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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 1/3/2008

File Folder FRANCE (02/10/1983-02/26/1983)

FOIA

S2007-081

Box Number 14

NOUZILLE

58

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
48280	CABLE	100305Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	2/10/1983	B1
48281	CABLE	101901Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	7	2/10/1983	B1
48282	MEMO	BAILEY TO CLARK RE MITTERRAND'S NEW TRADE ADVISER	1	2/14/1983	B1
48292	CABLE	082347Z FEB 83 D 5/7/2011 M081/1	1	2/8/1983	B1
48283	MEMO	FORTIER TO CLARK RE CALL TO MITTERRAND R 10/1/2010 MR2007-081/1	1	2/18/1983	B1
48284	MEMO	DRAFT CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE TALKING POINTS FOR CALL TO MITTERRAND R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	ND	B1
48285	MEMO	BUSH TO THE PRESIDENT RE CALL TO MITTERRAND R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	2/15/1983	B1
48286	CABLE	161713Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	2/16/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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48287	CABLE	162020Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	2/16/1983	B1
48288	MEMO	BLAIR TO MCFARLANE RE MEETING ON FRENCH COOPERATION R 4/29/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	2/24/1983	B1
48289	CABLE	241317Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	2/24/1983	B1
48290	CABLE	241613Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	3	2/24/1983	B1
48291	CABLE	261328Z FEB 83 R 5/19/2010 NLRRM2007-081	1	2/26/1983	B1

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SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 84151 DTG: 100305Z FEB 83 PSN: 040080
SIT701 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 041/0308Z

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHC #8415/01 0410305
O 100305Z FEB 83 ZFF4
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TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1159
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8481
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 038415
NODIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EEWT, FR
SUBJECT: US CONSULTATIONS WITH FRENCH ON MT-20

REF: PARIS 4689

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PER SEMERIA'S REQUEST, THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO BE PASSED TO THE GOF FOR THE
DISCUSSIONS ON FEB. 14-15 WITH GOF AND THOMSON-CSF
OFFICIALS.

3. FOR THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT:

(1) GIVEN THE EXPORT OF THE MT-20 SYSTEM (AS MODIFIED),
IN WHAT WAY WILL THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT PROCEED IN COCOM
ON THIS EXPORT PROPOSAL? WILL A FULL RATIONALE BE
PRESENTED ON THE LIMITATIONS-ON THE SYSTEM? WILL THERE
BE SUFFICIENT CLARITY SO THAT COCOM CAN FIX LIMITS ON

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FUTURE EXPORTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS AND THEIR TECHNOLOGY? CAN
THESE LIMITS BE SPECIFIED AT THIS TIME?

(2) HOW WILL THIS EXPORT (PARTICULARLY THE TECHNOLOGY)
IMPACT ON THE CONSENSUS (SAN FRANCE) THAT HAS EMERGED ON

STORED PROGRAM CONTROL SWITCHING TECHNOLOGY IN COCOM? IN
WHAT WAYS WILL THE EQUIPMENT FOR SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACT-
URING BE HANDLED IN COCOM, AND WILL THIS NOT AFFECT THE
ALREADY AGREED ON RULES AFFECTING THE EXPORT OF SUCH
EQUIPMENT TO PROSCRIBED DESTINATIONS?

(3) WHAT STRATEGY DOES THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ENVISION
FOR PROTECTING SUCH TECHNOLOGY IN FUTURE IN THE COCOM
FRAMEWORK? WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO ANTICIPATE COOPERATION
CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDANCE OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 84151 DTG: 100305Z FEB 83 PSN: 040080

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COCOM?

(4) GIVEN THE ALREADY SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITY ON THE SOVIET SIDE FOR PRODUCING MSI SEMICONDUCTORS, WHY IS AN ADDITIONAL MANUFACTURING FACILITY NEEDED FOR THE ALUMINUM-GRILL SEMICONDUCTORS? IS IT NOT POSSIBLE TO ADAPT ANY OF THE MANY EXISTING LINES TO THE RATHER SMALL NUMBER OF ALUMINUM-GRILL DEVICES REQUIRED FOR IMPLEMENTING THE MT-20 PROGRAM?

(5) AS FOR THE COMPUTER (S), WHAT MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE U. S. S. R. BEYOND THE SEMICONDUCTOR CAPABILITY?

(6) WHAT ARE THE EXACT SPECIFICATIONS AND INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THESE COMPUTERS? WHAT IS THE ASSOCIATED SOFTWARE? WHAT PERIPHERAL EQUIPMENT (S) ARE INTENDED TO BE PROVIDED WITH THESE COMPUTERS? HOW WILL THESE ITEMS BE HANDLED IN CONNECTION WITH QUESTIONS 1 THROUGH 4 ABOVE?

(7) OVERALL, WHAT IS THE ESTIMATE OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF THE MT-20 SYSTEM ON SOVIET COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES? HOW WILL C (3) BE AUGMENTED IN THE U. S. S. R.? ON WHAT TIMETABLE? WHAT OTHER "SPIN-OFFS" ARE VISUALIZED (E. G., WILL SOVIET COMPUTER MANUFACTURING BE STRENGTHENED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND WILL THIS

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BENEFIT SOVIET MILITARY PROGRAMS)?

(8) HOW WILL THE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR THE SOVIETS BE HANDLED? WILL THESE BE MONITORING OF THIS PROGRAM? WHAT INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE GIVEN TO FRENCH TECHNICIANS? WHERE PRECISELY WILL THE TRAINING TAKE PLACE IN FRANCE? IS THERE OTHER WORK CARRIED ON AT THESE FACILITIES? WILL THE SOVIET TECHNICIANS BE ASSOCIATED EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS, OR WILL THE SOVIET TECHNICIANS BE DRAWN FROM MEP RESOURCES? IF SO, WILL

THEY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SOLVE PROBLEMS AFFECTING PRODUCTION AT MEP-FACILITIES? IS THE FRENCH SIDE AWARE OF THESE PROBLEMS?

(9) TIME PERMITTING, WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE FURTHER THE MOD ESTIMATES (AS PROVIDED) ON ACTUAL SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND DEFICIENCIES IN REGARD TO SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING.

4. FOR THOMSON-CSF:

(1) WE ARE INTERESTED IN A PRECISE GRASP OF THE ACTUAL EQUIPMENTS TO BE PROVIDED TO THE U. S. S. R. FOR SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING INCLUDING, WHERE POSSIBLE, THE SOURCE (S) OF THIS EQUIPMENT AND THE ACTUAL MODEL FOR CRITICAL ITEMS.

(2) WE WOULD LIKE A CAREFUL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CIRCUITS TO BE PROVIDED TO THE U. S. S. R. (AS WELL AS WHAT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #8415/02 0410305
O 100305Z FEB 83 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1160

WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 8482

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WILL NOT BE PROVIDED).

(3) WHAT IS THE TRAINING PROGRAM AND SCHEDULES AGREED UPON FOR THE PRODUCTION OF SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES IN THE U. S. S. R.? WILL THOMSON TECHNICIANS BE IN THE U. S. S. R. -- OVER WHAT PERIOD OF TIME AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE (S)?

(4) WE WILL ASK FOR A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE OPERATION OF THE MODIFIED MT-20 SYSTEM FOR THE U. S. S. R.

