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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 1/2/2008

File Folder FRANCE (01/26/1983-02/09/1983)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 14

NOUZILLE

57

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48265	CABLE	261448Z JAN 83 R 1/25/2011 M081/1	4	1/26/1983	B1
48266	CABLE	261938Z JAN 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	6	1/26/1983	B1
48267	CABLE	290515Z JAN 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	1/29/1983	B1
48268	CABLE	290516Z JAN 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	1/29/1983	B1
48269	CABLE	290116Z JAN 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	1/29/1983	B1
48270	CABLE	291826Z JAN 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	1/29/1983	B1
48271	CABLE	011231Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	2/1/1983	B1
48272	MEMO	FORTIER TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING WITH ANDREANI R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	2/1/1983	B1
48273	CABLE	011743Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	2/1/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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SMF 1/2/2008

File Folder FRANCE (01/26/1983-02/09/1983)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 14

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48274	CABLE	031824Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	5	2/3/1983	B1
48275	CABLE	052045Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	2	2/5/1983	B1
48276	CABLE	071231Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	5	2/7/1983	B1
48277	CABLE	071643Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	2/7/1983	B1
48278	CABLE	081737Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	4	2/8/1983	B1
48279	CABLE	092146Z FEB 83	2	2/9/1983	B1

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48265

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 3097
SIT023 DATE 02/20/83

02744

DTG: 261448Z JAN 83 PSN: 016648
TOR: 026/1552Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB: NTS: CHECKLIST
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTLS. ADVISE AS TO FURTHER DISSEM. BERM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #3097/01 0261450
O 261448Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1715

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 03097
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, FR, GE
SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON INF
REF: PARIS 1633

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M081 # 48265

BY KML NARA DATE 1/27/2011

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DCM HAD RELAXED CONVERSATION ON INF WITH GENERAL SAULNIER EVENING OF JANUARY 25. BECAUSE OF THE UNUSUAL FRANKNESS OF SAULNIER'S REMARKS, WE REQUEST THAT THEY BE CAREFULLY PROTECTED.

3. DCM CONGRATULATED SAULNIER ON MITTERRAND'S BUNDESTAG SPEECH (AMBASSADOR HAS SENT A HAND-WRITTEN NOTE TO MITTERRAND TO CONGRATULATE HIM DIRECTLY). SAULNIER WAS CLEARLY VERY PLEASED WITH THE INF PASSAGE IN THE SPEECH, WHICH HE HAD DRAFTED. SAULNIER SAID THAT, FOLLOWING HIS LAST CONVERSATION WITH DCM (REF TEL), HE HAD SET ABOUT TRYING TO DEVELOP A FIRM AND DEFINITIVE STATEMENT ON INF TO BE INCLUDED IN MITTERRAND'S SPEECH. SAULNIER WAS WELL AWARE OF THE STAKES INVOLVED, BUT HIS TASK HAD BEEN DIFFICULT BECAUSE DIFFERENT ADVISORS SOUGHT TO PUSH MITTERRAND IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS. BUT MITTERRAND, SAID SAULNIER, IS AS "STUBBORN AS A MULE" ON THIS ISSUE. HE HAS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE RIGHT INSTINCTS AND REFUSES TO BE PUSHED IN DIRECTIONS OF WHICH HE IS WARY.

4. IN DRAFTING THE INF PASSAGE OF THE SPEECH, SAULNIER NEVERTHELESS HAD TO TREAD A VERY NARROW PATH. IT COULD NOT REPRODUCE U.S. ARGUMENTS OR APPEAR SIMPLY TO SUPPORT A U.S. POSITION, SINCE THAT WOULD HAVE BROUGHT CRITICISM FROM THE FAR LEFT OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY, THE COMMUNISTS, AND SOME OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AS WELL. NEITHER COULD THE SPEECH APPEAR TO BE TELLING THE GERMANS WHAT TO DO, SINCE THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN INTERFERENCE IN THE GERMAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THUS, SAULNIER HAD SOUGHT TO DEVELOP AN ENTIRELY FRENCH LOGIC, WHICH ARRIVED AT AN INDEPENDENT FRENCH CONCLUSION AND WAS AN EXPLANATION OF FRENCH VIEWS. SAULNIER CITED IN PARTICULAR THE SENTENCE AND SUBSE-

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2

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 PARIS 3097

02744

DTG: 261448Z JAN 83 PSN: 016648

QUENT PARAGRAPH WHICH READS: "BUT THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS EQUILIBRIUM IMPLIES, IN MY VIEW, THAT ENTIRE REGIONS OF EUROPE NOT BE WITHOUT DEFENSE IN THE FACE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED AGAINST THEM." THIS, SAULNIER SAID, WAS THE HEART OF THE FRENCH POSITION, AND EXPLAINED WHY IT WAS THAT EVEN THE ZERO OPTION, OFFERED IN ADVANCE FOR NEGOTIATION, WAS NOT IDEAL FROM THE FRENCH VIEWPOINT. PERSHING SHOULD BE INSTALLED TO COUNTER THE SS-20; THEN IF BOTH FORCES WERE REMOVED THE RESULTING BALANCE WOULD ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE. (NOTE: SAULNIER EQUATES ONLY THE PERSHING WITH THE SS-20, AND PLACES GLCM'S IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY.) SAULNIER WAS VERY NEGATIVE ABOUT VOGEL, CALLING HIM "DANGEROUSLY NAIVE" AND A "LAMB IN THE WOLF'S LAIR". SAULNIER ALSO SAID MITTERRAND HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO SOCIALIST PARTY REPS TO TAKE A VERY TOUGH POSITION ON INF IN THE CURRENT PARIS MEETING WITH OTHER SOCIALIST PARTIES.

5. SAULNIER SAID ONE ASPECT OF THE INSTALLATION OF THE PERSHING HAD NOT BEEN THOUGHT THROUGH CAREFULLY ENOUGH. IF THE GERMANS HAD THE RIGHT TO VETO ACTUAL USE OF THE PERSHING, THAT WOULD UNDERCUT THE ARGUMENT CURRENTLY CIRCULATING IN EUROPE THAT THE U.S. AND THE USSR COULD FIGHT OUT A NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THEM IN EUROPE WITHOUT THE EUROPEANS HAVING ANY SAY IN THE MATTER. GIVING THE GERMANS A VETO ON USAGE WOULD NOT GIVE THEM A "FINGER ON THE NUCLEAR TRIGGER", BUT ONLY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

A "FINGER ON THE SAFETY CATCH".

6. IN CONNECTION WITH THE NOTION OF EUROPEAN CONTROL OF PERSHING DCM ASKED FOR FRENCH VIEWS ON GENERAL GALLOIS' SUGGESTION THAT THE FRENCH BUY SOME PERSHING TO ADD TO THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCE. SAULNIER SAID HE HAD THOUGHT THROUGH THAT POSSIBILITY BUT WAS NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT IT. HE RECOGNIZED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR FRANCE TO BUY SOME PERSHING, BUT HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT THEY DID NOT FIT THE FRENCH SITUATION VERY WELL FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, THE FRENCH ARE TOO NATIONALISTIC AND PROUD OF THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE DEVELOPED THEIR OWN NUCLEAR FORCE COMPLETELY INDEPENDENTLY. ALTHOUGH FRENCH SYSTEMS NEED MODERNIZING, AND IT WILL BE VERY "INEFFICIENT" TO DO THIS THROUGH ENTIRELY FRENCH TECHNOLOGY, ANY FRENCH GOVERNMENT WHICH BOUGHT MISSILES ELSEWHERE WOULD BE CRITICIZED. SECOND, THE EXTREME ACCURACY OF THE PERSHING GAVE IT A POTENTIALLY ANTI-FORCE, THEREFORE FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY. SUCH A CAPABILITY

PARIS 3097

02744

DTG: 261448Z JAN 83 PSN: 016648

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3

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 3097
SIT022 DATE 02/20/83

02744 DTG: 261448Z JAN 83 PSN: 016649
TOR: 026/1553Z

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WHSR COMMENT: NODISLISTLS. ADVISE AS TO FURTHER DISSEM. BERM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #3097/02 0261451
O 261448Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1716

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 03097
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MARR, PREL, FR, GE
SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON INF
WOULD BE PURELY THEORETICAL IN A FRENCH FORCE BECAUSE
FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ARE SO SMALL-SCALE THAT FRANCE
COULD NEVER LAUNCH A FIRST STRIKE, WHICH WOULD BE
SUICIDAL. MOREOVER, SUCH AN ACCURATE SYSTEM DOES
NOT FIT WITH FRENCH STRATEGY, WHICH IS TO THREATEN
A RETALIATORY STRIKE. FRENCH EMPHASIS WILL INCREAS-
INGLY BE ON THEIR SLBM'S, WHICH ARE THE PERFECT RE-
TALIATORY SYSTEM.

