER

HELM

BLAIR

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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*C* FEB 0 1 1983

*Clark noted*

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(C)

NSC/S PROFILE

~~TOP SECRET~~

ID 8390058 37

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 20 JAN 83 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM BLAIR

DOC DATE 20 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

SUBJECT: THURSDAY BREAKFAST ITEM

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

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( B / B )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

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DUE

COPIES TO

C JAN 20 1983

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(C)

National Security Council  
The White House

~~SH~~

1745p

Package # 90058

JAN 20 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>      </u>	<u>  F  </u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>
Jacque Hill	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>
Judge Clark	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>
John Poindexter	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>
Staff Secretary	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>
Sit Room	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>
<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>

I-Information   A-Action   R-Retain   D-Dispatch   N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc:   VP   Meese   Baker   Deaver   Other       

COMMENTS

Breakfast Cancelled  
will be OBE  
by next Breakfast

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

January 20, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR *DB*

SUBJECT: Thursday Breakfast Item  
French Special Programs

NOTED

Minister of Defense Hernu and Secretary Weinberger discussed the program in general terms during the Hernu visit. Hernu agreed to the "policy level review" of the program which Weinberger proposed. The next step from the U.S. point of view will be to convene a meeting of the steering group of you, Dr. Ikle, and Larry Eagleburger.

The agenda of your meeting will be to review the elements of the program for discussion with the French, to approve our response to the pending new French requests, and to approve "quids" we may request from the French. It will take us a week to prepare properly the materials you will need for that meeting.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR M07-D81 #48260

BY RW NARA DATE 6-25-10

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

40

48261

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 88781 DTG: 211815Z JAN 83 PSN: 010484  
SIT745 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 021/1959Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP EOB EOBB EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: NODISLISTD IN SHULTZ REPORT---FURTHER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #8878 0211841  
O P 211815Z JAN 83 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0000  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 018878  
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, OVIP, US, FR

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH JACQUES CHIRAC  
JANUARY 13

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 107-081 #98261

BY GW NARA DATE 5/19/10

1. ~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN RESPONSE TO CHIRAC'S REQUEST SECRETARY REVIEWED SITUATION IN LEBANON AND MIDDLE EAST. CHIRAC EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT IRAN-IRAQ WAR. HE URGED U.S. MAKE EFFORT TO PREVENT ISRAEL FROM SUPPLYING ARMS TO IRAN. HE ALSO SAID SADDAM HUSAYN WOULD WELCOME CONTACTS WITH THE U.S. AND IS POTENTIALLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE REAGAN PEACE INITIATIVE. THE SECRETARY NOTED THE FACT THAT IRAQ HARBORS TERRORISTS WHICH MAKES IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-IRAQ RELATIONS DIFFICULT. CHIRAC AND THE SECRETARY ALSO EXCHANGED VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS. CHIRAC EXPRESSED PESSIMISM ABOUT FRENCH ECONOMY. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. CHIRAC BEGAN HIS MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY BY ASKING ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL

INTER-RELATED PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT WHILE WE TRY TO KEEP THEM SEPARATE, DEVELOPMENTS IN ONE AFFECT THE OTHERS. THE SECRETARY IDENTIFIED THE THREE PROBLEMS: LEBANON, THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN RELATIONSHIP.

4. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN VERY DIFFICULT. THE U.S. GOAL IS TO GET AGREEMENT ON AN OPERATIONAL PLAN AND A COMMITMENT FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. IF THAT HAPPENS, IT IS HOPED THAT THE SYRIANS AND PLO WILL ALSO WITHDRAW.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 88781 DTG: 211815Z JAN 83 PSN: 010484

5. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAS COOLED IN THE WAKE OF LEBANON AND THIS IS A NEGATIVE FACTOR IN THE OVERALL MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. THE U. S. HOPES THAT IF ISRAEL MAKES A COMMITMENT TO LEAVE LEBANON, EGYPT WILL BEGIN TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THERE IS TREMENDOUS SKEPTICISM THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL EVER LEAVE LEBANON. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IN MAKING ITS DECISION MUST CONTEND WITH DOUBTS AT HOME ABOUT THE EFFICACY OF TRADING TERRITORY FOR PEACE, AS IT HAD HOPED IT WAS DOING WITH THE SINAI.

6. IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS THE PROXIMATE U. S. GOAL IS TO CREATE A SITUATION THAT WILL ENABLE JORDAN'S KING HUSSEIN TO PARTICIPATE. THE OUTCOME OF CURRENT EFFORTS IS NOT CERTAIN, BUT HUSSEIN MAY BE PREPARED TO AGREE TO SOMETHING BY THE END OF FEBRUARY.

7. REFERRING TO CHIRAC'S EARLIER MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THE CONCERN EXPRESSED BY CHIRAC ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA. THERE HAS BEEN SOME COMPLACENCY

SECSTATE WASHDC 88781 DTG: 211815Z JAN 83 PSN: 010484  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ABOUT THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. CLEARLY IF IRAN SHOULD PREVAIL OVER IRAQ IT WOULD HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR NOT ONLY THE GULF COUNTRIES BUT FOR THE WEST.

8. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE U. S. WOULD LIKE TO FIND SOME WAY OF REESTABLISHING A RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN. HE NOTED THAT ITALY HAS A RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN WHICH THE U. S. WOULD LIKE TO SEE CONTINUE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT FRANCE ALSO HAS A STRONG HISTORIC RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQ. CHIRAC SAID THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ARAB STATES ARE VERY FRAGILE. THE COLLAPSE OF IRAQ WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS. EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO AVOID

FURTHER ISRAELI ASSISTANCE TO IRAN.

9. CHIRAC SAID THAT SADDAM HUSAYN IS NOT A MADMAN. HE HAS RECENTLY MADE TWO VERY POSITIVE PUBLIC STATEMENTS. FIRST, THAT HE IS READY TO SIT AT THE SAME TABLE WITH ISRAEL AND THE PLO (SIC), AND SECOND, THAT HE WANTS EGYPT BACK IN THE ARAB FAMILY WITHOUT CONDITIONS. SADDAM IS A REASONABLE MAN. HE IS READY TO TALK TO THE U. S. AND CAN BE HELPFUL WITH THE REAGAN PEACE INITIATIVE. ALL HE WOULD ASK IN RETURN, CHIRAC SAID, WOULD BE THE END OF THE ISRAELI AID TO IRAN.

10. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD MET A FEW MONTHS AGO WITH THE IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE MEETING HAD GONE FAIRLY WELL. ONE IMPORTANT BARRIER TO IMPROVED RELATIONS IS THE FACT THAT IRAQ HARBORS TERRORISTS. CHIRAC SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WAS A PROBLEM, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT IF THE U. S. WERE WILLING TO TALK TO IRAQ, SADDAM WOULD BE WILLING TO EXPEL THE TERRORISTS INCLUDING ABU NIDAL.

11. THE SECRETARY THEN ASKED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 03 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 88781 DTG: 211815Z JAN 83 PSN: 010484

FRENCH ECONOMIC RECOVERY. CHIRAC SAID HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC. THE BUDGET DEFICIT AND THE FOREIGN ACCOUNTS DEFICIT HAD GROWN DRAMATICALLY, AND IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO AVOID ANOTHER DEVALUATION OF THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FRANC AFTER THE MARCH ELECTIONS. MOROEOVER FRENCH RECOVERY IS SOMEWHAT DEPENDENT ON WORLD RECOVERY. FOR THE LATTER TO OCCUR THERE WOULD BE A NEED FOR A REAL REDUCTION OF THE STANDAR;RD OF LIVING IN MANY COUNTRIES. RICH NATIONS COULD DEAL WITH THIS POOR ONES COULD NOT. THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IS AT STAKE.

12. CHIRAC SAID EUROPEANS TRYING TO DEAL WITH THEIR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE TERRIFIED THAT THE U. S. HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO REDUCE ITS BUDGET DEFICIT. THE SECRETARY SAID ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT HAPPY WITH THE LARGE DEFICITS IN FY 83 AND FY 84 THEY WERE MANAGEABLE SINCE THEY WOULD LARGELY BE WIPED OUT IF THE ECONOMY WERE TO PICK UP SUBSTANTIALLY. MUCH WORSE, IN HIS VIEW, WERE THE PROJECTED DEFICITS IN 86, 87, AND 88, ALL OF WHICH ASSUMED-THE ECONOMY WOULD BE WORKING AT FULL CAPACITY.

13. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE IRREVERSIBILITY OF PUBLIC SPENDING TRENDS. FOR EXAMPLE SOCIAL BUDGETS ARE HARD TO CONTROL ONCE THEY HAVE REACHED A CERTAIN POINT. BANK NATIONALIZATIONS ARE ALSO DIFFICULT TO UNDO AS MEXICO IS FINDING OUT.

14. CHIRAC SAID SUCH QUESTIONS ARE A MATTER OF POLITICAL WILL. HE SAID THAT IN FRANCE ANY NEW ADMINISTRATION COULD DO VIRTUALLY ANYTHING IT WANTED IN THE FIRST THREE MONTHS AFTER IT TOOK POWER. IN HIS VIEW THE MITTERRAND GOVERNMENT IN ITS FIRST YEAR AND A HALF HAS DONE NOTHING IRREVERSIBLE, WITH ONE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION. FOR EXAMPLE, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE INDUSTRIAL AND BANK NATIONALIZATIONS COULD EASILY BE REVERSED. WHAT MIGHT NOT BE REVERSIBLE WAS THE PENETRATION BY COMMUNISTS INTO THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE MEDIA. NEVERTHELESS HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT A GAULLIST GOVERNMENT COULD DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS.

SHULTZ

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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FOR THE SECRETARY  
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK AND  
DOD FOR SECDEF WEINBERGER  
E.O. 12356: OADR  
TAGS: ESTC, FR  
SUBJECT: COMPUTERS FOR FRANCE  
AS A FOLLOW-UP TO MINISTER HERNU'S VISIT, I RECOMMEND  
WE IMMEDIATELY GRANT THE PENDING EXPORT LICENSES  
FOR COMPUTERS TO FRANCE.  
GALBRAITH

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BY CU NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~