THERE WILL BE A NUMBER OF RELATED TECHNICAL QUESTIONS DERIVING FROM ITEMS NUMBERED 1--4 ABOVE.

5. US TEAM WILL BE COMPRISED OF DOD DAS STEPHEN BRYEN, CLAIRE THORNTON (US ARMY, FORT MONMOUTH) AND ONE OR TWO OTHERS. UNDERSTAND THAT RESERVATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE AT HOTEL ETAP ST-HONORE FOR BRYEN AND THORNTON. WILL ADVISE ON DETAILS REGARDING OTHER TEAM MEMBERS.

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END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 05308
EXDIS

PASS TO VICE PRESIDENT'S STAFF

E.O. 12356: DECL: CADR

TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)

SUBJECT: DRAFT MEMCON OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
- WITH FONMIN CHEYSSON - FEBRUARY 8, 1983

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS DRAFT, UNCLEARED, MEMCON
FOR APPROVAL BY THE VICE PRESIDENT'S STAFF. END
SUMMARY.

POLAND

3. WHILE THE VICE PRESIDENT, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR
GALBRAITH, HELD A BRIEF PRIVATE MEETING WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER CHEYSSON, THE TWO DELEGATIONS BEGAN A DIS-
CUSSION OF POLAND. POLITICAL DIRECTOR ANDREANI SAID
THAT EVENTS HAD NOW ENTERED A PHASE OF SLOWER DEVELOP-
MENT. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES MUST NOT DISAPPOINT THE
POLES WHO HAVE HAD FAITH IN THE WEST, BUT AT THE
SAME TIME MUST KEEP CONTACT WITH THE POLISH AUTHORITIES.
WE SHOULD MAINTAIN A STRONG POLITICAL POSITION ON THE
PRINCIPLES AT ISSUE. ANDREANI THOUGHT WE SHOULD KEEP
SOME LEVERAGE ON THE POLISH GOVERNMENT, AND NOT RESOLVE
EVERYTHING AT ONCE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT NOTED
THAT THERE WERE NEW ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION: THE POL-
ISH GOVERNMENT HAS ADOPTED A DIFFERENT TACTIC. THEY
ARE CUTTING BACK ON CONTACTS WITH THE WEST AND BLAM-
ING US FOR THE SITUATION. THE USG IS CONCERNED ABOUT
THIS TACTIC AND IS CONSIDERING HOW TO DEAL WITH IT.
ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE TO SEE WHAT POSITIVE INDUCE-
MENTS MIGHT BE OFFERED AS A CARROT. BURT WONDERED
IF THERE WERE SOME KIND OF INITIATIVE WE COULD TAKE
TOGETHER--NOT A MAJOR AID PROGRAM, BUT SOMETHING MORE
MODEST. ANDREANI THOUGHT MOST POLES PROBABLY THINK
WE HAVE LET THEM DOWN. BUT THERE ARE MANY DIFFERENT
VOICES IN POLAND, AND ONE MUST LISTEN TO THEM ALL. THE

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BY GL NARA DATE 5/19/11

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CHURCH IS AN IMPORTANT VOICE. AS FOR NEW INITIATIVES, ANDREANI THOUGHT THE CHURCH'S INITIATIVE ON PRIVATE AGRICULTURE HAD BEEN A NON-STARTER.

CSCE

4. TURNING TO THE MADRID CSCE MEETING, ANDREANI NOTED THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR A MAJOR CHANGE IN THE WESTERN POSITION. WE HAVE ALWAYS INSISTED THAT THE WHOLE PACKAGE HAD TO BE AGREED IN ORDER TO REACH A CONCLUSION. ANDREANI WAS NEVERTHELESS NOT PESSIMISTIC; THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED IN AN EARLY OUTCOME AND COULD MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS. IN BILATERAL FRENCH-SOVIET CONTACTS THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN ADAMANT THAT WESTERN DEMANDS SHOULD SIMPLY FALL AWAY. BURT MENTIONED THAT SWISS NEGOTIATOR BRUNNER WAS ONCE AGAIN TALKING ABOUT HIS PROPOSED COMPROMISE SOLUTION. ANDREANI DID NOT THINK THE MOMENT WAS FAVORABLE FOR SUCH A SOLUTION. THE SOVIETS HAD NOT SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE--THEY WANT A CONCLUSION WITHOUT THE WESTERN HUMAN RIGHTS PROPOSALS. BURT STRESSED THAT SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S.; WE HAVE TO REACH A BALANCED RESULT. ANDREANI AGREED, BUT THOUGHT THE SITUATION WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO AGREE TO THE WESTERN POSITION ON A CDE MANDATE. IF THAT WERE THE CASE THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON THE EUROPEANS TO GO ALONG, AND THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT ABOUT NEXT STEPS. ANDREANI THOUGHT THE WEST WOULD HAVE TO OBTAIN SOMETHING ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT PERHAPS NOT 100 PERCENT OF WHAT WE'RE SEEKING. WE WOULD HAVE TO ADJUST OUR POSITION.

GREEK EC PRESIDENCY

5. NSC REP BLAIR ASKED ABOUT PLANS FOR THE GREEK PRESIDENCY OF THE EC. ANDREANI IN REPLY SAID IT WAS NOT SO IMPORTANT WHO HELD THE PRESIDENCY OF THE EC. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THE CONSENSUS AMONG THE TEN. THE GREEK PRESIDENCY MIGHT BE A BIT AWKWARD, BUT THE WAY EC POLITICAL COOPERATION WORKED, IF THERE WERE NO CONSENSUS ON AN ISSUE EACH GOVERNMENT WAS MASTER OF ITS OWN POLICY.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 PARIS 05308
EXDIS
PASS TO VICE PRESIDENT'S STAFF
AFGHANISTAN

6. BURT ASKED FOR THE FRENCH ANALYSIS OF THE CORDOVA TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN. ANDREANI SAID THE FRENCH WERE VAGUELY WORRIED. THEY DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT WAS HAPPENING, BUT THOUGHT THE END RESULT COULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE SOVIETS. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE COULD BE A PARTIAL SOVIET WITHDRAWAL WHICH WOULD LEAD TO INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT.

PURPOSE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP

7. THE VICE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON, AND AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH JOINED THE GROUP AT THIS POINT. THE VICE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF HIS TRIP WAS TO EXPLAIN US POLICY ON INF AND TO ASSURE THE EUROPEANS THAT THE US IS INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATING ON ARMS CONTROL. WE WISHED TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NOTHING LEFT UNSAID BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS ON THIS ISSUE. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO MANY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND THOUGHT HE HAD A GOOD UNDERSTANDING OF EUROPEAN VIEWS. THE PURPOSE OF HIS TRIP WAS ALSO CONSULTATION, PICKING UP THE MINOR DIFFERENCES AMONG THE POSITIONS OF THE ALLIES. WE HAD CONCLUDED THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY ACTIVE IN OUR PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORTS; WE NEEDED TO GET ACROSS TO THE PUBLIC THAT WE HAVE THE MORAL VALUES ON OUR SIDE. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE FELT REASONABLY GOOD ABOUT THE TRIP SO FAR, AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS OTHER SUBJECTS.