7. DCM NOTED RECENT ALLUSIONS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF
TAKING ACCOUNT OF FRENCH SYSTEMS IN START AS OPPOSED
TO INF, AND ASKED IF THE FRENCH HAD DEVELOPED A
POSITION ON THIS POINT. SAULNIER SAID THEY HAD NOT
DEVELOPED A POSITION ON THIS, AND PREFERRED NOT TO
"OPEN THAT DOOR". IN ANY CASE, SAULNIER SAID,
IT WAS NOT AND WOULD NOT BE UP TO FRANCE TO ADVANCE
IDEAS ON THIS POSSIBILITY. SAULNIER NONETHELESS EX-
PLAINED CURRENT FRENCH THINKING ON THIS ISSUE. HE
SAID IN PRINCIPLE THE FRENCH WOULD NOT BE OPPOSED
TO TAKING ACCOUNT OF FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS IN
START, BUT ONLY ON THE IMPORTANT CONDITION THAT FRANCE
BE ABSOLUTELY ASSURED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NEVER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AGAIN TRY TO COUNT THEM IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS.
SAULNIER SAID THE ONLY WAY THE FRENCH WOULD HAVE
SUCH AN ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE WOULD BE IF THE INF NE-
GOTIATIONS ARE CONCLUDED ON A BASIS WHICH THE FRENCH
FIND SATISFACTORY. THUS SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION OF
INF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD MAKE COUNTING OF FRENCH
SYSTEMS IN START ACCEPTABLE TO THE FRENCH.

8. COMMENT: SAULNIER IS A RELIABLE, DISCREET, AND
AUTHORITATIVE INTERLOCUTOR ON THE ISSUES MENTIONED
ABOVE. WHILE HE SOMETIMES MIXES PERSONAL IDEAS INTO
HIS COMMENTS, HE GENERALLY REFLECTS THE KINDS
OF DEBATES WHICH ARE GOING ON WITHIN THE FRENCH
GOVERNMENT ON THE RANGE OF TECHNICAL POLITICAL-MILITARY
ISSUES UNDER HIS RESPONSIBILITY. HIS CLOSENESS TO
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, AND THE FACT THAT MITTERRAND

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

4

PAGE 02 OF 02 PARIS 3097

02744 DTG: 261448Z JAN 83 PSN: 016649

HAS NO OTHER CLOSE ADVISORS WITH ANY EXPERTISE ON
STRATEGIC ISSUES, GIVE HIS VIEWS PARTICULAR WEIGHT.
GALBRAITH

PARIS 3097

02744 DTG: 261448Z JAN 83 PSN: 016649

~~SECRET~~

48246 5
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PAGE 1 - 371

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE243
STU7862
PP RUEHC
DE RUFHFR #3246/01 0261942
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261938Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1784
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3198
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0988
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4338
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 03246

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, FR

SUBJECT: CHIRAC'S VIEWS ON CURRENT ISSUES

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. PARIS MAYOR JACQUES CHIRAC INVITED THE AMBASSADOR, DCM AND EMBOFF TO LUNCH ON JANUARY 25 AND, AFTER INITIAL CONVERSATION DESCRIBING THE SUCCESS OF HIS RECENT TRIP TO WASHINGTON, TURNED THE TALK TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. MUCH ON CHIRAC'S MIND WAS THE MIDDLE EAST, AND HE APPEARED CONFIDENT AND WELL-REHEARSED IN THE LENGTHY APPEAL HE DELIVERED ON BEHALF OF THE ARAB WORLD IN GENERAL AND OF IRAQ IN PARTICULAR. BASED ON HIS PERSONAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN, CHIRAC STRONGLY URGED ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC A NUMBER OF HIS ARGUMENTS BEFORE, NEW ELEMENTS EMERGED WHICH MERIT ATTENTION. CHIRAC ALSO DISCUSSED INF DEPLOYMENTS IN THE SAME TERMS USED IN HIS RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON. CHIRAC REITERATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO SEE FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS COUNTED AT SOME FUTURE DATE IN START TALKS. END SUMMARY.

3. NEED TO SUPPORT IRAQ.

CHIRAC BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, SECRETARY SHULTZ AND OTHER OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON. THE U.S., SAID CHIRAC, WAS OBVIOUSLY THE KEY ACTOR IN EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A LONG-TERM SETTLEMENT IN THE REGION, AND THE REAGAN PLAN WAS BASICALLY A GOOD ONE, HAVING AT LEAST TWO MERITS: (1) THE FACT THAT IT EXISTED AND (2) THE FACT THAT IT

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BY GL NARA DATE 5/19/10

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6
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PAGE 1 - 372

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DEMANDED FROM THE ISRAELIS THE MAXIMUM ONE MIGHT REASONABLY EXPECT TEL AVIV TO AGREE TO. THAT SAID, CHIRAC CALLED THE FAHD PLAN EVEN BETTER. IT SYMBOLIZED A SINCERE EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE ARAB WORLD TO ARRIVE AT A CONSENSUS ON AN ISSUE WHICH IS VITAL TO ALL OF THEM. PUSHING THE ARABS BEYOND THE FAHD PLAN AND DEMANDING FROM THEM ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS RISKS DESTROYING THE FRAGILE UNITY THEY HAVE THUS FAR ACHIEVED. HOWEVER, SINCE THE REAGAN PLAN WAS THE ONLY ONE FEASIBLE, IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE U.S. MOVE QUICKLY TO SET IT IN MOTION. ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WAS THE FIRST STEP AND TIME WAS RUNNING OUT FOR THE U.S. UNLESS A SETTLEMENT WERE REACHED WITHIN TWO MONTHS, CHIRAC PREDICTED THAT ALL PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT THAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE REGION OVER THE PAST EIGHT MONTHS WOULD BE WASTED.

4. ADDING TO THE URGENCY OF THE U.S. TASK IN THE MIDDLE EAST, CHIRAC CONTINUED, WAS THE INCREASING FRAGILITY OF MOST ARAB STATES. CHIRAC DIVIDED THE ARAB WORLD INTO TWO GROUPS: NATIONS HE CHARACTERIZED AS HAVING MODERN STATE STRUCTURES (EGYPT, SYRIA, IRAQ) AND THOSE WHICH WERE ESSENTIALLY "FAMILY AFFAIRS" AND THUS ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE TO DESTABILIZATION AND VIOLENT CHANGE. IN THE CASE OF THE "MODERN STATES", CHIRAC SAID SYRIA WAS RULED BY A CRAZY (FOLLE) MINORITY, EGYPT WAS WANDERING OUTSIDE THE ARAB FOLD, AND IRAQ WAS INVOLVED IN A LIFE OR DEATH STRUGGLE WITH IRAN. IRAQ, CHIRAC INSISTED, WAS THE KEY.

5. IRAQ COULD COLLAPSE FROM ONE DAY TO THE NEXT. IF THE IRAQI ARMY WERE TO FALL PREY TO INTERNAL DISSENSION, THE IRANIANS WOULD BE IN BAGHDAD WITHIN A MATTER OF HOURS. THE THREAT FROM IRAN'S KHOMEINI WAS ONE WHICH AIMED AT THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD, AND IT WAS IRAQ THAT WAS PAYING THE PRICE FOR KEEPING IRANIAN FANATICISM AT BAY. WERE IRAQ TO SUCCUMB TO IRANIAN ATTACKS, OTHER STATES IN THE REGION WOULD COLLAPSE IN TURN, INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA.

6. U.S. SHOULD OPEN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ.

AFTER DEVELOPING THIS ANALYSIS, CHIRAC CAME TO THE REAL POINT OF HIS MIDEAST PRESENTATION. CHIRAC SAID THAT HE IS IN TOUCH WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN, THE LATEST COMMUNICATION BEING A LETTER WHICH CHIRAC HAD RECEIVED TWO DAYS AGO.

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7

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PAGE 1 - 373

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

IN HIS CONTACTS, THE IRAQIS HAVE PERSISTENTLY SIGNALLED
THEIR DESIRE FOR CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND WITH
THE U.S. IN PARTICULAR. CHIRAC FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE
THAT WASHINGTON WAS IGNORANT OF RECENT EVOLUTIONS IN
IRAQI POLICIES, INCLUDING RECENT DECLARATIONS OF IRAQI
WILLINGNESS TO SEE ISRAEL, THE PLO, AND EGYPT SIT AT
THE SAME NEGOTIATING TABLE, A MOVE WHICH CHIRAC SAID

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PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 3246
SIT408 RECALLED

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PRIORITY
STU7867
DE RUFHFR #3246/02 0261943
P 261938Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1785
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3199
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0989
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4339

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 PARIS 03246

EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, FR
SUBJECT: CHIRAC'S VIEWS ON CURRENT ISSUES
AMOUNTED TO IRAQI RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL. THE IRAQIS
ARE TRYING TO MOVE IN THE WEST'S DIRECTION, SAID CHIRAC,
AND THEY ARE ASKING FROM THE U. S. ONLY ONE CONCESSION:
THAT THE U. S. STOP THE FLOW OF ARMS FROM ISRAEL TO IRAN.

7. CHIRAC WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE KNEW THERE WERE
ELEMENTS IN THE US ADMINISTRATION WHICH BELIEVED THE
US COULD WIN INFLUENCE IN IRAN BY MAINTAINING AN ARMS
SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. CHIRAC CALLED THEM NAIVE AND
FOOLISH. HE SUGGESTED THAT NEITHER PRESIDENT REAGAN NOR
SECRETARY SHULTZ SEEMED TO BE SUPPORTIVE OF THIS POLICY,
BUT THAT NEVERTHELESS THE ARMS SUPPLY OPERATION HAD
REACHED MASSIVE PROPORTIONS. ISRAELI ADVISORS ARE ON THE
GROUND IN IRAN, HE SAID, AND SHARON HAD STATED PUBLICLY
THAT ISRAEL HAD SENT THREE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS WORTH
OF ARMS TO IRAN. CHIRAC SAID HE HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT THE
RECKLESSNESS OF SUCH A POLICY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, WHO
HAD QUICKLY AGREED AND CALLED THE IDEA "MADNESS". CHIRAC
SAID HE HAD REPORTED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REACTION TO
SADDAM HUSSEIN.

8. IF TERRORISM WAS A PROBLEM, CHIRAC SAID HE HAD
RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT THE ISSUE
WOULD BE QUICKLY RESOLVED. ABOU NIDAL, SAID CHIRAC,
SPENDS MOST OF HIS TIME IN DAMASCUS ANYWAY, AND
SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD BE WILLING TO ASSURE THAT HE NEVER
SETS FOOT INSIDE IRAQ AGAIN IF THAT WAS WHAT THE
AMERICANS WANTED. OTHER TERRORISTS WOULD "DISAPPEAR".

9. CHIRAC CONCLUDED BY EMPHASIZING THAT IT WAS TIME FOR
THE U. S. TO ESTABLISH FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH
IRAQ AND HE OFFERED TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN THE
AMBASSADOR AND THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR (WHO, UNLIKE HIS
PREDECESSOR, HAS SADDAM HUSSEIN'S COMPLETE CONFIDENCE).

INF DEPLOYMENT AND THE ALLIANCE

10. TURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF DEPLOYMENT OF U. S.
PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES IN EUROPE, CHIRAC
REITERATED HIS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE INITIATIVE. HE
REPEATED THAT FRANCE WAS UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO INCLUDING
FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ANY INF SETTLEMENT, BUT SAID
THAT FRENCH WEAPONS COULD BE COUNTED IN THE FUTURE UNDER
START NEGOTIATIONS. CHIRAC HASTENED TO ADD THAT THIS

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PAGE 02 OF 02 PARIS 3246

DTG: 261938Z JAN 83 PSN: 017128

DID NOT MEAN ANY EVENTUAL FRENCH REDUCTIONS IN FORCE, BUT SIMPLY THAT FRENCH WEAPONS COULD BE COUNTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARRIVING AT AN OVERALL APPRAISAL OF WESTERN STRENGTH.

11. CONCERNING PUBLIC OPINION IN FRANCE, CHIRAC SAID THE FRENCH SOLIDLY SUPPORTED THEIR OWN NUCLEAR FORCES AND INF DEPLOYMENTS IN OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. CHIRAC WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SITUATION IN GERMANY WAS DANGEROUS. AN SDP VICTORY THERE WOULD SPELL DISASTER FOR INF DEPLOYMENT. KOHL HAD TOLD CHIRAC LAST WEEK THAT THERE WAS NO REASON TO BE OVERLY PESSIMISTIC, AND CHIRAC HIMSELF EXPRESSED GUARDED OPTIMISM ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE MARCH VOTING. CHIRAC STRONGLY CRITICIZED SDP LEADER VOGEL FOR TRAVELLING TO MOSCOW AND "ALIGNING" BEHIND THE ANDROPOV PROPOSALS.

12. CHIRAC SAID THE ENTIRE NATO RELATIONSHIP HAD TO BE RETHOUGHT. NATO STRUCTURES ARE OUT OF DATE AND NEW MECHANISMS FOR CONSULTATIONS HAD TO BE FOUND. CHIRAC REPROACHED THE U.S. FOR CONSISTENTLY SCUTTLEING EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A EUROPEAN ARMS INDUSTRY AND TO ENSURE A MEANINGFUL TWO-WAY STREET ON ARMAMENTS PROCUREMENT. HE ARGUED THAT THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE HAD TO BE THOUGHT THROUGH AGAIN, SINCE IT NO LONGER REASSURES THE GERMANS, WHO ARE CONCERNED THAT A EUROPEAN WAR WILL BE FOUGHT OUT ON FRG TERRITORY. WHEN WE NOTED THAT THE FAILURE OF FRANCE TO COMMIT ITSELF TO THE FORWARD DEFENSE

OF GERMANY CONTRIBUTES TO GERMAN DOUBTS, CHIRAC AGREED THAT THIS WAS TRUE. CHIRAC ALSO THOUGHT A RENEWED U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE WAS CALLED FOR, THOUGH HE DID NOT WANT TO RENEGOTIATE THE NATO TREATY.

DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF U.S. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS.

13. CHIRAC SAID HE HAD BEEN DISTURBED IN WASHINGTON BY THE APPARENTLY DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED ANALYSES OF U.S. ECONOMIC PROSPECTS WHICH HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO HIM BY BT

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DE RUFHFR #3246/03 0261944
P 261938Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1786
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3200
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0990
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4340

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A L SECTION 03 OF 03 PARIS 03246

EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, FR
SUBJECT: CHIRAC'S VIEWS ON CURRENT ISSUES
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR ECONOMIC
POLICIES. SOME BELIEVED RECOVERY LIKELY; OTHERS WERE
PESSIMISTIC. CHIRAC SAID THIS INCONSISTENCY WAS THE
ONLY ELEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAD GIVEN HIM
PAUSE. OTHERWISE, HE WAS IN BROAD AGREEMENT WITH
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POLICIES. CHIRAC HIMSELF WAS DOUBTFUL
THAT A MEANINGFUL ECONOMIC RECOVERY WAS POSSIBLE IN THE
U. S. IN 1983. HE THOUGHT SOME SMALL MOVEMENT WAS THE
MOST WHICH COULD BE EXPECTED. THE AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED
TO CHIRAC WHY THE BEGINNING OF A RECOVERY NOW
SEEMED PROBABLE.

14. COMMENT.

CHIRAC SEEMED PLEASED WITH THE EVOLUTION OF RPR
POLICIES, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN POLICY.
WHILE HE SOUGHT TO DE-DRAMATIZE THE CHANGES, HE NOTED
POINTEDLY THAT DESPITE A NUMBER OF POLICY DIRECTIONS WHICH
ARE SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM TRADITIONAL GAULLIST VIEWS,
THERE HAD BEEN NO OBJECTION FROM THE GAULLIST "BARONS"
SUCH AS DEBRE AND COUVE DE MURVILLE.
GALBRAITH
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48267

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 69221 DTG: 290515Z JAN 83 PSN: 021020
SIT726 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 029/0821Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOBBOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTD IN SHULTZ REPORT---FURTHER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6922 0290631
O 290515Z JAN 83 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0467

~~SECRET~~ STATE 026922
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, EEWT, FR

SUBJECT: US CONSULTATIONS WITH FRENCH ON MT-20

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 1707-081 748267

BY GW NARA DATE 5/12/10

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS EMBASSY IS AWARE, ADMIRAL REYNARD AND FRANCOIS HEISBOURG MET WITH DOD ASST SECRETARY PERLE ON JANUARY 17 (THE DAY BEFORE THE VISIT OF MOD HERNU) TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE FINAL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF THE THOMSON-CSF MT-20 EQUIPMENT JUST SOLD TO THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS, THE GOF REPRESENTATIVES OFFERED TO ARRANGE FURTHER TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS FOR USG OFFICIALS.

3. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO CONVEY TO GENERAL MARTRE AND HEISBOURG OUR DESIRE TO PURSUE SUCH DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS, PREFERABLY DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN FEBRUARY. THE US TEAM, WHICH WILL BE LEAD BY DAS STEPHEN BRYEN AND WILL INCLUDE TWO OTHER TECHNICAL-LEVEL OFFICIALS, WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH BOTH MOD AND THOMSON-CSF OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE DETAILS OF THE LSI SEMI-CONDUCTOR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PRO, USED TO BE TRANSFERRED TO TH: USSR. BRYEN HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO PREPARE A REPORT FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON THIS SUBJECT. SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 69221 DTG: 290515Z JAN 83 PSN: 021020

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

12

48268

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 69231 DTG: 290516Z JAN 83 PSN: 021021
SIT725 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 029/0822Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOBBOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTD IN SHULTZ REPORT---FURTHER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6923 0290631
O 290516Z JAN 83 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0468

SECRET STATE 026923

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, FR, AO, US

SUBJECT: READOUT ON PLATT MISSION FOR PENNE DEBRIEF

REF: (A) PARIS 3280; (B) LISBON 754 (NOTAL)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. THE MESSAGES - REPEAT OF REF B AND SEPARATE MESSAGE
PASSED US FROM PLATT VIA BRITISH - ARE ON THEIR WAY TO
YOU FOR CONSERVATIVE USE AS NECESSARY IN PRIMING PUMP
IN MEETING (S) TO SEEK RESULTS OF PENNE STOP IN LUANDA,
AS REQUESTED. SHULTZ

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NLRR M07-081 #48268

BY CIL NARA DATE 5/11/11

SECRET

SECRET

13

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48269

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 66541 DTG: 290116Z JAN 83 PSN: 020827
SIT728 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 029/0345Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SITT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: NODISISTD IN SHULTZ REPORT---FURTHER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #6654 0290128
O 290116Z JAN 83 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0422

~~SECRET~~ STATE 026654

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, FR, AO, US

SUBJECT: READOUT ON PLATT MISSION FOR PENNE DEBRIEF

REF: PARIS 3280

1. (~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FOLLOWING IS GIST OF MESSAGE FROM PLATT IN LUANDA
REFERRED TO SEPTTEL FOR USE IN PENNE ANGOLA VISIT DEBRIEF.