SPAIN-NATO

8. FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON SAID HE HAD A FEW THINGS TO ADD TO THE DISCUSSION OF SPAIN WHICH HAD TAKEN

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PLACE DURING LUNCH. THE FRENCH HAD AT FIRST BEEN CONCERNED BY THE SPANISH SOCIALISTS' ATTITUDE TOWARD NATO. BUT THESE CONCERNS HAD BEEN EASED BY THE FIRST CONTACTS THE FRENCH HAD WITH THE SPANISH SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT. CHEYSSON SAID THE IMPRESSIONS HE GOT DURING HIS FIRST DISCUSSION WITH SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER FERNANDO MORAN HAD LATER BEEN CONFIRMED BY SECRETARY SHULTZ. MORAN HAD SAID WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT SPAIN DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN TWO WORLD WARS AND THAT UNDER FRANCO IT HAD BEEN CUT OFF FROM ALL CONTACT WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR. MOST SPANISH WERE VERY ANTI-COMMUNIST BUT DID NOT RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS A THREAT IN CLASSICAL MILITARY TERMS. THEY WOULD NOT AGREE WHEN WE TALK ABOUT A THREAT. MORAN HAD SAID THE SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT WOULD BE FAITHFUL TO ITS COMMITMENTS IN THE NATO TREATY BUT HAD WARNED THAT ANY "BULLYING" OF SPAIN COULD PRODUCE A SPONTANEOUS HOSTILE REACTION. MORAN HAD SAID IT WOULD TAKE TIME FOR SPAIN TO DECIDE ON ITS PRECISE STATUS IN THE ALLIANCE. THIS WOULD NOT BE FULL INTEGRATION BUT WOULD ALSO NOT BE SIMILAR TO FRANCE'S STATUS, SINCE SPAIN HAS NO NUCLEAR FORCES. CHEYSSON PREDICTED THAT THERE WOULD BE NUMEROUS DISPUTES WITH THE SPANISH SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT, BUT THERE WOULD ALSO BE COMMON ASPIRATIONS, AND THE FRENCH PLANNED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THEM. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO CONSIDER THE SPAIN-NATO RELATIONSHIP VERY DELICATE.

9. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE WAS VERY INTERESTED IN THIS ANALYSIS. WE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE FACT THAT THE SPANISH SOCIALISTS HAD MADE THE ADJUSTMENTS THEY REQUIRED AND HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON OUR BILATERAL TREATY. EARLY CONTACT BY SECRETARY SHULTZ WITH THE SOCIALISTS HAD BEEN MOST USEFUL, AND WE SAW MUCH PRAGMATISM AND REASONABLENESS IN FELIPE GONZALEZ. ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT ADDED THAT WE HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ'S VISIT. EVEN ON LATIN AMERICAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN ISSUES, GONZALEZ HAD STRUCK THE SECRETARY AS A PRAGMATIC

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 PARIS 05308
EXDIS

PASS TO VICE PRESIDENT'S STAFF
PERSON. THE PROBLEM OF SPANISH PARTICIPATION WAS
NOT A SIMPLE ONE OF BEING IN OR OUT; THE COUNTRY
NEEDED TO DEVELOP A NATIONAL CONSENSUS ON ITS ROLE
IN THE ALLIANCE. BURT NOTED THAT GONZALEZ WOULD VISIT
THE US IN JUNE.
EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

10. CHEYSSON TURNED TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO
AND EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS WHICH HAVE A BEARING
ON SECURITY. CHEYSSON SAID THERE IS ONLY ONE ORGANIZA-
TION WHICH CAN DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE: COCOM. COCOM
IS THE ONLY PLACE WHERE DECISIONS CAN BE MADE ON MATTERS
UNDER THIS HEADING; IT IS THE ONLY FORUM FRANCE CAN
ACCEPT IN THIS FUNCTION. CHEYSSON SAID HE THOUGHT THIS
WAS NOW VERY CLEAR TO U.S. OFFICIALS. FRANCE CAN ACCEPT
DISCUSSIONS IN OTHER FORA, BUT THE ONLY PERMANENT
MACHINERY FOR DECISIONS IS IN COCOM. CHEYSSON NOTED
THE PROBLEM OF RELATING JAPAN TO WORK IN THIS FIELD. THE
ONLY OTHER FORUM WHERE JAPAN IS PRESENT IS THE OECD, BUT
THE OECD CANNOT TAKE DECISIONS ON SECURITY GROUNDS.
CHEYSSON SAID HE HAD WRITTEN TO SECRETARY SHULTZ ON THIS
MATTER. THERE SHOULD BE NO FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BE-
TWEEN THESE ORGANIZATIONS. ANY ASSOCIATION OF JAPAN WITH
NATO OR BETWEEN COCOM AND NATO WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE.
EACH ORGANIZATION SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF WORK IN OTHER
ORGANIZATIONS BUT THERE SHOULD BE NO PERMANENT RELATION-
SHIP. THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING IN COCOM HAD LAID AN
EXCELLENT BASIS ON WHICH WE CAN REVIEW THE COCOM LISTS
AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE MACHINERY. CHEYSSON SAID
FRANCE ALSO AGREES TO ANOTHER HIGH LEVEL MEETING. WORK
IS PROCEEDING WELL IN COCOM. HOWEVER, IT WAS UNREASON-
ABLE TO ARGUE THAT CERTAIN TECHNOLOGY SHOULD NOT BE SOLD
TO THE USSR SIMPLY BECAUSE IT WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIETS
TO TRANSFER RESOURCES TO ANOTHER SECTOR. WE NEED BETTER

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MANAGEMENT IN COCOM, AND CAN IMPROVE THE INSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY, BUT SHOULD KEEP THE GOOD CLIMATE WHICH EXISTS THERE. BROAD DISCUSSIONS CAN TAKE PLACE IN OTHER FORA, AND THESE COULD RESULT IN ADDITIONAL DECISIONS IN COCOM.

11. THE VICE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT PREVENTING THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIETS THROUGH CONCERTED WORK IN COCOM IS A VERY HIGH PRIORITY WITH THE PRESIDENT. THERE IS A STRONG COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THIS, AND THE TOUGH LINE IS GENERALLY BACKED BY THE WHITE HOUSE. BURT ADDED THAT WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO ESTABLISH FORMAL LINKS BETWEEN JAPAN AND NATO -- WE ONLY WANT TO KEEP THE JAPANESE INFORMED, AND WANT TO WORK OUT PROCEDURES TO BRIEF THE JAPANESE. THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED IF THE FRENCH AGREED THAT THE JAPANESE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS COORDINATION. CHEYSSON REPLIED THAT THE JAPANESE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN COCOM ARRANGEMENTS BUT OTHERWISE LINKS WITH JAPAN SHOULD BE BILATERAL. CHEYSSON STRESSED THAT ANY DEFENSE-RELATED LINKS WITH JAPAN SHOULD BE BILATERAL.

U.S.-EC COMPETITION FOR AGRICULTURE SALES

12. CHEYSSON SAID THE ECONOMIC CRISIS MADE THE EC VERY SENSITIVE TO COMPETITION WITH THE U.S., ESPECIALLY IN SALES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. IN THIS CONNECTION CHEYSSON SAID THE U.S. "AGGRESSION" IN A TRADITIONAL EC MARKET IN EGYPT HAD BEEN DEEPLY RESENTED. (NOTE: CHEYSSON USED THE WORD "AGGRESSION" FIVE TIMES TO DENOTE THIS SALE TO EGYPT). THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THIS DECISION WENT FAR BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT. THE VICE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC OVER THIS ISSUE, AND HE WAS SURE THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON HEARS THE U.S. SIDE ALL THE TIME. WE ARE TRYING TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS IN THE APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL FORUMS. THE U.S. DOES NOT WANT A TRADE WAR, BUT WE HAVE SOME LEGITIMATE GRIEVANCES. WE WERE DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE GATT MINISTERIAL, AND ARE RESISTING POLITICAL PRESSURES AT HOME. WE WANT TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS BECAUSE THERE ARE MANY INEQUITIES.

13. CHEYSSON NOTED THAT THE EUROPEANS STOOD TOGETHER WHEN THEY FELT THREATENED. THEY HAD NOW HEARD THE U.S. WAS CONSIDERING A NEW "AGGRESSION" ON DAIRY PRODUCTS.

BT

#5308

NNNN

041675

CSN:HCE 0948

2

2

041/23:17Z

101901Z FEB 83

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE950

STU6067

00 RUEHC

DE RUFHFR #5308/04 0411913

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 101901Z FEB 83

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3022

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 PARIS 05308
EXDIS

PASS TO VICE PRESIDENT'S STAFF

THIS WOULD AFFECT ALL EUROPEANS AND WOULD NOT BE
SIMPLY A FRANCO-AMERICAN PROBLEM. THE VICE PRESIDENT
SAID HE UNDERSTOOD CHEYSSON'S POINT. CHEYSSON REPLIED
THAT U.S. OFFICIALS THINK THIS ISSUE CAN BE MADE INTO
A FRANCO-AMERICAN PROBLEM, BUT THEY ARE WRONG.

14. PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING INCLUDED: U.S.: THE
VICE PRESIDENT, AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH, ASSISTANT SEC-
RETARY BURT, AND MESSRS. FELDSTEIN, GREGG, BLAIR,
AND MARESCA. FRANCE: FONMIN CHEYSSON, AND FOREIGN
MINISTRY OFFICIALS ANDREANI, GERGORIN, DORIN, BROCHENIN
AND DELBOURG.

GALBRAITH

BT

#5308

NNNN

SENSITIVE

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

SMF 1/3/2008

File Folder

FRANCE (02/10/1983-02/26/1983)

FOIA

S2007-081

NOUZILLE

Box Number

14

58

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
48282	MEMO BAILEY TO CLARK RE MITTERRAND'S NEW TRADE ADVISER	1	2/14/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
48292	CABLE 082347Z FEB 83	1	2/8/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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540

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # 1012

'83 FEB 14 P2:18

'83 FEB 14 P2:17

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[]</u>	<u>T</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 14 FEB 83 15

TO CLARK

FROM BAILEY

DOCDATE 14 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

ECONOMICS

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

DOUMENG, J

SUBJECT: CABLE RE DOUMENG AS THE NEW FRENCH ADVISER ON TRADE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

ROBINSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

FEB 2 2 1983

Clark noted

12, 12, 08

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)✓

RECEIVED 16 FEB 83 13

TO PRESIDENT

FROM VICE PRESIDENT

DOCDATE 15 FEB 83

FORTIER

18 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PRES PHONE CALL TO MITTERRAND

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE:

STATUS IP FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

BLAIR

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Clark

X

2/18

Pres for info

C FEB 23 1983

Clark disapproved

DF

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

547

National Security Council The White House

Package # 90179

'83 FEB 18 A11:14

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>OBE</u>
Staff Secretary			<u>2/23</u>
Sit Room			<u>[initials]</u>
<u>Judge has decided on <u>no</u> call.</u>			
I-Information	A-Action	R-Retain	D-Dispatch
			N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

URGENT

Judge,
One possible reason not to call this afternoon is that Witterand has not responded yet to INF letter (Tal B).
Call could be attempted at about 4:00p.m. (10:00p.m. Paris) after NSPG mtg. Let me know if you are going ahead this afternoon. We will need interpreter.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

48283

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

February 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER *DF*

SUBJECT: Call to President Mitterrand

Attached are the personal talking points you requested for the President's telephone call to President Mitterrand. Obviously the President may want to say something about the Libyan situation as well, depending upon where events stand. I will work with Mannie Rubio tomorrow a.m. in making detailed arrangements for the call.

RECOMMENDATIONOKNO

—



That you send the memo at Tab I to the President

Attachment:

Tab I Talking points for President

*Let's wait until we have
read response to last
call — MK
no call.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NIR 107-0811 #48283
BY RU NARA DATE 10/1/12

18



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

48284

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Telephone Call
to President Mitterrand

You agreed recently, at the suggestion of George Bush, to make a short personal call to President Mitterrand in order to put your personal relations with him--already improving--back on a smooth track. Attached are a few suggested talking points:

- George Bush gave me a full report on his personal meeting with you. I think we are in full accord on the need to stand firmly by our decision to deploy the Pershings and GLCMs.
- I appreciate your giving George so much of your time. He said the lunch was enjoyed by all.
- As I said in my letter, your speech to the Bundestag was superb and an act of high statesmanship.
- I'm looking forward to seeing you in Williamsburg.

Prepared by
Donald R. Fortier

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 107-081-48284
BY CW NARA DATE 4/29/10

**National Security Council
The White House**

545 II
Package # 90179

1400P
FEB 1 5 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>FORTIER/BAIR</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Please work with State & Tyson
to get a time for this call Thurs or
Fri. Protect first P of VP's memo.
Prepare telephone memo for Pres.
J

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

February 15, 1983

22
48285

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Phone Call to President MitterandOK
let it
RR

On my trip Foreign Minister Cheysson conveyed to me his concern about the strained personal relationship between you and President Mitterand.

I have discussed this with George Shultz. He suggested that you call Mitterand briefly to thank him for his courtesy to me on my recent trip. Bill Clark concurs, reminding me that you already wrote Mitterand congratulating him on his speech to the Bundestag.


I believe a phone call this week would help. Suggested talking points:

George Bush came back and reported on his personal meeting with you. I think we are in full accord on the need to firmly stand by our decision to deploy the Pershings and GLCM's.

I appreciate your giving him so much of your time. He said the lunch was enjoyed by all.

I'm looking forward to seeing you at Williamsburg.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 107-081-748285
BY CN NARA DATE 4/29/10
GEORGE BUSH

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

23

PAGE 01 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 1240
SIT813 AN007705

DTG: 161713Z FEB 83 PSN: 049035
TOR: 047/1558Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP MR SIT /004

OP IMMED
DE WTE #1240 0471558
O 161713Z FEB 83
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

48286
DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M07-081 #48286
BY Cid NARA DATE 5/15/10

TO THE ELYSEE PALACE, PARIS

~~SECRET~~ VIA BLUE CHANNELS WH01240

FEBRUARY 16, 1983

DEAR FRANCOIS:

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH HAS BRIEFED ME ON HIS RECENT MEETING WITH YOU. HE AND I ARE MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE WARM RECEPTION YOU GAVE HIM AND THE CANDID INSIGHTS YOU PROVIDED ON A NUMBER OF MATTERS, PARTICULARLY INF.