3. QUOTE. SIX HOURS WITH VICE MINISTER DA MOURA WENT
AS FOLLOWS: IN MORNING SESSION REVIEWED EVENTS SINCE
SEPTEMBER: WISNER MISSION, PRISONER EXCHANGE, BOTHA
VISIT, CAPE VERDE MEETINGS, CROCKER IN MOSCOW, LESOTHO
RAID, MOZAMBIQUE DEVELOPMENTS; EMPHASIZED CONTINUED SOUTH
AFRICAN INSISTENCE ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL BEFORE CBI
AND IMPLEMENTATION AND DIRECTED ANGOLAN ATTENTION TO
CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON TABLE. I STRESSED NEED FOR SPECIFIC
RESPONSES ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE, CBI, AND SECURITY
GUARANTEES BEFORE WASHINGTON - BASED MISSION COULD RETURN
FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. CONSIDERED ANGOLAN RESPONSE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

(DELIVERED AFTER A RECESS OF SEVERAL HOURS PRESUMABLY TO
CLEAR WITH OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND PERHAPS WITH DOS
SANTOS PERSONALLY) INCLUDED STRONG APPEAL TO KEEP CHANNELS

TO US OPEN, RECOGNITION THAT US EFFORTS HAD IMPROVED IN
SOME DEGREE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN REGION; COMPLAINTS
THAT S.A. BACKED GUERRILLAS HAD DESTROYED BENGUELA DAM,
CLAIMS THAT PRESSURE OF BUSINESS AND WAR HAD PREVENTED
DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF ALL CONCRETE PROPOSALS; FIRM
STATEMENT THAT US DEMAND FOR SPECIFICITY ON DATES AND
NUMBERS WAS "UNTIMELY AND INAPPROPRIATE" AS LONG AS
SOUTH AFRICANS OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF ANGOLA; SOME EXPLA-
NATIONS THAT ANGOLA HAD NOT RESPONDED BECAUSE IT EXPECTED
ANSWERS FROM US; AND FAIR REQUESTS THAT THEY BE GIVEN
MORE ADVANCE NOTICE NEXT TIME OF AMERICAN VISIT.

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NLRR 108-081 # 48269
BY ON NARA DATE 5/19/10

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

14

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 66541 DTG: 290116Z JAN 83 PSN: 020827

DA MOURA WAS AT ONCE BUSINESSLIKE, AND FRIENDLY, CONVULSED AND INTRANSIGENT. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT ANGOLANS NEITHER ADVANCED NOR RETREATED FROM POSITIONS TAKEN IN EARLIER EXCHANGES WITH US. THEY ARE NOT INTERNALLY READY YET FOR A SETTLEMENT. OUR APPEARANCE AND MESSAGE CAME AT AN OPPORTUNE TIME, HOWEVER. GUY PENNE ARRIVES IN LUANDA JANUARY 28, PEREZ DE CUELLAR JANUARY 29 AND TALKS WITH SOUTH AFRICANS ARE RUMoured TO BEGIN AS SOON AS JANUARY 29. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR LEFT LUANDA FOR MOSCOW JANUARY 24 ON URGENT CONSULTATIONS.

I BELIEVE MISSION ACCOMPLISHED ITS LIMITED OBJECTIVES. WE ESTABLISHED INTERIM CONTACT WITH ANGOLANS WITHIN TIME LIMIT YOU HAD PROMISED, ATTACKED MISAPPREHENSIONS ABOUT SOUTH AFRICAN LACK OF INTEREST IN CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL; INSISTED THAT ANGOLANS ANSWER THEIR MAIL; AND SPENT NO WASHINGTON CAPITAL IN PROCESS. THE ANGOLANS ACCEPTED ME AS AN INTERLOCUTOR AND CONVENIENT SUPPLEMENTARY CHANNEL. ANGOLANS HAVE GIVEN VISIT MINIMUM PUBLICITY. I HOPE TO KEEP IT THAT WAY.

I BRIEFED THE LUANDA CONTACT GROUP IN VERY GENERAL TERMS ON THE PURPOSE AND WITHIN THE STRICT LIMITS OF THAT PURPOSE THE SUCCESS OF THE VISIT. END QUOTE. SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 66541 DTG: 290116Z JAN 83 PSN: 020827

~~SECRET~~

13
SENSITIVE

48270

PAGE 1 - 284

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83/1035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE403
OO RUEHC RUFHFR RUEHCR
DE RUEHC #7297 0291827
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 291826Z JAN 83
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0491
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE 8951
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 027297
EXDIS FOR THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PINT, NS, FR
SUBJECT: SURINAME

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-081 #48270

BY CJ NARA DATE 5/19/10

REF: PARIS 3279, PARIS 3281

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. PLEASE ARRANGE TO MEET AT EARLIEST CONVENIENCE FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON TO PROVIDE HIM WITH OUR LATEST ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN SURINAME. GIVEN FRENCH CONCERNS AND INTERESTS IN THE AREA AS WELL AS THE PRECARIOUS STATE OF AFFAIRS IN PARAMARIBO, WE BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL TO LET THE FRENCH KNOW AT A HIGH LEVEL OF OUR THINKING ON THE BOUTERSE REGIME AND ITS FUTURE. YOU MAY DRAW UPON THE FOLLOWING IN YOUR MEETING:

--SINCE THE KILLINGS IN EARLY DECEMBER IT HAS BECOME CLEAR TO US THAT BOUTERSE IS INCREASINGLY UNPOPULAR AND HAS LOST SUPPORT IN ALL IMPORTANT SECTORS, INCLUDING THE MILITARY. HE IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE ISOLATED AND HIS POWER BASE HAS ERODED TO THE POINT THAT ONLY A FEW CIVILIAN RADICALS AND A HANDFUL OF LOYAL MILITARY

PERSONNEL REMAIN AT HIS SIDE.

--AFTER FIRING MOST OF HIS OFFICERS, AND IN THE FACE OF SOME TROOP DESERTIONS, HE HAS TAKEN THE WEAPONS FROM VARIOUS OUTLYING UNITS AND STORAGE DEPOTS AND PLACED THEM IN FORT ZEELANDIA UNDER THE CONTROL OF A SMALL UNIT THAT HE STILL TRUSTS.

--HE APPARENTLY FEARS FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY, ROTATING

SENSITIVE

16
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 285

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HIS PLACES OF ABODE NIGHTLY, ACCOMPANIED ALWAYS BY A HEAVY BODYGUARD.

--ALTHOUGH EXILE GROUPS ARE APPARENTLY ORGANIZING, NO ACTIVE OR EFFECTIVE OPPOSITION HAS EMERGED INSIDE SURINAME, HOWEVER. STILL THE SITUATION IS UNSTABLE AND FRAGILE. --

--WE ARE MORE CONVINCED THAN EVER THAT BOUTERSE IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED AND HIS REGIME PROFOUNDLY ILLEGITIMATE. HE IS TOO HEAVILY IMPLICATED IN THE KILLINGS EVER TO EMERGE AS A POPULAR OR EFFECTIVE LEADER. HIS ONLY MEANS OF SURVIVAL IS THROUGH FORCE AND INTIMIDATION. FROM A MORAL AND PRACTICAL STANDPOINT NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH BOUTERSE OR AN ATTEMPT TO COOPT HIM BY RESTORING AID ARE OUT OF THE QUESTION.

-- HARD EVIDENCE IS LACKING TO PROVE SIGNIFICANT CUBAN PRESENCE AND INVOLVEMENT, BUT THE INFLUENCE OF CUBA THROUGH ITS AMBASSADOR IN PARAMARIBO AND ADVISERS IN A FEW KEY SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION LOCATIONS IS UNMISTAKEABLE. BOUTERSE'S SPEECHES AND THE GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL STATEMENTS SHOW AN INCREASED AMOUNT OF CUBANESQUE JARGON. ANTI-U.S. ITEMS ARE APPEARING MORE FREQUENTLY IN THE GOS CONTROLLED MEDIA. THERE HAS BEEN A DRAMATIC RISE IN MATERIAL SOURCED TO HAVANA'S PRENSA LATINA AND MOSCOW'S TASS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, BOUTERSE'S RECENT BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE CONTAINS THE USUAL FORMULAS TO CREATE A TOTALITARIAN STATE THROUGH A "PEOPLE'S REVOLUTION."

--WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT CUBA MAY CONCLUDE THAT BOUTERSE IS FATALLY FLAWED AND MAY VIEW HIM AS A TRANSITORY FIGURE TO PROVIDE TIME TO PREPARE THE GROUND FOR A MORE ACCEPTABLE PERSON--BOTH TO THEM AND TO THE SURINAMERS--TO TAKE POWER.

--WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN CURRENT FRENCH THINKING CONCERNING THE STATUS OF OPPOSITION TO BOUTERSE IN SURINAME AND OUTSIDE, SUCH AS IN FRENCH GUIANA.