WITH RESPECT TO INF, I WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE IN A WAY WHICH WILL BE MOST HELPFUL TO YOU IN SUSTAINING THE INF DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE AND THEREBY PROVIDING THE INCENTIVES NEEDED TO REACH AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT. BASED UPON THE VIEWS EXPRESSED TO THE VICE PRESIDENT, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT OUR CURRENT POSITION -- ONE OF COMMITMENT TO ZERO-ZERO AS THE OPTIMAL AND MOST MORAL OUTCOME -- BUTTRESSED BY CLEAR OPENNESS TO CONSIDER ANY REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE, IS AS FAR AS WE SHOULD GO AT THIS TIME. IN THE CONTEXT OF REAFFIRMING OUR COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH, IT OCCURS TO ME THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR ME TO PUT ON THE PUBLIC RECORD A MORE PRECISE STATEMENT OF THE CRITERIA WE ARE FOLLOWING IN THE TALKS. I WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO THIS IN PUBLIC REMARKS NOW SCHEDULED FOR NEXT TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22.

~~SECRET~~

B

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

24

PAGE 02 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 1240

DTG: 161713Z FEB 83 PSN: 049035

AT THAT TIME I MIGHT SAY THAT THE U.S. IS SETTING FORTH IN GENEVA CERTAIN PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES WHICH MUST SHAPE ANY OUTCOME. THESE CRITERIA INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

- (A) EQUAL RIGHTS AND LIMITS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION.
- (B) BILATERAL LIMITS WITHOUT COMPENSATION FOR THIRD COUNTRY SYSTEMS.
- (C) APPLICATION OF LIMITS TO INF MISSILES REGARDLESS OF LOCATION (AS A COROLLARY, NO EXPORT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY PROBLEM TO THE FAR EAST).
- (D) NO LIMITS THAT WOULD RESULT IN WEAKENING THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE.
- (E) VERIFIABILITY OF TREATY PROVISIONS.

MY REMARKS COULD CONCLUDE WITH A PARAGRAPH SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING:

THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THE STRONG ALLIED SUPPORT FOR THE PROFOUND MORAL OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING THE ENTIRE CATEGORY OF LONG-RANGE LAND-BASED NUCLEAR MISSILES. THE VICE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED TO THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE MY READINESS TO MEET WITH GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE THIS HISTORIC GOAL. HE ALSO REAFFIRMED OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY ANY REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE IDEA FOR PRODUCING THE SAME RESULT. THAT IS OUR PLEDGE, AND I HAVE REINFORCED TO MY NEGOTIATOR, AMBASSADOR NITZE, MY INSTRUCTIONS TO RENEW HIS EFFORTS TOWARD THIS END.

I WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR VIEWS ON THE VALUE OF SUCH A PUBLIC STATEMENT. I WILL VERY CAREFULLY CONSIDER YOUR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

25

PAGE 03 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 1240

DTG: 161713Z FEB 83 PSN: 049035

COMMENTS AS WELL AS THOSE OF OTHERS VISITED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT.

IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO ME TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS IF POSSIBLE
THIS WEEK.

SINCERELY
RON

0534

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

26

48287

PAGE 01 PARIS 6070 20464 DTG: 162020Z FEB 83 PSN: 049416
SIT984 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 047/2237Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB EOBTBEMP
EOB: NTS: CHECKLIST
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTLS. ADVISE AS TO FURTHER DISSEM. BERM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUFHFR #6070 0472020
R 162020Z FEB 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3355

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 06070

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 2/16/89

TAGS: PREL, FR, AO

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON PENNE'S ANGOLA VISIT

REF: (A) PARIS 3858 (B) PARIS 3942

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN VIEW OF PENNE'S COMMENTS REPORTED IN REFTELS REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF SOMETHING FURTHER FOR US ON ANGOLA, EMBOFF CONTACTED HIM FEBRUARY 16. PENNE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NOTHING NEW FROM THE ANGOLANS, AND DID NOT VOLUNTEER ANYTHING MORE. WHATEVER IT WAS THAT HE HAD TO SEEK THE PRESIDENT'S OKAY TO SHARE WITH US, PRESUMABLY HE DID NOT GET IT. GALBRAITH

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD7-081 #48287

BY AN NARA DATE 5/19/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUMSECRET**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**INFORMATION

February 24, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR BUD MCFARLANE

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR

SUBJECT: This Afternoon's Meeting on the French Strategic Cooperation Program

Fred Ikle called me a few minutes ago concerning this afternoon's meeting. He says a full meeting is not required; a conference phone call among you, Eagleburger and Ikle would be sufficient. He said that the meeting with Martre would be another "technical" meeting and would not get into any policy issues. As an alternative, he proposed that you, he and Eagleburger "go into Bud's office for five minutes" at the conclusion of the 1:00 p.m. meeting that you all will be attending in the Sit Room.

The format of this meeting is your call, but I would recommend that we hold it as scheduled in order to reach a common, recorded policy on this program. Too many times in the past different accounts of phone conversations have sent different parts of this government running in different directions.

DECLASSIFIEDNLRR MO7-081 #48288BY CU NARA DATE 4/29/10SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

National Security ~~Council~~
The White House

1230p

Package # 1252

FEB 2 4 1983

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u> </u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u> </u>	<u>RCM HAS SEEN</u>	<u> </u>
Jacque Hill	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Judge Clark	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
John Poindexter	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Staff Secretary	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Sit Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Spec Def Poindexter

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8301252

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 24 FEB 83 18

TO MCFARLANE

FROM BLAIR

DOC DATE 24 FEB 83

sim
1/3/08

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

DEFENSE POLICY

EAGLEBURGER, L

IKLE, F

SUBJECT: ORGANIZATION OF FEB 24 MTG RE FRENCH STRATEGIC COOPERATION PROGRAM

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C

3/10

Noted by McFarlane

DB

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA (C)

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

30

48289

PAGE 01 PARIS 6959 46556 DTG: 241317Z FEB 83 PSN: 060952
SIT830 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 055/1834Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB SIGR NORT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST COMBINED WITH VALLETTA 0424

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE

DE RUHFR #6959 0551317

R 241317Z FEB 83

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3837

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2624

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0238

USINT BAGHDAD 1631

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2340

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1329

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5714

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5751

BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 06959

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, FR, UR

SUBJECT: CHEYSSON'S VISITS TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND MOSCOW

REF: PARIS 6362

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTS PREVIOUS REPORTING ON CHEYSSON'S VISIT TO AMMAN, BAGHDAD AND DAMASCUS AND ON THE MIDDLE EAST ASPECT OF HIS TALKS IN MOSCOW. THE INFORMATION COMES FROM THE MEMBER OF CHEYSSON'S CABINET RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, BRUNO DELAYE (PROTECT).

3. JORDAN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ACCORDING TO DELAYE, THERE WAS NEVER ANY MISUNDERSTANDING OF HUSSEIN'S PRESENTATION TO CHEYSSON (AMMAN 1427) REGARDING LINKAGE BETWEEN FINAL TIMETABLE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THE KING'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WAS READY TO PROCEED WITH NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. DELAYE SAID THAT THIS LINKAGE IDEA WAS A PET THEORY OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR. HE (OR IN THIS CASE HIS DCM) WAS PROBABLY SENDING UP A TRIAL BALLOON TO ASCERTAIN OUR REACTION.