--WE HAVE CONSULTED WITH FRIENDS IN EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA AND ELSEWHERE. ALMOST ALL ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN SUSPENDED TO THE BOUTERSE GOVERNMENT, AND NO ONE, TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, HAS RESPONDED FAVORABLY TO HIS REQUESTS FOR AID.

SENSITIVE

17
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 286

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

--THE ECONOMIC SITUATION MAY BE MORE CRITICAL THAN WE FIRST THOUGHT. SURINAME'S RESERVES MAY BE MUCH LESS THAN THE 200 MILLION DOLLARS SOME HAD REPORTED. ALTHOUGH SURINAME'S RELATIVELY GOOD ECONOMIC BASE COULD PERMIT BOUTERSE TO COAST FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, HE APPARENTLY IS BEGINNING TO FEEL PINCHED AND IS SEEKING RATHER DESPERATELY TO OBTAIN SUFFICIENT AID TO REPLACE DUTCH ASSISTANCE (100 MILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY). WE HAVE A NUMBER OF REPORTS INDICATING THAT BOUTERSE HAS ARRANGED A SIZEABLE LOAN FROM THE COLOMBIAN NARCOTICS UNDERWORLD IN RETURN FOR FREE USE OF ZANDERIJ AIRPORT.

--WE WOULD APPRECIATE THE GOF ANALYSIS ON THE SURINAME SITUATION AND CURRENT THINKING AS TO POLICY OPTIONS.

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BT
#7297
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SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48271 18

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 3858
SIT006 DATE 02/20/83

02764

DTG: 011231Z FEB 83 PSN: 025098
TOR: 032/1344Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOBSITTBEMP
EOB: NTS: CHECKLIST
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTS. ADVISE AS TO FURTHER DISSEM. BERM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #3858 0321233
O 011231Z FEB 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2179
BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 03858
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AO, FR, US, SF
SUBJECT: GUY PENNE VISIT TO ANGOLA
1. S-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE ANGOLANS TOLD PENNE THAT THEY HAD NOT COMPLETED REFLECTING ON THE FRENCH PROPOSALS. HOWEVER, PENNE SAID HE MAY HAVE MORE FOR US ON THIS SUBJECT IN A FEW DAYS AS THE ANGOLANS ARE SUPPOSED TO BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH HIM SHORTLY.

3. DURING HIS MEETINGS WITH THE ANGOLANS, THEY TOLD PENNE THAT THEY NOW HAVE DIVIDED THE PROBLEM INTO TWO PARTS. THE FIRST IS THE WAR BETWEEN ANGOLA AND SOUTH AFRICA. THIS THEY WILL DEAL WITH IN THE BILATERAL CONTEXT AND HOPE TO MEET AGAIN SOON WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THEY WILL DEAL WITH THE CUBAN ISSUE. THE ANGOLANS TOLD PENNE THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE TOLD THEM THAT THEY ARE NOT CONCERNED WITH THE CUBAN ISSUE, IT IS SOLELY AN AMERICAN HANG-UP.

4. THE SECOND HALF OF THE ANGOLANS' DIVISION OF THE PROBLEM IS THE NAMIBIA SETTLEMENT WHICH IS THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

5. PENNE SAID THAT THE ANGOLANS TOLD HIM THEY ARE INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING THEIR DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. HOWEVER THEY TERMED THAT DIALOGUE AS VERY UNSATISFACTORY UP TO NOW BECAUSE OF THE AMERICAN OBSESSION OVER THE CUBAN ISSUE. CUBA, THEY SAID, IS THE ONLY THING THE AMERICANS EVER WANT TO TALK ABOUT.

6. BEFORE GETTING THE ABOVE FROM PENNE, WE WERE IN CONTACT WITH AUSSEIL WHO WAS RATHER OPTIMISTIC. HE SAID THAT PENNE HAD NOT GOTTEN ANYTHING DECISIVE OUT OF THE ANGOLANS, BUT THAT THINGS WERE MOVING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

7. SHOULD THE PARIS MEETING ON ZAIRE COME OFF (AND WE

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-081 #48271
BY AS NARA DATE 5/19/10

SECRET

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

19

PAGE 02 OF 02 PARIS 3858

02764 DTG: 011231Z FEB 83 PSN: 025098

WERE TOLD YESTERDAY, 1/31, THAT WE SHOULD HAVE A NEW
DATE BY TODAY OR TOMORROW) WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT WE
SET UP A SEPARATE SESSION WITH PENNE AND AUSSEIL TO
REVIEW THE ANGOLA TRACK.

8. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO LONDON AND
EMBASSY CAPETOWN.
GALBRAITH

PARIS 3858

02764 DTG: 011231Z FEB 83 PSN: 025098

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ACTION

February 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER *DF*

SUBJECT: Proposed meeting with Andreani

At a recent breakfast meeting at his residence, French Ambassador Vernier-Palliez asked me to convey his hope that you would be able to meet with Jacques Andreani, Political Director of the French Ministry of External Relations, when he visits Washington in early March. I had a useful discussion with Andreani in Paris during the Shultz trip.

Given the importance of the issues now confronting us, I would recommend that you try to see Andreani if at all possible. In addition to the standard big-ticket items, it would be worth exploring current French thinking on Libya and prospects for a diplomatic effort on problems of the Aegean--which I discussed with the Ambassador. It would also be worth cautioning Andreani on any new Central American initiative (mentioned in today's intelligence report) between France and Spain.

RECOMMENDATIONOKNO*DFM*

—

That you agree to see Andreani during his visit, March 2-4.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 107-081-48272

CN

DATE 4/29/10

527
2'

National Security Council
The White House

1225P

Package # 781

FEB 0 2 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>X</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>✓</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

22
ID 8300781

RECEIVED 02 FEB 83 14

TO MCFARLANE FROM FORTIER

DOCDATE 01 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

ANDREANI, JACQUES

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR MCFARLANE TO MEET W/ POLITICAL DIRECTOR OF FRENCH
MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS MAR 2 - 4

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 20 FEB 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION
MCFARLANE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

FEB 07 1983

Mcfarlane approved

DF

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *DA* (C) *N*

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

26

48273

PAGE 01 PARIS 3942 35464 DTG: 011743Z FEB 83 PSN: 025603
SIT999 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 032/1907Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB SITTBEMP
EOB: NTS: CHECKLIST
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTLS. ADVISE AS TO FURTHER DISSEM. BERM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #3942 0321743
O 011743Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2260

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 03942
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, AO, FR
SUBJECT: PENNE VISIT TO ANGOLA -- PART II
REF: PARIS 3858

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THERE APPARENTLY IS MORE TO PENNE'S ANGOLA CONVERSATION THAN REPORTED EARLIER TODAY (REFTEL). SUBSEQUENT TO REFTL, EMBOFF RAN INTO OENNE, WHO INDICATED THAT THERE IS ANOTHER VERY SENSITIVE AND INTERESTING ASPECT TO HIS CONVERSATIONS IN ANGOLA. HOWEVER, BEFORE HE CAN SHARE THE INFORMATION WITH US, HE SAYS HE MUST SEEK THE APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. WE WILL, OF COURSE, BE FOLLOWING UP WITH PENNE AND ASSUME IT HAS SOME DIRECT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CUBAN ISSUE. GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 107-081 48273

BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~

27

48274

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 1

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE276
UTS6064
OO RUEHC
DE RUFHFR #4362/01 0341827
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031824Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2504
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 5953
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0824
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1106
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4443
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5642
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 3262
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 04362

EXDIS

GENEVA AND ROME FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S DELEGATION
USINF/USSTART

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)

SUBJECT: ISSUES FRENCH MAY RAISE WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR HELD TOUR D'HORIZON WITH
QUAI SEC GEN GUTMANN FEB 1 TO IDENTIFY SUBJECTS WHICH
FRENCH MIGHT RAISE DURING THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT
HERE NEXT WEEK. DCM WENT OVER THE SAME GROUND WITH
MITTERRAND'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR (VEDRINE) ON FEB. 2.
THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THEIR VIEWS. END SUMMARY.

--INF:

3. THE FRENCH RECOGNIZE THAT INF WILL BE THE MAIN
SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION, AND THAT THERE IS BROAD AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE US AND FRANCE ON THIS ISSUE. THUS, DIS-
CUSSIONS WILL BE IN THE NATURE OF A COMPARISON OF
NOTES, EXCHANGE OF ANALYSES AND A REVIEW OF NEXT
STEPS. GUTMANN SAID THE FRENCH WILL BE INTERESTED
IN RECEIVING AN EXPLANATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE PRESIDENT'S OPEN LETTER. VEDRINE SAID THE FRENCH
HAD NOTED THE GLOBALITY INTRODUCED INTO THE US PRO-
POSAL BY THE OPEN LETTER, WHICH APPEARED TO HIM TO
REPRESENT A TOUGHER POSITION THAN OUR PREVIOUS STANCE.
VEDRINE WAS NONETHELESS COMPLIMENTARY ABOUT THE LETTER
AS A TACTIC. THE SOVIETS WERE ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE

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NLRR 007-081 #48274

BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/10

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 2

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PUBLIC OPINION IN WESTERN EUROPE AND WE HAD EVERY RIGHT TO DO SO TOO. THE LETTER WAS AN EXCELLENT TACTIC IN THIS REGARD, EVEN IF ITS CONTENT REPRESENTED ONLY A LIMITED REVISION OF THE US POSITION. IT IS NOW THE SOVIETS WHO ARE IN THE POSITION OF SAYING "NIET".