4. DELAYE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE HOPE THAT HUSSEIN WILL ANNOUNCE, AT THE END OF MARCH, HIS WILLINGNESS TO GO TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH ISRAEL, PROVIDED OF COURSE THE PLO AGREES. (NOTE: THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT THE PNC

HAS GIVEN ARAFAT SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY ON THIS SCORE BUT ARE HOLDING FINAL JUDGMENT UNTIL THEY HEAR DIRECTLY FROM PLO PARTICIPANTS IN THE ALGIERS MEETING WHO ARE EXPECTED SHORTLY IN PARIS TO BRIEF THEM.) AFTER THE KING'S ANNOUNCEMENT, THE PLO WOULD EITHER STATE ITS AGREEMENT OR SIMPLY REMAIN SILENT. DELAYE COMMENTED THAT IT WOULD BE A NICE ADDITION TO THIS SCENARIO IF WE COULD ANNOUNCE THEN THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES WILL BE OUT OF LEBANON IN THE WEEK TO FOLLOW.

5. SYRIA

IN HIS MEETING WITH CHEYSSON, PRESIDENT ASSAD HAD TAKEN WHAT MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS LOFTY POSITIONS. IT WAS FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM WHO TALKED MORE BLUNTLY. KHADDAM WAS EMPHATIC IN EXPRESSING SYRIAN OPPOSITION TO JORDAN ENGAGING IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND IN ITS DETERMINATION TO THWART THAT. KHADDAM MADE WHAT THE FRENCH BELIEVE WAS A NOT-TOO-VEILED THREAT. KHADDAM SAID THAT IF SYRIAN HAD A COMMON BORDER WITH EGYPT, THEY WOULD HAVE INVADDED WHEN SADAT WENT TO CAMP DAVID.

6. FRENCH EFFORTS TO GET SYRIA TO REOPEN THE PIPELINE FROM IRAQ AND TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THAT COUNTRY BROUGHT FORTH A LITANY OF THE OFFENSES THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD COMMITTED AGAINST SYRIA. NOTHING WILL IMPROVE UNTIL HE IS GONE FROM THE SCENE. THE SYRIANS TOLD THE FRENCH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT IT WAS ONLY BECAUSE IRAQ AND SYRIA ARE ARAB BROTHERS THAT SYRIA HAS LIMITED ITS ACTIONS TO ECONOMIC MEASURES.

7. IRAQ

ADMITTING TOTAL FAILURE ON THE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS WITH IRAQ (BAGHDAD 468), DELAYE WOULD NOT PLAY THE ENTIRE VISIT IN THAT WAY. FRANCE REMAINS COMMITTED TO HELP IRAQ. THE FRENCH ARE NEVERTHELESS CONCERNED BY IRAQ'S CLOSENESS TO THE SOVIETS. DELAYE URGED THE U.S. TO DO MORE IN IRAQ.

8. MOSCOW

ON LEBANON, THE SOVIETS TOLD CHEYSSON THAT THE U.S. WAS INTERESTED IN THE MNF AS A MEANS OF KEEPING U.S. TROOPS STATIONED THERE. THIS, THE SOVIETS SAY, THEY CANNOT ACCEPT. LIKE THE FRENCH, THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED IN IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAQ. CLEARLY, THEY ARE ALSO BOTHERED BY RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN. CHEYSSON NOTED A MUCH FIRMER ANTI-IRANIAN TONE IN GROMYKO'S REMARKS THAN IN PREVIOUS ENCOUNTERS.

GALBRAITH

PARIS 6959

46556

DTG: 241317Z FEB 83 PSN: 060952

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

48290 31

PAGE 01 PARIS 6985 04796 DTG: 241613Z FEB 83 PSN: 059907
SIT648 DATE 03/06/83 TOR: 055/1700Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLSS EOBHLR JP VP SIT EOB SIGR NORT
EOB:

WNSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST COMBINED WITH VALLETTA 0424

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUFHFR #6985/01 0551615
O 241613Z FEB 83
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3872

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5716
NATO COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA 1010
BT

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 06985
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, FR, UR
SUBJECT: MORE ON CHEYSSON VISIT TO MOSCOW
REFS: (A) PARIS 6867, (B) MOSCOW 2190 (NOTAL)

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. QUAI EUROPEAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR DUFOURCQ BRIEFED POLCOUNS ON CHEYSSON VISIT TO MOSCOW ON FEBRUARY 23 ALONG LINES OF BRIEFING VERNIER-PALLIEZ WOULD BE PROVIDING IN WASHINGTON. HE ALSO NOTED THAT CHEYSSON HAD SENT A LETTER TO SECRETARY SHULTZ.

3. SINCE BRIEFING COVERED ESSENTIALLY THE SAME GROUND AS ACCOUNTS REFTEL, WE NOTE ONLY FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS:

-- MIDDLE EAST. AS IN THE PAST, GROMYKO'S PRESENTATION STRESSED AS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET POSITION, NOT ONLY SELF-DETERMINATION FOR PALESTINIANS, BUT ALSO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST, A POINT WHICH GROMYKO SAID SOVIETS ALWAYS MADE IN ALL THEIR DISCUSSIONS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITH ARABS. ON PEACE PROCESS, FRENCH HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT SOVIETS WERE ASKING THEMSELVES WHAT THE JORDANIANS WOULD DO.

-- LEBANON. THE SOVIETS BLAMED SITUATION ENTIRELY ON ISRAEL, WHO IN SOVIET VIEW WERE ACTING FOR U.S. THEY STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE U.S. TROOP PRESENCE AND MAINTAINED THAT U.S. WISHED TO MAINTAIN ITS MILITARY PRESENCE THERE. IN GENERAL, HARSH CRITICISM OF THE U.S. WAS A THEME THROUGHOUT ALL DISCUSSIONS.

-- IRAN-IRAQ. IN FRENCH VIEW, SOVIETS APPEARED TO BE MOVING TOWARDS SOME DEGREE OF RAPPROCHEMENT WITH IRAQ. THEY DID NOT WISH TO SEE IRAQ OVERWHELMED BY IRAN AND HAD AGREED TO SOME LIMITED ARMS SHIPMENTS. THEY WISHED TO END THE HOSTILITY BETWEEN IRAQ AND SYRIA BUT WERE AT A LOSS AS TO HOW THIS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED.

4. AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS HAD INITIATED DISCUSSION ON THIS ISSUE, OBVIOUSLY ANTICIPATING THAT THE FRENCH WOULD RAISE IT. THEIR PRESENTATION WAS A REPETITION OF STANDARD SOVIET POSITIONS: I.E., AN END TO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE WAS A PREREQUISITE FOR ANY SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL. THEY HAD EXPRESSED SOME INTEREST IN CORDOVEZ MISSION AND SAID IT WAS NOT NECESSARY THAT IRAN BE PARTY TO AN INITIAL ACCORD WHICH COULD BE LIMITED TO AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN.