4. BOTH GUTMANN AND VEDRINE REFLECTED OUT LOUD ON NEXT STEPS. GUTMANN SAID THE TONE OF US AND FRENCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON INF SEEMED TO DIFFER, AND SAW THE FRENCH RESPONSE TO THE ANDROPOV PROPOSAL AS MUCH MORE BRUTALLY NEGATIVE THAN OURS. GUTMANN NOTED THAT, DESPITE THE CURRENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE, THERE HAVE BEEN NO POLEMICS ABOUT THE GOF POSITION ON INF-- NOT EVEN ABOUT MITTERRAND'S BONN SPEECH, WHICH WOULD NORMALLY BE A TEMPTING POLITICAL TARGET. THIS SHOWED THE BROAD AGREEMENT IN FRANCE ON THE NEED TO DEPLOY US INF. GUTMANN SAID FRANCE IS THE EUROPEAN ALLY WHICH IS MOST RESOLVED ON THIS ISSUE, AND WE AND THE FRENCH NEED TO WORK TOGETHER ON THE ISSUE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, EVEN THOUGH US AND FRENCH REASONING MAY AT TIMES DIFFER BECAUSE OF OUR DIFFERENT NATIONAL POSITIONS.

5. VEDRINE RECALLED THAT THE FRENCH HAD ALWAYS VIEWED THE ZERO OPTION NEGATIVELY BECAUSE IT APPEARED TO BE DECOUPLING. (WE REVIEWED FOR HIS BENEFIT THE HISTORY OF HOW WE GOT WHERE WE ARE, AND NOTED THAT IF THE FRENCH HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE TACTICAL DISCUSSIONS AT NATO THEY MIGHT HAVE HAD SOME INFLUENCE ON THINGS. VEDRINE REPLIED TO THIS POINT BY SAYING FRANCE HAD "MUCH TO LOSE" BY PARTICIPATING IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS-- AN APPARENT REFERENCE TO FRANCE'S INDEPENDENT DEFENSE POLICY). VEDRINE NONETHELESS THOUGHT THAT THE ZERO OPTION NOW APPEARS TO HAVE MERIT BECAUSE IT PROVIDES A LOGICAL BASIS FOR A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION BASED ON EQUAL FORCES FOR BOTH SIDES. SUCH A SOLUTION APPEARED TO BE THE NEXT STEP, AND VEDRINE RECOGNIZED ITS ADVANTAGES. INSTALLATION OF SOME US MISSILES WOULD RECOUPLE US TO EUROPEAN DEFENSE, AND A BALANCE OF US AND SOVIET INF WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PRESENT SITUATION. VEDRINE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO STRESS OUR OBJECTIVES REPEATEDLY IN SIMPLE TERMS THAT WEST EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION WILL UNDERSTAND. HE ALSO THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO STRESS THAT INF NEGOTIATIONS WILL CONTINUE DURING AND AFTER THE FIRST DEPLOYMENTS-- SO THAT THE PUBLIC DOESN'T GET THE IDEA THAT THERE IS NO LONGER HOPE FOR AN ARMS CONTROL SOLUTION AFTER THE FIRST PERSHING IS INSTALLED.

--ECONOMIC ISSUES:

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 3

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST

SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BT
#4362
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SENSITIVE

30
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 4

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST
SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE277
UTS6066
OO RUEHC
DE RUFHFR #4362/02 0341828
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031824Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2505
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 5954
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0825
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1107
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4444
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5643
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 3263
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 04362

EXDIS

GENEVA AND ROME FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S DELEGATION
USINF/USSTART

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)

SUBJECT: ISSUES FRENCH MAY RAISE WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT
6. GUTMANN NOTED THAT CEA CHAIRMAN FELDSTEIN WOULD BE
ACCOMPANYING THE VICE PRESIDENT, AND THOUGHT THE
TIMING WAS EXCELLENT FOR A TALK ABOUT COMMERCIAL
AND FINANCIAL POLICIES. THE FRENCH WILL BE INTERESTED
IN AN AUTHORITATIVE US ANALYSIS OF PROSPECTS FOR THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY OVER THE NEXT YEAR. INTERESTINGLY,
GUTMANN APPEARED TO INVITE IDEAS FOR FRENCH POLICIES;
HE SAID THE FRENCH ARE AT A STAGE WHERE THEY HAVE
IDENTIFIED GENERAL ORIENTATIONS BUT HAVE NOT YET
WORKED OUT A DETAILED TECHNICAL PROGRAM.

--LEBANON:

7. BOTH GUTMANN AND VEDRINE REFLECTED DEEP CONCERN
OVER THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AND THE IRAN/IRAQ
CONFRONTATION. WE HAVE HEARD THESE VIEWS SO OFTEN
RECENTLY THAT WE ARE CERTAIN THEY WILL BE RAISED DUR-
ING THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. ON LEBANON, THE FRENCH
VIEW THE PRESENT IMPASSE AS INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS,
AND BLAME IT LARGELY ON ISRAELI STUBBORNESS. THEY
ARE CONCERNED MORE THAN EVER AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF
THE GROWING DANGER TO THEIR OWN TROOPS, AND WILL PRO-

SENSITIVE

31
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 5

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/04/83//035

SITUATION: CHECKLIST

SUBJECT CATEGORY: SAVE

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BABLY URGE US TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE ISRAELIS.

--IRAN/IRAQ:

8. GUTMANN AND VEDRINE WERE ALSO PREOCCUPIED ABOUT THE NEED TO SUPPORT IRAQ. GUTMANN NOTED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OBSTACLE TO IMPROVED US-IRAQI RELATIONS IS IRAQI SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. GUTMANN WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT ARMS BEING SUPPLIED TO IRAN. HE SAID THE FRENCH HAD STUDIED THIS MATTER AND HAD FOUND THAT THE PREVIOUS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH NORTH KOREA HAD LARGELY BEEN REPLACED BY ARMS COMING FROM ARMS MERCHANTS IN WESTERN EUROPE (MAINLY THE FRG AND ITALY), BEIRUT AND ISRAEL.

--USSR:

9. GUTMANN ANTICIPATED AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON RELATIONS WITH THE USSR UNDER ANDROPOV. HE POINTEDLY EXPLAINED THAT CHEYSSON'S TRIP TO MOSCOW (SCHEDULED FOR FEB. 16-18) DOES NOT REPRESENT A WARMING OF FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS. MITTERRAND HAD WANTED TO BREAK THE REGULAR RHYTHM OF RELATIONS AFTER HE TOOK OFFICE, BUT THIS HAD NOW BEEN DONE. THE FRENCH DO NOT ANTICIPATE A RETURN TO THE FREQUENT HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL CONTACTS WHICH PREVIOUS FRENCH GOVERNMENTS HAD WITH THE SOVIETS.

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SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

32

48275

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 45031 DTG: 052045Z FEB 83 PSN: 033496
SIT710 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 037/0125Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOBEOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTED DAM REPORTS AS TO FURTHER DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #4503 0362124
O 052045Z FEB 83 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0912
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 5966

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 5326
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 6304
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 034503

NODIS

PARIS FOR HABIB FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, PINS, LE, IS, OW, US

SUBJECT: ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SHUF: CONTINGENCY
PLANNING

REF: 1. STATE 33879 2. HABIB-VELIOTES TELCON 2/5/83

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHILE WE HAVE BEGUN TO PUT ISRAELI AND LEBANESE GOVERNMENTS AND LEBANESE FACTIONS ON NOTICE THAT ANY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL NOT BE FOLLOWED BY COMMUNAL VIOLENCE, WE MUST ALSO THINK ABOUT WHAT WE, THE GOL AND OUR MNF PARTNERS MIGHT DO IF PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALAYH AND/OR THE SHUF DOES BEGIN AND IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT VIOLENCE IS IN THE OFFING. WE NEED TO CONSIDER WHAT MIGHT BE DONE WITHIN THE PARAMETERS, ON THE ONE HAND, OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOT USING THE MNF FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES, AND ON THE OTHER, OF NOT BEING SEEN TO BE DOING NOTHING WHILE MASSACRES ARE PERPETRATED NEARBY.

3. AS A FIRST STEP IN THINKING THOUGH THIS CONTINGENCY, YOU SHOULD RAISE IT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON AND AMBASSADOR DILLON WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. IT SHOULD OF COURSE BE MADE CLEAR THAT WE CONTINUE TO OPPOSE A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT ON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. NEVERTHELESS, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER IT IS IN ALL OUR INTERESTS TO CONSIDER NOW WHAT WE MIGHT DO TOGETHER TO FORESTALL COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN THE WAKE OF ANY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WHETHER SUCH VIOLENCE MIGHT ARISE SPONTANEOUSLY OR AS A RESULT OF A SCHEME BY LF EXTREMISTS AND DEFMIN SHARON. THE ONE OPTION WE DO NOT WANT

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-081 #48275
BY CIS NARA DATE 5/19/10

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PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 45031 DTG: 052045Z FEB 83 PSN: 033496

TO CONSIDER IS DISCOURAGING ISRAEL FROM LEAVING ANY AREA IT IS PREPARED TO LEAVE. WE DO WANT GEMAYEL'S BEST ESTIMATE OF LAF CAPABILITY TO FILL ANY AUTHORITY VACUUM IN THE SHUF OR ALAYH AREAS. GEMAYEL'S ADVISOR HADDAD TOLD US HERE FEB 3 THAT THE LAF WAS UP TO THE TASK BUT WE WOULD LIKE GEMAYEL'S AND EMBASSY BEIRUT'S JUDGMENTS AS WELL.

4. ONCE WE HAVE CHEYSSONS' THOUGHTS, AND THOSE OF GEMAYEL, WE WILL RAISE THE ISSUE IN LOW KEY WAY WITH THE ITALIANS HERE. THEN, WITH PHIL IN THE AREA, WE WILL MOVE THE SITE OF GOL-MNF CONTRIBUTOR DISCUSSIONS OF THE ISSUE TO BEIRUT WHERE CONSULTATION CAN MOST USEFULLY BE CARRIED OUT. DAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 1 - 508

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83//047

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA352
OO RUEADWW
DE RUFHFR #4631/01 0381234
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071231Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2673
INFO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0218
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 6021
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2600
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 7084
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2324
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 1617
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1307
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4779
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4466
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5723
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 3280

BT

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 04631

EXDIS

ROME FOR AMBASSADOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, IS, FR, US, XF

SUBJECT: AMB. HABIB'S DISCUSSION WITH FONMIN CHEYSSON

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD PRIVATE DINNER WITH FONMIN CHEYSSON ON FEB 6 IN PARIS. CHEYSSON WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT A LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON COULD LEAD TO DE FACTO PARTITION BETWEEN ZONES OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN CONTROL, LEAVING LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ISOLATED IN BEIRUT. CHEYSSON STRESSED FRENCH INTENTION TO GIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO AMIN GEMAYEL, AS INDICATED BY THEIR IMMEDIATE DISPATCH OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS. CHEYSSON WAS VERY SATISFIED TO HEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT IS STICKING FIRMLY TO THE US POSITION OF INSISTING ON COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES AND REINFORCEMENT OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. CHEYSSON AGREED TO CONFIRM DIRECTLY WITH THE SYRIANS THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE ISRAELIS. CHEYSSON WILL VISIT DAMASCUS, AMMAN AND BAGHDAD AT THE END OF THIS WEEK. END SUMMARY.

3. FONMIN CHEYSSON GAVE PRIVATE DINNER FOR HABIB

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NLRR MD7-081 *48276BY CN NARA DATE 5/19/10

48276

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SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

EVENING OF FEB. 6. ALSO PRESENT WERE QUAI SEC GEN GUTMANN, MIDEAST EXPERT DELAYE, AND EMBASSY PARIS DCM. IN INITIAL DISCUSSION OF LEBANON NEGOTIATIONS HABIB INFORMED CHEYSSON THAT USG HAD REJECTED SHARON'S PROPOSAL FOR A PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN RETURN FOR A PARTIAL SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. US WOULD ONLY ACCEPT SUCH A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IF IT WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT ON COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. NEVERTHELESS, HABIB THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT SHARON MIGHT CARRY OUT A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL UNILATERALLY, WHICH COULD LEAD TO A BLOOD-BATH AGAINST THE DRUZE IN THE SHUF. SHARON SEEMED DETERMINED TO SHOW THAT THE MNF COULD NOT ENSURE ORDER IN LEBANON, IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED ISRAELI PRESENCE. HABIB SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS DETERMINED TO STICK TO OUR INSISTENCE ON COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, AND OUR POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

4. CHEYSSON FULLY AGREED THAT A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE, AND TOOK DEEP SATISFACTION IN HABIB'S ACCOUNT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS. CHEYSSON SAID FRENCH POLICY WAS TO GIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO AMIN GEMAYEL, WHO HAD BEEN "MIRACULOUSLY ELECTED" AND WHO NEEDED TO EXPAND HIS AUTHORITY OR FACE "SARKISIZATION" (I.E. EBBING AWAY OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY). FRANCE WOULD SUPPORT ALMOST ANY POLICY OR REQUEST FROM AMIN WHICH IS WITHIN REASON. THIS WAS WHY FRANCE HAD IMMEDIATELY DISPATCHED ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO THE MNF WHEN AMIN REQUESTED THEM, EVEN THOUGH THE FRENCH DID NOT THINK THEY WERE REQUIRED. FRANCE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEND IN MORE TROOPS IF THIS WERE NECESSARY. CHEYSSON APPEARED TO BELIEVE THE US WAS ALSO SENDING ADDITIONAL TROOPS, BUT HABIB TOLD HIM THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. NEVERTHELESS, CHEYSSON STRESSED THAT SENDING OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS WAS DONE IN CONSULTATION WITH US (HERNU-WEINBERGER PHONE CONVERSATION), AND HABIB RESPONDED THAT WE VALUED AND APPLAUDED THE FRENCH ROLE.

5. CHEYSSON SAID HE WAS VERY CONCERNED THAT IF THERE WAS NO MOVEMENT SOON TOWARD WITHDRAWAL THE SITUATION COULD EVOLVE TOWARD A DE FACTO PARTITION OF LEBANON, WITH ISRAELI AND SYRIAN DOMINATION OF LARGE PORTIONS OF THE COUNTRY, AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT RESTRICTED TO BEIRUT AND A SMALL SURROUNDING AREA. THE FRENCH SAW AN "OBJECTIVE ALLIANCE" BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA IN THIS RESPECT, AND NOTED THAT ONE SENIOR SYRIAN OFFICIAL HAD SAID "THE ISRAELIS ARE NEGOTIATING FOR US. ANYTHING THEY GET WE GET TOO." CHEYSSON SAID

SENSITIVE

36
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 510

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83//047

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

IT WAS TERRIBLE FOR FRANCE TO SEE THIS COMING AND
TO BE UNABLE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. HABIB SAID THE
SYRIANS AND THE PLO WERE COMMITTED TO WITHDRAW AT THE
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#4631
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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 506

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83//047

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA353
OO RUEADWW
DE RUFHFR #4631/02 0381236
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071231Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2674
INFO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0219
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 6022
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2601
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 7085
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2325
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 1618
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1308
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4780
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4467
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5724
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 3281
BT

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 04631
SAME TIME AS THE ISRAELIS, AND THERE WAS NO REASON TO
DOUBT THIS. HE SAID CHEYSSON COULD HELP BY CONFIRMING
DIRECTLY WITH THE SYRIANS THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE ISRAELIS. CHEYSSON SAID HE
WOULD DO THIS AT THE END OF THE WEEK, WHEN HE WILL
VISIT AMMAN, DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD.

6. CHEYSSON WAS ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT IRAQ.
HE SAID HE FACED DIFFICULT DISCUSSIONS IN BAGHDAD
BECAUSE THE IRAQIS HAVE RUN OUT OF FOREIGN CURRENCY
RESERVES AND ARE UNABLE TO REPLENISH THEM BECAUSE OF
LOW OIL PRODUCTION. THEY WANT CREDIT AND THE FRENCH
WANT TO HELP THEM, BUT FRANCE ALSO HAS BALANCE-OF-
PAYMENT PROBLEMS. CHEYSSON THOUGHT THE SYRIANS WERE
WORKING WITH THE IRANIANS AGAINST IRAQ. HE CITED
THE CUTOFF OF IRAQI OIL EXPORTS THROUGH THE TRANS-
SYRIAN PIPELINE AS THE GREATEST BLOW TO IRAQ IN ITS
CONFRONTATION WITH IRAN. CHEYSSON THOUGHT THE SOVIETS
MIGHT BE BEHIND THIS, AND WAS SUSPICIOUS THAT IRAQ
MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO IMPROVE ITS RELATIONS WITH THE
USSR. THIS HAD BEEN THE ONE POINT ON WHICH TARIQ
AZIZ HAD BEEN VAGUE DURING HIS RECENT TALKS IN PARIS.
IN GENERAL, CHEYSSON FEARED THAT A LACK OF PROGRESS
COULD GIVE THE SOVIETS AN OPENING IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AND HE CITED THE INSTALLATION IN SYRIA OF SAM-5'S, MANNED BY SOVIET PERSONNEL, AS SHOWING THAT THE SOVIETS WERE DETERMINED TO PLAY A ROLE.

7. DELAYE, WHO HAD BEEN ON A SPECIAL MISSION TO LEBANON A FEW DAYS AGO AND HAD SEEN AMIN, SAID THE SITUATION OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT IMPROVING. THE LEBANESE ARMY WAS NOT BEING STRENGTHENED BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, WAS "ROTTING." CHEYSSON SAID THE ISRAELIS WERE WORKING INTENSELY AT THE VILLAGE LEVEL IN SOUTHERN LEBANON TO DEVELOP A MILITIA IN ADDITION TO HADDAD'S FORCES. THIS WAS PART OF A LONG-TERM ISRAELI PROGRAM TO DOMINATE SOUTHERN LEBANON. CHEYSSON SAID FRENCH POLICY CONTINUES TO BE TO FAVOR IN PRINCIPLE INTERNATIONAL FORCES (I.E. RELATED TO THE UN), BUT THAT WHEN SUCH FORCES CANNOT BE DEVELOPED FOR POLITICAL REASONS, AS IN THE SINAI OR BEIRUT, MULTINATIONAL FORCES ARE ALSO ACCEPTABLE. CHEYSSON THOUGHT A ROLE FOR UNIFIL IN THE SOUTH WAS DESIRABLE, AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE POSSIBLE EVEN IF SOME NEW ADJUSTMENTS TO THE UNIFIL MANDATE MIGHT BE NECESSARY.