5. INF. DUFOURCQ GAVE A PERFUNCTORY ACCOUNT OF INF DISCUSSIONS, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS A "DIALOGUE OF THE DEAF." THE SOVIETS HAD HARPED ON THEIR FAVORITE THEMES: U.S. SYSTEMS COULD REACH THE SOVIET UNION IN SEVEN MINUTES, NATO ALLIES SHOULD BE TREATED AS A UNIT, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT DISMANTLE ITS SYSTEMS IN SUCH A FASHION THAT THE WEST (THE U.S. PLUS FRANCE AND BRITAIN) HAD SUPERIORITY, ETC. BOTH ANDROPOV AND GROMYKO HAD OFFERED A "CONCRETE WALL" OF ARGUMENTATION WHICH WAS IMPERVIOUS TO FRENCH PRESENTATIONS. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, DUFOURCQ SAID THE SOVIETS HAD NOT REACTED TO CHEYSSON'S REITERATION OF THE STANDARD FRENCH POSITION ON EVENTUAL FRENCH PARTICIPATION ON STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS FOLLOWING MAJOR REDUCTIONS BY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. IN GENERAL, HE SAID, THE SOVIETS HAD SHOWN LITTLE INTEREST IN START.

6. CSCE. IN FRENCH VIEW, SOVIETS HAD SOME INTEREST IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ACHIEVING RESULTS IN MADRID, ALTHOUGH THIS APPEARED TO BE BASED AS MUCH ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MADRID AS ON THE DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW. SOVIETS HAD HELD TO THEIR POSITIONS ON THE NECESSITY OF NOTIFYING NAVAL MANEUVERS. THEY HAD SIMILARLY SHOWN NO FLEXIBILITY ON THE ISSUE OF WESTERN AMENDMENTS. CHEYSSON HAD MENTIONED TRADE UNIONS AND JOURNALISTS IN HIS TOAST, AND THE FRENCH SAW SOME SIGNIFICANCE IN THE FACT THAT THE PRAVDA ACCOUNT OF THE TOAST HAD NOT OMITTED THESE REFERENCES. SIMILARLY, WHILE CHEYSSON'S REMARKS ON POLAND HAD BEEN DELETED, THOSE ON AFGHANISTAN HAD NOT. FRENCH ALSO FOUND IT A PROMISING SIGN THAT SOVIETS WERE NOW SHOWING SIGNS OF WILLINGNESS AT LEAST TO DISCUSS WESTERN AMENDMENTS AT MADRID.

7. NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE. FRENCH HAD RAISED THE ISSUE. SOVIETS HAD NOT SHOWN MUCH ENTHUSIASM, BUT FRENCH THOUGHT FOR THE FIRST TIME THEY DETECTED SOME SIGNS OF INTEREST, POSSIBLY EMANATING FROM IMEMO AND ARBATOV CIRCLES.

PARIS 6985 04796 DTG: 241613Z FEB 83 PSN: 059907

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BY CS NARA DATE 5/15/00

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32

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8. NON-AGGRESSION TREATY. FRENCH WERE STRUCK BY GROMYKO'S FAILURE TO MENTION NON-AGGRESSION TREATIES IN ANY WAY, SHAPE OR FORM IN NEARLY NINE HOURS OF DISCUSSION.

9. ATMOSPHERICS. ARRANGEMENTS WERE FIRST RATE IN EVERY RESPECT, WHETHER FOR SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS, CHEYSSON'S TRIP TO LENINGRAD, OR MME. CHEYSSON'S SCHEDULE. SOVIETS HAD BEEN MUCH EASIER TO DEAL WITH THAN UNDER BREZHNEV. WHEN FRENCH SAID THEY DID NOT WANT A COMMUNIQUE, SOVIETS HAD NOT INSISTED AND HAD NOT EVEN HELD OUT FOR A PRESS STATEMENT ON THE VISIT.

10. CHEYSSON HAD FOUND ANDROPOV VERY IMPRESSIVE. HIS PRESENTATIONS DEMONSTRATED A HIGHLY LOGICAL MIND COUPLED WITH GREAT FIRMNESS. PHYSICALLY, HE SHOWED HIS AGE. HOWEVER, GROMYKO, IN CONTRAST, WAS IN TOP FORM.

11. WE ADD TO THE FOREGOING CHEYSSON'S OWN ACCOUNT OF HIS MEETING WITH ANDROPOV WHICH HE GAVE TO THE PRESS ON HIS RETURN JOURNEY. (PORTIONS HAVE BEEN CARRIED BY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WIRE SERVICES):

-- ANDROPOV: UNEMOTIONAL AND UNROMANTIC. HIS PRESENTATIONS WERE SOBER AND PRECISE. HE STICKS TO THE FACTS AND A "MATHEMATICAL" LOGIC. "I FELT AS THOUGH I WERE FACING COUVE DE MURVILLE BEFORE THE PARLIAMENTARY FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE."

-- INF: ANDROPOV SHOWED NO INTEREST IN FRENCH ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FRENCH DETERRENT. CHEYSSON POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET LOGIC WOULD PUSH FRENCH TOWARDS GREATER INTEGRATION WITHIN NATO, TO WHICH ANDROPOV DID NOT REPLY.

-- SUMMIT: NOT EXCLUDED, BUT NOTHING ENVISAGED FOR PRESENT. SUCCESSFUL CHEYSSON VISIT HAD IN ONE SENSE BROUGHT IT CLOSER, BUT NOTHING WAS DEFINITE OR "IMAGINABLE" FOR THE TIME BEING.

-- U.S.: REAL DISCUSSION WAS TAKING PLACE OVER FRENCH

HEADS AND WAS AIMED AT NATO COUNTRIES AS A WHOLE AND IN PARTICULAR THE UNITED STATES, "THE ONLY INTERLOCUTOR THAT MATTERS."

12. COMMENT. CHEYSSON'S LAST REMARK STRIKES US AS A REVEALING COMMENT. ALONG THE SAME LINES, A RECURRENT THEME IN RECENT PRESS AND OTHER COMMENTARY ON FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS HAS BEEN THE RECOGNITION THAT, WITHIN EUROPE, THE FRG IS A MORE IMPORTANT INTERLOCUTOR FOR THE SOVIET UNION AT THIS JUNCTURE THAN FRANCE AND THAT SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE WILL, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HINGE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMANY.

13. IN SUM, THE FRENCH APPEAR TO BE GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH THE VISIT. THERE WAS NO MEETING OF MINDS ON THE MAJOR ISSUES, BUT NONE WAS EXPECTED. THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE VISIT--A RESUMPTION OF HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE--WAS ACHIEVED. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS AN UNDERLYING RECOGNITION THAT FOR THE SOVIETS THE DIALOGUE WITH PARIS, THOUGH WELCOME AND USEFUL, IS SOMEWHAT MARGINAL AT THIS TIME--CERTAINLY LESS IMPORTANT THAN AT AN EARLIER PERIOD.
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33

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PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 38516716 DTG: 261836Z FEB 83 PSN: 063681
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HE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT SOCIAL CONTACTS WE HAVE
PROPOSED ARE LIMITS OF OUR FLEXIBILITY, AND THEY WILL
BE ARRANGED ONLY IF GOF OTHERWISE AVOIDS MAKING PUBLIC
ISSUE OF LE PORS TREATMENT IN US. DAM

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TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 2025

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CVIS, FR, US
SUBJECT: LE PORS VISIT

REF: PARIS 7354

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE REGRET GOF HAS CHOSEN TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF LE PORS
RECEPTION IN WASHINGTON. NEVERTHELESS WE SHARE
DESIRE OF GOF NOT TO ADD ANOTHER PROBLEM TO AN ALREADY
CROWDED BILATERAL AGENDA, AND WE BELIEVE COMPROMISE
SIMILAR TO THAT SUGGESTED BY GUTTMAN MAY PROVIDE WAY OUT.