8. THIS CABLE WAS NOT CLEARED BY AMBASSADOR HABIB.
GALBRAITH
BT
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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48277

39

PAGE 01 PARIS 4689 35464 DTG: 071643Z FEB 83 PSN: 035783
SIT995 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 038/2010Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP WHLR SIT EOB EOB SITBEMP
EOB: NTS: CHECKLIST
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTLS. ADVISE AS TO FURTHER DISSEM. BERM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #4689 0381644
O 071643Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2683
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 04689
NODIS
SECDEF PASS TO DOD/ISP FOR DR. BRYEN
E.O. 12356: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EEWT, FR
SUBJECT: US CONSULTATIONS WITH FRENCH ON MT-20
REF: (A) STATE 26922, (B) BRYEN-CARY TELCON 2/4

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SEMERIA OF FRENCH MOD CONFIRMED THAT FRENCH ARE PREPARED TO MEET WITH US TEAM ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 14. SEMERIA PROPOSED MEETING BEGIN AT 1400 WITH FRENCH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ONLY TO ALLOW DISCUSSION OF ISSUES WHICH DO NOT SPECIFICALLY INVOLVE THOMSON. HE SUGGESTED THAT MORNING MEETING ON TUESDAY, FEB 15 INCLUDE THE THOMSON SPECIALISTS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF THE AFTERNOON SESSION INCLUDING OR EXCLUDING THE THOMSON PEOPLE AS DESIRED. SEMERIA REQUESTED A LIST OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WE INTEND TO RAISE IN ADVANCE TO AVOID DELAYS AND ENSURE THAT THE FRENCH CAN PROVIDE COMPLETE INFORMATION.

3. PLEASE ADVISE NAMES, ARRIVAL TIMES AND HOTEL REQUIREMENTS OF WASHINGTON TEAM. EMBOFF CARY WILL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REPRESENT EMBASSY IN THE MEETING. GALBRAITH

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NLRR MD7-081 *48277

BY CU NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 1 - 422

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83//047

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE046
UTS2182
OO RUEHC
DE RUFHFR #4878/01 0391738
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081737Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2767
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 04878
EXDIS

S/S FOR BREMER FROM BURT
EUR FOR BLACKWILL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OGEN

SUBJECT: THEMES FOR SECRETARY'S TALK SHOW APPEARANCE
REF: STATE 034743

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO EUROPE HAS BEEN AN OUTSTANDING SUCCESS, REASSURING THE ALLIES ON THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO PURSUING SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL AND PROJECTING A SINCERE DESIRE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH OUR FRIENDS ON A CHALLENGING AND SENSITIVE ISSUE. ALTHOUGH THE VISIT IS NOT OVER (WE STILL HAVE LONDON TO GO), THE VICE PRESIDENT HAS SUCCEEDED, FOR THE TIME BEING, IN GIVING US BACK THE INITIATIVE ON INF AND NEUTRALIZING THE APPEAL OF THE ANDROPOV PROPOSALS. AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, WE ARE STILL IN THE EARLY ROUNDS OF A HEAVY-WEIGHT FIGHT THAT IS SURE TO GO 15 ROUNDS AND WE MUST NOT, AT THIS STAGE, REST ON OUR LAURELS. NEVERTHELESS, THE V.P. HAS PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT FOUNDATION FOR MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF THE YEAR OF THE MISSILE.

3. THE FOLLOWING ARE THEMES THAT THE SECRETARY COULD USE TO DISCUSS THE V.P.'S TRIP ON SUNDAY. I WILL UPDATE THEM IF NECESSARY FOLLOWING THE LONDON STOP. (BEGIN THEMES).

-
- THE BOTTOM LINE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP IS THAT THE ALLIANCE IS UNITED ON THE NECESSITY TO PURSUE BOTH TRACKS OF THE DECEMBER 1979 INF DECISION. THE V.P. FOUND COMPLETE SUPPORT FOR THE APPROACH WE ARE TAKING AT THE GENEVA TALKS AS WELL AS THE NECESSITY FOR HOLDING FIRM ON DEPLOYMENTS IN ORDER TO GIVE THE SOVIETS A

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NLRR M07-081 #48278
BY Q1 NARA DATE 5/19/10

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MAXIMUM INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY AT GENEVA.

- THE V.P.'S VISIT SERVED TWO IMPORTANT PURPOSES. FIRST, IT DEMONSTRATED OUR COMMITMENT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH OUR ALLIES ON ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY MATTERS. THE 1979, TWO-TRACK INF DECISION WAS NOT AN AMERICAN INITIATIVE, BUT AN ALLIANCE-WIDE UNDERTAKING. WHILE ONLY THE UNITED STATES IS NEGOTIATING IN A FORMAL SENSE WITH THE SOVIETS, OUR ALLIES, ESPECIALLY THE SO-CALLED BASING COUNTRIES, OBVIOUSLY HAVE AN IMPORTANT STAKE IN THE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS. THEIR VIEWS ARE IMPORTANT TO US AND I KNOW THAT THE PRESIDENT IS CAREFULLY REVIEWING THE V.P.'S TRIP REPORT.

- A SECOND PURPOSE SERVED BY THE V.P.'S MISSION WAS PUTTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COMMITMENT TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL. IN A CLEAR EFFORT TO DIVIDE THE ALLIANCE AND TO UNRAVEL THE 1979 INF DECISION, THE SOVIET UNION HAS KEPT UP A STEADY PROPAGANDA BARRANGE IN RECENT MONTHS, CLAIMING THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT INTERESTED IN PROGRESS IN GENEVA AND THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL FOR ELIMINATING AN ENTIRE CLASS OF INF MISSILES WAS SOMEHOW UNFAIR.

- THE V.P.'S TRIP, I BELIEVE, HAS SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT. THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO EUROPE, READ BY THE V.P. IN A SPEECH IN BERLIN, OFFERING A REAGAN-ANDROPOV SUMMIT TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT BANNING INF MISSILES WAS A VIVID DEMONSTRATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S DESIRE TO MOVE THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS ALONG. SO WAS THE V.P.'S DAY IN GENEVA, WHERE HE INFORMED THE SOVIET NEGOTIATORS FOR THE INF AND THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS READY TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS FROM MOSCOW.

- OF COURSE, MUCH OF THE REAL VALUE OF THE V.P.'S VISIT FLOWED FROM THE PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS THAT THE V.P. HAD WITH THE LEADERS OF GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, ITALY, BRITAIN AND FRANCE AS WELL AS THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL THE ALLIED COUNTRIES AT THE NATO COUNCIL IN BRUSSELS. OBVIOUSLY, I CANNOT DIVULGE THE DETAILS OF THESE CONVERSATIONS, BUT I CAN TELL YOU THAT THERE IS CONTINUING STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE GOAL OF ELIMINATING ALL U.S. AND SOVIET INF MISSILES AT THE GENEVA TALKS. THE LEADERS WERE ALSO AGREED THAT EXISTING SOVIET PROPOSALS AT GENEVA DO NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BECAUSE THEY WOULD LEAVE MOSCOW

SENSITIVE

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PAGE 1 - 424

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 02/16/83//047

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WITH A MONOPOLY OF INF MISSILES, AN OUTCOME WHICH WOULD
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 04878
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 EUR FOR BLACKWILL
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: OGEN
 SUBJECT: THEMES FOR SECRETARY'S TALK SHOW APPEARANCE
 CAST DOUBT ON THE U.S. SECURITY GUARANTEE TO OUR NATO
 PARTNERS.

- I THINK THAT V.P.'S TRIP HAS PUNCTURED THE MYTH
 THAT WE ARE UNCONCERNED ABOUT ARMS CONTROL OR THAT WE
 HAVE A "TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT" APPROACH IN GENEVA.
 EVERYONE HOPES THAT THE SOVIETS WILL FINALLY COME TO
 RECOGNIZE THE BENEFITS OF BANNING AN ENTIRE CLASS OF
 WEAPONS. BUT AS THE V.P. SAID IN EVERY CAPITAL HE
 VISITED, WE ARE READY TO EXPLORE SERIOUS SOVIET PROPOSALS,
 AS LONG AS THEY PROVIDE FOR EQUALITY AND VERIFIABILITY.

- ALL IN ALL, I BELIEVE THE COUNTRY HAS REAL REASON
 TO BE PROUD OF ITS VICE PRESIDENT. HE TOOK ON A
 DIFFICULT ASSIGNMENT COVERING A COMPLICATED ISSUE AND
 IN HIS OWN CLEAR AND STRAIGHT-FORWARD STYLE HAS ADDED
 IMMEASURABLY TO WESTERN UNITY. GALBRAITH

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