3. EMBASSY IS THEREFORE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM GUTTMAN
THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH GOF TO MINIMIZE
NEGATIVE FALLOUT FROM LE PORS VISIT. WHILE WE
REMAIN UNWILLING TO ARRANGE ANY OFFICE MEETINGS
BETWEEN US OFFICIALS AND LE PORS, WE ARE PREPARED TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AGREE TO SOCIAL CONTACTS BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK.
IF FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON OFFERS DINNER OR
LUNCH FOR LE PORS AND INVITES HIS COUNTERPART FROM
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT (SUCCESSOR AGENCY TO
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) WE WILL ENDEAVOR TO SEE THAT
AN APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL ATTENDS. (FYI. OUR INTENTION

WOULD BE TO HAVE SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE DIRECTOR OF
OPM ATTEND.) IF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN NEW YORK
HAS A SOCIAL FUNCTION, AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK WOULD
AGREE TO ATTEND.

4. IN INFORMING GUTTMAN OF POSITION OUTLINED ABOVE
EMBASSY SHOULD EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR HIS EFFORTS
TO AVOID CONFRONTATION. FACT THAT WE ARE WILLING TO
COMPROMISE DEMONSTRATES WE SHARE HIS GOAL. NEVERTHELESS

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PAGE 01 PARIS 7354 16716 DTG: 261328Z FEB 83 PSN: 063364
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CVIS, FR, US
SUBJECT: LE PORS VISIT
REF: STATE 51660

1. ~~C~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. QUAI SECGEN GUTMANN CONVOKED DCM FEB 26 TO DELIVER "VIGOROUS PROTEST" AGAINST INDICATIONS RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON (REFTEL) THAT A MEMBER OF DEMOCRATICALLY CHOSEN GOF (LE PORS) COULD NOT BE RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON. GUTMANN STRESSED GRAVITY OF THIS PROSPECT AND WARNED THAT IF IT WERE CONFIRMED THAT LE PORS WOULD NOT BE RECEIVED, GOF WOULD BE OBLIGED TO MAKE A STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE MATTER, WHICH FRENCH CONSIDER TO CALL IN-TO QUESTION FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY. GOF WOULD HAVE TO STATE THAT THEY CONSIDER US POSITION AN INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL FRENCH AFFAIRS, WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE AT THIS TIME (HEADLINE IN INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE THIS MORNING IS ON KOHL'S PROTEST OF SOVIET INTERFERENCE IN FRG ELECTION CAMPAIGN). IN ADDITION, GUTMANN SAID, GOF WOULD HAVE TO LOOK FOR AN OCCASION IN THE COMING MONTHS TO REFUSE TO RECEIVE A US CABINET MINISTER, A STEP THEY WOULD PREFER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO AVOID.

3. DCM WENT THROUGH HISTORY OF US POSITION ON COMMUNISTS IN ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, AND ON ATTITUDE TOWARD COMMUNISTS IN PRESENT GOF. DCM ALSO EXPLAINED US VISA LAWS AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF US ATTITUDES ON THIS MATTER. DCM NOTED PARTICULARLY THAT LE PORS VISIT HAD EVIDENTLY BEEN UNDER PREPARATION FOR SOME MONTHS, SINCE SUCH A SERIES OF UNIVERSITY LECTURES COULD NOT BE ARRANGED ON SHORT NOTICE. YET THE FIRST INFORMATION WE HAD RECEIVED ON THE VISIT WAS WHEN FRENCH EMBASSY HAD NOTIFIED THE DEPARTMENT. THIS OCCURRED ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH A STATEMENT BY THE QUAI TO THE PRESS INCLUDING AN ASSERTION THAT LE PORS WOULD SEE US OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON. DCM POINTED OUT THAT US POLICY ON COMMUNISTS WAS WELL KNOWN AND AN ADVANCE INFORMAL CONTACT ON THIS MATTER

COULD HAVE AVOIDED SOME DIFFICULTY. NOW QUESTIONS OF PRINCIPLE WERE AT STAKE.

4. GUTMANN, SPEAKING PERSONALLY (PROTECT CAREFULLY) SAID HE WISHED ABOVE ALL TO AVOID A PUBLIC INCIDENT WHICH WOULD POISON THE ATMOSPHERE OF US-FRENCH RELATIONS. HE WONDERED WHETHER A SOLUTION MIGHT BE FOUND WHICH WOULD PRESERVE PRINCIPLES ON BOTH SIDES. IN THINKING ALOUD ABOUT THIS POSSIBILITY, GUTMANN NOTED THAT LE PORS WISHED TO SEE HIS OPPOSITE NUMBER (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN) IN WASHINGTON, AND AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK IN NEW YORK. HE NOTED THAT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN IS NOT A CABINET MEMBER. HE ALSO HINTED THAT SOMETIMES AN OFFICIAL IS NOT AVAILABLE ON A CERTAIN DAY, AND A VISITOR HAS TO SEE A SUBSTITUTE. "WE UNDERSTAND THAT." GUTMANN ALSO SPECULATED THAT PERHAPS FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO UN COULD GIVE A DINNER TO WHICH AMB. KIRKPATRICK AND OTHER UN AMBASSADORS WOULD BE INVITED. GUTMANN STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT IN CURRENT ELECTORAL PERIOD HE WOULD NEED SOME INDICATIONS QUICKLY TO AVOID GOING PUBLIC AS INDICATED ABOVE. ELYSEE HAS ALREADY EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN OVER THE ISSUE. AT GUTMANN'S REQUEST, DCM AGREED TO BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH GUTMANN ON MONDAY, FEB. 28, TO SEE WHERE THINGS STAND.

5. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION: WE BELIEVE GUTMANN'S BROAD HINTS ARE AIMED AT FINDING A FACE-SAVING FORMULA, SUCH AS A DINNER AS SUGGESTED IN NEW YORK PLUS A MEETING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

(PERHAPS IN A SOCIAL SETTING LIKE THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR'S DINNER IN WASHINGTON) WITH A SUBSTITUTE FOR CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN, WHO MIGHT BE UNAVAILABLE ON THAT DATE. WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT PROPOSE A CHANGE IN USG POLICY AS LAID OUT IN REFTEL, WITH WHICH WE AGREE. HOWEVER, IF WE CAN AVOID A PUBLIC SPAT OVER THIS INCIDENT THROUGH A MINIMAL FACE-SAVING FORMULA, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WORTH THE EFFORT AT A TIME WHEN OUR CIRCUITS WITH THE FRENCH ARE HEAVILY LOADED WITH OTHER ISSUES. WE RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT REVIEW THIS MATTER URGENTLY AND PROVIDE US WITH NEW GUIDANCE BY 000 ON MONDAY, FEB 28, IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE THE FURTHER STEPS GUTMANN HAS FORESEEN. A FORMULA BASED ON TWO DINNERS ATTENDED BY US OFFICIALS APPEARS ACCEPTABLE TO US.

6. REQUEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT REFTEL TO USUN. GALBRAITH

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